

Document: PBAS 2017/7/W.P.2/Rev.1  
Agenda: 3  
Date: 5 July 2017  
Distribution: Restricted  
Original: English

**E**



Investing in rural people

## **PBAS formula enhancements**

### **Note to PBAS Working Group members**

#### Focal points:

#### Technical questions:

##### **Périn Saint-Ange**

Associate Vice-President  
Programme Management Department  
Tel. +39 06 5459 2448  
e-mail: p.saintange@ifad.org

##### **Lisandro Martin**

Chief  
Operational Programming and Effectiveness Unit  
Tel.: +39 06 5459 2388  
e-mail: lisandro.martin@ifad.org

#### Dispatch of documentation:

##### **William Skinner**

Chief  
Governing Bodies  
Tel.: +39 06 5459 2974  
e-mail: gb@ifad.org

Working Group on the Performance-Based Allocation System —  
Seventh Meeting

Rome, 11 July 2017

---

**For: Review**

Document: EB 2017/121/R.  
Agenda: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date: 2017  
Distribution: Public  
Original: English

**E**



## **PBAS formula enhancements**

### **Note to Executive Board representatives**

#### Focal points:

#### Technical questions:

**Périn Saint-Ange**  
Associate Vice-President  
Programme Management Department  
Tel. +39 06 5459 2448  
e-mail: p.saintange@ifad.org

**Lisandro Martin**  
Chief  
Operational Programming and Effectiveness Unit  
Tel.: +39 06 5459 2388  
e-mail: lisandro.martin@ifad.org

#### Dispatch of documentation:

**William Skinner**  
Chief  
Governing Bodies  
Tel.: +39 06 5459 2974  
e-mail: gb@ifad.org

Executive Board —121<sup>st</sup> Session  
Rome, 13-14 September 2017

---

**For: Approval**

## Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Abbreviations and acronyms</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Background</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>I. Enhancements to the PBAS</b>	<b>2</b>
A. Concept	2
B. Assessment	2
<b>II. Policy Relevance</b>	<b>3</b>
A. More stringent country selectivity	3
B. Focusing on the poorest countries	4
<b>III. Features</b>	<b>4</b>
A. Balancing the needs and performance components	4
B. Macrostability and microsensitivity	5
C. Enhanced elasticity for key variables	9
<b>IV. The formula</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>V. Moving forward</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Annexes</b>	
Annex I: Portfolio performance and disbursement (PAD) variable	14
Annex II: Countries with most fragile situations (MFS) and the revised PBAS formula	17
Annex III: Rural Population in the PBAS formula	19
Annex IV: Sensitivity analysis	21
Annex V: Finalizing enhancements to the PBAS management process	22
Annex VI: Alternative scenarios considered in the analysis	25
<b>Appendices</b>	
Appendix I: The enhanced Rural Sector Performance Assessment (currently being finalized)	31
Appendix II: Adjusted scenario 3: country scores and annual allocations 2016-2018	32

### **Acknowledgements**

This paper has been produced under the coordination of Soledad Marco, Operational Programming and Effectiveness Unit (OPE). The data and analysis underpinning the paper have been coordinated by Amine Zarroug (OPE) with the support of Laura Carnevali (OPE). Natalia Toschi (OPE) provided substantial inputs. We are grateful to Lauren Phillips, Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA), for her leadership in finalizing the proposal for a revised Rural Sector Performance Assessment. Sara Fornabaio (OPE) provided analytical support to the team. Valeri Vicari provided editorial support.

## Abbreviations and acronyms

CLE	corporate-level evaluation
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
GNIPc	gross national income per capita
IVI	IFAD Vulnerability Index
LIC	low-income country
LMIC	lower-middle-income country
MDB	multilateral development bank
MFS	most fragile situations
PAD	portfolio performance and disbursement
PAR	portfolio-at-risk
PoLG	programme of loans and grants
PPP	potential problem projects
RSP	rural sector performance
RSPA	rural sector performance assessment
UMIC	upper-middle-income country

## Executive summary

1. At the Executive Board session in April 2017, Management presented a revised formula for scenario 3 (SC3) of the performance-based allocation system (PBAS),<sup>1</sup> which incorporated several enhancements resulting from the corporate-level evaluation undertaken by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD. Board representatives requested Management to further fine-tune the proposal to: (i) increase the outward-looking characteristics of the formula; and (ii) increase the formula's rural poverty focus.
2. The formula hereby presented retains the positive features of scenario 3, with increased weight to the country performance component when compared to the current formula, and including the enhancements requested by the Board. Specifically, the proposed formula: (i) rebalances the weights of the rural sector performance variable and the portfolio performance and disbursement variable within the country performance component, favouring the former, which represents the performance of the sector and is therefore more outward-looking; (ii) increases the exponents of the gross national income per capita and the IFAD Vulnerability Index variables thereby increasing the focus on the poorest people. This results in a higher allocation to low-income countries (LICs) as compared to the original scenario 3.
3. At the second session of the Consultation on the Eleventh Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (IFAD11), Management presented the business model for IFAD11, which proposes strategic directions for the Fund during the next replenishment cycle. These directions include more stringent country selectivity and an enhanced focus on the poorest countries. As the PBAS formula must be in line with Management's commitments for the IFAD11 period, the proposed option supports these commitments, allowing for the channelling of 90 per cent of IFAD's core resources to LICs and lower-middle-income countries. Moreover, it allows IFAD to allocate approximately 45 per cent of its core resources to sub-Saharan Africa, and between 25 and 30 per cent of core resources to the most fragile situations (MFS). The overall allocation to MFS would increase by approximately 10 per cent compared to the amount of resources allocated to MFS with the current formula.

---

<sup>1</sup> Document EB 2017/120/R.2.

## Recommendation for approval

The Executive Board is invited to approve:

- The proposed changes to the PBAS formula associated with scenario 3-D as they appear in paragraph 33; and
- The proposed increase in minimum allocations from the current US\$3 million to US\$4.5 million per cycle, as explained in paragraph 34.

## PBAS formula enhancements

### Background

1. At its 120<sup>th</sup> session in April 2017, the Executive Board reviewed the document "PBAS formula and procedures" (EB 2017/120/R.2), which included a proposal for a revised formula. The proposal was the result of the two-phase review process undertaken by Management under the guidance of the Executive Board's Working Group on the Performance-Based Allocation System (PBAS Working Group). At the same session, the Executive Board approved that the PBAS Working Group continue its review and revision of the PBAS framework, building on the feedback received, and that the final conclusions and recommendations be presented to the session in September 2017 for approval.<sup>2</sup>
2. The second phase of the PBAS review process has evolved in parallel with discussions on IFAD's business model for the Eleventh Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (IFAD11) as proposed in "Enhancing the IFAD11 business model to deliver impact at scale" (IFAD11/2/R.3), which was presented to the second session of the Consultation. This has enabled the alignment of the PBAS formula review with the strategic direction that the Fund is proposing for the IFAD11 cycle. Moving forward, Management proposes to maximize the use of official development assistance (ODA) to support the poorest countries and the poorest people, while leveraging borrowed resources for continued engagement with middle-income countries, targeted at addressing their vast remaining rural poverty challenges.
3. The scenario presented in this paper supports this strategic direction. It would allow the Fund to allocate 90 per cent of core resources to low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), and the remaining 10 per cent to upper-middle-income countries (UMICs). This proposal follows four key principles, which were endorsed by the PBAS Working Group, namely: simplicity, efficiency, transparency and emphasis on rural poverty.
4. This document has five sections. The first (paragraphs 5-9) provides an overview of the features and rationale of the PBAS formula, the progress made on the formula review up to April 2017, and the conceptual evolution that has taken place since then in order to ensure alignment with the proposed IFAD11 business model. The second section (paragraphs 10-15) focuses on the policy relevance of the formula with regard to the changes to the business model proposed for IFAD11. The third section (paragraphs 16-30) focuses on the formula's enhancements, its

<sup>2</sup> Since April 2016, four meetings of the PBAS Working Group have taken place (in June and September 2016, and in January and March 2017). Management has also presented the findings of the analysis undertaken under the Working Group's guidance at the Executive Board sessions in April 2017 (EB 2017/120/R.2) and December 2016 (EB 2016/119/R.5), and at the Evaluation Committee session in March 2017 (EC 2016/95/W.P.2). In addition, Management has organised two Executive Board informal seminars (November 2015 and April 2017), and the first ever learning event on PBAS for IFAD staff (December 2016). Management has also engaged in dialogue on the PBAS with the Executive Board at Convenors and Friends meetings, and has held bilateral meetings with Executive Board representatives who manifested specific interest or concerns.

stability at the macro level and variability at the micro (or country) level, its sustainability over time, and the role that each variable plays in determining country scores. Section four provides a description of the formula proposed for approval. Section five highlights the steps needed to implement the revised PBAS in the IFAD11 cycle.

## I. Enhancements to the PBAS

### A. Concept

5. The performance-based allocation system is based on a simple concept: among the Member States with a clear need for IFAD support, resources should be given proportionally according to a country's track record in using those resources effectively. This system therefore combines measures of both country needs and country performance to ensure that IFAD resources are allocated where the expected returns on development effectiveness are the greatest.
6. While the country needs component represents the **stock** component given that country poverty and vulnerability do not change rapidly, the performance component is more dynamic, representing the **flow**. In other words, as described in the Corporate-level evaluation (CLE) on IFAD's PBAS (EB 2016/117/R.5), needs represent a **static** component and performance a **dynamic** one. Understanding their relative weight in the equation is therefore a complex endeavour: notwithstanding its coefficients and exponents, over time the country performance component has a higher incidence in determining the marginal change in allocations.
7. Similar to the allocation systems of other agencies, IFAD's system helps to make interventions more effective at the country level by: (i) providing a check on excessive resource allocations to poorly performing countries, and directing resources to better-performing ones; (ii) improving the stability and predictability of resource flows where most needed, i.e. to those countries with a stable or improving performance; and (iii) helping to provide a standard, through the use of performance ratings, which identifies the exogenous factors that make development more or less challenging in different countries or regions.

### B. Assessment

8. The CLE confirmed that the system ensures greater fairness in the allocation of IFAD's resources across developing Member States; that it is generally well tailored to IFAD; and that it has aligned IFAD's resource allocation system with those of similar organizations. Importantly, the CLE confirmed that the PBAS has consistently enabled IFAD to provide at least 50 per cent of its resources to Africa, and 45 per cent to sub-Saharan Africa. It has also ensured the provision of two thirds of its resources on highly concessional terms, as envisaged in the Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing. Quantitatively, the CLE provided an overall rating of 4.3, which is above the moderately satisfactory threshold, and found the PBAS to be relevant (rated 4.6), effective (rated 4.2) and efficient (rated 4.1).
9. Acknowledging the opportunity for improvements to further align the PBAS with the evolution of IFAD's operations, especially for IFAD11, Management has fully embraced IOE's recommendations in the proposal presented herein. In particular, it has: (i) improved the governance of the process by adopting a more corporate approach to the PBAS in general, improving transparency and promoting learning; (ii) strengthened the rural poverty focus of the country needs component, in particular by including measures of vulnerability and non-income poverty; and (iii) rebalanced the distribution of weight between the country needs and country performance components with the intention of strengthening the incentive for better performance when compared to the current formula. Points (i) and (ii) were already discussed and agreed by the Executive Board in December 2016. Therefore, this paper focuses on point (iii), that is, it proposes a revised

mathematical formula that provides a more balanced account than the current needs/performance distribution split of 65 per cent to 35 per cent acknowledged by the CLE.

## II. Policy relevance

### A. More stringent country selectivity

10. In the business model proposal, Management proposes establishing more stringent country selectivity. This differs from current practices in which the decision to include or exclude countries is based on indication of demand by Member States through dialogue with IFAD's country teams. This practice has led to a pervasive shortcoming in IFAD's PBAS: in a given PBAS cycle, close to 20 per cent of countries that express their willingness to avail themselves of resources at the beginning of each cycle do not transform these pledges into operations due to later changes in country conditions and priorities. This practice cuts across the whole spectrum of country groupings. Ensuring country readiness to prepare new projects is essential to linking PBAS allocations to pipeline planning and delivery. It also improves the efficiency of the system by reducing the need for large reallocations later in the cycle that contribute to bunching in project delivery.
11. Thus, Management proposes to limit the number of countries in any PBAS cycle to between 70 and 80. Analyses show that reducing the number of countries to this range would – *ceteris paribus* – increase the number of beneficiaries reached by IFAD-financed operations by 10 to 20 per cent due to economies of scale.
12. Doing this in a way that respects IFAD's universality and the fairness of the system requires the establishment of transparent criteria that provide incentives to prospective borrowers for a better use of IFAD resources. In the context of the IFAD11 Consultation, the following criteria have been proposed: (i) **strategic focus**: this is to be measured by the existence of a valid country strategy (country strategic opportunities programme [COSOP] or country strategy note [CSN]) early in the PBAS cycle. This would ensure that qualifying countries have a mature strategic vision of how to use IFAD resources and are therefore ready to engage in concrete operational discussions. This is particularly important for countries that have not borrowed from IFAD before; (ii) **absorptive capacity**: all operations in a country that have been effective for more than one year must have disbursed funds at least once in the previous 18 months. This would provide a practical check on resource absorption capacity, and allow the Fund to sequence new designs more closely with implementation support and non-lending activities; and (iii) **ownership**: no approved loans are pending signature for more than 12 months. This proxy ensures that adequate ownership and commitment are in place to facilitate the use of IFAD's resources.
13. These criteria will be applied with a degree of flexibility to ensure that all LICs have the possibility of accessing fresh resources if needed. The list of eligible countries will have to be compiled ahead of the IFAD11 cycle to account for changes in the eligibility over time with respect to one or more of these criteria. In order to have an indication of the resulting sample of countries, the criteria as proposed above were applied to the current list of countries that were allocated funds under IFAD10. As a result, 22 countries turned out to be ineligible under one or more of the criteria as of today. Specifically, 10 countries would be ineligible because of the absence of a COSOP or CSN, four because of limited absorptive capacity and eight because of insufficient ownership. The exclusions span across all country income categories, with the highest number of countries excluded being UMICs and the lowest being LICs. This confirms that the proposed criteria provide the basis for a balanced presence of countries in terms of both income category and financing terms.



## **B. Focusing on the poorest countries**

14. In IFAD11, the majority of IFAD core resources, which remain the bedrock of IFAD's financing, will be directed to operations in LICs and LMICs. There is a clear commitment by Management to channel 90 per cent of IFAD core resources to LICs and LMIC at the most concessional terms and the remaining 10 per cent to UMICs. Borrowed resources will be used to finance the remaining portion of the programme of loans and grants (PoLG), primarily for UMICs that borrow on ordinary terms, in line with a sustainable financial strategy. The proposed PBAS formula allows for this policy commitment to be strictly respected.
15. Moreover, the formula allows IFAD to allocate approximately 45 per cent of its core resources to sub-Saharan Africa, and 25 to 30 per cent of core resources to MFS. The overall allocation to MFS would increase by approximately 10 per cent when compared to the resources allocated to MFS with the current formula. With the proposed formula, 10 countries receive minimum allocations, compared to the seven that currently do. However, these countries see their overall allocation in absolute terms increase substantially, from the current US\$3.0 million to US\$4.5 million. This new threshold for minimum allocation benefits small countries. Vulnerability is taken into due account through the inclusion of the IFAD Vulnerability Index (IVI) and the fact that it is the variable with the highest elasticity, or influence, on country scores. Sub-Saharan African countries, LICs and small island developing states are almost entirely placed within the first three quintiles of the IVI, that is, they are among the most vulnerable countries. Lastly, in order to ensure that IFAD financing is allocated only to countries with the capacity to use it within each PBAS cycle, Management will continue to apply capping to specific country allocations to further ensure that country absorptive capacity is taken into due account.

## **III. Features**


### **A. Balancing the needs and performance components**

16. The scenario proposed for approval assigns 55 per cent of the formula's weight to country needs and 45 per cent to country performance.<sup>3</sup> This represents a 10 percentage point decrease for needs and a 10 percentage point increase for performance when compared to the current IFAD10 PBAS.
17. Given the new balance, figure 1 shows a concentration of allocations towards the intersection of the lowest needs quintile and the lowest performance quintile, confirming that the countries with high needs and high performance receive more resources. At the same time, this figure shows that, in the margins, countries with high needs and low performance benefit slightly more than countries with low needs and high performance. This distribution is coherent with IFAD's mandate and the specific focus of IFAD11 on the poorest countries, and is linked to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development principle of "leaving no one behind". Annex VI provides details of the analysis undertaken, and the alternative scenarios taken into consideration in order to identify the scenario proposed for approval.

---

<sup>3</sup> This scenario, like all the scenarios presented by Management for the Board's consideration, has been developed using the current rural sector performance (RSP) scores, i.e. those used for the IFAD10 PBAS allocation process (2015 RSP). The process of reviewing the RSP questionnaire and quality assurance process is ongoing, therefore the new RSP scores are not yet available and cannot be used in producing the scenarios. It is noteworthy that the extent of change between the current and the new RSP assessment will impact country allocations. However, an assessment of the probable change in RSP score and allocations has been undertaken and the likely impact is estimated to be small and statistically insignificant. For further information, see the appendix on the RSP review.

Figure 1  
**Allocations distribution by needs and performance quintiles (% of total)**



18. Moreover, this new balance allows Management to account for two technicalities of the formula. First, the fact that a higher weight to the performance component tends to polarize allocations, significantly increasing the number of countries with minimum allocations. Second, that as explained in paragraph 6, the influence of the performance component over time is higher than the static estimation of weights; therefore, this version reduces the weight of the country performance component with regard to the scenario proposed to the Board in the April 2017. This is in line with recent enhancements undertaken by other multilateral development banks (MDBs) to their PBAS formulas in order to allocate a higher volume of resources to poorer countries.
19. It is noteworthy that the preconception that increasing the weight given to the country performance component, with respect to the current PBAS formula that was applied in IFAD10, may skew allocations towards LMICs and UMICs is proved wrong by the analysis. Table 1 shows that with the proposed scenario, in spite of the 10 per cent increase in the weight of the performance component, the allocations to LICs see a 9 per cent increase, while the allocations to LMICs and UMICs see a corresponding decrease of 5 and 4 per cent respectively.

Table 1  
**Balance between components and distribution of allocations by country grouping – current and proposed PBAS formula (total resources)**

	<i>Current IFAD10 percentage</i>	<i>SC3 (April Executive Board) percentage</i>	<i>Proposed scenario (SC3-D) percentage</i>
Needs component	65	48	55
Performance component	35	52	45
MFS	22	25	31
LICs	32	36	41
LMICs	49	47	44
UMICs	19	17	15

## B. Macrostability and micro-sensitivity


20. In the context of the PBAS review, the sensitivity analysis<sup>4</sup> aims to provide an understanding of how allocations may change when changes to individual variables within the PBAS formula occur. The sensitivity analysis performed on the formula

<sup>4</sup> A sensitivity analysis is a technique used to determine how different values of an independent variable impact a particular dependent variable under a given set of assumptions. Also referred to as a “what-if” analysis, the sensitivity analysis is a way to predict the outcome of a decision given a certain range of variables. It allows analysts to determine how changes in one variable impact the outcome.

demonstrated that even when changes to the individual formula variables are applied, the formula is robust and remains stable. In practical terms, this means that regardless of variations in the inputs to the formula (for example changes to some or all of the values of the variables, such as a sharp decrease in all countries' GNIpc due to a global recession), or the presence of outliers (a sharp increase or decrease in the value of an individual variable), the results of the formula remain within a reduced range. This is demonstrated by the fact that the distribution of allocations across income groupings remains relatively constant.<sup>5</sup> Figure 2 shows this conclusion graphically. It illustrates how the distribution of allocations by country group behaves if an estimate of the expected future values of the gross national income per capita (GNIpc) and rural population variables is made, and such values are used in the allocations calculation.<sup>6</sup> This relationship also holds in the longer run and beyond the parameters shown in the figure.

Figure 2

**Sensitivity analysis: share of allocations across country groups when applying changes to income (GNIpc) and rural population (total resources)**



21. One key factor that determines this result is the heterogeneous nature of IFAD's Member States. The values of all individual variables in the PBAS formula for these countries vary significantly. This heterogeneity therefore is key to the stability of allocations distribution across income groups.
22. The sensitivity analysis also shows that while allocations across income groups are stable, the allocations to individual countries change in the different scenarios. Therefore the macro level (income groups) remains stable, while the micro level (the allocations to individual countries in each income group) varies. This is because countries' allocations are the result of: (i) the value of the individual variables of the formula for each country; and (ii) how the value of the formula variables for each country relates to the value of the variables of each other country included in the PBAS calculations.<sup>7</sup>


<sup>5</sup> See EB 2017/120/R.2, section IV, for details of the changes to the value of variables applied for the sensitivity analysis, and their respective results.

<sup>6</sup> The estimation was done through a trend analysis. In order to understand how the distribution of allocations would change over time as different countries experienced a change in the size of their rural population or their income levels, it was assumed that their populations and income over the next few years would continue to increase or decrease at the same pace as the past few years.

<sup>7</sup> Although counterintuitive, the combination of (i) and (ii) means that an increase in the value for one variable (or component) does not necessarily imply that countries with better scores in that variable receive more resources, even if that variable is lower for all other countries under consideration. This is an intrinsic characteristic of multiplicative formulas such as the PBAS formula.

23. In other words, there is evidence of a netting-off effect of allocation changes at income-group level. As shown in figure 3, when the allocations to LICs produced using two different PBAS scenarios are compared, the relative changes by country almost net each other off, with the net change within the group being only +1 per cent. This not only reiterates that allocations by country income group are stable; it also means, for individual countries, that increasing allocations are counterbalanced by decreasing allocations within the same country income group.

Figure 3  
**Proportional change in allocations to LICs, by country, using two different PBAS scenarios**



24. Figures 4 and 5 show that this behaviour is consistent also for other income groups: the proportional changes of allocations within the LMICs and UMICs income groups, respectively, almost net each other off. This means that an increase in the allocation to a country is balanced by a decrease in allocation to another country within the same income group.

Figure 4  
**Proportional change in allocations to LMICs, by country, using two different PBAS scenarios**





Figure 5  
Proportional change in allocations to UMICs, by country, using two different PBAS scenarios



25. The corollary of this is that once a mathematical variation of the formula is adopted to respond to Members' priorities and sense of fairness, the resulting distribution will be maintained over time.
26. This stability, coupled with the balanced distribution of country groupings ensured by the country selectivity criteria discussed in section III.A, provides an assurance that the policy statements made in the IFAD11 business model paper with regard to allocations to LICs and LMICs on the one hand, and UMICs on the other, will be honoured. In practice, it is equivalent to running the PBAS twice, on two separate groups of countries (divided either by lending terms or by income group). However, if Management were to adopt such a practice, the process of refining the PBAS formula would have to be reinitiated, including the search for meaningful variables. The main reason for this is the fact that, as explained above, the formula is stable because of the heterogeneity of the countries involved. Running the PBAS twice would separate countries into two, more homogeneous, groups, each needing a revised formula.
27. As IFAD prepares itself to access market borrowing, possibly in IFAD12, the PBAS system will need to be revisited. Allocating resources that are accessed through capital markets requires more careful consideration of risk and debt management, as well as matching allocations with specific lending terms, an aspect that is not guaranteed in the current PBAS system. Following the practice in other international financial institutions (IFIs), it is likely that the PBAS will eventually be limited to the allocation of concessional resources, and that separate allocation procedures would need to be established for ordinary lending. One important lesson learned from other MDBs is that given the centrality of the PBAS for advancing an institution's goals and priorities, continuous adjustments should be considered in successive replenishment cycles.

## Box 1

**Features of the PBAS formula**

Similarly to the PBAS formulas of other MDBs, IFAD's formula is multiplicative. The country score, on which the allocations are based, is therefore an output. Because of this, even small changes to a single variable (one of the numbers multiplied) may have a significant impact on the overall distribution of allocations across countries. This is because allocations are the result of: (i) the product of the individual variables of the formula by country; and (ii) how the results of such multiplication (the country score) relate to the country scores of every other country included in the PBAS calculations. This latter point is important because the country score determines the share of the total PoLG that a given country will receive as its allocation (country score/total country scores = percentage share of allocation for that country out of the total PoLG).

This leads to a counterintuitive conclusion. The combination of (i) and (ii) above means that an increase in the value for one variable (or component) does not necessarily imply that a country with better scores in that variable receives more resources, even if that variable is worse for all other countries under consideration. This is because allocations are not only influenced by the value of the variables in the formula for each country (and the resulting country score), but also by the value of the variables for all countries (hence all other country scores). This is an intrinsic characteristic of the PBAS process, in which countries compete with one another for the available resources.

To provide a practical example of how the formula works,\* table A shows what happens when the RSP score of one of the countries (country A) included in the PBAS increases, all things being equal for the other variables and for all other countries. The table shows that the allocation for country A increases substantially, while the allocations for countries B, C and all other countries included in the PBAS cycle decrease by 0.1 per cent as a result of country's A increased allocation. Importantly, this is a purely hypothetical case, because when the PBAS is run, all the variables for all countries are updated at the same time. Therefore, in reality, such a direct link between changes to the value of variables (either increase or decrease in value) and the resulting allocations cannot be made.

Table A

**Hypothetical case: impact on allocations of an increase in the RSP score of a single country**

Country	Current RSP score	Hypothetical RSP increase	Original allocation (US\$ million)	Allocation change in response to RSP increase (US\$ million)
A	2.7	5.4	8.2	12.2 (+50%)
B	3.7	-	71.7	71.6 (-0.1%)
C	3.8	-	77.3	77.2 (-0.1%)

Table B illustrates what happens to the allocations for countries D, E, and F as a result of random shocks to three formula variables (GNIpc, RSP and portfolio performance and disbursement [PAD]) in order to simulate actual changes to allocations when the PBAS formula variables are updated during the cycle. Looking at the RSP score for each of the countries in table B, one can observe an increase in the value of the RSP of country D and an increase in its allocation. In country E, there is an increase in the value of the RSP, but the country's allocation decreases. In country F, the allocation increases in spite of a sharp reduction in the RSP. Such diverse – and at times counterintuitive – outcomes are the result of the interplay between the individual variables associated with each country, and the variables associated with each of the countries included in the PBAS cycle.

Table B

**Realistic case: impact on allocations of random shocks to GNIpc, RSP and PAD for all countries**

Country	Variable	Current value	Variable value after shock	Original allocation (US\$ million)	Allocation after shock (US\$ million)
D	RSP	3.7	5	71.7	74
	GNI	670	663		
	PAD	5.8	4.9		
E	RSP	3.8	4.9	77.3	74.1
	GNI	1 710	1 727		
	PAD	5.7	4.4		
F	RSP	5	2.9	24.9	29.4
	GNI	10 840	10 732		
	PAD	5.1	6.0		


\* The analysis for tables A and B has been produced using the PBAS formula that is proposed for approval in this paper.

**C. Enhanced elasticity for key variables**

28. With regard to how each of the variables of the formula relate to one another, figure 6 shows the elasticity (or influence) of each variable for the proposed scenario in determining countries' scores. In line with the focus on the poorest countries, the IVI is the variable with the greatest elasticity, which ensures that the most vulnerable countries receive adequate compensation when vulnerability manifests itself. Targeting resource allocation based on structural vulnerabilities is a way of compensating for structural handicaps to growth and poverty reduction, i.e. shortcomings that are durable and beyond the country's current capacity to

overcome (these may result from past policy): they mainly reflect the impact of historical or geographical factors, or the international environment. However, focusing on vulnerability is also a way to enhance aid effectiveness. In the long run, focusing on this criterion helps to dampen likely but unforeseen shocks, and to avert social unrest and state fragility, in that prevention is better than cure.

Figure 6  
**Elasticities of the proposed PBAS scenario**



29. Portfolio performance and disbursement (PAD), which is part of the country performance component, is the variable with the second greatest elasticity. The PAD was introduced as a variation of the portfolio-at-risk (PAR) variable. As a result, the disbursement ratio was introduced as a further variable in the PAD. While it is recognized that disbursements are only one dimension of results, project results can hardly be achieved without timely disbursements. Therefore, disbursements are a good indicator of the overall performance of a project and are positively correlated with other results and impact measures. It is also a good indicator of country programme performance, given that within a country, projects tend to have the same disbursement performance. In order to avoid misrepresenting the disbursement performance for factors merely related to the portfolio age, thereby penalizing younger projects, the age of the portfolio is taken into account when applying the discount factor to the final PAD score (see annex I). In addition, another change from the previous PAR measure is that the PAD excludes so-called potential problem projects (PPPs), so as not to penalize the early identification of potential challenges and to incentivize the mobilization of additional operational support before projects become an actual risk.
30. Given that the PAD (together with the GNIpc) is the variable that may change more radically year-on-year, the high elasticity of the formula to changes in the PAD ensures that such changes have a direct and timely impact on allocations (see also paragraph 33 below).

#### IV. The formula

31. Of the four scenarios contained in the paper "PBAS formula and procedures" presented to the Board at its 120<sup>th</sup> session, Management recommended scenario 3 (SC3) as it incorporated several features that responded to the feedback received during the process of revising the PBAS criteria. Particularly, the Board had indicated the need to ensure: a good balance between country needs and performance by increasing the weight of the latter; alignment with IFAD's mandate by catering for the poorest people in rural areas and fragile situations; and greater

incentives to improve portfolio performance. Accordingly, SC3 shifted the weight between the components of the formula towards country performance, while maintaining a good balance between the two (48 per cent to needs and 52 per cent to performance). At that session, Management was requested to: (i) increase the outward-looking characteristics of the formula by rebalancing the weight of the rural sector performance (RSP) and the PAD variables in the country performance component; and (ii) increase the weight of the GNIpc and IVI variables, with the corollary of slightly reducing the proposed overall weight for the country performance component.

32. To this end, Management tested almost 20 variations of SC3 that would maintain its main features. Moreover, as most of the formula variables see little change in value year-on-year (rural population), or are updated once per PBAS cycle (RSP), Management also tested ways to enhance the formula's reactivity to yearly changes in its variables, by exploring changes to the variables that change the most within a PBAS cycle: the GNIpc and PAD. In addition, by working on the GNIpc exponent, Management tested options for increasing the likelihood that poorer countries would receive higher allocations in line with the strategic direction of the business model.
33. Based on this, Management proposes the following formula for Executive Board approval:

$$RuralPop^{0.4} \times GNIpc^{-0.3} \times IVI^{1.5} \times (0.25RSP + 0.75PAD)^1$$

34. With respect to the original SC3, the rural population variable remains unchanged, with a 0.4 exponent. Other variables have been adjusted as follows: (i) the GNIpc exponent has been increased in absolute value by 0.05 in order to increase poverty influence within the formula; (ii) the IVI exponent has been increased by 0.5 for the same reason; (iii) the RSP coefficient has been increased by 0.05, in order to increase the weight of the sector policies and institutional assessment within the formula; and (iv) the coefficient associated with the PAD has been reduced by 0.05, for the same reason. Table 2 summarizes the purpose of the changes, the actual changes to the formula in the proposed scenario for approval, and the results obtained when compared to the SC3 presented at the April session of the Board. Management proposes that minimum allocations are raised from the current US\$3 million to US\$4.5 million per cycle.



Table 2  
**Changes made to SC3 and respective results in the proposed scenario for approval**

	<i>Rural population</i>	<i>Gross national income per capita</i>	<i>IFAD Vulnerability Index</i>	<i>Rural sector performance</i>	<i>Portfolio performance and disbursement</i>
Description	Rural population of a country	Per capita gross national income	A vulnerability measure focusing on rural poverty, food security, nutrition and climate change	Rural sector performance score, ranging from 1 to 6	Portfolio-and-disbursement rating, ranging from 1 to 6
What it captures within the formula	Magnitude of needs in terms of potential IFAD target group	Level of average individual wealth	Susceptibility of a country to key enablers of rural poverty	Measure of the performance of countries' policy frameworks in areas applicable to the rural poor	Overall performance of the portfolio by combining two complementary measures: a proxy for the agility and pace of portfolio implementation, and the percentage of the ongoing portfolio where implementation is unsatisfactory.
What it measures	Proportion of a country's total population that lives in rural areas	Per capita income per year, expressed in United States dollars	This index of 12 equally weighted indicators measures rural vulnerability in terms of exposure, sensitivity and lack of adaptive capacity to endogenous and exogenous causes and/or events	Responsiveness of policies to the needs of poor rural people under six aspects, through 19 questions	Incidence of actual problem projects in the portfolio, taking into account their size, age and level of disbursement
Source	World Bank's World Development Indicators	World Bank's World Development Indicators – Atlas method, US\$ conversion	IFAD, based on internationally recognized data sources	IFAD	IFAD
What has changed when compared to original SC3 and why?	Exponent has remained at 0.4, as this exponent proved to be effective in reducing the range of variation of allocations across countries	Exponent has been increased in absolute value by 0.05 in order to increase poverty influence within the formula	Exponent has been increased by 0.5 to highlight the importance of non-monetary aspects of poverty	Questions have been reduced and scoring is more objective. 25 per cent of questions are on macro policies in order to cover relevant aspects formerly included in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment variable.  Coefficient was increased by 0.05 in order to increase the weight of the policies and institutional assessment within the formula	A measure of disbursement has been added in order to account for financial performance of projects. PPP status has been removed in order to incentivise early warning.  Coefficient was reduced by 0.05 to reduce the inward-looking nature of the formula

## **V. Moving forward**

35. The implementation of the new PBAS formula for IFAD11 will require swift action by Management on a number of fronts. The list of eligible countries will have to be compiled ahead of the IFAD11 cycle to account for changes in the eligibility over time with respect to the criteria established in the IFAD11 business model and described in section II.A. The RSP assessment questionnaire and quality assurance system will need to be finalized and tested in 2017. The first scoring exercise will need to take place before the end of the year to allow for any necessary adjustments to be made to the methodology before the second scoring exercise – to be undertaken in 2018 – is used for the IFAD11 allocations. To allow for delivery of projects during the first year of IFAD11, allocations must be calculated at least 6 months before the beginning of IFAD11 to confirm allocation amounts per country, in particular for those projects to be presented to the Executive Board in April 2019.
36. Management will continue working to automate the calculation process and facilitate simulations. It will also produce a PBAS manual, which will describe the calculation process and managerial rules in order to increase consistency and transparency.
37. The approval of the PBAS formula is a needed step to ensure that a solid and predictable resource allocation mechanism is in place. Such a mechanism is of paramount importance to construct reliable financial projections and scenarios of sources and uses of funds, and of the impact on the Fund of diversifying its funding sources for IFAD11. Sound financial planning is a prerequisite for the positive outcome of a rating exercise that IFAD might undertake as part of its preparations for a full assessment of its potential to tap into financial markets.
38. In light of the above, the Executive Board is hereby invited to approve the PBAS formula associated with scenario 3-D, as described in paragraph 33, and the increase in minimum allocations as described in paragraph 34.

## Portfolio performance and disbursement (PAD) variable

### I. Background

1. The current measure of the performance of the IFAD portfolio takes into account diverse aspects/criteria in order to rate projects:
  - (i) "Actual problem project" (APP) status;
  - (ii) "Potential problem project" (PPP) status;
  - (iii) "Not at risk" status;
  - (iv) Time persistence of the status;
  - (v) Sensitivity to the portfolio size, in terms of number of projects.
2. In order to factor the performance of IFAD-financed ongoing operations into the PBAS, IFAD uses a transformation matrix for the diverse possible performance statuses, as shown in table 1, and translates this into a 1-6-scale rating.

Table 1

**Transformation matrix used to score PAR before the review**

Portfolio performance rating	Number of active projects held by borrower		
	1 project	2 projects	3 projects or more
6	Project rated "not at risk" for two or more consecutive years	Both projects rated "not at risk" for two or more consecutive years	PAR proportion 0% for two or more consecutive years
5	Project rated "not at risk"	Both projects rated "not at risk" (N+N)	PAR proportion 0%
4	Project rated "potential problem project", but with a sum of implementation progress/development objective scores < 4	One project rated "not at risk" and one rated "potential problem project" (N+P)	PAR proportion 0-34%
3	Project rated "potential problem project" and a sum of implementation progress/likelihood of achieving the development objective scores = 4 (2+2)	Both projects rated "potential problem projects" or one project rated "not at risk" and one rated "actual problem project" (P+P or N+A)	PAR proportion 35-67%
2	Project rated "actual problem project"	One project rated "potential problem project" and one rated "actual problem project" or both projects rated "actual problem project" (P+A or A+A)	PAR proportion 68-100%
1	Project rated "actual problem project" for two or more consecutive years	One project rated "potential problem project" and one rated "actual problem project" or both projects rated "actual problem project" for two or more consecutive years	PAR proportion 100% for two or more consecutive years

3. The proposed new PAR calculation represents a shift from the qualitative approach based on the transformation matrix in table 1, to a formula, which is simpler and based on quantitative measures.

### II. The proposed formula

4. The proposed methodology introduces two main changes:
  - (i) It excludes PPPs, so as not to penalize the early identification of potential challenges and to incentivize the mobilization of additional operational support before projects become an actual risk;
  - (ii) It introduces a measure of the disbursement ratio, since the ability to disburse resources promptly and efficiently to finance project implementation is considered a predictor of project success.

### III. Calculation of the components of the PAD measure

#### APPs

5. Given the exclusion of PPPs, the performance of a given country's active portfolio is measured accounting only for APPs, calculated as follows:
- Assuming that  $x$  is the number of APPs in an active portfolio composed of  $p$  country projects ( $p$  = portfolio size);
  - The APPs ratio is then defined as  $x/p$ ;
  - The rating of the APPs variable is calculated as  $(1-x/p)$ , so that the highest performance value is 1 (when none of the projects is labelled as an "APP") and the lowest is 0 (when all projects are "APPs").

$$APP = \left(1 - \frac{x}{p}\right)$$


#### Portfolio size

6. The suggested PAD rating methodology differentiates between small and large portfolios, so that the PAD reflects the varying sizes through a logistic function. The function provides a smooth differentiation of the maximum ratings a country can get according to the size of its active portfolio. Thus the function gradually increases the PAD rating with respect to the number of active projects in a given country portfolio, rewarding bigger portfolio sizes, but without penalizing small portfolios.

Graph 1  
The PAD logistic function

$$Portfolio\ size = \left(\frac{6}{1 + 0.5e^{-p}}\right)$$

y: PAD value



x: portfolio size

#### Disbursement ratio

7. The opportunity to weigh the ability to fund the implementation of projects promptly and efficiently led to the inclusion of a disbursement measure, i.e. the disbursement ratio (DR). It is measured as a ratio between the actual disbursement value to date and the available disbursement for the ongoing year of implementation:

$$DR = \frac{\text{total disbursed amount at date}}{\text{disbursable amount at the beginning of the year}} \in [0,100]$$

8. The DR ranges from 0 to 100 per cent for each project; once it has been computed, it enters the formula as a discounting factor,  $z$ , ranging from 0 to 1, together with the portfolio age.

#### **Portfolio age**

9. As in the old PAR calculation, the new formula takes into consideration the age of each project included in the portfolio: the more recent the project, the higher the tolerance on its disbursement ratio.

#### **Inclusion of disbursement ratio and portfolio age in the formula**

$$z = \frac{1}{\sum \text{Age of project}} \sum \text{Age of project} (1 - DR)$$

10. The discounting factor is calculated as a weighted average, taking into account both the age and the DR of each project within the portfolio. In order not to penalize new projects, the discounting factor increases with age.

#### **The final PAD formula**

11. The final formula suggested for the calculation of the PAD rating is:

$$PAD = \left( \frac{6}{1 + 0.5e^{-p}} \right) \left( 1 - \frac{x}{p} \right) - z$$

- Where  $p$  is the total number of active projects in the country portfolio (the portfolio size);
- $x$  is the number of APPs;
- $z$  is the discount resulting from the disbursement ratio combined with the portfolio age.

#### **Status persistence**

12. Once the PAD has been calculated, it is further scored taking into consideration the persistence of each project's status: if in the two previous years the PAD has been lower than 3, it is considered equal to 1; if, conversely, in the two previous years the PAD has been higher than 4, it is considered equal to 6.
13. Finally, in order to prevent missing values and high year-by-year fluctuations, a three-year rolling average of the PAD is used in the PBAS calculation.

## Countries with most fragile situations (MFS) and the revised PBAS formula

### I. Overview

1. At its 119<sup>th</sup> session in December 2016, the Executive Board approved the IFAD Strategy for Engagement in Countries with Fragile Situations.<sup>8</sup> The strategy proposes a new definition of fragility, and a new approach to identify countries with the most fragile situations. The new definition is as follows:
 

“Fragility is a condition of high vulnerability to natural and man-made shocks, often associated with an elevated risk of violence and conflict. Weak governance structures along with low-capacity institutions are a common driver and consequence of fragile situations. Fragile situations typically provide a weaker enabling environment for inclusive and sustainable rural transformation and are characterized by protracted and/or periodic crises, often with implications for smallholder agriculture and food security.”
2. In order to identify countries with fragile situations, the strategy uses indicators related to institutional capacity and conflict:
  - (i) **Institutional capacity:** countries with the lowest IFAD rural sector performance (RSP) scores (approximately the bottom quintile);
  - (ii) **Conflict:** (a) countries in which United Nations/regional peacekeeping forces are present; and (b) countries classified as “very high alert” or “high alert” by the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index.
3. To be classified as most fragile, countries need to comply with one of those three indicators. IFAD's list of countries with the most fragile situations (MFS) for 2016, building on the methodology outlined in the strategy, comprises 30 countries and is reflected in table 1 below.
4. As part of its review of the current PBAS formula and process, Management committed to explore ways to allocate additional resources to MFS countries. The RSP is the only common element between the PBAS variables and the MFS-defining indicators. Seventeen countries, or 63 per cent of countries with MFS, are classified as such because of their low RSP score. The remaining countries are classified as MFS because they are in line with at least one of the other two indicators.
5. Because RSP is the only common element between the PBAS formula and the MFS-defining indicators, it would seem intuitive to explore how to provide additional resources through the PBAS to MFS through modifications to the RSP variable. However, the RSP variable is part of the performance component of the PBAS formula. Because the formula aims to reward good performers, and by definition countries with MFS have a low RSP score, countries with MFS cannot receive additional resources through an increase in the weight of the RSP variable within the formula. Conversely, reducing the RSP variable weight would achieve the desired effect, but would be contrary to the performance-based nature of the PBAS.
6. As part of the PBAS review, Management has included a measure of vulnerability, the IFAD Vulnerability Index, in the country needs component of the formula. Through this addition, the more vulnerable the country, the higher the IVI score and thus the greater the impact of the IVI on country scores. There is a partial overlap between the most vulnerable countries and MFS. As a result of this overlap and the other changes introduced to the PBAS formula, about half of MFS countries receive additional resources under the proposed adjusted version of scenario 3 (SC3). Overall, MFS receive an allocation increase of 10 per cent.

---

<sup>8</sup> Document EB 2016/119/R.4.

Table 1  
**Most fragile situations (MFS) as at December 2016**

<i>Country</i>	<i>RSP quintiles</i>	<i>Alert status</i>	<i>Peacekeeping or peace-building mission</i>	<i>Allocation variation (+/-)</i>
Afghanistan <sup>a</sup>		High alert	Yes	/
Bosnia and Herzegovina			Yes	-
Burundi	Lowest quintile	High alert	Yes	-
Central African Republic	Lowest quintile	Very high alert	Yes	+
Chad	Lowest quintile	Very high alert		+
Democratic Republic of the Congo <sup>a</sup>	Lowest quintile	Very high alert	Yes	/
Côte d'Ivoire	Lowest quintile		Yes	-
Guinea	Lowest quintile	High alert		+
Guinea-Bissau	Lowest quintile		Yes	+
Haiti	Lowest quintile	High alert	Yes	-
Iraq		High alert	Yes	+
Democratic People's Republic of. Korea <sup>a</sup>	Lowest quintile			/
Lebanon			Yes	-
Liberia	Lowest quintile		Yes	+
Mali			Yes	+
Myanmar	Lowest quintile			+
Niger				+
Pakistan		High alert		-
Papua New Guinea	Lowest quintile			-
Sao Tome and Principe	Lowest quintile			+
Sierra Leone			Yes	+
Somalia <sup>b</sup>			Yes	/
South Sudan	Lowest quintile	Very high alert	Yes	+
Sudan		Very high alert	Yes	+
Syrian Arab Republic <sup>b</sup>			Yes	/
Tajikistan	Lowest quintile			+
Togo	Lowest quintile			-
Uzbekistan	Lowest quintile			-
West Bank and Gaza <sup>b</sup>			Yes	/
Yemen		Very high alert		+

<sup>a</sup> These countries have been capped for IFAD10, therefore they remain capped in the proposed scenario. They would otherwise have received higher allocations.

<sup>b</sup> IFAD currently has no operations in these countries.

## Rural Population in the PBAS formula

### I. Overview

1. Since the introduction of a performance-based allocation system in 2003 and the first cycle of allocations driven by the PBAS formula in 2005, the most important change to the PBAS formula happened in 2006. This relates to the change of the "total population" variable in the country needs component of the formula to "rural population". This was done, *inter alia*, to ensure that the formula has a closer fit with IFAD's rural mandate. The exponent of the variable was also changed from 0.74 to 0.45.
2. The CLE on the PBAS,<sup>9</sup> presented in 2016, found that this change has contributed to a reduction in the number of countries that received maximum and minimum allocations. In particular, reducing the number of countries with minimum allocations has increased efficiency in project development, supervision and implementation support, and in country programme management across the regions generally.
3. The CLE's analysis also found that some countries define "rural population" differently, making the data less reliable across countries than the data for national population. Nevertheless, on balance, the CLE concluded that the change to rural population was correct in order to align the allocation formula more closely with IFAD's mandate.
4. However, the CLE evidenced the high correlation of the rural population variable to the final country score (0.7062), showing how rural population is still the variable that has the greatest influence on final country scores, and as a result, on country allocations.
5. The CLE also noted that the current weight of this variable results in allocations to the largest Member States that are greater than the established maximum allocation. This leads to the application of maximum capping, whereby no country can receive more than 5 per cent of IFAD's total yearly resources available for commitment, which introduces a degree of arbitrariness into the formula.
6. In 2016, Management agreed with the CLE recommendation to further reassess the balance between the country needs and country performance components of the PBAS formula.<sup>10</sup>
7. For this purpose, Management tested two methods for normalizing the rural population variable, i.e. smoothening the effect of large differences within the rural population variable on country scores.
8. **Its logarithmic measure.** The logarithmic measure has the advantage of reducing the variability of the variable it is applied to. Applying the logarithmic measure instead of rural population therefore attenuates the effect of population values within the formula. It further makes the outcome of the formula less sensitive to absolute changes in rural population and high absolute scores.
9. This amendment therefore reduces the range of variation of country scores, all else being equal, and can bring the allocations for the largest countries sufficiently in line with the smallest to avoid the need for an artificial cap at the maximum allocation level. While this achieves the result of reducing minimum and maximum allocations, it flattens all allocations, resulting in small allocation differences between countries with small and large rural populations. This concept is shown in figure one: the dots represent single countries and the vertical position of the dots is proportionate to their allocations. A higher dot, like China's, means a higher allocation. A lower dot, like Tonga's, represents a lower allocation. So, while there

<sup>9</sup> Document EB 2016/117/R.5.

<sup>10</sup> Document EB 2016/117/R.5/Add.1.



is dispersion within allocations, the distance between the top and bottom receivers and the rest of the group is limited. The distance is not very marked. This is to show that the allocations are “flattened” with no clear outlier.

Figure 1

**Normalization through logarithmic measure not rural population**



10. Management therefore tested normalizing this variable by modifying its exponent, which currently stands at 0.45. Tests were carried out by gradually reducing the exponent by 0.05 points, reaching a minimum exponent of 0.20. The results of the testing show that the best performing scenario is that in which a 0.40 exponent is applied to the rural population variable.
11. The advantages of this solution are:
  - (a) Maximum allocations become aligned to about 5 per cent of the total resource envelope, which eliminates the need to apply the 5 per cent maximum cap;
  - (b) The lowest allocations reach US\$1.5 million per year, i.e. to the desired minimum, without the need to increase them as is currently the case to reach the present minimum allocation;
  - (c) The formula remains simple.
12. Figure 2 shows the resulting allocations. As can be seen, this formula provides the right level of dispersions, in that countries with capped allocations "naturally" reach allocations close to the ceiling. Comparing this figure with figure 1, it is notable that the distance between the top allocations and the rest of the group is larger.

Figure 2

**Normalization through the -0.05 reduction of the rural population exponent**



13. The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) provided comments on the proposed PBAS formulas and procedures at the Executive Board session in April 2017<sup>11</sup> and highlighted that the revised formula introduces several improvements, but the “dominance of the rural population factor persists”. The correlation coefficient between the total projected country allocation for 2016-2018 and the rural population variable is 0.697, which, although reduced from 0.706 is still the highest among the variables.

<sup>11</sup> EB 2017/120/R.2/Add.1.

## Sensitivity analysis

1. The analysis of the sensitivity of the PBAS formula looks at the impact that changing the structures or the values of the variables within the formula has on the final allocation by country. In other words, it answers the question "what if?".
2. Due to the multiplicative aspect of the PBAS formula, even small changes to a single variable may have a significant impact on the overall distribution of allocations across countries. Testing the impact of changing the parameters and/or "shocking" the formula's variables is therefore very important in order to evaluate the stability and the robustness of the formula over the time.<sup>12</sup>
3. There is a wide range of approaches to performing a sensitivity analysis. Thus, Management has tested different hypotheses on how allocations vary in relation to changes applied to all the variables, selected variables, or the programme of loans and grants (PoLG).<sup>13</sup>
4. The conclusions derived from the hypotheses tested on the PBAS formula are explained in table 1. The different analyses done to test the robustness of the formula over time and to different type of shocks, confirm the overall stability of the system. Country groupings (LICs, LMICs, MFS countries, sub-Saharan African countries and countries borrowing on ordinary terms) have maintained the same level of allocations. Nonetheless, looking at the country level fluctuations occur. This macro level stability can be explained by two factors: (i) the changes are neutralized within the same group of countries; and (ii) from a mathematical point of view, all the changes done so far are a monotonic transformation of the current formula.

Table 1  
Sensitivity analysis of the proposed new PBAS formula

Test no.	Change applied	Aim of test	Methodology	Results
i	Shocks on all the variables at the same time	Assess stability in terms of allocations of the PBAS over time and its responsiveness to realistic changes	All variables have been shocked by an amount proportionate to their historical 15 year trend (GNlpc and rural population) or to their actual range (1-2 for IVI, 1-6 for RSP and PAD), in both directions ( $\pm$ )	The distribution of resources across country income groups remains constant
ii	Shocks on one variable at a time	Assess elasticity of single variables, i.e. how each individual variable impacts allocations to country grouping	Variables have been shocked, one at a time, by: GNlpc and rural population: 3 times the annual growth rate for each country IVI: $\pm$ 0.3 RSP: $\pm$ 0.9 PAD: $\pm$ 1.7	Shocks to single variables do not affect the distribution of allocations across country groupings
iii	Shocks to PoLG size	Assess the implications of increases or decreases of the PoLG envelope for the overall allocations' distribution	IFAD10 PoLG has been shocked by $\pm$ 13 per cent and 25 per cent.	The distribution of resources across country income groups remains, but there are considerable changes at the country level
iv	Shocks to rural population and GNlpc variables	Assess the stability of the formula over time	A trend analysis has been conducted to forecast their future values in the next two replenishment cycles. The estimated values were tested within the proposed formula, <i>ceteris paribus</i>	The formula shows stability over time as a system, while fluctuations are foreseeable at the country level.

<sup>12</sup> "Modelers may conduct sensitivity analyses for a number of reasons including the need to determine: (1) which parameters require additional research for strengthening the knowledge base, thereby reducing output uncertainty, (2) which parameters are insignificant and can be eliminated from the final model, (3) which inputs contribute most to output variability, (4) which parameters are most highly correlated with the output, (5) once the model is in production use, what consequence results from changing a given input parameter." D. M. Hamby, "A review of techniques for parameter sensitivity analysis of environmental models", *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment*, University of Michigan School of Public Health (1994).

<sup>13</sup> For the sensitivity analysis, shocks were applied to: (i) the whole PBAS system; (ii) single variables; (iii) the size of the PoLG; and (iv) a combined set of variables, namely rural population and GNlpc.

## Finalizing enhancements to the PBAS management process

### I. Background

1. As regards the PBAS management process, Executive Board representatives requested Management to provide further insights into the further refining of the rural sector performance assessment (RSPA) (questionnaire, quality assurance mechanism, performance reward system) and the process underpinning early reallocations. The sections below address this request.

### II. Options

#### Rural sector performance assessment

2. The RSPA is designed to provide a measure of the performance of countries' policy frameworks in areas applicable to the rural poor. The changes are in line with the recommendation of the CLE of IFAD's PBAS to revisit RSP indicators and questions, so as to "reflect emerging priorities, opportunities and challenges in the rural sector". This has been done by refining and revisiting RSP indicators and questions to ensure that they reflect priorities consistent with the IFAD Strategic Framework 2016-2025. The RSPA review also reflects the decision to eliminate the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) variable from the formula, given that the unavailability of the CPIA score for numerous countries currently leads to distortions in the formula, and that a strong correlation exists between the ratings associated with the questions within the RSPA and CPIA.
3. The enhanced RSPA: (i) maintains the focus on rural people, policies and institutions that was present in the previous version; (ii) maintains all categories of questions in the current RSPA, albeit in a more condensed fashion to reduce repetition; (iii) improves questions to eliminate the high degree of correlation between questions and subquestions present in the current version; (iv) updates questions to reflect current best practice, new metrics and indicators (e.g. on rural financial inclusion and policies for gender equality); and (v) adds new questions responding to key areas of thematic focus of IFAD's strategic objectives on the environment, climate change and nutrition, while reducing the number and overlap of the questions.
4. These changes are described in appendix I,<sup>14</sup> which also provides guidance to assessors on how to score responses to each of the questions. For each question one or two core indicators are suggested as the basis for increasing the degree of objectivity in scoring and to increase the comparability of country scores within and across regions. For some questions, scores from other assessments form the basis of scoring but with appropriate adjustment to reflect priorities relating to rural poverty.
5. Appendix I draws upon IFAD's current experience and the best practices of comparable organizations and describes further steps to strengthen the quality assurance process. These include clearly documented guidance to assessors, embedding the RSPA in a broader country dialogue, engagement of a wider range of expertise and peer review, and a regular process of review and adjustment to capture lessons learned and changing priorities.
6. Given that the RSPA will no longer be prepared annually there are opportunities for greater in-country consultation and feedback in preparing the RSPA. The proposed scoring process foresees strengthening the engagement of technical staff across IFAD departments and divisions and to increase the use of evidence-based scoring to ensure greater consistency in scores. Country programme managers (CPMs) will

<sup>14</sup> Work on appendix I is ongoing. The appendix will be posted as an addendum to this document before the seventh meeting of the PBAS Working Group.

remain key players in discussions with technical experts and partners within countries. They will be responsible for assigning the initial scores, which will be accompanied by a short statement that explains the basis of the scoring and any changes in the score since the previous RSPA. Regional economists will then draw upon expertise of the CPMs and that of peer reviewers to check the consistency of scoring within their region and between regions. Management will ensure that RSPA findings have a more far-reaching operational usefulness, such as offering robust analytics for the formulation of IFAD country strategies, and providing an input for conducting more evidence-based country-level policy engagement.

7. The PBAS Working Group also requested Management to explore ways to reward countries that are significantly improving their RSP scores. Appendix I explains the proposed options to reward both improvements in performance from one PBAS cycle to the next, and consistently good performance across cycles. In light of the significant change in the priorities, structure and content of the RSPA that will take place during IFAD11, the first RSPA in 2018 will be used as the baseline for future analysis, and the reward system will be implemented as of IFAD12.

### **Early reallocations**

8. The CLE on the PBAS recommended that reallocations should be formally made earlier than under the current practice, which foresees reallocations only in the third and final year of the PBAS cycle. In line with this, IOE also recommended that "efforts are needed to ensure a better spread of the total annual commitments across the three years of any allocation cycle. This will require tightening forward planning processes, in particular by ensuring better linkages among project pipeline development ... [and] country allocations..."<sup>15</sup>
9. In order to address this recommendation, in 2016 Management tested – for the first time – redistributing unused allocated resources that were less likely to translate into operations early in the IFAD10 cycle using the current PBAS reallocation methodology. While reallocating resources earlier in the cycle enables better forward planning, the existing methodology has proved unsuitable, as it was conceived for final year redistributions, when most of the allocations had already been invested.
10. In 2017, Management undertook further methodological testing and devised a methodology for early reallocations which was discussed with and endorsed by the PBAS Working Group, as described below.
11. The methodology establishes two main elements of the early reallocation process:
  - (a) The identification of countries that may or may not benefit from early reallocations; and
  - (b) The identification of unused resources that will constitute the "reallocation pot".
12. As regards the first group of countries, Management proposes that countries that may benefit from early reallocations are:
  - (a) Countries for which a financing gap has been identified, either for projects still under design that were approved during IFAD10 or for ongoing operations approved in previous replenishment cycles; and
  - (b) Countries with additional resource absorption capacity, as confirmed by regional divisions.
13. Countries that may not benefit from early reallocations are the following:
  - (a) Countries whose allocations had been capped by regional divisions at the beginning of IFAD10;

---

<sup>15</sup> Document EB 2016/117/R.5.

- (b) Countries that regional divisions have confirmed as being unable to absorb further resources, and are therefore capped at their current approvals and/or pipeline level (partial capping); and
  - (c) Countries that were dropped from the PBAS cycle either in the previous or current year.
14. The resources to be reallocated (the reallocation pot) will be made up of:
- (a) The unutilized amount of a country's allocation where the total planned or approved financing during the PBAS cycle is lower than its current allocation; and
  - (b) The full allocation of countries that were dropped from the PBAS cycle in either the previous or the current year.
15. The resources in the reallocation pot are distributed to the countries that may benefit from early reallocations based on their respective country scores, in line with the overall PBAS methodology.
16. This methodology enables Management to address the recommendation on this matter made in the CLE. Moreover, resources that are unlikely to be used can be redistributed earlier, allowing for better planning and to better spread the delivery of the PoLG. This is especially useful for IFAD, as its individual projects tend to absorb a country's total PBAS allocation, making it harder for countries to absorb additional resources in the third year of the cycle, by which time most projects have been already approved or designed. Reallocations will therefore take place both in the second and third year of the cycle.
17. Other MDBs do not undertake reallocations before the last year of the cycle. This is partly due to: (i) the fact that most other MDBs have similar or larger sized PoLGs distributed across a more limited number of countries, and therefore design and approve more than one project per country per PBAS cycle. This enables them to absorb any additional resource allocation due to yearly variations in allocations, while in IFAD this leads to a "leftover" amount of resources; (ii) the complexity of the early reallocation calculation, as reallocations are a yearly exercise while the reallocation pot is made up of three years' worth of resources.

### **III. Future updates**



18. Management will keep the Executive Board informed about the reallocation exercise through the established method of issuing an annual progress report on implementation of the performance-based allocation system, explaining the rationale for individual countries that are either being excluded or are benefiting from additional resources.

## Alternative scenarios considered in the analysis

### I. Background

- At the 120<sup>th</sup> session of the Executive Board in April 2017 Management presented four scenarios for Board consideration.<sup>16</sup> They were developed by gradually increasing the weight of the country performance component, which was at the core of the recommendations of the CLE on PBAS. The purpose of this was to increase the elasticity of the performance component in all proposed scenarios. For each scenario, the impact on allocations distribution was assessed based on country income categories. The share of allocations to countries with MFS was also assessed. Moreover, all four scenarios proposed complied with IFAD's commitments in terms of financing on highly concessional terms, and resource allocation to sub-Saharan Africa.
- Among the four proposed scenarios, Management recommended scenario 3 for approval. Among those proposed, scenario 3 provided the best distribution of resources to those countries that are, simultaneously, the neediest and the best performers. This is shown in the chart below. On the left, the chart shows the distribution of allocations (in percentage terms) by needs and performance quintiles. The needs quintiles (1 = neediest) are mapped horizontally and the performance quintiles (1 = best performers) vertically. On its right side, the chart shows the distribution of resources to LICs, LMICs, UMICs and MFS.

#### Scenario 3: needs, performance, income and MFS allocations distribution (% of total)



<sup>16</sup> Similarly to the scenarios presented in this annex, all scenarios presented to the Board in April used the 2015 RSP assessment scores, and the new PAD.

3. In terms of the balance between components, scenario 3 tended towards performance, while taking needs in due account (48 per cent needs and 52 per cent performance). In the formula, this was reflected through an increase in the PAD and a substantial increase in the exponent of the performance component, as follows:

$$[\text{RurPop}^{0.4} \times \text{GNIpc}^{-0.25} \times (\text{IVI})] \times (0.20 \times \text{RSP} + 0.80 \times \text{PAD})^4$$

4. Because of the increased weight of the PAD, Management considered that this scenario provided a clear incentive to country and project teams to improve the performance of the IFAD-financed portfolio by enhancing project implementation.
5. At the session, the Board expressed appreciation for Management's efforts to revise the formula and the recommendation of scenario 3 (SC3). The Board requested Management to continue working on the PBAS formula. Specifically, Management was asked to focus on the following aspects: (i) increasing the likelihood that poorer countries would receive higher allocations;<sup>17</sup> (ii) assessing the relative weight of the IVI; and (iii) reassess the balance between RSP and PAD within the performance component. To this end, Management tested variations of SC3 (SC3-A, SC3-B, SC3-C, SC3-D), which are presented in the sections below.

## II. Scenarios

6. Management developed and analysed 20 additional scenarios in order to assess how best to achieve the three goals described above. Management also took into consideration the additional factor of the number of countries that would receive minimum allocations, as in some cases this increased substantially. Management deems this as being worth of attention as a high number of countries with minimum allocations may hamper IFAD's capacity to effectively support these countries at the right scale. With the current formula, as applied in IFAD10, seven countries receive minimum allocations.
7. This section presents four selected variations on SC3. It includes distribution data for allocations obtained using the current formula as applied in IFAD10. It also describes the changes compared to the original SC3 presented in April, and explains how these changes address the Board's requests. Table 1 presents a summary of these scenario variations, highlighting the criteria identified by the Board at the April session. A more detailed description is provided below.

---

<sup>17</sup> Given that this is a multiplicative formula, the final allocations are determined by a complex interplay of the ratios of each variable with regard to other variables for the same country, and those same ratios with regard to the ratios of other countries. Therefore the increase or decrease in allocations cannot be attributed to changes in a single variable.

Table 1  
Scenario comparison

<i>Income category</i>	<i>IFAD10</i>	<i>SC3</i>	<i>SC3 variation</i>			
			<i>SC3-A</i>	<i>SC3-B</i>	<i>SC3-C</i>	<i>SC3-D</i>
LICs	32%	36%	39%	38%	61%	41%
LMICs	49%	47%	45%	46%	34%	44%
UMICs	19%	17%	16%	16%	6%	15%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Weights of variables in the needs components</b>						
Rural population	0.45	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
GNlpc	-0.25	-0.25	-0.325	-0.325	-1.25	-0.30
IVI	-	1	1.75	0.75	1.25	1.5
<b>Weights of variables in the performance components</b>						
RSP	0.45	0.2	0.3	0.25	0.2	0.25
PAD	0.35	0.8	0.7	0.75	0.8	0.75
CPIA	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Balance needs/performance</b>						
Needs	65%	48%	49%	49%	54%	55%
Performance	35%	52%	51%	51%	46%	45%
<b>Number of countries receiving minimum allocations</b>						
	<b>7</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>10</b>



### Scenario 3-A

The formula associated with SC3-A is as follows:

$$Ruralpop^{0.4} \times GNIpc^{-0.325} \times (IVI)^{1.75} \times (0.3 RSP + 0.7 PAD)^4$$

8. In SC3-A, compared to SC3, the exponent of GNIpc was increased by 0.075 in absolute terms from -0.25 to -0.325. This provides for a slightly higher elasticity for GNIpc within the formula, thereby increasing the formula’s focus on poverty. With the same intention, the exponent of the IVI was increased by 0.75, from 1 to 1.75. The combined effect of these two changes is a marginal increase in the weight of the needs component in the formula from, 48 to 49 per cent. Within the performance component, the balance between the RSP and the PAD variables was changed: the former was increased by 0.1 and the latter was decreased by the same amount. This maintains the focus on the performance of IFAD-financed projects but provides a slightly higher weight to the performance of the rural sector in terms of policies and institutions.
9. The changes in percentage allocations resulting from this formula change are described in table 1 above and charts 1 and 2 below. The share of allocations to LICs increases from 36 per cent in SC3-A to 39 per cent of total allocations. The allocation to MFS also increases from 25 per cent to 27 per cent. The number of countries with minimum allocations increases from the current level of seven under SC3, to 28 countries.

Chart 1

**Scenario 3-A: Allocations distribution by needs and performance quintiles (% of total) and country groupings**





Chart 2

**Scenario 3-A: Elasticity of formula variables**



### Scenario 3-B

10. SC3-B is a variation of SC3-A. While it maintains the same balance between the needs and performance components (49 per cent and 51 per cent respectively), this is achieved by decreasing the IVI from 1.75 in SC3-A to 0.75, and rebalancing by 0.5 the weights between the RSP and the PAD, bringing them to 0.25 and 0.75 respectively. This increases the focus on IFAD-financed operations. The formula for SC3-B is the following:

$$Ruralpop^{0.4} \times GNIpc^{-0.325} \times (IVI)^{0.75} \times (0.25 RSP + 0.75 PAD)^4$$

11. This provides a very similar amount of resources to LICs and LMICs as compared to SC3-A. The number of countries with minimum allocations increases from the current 7 to 27, as with the previous scenario, which is not a desired outcome. Notably, in SC3-B the PAD becomes the variable with the highest elasticity (43 per cent) within the formula, making it disproportionately inward-looking.

Chart 3

Scenario 3-B: Elasticity of formula variables






Chart 4

Scenario 3-B: Allocations distribution by needs and performance quintiles (% of total) and country groupings



### Scenario 3-C

12. In response to the Board’s wish to see an increased focus on poverty in the formula, Management proposes two scenario variations which reverse the balance between needs and performance, leading to a higher weight for the needs component when compared to the SC3 proposed at the April session. Option SC3-C achieves this by increasing the exponent of the GNIpc by 1.0 in absolute terms, therefore moving from -0.25 to -1.25 and, at the same time, increasing the exponent of the IVI by 0.25, from 1 to 1.25. In this scenario, the weight of the needs component is 54 per cent and the weight of the performance component is 46 per cent. In this option, the weights of the RSP and PAD variables are 0.2 and 0.8 respectively, therefore maintaining a strong focus on the performance of IFAD-financed operations. The formula for SC3-C is the following:

$$Ruralpop^{0.4} \times GNIpc^{-1.25} \times (IVI)^{1.25} \times (0.2 RSP + 0.8 PAD)^4$$

13. With this formula, the elasticity of the GNIpc increases significantly (54 per cent). The allocation to LICs also increases to 61 per cent. The number of countries with minimum allocations increases to 45. Therefore, while this option indeed shifts a higher share of resources to poorer countries, it also leads to the dispersion of small amounts of resources (minimum allocations) to a large number of countries. In addition, given the high elasticity of the GNIpc, this formula would be very vulnerable to fluctuations in GNIpc.

Chart 5  
Scenario 3-C: Allocations distribution by needs and performance quintiles (% of total) and country groupings





Chart 6  
Scenario 3-C: Elasticity of formula variables



### Scenario 3-D

14. SC3-D, the last option hereby presented, is a variation of SC3-C. It aims to allow for more balanced allocations across country income categories. Under this option, the number of countries receiving minimum allocations is lowered, which reduces the dispersion of results while at the same time ensuring an increased focus on poverty when compared to SC3.
15. SC3-D achieves this by increasing the exponent of the  $GNI_{pc}$  by 0.05 in absolute terms from -0.25 to -0.30 and at the same time increases the exponent of the IVI by 0.5 from 1 to 1.5. Within the performance component, the weight of the RSP is increased from 0.2 in SC3 to 0.25, counterbalanced by a decrease in the PAD, thereby providing an increased outward-looking focus to the formula. In this scenario, the weight of the needs component increases from 48 to 55 per cent and the weight of the performance component decreases accordingly from 52 to 45 per cent. The formula for scenario 3-D is as follows:

$$Ruralpop^{0.4} \times GNI_{pc}^{-0.3} \times (IVI)^{1.5} \times (0.25 RSP + 0.75 PAD)^1$$

16. With a higher elasticity of  $GNI_{pc}$  and the IVI when compared to SC3, this formula better responds to the need to better react to changes in country needs. The allocation to LICs increases from the current 32 per cent in IFAD10 and from the 36 per cent of SC3, to 41 per cent of resources in SC3-D. The number of countries with minimum allocations increases from the current seven to 10 – which is considerably lower than the 28 countries under SC3-A – thereby remaining aligned with the current situation. This option is therefore brought forward as the preferred option for approval.

Chart 7

**Scenario 3-D: Allocations distribution by needs and performance quintiles (% of total) and country groupings**





Chart 8

**Scenario 3-D: Elasticity of formula variables**



## **Enhanced Rural Sector Performance Assessment**

Currently being finalized.

## Adjusted scenario 3: country scores and annual allocations 2016-2018

**Adjusted scenario 3-A:**  $\text{Ruralpop}^{0.4} \times \text{GNIpc}^{-0.325} \times (\text{IVI})^{1.75} \times (0.3 \text{ RSP} + 0.7 \text{ PAD})^4$

Table 1  
Asia and the Pacific (SC3-A)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Afghanistan	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	30 616 888	30 616 888	30 616 888	91 850 664
Bangladesh	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	46 383 733	46 383 733	46 383 733	139 151 199
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	17 915 476	17 915 476	17 915 476	53 746 427
China	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	46 430 857	46 430 857	46 430 857	139 292 572
India**	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Indonesia	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	13 135 221	13 135 221	13 135 221	39 405 664
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		3 071 763	3 071 763	3 071 763	9 215 289
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		2 528 553	2 528 553	2 528 553	7 585 660
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	2 694 740	2 694 740	2 694 740	8 084 220
Malaysia	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		3 011 122	3 011 122	3 011 122	9 033 365
Mongolia	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	3 380 315	3 380 315	3 380 315	10 140 944
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	19 656 488	19 656 488	19 656 488	58 969 464
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	14 890 257	14 890 257	14 890 257	44 670 771
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	8 785 921	8 785 921	8 785 921	26 357 763
Papua New Guinea	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	8 740 819	8 740 819	8 740 819	26 222 458
Philippines	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	24 030 466	24 030 466	24 030 466	72 091 398
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	10 144 229	10 144 229	10 144 229	30 432 688
Tonga*	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vanuatu*	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Viet Nam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	30 552 637	30 552 637	30 552 637	91 657 910
<b>Total Asia and the Pacific</b>						<b>339 636 152</b>	<b>339 636 152</b>	<b>339 636 152</b>	<b>1 018 908 457</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 2  
East and Southern Africa (SC3-A)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	9 861 846	9 861 846	9 861 846	29 585 538
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	4 710 283	4 710 283	4 710 283	14 130 850
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	9 939 729	9 939 729	9 939 729	29 819 188
Ethiopia**	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	4 619 377	4 619 377	4 619 377	13 858 130
Madagascar	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	30 326 117	30 326 117	30 326 117	90 978 351
Malawi	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	7 003 728	7 003 728	7 003 728	21 011 183
Mauritius	9 710	758 906	1.42	5.03		2 342 477	2 342 477	2 342 477	7 027 430
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	10 063 209	10 063 209	10 063 209	30 189 628
Namibia	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		1 521 121	1 521 121	1 521 121	4 563 362
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	21 640 139	21 640 139	21 640 139	64 920 416
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1.36	4.47	4.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa	6 800	19 279 777	1.37	4.28		4 831 451	4 831 451	4 831 451	14 494 354
South Sudan*	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Tanzania (United Republic of)	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	6 648 057	6 648 057	6 648 057	19 944 170
Uganda	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	5 510 585	5 510 585	5 510 585	16 531 755
Zambia	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	3 722 378	3 722 378	3 722 378	11 167 133
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		5 530 611	5 530 611	5 530 611	16 591 832
Total East and Southern Africa						184 937 773	184 937 773	184 937 773	554 813 319
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 3  
Latin America and the Caribbean (SC3-A)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	I/VI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Argentina*	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Belize*	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	3 843 679	3 843 679	3 843 679	11 531 038
Brazil	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	12 190 913	12 190 913	12 190 913	36 572 740
Colombia	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	1 595 164	1 595 164	1 595 164	4 785 491
Cuba*	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Dominican Republic*	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Ecuador*	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
El Salvador	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	2 812 180	2 812 180	2 812 180	8 436 541
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala*	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guyana*	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Haiti*	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Honduras*	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	14 279 847	14 279 847	14 279 847	42 839 540
Nicaragua*	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Paraguay*	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	9 088 883	9 088 883	9 088 883	27 266 648
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)*	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
<b>Total Latin America and Caribbean</b>						<b>64 810 666</b>	<b>64 810 666</b>	<b>64 810 666</b>	<b>194 431 998</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions



Table 4  
Near East, North Africa and Europe (SC3-A)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Armenia*	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Azerbaijan*	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	3 144 532	3 144 532	3 144 532	9 433 595
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	4 358 024	4 358 024	4 358 024	13 074 073
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	12 521 521	12 521 521	12 521 521	37 564 564
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	8 238 902	8 238 902	8 238 902	24 716 705
Iraq	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73		3 610 112	3 610 112	3 610 112	10 830 336
Jordan	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	2 751 615	2 751 615	2 751 615	8 254 845
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	13 360 310	13 360 310	13 360 310	40 080 930
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Republic of Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	9 862 990	9 862 990	9 862 990	29 588 969
Montenegro	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51		1 546 375	1 546 375	1 546 375	4 639 124
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	10 254 763	10 254 763	10 254 763	30 764 290
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	35 836 608	35 836 608	35 836 608	107 509 823
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	16 005 895	16 005 895	16 005 895	48 017 686
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	9 879 146	9 879 146	9 879 146	29 637 437
Turkey	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	10 376 785	10 376 785	10 376 785	31 130 354
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	14 420 771	14 420 771	14 420 771	43 262 313
Yemen	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	2 707 143	2 707 143	2 707 143	8 121 430
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe						163 375 492	163 375 492	163 375 492	490 126 476
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 5  
West and Central Africa (SC3-A)

Country	GNI per capita			RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
	2015	Rural population 2015	IVI						
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	18 784 787	18 784 787	18 784 787	56 354 361
Burkina Faso	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	13 584 232	13 584 232	13 584 232	40 752 696
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	19 316 875	19 316 875	19 316 875	57 950 625
Cabo Verde	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	2 970 222	2 970 222	2 970 222	8 910 665
Central African Republic	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	10 684 115	10 684 115	10 684 115	32 052 344
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	22 193 719	22 193 719	22 193 719	66 581 158
Democratic Republic of the Congo	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		6 316 896	6 316 896	6 316 896	18 950 687
Republic of the Congo*	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Côte d'Ivoire*	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia (The)	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	11 295 021	11 295 021	11 295 021	33 885 062
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	11 059 088	11 059 088	11 059 088	33 177 264
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	6 427 334	6 427 334	6 427 334	19 282 003
Guinea-Bissau*	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	14 759 751	14 759 751	14 759 751	44 279 252
Mali	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	6 370 905	6 370 905	6 370 905	19 112 715
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	10 432 080	10 432 080	10 432 080	31 296 241
Niger	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	44 843 497	44 843 497	44 843 497	134 530 490
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	22 360 451	22 360 451	22 360 451	67 081 352
Sao Tome and Principe	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	2 354 970	2 354 970	2 354 970	7 064 911
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	25 197 708	25 197 708	25 197 708	75 593 125
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	4 121 600	4 121 600	4 121 600	12 364 799
Togo*	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total West and Central Africa						260 573 250	260 573 250	260 573 250	781 719 750
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

**Adjusted scenario 3-B:  $\text{Ruralpop}^{0.4} \times \text{GNIpc}^{-0.325} \times (\text{IVI})^{0.75} \times (0.25 \text{ RSP} + 0.75 \text{ PAD})^4$**

Table 1  
Asia and the Pacific (SC3-B)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual Allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Afghanistan	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	38 597 782	38 597 782	38 597 782	115 793 345
Bangladesh**	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	22 412 019	22 412 019	22 412 019	67 236 056
China**	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
India**	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Indonesia	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	15 655 658	15 655 658	15 655 658	46 966 975
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		3 569 361	3 569 361	3 569 361	10 708 082
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		2 938 156	2 938 156	2 938 156	8 814 468
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	3 118 353	3 118 353	3 118 353	9 355 059
Malaysia	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		3 498 896	3 498 896	3 498 896	10 496 688
Mongolia	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	4 269 216	4 269 216	4 269 216	12 807 647
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	24 803 245	24 803 245	24 803 245	74 409 735
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	17 696 364	17 696 364	17 696 364	53 089 092
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	9 746 620	9 746 620	9 746 620	29 239 859
Papua New Guinea	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	11 154 934	11 154 934	11 154 934	33 464 801
Philippines	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	29 259 776	29 259 776	29 259 776	87 779 329
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	12 455 085	12 455 085	12 455 085	37 365 254
Tonga*	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vanuatu*	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Viet Nam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	37 375 023	37 375 023	37 375 023	112 125 069
Total Asia and the Pacific						391 550 487	391 550 487	391 550 487	1 174 651 460
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 2  
East and Southern Africa (SC3-B)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	/VI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	12 528 248	12 528 248	12 528 248	37 584 745
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	5 429 806	5 429 806	5 429 806	16 289 419
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	12 269 586	12 269 586	12 269 586	36 808 758
Ethiopia**	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	4 988 643	4 988 643	4 988 643	14 965 930
Madagascar	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	37 914 891	37 914 891	37 914 891	113 744 673
Malawi	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	8 077 035	8 077 035	8 077 035	24 231 104
Mauritius	9 710	758 906	1.42	5.03		2 721 936	2 721 936	2 721 936	8 165 809
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	11 643 010	11 643 010	11 643 010	34 929 030
Namibia	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		1 767 529	1 767 529	1 767 529	5 302 586
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	25 971 112	25 971 112	25 971 112	77 913 336
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1.36	4.47	4.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa	6 800	19 279 777	1.37	4.28		5 614 103	5 614 103	5 614 103	16 842 308
South Sudan*	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Tanzania (United Republic of)	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	7 366 300	7 366 300	7 366 300	22 098 899
Uganda	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	5 981 310	5 981 310	5 981 310	17 943 930
Zambia	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	4 301 594	4 301 594	4 301 594	12 904 782
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		6 426 519	6 426 519	6 426 519	19 279 557
<b>Total East and Southern Africa</b>						<b>209 668 288</b>	<b>209 668 288</b>	<b>209 668 288</b>	<b>629 004 865</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 3  
Latin America and the Caribbean (SC3-B)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	I/I	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Argentina*	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Belize*	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	4 559 405	4 559 405	4 559 405	13 678 216
Brazil	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	14 597 712	14 597 712	14 597 712	43 793 136
Colombia	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	1 756 620	1 756 620	1 756 620	5 269 861
Cuba*	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Dominican Republic*	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Ecuador*	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
El Salvador	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	3 291 711	3 291 711	3 291 711	9 875 134
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala*	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guyana	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	1 735 026	1 735 026	1 735 026	5 205 079
Haiti*	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Honduras	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	1 582 955	1 582 955	1 582 955	4 748 865
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	13 142 997	13 142 997	13 142 997	39 428 990
Nicaragua*	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Paraguay*	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	8 829 153	8 829 153	8 829 153	26 487 460
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)*	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
<b>Total Latin America and Caribbean</b>						<b>67 495 580</b>	<b>67 495 580</b>	<b>67 495 580</b>	<b>202 486 741</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 4  
Near East, North Africa and Europe (SC3-B)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Armenia*	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Azerbaijan*	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	2 759 173	2 759 173	2 759 173	8 277 520
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	3 405 988	3 405 988	3 405 988	10 217 963
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	9 000 729	9 000 729	9 000 729	27 002 186
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	7 156 923	7 156 923	7 156 923	21 470 768
Iraq	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73	-	2 670 262	2 670 262	2 670 262	8 010 785
Jordan	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	2 379 363	2 379 363	2 379 363	7 138 088
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	11 553 486	11 553 486	11 553 486	34 660 459
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Republic of Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	7 971 827	7 971 827	7 971 827	23 915 482
Montenegro*	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51	-	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	8 058 361	8 058 361	8 058 361	24 175 084
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	24 688 442	24 688 442	24 688 442	74 065 325
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	13 303 604	13 303 604	13 303 604	39 910 811
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	8 641 390	8 641 390	8 641 390	25 924 171
Turkey	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	9 096 070	9 096 070	9 096 070	27 288 211
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	13 958 247	13 958 247	13 958 247	41 874 741
Yemen	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	1 646 057	1 646 057	1 646 057	4 938 170
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe						132 289 922	132 289 922	132 289 922	396 869 765
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 5  
West and Central Africa (SC3-B)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	15 423 995	15 423 995	15 423 995	46 271 984
Burkina Faso	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	9 957 287	9 957 287	9 957 287	29 871 862
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	16 639 676	16 639 676	16 639 676	49 919 029
Cabo Verde	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	2 544 248	2 544 248	2 544 248	7 632 744
Central African Republic	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	9 932 806	9 932 806	9 932 806	29 798 417
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	17 608 038	17 608 038	17 608 038	52 824 113
Democratic Republic of the Congo	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		5 103 605	5 103 605	5 103 605	15 310 816
Republic of the Congo*	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Côte d'Ivoire*	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia (The)	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	9 457 481	9 457 481	9 457 481	28 372 444
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	9 396 172	9 396 172	9 396 172	28 188 517
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	5 169 378	5 169 378	5 169 378	15 508 134
Guinea Bissau*	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	12 945 802	12 945 802	12 945 802	38 837 405
Mali	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	4 480 068	4 480 068	4 480 068	13 440 205
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	8 437 588	8 437 588	8 437 588	25 312 765
Niger	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	32 551 718	32 551 718	32 551 718	97 655 153
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	20 736 302	20 736 302	20 736 302	62 208 905
Sao Tome and Principe	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	1 945 521	1 945 521	1 945 521	5 836 562
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	19 187 711	19 187 711	19 187 711	57 563 133
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	3 311 660	3 311 660	3 311 660	9 934 980
Togo*	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
<b>Total West and Central Africa</b>						<b>212 329 057</b>	<b>212 329 057</b>	<b>212 329 057</b>	<b>636 987 170</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

## Adjusted scenario 3-C: $\text{Ruralpop}^{0.4} \times \text{GNIpc}^{-1.25} \times (\text{IVI})^{1.25} \times (0.2 \text{ RSP} + 0.8 \text{ PAD})^4$

Table 1  
Asia and the Pacific (SC3-C)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Afghanistan**	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Bangladesh**	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	22 975 250	22 975 250	22 975 250	68 925 750
China	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	9 070 329	9 070 329	9 070 329	27 210 987
India	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	47 693 098	47 693 098	47 693 098	143 079 294
Indonesia	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	4 731 343	4 731 343	4 731 343	14 194 029
Iran (Islamic Republic of)*	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		4 699 986	4 699 986	4 699 986	14 099 958
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	1 897 674	1 897 674	1 897 674	5 693 021
Malaysia*	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mongolia*	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	20 933 032	20 933 032	20 933 032	62 799 096
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	23 512 560	23 512 560	23 512 560	70 537 679
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	6 572 329	6 572 329	6 572 329	19 716 988
Papua New Guinea	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	6 195 294	6 195 294	6 195 294	18 585 881
Philippines	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	9 414 621	9 414 621	9 414 621	28 243 862
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	4 117 121	4 117 121	4 117 121	12 351 364
Tonga*	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vanuatu*	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Viet Nam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	21 191 713	21 191 713	21 191 713	63 575 140
Total Asia and the Pacific						291 837 683	291 837 683	291 837 683	875 513 050
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions



Table 2  
East and Southern Africa (SC3-C)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	3 081 266	3 081 266	3 081 266	9 243 797
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	17 561 663	17 561 663	17 561 663	52 684 990
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	18 067 001	18 067 001	18 067 001	54 201 004
Ethiopia**	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	3 552 674	3 552 674	3 552 674	10 658 021
Madagascar**	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Malawi	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	28 063 143	28 063 143	28 063 143	84 189 429
Mauritius*	9 710	758 906	1.42	5.03		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	17 518 305	17 518 305	17 518 305	52 554 915
Namibia*	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	36 220 580	36 220 580	36 220 580	108 661 740
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1.36	4.47	4.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa*	6 800	19 279 777	1.37	4.28		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Sudan*	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Tanzania (United Republic of)	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	7 290 735	7 290 735	7 290 735	21 872 206
Uganda	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	7 742 359	7 742 359	7 742 359	23 227 078
Zambia	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	2 570 907	2 570 907	2 570 907	7 712 722
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		7 414 702	7 414 702	7 414 702	22 244 105
<b>Total East and Southern Africa</b>						<b>260 916 669</b>	<b>260 916 669</b>	<b>260 916 669</b>	<b>782 750 007</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 3  
Latin America and the Caribbean (SC3-C)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	I/V	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Argentina*	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Belize*	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	1 682 615	1 682 615	1 682 615	5 047 844
Brazil*	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Colombia*	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Cuba*	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Dominican Republic*	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Ecuador*	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
El Salvador*	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala*	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guyana*	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Haiti*	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Honduras*	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	1 871 404	1 871 404	1 871 404	5 614 213
Nicaragua*	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Paraguay*	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	1 833 420	1 833 420	1 833 420	5 500 260
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)*	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total Latin America and Caribbean						30 887 439	30 887 439	30 887 439	92 662 316
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 4  
Near East, North Africa and Europe (SC3-C)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	/VI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Armenia*	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Azerbaijan*	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bosnia and Herzegovina*	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	2 797 284	2 797 284	2 797 284	8 391 853
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	3 709 290	3 709 290	3 709 290	11 127 871
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	2 526 519	2 526 519	2 526 519	7 579 558
Iraq*	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Jordan*	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	11 879 766	11 879 766	11 879 766	35 639 299
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Republic of Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	4 214 697	4 214 697	4 214 697	12 644 092
Montenegro*	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	3 393 904	3 393 904	3 393 904	10 181 713
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	21 172 110	21 172 110	21 172 110	63 516 329
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	16 538 612	16 538 612	16 538 612	49 615 837
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	2 781 109	2 781 109	2 781 109	8 343 327
Turkey*	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	8 743 603	8 743 603	8 743 603	26 230 809
Yemen*	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe						91 256 895	91 256 895	91 256 895	273 770 686
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 5  
West and Central Africa (SC3-C)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	I/I	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	24 059 629	24 059 629	24 059 629	72 178 886
Burkina Faso	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	17 267 069	17 267 069	17 267 069	51 801 208
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	15 934 487	15 934 487	15 934 487	47 803 460
Cape Verde*	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Central African Republic	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	36 455 443	36 455 443	36 455 443	109 366 329
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	24 915 025	24 915 025	24 915 025	74 745 074
Democratic Republic of the Congo	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		14 546 451	14 546 451	14 546 451	43 639 353
Republic of the Congo*	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Cote D'Ivoire*	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia (The)	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	25 794 621	25 794 621	25 794 621	77 383 863
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	7 200 966	7 200 966	7 200 966	21 602 899
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	13 075 218	13 075 218	13 075 218	39 225 653
Guinea Bissau*	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	42 229 878	42 229 878	42 229 878	126 689 634
Mali	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	7 857 100	7 857 100	7 857 100	23 571 299
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	8 903 026	8 903 026	8 903 026	26 709 078
Niger**	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	9 110 319	9 110 319	9 110 319	27 330 956
Sao Tome and Principe*	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	24 584 889	24 584 889	24 584 889	73 754 667
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	5 333 860	5 333 860	5 333 860	16 001 580
Togo*	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total West and Central Africa						338 434 647	338 434 647	338 434 647	1 015 303 941
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

### Adjusted Scenario 3-D: $\text{Ruralpop}^{0.4} \times \text{GNIpc}^{-0.3} \times (\text{IVI})^{1.5} \times (0.25 \text{ RSP} + 0.75 \text{ PAD})^1$

Table 1  
Asia and the Pacific (SC3-D)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Afghanistan	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	23 890 284	23 890 284	23 890 284	71 670 852
Bangladesh	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	33 252 044	33 252 044	33 252 044	99 756 131
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	13 762 286	13 762 286	13 762 286	41 286 858
China	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	32 261 627	32 261 627	32 261 627	96 784 880
India**	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Indonesia	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	18 606 913	18 606 913	18 606 913	55 820 739
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		7 030 431	7 030 431	7 030 431	21 091 294
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		8 865 524	8 865 524	8 865 524	26 596 572
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	5 365 991	5 365 991	5 365 991	16 097 973
Malaysia	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		4 087 392	4 087 392	4 087 392	12 262 175
Mongolia	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	3 053 046	3 053 046	3 053 046	9 159 139
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	19 092 219	19 092 219	19 092 219	57 276 657
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	17 933 927	17 933 927	17 933 927	53 801 782
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	21 418 246	21 418 246	21 418 246	64 254 739
Papua New Guinea	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	8 134 362	8 134 362	8 134 362	24 403 087
Philippines	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	16 682 916	16 682 916	16 682 916	50 048 749
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	9 970 327	9 970 327	9 970 327	29 910 982
Tonga*	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vanuatu*	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vietnam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	20 920 668	20 920 668	20 920 668	62 762 004
Total Asia and the Pacific						317 994 871	317 994 871	317 994 871	953 984 612
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 2  
East and Southern Africa (SC3-D)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	I/I	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	9 051 996	9 051 996	9 051 996	27 155 988
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	12 522 303	12 522 303	12 522 303	37 566 910
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	10 755 726	10 755 726	10 755 726	32 267 178
Ethiopia	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	38 239 863	38 239 863	38 239 863	114 719 589
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	12 588 895	12 588 895	12 588 895	37 766 685
Madagascar	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	21 807 752	21 807 752	21 807 752	65 423 256
Malawi	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	15 287 474	15 287 474	15 287 474	45 862 423
Mauritius	9 710	758 906	1.42	5.03		2 086 025	2 086 025	2 086 025	6 258 076
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	15 893 351	15 893 351	15 893 351	47 680 052
Namibia	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		2 679 148	2 679 148	2 679 148	8 037 445
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	13 724 049	13 724 049	13 724 049	41 172 147
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1.36	4.47	4.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa	6 800	19 279 777	1.37	4.28		6 952 262	6 952 262	6 952 262	20 856 785
South Sudan	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	3 176 600	3 176 600	3 176 600	9 529 799
Tanzania (United Republic of)	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	15 330 106	15 330 106	15 330 106	45 990 317
Uganda	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	14 908 807	14 908 807	14 908 807	44 726 422
Zambia	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	7 398 521	7 398 521	7 398 521	22 195 564
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		10 666 229	10 666 229	10 666 229	31 998 686
<b>Total East and Southern Africa</b>						<b>217 569 108</b>	<b>217 569 108</b>	<b>217 569 108</b>	<b>652 707 323</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

\*\* Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 3  
Latin America and the Caribbean (SC3-D)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Argentina	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	2 059 533	2 059 533	2 059 533	6 178 600
Belize*	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	4 830 530	4 830 530	4 830 530	14 491 590
Brazil	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	8 221 745	8 221 745	8 221 745	24 665 235
Colombia	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	4 071 809	4 071 809	4 071 809	12 215 427
Cuba	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	1 685 073	1 685 073	1 685 073	5 055 218
Dominican Republic	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	1 959 102	1 959 102	1 959 102	5 877 307
Ecuador	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	3 259 293	3 259 293	3 259 293	9 777 879
El Salvador	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	3 413 673	3 413 673	3 413 673	10 241 019
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	2 646 153	2 646 153	2 646 153	7 938 458
Guyana	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	2 050 627	2 050 627	2 050 627	6 151 881
Haiti	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	2 726 127	2 726 127	2 726 127	8 178 381
Honduras	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	3 860 781	3 860 781	3 860 781	11 582 344
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	10 016 017	10 016 017	10 016 017	30 048 050
Nicaragua	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	4 233 927	4 233 927	4 233 927	12 701 782
Paraguay	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	3 154 097	3 154 097	3 154 097	9 462 290
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	6 170 497	6 170 497	6 170 497	18 511 492
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	2 638 470	2 638 470	2 638 470	7 915 410
<b>Total Latin America and Caribbean</b>						<b>71 497 455</b>	<b>71 497 455</b>	<b>71 497 455</b>	<b>214 492 364</b>
<b>Total IFAD</b>						<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>1 013 333 333</b>	<b>3 040 000 000</b>

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Table 4  
Near East, North Africa and Europe (SC3-D)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	PAD		2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
				RSP 2015	2016				
Armenia	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	1 577 802	1 577 802	1 577 802	4 733 407
Azerbaijan	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	2 018 581	2 018 581	2 018 581	6 055 743
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	3 884 923	3 884 923	3 884 923	11 654 770
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	3 115 425	3 115 425	3 115 425	9 346 275
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	17 468 510	17 468 510	17 468 510	52 405 531
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	5 267 855	5 267 855	5 267 855	15 803 565
Iraq	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73		7 010 757	7 010 757	7 010 757	21 032 272
Jordan	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	2 911 491	2 911 491	2 911 491	8 734 474
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	9 514 349	9 514 349	9 514 349	28 543 047
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Republic of Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	6 436 425	6 436 425	6 436 425	19 309 275
Montenegro	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51		1 707 418	1 707 418	1 707 418	5 122 253
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	10 641 294	10 641 294	10 641 294	31 923 883
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	25 773 006	25 773 006	25 773 006	77 319 019
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	12 778 863	12 778 863	12 778 863	38 336 590
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	6 443 697	6 443 697	6 443 697	19 331 092
Turkey	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	8 310 279	8 310 279	8 310 279	24 930 836
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	13 035 612	13 035 612	13 035 612	39 106 835
Yemen	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	11 227 852	11 227 852	11 227 852	33 683 555
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe						150 624 141	150 624 141	150 624 141	451 872 424
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions



Table 5  
West and Central Africa (SC3-D)

Country	GNI per capita 2015	Rural population 2015	IVI	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	2016 annual allocation	2017 annual allocation	2018 annual allocation	Total
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	13 711 750	13 711 750	13 711 750	41 135 250
Burkina Faso	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	17 157 979	17 157 979	17 157 979	51 473 936
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	14 066 426	14 066 426	14 066 426	42 199 279
Cape Verde	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	2 011 363	2 011 363	2 011 363	6 034 089
Central African Republic	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	11 049 574	11 049 574	11 049 574	33 148 723
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	17 819 408	17 819 408	17 819 408	53 458 223
Democratic Republic of the Congo	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		20 693 692	20 693 692	20 693 692	62 081 076
Republic of the Congo	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	2 137 792	2 137 792	2 137 792	6 413 375
Cote D'Ivoire	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	5 833 070	5 833 070	5 833 070	17 499 209
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia (The)	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	7 388 578	7 388 578	7 388 578	22 165 734
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	11 754 204	11 754 204	11 754 204	35 262 611
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	12 709 000	12 709 000	12 709 000	38 127 000
Guinea Bissau	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		3 259 594	3 259 594	3 259 594	9 778 781
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	11 069 604	11 069 604	11 069 604	33 208 813
Mali	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	13 344 241	13 344 241	13 344 241	40 032 723
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	7 478 168	7 478 168	7 478 168	22 434 503
Niger	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	30 572 829	30 572 829	30 572 829	91 718 486
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	21 563 352	21 563 352	21 563 352	64 690 056
Sao Tome and Principe	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	1 838 579	1 838 579	1 838 579	5 515 736
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	16 649 875	16 649 875	16 649 875	49 949 624
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	7 897 926	7 897 926	7 897 926	23 693 779
Togo	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	4 140 757	4 140 757	4 140 757	12 422 271
Total West and Central Africa						255 647 759	255 647 759	255 647 759	766 943 277
Total IFAD						1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

\*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions