

MOPAN

2017-18 ASSESSMENTS

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**International Fund for  
Agricultural Development  
(IFAD)**

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MOPAN Assessments

# **International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)**

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2017-18 Performance Assessment



# Preface

## ABOUT MOPAN

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) comprises 18 countries<sup>1</sup> that share a common interest in assessing the effectiveness of the major multilateral organisations they fund. These include United Nations agencies, international financial institutions and global funds. The Network generates, collects, analyses and presents relevant and credible information on their organisational and development effectiveness. This knowledge base is intended to contribute to organisational learning within and among the organisations, their direct clients and partners, and other stakeholders. Network members use the reports for their own accountability needs and as a source of input for strategic decision-making.

MOPAN 3.0, first applied in 2015-16, is the latest operational and methodological iteration of how the Network assesses organisations. It builds on the former version, the Common Approach, which the Network implemented from 2009 through 2014.

In 2017-18, MOPAN assessed 14 organisations, including the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The other 13 are:

- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- Global Environment Facility (GEF)
- Global Partnership for Education (GPE)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
- World Food Program (WFP)
- World Health Organization (WHO)

### Operating principles

MOPAN generates assessments that are credible, fair and accurate. Credibility is ensured through an impartial, systematic and rigorous approach. MOPAN seeks an appropriate balance between coverage and depth of information from a variety of sources and through multiple streams of evidence. The Network gives priority to quality of information over quantity and uses structured tools for enquiry and analysis. An audit trail of findings ensures transparency. MOPAN applies efficient measures of assessment practice through building layers of data, with a view to limiting the burden on organisations assessed. A focus on organisational learning aims to ensure utility of the findings by multiple stakeholders.

### Objectives of the MOPAN methodology

MOPAN seeks to provide a diagnostic assessment, or snapshot, of an organisation. It tells the story of an organisation's current performance. MOPAN is guided by framing questions which serve to understand the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of multilateral organisations, while also garnering a sense of the sustainability of their results. The empirical design of MOPAN is based on a theory of change.

1. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. MOPAN also has two observers, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates.

The methodology's key elements include a set of five performance areas against which the assessment takes place. The first four cover strategic, operational, relationship and performance management. The fifth area englobes the organisation's contribution to development, humanitarian and normative results. These areas are captured in the MOPAN indicator framework against which performance is measured using three evidence streams – a document review, surveys, and interviews and consultations – brought together in a combined approach.

A MOPAN assessment is not an external audit of an organisation, nor is it an institutional evaluation. MOPAN does not comprehensively assess all operations or all processes of an organisation, nor can it provide a definitive picture of all the organisation's achievements and performance during the time period of the assessment. Neither does MOPAN offer comprehensive documentation or analysis of ongoing organisational reform processes.

## Acknowledgements

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The MOPAN assessment was finalised under the overall strategic guidance of Suzanne Steensen, Head of the MOPAN Secretariat. It was prepared under the responsibility of Samer Hachem. We are very grateful to Jr. Marcus A. Johnson from the United States for championing this assessment of IFAD on behalf of the MOPAN membership.

The assessment was conducted with support from IOD PARC, an independent consultancy specialised in assessing performance and managing change in the field of international development. Ronnie MacPherson served as Team Lead for the assessment of IFAD, with support from Ingrid Obery and Steven Lally, under the overall leadership of Julian Gayfer. Ipsos MORI administered the partner survey.

The report benefited from a peer review conducted within the MOPAN Secretariat and from the comments of a senior independent advisor, Bruce Murray, former Head of Evaluation at the Asian Development Bank. Susan Sachs and Jill Gaston edited the report, and Andrew Esson provided layout and graphic design.

MOPAN is grateful to its Steering Committee representatives for supporting the assessment of IFAD. Finally, MOPAN would like to convey appreciation to IFAD management and staff for their input and comments at various stages, in particular those staff members who internally co-ordinated the process and provided substantive feedback on the final draft report.

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>ADB</b>	Asian Development Bank	<b>PoLG</b>	Programme of loans and grants
<b>ARRI</b>	Annual report on results and impact	<b>PoW</b>	Programme of work
<b>ASAP</b>	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme	<b>PRISMA</b>	President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions
<b>AUO</b>	Office of Audit and Oversight	<b>QA</b>	Quality assurance
<b>CCR</b>	Completion reviews	<b>QE</b>	Quality enhancement
<b>COSOP</b>	Country strategic opportunities programme	<b>RBA</b>	Rome-based Agency
<b>CPE</b>	Country programme evaluation	<b>RBB</b>	Results-based budgeting
<b>DEF</b>	Development Effectiveness Framework	<b>RB-COSOP</b>	Results-based country strategic opportunities programme
<b>DMRG</b>	Departmental Management Review Group	<b>RBM</b>	Results-based management
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo	<b>RIDE</b>	Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness
<b>DSF</b>	Debt Sustainability Framework	<b>RIMS</b>	Results and Impact Management System
<b>EFA</b>	Economic and financial analysis	<b>RMF</b>	Results measurement framework
<b>ENRM</b>	Environment and natural resource management	<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization	<b>SEA</b>	Sexual exploitation and abuse
<b>GEF</b>	Global Environment Facility	<b>SECAP</b>	Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures
<b>GPE</b>	Global Partnership for Education	<b>SH</b>	Sexual harassment
<b>HR</b>	Human resources	<b>SMRG</b>	Senior Management Review Group
<b>HRD</b>	Human Resources Division	<b>SSTC</b>	South-South and triangular co-operation
<b>HRIP</b>	Human resources implementing procedures	<b>SUN</b>	Strategic update note
<b>IAI</b>	Impact Assessment Initiative	<b>SWOT</b>	Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
<b>IASB</b>	International Accounting Standards Board	<b>SWP</b>	Strategic workforce plan
<b>IATI</b>	International Aid Transparency Initiative	<b>ToC</b>	Theory of change
<b>IED</b>	Independent Evaluation Department	<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development	<b>UNEG</b>	United Nations Evaluation Group
<b>IFI</b>	International financial institution	<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>IFRS</b>	International Financial Reporting Standards	<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>IOE</b>	Independent Office of Evaluation	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations Refugee Agency
<b>ISA</b>	International Standards on Auditing	<b>UNRWA</b>	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
<b>ISAE</b>	International Standards on Assurance Engagements	<b>UN-SWAP</b>	United Nations System-wide Action Plan
<b>KM</b>	Knowledge management	<b>UN Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and evaluation	<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>MfDR</b>	Managing for development results	<b>WEAI</b>	Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index
<b>MTR</b>	Mid-term review	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
<b>OPEX</b>	Operational Excellence on Results exercise		
<b>ORMS</b>	Operational Results Management System		
<b>PBAS</b>	Performance-based allocation system		
<b>PCR</b>	Project completion report		
<b>PDR</b>	Project design report		
<b>PES</b>	Performance evaluation system		

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## Executive summary

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In 2017-18, MOPAN, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network, assessed the performance of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The assessment looked at IFAD's organisational effectiveness (strategic, operational, relationship and performance aspects) and the results it achieved against its objectives. This was the second MOPAN assessment of IFAD; the first was conducted in 2013.

### CONTEXT

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IFAD finances agricultural development projects, primarily to introduce, expand or improve food production systems as well as to strengthen related policies and institutions. The Fund's work focuses on supporting rural poor people, particularly those in the most remote, hardest-to-reach areas. IFAD has a unique dual nature in that it serves both as a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN) and as an international finance institution (IFI). In line with this dual nature, IFAD does not deliver interventions directly. Rather, it mostly relies on and finances government-level partners for implementation. In line with its role as a specialised UN agency, however, IFAD is much more intensely involved in designing, supporting and supervising interventions than are other IFIs.

Member state contributions provide IFAD's core resources, and these resources are mobilised through a replenishment process every three years. While the value of these member state contributions is relatively stable, it is not increasing and an expanding work programme means that IFAD must increasingly diversify its funding base beyond member state core contributions. As an IFI, the Fund has access to a broader range of financial instruments than do other UN agencies.

The UN Reform agenda has implications for the majority of IFAD's work, particularly the development and delivery of projects in countries. IFAD's current organisational change processes, and particularly its accelerated decentralisation and institutional restructuring, are partly driven by the demands of that agenda.

### KEY FINDINGS

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The assessment finds that IFAD is an agile, responsive and well-performing organisation. The Fund's strategy, organisational architecture and operating model are all very well geared to deliver IFAD's mandate and are sufficiently flexible to adapt to the changing global context and to member states' evolving needs and priorities.

IFAD's 2016-25 Strategic Framework is well-aligned with the Fund's mandate, as was its previous strategic framework. While the effectiveness of the 2018 reforms cannot yet be ascertained, the current accelerated decentralisation process is a clear and resourced response to the demands of this strategic framework. The Fund consistently makes positive contributions to reducing rural poverty and continues to deliver results that are highly relevant to its member states' needs and priorities. Sustainability and efficiency remain, however, areas for improvement, although the assessment team noted a positive trend.

IFAD's results culture is strong and growing stronger, and the evaluation and accountability functions continue to be robust. The Fund has now established the basics of results-based budgeting. At the operations level, developments such as the Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) have further strengthened the intervention design process, including the mainstreaming of the cross-cutting issues such as gender and environment, although good governance and human rights remain a step back. Where outlooks could be stronger – notably on speed of disbursement – IFAD is making progress or is actively addressing the institutional shortcomings that have been linked with comparatively weaker performance. A major reform process is on-going, including decentralisation for redeploying IFAD's resources at regional and country levels.

Finally, IFAD's work on diversifying its resource base, developing a transition framework for member states and upscaling its knowledge brokering role is a clear indicator of a forward-looking organisation that is highly alert and responsive to major upcoming strategic challenges. As a result of the refinement of the Performance-Based Allocation System and the adoption of new financing frameworks, IFAD is better equipped to deal with a tighter financial environment, in particular the lack of growth in the value of member state core contributions, and to further evolve over the IFAD11 replenishment period, 2019-21.

The strengths identified during the 2013 MOPAN assessment of IFAD have largely been sustained. However, as in 2013, inefficiency continues to be an institutional bottleneck today, and IFAD openly acknowledges this.

The assessment identified five **key strengths** of IFAD:

**1. A clear mandate supported by a well-articulated strategic framework that is aligned with the 2030.** As the 2013 MOPAN assessment noted, IFAD's strategic framework is tightly linked to its mandate and provides an admirable level of detail on the Fund's direction and approach.

**2. Regular, intensive consultation processes that ensure a responsive, relevant organisation.** The replenishment consultation process, the Farmers' Forum, the Indigenous Peoples' Forum, and the intensive country strategy development and project design processes all help to ensure that IFAD's work is relevant to the needs and priorities of member states. The strength of these processes is likely a factor in the highly relevant results that IFAD delivers for partner countries. It also drives agility to respond to demands.

**3. A transparent, well-defined approach to resource allocation.** IFAD's Performance-Based Allocation System continues to ensure that resource allocation strongly corresponds to the Fund's immediate strategic priorities. Additionally, IFAD is devoting considerable effort to ensuring that its services can continue to be delivered to as many member states as possible, including upper-middle-income countries.

**4. A strong institutional focus on results that is underpinned by a well-developed results infrastructure.** IFAD's results culture and the underlying systems are well developed and continue to improve. IFAD's country strategies and projects benefit from comparatively intensive design and supervision processes, with the quality enhancement and SECAP approaches bringing a significant level of expertise and attention to bear on every intervention. The strong results focus extends to the Fund's evaluation function, which continues to be robust.

**5. A clear progress towards results-based budgeting.** Directly addressing a limitation identified in the 2013 assessment, IFAD's programme of work now presents the regular budget according to institutional output areas and outlines resource allocation according to strategic objectives and thematic areas. Corporate reporting remains however to be adjusted so that resource utilisation/expenditure is reported against results areas.

The assessment also identified five major **areas for improvement**:

**1. Speed of disbursement remains to be improved:** Both independent evaluations and management reporting consistently identify disbursement delays as having potentially negative effects on IFAD's results. Recent improvements have, however, been noted.

**2. Institutional capacity analysis should be strengthened:** While capacity analysis is undertaken during strategy and project development and delivery, it is comparatively basic. This constrains IFAD's capacity for higher-level policy engagement and limits cross-cutting results in governance – beyond the absence of dedicated policy.

**3. Shortcomings in targeting strategies weaken IFAD's approach.** Targeting approaches sometimes lack clarity regarding the specific intended beneficiary groups, with potential implications on the relevance of interventions and on reaching the most vulnerable. This has also implications on cross-cutting results in human rights – also beyond the absence of dedicated policy and explicit guidelines. IFAD's intention to explicitly incorporate human rights into the next iteration of the SECAP was noted.

**4. Measurement of knowledge work needs to be enhanced:** IFAD's rapidly expanding focus on the deployment of its own knowledge assets should be supported by a more rigorous approach to monitoring and evaluation of the Fund's knowledge role, outputs and influence.

**5. Integration of performance data and lesson learning could be more systematic:** IFAD corporate reporting recognises this shortcoming. Several well-developed processes and feedback loops are in place for integrating past experience into new intervention designs, but these processes are not applied systematically.




## METHODS OF ANALYSIS

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
The assessment of performance covers the IFAD headquarters and regional and country field presence. It addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved during the period 2016 to mid-2018. It relies on three lines of evidence: a review of 92 documents, interviews with 71 staff members individually and in small groups, and an online survey conducted among partners in 13 countries.

The MOPAN 3.0 methodology entails a framework of 12 key performance indicators and associated micro-indicators. It comprises standards that characterise an effective multilateral organisation. MOPAN conducted the assessment with support from IOD PARC, a consulting company located in the United Kingdom that specialises in results-based performance assessment in international development. The United States acted as the Institutional Lead country, representing MOPAN members in this assessment process.

**IFAD PERFORMANCE RATING SUMMARY (2017-18)**



# 1. INTRODUCTION



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# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

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This report has three chapters and three annexes. Chapter 1 introduces the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the MOPAN 3.0 assessment process. Chapter 2 presents the main findings of the assessment in relation to each performance area. Chapter 3 provides the conclusions of the assessment. Annex 1 summarises the evidence gathered against each indicator with the detailed scores. Annex 2 lists the documents used for the analysis. Finally, Annex 3 provides an overview of the results of MOPAN's partner survey.

## 1.2. IFAD AT A GLANCE

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**Mission and mandate:** IFAD was established in 1977 as a response to the United Nations' 1974 World Food Conference. Held against a backdrop of global food shortages and multiple famines, the World Food Conference identified the causes of these crises as being not just failures in food production, but also broader structural problems. IFAD was subsequently established to finance agricultural development projects, primarily for the introduction, expansion or improvement of food production systems, including the strengthening of related policies and institutions. The Fund's work was to be focused on supporting rural poor people, particularly those in the remotest, hardest to reach areas. This core approach remains unchanged since IFAD's inception and is encapsulated in the Fund's current overarching goal: "to invest in rural people to enable them to overcome poverty and achieve food security through remunerative, sustainable and resilient livelihoods". IFAD has a dual nature, serving both as a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN), and as an international finance institution (IFI).

**Governance:** IFAD's highest decision-making body is the Governing Council, which meets annually and is open to all of the Fund's 176 member states. Member states are grouped into three lists that broadly categorise them as countries that provide contributions to the Fund but do not receive IFAD support (List A); countries that are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, provide contributions and may receive IFAD support (List B); and developing country recipients, many of whom also provide contributions (List C). The Executive Board is composed of representatives from 18 member states (plus 18 alternates) drawn from 8 List A countries, 4 List B countries and 6 List C countries. The Executive Board meets three times a year and is responsible for overseeing IFAD's general operations including approval of the Fund's programme of work, projects, programmes and grants. The Executive Board is chaired by the IFAD President, who is responsible for the overall management of the Fund. The President is appointed by the Governing Council for a four-year term that is renewable once.

**Organisational structure:** With direction from the Governing Council and Executive Board, the Office of the President and Vice President provide IFAD's day-to-day leadership. IFAD operations are organised across five departments: External Relations and Governance, Financial Operations, Programme Management, Strategy and Knowledge, and Corporate Services. These departments are further delineated into divisions and offices; one example is the Programme Management Department, which comprises five regional divisions and the Operational Policy and Results Division. The Independent Office of Evaluation sits outside this structure, reporting directly to the Executive Board.

In addition to the Fund's Rome headquarters, as of mid-2018 IFAD has 9 regional hubs (with another 3 planned), 3 South-South and Triangular Cooperation and Knowledge Centres, and a further 28 country offices. The Fund has over 600 staff; approximately 70% are based at headquarters and 30% are in regional hubs or country offices.

**Strategy:** IFAD's current ten-year Strategic Framework (2016-25) establishes three strategic objectives:

- increase poor rural people's productive capacities
- increase poor rural people's benefits from market participation
- strengthen the environmental sustainability and climate resilience of poor rural people's economic activities.

The Fund aims to meet these objectives through the delivery of three outcomes, namely:

- enabling policy and regulatory frameworks at national and international levels
- increased levels of investment in the rural sector
- improved country-level capacity for rural policy and programme development, implementation and evaluation.

The ten-year Strategic Framework also explicitly incorporates the seven Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to which IFAD aims to contribute. The most directly relevant to IFAD are SDG 1 (no poverty) and SDG 2 (zero hunger).

IFAD primarily works towards these results by financing country-level and regional projects and programmes. Projects are typically delivered and managed by implementation partners (ordinarily governments), with IFAD providing support, supervision and technical advice. As of 31 December 2017, IFAD was financing 211 ongoing projects in 97 countries. Based on its project-level experience, IFAD also works towards its results by building and disseminating knowledge, including through policy engagement.

**Finances:** IFAD's core resources are provided by member state contributions, with these contributions mobilised through the Fund's replenishment process. Undertaken every three years, the replenishment consultation is a process, usually lasting one year, whereby the Governing Council reviews IFAD performance, sets strategic direction, and invites new commitments and contributions. Member states pledged a total of USD 1.1 billion for the three-year IFAD10 period (2016-18), with virtually all pledges received by the end of 2017. IFAD11 (2019-21) sets a target for member states contributions of USD 1.2 billion.

Member state contributions remain static, but the Fund's programme of loans and grants continues to expand, so IFAD is working to diversify its funding base beyond member state core contributions. Recent replenishment processes saw the establishment of a Sovereign Borrowing Framework (enabling IFAD to secure loans from individual countries) and the approval of concessional partner loans as another financing vehicle for the Fund. IFAD has taken initial steps to assess the feasibility of market borrowing as an additional resource for the Fund.

The recent IFAD11 replenishment consultation process set targets that will see 90% of core resources allocated to lower- and lower middle-income countries (with the remaining 10% targeted for allocation to upper middle-income countries). Geographical allocation targets were also set, with 50% of core resources allocated to Africa (45% to sub-Saharan Africa). A further target will see 25-30% of resources allocated to work in the most fragile situations.

For the three most recent years with available data, IFAD's annual loan and grant disbursements were USD 660.5 million (2015), USD 702.6 million (2016) and USD 804.6 million (2017).

**Organisational change initiatives:** The Operational Excellence exercise (OPEX) is the change initiative driving IFAD's organisational realignment and decentralisation exercise<sup>2</sup>. IFAD's decentralisation process gained pace in 2018, with the establishment of nine regional hubs and three South-South and Triangular Cooperation and Knowledge Centres. This development was supported by the relocation of a comparatively large proportion of previously headquarters-based technical staff, with a view to strengthening the Fund's regional presence and capacity to provide more responsive support to the interventions they finance. Policy and infrastructure developments were underway to further support

2. The Operational Excellence for Results (OpEx), started in June 2017, involves a review of IFAD's operational model in its entirety, from core business processes to the organization as a whole.

the decentralisation, most notably a review and revision of the delegated authority framework and processes. During the same period, organisational restructuring created a new External Relations and Governance Department and relocated some divisions between departments. This restructuring was partly driven by the decentralisation process, but it also aimed to strengthen co-ordination of IFAD's knowledge- and policy-related work and to support the Fund's increasingly diversified financial framework.

### Box 1: Preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment<sup>3</sup>

- In January 2018, IFAD established a task force on sexual harassment/sexual exploitation and abuse (SH/SEA), overseen by the Ethics Office. Initial work focused on developing an organisational SH/SEA policy. The policy outlines IFAD's institutional responsibilities and systems, as well as the obligations of IFAD staff and individuals holding work contracts with the Fund. The IFAD President released the policy in early 2018, and IFAD11 included as a replenishment commitment the development of an SH/SEA action plan (for delivery by Q4, 2018).
- For commercial contracts, IFAD applied the pre-existing SH/SEA provisions from the UN Supplier Code of Conduct and includes in these contracts a reference to the IFAD policy. This is critical given that most IFAD financed activity – and by extension most interactions with beneficiaries – is conducted through intermediaries. Work has also commenced on amending IFAD's General Conditions for Financing.
- The SH/SEA task force also oversees strengthening of internal rules, procedures and processes, including risk assessment during project and programme design.
- The Ethics Office has led development of an online SEA training module for staff and has provided awareness-raising sessions.

## 1.3. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

### Assessment framework

This MOPAN 3.0 assessment covers the period from 2016 to mid-2018 in line with the MOPAN 3.0 methodology, which can be found on MOPAN's website.<sup>4</sup> The assessment addresses organisational systems, practices and behaviours, as well as results achieved. It focuses on the five performance areas presented in Table 1. The first four relate to organisational effectiveness, and each has two key performance indicators (KPIs). The fifth performance area relates to effectiveness of development, humanitarian and normative work, and comprises four KPIs.

The MOPAN 3.0 indicator framework was developed by MOPAN's Technical Working Group, drawing on international standards and reference points, as described in Annex C of the Methodology Manual.

### Applying the MOPAN methodology to IFAD

The assessment of performance covers the IFAD organisation (headquarters, regional hubs and field operations) and coincides with the first years of the current 2016-25 Strategic Framework. This aligns with the active IFAD replenishment period – IFAD10, 2016-18 – and the consultation process for the upcoming replenishment period (IFAD11, 2019-21). The assessment places more weight on the active IFAD10 period, but also takes account of the IFAD11 consultation process, given that this consultation concluded in early 2018 and formally established directions and policies that are already being implemented.

3. IThe 2017-18 MOPAN assessment does not assess the Organisation's performance with regard to preventing sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment (SEAH). This topic may become an area of assessment in future cycles. In the meantime, the assessment team simply collected key facts related to SEAH safeguarding as self-reported by the Organisation, but did not verify the actual implementation of the instruments outlined by the organisation.

4. MOPAN 3.0 Methodology Manual, 2017-18 Assessment Cycle, [www.mopanonline.org/ourwork/ourapproachmopan30](http://www.mopanonline.org/ourwork/ourapproachmopan30).

**Box 2: Performance areas and key performance indicators**

Aspect	Performance area	KPI
Organisational effectiveness	Strategic management	<b>KPI 1:</b> The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results
		<b>KPI 2:</b> Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels
	Operational management	<b>KPI 3:</b> The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility
		<b>KPI 4:</b> Organisational systems are cost and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability
	Relationship management	<b>KPI 5:</b> Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships
		<b>KPI 6:</b> Partnership working is coherent and directed at ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources
	Performance management	<b>KPI 7:</b> The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function
		<b>KPI 8:</b> The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming
Development effectiveness	Results	<b>KPI 9:</b> Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals
		<b>KPI 10:</b> Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate
		<b>KPI 11:</b> Results are delivered efficiently
		<b>KPI 12:</b> Results are sustainable

Given the dual nature of IFAD, the applicability of the indicator assessing the integration of human rights as cross-cutting issue (M2.1d) as defined in the methodology was debated, including with the senior independent advisor. This indicator has indeed not been applied for other IFIs such as the Asian Development Bank in the current cycle. The assessment team has decided to apply this indicator, in view of the UN nature of IFAD, while acknowledging that its definition does not exactly match the way IFAD addresses the issue as an IFI.

**Lines of evidence**

The MOPAN assessment of IFAD covers IFAD's headquarter operations, with insights into regional and country field presence. As part of the methodology, it relies on the following lines of evidence:

- **Document review:** The assessment team collected and reviewed a significant body of evidence. See Annex 2 for a list of the 92 documents utilised, though many more than this were screened for inclusion. Results documentation included 12 independent evaluations. A draft of the document review was shared with IFAD who provided feedback and additional documentation to update the review and address gaps before it fed into the overall analysis.
- **Online partner survey:** There were 115 responses to the online partner survey, which was conducted between March and April 2018. The responses came from people in 13 countries (Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tunisia and Turkey).

The survey (see Annex 3) was designed to gather both perception data and an understanding of practice from a diverse set of well-informed partners of IFAD, including from donor and national government representatives, UN agencies, international non-governmental organisations and other non-governmental organisations.<sup>5</sup>

- **Interviews and consultations:** The team interviewed or consulted with 71 staff members at IFAD headquarters in Rome in May 2018, primarily face-to-face but also through several video-conferences, covering all the Fund's Departments and operational regions. Member State representatives were also consulted.

Discussions were held with Institutional Lead representatives from the United States, as part of the analytical process, to gather insights on current priorities for the organisation from the perspective of MOPAN member countries.

### Limitations

The assessment was undertaken during a period of considerable, comparatively rapid organisational change across IFAD, most notably the accelerated decentralisation process and departmental restructuring. The effects of these major initiatives are likely to be significant, but it was not possible for this MOPAN assessment to identify or reflect the extent and influence of those institutional developments given the timing. Instead, the assessment should be understood as a "snapshot" of IFAD at a specific point in time (mid-2018), keeping in mind that the Fund was only just embarking on these substantial reforms.

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5. The assessment included gathering of survey data from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Myanmar and Papua New Guinea. However, at the time of the survey, IFAD's programme in the DRC was suspended, operations had only just commenced through one project in Myanmar, and there was no country office in Papua New Guinea. Consequently, any survey respondents' recent experience of IFAD in these countries would have been comparatively limited; the interpretation and analysis of survey data took account of this context.



## **2. DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF IFAD PERFORMANCE**

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## Chapter 2. Detailed assessment of IFAD performance

The performance is assessed on four dimensions of organisational effectiveness – strategic, operational, relationship and performance management – and on the results achieved by the organisation. These findings are constructed against the organisation’s own strategic plan and performance indicators.

In this way, organisational effectiveness relates to a blended assessment of intent, effort and response. Organisational intent is expressed through commitments, strategies, policies and plans. The organisational effort is that which the organisation puts behind a particular agenda for performance and improvement including guidance issued. The organisational response is its reaction to the effects of this effort in relation to changing organisational direction, practice and behaviour.

Organisational effectiveness is juxtaposed alongside development effectiveness. The latter refers to the extent to which the organisation is making a difference in ways that reflect its strategic objectives and mandate.

### 2.1. ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

#### PERFORMANCE AREA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

*Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities.*

The strategic framework of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is well articulated and clearly defines the organisation’s comparative advantage, its expected results (including contributions to the 2030 Agenda) and the means through which those results will be achieved. The strategic approach is regularly and intensively reviewed through the Fund’s triennial replenishment process, which helps to ensure that IFAD’s work is responsive to global developments and continuously relevant to member state needs and priorities. In turn, the Fund’s well-developed, results-oriented systems and processes support the design and delivery of interventions that are well aligned with strategic objectives and outcomes. However, some global cross-cutting issues are not yet systematically addressed by IFAD, most notably governance and human rights.

#### KPI 1: The organisational architecture and the financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results.

This KPI focuses on the extent to which IFAD has articulated a coherent and strategic vision of how and for what purpose it has organised its human activity and capital assets to deliver both long- and short-term results.

**IFAD’s clear mandate is supported by a well-articulated strategic framework and medium-term plan that are aligned with the 2030 Agenda.** IFAD firmly reinforces these with continuous analysis of its position within the global development architecture and its comparative advantage, namely its focus on reducing poverty and food insecurity in rural areas through agriculture and rural development. This analysis includes identifying explicit contributions IFAD



intends to make to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The strategic framework also sets out an overarching development goal, principles of engagement, strategic objectives and strategic outcomes. The framework and the medium-term plan guide the Fund in determining its results targets; IFAD's regularly updated results measurement framework (RMF) defines the targets and indicators in detail. Together, these instruments provide a convincing level of detail regarding the Fund's strategy and how it will be achieved, why IFAD is best placed to deliver the related work, and how performance against the strategy will be measured.

**Regular, intensive consultation with member states helps IFAD keep its mandate, strategy and priorities relevant.**

Various review processes help IFAD to remain relevant and make improvements. The most notable and substantial of these are the replenishment consultations that take place every three years, providing IFAD and its member states a regular, systematic opportunity to review the effectiveness and appropriateness of the organisation's strategy, direction and financial framework. During the consultations, the organisation, donors and partners take stock of the global context and constraints on the organisation and how these may affect or are affecting IFAD's vision and comparative advantage.

**IFAD's operating model and organisational architecture are undergoing major changes in line with a clearly articulated reform agenda, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of these changes.**

The reforms are largely a response to IFAD's move from results clusters to the four new "pillars of results delivery" set out in its 2016-25 Strategic Framework. These pillars identify the main operational components required to deliver the overall strategy: country programme delivery; knowledge building; financial capacity and instruments; and institutional functions, services and systems. In line with the objectives of the four pillars, particularly those pertaining to country programme management and knowledge building, IFAD has accelerated its decentralisation process. This process eventually will result in the creation of nine regional hubs and an additional three South-South and Triangular Cooperation and Knowledge Centres. To support this decentralised expansion, IFAD is relocating a significant proportion of technical staff to regional hubs and country offices from its headquarters in Rome. Member states and IFAD staff are generally supportive of the accelerated decentralisation. Moreover, the plans are appropriate, in that they improve alignment of the Fund's organisational architecture with its medium-term and long-term objectives. However, as the process has only recently started, it is not yet clear how well the changes will support delivery of the strategic objectives.

**IFAD faces ongoing resource pressures, but is working to address these constraints through significant diversification of its financial framework.**

The main financial challenge for IFAD continues to be securing full funding for its programme of loans and grants, with some evaluations noting that priority areas do not always receive adequate funding. For example, several evaluations concluded that inadequate funding for environment and natural resource management activities had on occasion compromised project implementation. Diversifying the resource base beyond member state core contributions is a major, ongoing workstream for IFAD and is aimed partly at addressing such funding constraints and financial risks. Recent milestones include the adoption of the Sovereign Borrowing Framework and Concessional Partner Loan Framework and initial exploration of the potential for market borrowing. These continuing efforts to strengthen and diversify IFAD's financial framework are significant and are laying the foundations for a more sustainable resource base.

**KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels.**

This KPI looks at the articulation and positioning within IFAD structures and mechanisms of the cross-cutting priorities to which the organisation is committed, in pursuit of its strategic objectives.


**IFAD's well-developed results infrastructure and strong planning processes provide a sound base for integrating cross-cutting issues, yet not all cross-cutting issues have been fully integrated within these mechanisms.**

Many cross-cutting issues are already well-embedded in the Fund's strategic framework and results infrastructure.

At the operational level, IFAD's planning processes – in particular the detailed quality enhancement (QE) process and the Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) – also provide a strong foundation for dealing with cross-cutting issues. Through these processes, IFAD applies significant expertise and targeted resources to analyse specific intervention-level issues. Gender, climate change and environment are systematically addressed through both the QE process and the SECAP at the country strategy and individual project levels. However, IFAD's systems only partially and/or implicitly consider the cross-cutting issues of governance and human rights.

**Gender equality and women's empowerment are well integrated within IFAD's programming, budget and evaluative functions.** Gender targets and indicators are an integral part of the RMF. More broadly, IFAD's gender-related results are also aligned with SDG 5 and the United Nations System-wide Action Plan (UN-SWAP) on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. (UN Women recently identified IFAD as one of the most successful UN entities in terms of meeting UN-SWAP's indicators). At the operational level, IFAD routinely addresses gender equality and women's empowerment during intervention design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The QE process and the SECAP ensure a high level of integration. Staff training on gender is available through the Operations Academy, and technical training also is provided by the Gender and Social Inclusion Team and the Human Resources Division. However, recent annual reports on results and impact (ARRIs) have noted that training is provided on a limited basis and requires more attention.

**Figure 1: Survey response – CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**



**The cross-cutting issues of environmental sustainability and climate change are well integrated within IFAD's structures and are increasingly important.** Strengthening environmental sustainability and climate resilience is one of IFAD's three strategic objectives for the 2016-25 period, requiring the Fund to adopt new core indicators and develop new monitoring processes. IFAD also has effected significant institutional realignment to support a stronger focus on climate and environment. These include the SECAP; the establishment of an Environment and Climate Division (restructured in 2018 as the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division); the launch of the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme and solid progress towards full accreditation with the Green Climate Fund. However, the current Climate Change Strategy (2010) and Environment and Natural Resource Management Policy (2011) are somewhat dated, particularly given the many internal and external developments that have taken place since their approval. A new, consolidated climate and environment strategy is being developed, and is projected to be adopted in early 2019.

**IFAD routinely addresses several aspects of good governance, but has no dedicated policy or approach for comprehensively addressing governance or advancing a good governance agenda.** IFAD's national-level governance work focuses almost entirely on financial governance and has very clear rules and guidance, particularly for assessing and dealing with fiduciary risk. Beyond financial governance, though, the organisation has little in the way of formal requirements or guidance on advancing good governance at the country or government level. While


IFAD does apply several governance-related indicators, systematic analysis of governance issues is not mandatory for country strategy or project development processes, although such analysis often does take place. IFAD’s main and most systematic approach to improving governance is through bottom-up rather than top-down channels. The Fund’s interventions often include components that develop grassroots individual and organisational capacities. The Strategic Framework 2016-25 notes that this approach aims “to enable its target group to attain secure access to natural resources and production services [and to] build their skills and knowledge to take advantage of new economic opportunities. In so doing, IFAD promotes better governance, policies and institutions for agriculture and rural development”. Recent ARRI findings find that this capacity development work contributes to positive results such as increased beneficiary engagement in local governance processes.

**IFAD’s processes address elements of human rights, but the organisation has no dedicated policy or guidance on this cross-cutting issue.** Some IFAD structures and processes – most notably the Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples as well as some aspects of the SECAP – address human rights, although the issue is not explicitly labelled as such. The consensus among IFAD staff is that the Fund’s work inherently addresses human rights, due in no small part to its extensive work with some of the most excluded and vulnerable populations. However, independent evaluations and ARRI findings have noted that IFAD’s targeting strategies are insufficiently refined, with interventions sometimes missing the most vulnerable communities and individuals. The Fund still has no plans to develop a dedicated human rights policy but, partly in recognition of the evaluation and review comments, it intends to explicitly incorporate human rights into the next iteration of the SECAP. This will include addressing specific human rights issues not previously dealt with systematically, such as labour rights.

**PERFORMANCE AREA: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT**

*Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility and accountability.*

IFAD applies a transparent resource allocation model that is tightly aligned with its strategic objectives and is very well targeted at IFAD’s highest priority countries. The organisation’s operating model is also well aligned with strategic priorities and is sufficiently responsive to changing operational needs. Driven by the current strategic objectives, a major institutional realignment is underway through an accelerated decentralisation process, although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this process. Results-based budgeting (RBB) is also evolving within IFAD, with the 2018 programme of work the first to present output level budgets against expected results. RBB, however, remains a work in progress. Timely disbursement of funds continues to be a problem despite IFAD’s robust resource allocation processes. IFAD openly acknowledges this persistent difficulty and continues to focus considerable attention on improving disbursement rates. The organisation also benefits from well-developed systems and procedures for staff management and performance assessment. However, the system is imperfect and perhaps overly rigid, with the result that processes are sometimes inconsistently applied.



### KPI 3: The operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility.

This KPI focuses on how key operational functions (e.g. human resources, resource generation and programming) are continuously geared to support strategic direction and deliver results.

**Using appropriate tools, IFAD routinely reviews and adjusts organisational structures and resources to ensure they are aligned with strategic priorities and needs.** The Fund's Strategic Framework 2016-25 explicitly recognises the importance of ensuring a responsive resource base (staffing and finance) that is continuously aligned to the organisation's evolving objectives. One of IFAD's four strategic results pillars is entirely focused on institutional functions, services and systems. This pillar supports the ongoing review, rationalisation and streamlining of business processes, with a view to improving institutional efficiency and effectiveness. IFAD has several tools that help to operationalise the pillar, among them the medium-term plan and the annual strategic workforce planning process and its associated strategic update note. The recently initiated Operations Academy has also established a more systematic, targeted approach to staff training and capacity development. Most IFAD staff regard these resources and tools as valuable for strategic planning and their day-to-day work. However, some staff and member state representatives expressed the view that the Fund's skill base and capacity development opportunities may still be too investment focused given the evolution and strategic direction of IFAD, and that more emphasis is needed on developing increasingly important, non-lending skills such as policy engagement. Evaluations of IFAD have made the same point.


**IFAD's core operations are well supported by a robust resource mobilisation strategy that benefits from frequent review and refinement.** The triennial replenishment process is more than just a fundraising exercise through which IFAD secures its resources. The process also ensures that finances are raised from appropriate sources and that resources are continuously aligned to the Fund's evolving needs and priorities.

**IFAD has a highly developed and well-codified performance assessment system in place, but this is not always applied consistently or as intended.** Clear and detailed written procedures and a robust performance assessment infrastructure support the day-to-day management of staff. IFAD adheres to the systems and reports that it is also in full administrative compliance with the core processes; for example, all staff routinely undergo the required performance assessments. However, many staff, including those with line management responsibilities and those without, expressed the view that the system's rigidity introduced some weaknesses and misaligned incentives, particularly with regard to the management of over-performing and under-performing staff (Box 2). Many staff perceive the system as having sometimes artificial performance management processes and rules. Interviews suggested that staff are generally content with the Fund's approach and appreciate the difficulty in achieving an objective yet flexible system, although the system's imperfections can and do sometimes have a negative impact on morale.

#### Box 3: Staff performance assessment

- Several IFAD staff members criticised the limit applied to performance assessments, whereby directors may assess only 15% of the staff they manage as "superior" or "outstanding". High-performing staff receive monetary and non-monetary rewards in addition to their core remuneration packages. IFAD directors typically respond to this limit by rotating the annual reward among their high-performing staff. This means that consistently high-performing individuals who may not receive such rewards every year at least receive them some years.
- Staff also expressed concern with the institutional response when an IFAD staff member is assessed as "underperforming". Such individuals face considerably stricter performance management requirements than co-workers whose performance may be only marginally better, but who are not assessed as underperforming. There is reluctance to rate a staff member as underperforming because of the ramping up of performance oversight.

**Figure 2: Survey response – STAFF PERFORMANCE**



**A major organisational realignment is underway through the accelerated decentralisation process, but it is too early to assess its effectiveness.** The current reforms are an ongoing and clear example of how IFAD responds to and realigns its operations according to changing strategic priorities. The Operational Excellence on Results exercise (OPEX), started in 2017, is the major change initiative driving IFAD’s organisational realignment and decentralisation exercise. The accelerated decentralisation and increased emphasis on knowledge building are logical, justified responses to both the 2016-25 Strategic Framework and the recommendations by a recent corporate evaluation on decentralisation. If the reforms are successful and strengthen IFAD’s performance, they will solidly demonstrate the Fund’s agility and responsiveness. IFAD has the tools necessary to ensure a responsive organisation, and it routinely applies them. Its strategic workforce planning, continuously refined resource mobilisation strategies and performance assessment processes all underpin an agile resource base. The current changes within IFAD are occurring rapidly, but the organisation’s existing systems provide a solid foundation for those changes to take place. However, with the reforms still underway, it is too early to assess their effectiveness.

**KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability.**


This KPI examines how IFAD uses its external and internal control mechanisms to meet the standards it sets on financial management and transparency.

**IFAD’s systematic, well-defined approach, including recently adopted targets for distributing its resources to the poorest member states, ensures that resource allocation is transparent and continuously aligned to strategic priorities.** The Fund’s performance-based allocation system (PBAS) sets clear rules for calculating how and where resources should be distributed. IFAD recently refined these rules in direct response to the recommendations of an independent evaluation. Increasingly, the Fund’s resources are allocated to the poorest member states, and its target for the 2019-21 IFAD11 period is to distribute 90% of core resources to lower- and lower-middle-income countries. This target is in line with the 2016-25 Strategic Framework. But, in consequence, IFAD’s upper middle-income member states would receive only 10% of core resources during this period, at a time of continuing demand for IFAD’s support across many middle-income member states.

Partly in response to this dilemma, IFAD is developing a transition framework. This voluntary framework will establish guidance for IFAD’s lending to countries that also covers the process for graduating from IFAD’s financial support. The increased emphasis on building the Fund’s knowledge assets and its knowledge broker role is partly driven by the

need to provide broader (non-financial) value to middle-income countries. Overall, resource allocation is very well targeted at the Fund's priority countries, but IFAD is working to ensure that non-priority countries can continue to demand and access its services with the support of transparent, clearly defined rules.

**Figure 3: Survey response – FINANCIAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**



**While IFAD has a robust resource allocation system in place, meeting disbursement targets continues to be a difficulty.** IFAD's annual reporting openly acknowledges the ongoing poor performance on disbursement and provides honest analyses as to the underlying causes. According to the latest performance reported in the 2017 RIDE, the time from project approval to first disbursement is just under 17 months against a target of 14 months. Although there are some internal bottlenecks, external factors have a significant negative impact on IFAD's ability to follow disbursement plans, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In response to this acknowledged, persistent difficulty, IFAD developed a corporate disbursement action plan in 2016 that is currently under implementation. Key disbursement targets for the IFAD11 period are to reduce time from concept note to project approval from 17 months to 8 months, and to reduce time from project approval to first disbursement from 17 months to 12 months.

**IFAD's financial transparency and accountability are supported by a solid audit function, although the Fund's policy on preventing fraud and corruption is dated.** The Fund's internal and external audits comply with international standards, and internal systems for identifying, addressing and monitoring risk- and audit-related issues are well developed. IFAD's internal control policies and frameworks are summarised properly in its accountability framework. A 2005 policy on preventing fraud and corruption outlines the Fund's anti-corruption principles, structures and processes. However, this policy is extremely dated and does not reflect several subsequent and significant events including establishment of the Office of Audit and Oversight and the replacement of the Oversight Committee with a Sanctions Committee. A revised policy was scheduled for implementation by the end of 2018.<sup>6</sup>


**IFAD has established the foundations for results-based budgeting, but tracking and reporting of costs from activity through to result is still not sufficient.** The annual budget presented in the 2018 programme of work is a considerable step forward over previous years' budgets. This programme of work was the first to provide a results-based budget that identifies the regular budget for each "institutional output group" according to a results pillar. The document also summarises projected distributions according to strategic, objective and thematic areas. As results-based budgeting was materially adopted only this year, the approach is still in its infancy. Critically, IFAD's ongoing analysis and reporting do not yet incorporate results-based budgeting, and the main results reporting documents – the ARRI and the Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (RIDE) – do not align resource allocation or expenditure with results areas.

6. Following the conclusion of the MOPAN assessment, the revised Policy on Preventing Fraud and Corruption was adopted in December 2018.

**PERFORMANCE AREA: RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT**

*Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results (in line with Busan Partnerships commitments).*

Partnership working is foundational to IFAD’s operating model, which relies mostly on government-level partners for implementation. Accordingly, IFAD’s well-defined intervention design and support processes are based on close consultation with partners, and help to ensure relevance and build ownership. All IFAD’s partnerships and interventions – regardless of whether these are with governments, UN entities or other actors – are based on clear analysis of the comparative advantage and added value that IFAD brings. IFAD’s systems are also sufficiently agile to support programme- and project-level management and decision-making. Nonetheless, partner and institutional capacity analysis is an area that could be strengthened. While IFAD undertakes rigorous assessments of potential partners’ financial capabilities, its analyses of institutional capacity are somewhat basic. Beyond individual partnerships and projects, IFAD is taking significant measures to strengthen its role as a knowledge broker, not least through the establishment of South-South and Triangular Cooperation and Knowledge Centres, although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the current institutional restructuring. While monitoring of the Fund’s knowledge work remains underdeveloped, responses to the MOPAN partner survey indicate that external partners both value and apply IFAD’s knowledge products.



**KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships.**


This KPI focuses on the scope and robustness of IFAD’s processes and practice to support timely, flexible and responsive planning and intervention design for partnerships.

**IFAD’s intensive design and supervision processes are geared towards country ownership and ensure that strategies and projects are highly relevant.** For both country strategies and individual projects, IFAD applies intensive design and supervision processes involving close consultation with government, other implementation partners and target groups. This ensures that interventions are inherently aligned with national development objectives. The intervention design and supervision processes also benefit from a suite of detailed, formal procedures (the SECAP and supervision and implementation guidelines), advisory notes (how-to toolkits) and, during design, the QE process. In combination, these systems and tools help to ensure that interventions start off and remain relevant throughout delivery. IFAD staff frequently commented that the intense design and supervision processes, and particularly the depth of consultation, often compromise disbursement rates by encroaching on planned implementation timeframes. Nevertheless, many staff also said that they see this as an acceptable cost for maintaining the relevance, national ownership and quality of interventions.

**The SECAP and quality enhancement process are effective tools for analysing and strengthening interventions and integrating cross-cutting issues, but IFAD does not address governance and human rights in a sufficiently systematic manner during design and supervision.** The application of the SECAP and QE brings considerable

expertise to bear on intervention design. IFAD staff frequently pointed out that the processes, while intense, have recently become more efficient and invariably add value to intervention design. The SECAP in particular ensures that climate, environment and gender are mainstreamed throughout country strategy and project designs. However, governance and human rights are not addressed in the same thorough, systematic way. The limited attention paid to these issues during design may help to explain IFAD's comparatively weaker performance when it comes to results related to governance and human rights. IFAD management indicates that the next iteration of the SECAP will explicitly address human rights.

**Figure 4: Survey response – OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND INTERVENTION DESIGN**




**A degree of institutional capacity analysis is undertaken during planning, design and implementation of interventions, but this is often basic and not applied systematically.** IFAD has detailed guidance on capacity analysis in place, most notably through a field practitioner's guide on institutional and organisational analysis and capacity strengthening, and in the Financial Management and Administration Manual. Apart from IFAD's routine, rigorous analyses of financial capacity, however, its institutional analysis is somewhat basic and often limited to a short strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, or SWOT, exercise. Country strategies include details about the national government and institutions, but these tend to be more descriptive than analytical. There are no dedicated, mandatory analyses of capacity limitations within countries, governance issues or potential measures that could improve capacity, among others. IFAD's limited capacity analysis is somewhat incongruous when compared to the detail and depth provided through other components in design documents. To an extent, the reason IFAD devotes limited resources to capacity analysis relates to the partners it most frequently works with and often is required to work with – that is, government-level institutions. There may be only one possible implementation partner in many countries, but capacity analysis is about more than just identifying the most appropriate partner. It should also be used to identify strengths, weaknesses and potential "pinch points" with implementation partners and to strengthen risk management and sustainability of results.

**KPI 6: Partnership working is coherent and directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and the catalytic use of resources.**

This KPI looks at how IFAD engages in partnerships to maximise the effect of its investment resources and its wider engagement.

**Partnerships, particularly those with government institutions, are central to IFAD’s operating model.** Although a specialised agency of the United Nations, IFAD is also an international finance institution. The Fund’s investments and interventions are delivered through implementation partners (most commonly government-level institutions) rather than directly by IFAD. Consequently, effective partnership working is foundational to IFAD’s mission and its operating model. This is reflected throughout the 2016-25 Strategic Framework in IFAD’s principles of engagement, its performance at the operational level, its highly participative country strategy and project design processes, and its intensive support and supervision cycle.

**Figure 5: Survey response – PARTNERSHIPS**



**Internal analysis and knowledge of IFAD's comparative advantage underpin its coherent and relevant role in partnerships.** IFAD's approach to government-level partnerships is well-aligned with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles and extends to widespread use of country systems for financial management. Rigorous procedures and guidance are in place and are applied to assess the suitability of country systems; among these are processes for addressing concerns with country systems.

**IFAD's partnerships within the UN system are appropriate and clearly based on the Fund's comparative advantage and the added value it brings.** IFAD is almost always included as a full member of UN Country Teams where the teams have a country office. IFAD further participates in United Nations Development Assistance Framework exercises in most of the countries in which it works. Given its dual nature and investment-focused operating model, IFAD also works in partnership with other international finance institutions where appropriate. IFAD staff remarked that the organisation more commonly deals with other IFIs than it generally does with UN entities in terms of day-to-day knowledge exchange and networking.

Recently, IFAD has increased its emphasis on working collaboratively with the other Rome-based agencies and on developing a formal strategy for such collaboration, particularly around supporting delivery of the SDGs. IFAD has always worked collaboratively to some degree with these agencies, including the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Food Programme. But the recent joint strategy is more formal and substantive, and IFAD is treating it as such; for example, IFAD now has a director-level position leading on relationships with FAO and WFP as part of the partnership. As with its other partnerships, however, IFAD undertakes joint work with FAO and WFP only when the comparative advantage and added value of IFAD's contribution are clear.

**IFAD has effective systems in place to support agility in partnerships and interventions.** IFAD's detailed supervision and implementation guidelines codify mechanisms for reviewing, identifying and enacting programmatic and project-level changes. Project management and decision-making are further supported by a range of policies and procedures, most notably the Accountability Framework, the Framework for Delegation of Authority and detailed procurement guidelines. Across the staff base, views are mixed about the agility and responsiveness of these mechanisms and there is some apprehension as to how effectively specific mechanisms, particularly delegated authorities, will evolve in parallel with the current decentralisation process. On balance, though, staff are positive about partnership and intervention-level agility, and external partners give similarly positive assessments.

**The Farmers Forum and Indigenous Peoples' Forum are effective platforms for improving IFAD's accountability to beneficiaries, but assurance of accountability to beneficiaries at the partnership and intervention levels could be strengthened.** The Farmers Forum and Indigenous Peoples' Forum are substantive platforms that have demonstrable influence on IFAD's strategy and work, and also serve to build the advocative capacity of IFAD's target groups. At the partnership and intervention level, the SECAP establishes accountability to beneficiaries as a guiding principle across design, implementation and monitoring; guidance is also provided as to how this can be achieved. While the QE process often reviews the application of these principles, such reviews of accountability to beneficiaries are not mandatory. A more systematic approach here could be beneficial, particularly given the ARRI-identified shortcomings in IFAD's targeting and inclusion of the most vulnerable groups.


**IFAD is significantly strengthening its knowledge-building and brokering role, but measurement of its effectiveness in this area is underdeveloped.** Knowledge generation and application clearly constitute a central and increasingly important component of IFAD's work. The 2016-25 Strategic Framework demonstrates this, identifying "knowledge building, dissemination and policy engagement" as one of the Fund's four results pillars. IFAD allocates resources accordingly, with the increased emphasis on IFAD's knowledge role driving the current decentralisation process (particularly the new South-South and Triangular Cooperation and Knowledge Centres) and organisational restructuring. A well-articulated knowledge management framework and action plan, and work to strengthen

the Fund’s approach to policy engagement, further support these structural changes. However, monitoring and measurement of the Fund’s knowledge work remains underdeveloped, particularly around policy engagement, external use of IFAD knowledge resources, and longer-term influence and effectiveness. At the same time, responses to the MOPAN partner survey indicate that external partners do value – and apply – IFAD’s knowledge products.

**PERFORMANCE AREA: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT**

*Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning.*

IFAD has a strong results culture that is supported by a highly developed results measurement infrastructure and a robust, independent evaluation function. Results-based management (RBM) has become an integral part of day-to-day project management, with a range of high-quality tools, guidance and training available for staff. IFAD’s systems routinely generate actionable data, lessons and recommendations, with this data often influencing the design and delivery of interventions. However, performance data and past experience are not systematically used to inform intervention design, and IFAD’s own analyses acknowledge that integrating lessons is a weakness in project planning. Quality assurance processes are also underdeveloped, particularly for monitoring data and management-led self-evaluations.



**KPI 7: The focus on results is strong, transparent and explicitly geared towards function.**


This KPI looks at how IFAD transparently interprets and delivers an organisation-wide focus on results.

**IFAD has a strong institutional focus on results that is underpinned by a highly developed and regularly refined results measurement infrastructure.** The corporate commitment to developing and maintaining a results culture is evident across IFAD’s leadership; it is codified by numerous strategies and policies, and operationalised through a robust results management and measurement infrastructure. A central feature of this infrastructure is a clear, logical theory of change that is underpinned by a wide-ranging set of well-defined results and indicators. Progress against results is systematically tracked and measured through an extensive system of monitoring frameworks and tools (RMF, RIMS), with formal, detailed annual reports issued by both management (RIDEs) and the Independent Office of Evaluation (ARRIs). The approach is also regularly reviewed and adjusted, where appropriate; an example is the introduction in early 2017 of a new set of Core Indicators that eventually will replace the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS). A results focus is also embedded well at project level, with every intervention required to include a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan that includes a log frame and baseline data. Since IFAD9, the Fund also has invested significantly in management-led impact measurement, establishing a Research and Impact Assessment Division. As a result, 15% of IFAD’s active portfolio is now subject to internal impact assessment.

Although it is only partially implemented, the nascent Operational Results Management System (ORMS) further strengthens project-level RBM, simplifying data management and improving project managers’ ability to use monitoring

data (including lessons learned) for day-to-day decision-making. RBM-related capacity development opportunities are available through IFAD's Operations Academy, although staff frequently noted that training is, and will continue to be, a constant rather than one-off requirement, given the continuously evolving nature of the results infrastructure.

**Figure 6: Survey response – RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT**



**Data quality assurance processes are not applied systematically.** Notwithstanding the strength of IFAD's overall approach to results measurement, there is a lack of systematic quality assurance of monitoring data. Invariably, multiple personnel review project-level data that have been collected and reported. Staff noted that this approach allows them to identify problems with specific data sets or collection approaches; however, this is not a formalised, systematic process for data quality assurance and could ultimately compromise the objectivity and accuracy of results reporting.

**The integration of performance data and lesson learning is not systematic.** IFAD corporate reporting recognises this shortcoming. For example, the 2016 RIDE notes that "Some recommendations were common to many of the project designs reviewed ... and have been consistently flagged in QA annual reports in previous years". Several well-developed processes and feedback loops are in place for integrating past experience into new intervention designs, but these processes are still not applied systematically.

**A clearer expression of linkages between IFAD's results hierarchies would improve understanding of a strong but complex results infrastructure.** Although it ostensibly provides a summary of IFAD's results infrastructure, the "Overview of managing for development results at IFAD" publication is out of date and has been superseded by many internal developments. To an extent, the hierarchy of IFAD's various results layers can be inferred from other core RBM-related documentation. The necessary project-to-impact linkages are in place: log frames (project level) are aligned with the RIMS, the RIMS is aligned with the RMF (corporate level), and the RMF is ultimately aligned to the institutional theory of change (impact level). However, IFAD does not have a single, succinct overview of this complex results infrastructure. As a result, it can be difficult, particularly from the outside, to see the big picture and comprehend the role that each intervention and country strategy plays

#### **KPI 8: The organisation applies evidence-based planning and programming.**

This KPI focuses on the evaluation function, its positioning within IFAD structures, attention to quality, and accountability and putting learning into practice.


**IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) consistently delivers high-quality evaluations that are useful to and applied by IFAD's management.** IFAD's evaluation policy and the IOE contain all the necessary elements of an independent evaluation function. The IOE is operationally, structurally and behaviourally independent, and has budgetary independence. Its work is supported by a clear, relatively detailed evaluation manual that sets out the overarching principles

to be applied; the planning, budgeting and prioritisation processes; and the types of evaluation that will be conducted, and how these should be performed. IFAD's annual programmes of work feature the IOE's yearly workplan and budget prominently. IFAD management routinely tracks evaluation recommendations through the annual President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions (PRISMA). In combination, all these elements and processes have helped to create a culture within IFAD that is supportive of and responsive to evaluation.

**IFAD has well-developed processes feeding performance data and learning into intervention design, but these are not applied systematically.** IFAD's results and evaluation infrastructure routinely generates actionable data, lessons and recommendations. IFAD regularly shares these data through RIDEs, ARRI, independent evaluations, knowledge products and less-formalised channels such as peer-to-peer interactions. Document design templates for country strategies and projects include mandatory sections for identifying what (and how) lessons and/or performance data inform the design. Perhaps most critically, IFAD's QE process then reviews whether lessons and past experience have been taken into account during the design process. However, IFAD's own RIDEs frequently identify the integration of lessons as a weak point within project planning. This is supported by staff interviews which confirmed that the QE process, as one example, does not systematically review the integration of lessons and performance data. Overall, while IFAD has adequate systems for integrating lessons and performance data, some of these systems are non-mandatory, and consequently are not always applied.

**Independent evaluations benefit from clear quality assurance processes, but quality assurance of IFAD's self-evaluations is a work in progress.** The evaluation manual outlines quality assurance (QA) processes for IOE-led independent evaluations, but these processes do not extend to assessments undertaken outside IOE, particularly management-led self-evaluations. IFAD's Development Effectiveness Framework implies that quality assurance of self-evaluations will be developed, but these processes have not yet been established.


**Figure 7: Survey response – IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF EVALUATIONS**



## 2.2. DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

### PERFORMANCE AREA: RESULTS

*Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way*



IFAD consistently delivers strong results for its core target group – the rural poor – and clearly contributes to rural poverty reduction more broadly. Internal estimates suggest that IFAD interventions raised 24 million individuals out of poverty during the period 2010-15. The Fund's interventions and results are highly relevant to country needs and priorities, largely due to the intensive consultation process IFAD routinely undertakes during country strategy development. IFAD's frequent prioritisation of capacity development at grassroots level also has contributed to positive results and to the sustainability of those results. However, results are comparatively weak in some areas, most notably in environment and natural resources and in policy engagement. Operational efficiency and timeliness of disbursement also continue to negatively affect IFAD's results, although a corporate disbursement action plan is being implemented. Sustainability of results and interventions is another consistently weaker point for IFAD, but there is a positive trend, with sustainability improving in recent years and notable examples of interventions being mainstreamed into government activity.

### **KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved, and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals.**

This KPI examines the nature and scale of the results IFAD is achieving against the targets it sets and its expectations on making a difference.

**IFAD consistently delivers positive contributions towards rural poverty reduction, particularly in the domain of human and social capital; however, results in the domain of food security are less strong.** In line with the Fund's original mandate, the Strategic Framework 2016-25 identifies IFAD's main target group as the rural poor. Accordingly, the Fund places considerable emphasis on routinely measuring the criterion of "rural poverty impact". The last three ARRI (2015-17) confirmed that performance on rural poverty impact has been consistently strong. The criterion is further measured at a more granular level through the four sub-domains of household income and assets, human and social capital and empowerment, food security, and institutions and policies. IFAD performs most strongly in the sub-domain of human and social capital and empowerment. Performance against "food security" is not as strong, although this is partly due to data gaps, particularly on malnutrition rates. The IFAD9 Impact Assessment Initiative (IAI), while management-led rather than IOE-led, quantified overall beneficiary numbers and estimated that during the period 2010-15, IFAD interventions realised positive benefits for 139 million individuals, with around 24 million individuals lifted out of poverty.

**IFAD is delivering positive results on gender equality and the empowerment of women, but it needs to focus more on targeting and achieving systemic changes.** Recent evaluations, most notably the gender equality and women's empowerment synthesis evaluation, demonstrate that IFAD has delivered significant benefits for women. This is supported by the annual analyses. For example, in the 2017 ARRI, the gender criterion scored third-highest out of 13 criteria assessed. Benefits are certainly being attained at the individual level, with the synthesis evaluation finding that "in many cases IFAD has addressed the root causes of gender inequality and women's powerlessness, in particular illiteracy, exclusion from access to resources and limited social capital". However, evaluations and ARRIs indicate that interventions can sometimes lack a systematic approach, for example insufficient gender analyses and targeting during project design. Perhaps most critically, evaluations and ARRIs also find that only limited systemic changes have been realised, such as changes to national laws and policies.

**IFAD's main channel for strengthening governance is through the empowerment of poor people, and particularly through the development of stronger grassroots institutions, but higher-level policy engagement-related results are limited.** During intervention design and delivery, IFAD frequently prioritises the development of grassroots capacities at both the individual and, more commonly, organisational level. IFAD technical staff emphasised that this approach is effective, and evaluations and ARRIs support this view. The 2017 ARRI noted that capacity-focused activity typically helps to improve "access to basic amenities and productive resources, as well as fostering [beneficiaries'] engagement in local governance processes". While these bottom-up results are clear and relatively consistent, IFAD's top-down, governance-related results are far more limited. Findings from the Country-Level Policy Dialogue evaluation synthesis are illustrative here, noting that "although there have been some remarkable achievements ... there is scope for substantial improvement. Most of the work on country-level policy dialogue and engagement has been informal, reacting to opportunities, unrecorded, un-resourced, with neither indicators nor incentives, with non-lending as an add-on, and without specified deliverables". The 2017 ARRI identifies possible causes of this weaker performance: "[positive results] appear to be largely determined by the interests, experience and initiatives of [country programme managers]"; this analysis is supported by IFAD staff interviews. However, the 2017 ARRI goes on to note that the potential success of such individual-driven approaches is undermined, as "no corporate incentives exist to encourage [country programme managers] or [IFAD Country Offices] to undertake country-level policy engagement and individual performance assessments are more heavily driven by project approval, successful implementation and ensuring sound fiduciary matters than by non-lending activities".

**Despite the absence of a dedicated human rights policy or strategy, IFAD is contributing to some human rights-related results.** The absence of a human rights policy is a weak point when assessing IFAD against the MOPAN methodology, as IFAD does not frame its work or expected results using the language of human rights. However, IFAD does contribute to human rights-related results in several areas including through its work on gender equality and women's empowerment and, most notably, on the protection of indigenous peoples' rights to lands, territories and resources. The criterion of "rural poverty impact" in ARRI covers qualitative assessment of "human and social capital and empowerment". IFAD's performance against this sub-domain is strong even though it is not exclusively focused on human rights.

**Shortcomings in targeting strategies, which ARRI consistently identify as a weakness in IFAD's approach, have definite human rights implications.** IFAD works in challenging contexts, and primarily with very marginalised and disadvantaged groups, meaning that the Fund *inherently* focuses on hard-to-reach populations. But targeting approaches sometimes lack clarity regarding the *specific* intended beneficiary groups. The most recent ARRI highlighted a related concern. The 2016 ARRI found that IFAD interventions often are "not sufficiently refined to meet the needs of all intended beneficiaries, in particular those at risk of being excluded, such as indigenous peoples, pastoralists, landless people, migrants and other vulnerable groups". The 2017 ARRI noted that in some instances, the positive results attained on human and social capital "were mostly among the better off and to a lesser extent among the extreme poor".

**IFAD's performance and contribution to results in the domain of environment and natural resource management have been weak in comparison to other results areas.** IFAD increasingly emphasises climate change and environment and natural resource management (ENRM) in its work. Examples include the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) and a recent increase in core RMF indicators focused on climate and ENRM. However, a 2016 synthesis evaluation of the Fund's ENRM work found generally weak performance. Contributing factors cited included poor co-ordination with government partners; inadequate budgets and monitoring of loans; overlooked environmental risks; few linkages among ENRM, poverty and livelihoods; inadequate monitoring systems for ENRM; poor alignment with country strategies; lack of prioritisation in country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs); and the prioritisation of climate change over ENRM. This synthesis evaluated many programmes, some of which were very dated at the time of the evaluation. Nonetheless, the 2017 ARRI partly echoed the synthesis findings, scoring the ENRM criterion 9th out of 13 criteria. The adaptation criterion was scored lowest, although the ARRI noted that because the adaptation criterion was new, immature monitoring methodologies and limited evidence may have contributed to the poor score.

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#### **KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate.**

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This KPI centres on the relevance of IFAD's engagement given the needs and priorities of its partner countries and its results focus.

**IFAD's interventions are very relevant to the high-level needs and priorities of partner countries, with country strategies frequently assessed as effective.** ARRI consistently assess the relevance of IFAD interventions as either one of the highest-scoring or the highest-scoring criteria. Moreover, the trajectory is positive, with an increasing proportion of projects rated satisfactory, while in recent years, several projects attained the rarely awarded rating of highly satisfactory. IFAD staff often attribute this high degree of relevance to an intensive consultation process during COSOP development, whereby national governments are so intimately involved in detailed country-level planning that true country ownership of the strategy is attained. To assess COSOPs, ARRI considers the strategies across three dimensions: relevance, effectiveness and performance. While relevance, as noted, has scored highest in recent years, COSOP effectiveness and performance still score relatively and consistently well.

**While IFAD interventions have strong country-level relevance, in some cases weak targeting strategies affect the project's relevance to beneficiaries.** The value of targeting to ensure project relevance is well recognised, with evaluations and ARRI regularly identifying the most relevant interventions as those with well-defined targeting strategies. However, these same analyses also find the inverse – that weak targeting directly affects project relevance and particularly relevance to beneficiaries and target groups. The 2017 ARRI noted the influence of shortcomings in targeting and related planning processes, with weaker performance linked to “limitations in project preparation and design”. As examples of such limitations, the report cited the absence of a proper targeting strategy, lack of ownership of the project by the respective implementing agencies, and insufficient analysis of the socio-economic and political context of the project area and the (potential) partners and institutions involved. Human rights-related results confirmed that insufficient targeting affected some interventions' ability to reach the most vulnerable groups.

#### **KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently.**

This KPI looks at the extent to which IFAD is meeting its own aims and standards on delivering results efficiently.

**IFAD's efficiency is weak, but it is often influenced by external factors.** Of the criteria assessed through ARRI, IFAD's operational efficiency is consistently rated among the weakest. Country evaluations report similar mixed results. Across these analyses, internal factors are repeatedly identified as negatively affecting efficiency, particularly under-spending and over-spending on project components, high costs per beneficiary and high management costs. However, IFAD staff regularly noted that the nature of IFAD's work, target groups and operating contexts will inevitably incur higher costs, particularly if the Fund is compared or benchmarked against other IFIs. ARRI support this view, highlighting the influence of context on efficiency, especially within the isolated, difficult and fragile environments where IFAD often works. In any case, and notwithstanding the weak performance on efficiency when compared to other criteria, ARRI also suggest that a slightly positive trend is evident, with an increase in the proportion of projects attaining a satisfactory rating for operational efficiency during the period 2009-13, although this proportion has plateaued in more recent years.


**Slow disbursement rates negatively affect efficiency.** Independent evaluations and country evaluations consistently identify disbursement delays as having potentially negative effects on IFAD's results, as do the management-led RIDEs. The 2017 RIDE found that the average time between project approval and first disbursement was just below 17 months against the target of 14 months; the RIDE further noted that IFAD's 13% disbursement ratio for the overall portfolio, and in fragile situations, failed to meet its target even after the target was lowered to 15%. In response to this well-acknowledged, persistent difficulty, IFAD developed a corporate disbursement action plan in 2016, which is currently under implementation. ARRI suggest that a slightly positive trend is evident in recent years. It is also important to consider the challenging environments within which IFAD works, often with the most isolated and disadvantaged populations.


#### **KPI 12: Results are sustainable.**

This KPI looks at the degree to which IFAD successfully delivers results that are sustainable in the longer term.

**Sustainability remains one of IFAD's weakest areas, but notable examples of interventions being mainstreamed into government activity are evidence of a positive trend in sustainability of benefits.** ARRI acknowledge that sustainability is one of IFAD's weaker points. In the 2017 ARRI, sustainability was the third-poorest performing of IFAD's evaluation criteria after efficiency and adaptation. Limited ownership and a lack of exit strategies were identified as two of the most important contributing factors to this comparatively weak performance. At the same time, there is a positive trend, with ARRI scores for sustainability of benefits improving steadily in recent years. Moreover, country evaluations identify several notable examples of IFAD interventions building sufficient institutional capacity and/or IFAD interventions being mainstreamed into government activity.

**IFAD's work on innovation and scaling-up is performing strongly.** The sustainability-related criterion of innovation and scaling-up assesses the extent to which IFAD has introduced innovative poverty reduction approaches and the extent to which governments, donors and other institutions have scaled-up IFAD interventions. The latter metric is particularly relevant to sustainability. The 2017 ARRI noted a statistically significant improvement against this criterion, with the performance of IFAD interventions exceeding targets. This report found that the percentage of projects rated as moderately satisfactory or better increased to 91.3% in 2013-15 from 73.7% in 2009-11. It is not clear how much this performance is due to achievements related to scaling-up as opposed to innovation. However, newly implemented changes in IFAD metrics split innovation and scaling-up into separate criteria, and this refinement should help to improve IFAD's understanding of its overall performance on sustainability.





# 3. OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF IFAD

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## Chapter 3. Overall performance of IFAD

The performance conclusions first consider four key attributes of an effective organisation: (i) whether it understands future needs and demands; (ii) whether it is organised and makes use of its assets and comparative advantages; (iii) whether it has mandate-oriented systems, planning and operations; and (iv) whether it makes consistent developments according to its resource level and operational context. The journey of the organisation then is mapped against MOPAN's previous assessment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Lastly, the assessment report presents the key findings: the observed strengths and areas for improvement.

### 3.1. CURRENT STANDING AGAINST THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION

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#### Is IFAD future facing?

IFAD's triennial replenishment consultation process regularly and rigorously tests IFAD's analysis of and response to the changing global context. This detailed exercise ensures that member states are meaningfully involved in determining the Fund's strategic direction and in ensuring that IFAD's priorities remain relevant to member state needs. While going through the process every three years is resource-intensive, this frequency helps to maintain the Fund's agility and responsiveness to changing needs.

For its contextual analyses and consultation, IFAD also reaches beyond member states and the replenishment process to the Farmers' Forum and Indigenous Peoples' Forum. Both of these distinctive platforms genuinely bring the voice of IFAD's core beneficiary groups to bear on the Fund's direction. These forums are categorically not cosmetic. IFAD is required to make commitments to the forums during the replenishment process, and the forums then hold the Fund accountable. The forums are based on extensive preparatory grassroots consultations that IFAD supports through a grant programme to build target groups' capacities to engage with the forums and other governance-related processes.

IFAD is engaged in reforms that are largely a response to its move from results clusters to the four new "pillars of results delivery" set out in the Fund's 2016-25 Strategic Framework. IFAD has in particular accelerated its decentralisation process, relocating a significant proportion of technical staff to regional hubs and country offices from its headquarters in Rome. While the effectiveness of the reforms remains to be assessed, the on-going reform agenda speaks for the organisation's agility and its ability to face the future.

The reforms underlie more fundamental changes for IFAD. A central question for the organisation is the clarification of its value proposition towards its different target countries. As IFAD's allocation rules and targets rightly turn its focus and financial resources towards member states with the lowest national income, they also consequently reduce the resources available for upper-middle-income member states. Demand for IFAD's services remains high across these countries, and there are still major opportunities in middle-income countries to substantially reduce poverty through agricultural development.

Responding to this demand places IFAD under continuous pressure to increase its financial assets and mobilise resources to compensate for the relatively static funding base of core contributions from member states. Diversifying the resource base beyond member state core contributions is a major, ongoing workstream for IFAD and aims partly at addressing such funding constraints and financial risks. Recent milestones include adopting the Sovereign Borrowing Framework and the Concessional Partner Loan Framework and initial exploration of the potential for market borrowing, implying the capacity to obtain a good credit rating.

Equally significant is IFAD's development of a voluntary transition framework that will establish guidance for countries transitioning or graduating from IFAD finance. Once in place, this framework should further enhance the transparency and efficiency of IFAD's overall resource allocation and help the Fund to maintain services for as many member states as possible.

The value of the organisation's work is not only financial; its knowledge assets also are attractive to member states including those upper-middle-income member countries that may now find it more difficult to access IFAD finance. IFAD member states and other partners value its expertise and tangible knowledge products, which benefit from a well-regarded knowledge management action plan. Building on this strong foundation, IFAD's current institutional reforms are geared towards formalising the Fund's knowledge work and significantly increasing the profile of this work. The increased emphasis on IFAD's knowledge role is partially driving the current decentralisation process (particularly the new South-South and Triangular Cooperation and Knowledge Centres) and organisational restructuring. While it is too early to assess their effectiveness, and specifically their impact on IFAD's knowledge resources, these institutional reforms at least demonstrate how seriously IFAD is taking its role as a knowledge broker.

### **Is IFAD making best use of what it has?**

IFAD's clear mandate is supported by a well-articulated strategic framework and three-year, medium-term plans, aligned with the 2030 Agenda. The strategic framework sets out an overarching development goal, principles of engagement, strategic objectives and strategic outcomes. The Fund continuously analyses its position within the global development architecture and its comparative advantage, including identifying explicit contributions to the Sustainable Development Goals. The replenishment consultations that take place every three years provide IFAD and its member states a regular, systematic opportunity to review the effectiveness and appropriateness of the organisation's strategy, direction and finances. IFAD's results measurement framework defines indicators and targets.

IFAD's work is highly relevant to its mandate and comparative advantage and to the needs of its member states and target groups. This relevance is assured through well-developed institutional structures that enable substantive consultation, planning and monitoring with member states, major beneficiary groups and individual countries.

Partnerships are central to IFAD's operating model, allowing the organisation to make the best use of its positioning. Partnering at country level is common practice as the Fund's investments and interventions are delivered through implementation partners rather than directly by IFAD. IFAD's partnerships within the United Nations (UN) system are appropriate and clearly based on the Fund's comparative advantage and the added value it brings. A specific Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2018 with the two other Rome-based UN agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme. Given its investment-focused operating model, IFAD also works in partnership with other international finance institutions where appropriate, and quite commonly in terms of day-to-day knowledge exchange and networking.

More broadly, IFAD's involvement in relevant normative frameworks and strategic partnerships enhances the organisation's understanding of the global context. IFAD is highly selective in this regard. Its staff base is smaller than that of many international finance institutions and UN agencies, so any engagement must either accrue or add clear value to IFAD through the Fund's expertise and comparative advantage. IFAD successfully achieves this balance. For example, IFAD is a valued partner in the UN System-wide Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and has used the UN System-wide Action Plan to strengthen its own work on gender. Importantly, IFAD has firmly aligned its strategy with the 2030 Agenda and has done this with precision, identifying specifically where its contributions will be strongest.

IFAD's financial resource allocation process is firmly aligned with its mandate and strategic priorities, and it is geared towards areas that are likeliest to make the greatest impact. This process is responsive, allowing resource allocations to shift according to member states' changing needs and situations. In particular, the distribution of IFAD's financial

assets is governed by a well-defined, transparent performance-based allocation system and a recently adopted series of targets, such as distributing 90% of core resources to lower-income and lower-middle-income member states. In combination, these rules and targets ensure that financial resource allocation is tightly aligned to strategic priorities.

At the operational level, however, IFAD's poor performance against disbursement targets is a persistent, fully acknowledged concern for efficiency. At the same time, many disbursement bottlenecks are related to external factors beyond IFAD's direct control. Internal analyses have repeatedly identified this as problematic, and the organisation has had an action plan in place since 2016 to address the matter. Nevertheless, it is not clear that disbursement rates have improved.<sup>7</sup>

All the same, it should be acknowledged that disbursement is just one metric of overall performance and should be balanced with IFAD's dual nature. As an international finance institution (IFI), IFAD should be expected to disburse funds efficiently. But IFAD also is a specialised agency of the UN that focuses on a single, specific development sector; as a consequence, it provides partners with considerably more intensive support and supervision than do other IFIs. In addition, while the period from project approval to project start-up has been identified as one of the main disbursement bottlenecks, it also is the time when IFAD works hardest to ensure high-quality, relevant interventions that are fully owned by national partners.

### **Is IFAD a well-oiled machine?**

This MOPAN assessment was conducted during the height of IFAD's accelerated decentralisation process. Some core operational processes and policies, such as delegated authorities, were being overhauled to better serve a more decentralised organisation. All these developments seemed to be logical and proportionate, but it was still too early to assess the effectiveness of either the institutional reforms or the accompanying operational and process changes. This said, IFAD benefits from strong operational systems that support the effective design, delivery, supervision and monitoring of its work. A well-developed results measurement infrastructure underpins these systems, with positive recent steps towards embedding results-based budgeting across the organisation. However, the assessment found some areas for improvement, most notably institutional capacity analysis and mainstreaming of some cross-cutting issues.

IFAD's operational systems, including its highly developed results measurement infrastructure, help to ensure that individual country strategies and interventions are consistently well-gearred towards delivering the Fund's mandate. These systems promote the relevance of the Fund's work but also support the development of effective, high-quality interventions. In particular, IFAD's internal quality enhancement process and the Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) ensure that the design of every single project benefits from an admirable level of expertise and attention. IFAD also applies significant expertise during implementation, with IFAD's detailed support and supervision process further enhancing intervention quality.

The Fund's robust approach to results measurement also supports effectiveness. The annual Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (RIDE) and the Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations provide management and governing bodies with detailed overviews of performance, achievements and shortcomings. Although it is already well developed, IFAD's results focus continues to strengthen. The nascent Operational Results Management System appears to be a promising platform for supporting day-to-day results-based management, and the Fund has now taken initial, significant steps towards results-based budgeting. Overall, this well-developed infrastructure not only supports results monitoring and measurement but also provides another means for ensuring that country strategies and intervention designs are continually linked back to IFAD's strategy and priorities. This

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7. It is acknowledged that the latest Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness for 2018 (Executive Board 2018/124/R.13/Rev.1) reported improvements in disbursements performance. This document is however out of the time scope for this assessment.

results culture is further reinforced by IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) consistently delivering high-quality evaluations that are applied by IFAD's management.

Finally, IFAD's financial transparency and accountability are supported by a solid audit function. The Fund's internal and external audits comply with international standards, and internal systems for identifying, addressing and monitoring risk- and audit-related issues are well developed. IFAD's internal control policies and frameworks are summarised properly in its accountability framework. A revised policy on preventing fraud and corruption was scheduled for implementation by the end of 2018.

Fundamentally, IFAD's operational systems are fit for purpose and geared towards delivering the organisation's mandate. However, some aspects of intervention design and supervision could be strengthened, in particular in relation to the cross-cutting issues of governance and human rights.

Shortcomings in targeting strategies, identified as a weakness in IFAD's approach, have definite human rights implications. IFAD works in challenging contexts and primarily with very marginalised and disadvantaged groups, meaning that the Fund inherently focuses on hard-to-reach populations. But targeting approaches sometimes lack clarity regarding the specific intended beneficiary groups, with potential implications on the relevance of interventions and on reaching the most vulnerable.

In addition, institutional capacity analysis beyond the direct scope of interventions remains basic and non-systematic. The Fund is strong at analysing and addressing grassroots-level governance issues and gaps, but its approach to advancing a good governance agenda is not equally systematic at the national government level. Apart from IFAD's routine, rigorous analyses of financial capacity, institutional analysis is often limited to a short strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats exercise. Country strategies include details about the national government and institutions, but these tend to be more descriptive than analytical. There are no dedicated, mandatory analyses of, for example, capacity limitations within countries, governance issues or potential measures that could improve capacity. Beyond processes, the skill base and capacity development opportunities may still be too investment focused, without enough emphasis on developing increasingly important, non-lending skills such as policy engagement.

In considering these issues, it should, however, be acknowledged that IFAD's ability to address institutional capacity gaps or governance issues often may be heavily constrained. The Fund works frequently in difficult and fragile contexts where there is only one possible implementation partner.

### **Is IFAD making a difference?**

IFAD continues to realise clear results in line with its core mandate, consistently helping reduce rural poverty. Building on the Fund's substantial strategic and operations-level consultation processes, these results are invariably highly relevant to the needs and priorities of member states. However, IFAD's own assessments of cost efficiency and sustainability confirm that there is room for improvement.

IFAD delivers strong results for its core target group – the rural poor – and contributes to rural poverty reduction more broadly, as well as to cross-cutting results, most notably gender. The three Annual Reports on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRIs) for 2015-17 confirmed a consistently strong impact on rural poverty. Recent evaluations, most notably the gender equality and women's empowerment synthesis evaluation, also demonstrate that IFAD has delivered significant benefits for women. The high relevance of IFAD's results – both to the Fund's mandate and to its member states' needs – is largely due to the Fund's deep strategic consultations and its highly participative intervention design processes. IFAD's effective, intensive pre-implementation approaches also have been central to deliver relevant results. These include a quality enhancement process and the Fund's Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP), as well as support and supervision procedures for overseeing active projects.

Efficiency and sustainability remain, however, among IFAD's weakest areas. ARRI's acknowledge this, and country evaluations that were reviewed report similarly mixed results. Both identify some internal factors as negatively affecting efficiency, particularly under-spending and over-spending on project components, high costs per beneficiary, and high management costs. However, the nature of IFAD's work, target groups and operating contexts inevitably incurs higher costs, particularly if the Fund is compared or benchmarked against other IFIs. For sustainability, limited ownership and a lack of exit strategies were identified as two of the most important contributing factors to this comparatively weak performance.

There is, however, evidence of a positive trend in sustainability, especially in relation to innovation and scaling-up. Moreover, country evaluations identified several notable examples of IFAD interventions building sufficient institutional capacity and/or being mainstreamed into government activity.

### 3.2. PERFORMANCE JOURNEY

#### Comparison with previous assessments

The MOPAN methodology has evolved significantly since the previous assessment of IFAD in 2013, so a direct comparison of that assessment and the present one is not feasible. Nevertheless, it is instructive to revisit the 2013 assessment's main findings.

The 2018 MOPAN assessment largely sustains the strengths identified in 2013. IFAD's clear strategic framework continues to be well aligned with the Fund's mandate; the Fund's results culture is strong (and growing stronger); and the evaluation and accountability functions continue to be robust. Mainstreaming of the cross-cutting issues of gender equality, the environment, and food security and nutrition has improved further, primarily due to the introduction

#### Box 4: Main strengths and areas for improvement identified in the MOPAN 2013 assessment

##### Strengths in 2013

- A clear mandate that is well reflected in its strategic framework
- Total commitment to a results agenda
- A strong evaluation function
- Sound financial accountability
- Good progress on mainstreaming cross-cutting priorities such as gender equality, the environment, and food security and nutrition
- Significantly improved human resources functions and a commitment to further reforms.

##### Areas for improvement in 2013

- Results-based budgeting needs to link allocated resources to expected outputs.
- IFAD's adequate approach to knowledge management has room for improvement.
- Decentralised decision-making authorities are limited and adequate country presence can be better assured.
- Reporting practices do not allow for a clear alignment of contributions to actual outcomes and impact.
- It is difficult to fully appreciate contributions to country-level goals and priorities.
- Corporate procurement process could be more efficient.

of the SECAP in the intervening period. Finally, reforms of the human resources functions have continued, with well-developed, formalised processes and systems now in place. However, some of these processes may have now become too rigid.

With regard to the areas for improvement identified in the 2013 assessment, the 2018 MOPAN assessment team found demonstrable progress on some issues. Most notably, IFAD has since established the basics of results-based budgeting. In addition, the Fund's approach to knowledge management has evolved considerably, with substantial weight and resources now devoted to developing the Fund's knowledge-brokering role. As for decentralisation and delegated authorities, IFAD was in the midst of a major institutional realignment at the time of the 2018 assessment; while it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this accelerated decentralisation, IFAD was most certainly addressing this previously identified weakness with vigour. On outcome and impact reporting, IFAD established and allocated considerable resources towards management-led impact assessments subsequent to the 2013 assessment. While promising, this work is still at an early stage. Similarly, IFAD has made advances in identifying country-level contributions, but this remains a work in progress. However, and as IFAD openly acknowledges, a lack of operational efficiency, including procurement efficiency, continues to be an institutional bottleneck.

### **IFAD's broader trajectory**

The MOPAN assessment team found that IFAD is heading in the right direction when its performance is compared to findings of the 2013 assessment. Member states and the IFAD staff base also expressed the view that the organisation is on a positive trajectory. These stakeholders regard IFAD as a solid, responsive organisation that serves its niche well.

Refining the Performance-Based Allocation System and adopting new financing frameworks, the most significant developments since 2013, have better equipped the organisation to deal with a tighter financial environment. (The most notable risk is an increased programme of loans and grants despite a lack of growth in member state core contributions.) At the operations level, developments such as the SECAP have strengthened what was already a robust intervention design process. Even though the effectiveness of the 2018 reforms cannot yet be ascertained, the current accelerated decentralisation process certainly appears to be a logical, proportionate response to the demands of IFAD's 2016-25 Strategic Framework.

In conclusion, IFAD is an agile, responsive and well-performing organisation. The Fund's strategy, organisational architecture and operating model are all very well geared to deliver IFAD's mandate, and they are sufficiently flexible to adapt to the changing global context and to member states' evolving needs and priorities. IFAD's work on diversifying its resource base, developing a transition framework for member states and upscaling its knowledge-brokering role clearly indicates a forward-looking organisation that is extremely alert and responsive to major upcoming strategic challenges. The Fund consistently contributes positively to reduce rural poverty and continues to deliver results that are highly relevant to its member states' needs and priorities. Where results could be stronger, notably on sustainability and cost efficiency, IFAD is making progress or is actively addressing the institutional shortcomings that have been linked with poorer performance.

While the overall assessment of IFAD is positive, there are areas for improvement. The following boxes summarise the key institutional strengths identified through this MOPAN assessment and areas that could benefit from attention.

### Box 5: Main strengths identified in the MOPAN 2017-18 assessment

- **A clear mandate supported by a well-articulated strategic framework that is aligned with the 2030.** As the 2013 MOPAN assessment noted, IFAD's strategic framework is tightly linked to its mandate and provides an admirable level of detail on the Fund's direction and approach.
- **Regular, intensive consultation processes that ensure a responsive, relevant organisation.** The replenishment consultation process, the Farmers' Forum, the Indigenous Peoples' Forum, and the intensive country strategy development and project design processes all help to ensure that IFAD's work is relevant to the needs and priorities of member states. The strength of these processes is likely a factor in the highly relevant results that IFAD delivers for partner countries. It also drives agility to respond to demands.
- **A transparent, well-defined approach to resource allocation.** IFAD's Performance-Based Allocation System continues to ensure that resource allocation strongly corresponds to the Fund's immediate strategic priorities. Additionally, IFAD is devoting considerable effort to ensuring that its services can continue to be delivered to as many member states as possible, including upper-middle-income countries.
- **A strong institutional focus on results that is underpinned by a well-developed results infrastructure.** IFAD's results culture and the underlying systems are well developed and continue to improve. IFAD's country strategies and projects benefit from comparatively intensive design and supervision processes, with the quality enhancement and SECAP approaches bringing a significant level of expertise and attention to bear on every intervention. The strong results focus extends to the Fund's evaluation function, which continues to be robust.
- **A clear progress towards results-based budgeting.** Directly addressing a limitation identified in the 2013 assessment, IFAD's programme of work now presents the regular budget according to institutional output areas and outlines resource allocation according to strategic objectives and thematic areas. Corporate reporting remains however to be adjusted so that resource utilisation/expenditure is reported against results areas.

### Box 6: Main areas for improvement identified in the MOPAN 2017-18 assessment

- **Speed of disbursement remains to be improved.** Both independent evaluations and management reporting consistently identify disbursement delays as having potentially negative effects on IFAD's results. Recent improvements have, however, been noted.
- **Institutional capacity analysis should be strengthened.** While capacity analysis is undertaken during strategy and project development and delivery, it is comparatively basic. This constrains IFAD's capacity for higher-level policy engagement and limits cross-cutting results in governance – beyond the absence of dedicated policy.
- **Shortcomings in targeting strategies weaken IFAD's approach.** Targeting approaches sometimes lack clarity regarding the specific intended beneficiary groups, with potential implications on the relevance of interventions and on reaching the most vulnerable. This has also implications on cross-cutting results in human rights – also beyond the absence of dedicated policy and explicit guidelines. IFAD's intention to explicitly incorporate human rights into the next iteration of the SECAP was noted.
- **Measurement of knowledge work needs to be enhanced.** IFAD's rapidly expanding focus on the deployment of its own knowledge assets should be supported by a more rigorous approach to monitoring and evaluation of the Fund's knowledge role, outputs and influence.
- **Integration of performance data and lesson learning could be more systematic.** IFAD corporate reporting recognises this shortcoming. Several well-developed processes and feedback loops are in place for integrating past experience into new intervention designs, but these processes are not applied systematically.

# ANNEXES



## Annex 1. Evidence table

### Methodology for scoring and rating

The approach to scoring and rating under MOPAN 3.0 draws from the OECD *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide* (OECD/EU/JRC, 2008). Each of the MOPAN 3.0 key performance indicators (KPIs) contains a number of micro-indicators (MIs) which vary in number. The MIs, in turn, contain elements representing international best practice; their numbers also vary.

The approach is as follows:

#### a) Micro-indicator level

Scores ranging from 0 to 4 are assigned per **element**, according to the extent to which an organisation implements the element.

For **KPIs 1-8**, the following criteria frame the scores:

- 4 = Element is fully implemented/implemented in all cases
- 3 = Element is substantially implemented/implemented in the majority of cases
- 2 = Element is partially implemented/implemented in some cases
- 1 = Element is present, but not implemented/implemented in zero cases
- 0 = Element is not present

Taking the average of the constituent elements' scores, a rating is then calculated per MI. The rating scale applied is as follows:

3.01-4	Highly satisfactory
2.01-3	Satisfactory
1.01-2	Unsatisfactory
0.00-1	Highly unsatisfactory

The ratings scale for **KPIs 9-12** applies the same thresholds as for KPIs 1-8, for consistency, but pitches scores to the middle of the threshold value (to guard against skewing in favour of higher ratings).

3.01-4	Highly satisfactory
2.01-3	Satisfactory
1.01-2	Unsatisfactory
0.00-1	Highly unsatisfactory

A score of zero (0) for an element means the assessment team had expected to find evidence but did not find any. A score of zero counts towards the MI score.

A score of “N/E” means “no evidence” indicates that the assessment team could not find any evidence but was not confident of whether or not there was evidence to be found. The team assumes that “no evidence” does not necessarily equal a zero score. Elements rated N/E are excluded from any calculation of the average. A significant number of N/E scores in a report indicates an assessment limitation (see the Limitations section at the beginning of the report).

A note indicating “N/A” means that an element is considered to be “not applicable”. This usually owes to the organisation’s specific nature.


*b) Aggregation to the KPI level*

The same logic is pursued at aggregation to the KPI level to ensure a consistent approach. Taking the average of the constituent scores per MI, a rating is then calculated per KPI.

The calculation for KPIs is the same as for the MIs above, namely:

3.01-4	Highly satisfactory
2.01-3	Satisfactory
1.01-2	Unsatisfactory
0.00-1	Highly unsatisfactory


## Key




## Strategic management



## Operational management



## Relationship management



## Performance management

### KPI 7: Results focus

7.1 BRM applied	■	
7.2 RBM in strategies	■	
7.3 Evidence-based targets	■	
7.4 Effective monitoring systems	■	
7.5 Performance data applied	■	

### KPI 8: Evidence-based planning

8.1 Evaluation function	■	
8.2 Evaluation coverage	■	
8.3 Evaluation quality	■	
8.4 Evidence-based design	■	
8.5 Poor performance tracked	■	
8.6 Follow-up systems	■	
8.7 Uptake of lessons	■	

## Results

### KPI 9: Achievement of results

9.1 Results deemed attained	■
9.2 Benefits for target groups	■
9.3 Policy/capacity impact	■
9.4 Gender equity results	■
9.5 Environment results	■
9.6 Governance results	■
9.7 Human rights results	■

### KPI 10: Relevance to partners

10.1 Target groups	■
10.2 National objectives	■
10.3 Coherence	■

### KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently

11.1 Cost efficiency	■
11.2 Timeliness	■

### KPI 12: Sustainability of results

12.1 Sustainable benefits	■
12.2 Sustainable capacity	■
12.3 Enabling environment	■

## STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

*Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities*

<b>KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.65</b>
<p>IFAD benefits from a clearly articulated strategic vision and framework, which in turn is firmly based on an analysis of the institution's position within the global development architecture and its comparative advantage, namely, its focus on reducing poverty and food insecurity in rural areas through agriculture and rural development. IFAD's move towards basing its operations on four 'pillars of results delivery' clearly aligns the organisational architecture and operating model with the strategic framework. This results pillars approach is a relatively recent development and the accelerated decentralisation process (arguably the most substantive related organisational change) has only recently commenced, so it is not yet clear as to how supportive the new architecture and operating model actually is for delivery of the strategic objectives. However, every three years the Fund's replenishment process affords IFAD and its member states a regular, systematic opportunity to review the effectiveness and appropriateness of the organisation's strategy, direction and financial framework, including the extent to which the financial framework supports delivery of IFAD's mandate. The main, ongoing financial challenge for IFAD continues to be full funding of its Programme of Loans and Grants. Partly to address this problem, diversification of the resource base beyond member state core contributions is a major, ongoing workstream for IFAD, with recent milestones including the adoption of the Sovereign Borrowing Framework and Concessional Partner Loan Framework.</p>	
<b>MI 1.1: Strategic plan and intended results based on a clear long-term vision and analysis of comparative advantage</b>	
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>4</b>
Element 1: A publicly available Strategic Plan (or equivalent) contains a long-term vision	4
Element 2: The vision is based on a clear analysis and articulation of comparative advantage	4
Element 3: A strategic plan operationalises the vision, including defining intended results	4
Element 4: The Strategic Plan is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	4
<b>MI 1.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's Strategic Framework 2016-25 highlights its long-term vision, which is aligned with the broader Agenda 2030. Specifically, "IFAD's strategic vision of inclusive and sustainable rural transformation is one in which extreme poverty is eliminated; every rural family lives in dignity; poor rural people and communities are empowered to build prosperous and sustainable livelihoods; rural families achieve food and nutrition security; young rural people can hope to realise their aspirations for a better life in their own communities; and where rural economies thrive, alleviate pressure on natural resources, and are linked to cities – supporting and supported by a process of sustainable urbanization".</p>	2, 30, 37

<p>IFAD articulates its comparative advantage by highlighting its history, as well as its unique position as the only UN agency and IFI “focused exclusively on reducing poverty and food insecurity in rural areas through agriculture and rural development”. IFAD identifies its role within the “international development landscape, and [as] a trusted broker of partnerships between governments and other stakeholders” as well as the lessons it brings from the large number of countries it works in. IFAD suggests that its main strength is in “building the capacity, productivity and market participation of rural people using an approach that encourages governments and other actors to facilitate the economic and social empowerment of poor rural people, particularly marginalised rural groups such as women and indigenous peoples”. IFAD also states that its “focus on smallholder agriculture and rural development, its specialised experience, and expertise strengths and qualities of its approach give it a comparative advantage and strategically position it to play a stronger role at national and international levels in promoting inclusive and sustainable rural transformation and in contributing to the SDGs”, which is directly aligned with its strategic vision.</p> <p>The Strategic Framework is operationalised through three-year, medium-term plans. The Framework and the three-year plans articulate IFAD’s intended results, including the long-term vision, an overarching goal (“rural people overcome poverty and achieve food security through remunerative, sustainable and resilient livelihoods”), three strategic objectives, three intended outcomes, and four pillars of results. Five ‘Principles of Engagement’ (such as gender equality and partnerships) underpin this whole results model. IFAD aims to focus its results on five key thematic areas (gender equality, decent work and economic growth, reduced inequalities, climate action and life on land) and two cross-cutting issues (no poverty and zero hunger) that are directly aligned with the SDGs. Intended results are further articulated through IFAD’s results measurement framework (RMF), which defines indicators at different levels of a results hierarchy.</p> <p>IFAD’s Strategic Framework 2016-25 states that “its 10-year time frame is a long one, and so to ensure its relevance amid changes in the broader development context, a midterm review will be carried out in 2020 to determine the need for any substantive reorientations”. IFAD’s periodic replenishment process also provides a regular point through which the organisation, donors and partners take stock of the global context, the constraints on the organisation, and how this may / does affect IFAD’s vision and comparative advantage. Replenishment documentation (including supporting papers) routinely includes relatively detailed analysis in this respect. The replenishment process was evaluated in 2014, and a key recommendation was the definition of a long-term vision, which was subsequently developed. Other recommendations have also been implemented and have further strengthened the process.</p>	2, 30, 37
<b>MI 1.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 1.2: Organisational architecture congruent with a clear long-term vision and associated operating model</b>	
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.2</b>
Element 1: The organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan	3
Element 2: The operating model supports implementation of the strategic plan	2
Element 3: The operating model is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance	4
Element 4: The operating model allows for strong co-operation across the organisation and with other agencies	3
Element 5: The operating model clearly delineates responsibilities for results	4

MI 1.2 Analysis	Source document
<p>The whole strategic framework is underpinned by four ‘pillars of results delivery’, which in turn identify the main operational areas / components required for delivery of the strategy (namely: country programme delivery; knowledge building; financial capacity and instruments; and institutional functions, services and systems). In line with this move to results pillars, IFAD is accelerating its decentralisation process and strengthening its client focus by working towards six medium term objectives including: “establishment of additional IFAD country offices; improved portfolio performance through supervision and implementation support; increased partnerships, resource mobilization and policy engagement; more systematic analysis and sharing of country programme knowledge; enhanced capacities of decentralised staff; and streamlined business processes”. Some policies and papers – for example ‘Tailoring operations to a country context’ – further articulate how these medium-term objectives will be delivered. The results pillars approach is a relatively recent development though, and the accelerated decentralisation (particularly establishment of nine regional hubs and the accompanying relocation of technical staff) has only recently commenced, so, at this stage evidence is limited as to how supportive the new organisational architecture and operating model actually are for delivery of the strategic objectives.</p> <p>Various review processes help IFAD to ensure continual organisational improvement and relevance, most notably and substantially through the regular (three-yearly) replenishment consultation process with member states. While the replenishment process is used to guide overall strategy and direction, specific operational areas also benefit from regular, structured review. For example, the Working Group on the Performance-based Allocation System (PBAS) – comprising the Executive Board, the Evaluation Committee – meets each year to consider ongoing enhancements and updates to the operating model.</p> <p>IFAD’s operating model emphasises co-operation across countries, but also across institutions. It aims to facilitate multi-stakeholder partnerships across multiple levels including between governments, UN agencies, development partners, research institutions, the private sector and small-scale rural producers: the strategic framework states that “IFAD will continue to engage with the international development community to build support around global issues affecting rural communities. It will facilitate multi-stakeholder partnerships between governments, the private sector and small-scale rural producers, including through South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Collaboration with the Rome-based agencies will be of strategic priority”. The framework also states that IFAD’s “business model, partnerships and policy engagement with governments are the basis for the formulation and country ownership of IFAD-supported programmes. Yet, the success of these programmes very much relies on collaboration with other development partners, research institutions, the private sector and civil society, rural communities and their organizations”. Various strategies outline the means through which IFAD intends to deliver this co-ordination (e.g. Partnership Strategy, Private Sector Strategy).</p> <p>The Medium-term Plan 2016-18 outlines Divisional responsibilities for delivery of annual key outputs. This is broken down by results pillar.</p>	2, 11, 12, 30, 37, 39, 42
<b>MI 1.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 1.3: The strategic plan supports the implementation of wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030 and others where applicable (e.g. the quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR), Grand Bargain, replenishment commitments, or other resource and results reviews)</b>	
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.8</b>
Element 1: The strategic plan is aligned to wider normative frameworks and associated results, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	4
Element 2: The strategic plan includes clear results for normative frameworks, including Agenda 2030, and others, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	4
Element 3: A system to track normative results is in place for Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable)	4
Element 4: The organisation's accountability for achieving normative results, including those of Agenda 2030, and any other relevant frameworks, such as the SDGs and their targets and indicators, the QCPR and the Grand Bargain (where applicable), is clearly established	3
Element 5: Progress on implementation on an aggregated level is published at least annually	4
<b>MI 1.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's Strategic Framework 2016-25 is directly aligned with Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, and also highlights the Fund's ongoing role in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The broader replenishment process - and the RMF in particular - also provides IFAD with a normative framework.</p> <p>The Strategic Framework, the medium-term plan and the more regularly updated RMF all establish results relating to normative frameworks. Relevant objectives and indicators are directly defined within the RMF.</p> <p>The RMF measures progress in realising the Strategic Framework 2016-25, including those strategic objectives aligned with Agenda 2030.</p> <p>The RMF explicitly includes the SDGs. The Strategic Framework and Medium-term Plan clearly reflect where IFAD intend to contribute and – to an extent – the Medium-term Plan incorporates SDGs into its log frame. While clear accountabilities for IFAD's SDG contributions are not explicitly articulated within this logframe, accountabilities can be inferred given the logframe's connection to IFAD outcomes and the overarching RMF. The same Medium-term Plan logframe identifies accountabilities (Division-level) for outputs.</p> <p>Given that SDGs are embedded within the current RMF, IFAD will routinely report on their contributions towards implementation of the SDGs. Progress towards the IFAD targets that are aligned to SDGs will be reported on annually through the management-led RIDE reports, and through the Independent Office of Evaluation-led ARRI reports.</p>	1, 2, 30, 37, 38, 40, 42
<b>MI 1.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 1.4: Financial Framework (e.g. division between core and non-core resources) supports mandate implementation</b>	
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.6</b>
Element 1: Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited	2
Element 2: A single integrated budgetary framework ensures transparency	4
Element 3: The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies	4
Element 4: Funding windows or other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide more flexible/un-earmarked funding at global and country levels	4
Element 5: Policies/measures are in place to ensure that earmarked funds are targeted at priority areas	4
<b>MI 1.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's periodic replenishment process affords the Fund and its member states a regular, systematic opportunity to review the effectiveness and appropriateness of the organisation's financial framework, including the extent to which the financial framework supports delivery of IFAD's mandate. The development of – and discussions around – the PoW and Programme of Loans and Grants (PoLG) are at the core of IFAD's financial and budgetary planning and prioritisation process. An annual strategic workforce planning process and Strategic Update Note (SUN) provides additional guidance to management for resource allocation, primarily by analysing results and identifying strategic priorities for departments and divisions.</p> <p>However, the main ongoing financial challenge for IFAD continues to be ensuring its PoLG is fully funded. Replenishment process documentation and the annual PoW and budget documentation invariably focus on this problem, and on strategies for raising sufficient finance to cover IFAD's core programme of work. Evaluations have noted that some priority areas sometimes do not receive adequate funding. For example, there was found to be inadequate funding for environment and natural resource management (ENRM) activities, which several evaluations identified as compromising for implementation, citing "inadequate budget as a factor for weak performance" (from ENRM synthesis).</p> <p>IFAD produces and publicly releases their PoW and Regular and Capital Budgets annually, which set out existing and forecasted spending, as well as changes in funding.</p> <p>IFAD's replenishment process routinely includes formal consultation with member states on the Fund's financial framework, review of the financial framework is essentially a standing agenda item within this process. Additionally, the replenishment processes' supporting papers invariably provide analyses of specific dimensions of the financial framework (IFAD11 examples include papers on IFAD's Business Model, and on the Concessional Partner Loan Framework).</p> <p>Diversification of the resource base beyond member state core contributions is a major, ongoing workstream for IFAD. The main recent milestones have been adoption of the Sovereign Borrowing Framework and Concessional Partner Loan Framework. Initial exploration of the potential for market borrowing is underway. Replenishment process related documentation routinely encourages member states to increase the levels of unrestricted and complementary funding, above and beyond IFAD's core requirements. Moreover, documentation often identifies specific priorities, should unrestricted funding be secured. For example, IFAD10 documentation identifies (amongst others) nutrition-sensitive agriculture and public-private-producer-partnerships as being priority areas for unrestricted funding.</p>	1, 2, 14, 23, 34, 37, 38, 42, 43, 56, 60, 92

<p>IFAD11 and the revised PBAS establish clear targets for the allocation of core resources. More broadly, replenishment documentation emphasises IFAD’s ongoing intention to accept supplementary funds in line with its strategic priorities: “To expand the PoW, IFAD will continue to receive supplementary funds in support of thematic priorities consistent with IFAD’s Strategic Vision. Such funds could also attract new financing partners, including global funds, foundations, impact/ethical investors and corporate partners. Creation of any dedicated thematic trust fund will not detract from IFAD’s ability to plan and implement its PoLG, nor will it require IFAD to put in place substantially differentiated business practices and administrative systems. IFAD will ensure that, over time, there is a plan in place for any thematic trust fund to mainstream its resources into IFAD’s PoLG, making them part of IFAD’s revolving internal resources to the greatest extent possible”.</p>	<p>1, 2, 14, 23, 34, 37, 38, 42, 43, 56, 60, 92</p>
<p><b>MI 1.4 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>High confidence</b></p>
<p><b>KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for cross-cutting issues at all levels</b></p>	<p><b>KPI score</b></p>
<p><b>Satisfactory</b></p>	<p><b>2.46</b></p>
<p>The cross-cutting issues of gender equality and the empowerment of women and environmental sustainability and climate change are both well-integrated within IFAD’s corporate structures, benefiting from dedicated policies, considerable resources, and clear targets and indicators within the Fund’s results framework. However, the cross-cutting issues of good governance and human rights are not supported by dedicated policies, although the Fund’s Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) do ensure at least some coverage of these issues during intervention design processes.</p>	
<p><b>MI 2.1a: Gender equality and the empowerment of women</b></p>	
<p><b>Overall MI rating</b></p>	<p><b>Highly satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI score</b></p>	<p><b>3.67</b></p>
<p>Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on gender equality available and showing evidence of use</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect gender equality indicators and targets</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 4: Gender screening checklists or similar tools used for all new Interventions</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address gender issues</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>Element 6: Capacity development of staff on gender is underway or has been conducted</p>	<p>3</p>
<p><b>MI 2.1a Analysis</b></p>	<p><b>Source document</b></p>
<p>The Policy on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment sets out a goal to deepen IFAD’s impact in its supported countries and programmes: “The purpose is to increase IFAD’s impact on gender equality and strengthen women’s empowerment in poor rural areas. This will be achieved through three strategic objectives: Promote economic empowerment to enable rural women and men to have equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from profitable economic activities; Enable women and men to have equal voice and influence in rural institutions and organizations; Achieve a more equitable balance in workloads and in the sharing of economic and social benefits between women and men”.</p>	<p>1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 29, 30, 37, 38, 51, 54, 55, 60, 92</p>

The Strategic Framework 2016-25 confirms IFAD's intention to apply the principles laid out in the policy, stating that it "will promote economic empowerment that enables rural women and men to have an equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the activities that it finances. This will be complemented by efforts to reduce the labour burden of rural women and increase their voice in decision-making at all levels. IFAD will look to move beyond mainstreaming and scaling up in order to achieve real transformative gender impact. Through investments and policy engagement IFAD will address the underlying root causes of gender inequality – including prevailing social norms, attitudes and behaviours, and social systems – to ensure equal access for women to productive assets and services and to employment and market opportunities".

IFAD has aligned itself with relevant UN frameworks on gender, ensuring that the Policy on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment contributes to SDG 5 on Gender Equality. IFAD has aligned its programming with the UN-SWAP, which provides an overarching accountability framework to monitor progress against 15 gender mainstreaming indicators. The IFAD10 RMF and Medium-term Plan 2016-18 set out three respective gender targets.

IFAD's approach to monitoring gender performance is outlined according to five action areas within the gender policy. These cover IFAD's core activities, institutional structures and resources for policy delivery. Alignment with these action areas is promoted through specialist gender staff at headquarters and regional levels. IFAD's Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) and Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) both aim to systematically monitor project performance and impact from a gender perspective. IFAD10 makes the commitment towards ensuring that at least 15% of project designs are gender transformative and at least 50% achieve full gender mainstreaming. Gender equality and women's empowerment targets are also well integrated within the IFAD10 RMF and Commitment Matrix. IFAD11 has also made a commitment for 25% of projects to be gender transformative.

The gender policy requires the use of several checklists within IFAD programming: 1) gender analysis incorporated within the results-based country strategic opportunities programme (RB-COSOP) and 2) project design reports include a checklist to guide the formulation of the gender strategy. The Guidelines for Supervision and Implementation Support of Projects and Programmes Funded from IFAD Loans and Grants also ask for gender issues to be included as well as regular monitoring of sex-disaggregated data.

The action areas within IFAD's policy on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment include an output on gender in human and financial resources ("IFAD's corporate human and financial resources, and monitoring and accountability systems fully support gender equality and women's empowerment"), supported by three accompanying indicators, one of which is "increase in human and financial resources from IFAD's core budget invested to support gender equality and women's empowerment". While no data was available against this specific indicator, IFAD's PoW routinely reports the contribution towards gender related and supporting activities in the regular budget.

IFAD has been committed to improving awareness of gender issues and incorporating it into its competency framework. However, staff capacity development has also been cited as a key concern for programmes where further training could be provided to project management staff and technical assistance service providers.

1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 29, 30, 37, 38, 51, 54, 55, 60, 92

<b>MI 2.1b: Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.33</b>
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability and climate change available and showing evidence of use	3
Element 2: Environmental sustainability/ climate change indicators and targets are fully integrated into the organisation's strategic plan and corporate objectives	4
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets	4
Element 4: Environmental screening checklists/impact assessments used for all new Interventions	4
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address environmental sustainability and climate change issues	2
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on environmental sustainability and climate change is underway or has taken place	3
<b>MI 2.1b Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD has both a Climate Change Strategy and an ENRM Policy which continue to guide IFAD's approach to environmental sustainability and climate change. The Climate Change Strategy includes a results framework, which in turn includes a goal, purpose and objectives. The ENRM policy "builds on and incorporates relevant actions taken in the implementation of the Climate Change Strategy" and defines an ENRM specific policy goal and purpose. There are also 10 ENRM core principles (adapted from the Climate Change Strategy) which "provide the basis for shaping IFAD's programmes and investments, and strengthening ENRM across IFAD activities". However, these climate change strategy (2010) and ENRM policy (2011) are somewhat dated, especially considering the many internal and external developments during the last seven to eight years. A new consolidated climate and ENRM strategy is under development, due for adoption in 2019.</p> <p>The Strategic Framework 2016-25 fully acknowledges the importance of environment and climate change by making it one of its three strategic objectives ("SO3: Strengthen the environmental sustainability and climate resilience of poor rural people's economic activities"). The Strategic Framework also recognises the role of environmental factors and climate change in rural livelihoods and aims to promote a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and agrifood value chains.</p> <p>IFAD10 commits to environmental sustainability and climate change actions, including "a 10-point plan to achieve 100 per cent climate mainstreaming by 2018". These actions have been reinforced with targets set out in the IFAD10 Commitment Matrix, with targets to be monitored through project completion reports and the Independent Office of Evaluation. RIMS will also be used to track certain climate change and ENRM targets (including through several CORE indicators), and a reviewed Divisional Management Plan (APR) also contains a climate change related target.</p> <p>The RMF has integrated related targets on achievement of satisfactory performance ratings in projects, land management and irrigation practices and numbers of beneficiaries supported in coping with the effects of climate change.</p> <p>The ENRM Evaluation Synthesis confirms that IFAD has made steps at the corporate level to improve IFAD's commitment to ENRM issues. This included establishment of an Environment and Climate Division (now the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division), environmental and social safeguards being upgraded to become SECAP, the launch of the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP), and IFAD's ongoing membership of the Global Environment Facility (GEF).</p>	1, 2, 14, 15, 28, 29, 37, 41, 46, 61, 68, 90

<p>The Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) provides highly detailed guidance on how to incorporate environmental and climate change considerations within intervention designs. This is supported by checklists. The ENRM policy also established use of “a climate risk tool for screening COSOPs and projects, strategic environmental assessments for COSOPs”.</p> <p>IFAD has promoted measures to attract private financing through commercial partners for climate change interventions, however, its more substantial funding comes principally through the GEF. IFAD has also launched the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP), which is dedicated to providing climate change adaptation finance. However, funding efforts to mainstream ENRM into IFAD’s investment portfolio have been constrained, with further evidence suggesting that inadequate budgets for ENRM activities have sometimes compromised implementation.</p> <p>The Operations Academy has a SECAP module with Project Design course which is mandatory for project (but not all) staff. SECAP training also takes place at regional level and at project initiation.</p>	1, 2, 14, 15, 28, 29, 37, 41, 46, 61, 68, 90
<b>MI 2.1b Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 2.1c: Good governance</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>1.67</b>
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on the principles of good governance and effective institutions available and showing evidence of use	0
Element 2: Indicators and targets related to the principles of good governance and effective institutions are integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives	3
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect the principles of good governance and effective institutions	2
Element 4: New interventions are assessed for relevant governance/institutional effectiveness issues	2
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address the principles of good governance and issues related to effective institutions	2
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on the principles of good governance and effective institutions is underway or has taken place	1
<b>MI 2.1c Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>There is no dedicated policy on good governance or on advancing a good governance agenda, although the SECAP, anti-corruption policy, financial management policies and country engagement policies do partly cover elements of good governance. Additionally, elements of good governance are highlighted within the Strategic Framework 2016-25 which acknowledges the importance of promoting social and economic empowerment of rural people and the capacities of grassroots organisations.</p> <p>IFAD’s outcome on “improved country-level capacity” implies a focus on good governance through promoting transparency, responsiveness and accountability in the planning, financing and provision of public sector services. This is accomplished through redefining the role and core functions of public institutions, developing enabling institutional frameworks, and creating space for dialogue for rural people. Several governance-related indicators can be applied during project monitoring and evaluation.</p>	2, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 48, 57, 58, 61, 62, 77, 78, 90

<p>Intervention design processes (COSOPs and projects) do require at least a basic analysis of institutional effectiveness, but – as above – this is not underpinned by a dedicated governance policy, or on guidance for advancing a good governance agenda. Analysis during project design rather forms the basis defining targeted delivery mechanisms, capacity building plans and selectively adjusting systems to enhance implementation of programmes – such as accounting procedures, procurement processes, regulations related to local, meso and national interactions between public and private programme delivery agencies.</p> <p>Another pillar of institutional analysis work conducted by IFAD is in the context of the Rural Sector Performance assessment (RSPA), which is an integral element of the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS). The RSPA measures the quality of policies and institutions in the rural sector for achieving rural development and rural transformation benefitting the poor. It is a valuable tool to support country policy engagement/dialogue, identify policy and institutional capacity gaps, notably during the design and revision of results-based country strategic opportunities programme (COSOPs) and Country Strategy Notes (CSNs).</p> <p>The Risk Based Assurance Framework and Guidelines outlines the methodology for assessing the fiduciary risk of interventions. However, this does not extend to any broader governance issues. COSOPs routinely include a SWOT analysis of implementation partners, this can and sometimes is used to identify governance issues, but is more akin to a light-touch capacity analysis. Project design guidelines require all interventions to address ‘financial management, procurement and governance’ issues through a dedicated section within Project Design Reports, however, these sections are typically used to outline intervention-level governance arrangements, rather than to assess potential systemic and/or governance issues.</p> <p>The routine SWOT analysis undertaken during COSOP development can support some analysis of governance issues, and programme and project design teams are able to allocate resources (e.g. through consultancy inputs) during the intervention design process, should a specific need be identified. Governance specific allocations are not routinely applied to interventions.</p> <p>IFAD has a modestly-sized grant funding facility that can be used for the development of national level institutional capacities. One of the aims of IFAD’s Policy for Grant Financing is strengthening of partners’ institutional and policy capacities.</p> <p>To an extent, SECAP training builds capacities relating to the analysis and development of effective institutions. However, routine, governance specific capacity development is not undertaken.</p>	<p>2, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 48, 57, 58, 61, 62, 77, 78, 90</p>
<b>MI 2.1c Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 2.1d: Human Rights</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>1.17</b>
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on human rights issues available and showing evidence of use	0
Element 2: Human rights indicators and targets fully integrated into the organisation’s strategic plan and corporate objectives	2
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect human rights indicators and targets	2
Element 4: Human rights screening checklists or similar tools used for all new interventions	1
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address human rights issues	2
Element 6: Capacity development of staff on human rights is underway or has been conducted	0

MI 2.1d Analysis	Source document
<p>Corporate policies, and programme and project design guidelines do inherently cover some elements of human rights (albeit not explicitly labelled as such), but there is no dedicated policy on human rights.</p> <p>Specific human rights targets and indicators are not integrated within the organisation's results framework or monitoring and reporting mechanisms. However, IFAD's core criterion of rural poverty impact does address aspects of human rights (although not explicitly labelled as such), and it is routinely measured through ARRI. This routine measurement has found aspects of IFAD's design, implementation and accountability systems that require strengthening with respect to human rights, for example, the 2016 ARRI noted that of the evaluations reviewed "project activities are often not sufficiently refined to meet the needs of all intended beneficiaries, in particular those at risk of being excluded, such as indigenous peoples, pastoralists, landless people, migrants and other vulnerable groups".</p> <p>Although no explicit screening checklists, or, similar tools are used at present, SECAP includes elements of risk assessment that are related to human rights. It has been noted that IFAD intend to explicitly incorporate human rights within the next iteration of the SECAP.</p> <p>Human rights specific allocations are not routinely applied to interventions, but programme and project design teams are able to allocate resources (e.g. through consultancy inputs) during the intervention design process, should a specific need be identified.</p> <p>Routine, human rights specific capacity development is not undertaken.</p>	2, 17, 54, 57, 58, 61, 62, 77, 90
<b>MI 2.1d Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

## OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

*Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance agility and accountability*

<b>KPI 3: Operating model and human/financial resources support relevance and agility</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.05</b>
<p>Out of IFAD's four results pillars, one pillar is entirely focused on 'institutional functions, services and systems'. This pillar supports the ongoing review, rationalisation and streamlining of business processes, with a view to improving institutional efficiency and effectiveness. Closely related to this, IFAD's annual Strategic Workforce Planning process aims to ensure the adequate staffing that is well-aligned to the needs of the strategic framework. Financial resource mobilisation is underpinned by the periodic replenishment process, with these processes being tightly aligned to the organisation's strategic objectives. At the regional and country level, IFAD's approach to delegated authorities and decentralised decision-making is in flux at present, given the current accelerated decentralisation process. More broadly, IFAD's human resources are supported by a well-documented set of implementing procedures, which describe the organisation's approach to performance management and performance assessment. However, the system is imperfect and perhaps overly rigid, sometimes resulting in inconsistent application of the process.</p>	
<b>MI 3.1: Organisational structures and staffing ensure that human and financial resources are continuously aligned and adjusted to key functions</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.67</b>

Element 1: Staffing is aligned with, or being reorganised to, requirements set out in the current Strategic Plan	3
Element 2: Resource allocations across functions are aligned to current organisational priorities and goals, as set out in the current Strategic Plan	3
Element 3: Internal restructuring exercises have a clear purpose and intent, aligned to the priorities of the current Strategic Plan	2
<b>MI 3.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD is currently undertaking a large, rapid, decentralisation process to move technical staff closer to the field, and this has implications across the organisation, with up to 30% of all staff (previously 18%) based outside headquarters by the end of 2018. The 2016 Corporate Decentralisation Plan outlines how the decentralised results pillar of 'country programme delivery' will be shaped through realignment of country programmes and offices.</p> <p>IFAD uses a combination of full-time, temporary and consulting staff. The annual Strategic Workforce Plan (SWP) aims to ensure an appropriately sized and placed workforce with adequate competencies and skills to deliver on its commitments. This plan is well-aligned with the Strategic Framework. However, decentralisation will reveal whether field-based staff have enough development / non-lending capacity as opposed to investment-focused capacity. IFAD aims to further refine HR policy and management in line with decentralisation by providing HR services through regional hubs.</p> <p>The SUN identifies strategic priorities and provides departments and divisions with guidance on resource allocation. The SWP allocates resources across functions, also maintaining alignment with the current Strategic Framework. The current Strategic Framework is organised into results pillars, which means staff costs must be allocated against institutional output groups instead of Corporate Management Results and activities. The Corporate Decentralisation Plan also outlines three new models for managing country offices, including the sharing of country programme functions, which in turn may include shared resources.</p> <p>IFAD's Corporate Decentralisation Plan (2016) – and its objectives – are clearly aligned to the Strategic Framework and results pillars. Decentralisation is accompanied by streamlining and rationalisation of key business process, with this process closely influenced by the IOE's corporate evaluation of IFAD's institutional efficiency and cost effectiveness. The Consolidated Action Plan to Enhance Operational and Institutional Efficiency is monitored and maintained on an ongoing basis.</p> <p>The current decentralisation process was timed to minimise disruption, taking place at the end of IFAD10 and the beginning of IFAD11. It builds on existing decentralised regions, with the Nairobi Office being used as the model for sub-regional hubs and decentralised knowledge management. The overarching rationale about building country presence was communicated extensively, with staff offered opportunities for career mobility and diversified experience. Staff also had opportunities to contribute ideas, and individuals were encouraged to share experiences about deployment. Despite these efforts, staff concerns persist about the speed of the process, the extent to which efficiency is really being improved, and the precise role of the regional hubs.</p>	2, 6, 7, 34, 45, 53, 60, 92
<b>MI 3.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 3.2: Resource mobilisation efforts consistent with the core mandate and strategic priorities</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.8</b>
Element 1: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support explicitly aligned to current strategic plan	4
Element 2: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support reflects recognition of need to diversify the funding base, particularly in relation to the private sector	4
Element 3: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support seeks multi-year funding within mandate and strategic priorities	4
Element 4: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support prioritises the raising of domestic resources from partner countries/institutions, aligned to goals and objectives of the Strategic Plan/ relevant country plan	3
Element 5: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support contains clear targets, monitoring and reporting mechanisms geared to the Strategic Plan or equivalent	4
<b>MI 3.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Resource mobilisation is guided primarily by the periodic replenishment process. Both reviewed processes (IFAD10 and IFAD11) are tightly aligned to the Strategic Framework 2016-25 and Mid-term Plan 2016-18.</p> <p>Annual Reports emphasise the need to diversify IFAD's funding base, and replenishment documentation and the annual PoW routinely emphasise the need for (and importance of) diversifying IFAD's funding base, particularly given the ongoing inadequacy of the PoLG to cover the organisation's overall commitments.</p> <p>Financial partnerships with the private sector have shown to be a priority for IFAD. The Strategic Framework states that IFAD will pursue "promotion of closer collaboration at local and country level between private-sector actors, financial institutions, and producers' organizations and cooperatives to catalyse investments and employment in rural areas while reinforcing the inclusiveness of market-driven smallholder development". The ARRI also notes that "expansion of IFAD's engagement with the private sector, including large private companies in the agriculture and food sector, especially at the country level is a priority for improved partnership-building moving forward" and IFAD10: "IFAD needs to examine the options for broadening its strategy for resource mobilization ... in the short-term borrowing from sovereign states and state-supported institutions, and for the longer term, exploring the scope for borrowing from the market".</p> <p>IFAD replenishment documentation set out financial frameworks for three-year periods. More broadly, the 2017 PoW confirms the overarching, high-level resource mobilisation ambition: "In accordance with the Strategic Framework thrust of becoming "bigger", IFAD will endeavour to play a larger role in fulfilling its mandate and achieving greater impact by mobilizing substantially more resources over and above the stated USD 3.2 billion target".</p>	1, 2, 4, 14, 15, 28, 30, 37, 39, 42, 43, 56, 60, 86, 92

<p>Although not necessarily identified as a priority source of funding, IFAD10 and IFAD11's financial frameworks allow for the mobilisation of resources from domestic sources. Commitments to domestic financing are also made within IFAD's Approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation: "The Fund will revisit opportunities to support developing countries interested in deploying public financial resources in support of development projects or other activities in other developing countries. Potential options in this regard include the creation of a cofinancing facility, or similar one-off bilateral arrangements, which would enable developing countries to contribute financial resources in support of IFAD-supported lending operations in other developing countries beyond what each country can make available through replenishment contributions".</p> <p>The RMF highlights several targets concerned with mobilizing co-financing: "a mean 1:1.2 cofinancing ratio and monitor and report on its cofinancing performance by source of cofinancing (domestic and international, public and private) and country type (MIC and low-income country)" and "the percentage of IFAD10 pledges over replenishment target". One reviewed Divisional Management Plans (APR) also set co-financing targets.</p>	1, 2, 4, 14, 15, 28, 30, 37, 39, 42, 43, 56, 60, 86, 92
<b>MI 3.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 3.3: Aid reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need can be made at a decentralised level</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.75</b>
Element 1: An organisation-wide policy or guidelines exist which describe the delegation of decision-making authorities at different levels within the organisation	2
Element 2: <i>(If the first criterion is met)</i> The policy/guidelines or other documents provide evidence of a sufficient level of decision-making autonomy available at the country level (or other decentralised level as appropriate) regarding aid reallocation/programming	3
Element 3: Evaluations or other reports contain evidence that reallocation/programming decisions have been made to positive effect at country or other local level, as appropriate	4
Element 4: The organisation has made efforts to improve or sustain the delegation of decision-making on aid allocation/programming to the country or other relevant levels	2
<b>MI 3.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's approach towards decentralised decision-making is presented within the 2016 Update on IFAD's Country Presence and the Corporate Decentralization Plan. The 2016 Update on IFAD's Country Presence highlights progress and challenges in enhancing IFAD's operating model and how IFAD's operations can be decentralised. The Corporate Decentralization Plan draws on recent successful examples of IFAD's decentralisation experience and is "aimed at consolidating the knowledge acquired over the years into a more coherent and harmonised approach".</p> <p>However, the organisation's approach to delegated authorities is currently in flux, given the current accelerated decentralisation process. The institutional restructuring (and staff relocations) are being undertaken first, with delegated authorities to be confirmed later in 2018. There are mixed views across the staff base as to whether this has been an effective approach: some staff are supportive, but other staff are concerned that any revisions to delegation of authorities should have been confirmed prior to the decentralisation process being initiated.</p>	13, 42, 45, 66, 79

While the eventual (post-decentralisation) delegated authorities are still to be confirmed, staff are generally supportive of the <i>current</i> levels of delegation. There are some concerns about insufficient delegation of authorities for some <i>administrative</i> tasks, but no similar concerns on <i>programmatic</i> decision making. Overall the current framework is not seen to compromise operational efficiency.	13, 42, 45, 66, 79
A corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's Decentralization Experience explored the decentralisation experience in general. Key findings were that country offices and increased country presence contributed to improved design and performance, helped to enhance project effectiveness, and supported partnership building. The evaluation also found a plausible connection between increased country presence and stronger contributions to development results (reduced rural poverty, enhanced gender equality, stronger potential for sustainability).	
<b>MI 3.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 3.4: HR systems and policies performance based and geared to the achievement of results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: A system is in place which requires the performance assessment of all staff, including senior staff	4
Element 2: There is evidence that the performance assessment system is systematically and implemented by the organisation across all staff and to the required frequency	2
Element 3: The performance assessment system is clearly linked to organisational improvement, particularly the achievement of corporate objectives, and to demonstrate ability to work with other agencies	3
Element 4: The performance assessment of staff is applied in decision making relating to promotion, incentives, rewards, sanctions, etc.	2
Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints relating to staff performance assessments	4
<b>MI 3.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
The Human Resources Implementing Procedures 2017 describes a performance management system that "aims at regularly reviewing staff performance to promote the most effective use of expertise, ensure quality of service, recognise achievements, reward high performance, identify learning and development needs, and supporting the overall objectives of the organization by linking each staff member's objectives to departmental/divisional and unit work plans and IFAD's Corporate Management Results". Performance management for senior staff is also undertaken through the SMRG (Senior Management Review Group) which "review the performance assessments and decide on performance ratings for all staff at grade levels D1 and above and other high-level staff as determined by the President with the exception of IOE staff"	34, 52, 53

A performance assessment system is systematically applied and at several intervals over the year: "Annual performance evaluations shall be carried out through an appropriate performance evaluation system (PES). Performance documents must be finalised in accordance with the relevant guidelines and annual deadlines published by HRD. The PMP cycle starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December every year. It consists of distinct phases that occur sequentially or in parallel over a twelve-month period. These phases include the following: (a) Performance planning; (b) Performance delivery; (c) Mid-year review; (d) Year-end review". This process is well-adhered to, with full administrative compliance. The annual Strategic Workforce Planning (SWP) process and Strategic Update Note (SUN) provide divisions and departments with additional direction and guidance on strategic prioritisation and resource allocation (including human resource allocation). Additionally, "Performance management aims at ... supporting the overall objectives of the organization by linking each staff member's objectives to departmental/divisional and unit work plans and IFAD's Corporate Management Results".

However, many staff – those with line management responsibilities and those without – felt that the rigidity of the system introduced some weaknesses and misaligned incentives, particularly when it came to managing over- and under-performing staff. For example, several staff were critical of the limitation whereby only 15% of staff managed by any given Director can be assessed as 'superior' or 'outstanding' (high-performing staff currently receive monetary and non-monetary rewards above and beyond their core remuneration package). A typical response to this is for Directors to 'rotate' the annual reward across their high performing staff, so that consistently high performing individuals may not receive an annual award, but at least receive the benefits some of the time. At the other end of the performance spectrum, staff felt that the institutional response to the 'underperforming' rating was disproportionate. Individuals rated in the 'underperforming' category undergo considerably stricter performance management requirements when compared to individuals who are not rated as 'underperforming', but whose performance may only be marginally better. Directors were therefore often reluctant to allocate the 'underperforming' rating due to what they see as the disproportionate ramping up of performance oversight. These are just two examples of what many staff perceive as overly rigid and sometimes 'artificial' performance management processes and rules. While the staff base is generally content with the Fund's approach and appreciate the difficulty in achieving an objective yet flexible system, the imperfections can and do sometimes have a negative impact on morale.

"In case staff members disagree with the Departmental Management Review Group (DMRG), or Senior Management Review Group (SMRG) decision on their performance, they may state their disagreement in the relevant performance evaluation system. The staff member's completion of the PES confirms that staff members have received and read the performance feedback, it does not necessarily imply agreement. Staff members may file an appeal against the final decision in relation to their performance in accordance with the procedures set forth in HR Implementing Procedures (HRIP) chapter 9 - Dispute Resolution".

34, 52, 53

**MI 3.4 Evidence confidence****High confidence**

<b>KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency/accountability</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.5</b>
<p>IFAD has detailed, transparent resource allocation policies and procedures that are clearly grounded in the organisation's overall mandate and current strategic framework. These policies confirm that resource allocation decision-making and prioritisation is performance-based, closely informed by the annual country 'scoring' process, which in turn is comprised of an assessment of (i) country programme needs and (ii) country programme performance. However, IFAD acknowledges that the speed and efficiency of actual resource disbursement is an area in which the organisation needs to improve. The 2018 budget is structured according to results pillar and institutional output group, and summarises projected distributions according to strategic objective and thematic areas. The 2018 PoW demonstrates an improvement on 2017 by incorporating results-based planning and budgets against the pillar-based approach, and the SUN also represents a step towards 'building a better system' for results-based budgeting. IFAD's internal and external audits comply with international standards, and internal systems for identifying, addressing and monitoring risk and audit related issues are well developed. The current anti-corruption policies and procedures have been in place since 2005, with anti-corruption processes supported by a public, relatively detailed annual report on anti-corruption and fraud related activity.</p>	
<b>MI 4.1: Transparent decision-making for resource allocation, consistent with strategic priorities</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>4</b>
Element 1: An explicit organisational statement or policy exists which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners	4
Element 2: The criteria reflect targeting to the highest priority themes/countries/areas of intervention as set out in the current Strategic Plan	4
Element 3: The organisational policy or statement is regularly reviewed and updated	4
Element 4: The organisational statement or policy is publicly available	4
<b>MI 4.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's criteria for allocation of resources to partners is detailed in the Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing 2013, which cites the Agreement Establishing IFAD as the source of its objectives ("the Fund shall ... mobilize additional resources to be made available on concessional terms for agricultural development in developing Member States") and its priorities: "in allocating its resources the Fund shall be guided by the following priorities: (i) the need to increase food production and to improve the nutritional level of the poorest populations in the poorest food-deficit countries; and (ii) the potential for increasing food production in other developing countries. Likewise, emphasis shall be placed on improving the nutritional level of the poorest populations in these countries and the conditions of their lives". The policies and criteria for fulfilling these objectives and priorities of the Fund include: the performance-based allocation system (PBAS), the programme of work, COSOPs, selection criteria set out in the thematic policies and strategies, implementation of projects and programmes consistent with the regulations, and independent evaluations of projects and programmes conducted in accordance with the evaluation policy.</p>	10, 24, 44, 56, 67, 80

<p>The PBAS aims to “increase the effectiveness of the use of IFAD’s scarce resources, and to establish a more transparent basis and predictable level of future resource flows”. “The resources of the Fund available for financing for developing Member States shall be allocated in accordance with a performance-based allocation system (PBAS) established by the Executive Board.” “The PBAS has allowed IFAD to allocate its loan and grant resources to country programmes annually on the basis of the country score, which is determined by two components: (a) a country needs component, made up of two variables: rural population and gross national income per capita (GNIPC); and (b) a country performance component, composed of three variables: broad policy framework, portfolio performance and rural-sector performance.”</p> <p>While the Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing 2013 were developed prior to the Strategic Framework 2016-25 they were nevertheless guided by the original Agreement Establishing IFAD. As such, they are well-aligned with the Strategic Framework 2016-25 and its objectives. The PBAS allows IFAD to allocate its loan and grant resources to county programmes on the basis of country scores, which supports targeting of allocations to the highest priority countries. IFAD has also developed a corporate disbursement action plan, which was formulated in response to poor disbursement metrics.</p> <p>IFAD is committed to ongoing relevance of the policy and criteria and is required through its mandate to review policies and criteria for IFAD Financing periodically. In line with this, the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing was revised in 2015 following an internal review regarding shortcomings and poor implementation in the 2009 Policy. The PBAS was also evaluated in 2016, with revisions made to the PBAS formula based on that evaluation’s findings.</p> <p>All key resource allocation policies and documents are available online, including the Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing, the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing and the Performance Based Allocation System Formula and Procedures.</p>	10, 24, 44, 56, 67, 80
<b>MI 4.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 4.2: Allocated resources disbursed as planned</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: The institution sets clear targets for disbursement	4
Element 2: Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were met within institutionally agreed margins	2
Element 3 Clear explanations are available in relation to any variances	3
Element 4: Variances relate to external factors rather than internal procedural blockages	3
<b>MI 4.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The RMF sets explicit targets for overall programme disbursement and disbursement in fragile states: “Percentage disbursement ratio (overall)” and “Percentage disbursement ratio (fragile situations)”.</p> <p>Divisional Management Plans and the RMF establish more detailed, operational targets related to disbursements under different grants and programmes, for example: average time from project approval to first disbursement (36-month rolling); disbursements of IFAD financed loans and Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) grants in USD million (12-month rolling); disbursements of IFAD financed loans and DSF grants in USD million (12-month rolling); Disbursements of ASAP financing in USD million (cumulative, current year); disbursements of GEF financing in USD million (cumulative, current year); disbursement ratio for overall portfolio (in %).</p>	4, 6, 10, 15, 24, 33, 37, 44, 54, 55

<p>Meeting disbursement targets has been a consistent difficulty for IFAD with roughly a third of projects meeting the required targets by mid-term. Since the inclusion of these targets in the RMF in IFAD8, the target of 14 months between project approval and first disbursement has not been met and – as of mid-2018 – stood at just below 17 months. The disbursement ratio was lowered to 15% in December 2016, however, the ratio continued to be around 13%. This is particularly seen to be an issue in fragile states or those with severe capacity limitations where many other factors have an impact on disbursement.</p> <p>Slow project start-up and low disbursement at completion are often cited as one of the main reasons for poor performance. Other processes such as application withdrawal, building political will in country, older projects, procurement of goods and services, and submission of expenditures statements have also slowed disbursements.</p> <p>The issues that IFAD has experienced on disbursements often relate to internal blockages such as HR processes, slow administration, procedural challenges, and problematic recruitment processes at the programme level. Political interference, non-compliance with labour legislation and establishment of staff contracts have also been a concern. However, external factors are significant most notably including fiduciary and administrative capacity of clients.</p>	4, 6, 10, 15, 24, 33, 37, 44, 54, 55
<b>MI 4.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 4.3: Principles of results-based budgeting applied</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: The most recent organisational budget clearly aligns financial resources with strategic objectives/intended results of the current Strategic Plan	4
Element 2: A budget document is available which provides clear costings for the achievement of each management result	3
Element 3: Systems are available and used to track costs from activity through to result (outcome)	1
Element 4: There is evidence of improved costing of management and development results in budget documents reviewed over time (evidence of building a better system)	4
<b>MI 4.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The annual budget as presented within IFAD's latest (2018) PoW represents a considerable step forward on previous years. This PoW is the first to provide a results-based budget, identifying the regular budget for each of IFAD's 'institutional output groups' according to the results pillar. In particular, the 2018 IFAD PoW and budget are the first to be based on an enhanced approach, with a stronger and more explicit link between the four results pillars in the Strategic Framework, planned institutional outputs and resource allocations.</p> <p>An indicative breakdown of 2018 regular budget by results pillar and institutional output group is available and summarises projected distributions according to strategic objective and thematic areas.</p> <p>While internal systems are capable of tracking costs from activity through to results, this has not yet translated to ongoing analysis and reporting, which does not yet incorporate results-based budgeting: the main results reporting documents (ARRI, RIDE) do not align resource allocation or utilisation / expenditure with results areas.</p>	4, 6, 14, 34, 37, 54, 55, 60, 92

<p>The approach is still a work-in-progress, but clear progress was made between the 2017 and 2018 PoW, the 2017 PoW was based on high-level outputs and on clusters rather than pillars, but the 2018 version presents a budget aligning institutional output groups to the four strategic results pillars. The SUN also represents a step towards ‘building a better system’ for results-based budgeting as it provides guidance on strategic priorities and resource allocations, based on an analysis of IFAD’s performance.</p>	4, 6, 14, 34, 37, 54, 55, 60, 92
<b>MI 4.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 4.4: External audit or other external reviews certifies the meeting of international standards at all levels, including with respect to internal audit</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>4</b>
Element 1: External audit conducted which complies with international standards	4
Element 2: Most recent external audit confirms compliance with international standards across functions	4
Element 3: Management response is available to external audit	4
Element 4: Management response provides clear action plan for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audit	N/E
Element 5: Internal audit functions meet international standards, including for independence	4
Element 6: Internal audit reports are publicly available	4
<b>MI 4.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>External audits of the financial statements and internal controls adhere to the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) and International Standards on Assurance Engagement (ISAE) 3000. Other than for financial statements, no external audits of IFAD were undertaken.</p> <p>The 2015 external audit of IFAD’s financial statements confirmed that statements adhered to International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) standards, as per IFAD’s audit guidelines. The latest (2016) external audit of IFAD’s financial statements was carried out according to ISA standards, and confirms IFAD’s adherence to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) standards.</p> <p>Management responses are routinely presented along audits of financial statements. Other than for financial statements, no external audits of IFAD were undertaken.</p> <p>While detailed management responses and action plans are prepared, this documentation is confidential. Other than for financial statements, no external audits of IFAD were undertaken.</p> <p>The Office for Audit and Oversight’s charter states that “internal auditing activities will be carried out consistent with the Definition of Internal Auditing, the Code of Ethics, and the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing promulgated by the Institute of Internal Auditors” and that its “activities are carried out in accordance with the Uniform Guidelines for Investigations applicable to the conduct of administrative investigations, and with the Uniform Framework for Combating Fraud and Corruption”. The charter also sets out the measures applied to ensure objectivity and independence.</p>	1, 56, 81

Internal audit reports are not publicly available. In line with the Office for Audit and Oversight's charter, summaries of internal audit reports are provided to the Audit Committee (NB: the revised charter approved in late 2018 – outside the MOPAN window of assessment – states that internal audit reports are provided to Members of the Audit Committee and the Executive Board upon request, and an annual report with summaries of the key findings from all internal audit reports is provided to the Audit Committee and to the Executive Board).	1, 56, 81
<b>MI 4.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 4.5: Issues or concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc.) adequately addressed</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.67</b>
Element 1: A clear policy or organisational statement exists on how any issues identified through internal control mechanisms will be addressed	4
Element 2: Management guidelines or rules provide clear guidance on the procedures for addressing any identified issues, including timelines	3
Element 3: Clear guidelines are available for staff on reporting any issues identified	4
Element 4: A tracking system is available which records responses and actions taken to address any identified issues	4
Element 5: Governing Body or management documents indicate that relevant procedures have been followed/action taken in response to identified issues, including recommendations from audits (internal and external)	4
Element 6: Timelines for taking action follow guidelines/ensure the addressing of the issue within twelve months following its reporting	3
<b>MI 4.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's Accountability Framework describes the organisation's internal controls including policies, procedures, responsibilities, and reporting channels for identifying, monitoring and addressing risks and specific issues / problems identified through, for example, risk assessment, internal audit etc. The Framework in turn points readers towards more specific policies and guidelines relating to e.g. enterprise risk, fiduciary risk, internal audit recommendations etc.</p> <p>The Accountability Framework serves as a central reference point, providing a summary of – and 'signpost' towards – policies and guidelines for identifying, reporting, addressing and monitoring risks and issues / problems. However, timelines for dealing with issues are not explicitly laid out.</p> <p>The Accountability Framework serves as a central reference point, providing a summary of – and 'signpost' towards – policies and guidelines for identifying, reporting, addressing and monitoring risks and issues / problems. For fraud related issues, the anti-corruption policy provides general guidance on reporting, supported by anti-corruption intranet and internet sites. The Office for Audit and Oversight and the Ethics Office both have dedicated reporting channels for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The SEA/SH policy establishes responsibilities and obligations regarding conduct, including reporting SH/SEA. It is planned that SECAP will include SH/SEA risks assessment and that SH/SEA related issues will be included in supervision and support missions.</p>	6, 18, 20, 26, 27, 35, 47, 48, 81

<p>Several systems exist for tracking fiduciary risk as well as internal audits and their recommendations. Web-based tools have been developed to support the fiduciary management of projects including “The Financial Management Dashboard ... an IFAD online FM tool that allows Finance Officers and other staff to monitor and obtain information about the financial management risk and performance as well as the most important mitigation actions by country, project, institution and financing instrument”. The “Audit Report Tracking System – ARTS” launched in 2012 has been redesigned in 2015/16 to include grants. IFAD’s Corporate Risk Register is also used to record the status of ongoing risks and ranks them according to severity.</p> <p>Internal, confidential Audit Committee documentation outlines institution wide actions and measures to address high priority or systemic issues identified through internal audit. The same documentation indicates that project-level audits should all contain management reports / responses that, ideally, should include time-bound plans for responding to audit recommendations and/or identified issues which are reported directly to the Vice President.</p> <p>The RIDE routinely reports against some institution wide measures of risk: “Projects at risk continue to account for 20 per cent of the ongoing portfolio. Proactivity has improved since the previous reporting period and has reached 50 per cent: 21 of the 42 projects that were at risk in the previous review changed status.” To address these risks, the RIDE continues: “In this context, a major update of IFAD’s supervision guidelines is under way to enhance overall portfolio performance. Envisioned changes include: (i) shifting from a culture of supervision “by mission” to a culture of “continuous supervision”; (ii) anchoring supervision in results by updating log frames and streamlining project performance ratings to be supported with evidence; and (iii) streamlining supervision reporting tools into one single action-oriented instrument”.</p> <p>Operational Procedures for Project and Programme Audits and internal Audit Committee documentation indicates that responses to high priority / high risk audit recommendations should be time-bound (for example, where financial irregularities have been identified). High priority / high risk recommendations are due for implementation at the latest within six months while normal priority recommendations within a deadline agreed between the Office for Audit and Oversight and Management.</p>	<p>6, 18, 20, 26, 27, 35, 47, 48, 81</p>
<p><b>MI 4.5 Evidence confidence</b></p>	
<p><b>MI 4.6: Policies and procedures effectively prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities</b></p>	<p><b>Score</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI rating</b></p>	<p><b>Highly satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI score</b></p>	<p><b>3.33</b></p>
<p>Element 1: A clear policy/guidelines on fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities is available and made public</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 2: The policy/guidelines clearly define the roles of management and staff in implementing/ complying with the guidelines</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted in relation to the policy/guidelines</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 4: There is evidence of policy/guidelines implementation, e.g. through regular monitoring and reporting to the Governing Body</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 5: There are channels/mechanisms in place for reporting suspicion of misuse of funds (e.g. anonymous reporting channels and “whistle-blower” protection policy)</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 6: Annual reporting on cases of fraud, corruption and other irregularities, including actions taken, ensures that they are made public</p>	<p>4</p>

MI 4.6 Analysis	Source document
<p>IFAD has a dedicated anti-corruption policy, developed in 2005, which is publicly available. It takes a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption and details a range of sanctions which can be enforced where fraudulent activity has occurred in accordance with the provisions of applicable IFAD rules and regulations and legal instruments. This also requires the protection of individuals from reprisals who have revealed corrupt practices. However, this policy does not reflect several subsequent and significant changes, including the establishment of an Office of Audit and Oversight, and the replacement of the Oversight Committee with a Sanctions Committee. A revised policy is due to be introduced by the end of 2018 (following the conclusion of the MOPAN assessment, the revised <i>Policy on Preventing Fraud and Corruption</i> was adopted in December 2018). A policy on preventing and responding to sexual harassment, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) was introduced in 2018.</p> <p>The anti-corruption policy states that: "IFAD rules and regulations, legal instruments and control processes (including internal audit and external audit) define and enforce the parameters of proper conduct for staff and consultants, and constitute prevention and detection controls against the incidence of fraud and corruption". The policy goes on to say that HR procedures have been updated and a code of conduct produced to guide the ethical behaviour of IFAD staff and consultants.</p> <p>As a part of the Update on IFAD's Accountability Framework 2013, IFAD staff are required to declare on a yearly basis: "(i) that they have read, understood and will ensure compliance with the Code of Conduct; (ii) all conflicts of interest, including the appearance thereof; and (iii) all sources of non-IFAD income, goods, services and assets".</p> <p>IFAD has used several methods of engaging staff on matters of anti-corruption including: presentations to all staff on the first annual report of the IFAD Oversight Committee completed in 2005; an anti-corruption awareness kit given to staff which provides guidance on communication channels and processes for dealing with different types of irregular practices; and the creation of an IFAD anti-corruption Intranet and Internet site to share up-to-date information in relation to anti-corruption and reporting. The Office of Audit and Oversight (AUO) is also responsible for developing and delivering anti-corruption training.</p> <p>The AUO develop an annual, publicly available report on Investigation and Anticorruption Activities. The Sanctions Committee coordinates investigations into alleged irregular practices, both within IFAD and in relation to IFAD projects. This was reinforced through the adoption of the investigation guidelines which require protection from reprisals for individuals who report corrupt practices (including whistle-blowers). The Office of Audit and Oversight's charter indicates that they now fulfil most of these functions, supported by a Sanctions Committee. An Ethics Office has also been established since the anti-corruption policy was introduced. However, the 2005 policy has not been amended to reflect these changes (following the conclusion of the MOPAN assessment, the revised <i>Policy on Preventing Fraud and Corruption</i> was adopted in December 2018).</p> <p>A relatively detailed Annual Report on Investigation and Anti-corruption Activities is published each year by the Office of Audit and Oversight, including analysis of the type of case, status / resolution of cases, and a more general description of the organisation's approach to investigation and anti-corruption. Through this document, cases are made public without identifying details.</p>	<p>19, 26, 27, 56, 81, 89</p>
<b>MI 4.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

## RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

*Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, to leverage effective solutions and to maximise results (in line with Busan Partnerships commitments)*

<b>KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility (within partnerships)</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>3.00</b>
<p>IFAD country strategies are grounded in an inclusive analysis of national context (based on inputs from governmental and non-governmental sources alike), with country level objectives well-aligned to national objectives and priorities. However, several critical steps in the planning and design process are not routinely undertaken. While central, detailed guidance on organisational capacity analysis is in place, detailed capacity analysis is not undertaken routinely. The analysis of programme / project sustainability (as separate from IFAD's 'scaling up' agenda) also appears to lack structure, although at the same time it should be noted that country programme objectives are very often inherently focused on delivering sustainability. COSOPs do give cross-cutting issues (particularly gender and climate) significant attention. But analysis of governance and human rights is not systematic or particularly prominent within country programme or intervention design.</p>	
<b>MI 5.1: Interventions aligned with national/regional priorities and intended national/regional results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.67</b>
Element 1: Reviewed country or regional strategies make reference to national/regional strategies or objectives	4
Element 2: Reviewed country strategies or regional strategies link the results statements to national or regional goals	4
Element 3: Structures and incentives in place for technical staff that allow investment of time and effort in alignment process	3
<b>MI 5.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>COSOP and PDR guidelines both include requirements for interventions (country strategies and individual projects, respectively) to link design with national priorities. COSOPs and Project Design Reports (PDRs) routinely include sub-sections dedicated to discussion of the extent of relevance, harmonisation and alignment of IFAD country strategy or project design with national, government-level objectives. The reviewed COSOPs all make reference to national strategies.</p> <p>The COSOPs reviewed link strategic objectives to national goals and strategies e.g. in Bangladesh team "will support commercialization of smallholder agriculture in line with the Government's Sixth Five-Year Plan." COSOPs allow IFAD to translate its strategic vision into a set of country-level objectives which are aligned with IFAD's strategic objectives and clearly set out the results chain that contributes to the achievement of country-level objectives.</p> <p>There are several tools and guidelines available to staff in the alignment process. The design process (COSOPs and projects) and broader Quality Enhancement process place considerable emphasis on alignment, including the allocation of sufficient time for staff to dedicate to ensuring alignment. Equally, the Supervision and Implementation guidelines support ongoing contextual analysis of interventions and realignment of priorities, as required. As part of the Operations Academy, IFAD also aims to continue efforts to build staff expertise and skills for both public and private sector engagement to better leverage resources.</p>	57, 58, 62, 77, 78, 84
<b>MI 5.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 5.2: Contextual analysis (shared where possible) applied to shape the intervention designs and implementation</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement that positions the intervention within the operating context	4
Element 2: Context statement has been developed jointly with partners	4
Element 3: Context analysis contains reference to gender issues, where relevant	4
Element 4: Context analysis contains reference to environmental sustainability and climate change issues, where relevant	4
Element 5: Context analysis contains reference to governance issues, including conflict and fragility, where relevant	2
Element 6: Evidence of reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in context	3
<b>MI 5.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>COSOPs define IFAD's comparative advantages in member countries, and identify how best it can add value to each country's own strategy for rural poverty reduction in the context of IFAD's mandate and strategic vision. Contextual analysis is similarly central for PDRs.</p> <p>Consultation with national partners takes place during COSOP development, and it is mandatory to include details on stakeholder consultation.</p> <p>Targeting and gender is a mandatory section within COSOPs, which should be used to describe IFAD's national approach to gender analysis and targeting, including presentation of gender perspectives. Gender was fully incorporated within the reviewed COSOPS' contextual analyses.</p> <p>Inclusion of 'natural resources and climate change' is a mandatory section within COSOPs, with an additional mandatory annex on the subject. Climate change and environmental sustainability were covered where appropriate within the reviewed COSOPs.</p> <p>A formal analysis of governance related issues is not a requirement within COSOPs, however, sections on 'policy engagement' and a higher-level country diagnosis are necessary and can include relevant material. Based on the reviewed COSOPs, reference to – and analysis of – governance related issues is not particularly substantive, and is not a requirement. References to governance issues in the reviewed COSOPs were mainly tangential and are primarily with regards to economic inequality. Staff interviews confirm that analysis (and/or integration) of governance is not mandatory.</p> <p>There is evidence of reflection points with partners being applied during Country Programme Evaluations. Additionally, self-evaluations in the form of COSOP Completion Reviews (CCRs) are required to be undertaken at the end of every COSOP period. This CCR should then be used to inform the next COSOP strategy and design.</p>	57, 58, 62, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78
<b>MI 5.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 5.3: Capacity analysis informs intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weakness found are employed</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.4</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement of capacities of key national implementing partners	3
Element 2: Capacity analysis considers resources, strategy, culture, staff, systems and processes, structure and performance	2
Element 3: Capacity analysis statement has been developed jointly where feasible	3
Element 4: Capacity analysis statement includes clear strategies for addressing any weaknesses, with a view to sustainability	2
Element 5: Evidence of regular and resourced reflection points with partner(s) that take note of any significant changes in the wider institutional setting that affect capacity	2
<b>MI 5.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD has developed a relatively detailed ‘field practitioner’s guide’ on institutional and organisational analysis and capacity strengthening. This includes guidance on capacity analysis at country (COSOP) level and intervention (project) level. Within COSOPs, only limited capacity analysis is undertaken within the main text, rather the analysis is primarily presented via the ‘Organizations Matrix (SWOT analysis)’. More detailed analyses are undertaken at the level of project design, with a PDR section (‘Organizational Framework’) dedicated to identifying institutional strengths, weaknesses and considerations. The project design process carries out elaborate policy analyses as well as institutional analyses and identifies capacity gaps (with aid of adequate institutional analysis tools it has developed including with the SECAP). Requirements for this analysis are prescribed in “Guidance Notes for Institutional Analysis in Rural Development Programmes”, (<a href="https://www.ifad.org/en/web/knowledge/publication/asset/39417009">https://www.ifad.org/en/web/knowledge/publication/asset/39417009</a>). This forms the basis defining targeted delivery mechanisms, capacity building plans and selectively adjusting systems to enhance implementation of programmes – such as accounting procedures, procurement processes, regulations related to local, meso and national interactions between public and private programme delivery agencies.</p> <p>The guide on Institutional and Organizational Analysis and Capacity Strengthening includes advice and suggested processes for undertaking capacity analysis, including analysis of organisational resources. Detailed guidance on assessing financial capacity (including fiduciary risk) is provided via IFAD’s Financial Management and Administration Manual. Beyond financial considerations, capacity analysis is undertaken via SWOTs in the COSOPs, and through a more detailed narrative assessment within PDRs. However, these analyses are not structured against detailed requirements.</p> <p>Notwithstanding the relatively light-touch nature of capacity assessments, these will inherently be undertaken jointly, at least with the lead government partner within any given intervention. When possible, design teams also leverage analyses done by IFAD partners such the World Bank, AfDB, AsDB and other bilateral agencies and Governments’ own assessments.</p> <p>The lack of structured capacity analyses within COSOPs means that strategies for addressing partner weaknesses are not covered systematically. At the same time, the reviewed COSOPs do provide some evidence of mitigation strategies for weaknesses in national implementing partners within that specific country.</p>	11, 57, 58, 63, 64, 66, 71, 77, 78, 84

The supervision and implementation support guidelines emphasise the need for regular review and reflection, and IFAD evaluations confirm that review meetings are routinely held between programme staff to discuss implementation progress. However, no evidence has been identified of these meetings systematically addressing capacity developments.	11, 57, 58, 63, 64, 66, 71, 77, 78, 84
<b>MI 5.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 5.4: Detailed risk (strategic, political, reputational, operational) management strategies ensure the identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk	4
Element 2: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for strategic risk	4
Element 3: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for political risk	2
Element 4: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for reputational risk	1
Element 5: Risks are routinely monitored and reflected upon by the partnership	4
Element 6: Risk mitigation actions taken by the partnership are documented and communicated	N/E
<b>MI 5.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>COSOPs and PDRs routinely analyse both strategic and operational risks, including the identification of mitigation strategies. Strategic risks are analysed within the main body of the document, with operational / intervention level risks identified in project profiles, logframes and SWOT analyses within the annexes.</p> <p>While intervention-level risk analysis is routinely undertaken, these analyses do not always consider political risk, and there is no requirement for them to do so. Some analyses certainly do analyse political risk e.g. although the term 'political' is not directly used, the Myanmar COSOP clearly identifies – and suggests mitigation actions for – the overarching risk of government-level trust in IFAD.</p> <p>While intervention-level risk analysis is routinely undertaken, the reviewed analyses made no reference to reputational risk (and there is no requirement for analyses to consider reputational risk). Staff did indicate that they considered reputational risk on a case-by-case basis.</p> <p>The periodic support and supervision process (including physical visits) is the primary means through which risk is reflected on within the partnership.</p> <p>Beyond identifying potential risk mitigation strategies, it is not clear whether, or, how COSOPs and COSOP monitoring processes identify and document actual mitigation actions.</p>	57, 58, 62, 77, 78
<b>MI 5.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 5.5: Intervention designs include the analysis of cross-cutting issues (as defined in KPI 2)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.71</b>
Element 1: Intervention design documentation includes the requirement to analyse cross-cutting issues	2
Element 2: Guidelines are available for staff on the implementation of the relevant guidelines	2
Element 3: Approval procedures require the assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated in the design	3
Element 4: Intervention designs include the analysis of gender issues	4
Element 5: Intervention designs include the analysis of environmental sustainability and climate change issues	4
Element 6: Intervention designs include the analysis of good governance issues	1
Element 7: Plans for intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross-cutting issues	3
<b>MI 5.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The analysis of some cross-cutting issues – notably gender, environment and climate change – is mandatory within COSOPs and PDRs. However, other cross-cutting issues – particularly human rights and governance – are not subject to mandatory analysis. IFAD intends to explicitly incorporate human rights within the next iteration of the SECAP.</p> <p>Guidance documentation does exist on, for example, gender mainstreaming within intervention design, and environmental sustainability (via SECAP). These guidance notes are further supported by a series of ‘how to’ toolkits. Again though, this material does not currently cover all cross-cutting issues, with no analogous guidance available on human rights or governance.</p> <p>IFAD’s Quality Enhancement (QE) panel provides input during COSOP and project development, including a responsibility to “systematically [review] how main corporate commitments have been taken into account” including gender equality, environment and climate change, but not governance.</p> <p>The Operational procedures on country strategies confirms that ‘targeting and gender’ is a mandatory section within COSOPs. The Bangladesh COSOP, for example, suggests that additional in-depth analysis can also take place including development of a gender analysis / background paper. Similarly, ‘Poverty, Targeting and Gender’ is a mandatory appendix for PDRs.</p> <p>The Operational procedures on country strategies confirms that ‘natural resources and climate change’ is a mandatory section within COSOPs, and that there is an additional mandatory annex on the subject. The environmental and NRM policy also outlines clear intentions and actions for systematically incorporating environment and climate considerations into all IFAD intervention designs. For example, the Bangladesh COSOP suggests that in-depth analysis does take place and included the development of a climate change paper. PDRs include a mandatory appendix (‘Compliance with IFAD policies’) that in turn require analysis of an intervention’s adherence to SECAP, including the SECAP Review Note.</p>	7, 46, 51, 57, 58, 61, 62, 77, 78, 90

<p>While COSOPs routinely present detail on national government and institutions, the detail presented tends to be more descriptive than analytical, and there is no (e.g.) sub-section of COSOPs dedicated to analysis of governance issues. Governance issues are also integrated within SECAP however, not comprehensively.</p> <p>Guidance documentation extends to guidance on monitoring of some (but not all) cross-cutting issues.</p>	7, 46, 51, 57, 58, 61, 62, 77, 78, 90
<b>MI 5.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 5.6: Intervention designs include detailed and realistic measures to ensure sustainability (as defined in KPI 12)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.75</b>
Element 1: Intervention designs include statement of critical aspects of sustainability, including; institutional framework, resources and human capacity, social behaviour, technical developments and trade, as appropriate	2
Element 2: Key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment that are required to sustain expected benefits from a successful intervention are defined in the design	3
Element 3: The critical assumptions that underpin sustainability form part of the approved monitoring and evaluation plan	3
Element 4: Where shifts in policy and legislation will be required these reform processes are addressed (within the intervention plan) directly and in a time sensitive manner	3
<b>MI 5.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Sustainability is arguably inherent to IFAD's scaling-up agenda, but sustainability more broadly does not appear to be addressed systematically within COSOPs. The Operational procedures on country strategies require COSOPs to include a section on 'Sustainable Results: what are key areas to achieve sustainable outcomes?' This section then contains a sub-section for each key area (e.g. 'Targeting and Gender', 'Policy Engagement' etc.). However, the actual COSOPs tend to provide broad analysis against each of these key areas, rather than sustainability specific analysis.</p> <p>A lack of substance on sustainability is characteristic of the majority of COSOPs conducted recently. For example, 33 of the 35 COSOPs from 2010 to 2015 have referred to scaling up, "although few have articulated a real strategy for it". There have been varied levels of coverage given to scaling-up, as well as varied degrees of detail in identifying specific approaches for scaling-up. Of these 33 COSOPs, only 2 included scaling-up strategies.</p> <p>The broad analysis within COSOPs – particularly around policy and institutional context – often addresses the enabling environment and conditions required for sustainability. Moreover, country-level strategic objectives are often focused on sustainability.</p> <p>For individual interventions, the RIMS Handbook provides a large variety of sustainability focused indicators, supported by definitions, guidance and examples; reviewed intervention documentation made use of these indicators where relevant.</p> <p>COSOPs do include a section on 'policy engagement' and the Operational procedures on country strategies indicates that specific opportunities should be identified for engaging with the national policy agenda.</p>	3, 57, 58, 62, 65
<b>MI 5.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 5.7: Institutional procedures (including systems for engaging staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) positively support speed of implementation</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
Element 1: Internal standards are set to track the speed of implementation	4
Element 2: Organisation benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on speed of implementation across different operating contexts	4
Element 3: Evidence that procedural delays have not hindered speed of implementation across interventions reviewed	2
Element 4: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in speed of implementation identified and actions taken leading to an improvement	2
<b>MI 5.7 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The time from project approval to first disbursement for projects is measured by the RMF and a target is set.</p> <p>The ARRI benchmarks IFAD's performance externally against agriculture sector operations of other development organisations. While internal benchmarking is done against the targets included in the IFAD10 RMF, and across the IFAD regions. Peer-to-peer comparison of IOE and the PMD ratings is also provided.</p> <p>There are ongoing concerns about factors which are responsible for procedural delays including start-up delays, slow disbursement rate from IFAD and/or partners and low disbursement at project completion. Efficiency and sustainability of benefits remain long-standing bottlenecks for IFAD projects. These issues are due to various (predominantly external) project related issues across counties including: administrative and procedural challenges while conducting fiduciary activities at project inception, problematic recruitment processes, political interference, compliance with labour legislation and fragile states. While they are transparently acknowledged, it is not clear that common bottlenecks are improving, or, that the issues are within IFAD's control.</p>	4, 37, 54, 57, 58, 86
<b>MI 5.7 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>KPI 6: Works in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging and/or ensuring relevance and catalytic use of resources</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.34</b>
<p>Partnership working is foundational to IFAD's operating model, which relies mostly on government-level partners for implementation. Accordingly, IFAD's well-defined intervention design and support processes are grounded in very close consultation with partners, all of which helps to ensure relevance and build ownership. All of IFAD's partnerships and interventions – regardless of whether these are with governments, UN entities or other actors – are based on clear analysis of comparative advantage and the added value that IFAD can bring. IFAD's systems are also sufficiently agile to support programme and project-level management and decision-making. Looking beyond individual partnerships and projects, IFAD is taking significant but proportionate measures to strengthen its role as knowledge broker, not least through the establishment of South-South and Triangular Cooperation Knowledge Centres (although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the current institutional restructuring). While monitoring of the Fund's knowledge work remains underdeveloped, the MOPAN survey indicates that external partners both value and apply IFAD's knowledge products.</p>	

<b>MI 6.1: Planning, programming and approval procedures enable agility in partnerships when conditions change</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.2</b>
Element 1: Mechanisms in place to allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change	4
Element 2: Mechanisms in place to allow the flexible use of programming funds as conditions change (budget revision or similar)	3
Element 3: Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at country/regional/HQ level within a limited timeframe (less than three months)	3
Element 4: Evidence that regular review points between partners support joint identification and interpretation of changes in conditions	4
Element 5: Evidence that any common institutional bottlenecks in procedures identified and action taken leading to an improvement	2
<b>MI 6.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The supervision and implementation guidelines codify mechanisms – and provide detailed guidance on – the processes for reviewing, identifying and enacting programmatic changes. Procurement guidance is clear and detailed on changes during tendering processes.</p> <p>The supervision and implementation guidelines identify the review processes for identifying programmatic changes. Accompanying those guidelines, IFAD’s Framework for Delegation of Authority (2011) outlines budget related programmatic revision processes (the Delegation of Authority framework is undergoing significant revision during 2018, to support IFAD’s accelerated decentralisation process).</p> <p>The regular supervision missions offer regular review points for all interventions. Self-evaluations in the form of COSOP Completion Reviews (CCRs) are required to be undertaken at the end of every COSOP period. These are shared with government counterparts for inputs, with counterpart comments being a mandatory annex to the final CCR.</p> <p>There are ongoing concerns about factors which are responsible for procedural delays. These issues are due to various (predominantly external) project related issues across counties including administrative and procedural challenges while conducting fiduciary activities at project inception, problematic recruitment processes, political interference, compliance with labour legislation and fragile states. While they are transparently acknowledged, it is not clear that common bottlenecks are improving or that the issues are within IFAD’s control.</p>	22, 27, 54, 62, 77, 84, 91
<b>MI 6.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 6.2: Partnerships based on an explicit statement of comparative advantage e.g. technical knowledge, convening power/partnerships, policy dialogue/advocacy</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Element 1: Corporate documentation contains clear and explicit statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation is intending to bring to a given partnership	4
Element 2: Statement of comparative advantage is linked to clear evidence of organisational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership	4
Element 3: The organisation aligns its resources/competencies to its perceived comparative advantage	3
Element 4: Evidence that comparative advantage is deployed in partnerships to positive effect	3
<b>MI 6.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's Partnership Strategy 2012 provides a statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation brings to its partnerships: "IFAD acts in partnership in virtually all aspects of its work. It does so for resource mobilisation for investment in smallholder development – and scaling up of successful initiatives; in its country programmes and the projects it supports; for policy dialogue and advocacy; for knowledge management and innovation, and lesson learning; for communications; for enhanced organizational efficiency; and for institutional representation. It does so at different levels: its partnerships include those that are global in nature; some work at regional level; many operate at national or even local levels; and there are also those focused on organizational issues that operate at the corporate level. Some partnerships are formalised through memoranda of understanding or agreements of one form or another; however, many, and particularly those at the national/local levels, are less formal and are not governed by any form of agreement. Nor do they need to be: they function effectively on the basis of long-term cooperation and established trust."</p> <p>The Operational procedures on country strategies places more emphasis on (during COSOP preparation) the need to analyse the comparative advantage that IFAD brings to specific country and intervention-level partnerships, highlighting in particular "the intersection of the country's own development goals and IFAD's comparative advantage". This extends to the intervention level, with Project Design Report guidelines outlining the process for analysing and describing partner capacities and comparative advantage.</p> <p>IFAD's high-level comparative advantage with regards to partnerships is clearly articulated, and the Strategic Framework the Operational procedures on country strategies, and the Guidelines for Project Design Report all confirm that such analysis should take place. Relatively detailed guidance documentation on assessing capacity of potential partners is available (e.g. Institutional and organizational analysis and capacity strengthening: A Field Practitioner's Guide) but the level of – and suggested approach to – capacity analysis is not mandatory.</p> <p>Relatively detailed guidance documentation on assessing capacity of potential partners is available (e.g. Institutional and organizational analysis and capacity strengthening: A Field Practitioner's Guide) but the level of – and suggested approach to – capacity analysis is not mandatory.</p>	2, 11, 37, 62, 63, 77, 78
<b>MI 6.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 6.3: Clear adherence to the commitment in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation on use of country systems</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.67</b>
Element 1: Clear statement on set of expectations for how the organisation will seek to deliver on the Busan commitment/QCPR statement (as appropriate) on use of country systems within a given time period	3
Element 2: Internal processes (in collaboration with partners) to diagnose the condition of country systems	4
Element 3: Clear procedures for how organisation to respond to address (with partners) concerns identified in country systems	4
Element 4: Reasons for non-use of country systems clearly and transparently communicated	3
Element 5: Internal structures and incentives supportive of greater use of country systems	4
Element 6: Monitoring of the organisation trend on use of country systems and the associated scale of investments being made in strengthening country systems	4
<b>MI 6.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's Partnership Strategy 2012 states how it intends to deliver on the Busan commitment: "The 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation sets the context for IFAD's work today. More specifically, effectively managed partnerships with carefully selected partners can enable IFAD to: (a) focus on what it is mandated to do and does best, while its partners focus on the complementary activities needed; (b) strengthen its capacity to address agricultural and rural development issues effectively and efficiently, and so better achieve its strategic objectives; (c) leverage additional resources to scale up successful approaches to achieve development impact; and (d) have greater influence as to global policy and practice for rural poverty reduction". However, this and other references to Busan focus on the use of partnerships, rather than use of country systems specifically.</p> <p>IFAD requires assurance from recipient countries to ensure that they meet its fiduciary standards, particularly adequate financial management arrangements. In line with this, IFAD oversees the effectiveness of the financial management arrangements and fiduciary capacity of its recipient countries at the project design stage and during implementation. To that end, the Financial Management and Administration Manual details the principles (including reference to the Paris Declaration) behind using country systems, and the processes for assessing the suitability of country systems. More broadly, COSOPs routinely include contextual information that presents detail on relevant national policies and institutions.</p> <p>The Financial Management and Administration Manual provides considerable detail on the rules and principles (including reference to the Paris Declaration) behind using country systems, and the processes for assessing the suitability of country systems. This extends to guidance on dealing with issues / problems / concerns with country systems.</p> <p>It can be inferred that IFAD will seldom not use country systems. IFAD states in many documents its commitment to effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of benefits and has specific targets linked to these, and explains the trade-off between mitigating short-term risk and longer-term sustainability. The organisation measures performance against these targets and is focused on effective identification of the specific socio-economic context, beneficiaries' requirements and institutional priorities.</p>	11, 54, 57, 58, 62, 64

IFAD focuses on monitoring country systems particularly that recipient countries meet IFAD's fiduciary standards, as well as overseeing the effectiveness of the financial management arrangements and fiduciary capacity. The lessons learned are that: identifying weakness in institutional capacity reduces exposure to fiduciary risk; there may need to be a trade-off between short-term risk and longer-term sustainability when using country systems; monitoring enhances financial management controls and fiduciary compliance but does not eliminate risk; and implementation support is necessary but this comes at a high transaction cost.	11, 54, 57, 58, 62, 64
<b>MI 6.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.4: Strategies or designs identify synergies, to encourage leverage/catalytic use of resources and avoid fragmentation</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.8</b>
Element 1: Strategies or designs clearly recognise the importance of synergies and leverage	4
Element 2: Strategies or designs contain clear statements of how duplication/fragmentation will be avoided based on realistic assessment of comparative advantages	3
Element 3: Strategies or designs contain clear statement of where an intervention will add the most value to a wider change	3
Element 4: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how leverage will be ensured	2
Element 5: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how resources will be used catalytically to stimulate wider change	2
<b>MI 6.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's Strategic Framework 2016-25 and other core strategies and results documents contain extensive discussion around comparative advantage, including the importance of identifying and exploiting synergies, and the role that partnerships have in leveraging resources. This is particularly in reference to the use of evidence-based results in leveraging additional resources from governments, the private sector, development partners and rural communities in order to support scaling up of results. IFAD is also committed to moving towards country programme approaches with greater synergy between investments and non-lending activities to scale up successes. IFAD also aims to create synergies through co-ordinated strategies with donors involved in rural poverty reduction.</p> <p>IFAD's Approach to Global Engagement highlights that its overarching goal is to leverage all its resources to promote policy outcomes for rural transformation. "The overarching goal of IFAD's global policy engagement is specifically to leverage the Fund's mandate, operating model, partnerships, and knowledge – including knowledge derived through rigorous research, impact assessment, and evaluation from IFAD's own programme portfolio - to promote policy outcomes that advance inclusive and sustainable rural transformation".</p> <p>A clear implication of IFAD's focus on comparative advantage is – at least in part – the minimisation of duplication and fragmentation (the Strategic Framework states that IFAD will "leverage ... partnerships where comparative advantages are exploited so that the sum of the whole creates greater impact than those of its parts"). As noted in the Guidelines for Project Design Reports, interventions should then identify how duplication will be avoided, and synergies realised.</p>	2, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 53, 54, 77, 78

<p>The Annual Report 2016 recognises the need to avoid overlap in its work with other Rome-based agencies, "...opportunities for collaboration with Rome-based agencies around SSC have not been fully exploited at the corporate or country level. Although each organization has its own mandate and comparative advantage, there are opportunities for better co-ordination of efforts in specific areas to avoid overlap with the aim of enhancing collective results and improving transaction costs for governments. This is of particular importance also in consideration of the strategic priority that the Strategic Framework 2016-2025 attaches to collaboration among the Rome-based agencies".</p> <p>At the intervention level, Project Design Reports include a rationale that outlines the intervention's expected contribution to results, both in terms of contribution to wider (e.g. national) goals, and in terms of IFAD's discrete contribution.</p> <p>There is only limited corporate-level discussion around how leverage will actually be ensured. Some corporate-level examples are evident around how IFAD will use resources to catalyse wider change. IFAD states that through global policy engagement, "the role of finance will continue to be pivotal in terms of being a catalyst to growth of rural agriculture and as a key point of co-ordination between IFAD and the other partner organizations". The South-South and Triangular Cooperation platform (SSTC) also goes on to say that IFAD intends to leverage opportunities to promote the flow of resources between developing countries, "Given the IFAD's role as an IFI, and building on previous efforts, it will seek to further strengthen, create and leverage opportunities for promoting the flow of financial resources between developing countries. Specifically, IFAD may experiment with and/or scale up a range of instruments (e.g. finance facilitation, improving access to producer data, and business-to business cooperation) across regions to promote different kinds of cross-border investment between developing countries".</p>	<p>2, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 53, 54, 77, 78</p>
<b>MI 6.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.5: Key business practices (planning, design, implementation, monitoring and reporting) co-ordinated with other relevant partners (donors, UN agencies, etc.)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.4</b>
Element 1: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint planning exercises, such as the UNDAF	4
Element 2: Evidence that the organisation has aligned its programme activities with joint planning instruments, such as UNDAF	2
Element 3: Evidence that the organisation has participated in opportunities for joint programming where these exist	4
Element 4: Evidence that the organisation has participated in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key partners (donor, UN, etc.)	3
Element 5: Evidence of the identification of shared information gaps with partners and strategies developed to address these	N/E
Element 6: Evidence of participation in the joint planning, management and delivery of evaluation activities	4

MI 6.5 Analysis	Source document
<p>IFAD participates in UNDAF exercises for the majority of its countries. IFAD's collaboration with the other RBAs (namely FAO and WFP) – and in particular the RBAs collaborative work in support of the SDGs – has also been recently formalised through a joint strategy, which has also been subject to a progress review.</p> <p>IFAD purposefully does not always align its activities with UNDAFs, particularly where efficiency could be compromised, or, where relevance of the UNDAF is limited. For example, the Bangladesh Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) states that IFAD participates in the UNDAF planning and formulation process but does not adopt its programme pillars and does not align itself with the UN system.</p> <p>IFAD's collaborative work and trainings with the other RBAs extends to joint programming and annual conferences. Occasionally staff are seconded where capacity limitations arise within the RBAs. IFAD is also an active participant in the UN SWAP on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, and the SWAP on Indigenous Peoples. Joint programming with other agencies (e.g. World Bank) appears to be a relatively routine approach within COSOPs.</p> <p>The RBA collaboration has been subject to a progress review, with this assessment being undertaken on a joint basis with FAO and WFP. COSOPs suggest that country-level, joint monitoring and reporting is a regularly adopted approach for IFAD.</p> <p>Relatively detailed guidance documentation on assessing capacity of potential partners is available (e.g. Institutional and organizational analysis and capacity strengthening: A Field Practitioner's Guide) but in practice capacity analysis is sometimes basic, and is not applied systematically. While COSOPs suggest that country-level sharing of information gaps (and joint responses) is a regularly adopted approach for IFAD, no evidence was identified.</p> <p>Joint evaluations have been undertaken with other development banks, for example, the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) of the Asian Development Bank and IOE conducted a joint project performance evaluation of the Northern Region Sustainable Livelihoods through Livestock Development Project in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The RBA collaboration has been assessed through a joint progress review, undertaken with FAO and WFP.</p>	1, 13, 57, 58, 60, 63, 71, 82, 83, 92
<b>MI 6.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.6: Key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results etc.) shared with strategic/ implementation partners on an ongoing basis</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.4</b>
Element 1: Information on the organisation's website is easily accessible and current	4
Element 2: The organisation has signed up to the International Aid Transparency Initiative or reports through the OECD-DAC systems	4
Element 3: Accurate information is available on analysis, budgeting, management and is in line with IATI or OECD-DAC (CRS) guidelines	3
Element 4: Evidence that partner queries on analysis, budgeting, management and results are responded to in a timely fashion	3
Element 5: Evidence that information shared is accurate and of good quality	3

<b>MI 6.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
The information on the IFAD's website is easily accessible and current.	9, 42
The IFAD website confirms that the organisation is a signatory to the IATI. It also has a Policy on the Disclosure of Documents to support transparency of information.	
MOPAN survey data indicates that external partners positively rate the extent and quality of data shared. The development of key results management systems including ORMS represent significant steps towards open data.	
MOPAN survey data indicates that external partners both value and apply IFAD knowledge products. IFAD has an appeals procedure for disclosed content, as well as complaints procedures available online. No complaints on content posted on the IFAD website were received in the last two years.	
<b>MI 6.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.7: Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries implemented</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.17</b>
Element 1: Explicit statement available on standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations e.g. Accountability to Affected Populations	4
Element 2: Guidance for staff is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	4
Element 3: Training has been conducted on the implementation of procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	2
Element 4: Programming tools explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures for accountability to beneficiaries	3
Element 5: Approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed within the intervention	3
Element 6: Monitoring and evaluation procedures explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries have been addressed within the intervention	3
<b>MI 6.7 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
The SECAP outlines multiple channels and processes through which IFAD staff should engage and consult with beneficiaries during programme and project development and implementation. Other documentation (notably the policy on Indigenous Peoples) provides guidance and procedures for specific groups. Broader engagement and consultation are also encouraged, notably through the IFAD Farmers' Forum and the Indigenous People's Forum. Accountability to beneficiaries is also covered within the Accountability Framework, but only as it relates to complaint mechanisms.	4, 17, 27, 49, 51, 54, 61, 62, 71, 77, 90
The SECAP and other policies (e.g. Indigenous Peoples) provide guidance for staff on procedures for accountability to beneficiaries; these (particularly the SECAP) are frequently referenced within the 'headline' COSOP and PDR guidance documents. The mechanisms to operationalise these aspects work in practice are explained in 'how to do' notes for staff.	

<p>An important capacity development effort on SECAP was pursued through staff training and knowledge products. The SECAP e-learning course is available through IFAD's Learning Management System and is a part of IFAD's Operations Academy. However, specific training on ensuring accountability to beneficiaries is not a substantive part of this support.</p> <p>The SECAP confirms that ensuring accountability to target groups (beneficiaries) within intervention design, implementation and monitoring is a guiding principle. The SECAP also provides high-level guidance as to how accountability can be achieved, with this further supported by detail within other policies and IFAD's series of 'how to' notes. However, the two most recent ARRI's suggest that programming needs to improve the targeting and inclusion of beneficiaries particularly those at risk of being excluded, such as indigenous peoples, pastoralists, the landless and migrants. It also provides mitigation measures for future operations including adapting programme activities to pay increased attention to those in risk of being left behind, ensuring better development of M&amp;E systems and improving disaggregated indicators to track the participation of beneficiaries.</p> <p>While ensuring accountability in operations is a core guiding principle of SECAP, the underlying SECAP and QE Panel review processes do not require any explicit, mandatory assessment of an intervention's approach to beneficiary accountability.</p> <p>As a component of CPEs, IFAD may interview beneficiaries to assess impacts of a programme. Accountability to beneficiaries is embedded in M&amp;E systems and they are interviewed during supervision visits. IFAD's definition of 'relevance' as an evaluation criterion does ensure that an intervention's consistency with beneficiary requirements is assessed ("Relevance [includes] the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements"). The SECAP also includes a requirement that completion reports "should take special note of views expressed by rural beneficiaries".</p>	<p>4, 17, 27, 49, 51, 54, 61, 62, 71, 77, 90</p>
<b>MI 6.7 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 6.8: Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.8</b>
Element 1: Evidence of participation in joint performance reviews of interventions e.g. joint assessments	4
Element 2: Evidence of participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments	4
Element 3: Evidence of engagement in the production of joint progress statements in the implementation of commitments e.g. joint assessment reports	4
Element 4: Documentation arising from mutual progress assessments contains clear statement of the organisation's contribution, agreed by all partners	3
Element 5: Surveys or other methods applied to assess partner perception of progress	4

MI 6.8 Analysis	Source document
<p>IFAD's supervision and implementation support guidelines recommend within programme cycles that partners should be involved in joint reflection, learning, monitoring and evaluation exercises. Programming guidance and templates (COSOP and PDR) operationalise this guidance. The COSOP project completion report (PCRs) are also intended to be a joint assessment by the government and IFAD of the investment and non-project programmes. Reviewed COSOPs indicate that COSOPs do include joint assessment of performance, and/or are informed by joint learning events with partners. IFAD regularly participates in multi-stakeholder dialogues.</p> <p>The supervision and implementation support guidelines outline a means through which joint progress assessments (and statements) can be conducted, with programming guidance, the evaluation policy and the evaluation manual also providing guidance. Supervision reports often contain aide memoires (essentially progress assessments) that are jointly signed / endorsed by IFAD and partners.</p> <p>IFAD regularly applies perception surveys at the intervention and corporate level.</p>	2, 5, 17, 30, 49, 57, 58, 62, 77, 84
MI 6.8 Evidence confidence	High confidence
MI 6.9: Deployment of knowledge base to support programming adjustments, policy dialogue and/or advocacy	Score
Overall MI rating	Highly satisfactory
Overall MI score	3.17
Element 1: Statement in corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organisation's role in knowledge production	4
Element 2: Evidence of knowledge products produced and utilised by partners to inform action	3
Element 3: Knowledge products generated and applied to inform advocacy at country, regional or global level	3
Element 4: Evidence that knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners	3
Element 5: Evidence that knowledge products are perceived as high quality by partners	3
Element 6: Evidence that knowledge products are produced in a format that supports their utility to partners	3
MI 6.9 Analysis	Source document
<p>IFAD's corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organisation's role in knowledge production. The Strategic Framework 2016-25 highlights that knowledge building is one of the four core pillars of IFAD's results delivery. Furthermore, as a part of its mandate of knowledge building IFAD is committed to producing a comprehensive evidence base, "IFAD recognizes that a core purpose of its knowledge management efforts must be to identify, develop and promote successful and innovative approaches and interventions that have demonstrated potential to be scaled up."</p> <p>IFAD's Knowledge Management Framework 2014-2018 positions IFAD as a learning organisation that aims to achieve high impact, "IFAD is a learning organization in which priority knowledge from various sources, and rapid learning from experiences of projects, partners and policy processes are applied to achieve high impact. Knowledge management in IFAD is a coordinated effort by all departments, divisions, regions, countries and programmes to learn and to generate, share and apply knowledge to continuously improve practice, and scale up successes".</p>	2, 17, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 40, 54

This is mirrored by the Climate Change Strategy, “Sharing of knowledge and innovation is part of IFAD’s core business.”

IFAD’s Knowledge Management Action Plan 2016-18 establishes four main action points, “which respond to and expand on the priorities and gaps identified by the KMCG, address the IFAD10 commitments and complement KM activities already on-going throughout the organization. They are as follows: 1) Generate, use and disseminate knowledge; 2) Enhance IFAD’s role as a learning organization; 3) Improve IT platforms to promote better access to and sharing of knowledge and information; and 4) Monitor, assess and report on KM performance”.

MOPAN survey data indicates that external partners value and apply IFAD knowledge products. Additionally, the Knowledge Management Action Plan has one of only four action areas dedicated wholly to monitoring and reporting on knowledge management implementation, which will include analysis of knowledge product usage.

Numerous corporate strategies and policies confirm IFAD’s intention to apply knowledge products across their global, regional and country level work. Firstly, the Knowledge Management Action Plan highlights several outputs which specifically relate to informing advocacy at country, regional or global level and the online South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) platform has also been developed and deployed. IFAD regards knowledge management, partnership building and country-level policy engagement as mutually reinforcing actions to complement IFAD’s investment projects and that knowledge platforms allow the flow of project level knowledge to IFAD to government and eventually, external partners.

Other documentation that explicitly sets out actions and/or targets for application of knowledge products include the Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples, the Climate Change Strategy, and the Approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Moreover, several major interventions are squarely focused on developing and applying knowledge (e.g. the Smallholder Agriculture Finance and Investment Network, the Scaling Up Nutrition initiative). ORMS is also seen to be IFAD’s key knowledge management driver by compiling all of its performance data. ‘How to do’ toolkits, Knowledge Notes, Research Series and Results from the Field are also used by partners to inform action at national, regional, and global levels.

While the emphasis on knowledge generation and application is clear, no substantive analyses have been identified regarding the extent to which IFAD’s knowledge work is effective, and/or the extent to which it is influential.

MOPAN survey data indicates that external partners value and apply IFAD knowledge products. IFAD is seen to be a knowledge producer within its community of practice and a large quantity of knowledge is produced via corporate processes (e.g. supervision missions). For example, the toolkits/ ‘how to do’ notes series were generated in response to the technical needs expressed by country teams in implementing project activities on the ground. New toolkits are developed as new needs are identified, for example, the recent toolkit on country-level policy engagement.

2, 17, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 40, 54

**MI 6.9 Evidence confidence**

**Medium confidence**

## PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

*Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson learning*

<b>KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.24</b>
There is a strong corporate commitment to the development and maintenance of a results culture within IFAD, expressed across numerous strategies and policies. Central to this, IFAD benefits from a clear, logically consistent theory of change that is underpinned by a wide-ranging set of well-defined results and indicators. Progress against these results and indicators is tracked and measured through a relatively extensive system of monitoring tools (RIMS) and reporting mechanisms (ARRI, RIDE).	
<b>MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation-wide RBM approach</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.33</b>
Element 1: Corporate commitment to a results culture is made clear in strategic planning documents	4
Element 2: Clear requirements/incentives in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming	3
Element 3: Guidance for setting results targets and developing indicators is clear and accessible to all staff	3
Element 4: Tools and methods for measuring and managing results are available	4
Element 5: Adequate resources are allocated to the RBM system	3
Element 6: All relevant staff are trained in RBM approaches and methods	3
<b>MI 7.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD has a strong corporate commitment to a results culture, which is made clear in strategic planning documents.</p> <p>The RMF is the overarching framework for measuring programme results, which is supported by the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS), IFAD's primary mechanism for "measuring and reporting the results and impact of the projects it finances". This was superseded by the 'Taking RIMS to the next level' document, which was also complemented by the July 2017 Memo, which indicates that in planning projects, "Outcomes will be measured through Core Indicators and project-specific indicators". Projects necessarily report against RIMS (and by extension the RMF), which establishes a clear requirement/incentive to integrate RBM in planning and programming.</p> <p>Another development has been the formulation of IFAD's Development Effectiveness Framework (DEF) in 2016. The overall objective of the DEF is to create the necessary structure and processes to facilitate the use of evidence in decisions regarding the design and implementation of IFAD policies, strategies and projects.</p> <p>The RIMS Handbook aims to guide staff in identifying the most appropriate (pre-defined) IFAD indicators, setting targets, and reporting of results: "this Handbook has been prepared to assist project managers and staff in the reporting of RIMS first- and second-level results. It clarifies the definitions of indicators and suggests approaches for their measurement".</p>	1, 3, 8, 34, 37, 41, 50, 53, 55, 59

However, the July 2017 Memo outlining the 'enhanced approach' to RBM provides an overview of the latest systems and processes and confirms that the RIMS Handbook is no longer current. The memo "supersedes several related documents, including: the First and Second Level Results RIMS Handbook (2014)". The Memo describes how core indicators (including impact indicators) were adopted by Management and the Executive Board. It is explained that these indicators should be "complemented by project-specific output, outcome and impact indicators to measure specific results" and explains that ongoing projects need to be 'retrofitted' to these new CIs. The Memo outlines requirements for selecting project/logframe indicators, for example: "ensuring that projects are 'evaluable' is a fundamental requisite".

Further, the Memo provides specific, project-level guidance. IFAD requires logframes as a primary tool at the start of a process, and that "each project needs to have a comprehensive M&E and impact assessment plan that clearly articulates the methods and tools to be used to assess performance", which need to be linked to country level systems. Baselines studies must be carried out. The 2017 Memo also indicates that "CPMs remain accountable for selecting relevant LogFrame indicators and defining an M&E and impact assessment plan to credibly and reliably measure them".

Although dated, IFAD's Managing for Development Results (MfDR) identifies some core principles, stating that IFAD's application of MfDR is both "a management approach" and "a set of tools for strategic planning of activities and expenditures, managing risks, monitoring and evaluating performance, reporting and learning".

IFAD results measurement and management are undertaken through several mechanisms. The RMF is the framework for measuring programme results, and is updated for each replenishment period. As explained within replenishment documentation, the RMF "consists of a suite of indicators and targets that serve to assess and drive improvement of the Fund's performance in achieving objectives relative to its development and institutional effectiveness and efficiency". Other central mechanisms include the RIMS (the central monitoring tool), and the RIDE, which is the Fund's main corporate document reporting on institutional and development effectiveness.

The MfDR overview indicates that at the country level, "IFAD's main planning and monitoring instrument is the results-based country strategic opportunities programme (RB-COSOP) ... the core instrument for managing the alignment of IFAD's programme of work of loans and grants with the organization's strategic objectives, and for learning and accountability within country programmes" and that at the project-level "the quality enhancement (QE) and quality assurance (QA) processes strengthen the quality of project design".

The July 2017 Memo provides the most up-to-date overview, outlining the 'enhanced approach' to RBM, and in turn explaining how results management initiatives and reporting on SDG initiatives are being linked to form an Operational Results Management System (ORMS). The Memo includes some guidance on potential measurement methods, for example suggesting that 'Outcomes and Impact Surveys' can be applied to measure country-level progress.

The Strategic Update Note indicates that divisional/departmental annual plans are developed in such a way that they contribute to relevant results pillars in the Strategic Framework, which in turn will require the allocation of appropriate administrative budgets. Additionally, the 2018 Strategic Workforce Plan suggest that IFAD's commitment to RBM means that resources (including staff resources) will be allocated in line with the organisation's strategic priorities.

1, 3, 8, 34, 37, 41, 50, 53,  
55, 59

<p>The 2017 RBM Memo states that “between 2017 and 2019, 300 project staff will be sponsored to complete a seven month M&amp;E certification”. IFAD is also “implementing an Operations Academy, which will strengthen IFAD’s own capacity in numerous managerial, operational and technical areas, including in results management ... the Operations Academy is designed to enable IFAD’s ‘evolving business model’, with particular emphasis on managing expectations on the role of the CPM and COPs and building capacity in results management. The Academy and its on-line system provides a space for peer to peer interaction – a learning community”. The Memo also outlines training initiatives focussed on more specific M&amp;E requirements, for example: “IFAD staff and project M&amp;E staff will receive training through the CLEAR programme on methodologies for baseline data collection”.</p> <p>While not necessarily categorised as training, the MfDR overview indicates that regular HR processes should also contribute to general RBM awareness: “Performance conversations provide a regular opportunity for managers and staff to assess the progress made towards reaching planned results. They serve to highlight the main problems and/or success factors, and identify and monitor action to overcome performance problems. Performance conversations also have the aim of providing a space for learning and information sharing”.</p>	<p>1, 3, 8, 34, 37, 41, 50, 53, 55, 59</p>
<p><b>MI 7.1 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>High confidence</b></p>
<p><b>MI 7.2: Corporate strategies, including country strategies, based on a sound RBM focus and logic</b></p>	<p><b>Score</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI rating</b></p>	<p><b>Highly satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>Overall MI score</b></p>	<p><b>3.2</b></p>
<p>Element 1: Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project through to country and corporate level</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 3: An annual report on performance is discussed with the governing bodies</p>	<p>4</p>
<p>Element 4: Corporate strategies are updated regularly</p>	<p>2</p>
<p>Element 5: The annual corporate reports show progress over time and note areas of strong performance as well as deviations between planned and actual results</p>	<p>4</p>
<p><b>MI 7.2 Analysis</b></p>	<p><b>Source document</b></p>
<p>The RMF is the overarching framework for measuring programme results over the course of each replenishment period. RMF indicators (exception impact level) are measured, monitored and reported on at management level at least once a year and are reported to the Evaluation Committee and Executive Board annually through the RIDE.</p> <p>At the operational level, the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) is IFAD’s primary mechanism for “measuring and reporting the results and impact of the projects it finances”. This is now complemented by the July 2017 Memo, which indicates that in planning projects, “Outcomes will be measured through Core Indicators and project-specific indicators”. Projects necessarily report against RIMS (and by extension the RMF), which establishes a clear requirement/incentive to integrate RBM in planning and programming.</p> <p>At the project level, the 2017 Memo on RBM confirms that IFAD requires logframes as a primary tool at the start of the project development process, and that “each project needs to have a comprehensive M&amp;E and impact assessment plan that clearly articulates the methods and tools to be used to assess performance”. At the country-level, COSOPs routinely articulate linkages between national IFAD objectives and frameworks with corporate-level / IFAD strategic objectives and frameworks.</p>	<p>4, 6, 8, 12, 29, 34, 37, 42, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59</p>

<p>Although ostensibly providing an overview / summary of IFAD's results infrastructure, the Overview of MfDR at IFAD (9) is clearly well out of date. A more up-to-date summary / primer on the results infrastructure has not been identified. To an extent, the hierarchy, layers and linkages of the various results frameworks can be inferred from the core RBM related documentation, with the RIDE reports providing perhaps the most rounded description of the overall results architecture. However, a complete description (through, for example, a schematic) has not been identified, the absence of such a description to an extent results in a lack of clarity and transparency.</p> <p>At the same time, it is clear that the necessary project-to-corporate linkages are in place, for example, logframes (project-level) are required to feed in to the RIMS, which in turn is aligned with the RMF (corporate-level).</p> <p>The ARRI and RIDE are the primary mechanisms for annual reporting of performance and results to IFAD's members. The 2017 Memo on RBM provides a recent example of IFAD adjusting its internal strategies and processes in line with good practice and improved available technologies. The latest RIDE also suggests that IFAD is continuously working to improve its results architecture to achieve better impact and promote accountability, learning and transparency.</p> <p>IFAD's document on Tailoring Operations to Country Context discusses how – in order to ensure IFAD's contributions to the SDGs are relevant and effective – country-level operations need to evolve in line with changes at the national level and in the broader global development environment.</p> <p>However, a number of important corporate policies and strategies are five, and sometimes over ten years old, a process has been recently initiated to review the policy and strategy framework and any need for updates.</p> <p>The ARRI routinely reports on progress, including analysis of performance trends over time, and comparisons between replenishment periods. The ARRI also routinely identifies areas requiring particular attention and improvement (for example, shortcomings relating to financial management and fiduciary responsibilities were a major focus within the 2017 ARRI).</p>	<p>4, 6, 8, 12, 29, 34, 37, 42, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59</p>
<b>MI 7.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 7.3: Results targets set based on a sound evidence base and logic</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.75</b>
Element 1: Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives	3
Element 2: Indicators are relevant to the expected result to enable measurement of the degree of goal achievement	4
Element 3: Development of baselines are mandatory for new interventions	4
Element 4: Results targets are regularly reviewed and adjusted when needed	4

MI 7.3 Analysis	Source document
<p>IFAD's ToC – the most recent iteration of which is described in the IFAD11 RMF – is split into three results 'tiers' (in short: operational and organisational performance, development results, and SDG contributions). The ToC includes high-level descriptions of the causal pathways between tiers. In turn, the RMF establishes detailed indicators for each tier, including definitions, data sources, baselines, and targets for each indicator.</p> <p>The 2017 RBM Memo identifies a set of Core Indicators (output and outcome level) linked to IFAD's three Strategic Objectives, broken down further by thematic work area. The Memo also provides one illustration of how internal, project-level logic is developed and maintained, by outlining the linkage of the project-level Economic and Financial Analysis (EFA) with the project LogFrame: "A sound EFA builds the economic case by aggregating the financial models using the underpinning logic of the LogFrame. The LogFrame provides a structure to organise data and assumptions utilized in the EFA's elaboration ... each of the financial models contain valuable information to set accurate initial, intermediate and final targets".</p> <p>The quantity, variety (including balance of quantitative and qualitative) and relative clarity of IFAD's main indicators provide a robust framework for measuring IFAD's results.</p> <p>RMF indicators and the more recent core indicators all appear to be relevant to their respective results. Moreover, the qualitative nature of many indicators allows for a more nuanced measure of the 'degree of goal achievement'.</p> <p>Previously, all interventions were required to undertake 'impact baselines'. This has been amended through the 2017 Memo on RBM: "RIMS impact baselines are no longer mandatory and 'baselines studies' (representing a more flexible approach) may be carried out instead". While the approach to developing baselines is now more 'flexible', baselines are nevertheless still mandatory.</p> <p>The 2017 RBM Memo encourages projects to review and revise targets prior to project launch / start, particularly where significant time has elapsed between project design, approval and implementation.</p>	3, 6, 8, 37, 41, 49, 59, 86
<b>MI 7.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 7.4: Monitoring systems generate high quality and useful performance data</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.14</b>
Element 1: The corporate monitoring system is adequately resourced	4
Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome level of the results chain	4
Element 3: Reporting structures are clear	3
Element 4: Reporting processes ensure timely data for key corporate reporting, and planning	4
Element 5: A system for ensuring data quality exists	1
Element 6: Data adequately captures key corporate results	3
Element 7: Adequate resources are allocated to the monitoring system	3

MI 7.4 Analysis	Source document
<p>Given the extent and profile of monitoring mechanisms that are routinely applied (e.g. RIMS, RIDE, ARRI), along with the apparent depth and quality of data generated (including the depth of analysis), it can be inferred that substantial resources are available for monitoring.</p> <p>The RMF clearly defines output, outcome and impact level indicators, progress against which are recorded through RIMS and routinely reported primarily through the RIDE, but also through the ARRI and – to an extent – Annual Reports. By definition, IFAD’s monitoring systems are clearly (and comprehensively) generating data for indicators across the full result chain.</p> <p>The 2017 RBM Memo provides further detail on project-level data generation and management, stating that the logframe and EFA planning instruments aim to ensure that the kinds of data required at each level of the results chain is identified. The Memo’s discussion around updating and alignment of IFAD’s different data platforms also confirms ongoing efforts to enable better data management and analysis.</p> <p>The overall reporting structure can be inferred from the core RBM related documentation – with the RIMS Handbook perhaps providing the most detail – although a succinct yet complete description (through, for example, a schematic) has not been identified. A similar observation was noted above regarding the relationships between IFAD’s various ‘layers’ of results frameworks.</p> <p>The regularity and comprehensiveness of RIDEs and ARRI suggests that the underlying reporting processes – particularly via RIMS – are timely. Efforts are underway to further improve timeliness of reporting via a new Operational Results Measurement System (ORMS). Current reporting processes (particularly ARRI and RIDE) certainly generate actionable data and recommendations, on a routine, annual basis.</p> <p>Data quality assurance processes are not applied consistently. There is a lack of systematic quality assurance of monitoring data. Invariably, multiple personnel will review project-level data that is collected and reported on, and staff noted that the current systems are adequate for identifying problems with specific data sets or collection approaches. However, this is not a formalised, systematic approach to data quality assurance.</p> <p>The comprehensiveness of RIDEs and ARRI suggests that sufficient data is being captured to report against corporate results. However, the underlying monitoring infrastructure needs to be flexible and capable of realigning to changing strategic objectives and indicators, particularly between replenishment periods. For example, the RBM Memo confirms that “linking project M&amp;E to corporate results reporting” is a current action area, particularly with regards to rolling out the new corporate indicators.</p> <p>The Strategic Update Note indicates that divisional/departmental annual plans are developed in such a way that they contribute to relevant results pillars in the Strategic Framework, which in turn will require the allocation of appropriate administrative budgets. Additionally, the 2018 Strategic Workforce Plan suggest that IFAD’s commitment to RBM means that resources (including staff resources) will be allocated in line with the organisation’s strategic priorities.</p>	<p>2, 3, 4, 6, 34, 37, 41, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59</p>
<b>MI 7.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 7.5: Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.75</b>
Element 1: Planning documents are clearly based on performance data	2
Element 2: Proposed adjustments to interventions are clearly informed by performance data	3
Element 3: At corporate level, management regularly reviews corporate performance data and makes adjustments as appropriate	3
Element 4: Performance data support dialogue in partnerships at global, regional and country level	3
<b>MI 7.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>COSOPs include dedicated sections on ‘past results, impact and performance’ and ‘lessons learned’, and – at the intervention level – PDRs include a section on ‘lessons learned’. The QE process is another route through which performance data is brought to bear on the design process. However, the QE Guidance Note does not suggest that previous, relevant performance data or lessons learned, are systematically reviewed during the process. The recently introduced ORMS has the potential to improve recording of lessons and the integration of lessons during design processes, as it offers a more accessible platform for cataloguing and retrieving relevant learning.</p> <p>The RIDEs consistently identify the (lack of) application of lesson learning in planning as a shortcoming. The 2016 RIDE notes that “Some recommendations were common to many of the project designs reviewed ... and have been consistently flagged in QA annual reports in previous years” including that “the analysis of [lessons learned] from previous IFAD experience is not consistently presented as a basis for informing design approaches, and considerable scope remains to ensure that the context of IFAD’s history of engagement in a given environment is fully leveraged as a core aspect of every design”. The 2017 RIDE notes in particular for COSOPs that “lessons learned presented in some COSOPs were comprehensive, but scope remains to ensure that the Fund’s experience is a core aspect of every COSOP”.</p> <p>The Supervision and implementation support guidelines outline regular intervention review processes (including requirements to document lessons), and how these processes should be used to identify and propose intervention adjustments.</p> <p>RIDE and ARRI both provide management with corporate performance data, and with recommendations for improving performance (“the key question that the 2016 ARRI seeks to address is: how can IFAD raise the bar from moderately satisfactory to satisfactory and highly satisfactory performance? The 2016 ARRI identifies areas of operational performance to be improved moving forward”). The RIDE suggests that – in addition to and in support of management – the Quality Assurance Group have a role in ensuring data is used to inform decisions, as their responsibilities include to “facilitate knowledge-sharing within IFAD based on lessons learned from QA review processes, and as an outcome of the IFAD grants policy”.</p> <p>RIDEs and ARRI are an input to annual discussions with member states and are an input to the periodic replenishment processes. COSOPs contain sections dedicated to ‘past results, impact and performance’ and ‘lessons learned’.</p>	4, 6, 33, 35, 51, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 77, 78, 84
<b>MI 7.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Highly satisfactory</b>	<b>3.6</b>
<p>IFAD's Evaluation Policy and its Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) enshrine all key dimensions of an independent evaluation function. The IOE is operationally, structurally and behaviourally independent, and has budgetary independence. The work of the IOE is supported by a clear, relatively detailed Evaluation Manual, which outlines: the overarching principles to be applied, the planning, budgeting and prioritisation processes, and the types of evaluation that will be conducted (and how they will be conducted). The Manual also describes quality assurance processes, but QA processes for (decentralised) self-evaluations are still a work-in-progress. IOE evaluations routinely incorporate management responses to evaluation recommendations, with the implementation status of these recommendations tracked through the publicly available President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions (PRISMA). The IOE has a responsibility to ensure evaluation evidence informs intervention design, and they are required to routinely assess the extent to which this is achieved. However, through the RIDE, IFAD regularly acknowledges that the lack of application of lesson learning is a shortcoming for the organisation. RIMS and the nascent ORMS support tracking of intervention-level performance, with IFAD's detailed supervision and implementation guidance (and procedures) outlining how poor performance should be tracked and addressed.</p>	
<b>MI 8.1: A corporate independent evaluation function exists</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>4</b>
Element 1: The evaluation function is independent from other management functions such as planning and managing development assistance ( <i>operational independence</i> )	4
Element 2: The Head of evaluation reports directly to the Governing Body of the organisation ( <i>Structural independence</i> )	4
Element 3: The evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme	4
Element 4: A separate budget line (approved by the Governing Body) ensures <i>budgetary independence</i>	4
Element 5: The central evaluation programme is fully funded by core funds	4
Element 6: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making pertaining to the subject of evaluation	4
Element 7: Evaluators are able to conduct their work throughout the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated ( <i>Behavioural independence</i> )	4
<b>MI 8.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The evaluation function is independent from other management functions: "Independent evaluation was mandated by the Governing Council upon the recommendation of Consultation on the Sixth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (2002), which proposed that the Office of Evaluation and Studies, as it was then called, report directly to the Executive Board, independently of IFAD management and, as has been the case since 1994, of the President of IFAD".</p> <p>IFAD complies with structural independence of the evaluation function as "the Director of IOE reports to the Executive Board rather than to the President of IFAD".</p> <p>As per the Evaluation Policy, the IOE has the authority to "(i) select projects, programmes and policies for evaluation and formulate the work programme; and (ii) revise and issue evaluation reports after discussion with relevant partners".</p>	14, 16, 27, 49, 60, 92

<p>A separate budget line is provided for the IOE, "Budget appropriation for evaluation is another important dimension of independence. IOE's annual budget shall therefore be presented separately to the Executive Board for its consideration and transmittal to the Governing Council for final approval". PoWs routinely include a standalone section that presents a relatively detailed, results-based budget for the IOE.</p> <p>The PoW confirms that the IOE and its activities are financed entirely from core funds.</p> <p>The policy requires that "All evaluation reports will be submitted to the Executive Board at the same time as they are forwarded to the President of IFAD".</p> <p>Interviews with IOE confirmed that they are able to work freely and independently.</p>	14, 16, 27, 49, 60, 92
<b>MI 8.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 8.2: Consistent, independent evaluation of results (coverage)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>4</b>
Element 1: An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure coverage, quality and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations	4
Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralised evaluations	4
Element 3: A prioritised and funded evaluation plan covering the organisation's planning and budgeting cycle is available	4
Element 4: The annual evaluation plan presents a systematic and periodic coverage of the organisation's Interventions, reflecting key priorities	4
Element 5: Evidence from sample countries demonstrate that the policy is being implemented	4
<b>MI 8.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The Evaluation Policy outlines IFAD's evaluation principles, including requirements to ensure adequate coverage, quality and use of findings. The policy also notes that IFAD's evaluation approach "reflects and is harmonized with internationally accepted [OECD/DAC] evaluation norms and principles". The Evaluation Manual elaborates on coverage, quality control mechanisms, and use of findings.</p> <p>IFAD's Evaluation Policy highlights the intention to evaluate through different approaches and reporting mechanisms, "(i) Every year IOE shall evaluate on a number of COSOPs/country programmes, as well as key IFAD policies, strategies and corporate business processes. In addition, IOE shall undertake project evaluations in the form of: (i) validation of all PCRs completed in a given year; and (ii) project performance assessment, undertaken for a selected number of projects previously exposed to PCR validation by IOE". The Evaluation Manual 2015 contains specific chapters dedicated to guiding country strategy and programme evaluation, corporate-level evaluation, impact evaluation, evaluation synthesis reports, project performance evaluations, and project completion report validations.</p>	14, 16, 26, 49, 50, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 92

IFAD do not apply the term ‘decentralized evaluation’; Rather, IFAD undertake ‘independent evaluation’ through the IOE, and ‘self-evaluation’ is delivered under the responsibility of management. The Evaluation Policy includes a brief section on the principles that should underpin IFAD’s self-evaluation. The role of self-evaluation is discussed in more detail throughout the Manual, and it is noted that one core question for IOE’s evaluation of IFAD performance is “Did IFAD have a well-functioning self evaluation system? In particular was adequate supervision and implementation support provided and a MTR undertaken in a timely manner, and portfolio performance monitored on a continuous basis?”.

The Policy notes that “the IOE Director, acting independently of the IFAD management, is responsible for formulating IOE’s annual work programme and proposed budgetary appropriations”. This evaluation plan and budget is a standing item within IFAD’s PoW, presented with a relatively high level of detail, and applying results-based budgeting principles.

The PoWs indicate that evaluation plans are based on “consultation with IFAD Management and takes into account the priorities expressed by IFAD governing bodies ... and feedback from the Evaluation Committee, Audit Committee and Executive Board”. The PoW goes on to discuss IFAD’s current context and priorities, results of previous / recent evaluations, and – ultimately – how these various elements influenced the proposed plan. The IOE also have their own Strategic Objectives, with the evaluation plan presented against those Objectives accordingly.

The Policy requires the IOE to submit a list of all evaluations that are included or excluded within evaluation plans, along with justifications reasons for these decisions: “IOE shall include an appendix in its work programme and budget document providing the criteria used to set priorities for inclusion of evaluations in the work programme, listing the requested evaluations that were not included, and evaluations included in the previous work programme approved by the Executive Board that were dropped or deferred”.

The annual workplan and budget within the PoW (including analysis of previous IOE activity), and the regular publication of IOE evaluations confirms that the Policy is being implemented. Self-evaluations are also clearly being undertaken through production of (e.g.) PCRs.

All of the evaluations reviewed indicate application of the Evaluation Policy provisions. Taking one example, the Scaling Up Synthesis Report clearly outlines its methodology, the limitations and its intention. The report indicates where evaluation and sector analysis has evolved. It outlines lessons to be learned and points out operational gaps. It also benchmarks against other similar organisations’ reflections on scaling up and indicates where scaling up opportunities have not been analysed. Another (Decentralization Experience) demonstrates learning intention and a clear use of the evaluation policy, including methodology employed and limitations. The evaluation was undertaken “With a view to strengthening future strategies and plans, the overarching objectives of this CLE were to assess and generate learning on: (i) IFAD’s decentralization experience, efforts and underlying assumptions; (ii) the contribution of IFAD decentralization to better operational performance and better development results; and (iii) costs of the decentralization process in relation to the results achieved”.

**Other:** Joint evaluations are undertaken with other banks. For example, the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) of the Asian Development Bank and IOE conducted a joint project performance evaluation of the Northern Region Sustainable Livelihoods through Livestock Development Project in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. IFAD’s IOE also conducted a joint synthesis evaluation with FAO in 2016 (Engagement in Pastoral Development).

IFAD’s Strategy and Knowledge Department also undertake ‘impact studies’ using separate methodologies and approaches from those outlined in the Evaluation Manual. This approach underpinned the IFAD9 Impact Assessment Initiative (IAI).

14, 16, 26, 49, 50, 60, 65,  
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,  
73, 74, 92

<b>MI 8.3: Systems are applied to ensure the quality of evaluations</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.6</b>
Element 1: Evaluations are based on design, planning and implementation processes that are inherently quality oriented	4
Element 2: Evaluations use appropriate methodologies for data-collection, analysis and interpretation	4
Element 3: Evaluation reports present in a complete and balanced way the evidence, findings, conclusions, and where relevant, recommendations	4
Element 4: The methodology presented includes the methodological limitations and concerns	4
Element 5: A process exists to ensure the quality of all evaluations, including decentralised evaluations	2
<b>MI 8.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The Evaluation Manual guides evaluation teams on design, management and implementation processes, all of which are underpinned by the Evaluation Policy. The Manual is a relatively thorough document, with a consistent emphasis on quality throughout, and confirmation that the IOE subscribes to UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards. All IOE reports are based on (and guided by) the Manual, and routinely describe the detailed evaluation approach adopted. In addition, the IOE monitors the quality of the self-evaluation system to ensure that internal data generation remains credible: "IOE will undertake specific evaluation devoted to assessing the design and functioning of the self-evaluation system, or any of its components, as decided by the Executive Board".</p> <p>The Evaluation Manual provides guidance for IOE staff, external consultants (and, to an extent, self-evaluation teams) as to the most appropriate evaluation methodology to adopt.</p> <p>Adopted methodologies are clearly indicated within evaluation reports, including justifications for their selection.</p> <p>All evaluation reports incorporate evidence, findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Country-level evaluations include Action Points agreed at the time of completing the evaluation. These are agreed actions based on the evaluation recommendations and include responsibilities allocation, and a timeline for implementation.</p> <p>All evaluation reports mention, or, have dedicated sections to address methodological or contextual limitations encountered during the evaluation process.</p> <p>The Evaluation Policy and Manual indicate that internal peer reviews are undertaken to ensure the quality of all IOE evaluations "In order to ensure quality of key evaluation deliverables, IOE shall undertake internal peer reviews for all evaluations. Members of the internal peer review process will be assigned from IOE staff by the division's Director". The Evaluation Committee also plays a critical quality assurance role, reviewing (e.g.) all corporate-level evaluations (approach papers, final reports, management responses).</p> <p>However, quality assurance of IFAD's self-evaluations is still a work-in-progress. IFAD's Development Effectiveness Framework implies that QA of self-evaluations will be developed, but these processes have not yet been established.</p>	6, 14, 16, 49, 54, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74
<b>MI 8.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 8.4: Mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.8</b>
Element 1: A formal requirement exists to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the design of new interventions	4
Element 2: Clear feedback loops exist to feed lessons into new interventions design	4
Element 3: There is evidence that lessons from past interventions have informed new interventions	2
Element 4: Incentives exist to apply lessons learnt to new interventions	2
Element 5: The number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public	2
<b>MI 8.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The IOE Director’s responsibilities include “ensuring that evaluation knowledge and lessons are fed in a timely manner into key IFAD’s processes for the formulation of policies, strategies and operations”. However, the extent to which this is operationalised is not clear. While guidance, project design templates and QA / QE processes encourage the integration of lessons learned, it is not clear that there are formal requirements in place. However, the Evaluation Manual confirms that IOE is required to analyse the extent to which recommendations from evaluations, PCRs, MTRs have been integrated into any given programme or policy: “Given IFAD’s learning mandate ... IOE evaluations should analyse the extent to which recommendations from past evaluations, PCRs, MTRs and supervision and implementation support missions were reflected in the project/ programme/policy under consideration. Evaluations should review whether the advice generated through IFAD’s quality enhancement and quality assurance processes was internalized in the subsequent phases of project/programme/strategy/ policy development”.</p> <p>IOE’s evaluations and the core monitoring reports (RIDE, ARRI) are all readily available, and all provide data and lessons that could be used to inform intervention design. Additionally, the QA and QE processes represent more structured mechanisms for integrating lessons. The Knowledge Management Framework 2014-18 goes further, establishing IFAD’s intentions to ensure and maintain adequate feedback loops, with KM intended results including: “a) Knowledge feedback loops are established between key business processes, b) Existing review and reporting mechanisms are used more effectively for learning and improvement, in particular to remedy consistent areas of weakness, c) IFAD uses the findings and conclusions from evaluations to improve the design and implementation of projects and programmes, d) Guidelines for key business processes integrate KM, learning and sharing”.</p>	4, 6, 9, 16, 31, 49, 51, 55, 57, 58, 62, 77

<p>Well-developed processes are available for feeding performance data and learning into intervention design. However, IFAD's own RIDEs frequently identify the integration of lessons as a weak point within project planning. This is supported by interviews with staff, with IFAD personnel often acknowledging that, for example, the QE process does not systematically review the integration of lessons and performance data. There are adequate systems in place for the integration of lessons and performance data, but some of these systems are non-mandatory, and consequently are not always applied. The 2016 RIDE notes that "Some recommendations were common to many of the project designs reviewed ... and have been consistently flagged in QA annual reports in previous years" including that "the analysis of [lessons learned] from previous IFAD experience is not consistently presented as a basis for informing design approaches, and considerable scope remains to ensure that the context of IFAD's history of engagement in a given environment is fully leveraged as a core aspect of every design". Further, "the analysis of outcomes (lessons learned) from previous IFAD experience is not consistently presented as a basis for informing design approaches, and considerable scope remains to ensure that the context of IFAD's history of engagement in a given environment is fully leveraged as a core aspect of every design". The 2017 RIDE notes in particular for COSOPs that "lessons learned presented in some COSOPs were comprehensive, but scope remains to ensure that the Fund's experience is a core aspect of every COSOP".</p> <p>The disclosure policy confirms that all programme / project design documentation is made public. This documentation routinely includes a section on 'lessons learned', which invariably includes lessons from previous reviews and evaluations. However, no documentary evidence was identified that confirms the number / share of new designs that draw on lessons (and whether this data is made public).</p>	<p>4, 6, 9, 16, 31, 49, 51, 55, 57, 58, 62, 77</p>
<b>MI 8.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 8.5: Poorly performing interventions proactively identified, tracked and addressed</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Element 1: A system exists to identify poorly performing interventions	4
Element 2: Regular reporting tracks the status and evolution of poorly performing interventions	4
Element 3: A process for addressing the poor performance exists, with evidence of its use	3
Element 4: The process clearly delineates the responsibility to take action	3
<b>MI 8.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Project performance is rated annually, with this rating then feeding directly into (e.g.) country level evaluations, evaluation synthesis reports, RIDE and ARRI, where directions and improvements are suggested as appropriate. Much of this work is underpinned by the regular system of intervention-level supervision, described through the supervision and implementation support guidelines.</p> <p>While RIMS has historically been used to track project status, the RBM Memo outlines that in future the process for reporting will be via the online systems which are being integrated into the ORMS, and the Supervision and Implementation Status Reports against intervention logframes. The Memo indicates that these processes will enable changes / correctives as required. In addition, a new AG-Scan programme will be rolling out from 2017 to "assess M&amp;E systems in the rural sector in 20 countries across all regions. The AG-Scan diagnostic will allow IFAD government counterparts to implement targeted improvements to their M&amp;E systems allowing them to better manage for results".</p>	<p>3, 4, 6, 49, 59, 84, 85</p>

<p>At the aggregate (corporate) level, both RIDE and ARRI routinely track and report portfolio-level performance. For example, the RIDE 2016 notes that “reducing the share of projects at risk in IFAD’s portfolio of ongoing projects is key to enhancing overall development impact, yet despite efforts in recent years the share has climbed from 18 to 20 per cent”.</p> <p>Management routinely responds to high-level recommendations issued through IOE evaluations, ARRI and RIDEs, often implementing institution-wide studies and initiatives to address systemic issues, with the annual PRISMA report being the primary channel through which management (publicly) reports on how evaluation recommendations are being addressed.</p> <p>At the intervention level, the process for addressing poor performance is outlined in both the supervision and implementation support guidelines and the RIMS Handbook, which states that: “In order to ensure that results are achieved, performance against stated objectives has to be continuously monitored. Lessons based on experience have to be applied in order to address shortcomings and increase the likelihood that the intended results will be achieved”. The Handbook also indicates that: “Information on project performance towards the intended outputs, outcomes and impact should be used to suggest adjustments and improvements at the level of inputs and activities”.</p> <p>Performance information is collected and analysed “in order to assess whether results have been achieved, identifying best/worst practices” and the results of this analysis is meant to be communicated to all stakeholders concerned: “government, funding agencies, beneficiaries, implementing partners, donors, managers, etc. M&amp;E findings may be presented in various ways: written reports, audio-visual techniques, workshops, brochures”. The RIMS rating scale indicates actions to be taken based on the effectiveness and sustainability assessment. These proposed actions range from “consideration should be given to cancelling component/output”, if the intervention has a rating of 1, to Corrections or Modifications need to be “introduced to improve performance” if the ratings are 3 or 4, and if the rating is 6 “the implementation approach can be considered as a best practice”.</p> <p>The RIMS Handbook only provides high-level guidance here, once poor performance has been identified, “the findings of the analysis should be used to define corrective actions and make decisions on improving the project strategy”. However, the supervision and implementation support guidelines provide relatively detailed principles and processes for addressing poor performance, including guidance on allocating roles.</p>	3, 4, 6, 49, 59, 84, 85
<b>MI 8.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 8.6: Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>4</b>
Element 1: Evaluation reports include a management response (or has one attached or associated with it)	4
Element 2: Management responses include an action plan and/or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities	4
Element 3: A timeline for implementation of key recommendations is proposed	4
Element 4: A system exists to regularly track status of implementation	4
Element 5: An annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations is made public	4

MI 8.6 Analysis	Source document
<p>The Evaluation Manual confirms that management responses are required, and outlines the process, content and timing of management responses, including how they are addressed and integrated within final evaluation reports. All evaluations included in the review contain management responses.</p> <p>The Evaluation Manual states that management responses should include “an action-oriented and time-bound matrix which clearly assigns responsibility and deadlines for follow-up”.</p> <p>Within the reviewed evaluations, all management responses (or ‘Agreements at Completion Point’) included a detailed response to each set of recommendations, including identification of respective responsibilities and accountabilities.</p> <p>The Evaluation Manual states that management responses should include “an action-oriented and time-bound matrix which clearly assigns responsibility and deadlines for follow-up”.</p> <p>Within the reviewed evaluations, all management responses included a detailed response to each set of recommendations, but these rarely outlined timelines for implementation of those recommendations. However, the ‘Agreements at Completion Point’ within country level evaluations did establish timelines.</p> <p>As noted in the Evaluation Manual, the PRISMA is the primary mechanism through which management reports progress against evaluation recommendations.</p> <p>An annual PRISMA is produced and made publicly available, as confirmed in both the Evaluation Manual and ARRI.</p> <p>The Evaluation Policy notes another layer of accountability: “IOE’s budget and expenditure shall be included in the regular annual external audit of IFAD’s accounts. The Evaluation Committee may commission external budget reviews of IOE as well as ad hoc audits of IOE’s compliance with various IFAD policies”.</p>	4, 16, 49, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 85
<b>MI 8.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 8.7: Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations and other reports</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.33</b>
Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use	4
Element 2: A mechanism for distilling and disseminating lessons learned internally exists	3
Element 3: A dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is available and employed	3
Element 4: A system is available and used to track the uptake of lessons learned	4
Element 5: Evidence is available that lessons learned and good practices are being applied	2
Element 6: A corporate policy for Disclosure of information exists and is also applied to evaluations	4

MI 8.7 Analysis	Source document
<p>In addition to IFAD's own website, the UNEG database is also used to store all IFAD evaluations. Both platforms are public.</p> <p>The ARRI and RIDE routinely highlight lessons learned from evaluations. Furthermore, evaluations of corporate policies and strategies aim to be internalised by IFAD through communications with the Evaluation Committee and Board, "The review of corporate policies and strategies will focus on the internalization of evaluation-based lessons and recommendations. These policies and strategies together with IOE comments will be discussed in the Evaluation Committee, prior to their consideration by the Board. The IFAD management will make available to IOE early drafts of such policies or strategies, so that the division can provide feedback on any specific evaluation lessons that should be included during the preparation of the policy or strategy".</p> <p>In addition, the formation of RB-COSOPs requires that all lessons learned from past country activities are incorporated into the report, "IFAD's results-based country strategic opportunities programme (RB-COSOP) preparation requires lessons to be learned from past activities in the country, conducted not only by IFAD but also by other partners and the government". To address this, COSOPs do include dedicated sections on 'past results, impact and performance' and 'lessons learned'. Similarly, PDRs include a mandatory 'lessons learned' section.</p> <p>The IOE Policy also states that "IOE will be an active member in IFAD's communities of practice on knowledge management. Moreover, it will participate in knowledge fairs held by the management and organise as hoc seminars and workshops to promote timely feedback of evaluation findings and lessons learned".</p> <p>The IOE produced 'Insights' brochures appear to be the primary mechanism for broad sharing of lessons; moreover, 'Insights' do appear to be routinely published alongside most if not all IOE evaluations. As noted in the Evaluation Manual: "Insights are two-sided brochures of approximately 800 words and focus on one learning issue emerging from an evaluation. They primarily serve to direct attention to critical learning hypotheses and form the basis for further debate among professionals and policy-makers at IFAD and outside the institution, project staff, development practitioners and other partners". More broadly, IFAD's general approach to – and implementation of – knowledge management provides another channel through which lessons can be (and are) disseminated.</p> <p>The IOE Director's responsibilities include "ensuring that evaluation knowledge and lessons are fed in a timely manner into key IFAD's processes for the formulation of policies, strategies and operations". The Evaluation Manual confirms that IOE is required to analyse the extent to which recommendations from evaluations, PCRs, MTRs have been integrated into any given programme or policy: "Given IFAD's learning mandate ... IOE evaluations should analyse the extent to which recommendations from past evaluations, PCRs, MTRs and supervision and implementation support missions were reflected in the project/ programme/policy under consideration. Evaluations should review whether the advice generated through IFAD's quality enhancement and quality assurance processes was internalized in the subsequent phases of project/programme/strategy/ policy development".</p>	<p>4, 5, 6, 9, 16, 31, 32, 49, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 77, 78, 85</p>

<p>ARRIs provide a general, useful assessment of the extent to which lessons learned are – or are not – applied across IFAD, with the 2016 ARRI in particular focusing on IFAD’s internal knowledge management systems, including approaches for the identification and sharing of lessons learned.</p> <p>As noted in MI7.5 (performance data informing intervention design) and MI8.4 (lessons informing new interventions) IFAD regularly identifies the uptake of past lessons as an institutional shortcoming. The RIDEs consistently acknowledge the (lack of) application of lesson learning in planning. The 2016 RIDE notes that “Some recommendations were common to many of the project designs reviewed...and have been consistently flagged in QA annual reports in previous years” including that “the analysis of [lessons learned] from previous IFAD experience is not consistently presented as a basis for informing design approaches, and considerable scope remains to ensure that the context of IFAD’s history of engagement in a given environment is fully leveraged as a core aspect of every design”.</p> <p>At the same time, these documents do sometimes identify how certain improvements have been influenced by prior experience and lessons learned. They also suggest that integration of lessons has sometimes been achieved and is worthwhile. For example, the 2017 RIDE notes that “project reviews show that where lessons from previous experience have been identified and applied to design, the project foundation is stronger and has a firmer basis for proposing a coherent scaling up pathway. The OSC and QAG prioritize this aspect, because the main source of knowledge for IFAD is the project implementation experience”.</p> <p>The management response within the 2016 ARRI identifies one potential factor that contributes to the apparent lack of a focus on lesson learning: “because individual performance measures focus on results achieved, staff do not have strong incentives to identify learning opportunities from programme or project failures, even though these often provide important lessons that can support future success”.</p> <p>The Policy on the Disclosure of Documents also applies to IOE evaluations, which must be made publicly available.</p>	<p>4, 5, 6, 9, 16, 31, 32, 49, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 77, 78, 85</p>
<p><b>MI 8.7 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>High confidence</b></p>

## RESULTS

*Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results in an efficient way*

<b>KPI 9: Achievement of development and humanitarian objectives and results e.g. at the institutional/corporate wide level, at the regional/corporate wide level and, at the regional/country level, with results contributing to normative and cross-cutting goals</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.64</b>
<p>IFAD's achievement against its expected results has been reasonable, particularly for its main target group of the rural poor.</p> <p>Recent ARRI reports repeatedly demonstrate that the Fund delivers positive contributions towards rural poverty reduction, with IFAD's measure of 'rural impact poverty' scoring consistently well. IFAD's contribution to the domain of 'human and social capital and empowerment' has been particularly strong at least in part due to their "notable comparative advantage versus other IFIs [due to their] targeting and participatory approaches". Performance against IFAD's 'gender equality and women's empowerment' criteria has also been consistently strong. Components of good governance have also been supported through IFAD's economic and social empowerment of poor rural people and building the capacity of grass roots institutions and organisations.</p> <p>However, results are not as strong in some areas, including policy engagement, environment and natural resource management, and in the sub-domain of food security (although this is partly due to data gaps, particularly on malnutrition rates).</p>	
<b>MI 9.1: Interventions assessed as having achieved their stated development and/or humanitarian objectives and attain expected results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's achievement against its expected results has been reasonable, with some poorer performing areas.</p> <p>IFAD's Policy on Targeting and the Strategic Framework 2016-25 determines that its main target group is the rural poor. Considering this main target group, the ARRI 2016 reports that: "80 per cent of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better ... IOE evaluations show that IFAD has made a positive contribution to rural poverty reduction. This is mainly a result of the Fund's attention to improving income and assets, empowerment, and enhancing agricultural productivity and food security. IFAD's operations made significant contributions to better agricultural productivity, diversification of income-generating activities and access to microfinance".</p> <p>However, the ARRI 2017 reports declining or similar performance in several areas compared to results from ARRI 2016, "In the period 2013-2015, although IFAD performance as a partner increased to 88 percent of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better [there is] slightly declining performance in overall project achievement (81 per cent), government performance (77 per cent), rural poverty impact (85 per cent) and project performance (67 per cent). The decline in project performance can be attributed to declines in the percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better in effectiveness (from 77 to 75 per cent) and efficiency (from 61 to 57 per cent), as relevance increased slightly (from 88 to 90 per cent) and sustainability of benefits remained flat at 65 per cent. Among the IFAD-specific criteria, innovation and scaling up increased slightly to 91 per cent, while gender and women's empowerment showed flat performance, with 85 per cent of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, and ENRM declined to 77 per cent".</p>	
	4, 6, 50, 54, 55, 66, 70, 88

<p>The RIDE 2016 – which collates information from the prior period’s evaluations – states that “performance has improved in all outcome areas compared to the baseline ... [and] all outcome targets for 2015 have been either met or surpassed” with regards to the IFAD9 RMF indicators. The strongest performance was for the following outcomes: effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability, replication and scaling up, and government performance. More conservative results were seen for relevance, gender equality, innovation and learning, and environment and natural resource management</p> <p>For the IFAD10 period the RIDE 2017 finds that with regards to development effectiveness “most of the indicators assessed show that project performance is in the satisfactory zone, and that 2018 year-end targets have either already been met or are close to being so”. However, performance against several outcomes (climate change, environment and natural resource management) are constraining IFAD’s broader development effectiveness, and – in comparison to the RIDE 2016 – the RIDE 2017 suggests a decline in performance for some indicators: “the weakest performing outcome indicators are project efficiency and sustainability of benefits”. A contributing factor to these weaker results is that “project performance in most cases is moderately satisfactory and there is a need to work towards ensuring that a greater proportion of projects are either satisfactory or highly satisfactory”.</p>	4, 6, 50, 54, 55, 66, 70, 88
<b>MI 9.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 9.2: Interventions assessed as having realised the expected positive benefits for target group members</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Highly satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>3.5</b>
<b>MI 9.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The three latest ARRIIs (2015, 2016, 2017) indicate that the criterion of ‘rural poverty impact’ scores consistently well. For example, in 2017 the criterion was the fifth highest scored out of 13 criteria assessed. At the same time, the report also notes that “the overall trend is essentially flat” with no projects “rated as highly satisfactory” against the criterion.</p> <p>The rural poverty impact criterion is comprised of four sub-domains (household income and assets; human and social capital and empowerment; food security; institutions and policies), and the ARRIIs provide a granular, qualitative assessment of IFAD performance against these sub-domains. The 2017 ARRI suggests that IFAD’s performance is particularly strong within the ‘human and social capital and empowerment’ sub-domain, at least in part due to their “notable comparative advantage versus other IFIs [due to their] targeting and participatory approaches”. Performance in the ‘food security’ domain is not as strong, although this is partly due to data gaps, particularly on malnutrition rates.</p> <p>The 2016 RIDE notes that - during the period 2010-5 - 24 million people were moved out of poverty as a result of IFAD interventions. However, this was against an RMF target of 80 million for the same period. The IFAD9 Impact Assessment Initiative (IAI) suggested that the metric used (people having their income lifted above the poverty line) was “on its own, inadequate to assess the impact on the well-being of IFAD’s beneficiaries”.</p> <p>The IAI also states that during the period 2010-5 positive benefits were delivered to “139 million people and 24 million households [that] received project interventions”. These beneficiaries include: “18.0 million active borrowers and 26.6 million voluntary savers, highlighting IFAD’s focus on financial inclusion. Numerous farmers have been trained in agricultural practices, including 4.4 million in crop production technologies, 1.6 million in livestock production and 1.4 million in natural resource management”.</p>	4, 6, 50, 54, 70, 88

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The IFAD9 IAI also demonstrated that IFAD beneficiaries are, on average, better off when compared with a control group. IFAD's investments in rural people have generated returns in a number of critical areas, including assets, resilience, livestock ownership, agricultural revenues, nutrition and women's empowerment. Moreover, "improvements in agricultural activities have been promoted, leading to 5.0 million hectares under improved management practices. This has largely been accomplished through strengthening farmers' organizations and thousands of community groups, including market, productive, infrastructure, agricultural and livestock groups". The extent to which the well-being of these beneficiaries was improved varies greatly across project and countries. IFAD estimates that its investments in projects will overall lead to a projected reduction in poverty of "between 5.6 per cent and 9.9 per cent" and that "about 24 million beneficiaries were moved out of poverty under the entire portfolio of projects closed and ongoing from 2010 to 2015".

In terms of IFAD's overall impact on all its beneficiaries, the IAI states that it "is effectively improving the well-being of rural people in terms of asset accumulation and higher revenue and income". These projections imply that "43.2 million beneficiaries exhibited a significant and substantial increase in their agricultural revenue; 28.8 million – a rise in poultry ownership; and 22.8 million – an increase in livestock assets". It is also estimated that 10 million beneficiaries experienced some form of benefit in overall assets, productive assets, gender empowerment, dietary diversity and reduction in shock exposure. However, asset accumulation and higher incomes for its beneficiaries were the only results to be deemed statistically significant (0.05 level).

4, 6, 50, 54, 70, 88

<b>MI 9.3: Interventions assessed as having contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programmes (policy and capacity impacts), or needed system reforms</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The Country-Level Policy Dialogue Evaluation Synthesis suggests mixed results when it comes to policy engagement, with a key conclusion being that “although there have been some remarkable achievements ... there is scope for substantial improvement. Most of the work on country-level policy dialogue and engagement has been informal, reacting to opportunities, unrecorded, un-resourced, with neither indicators nor incentives, with non-lending as an add-on, and without specified deliverables”.</p> <p>Out of three non-lending activities analysed by ARRI (partnership building, country-level policy engagement and knowledge management), policy engagement scores the lowest, showing a declining trend. The 2017 ARRI notes that positive results are often driven by individuals: “[positive results] appear to be largely determined by the interests, experience and initiatives of [Country Programme Managers]”. However, the apparent success of individual-driven approaches is undermined as “no corporate incentives exist to encourage [Country Programme Managers] or [IFAD Country Offices] to undertake country-level policy engagement and individual performance assessments are more heavily driven by project approval, successful implementation and ensuring sound fiduciary matters than by non-lending activities”.</p> <p>However, it is also acknowledged that most of the CPEs achieved one or more of the three necessary policy outcomes. The Country-level Policy Engagement Guidebook also contains numerous case studies of successful IFAD policy engagement initiatives, realised through a combination of investment and/or regional grant financed programmes. Importantly, the guidebook is evidence of IFAD’s efforts to enhance the effectiveness of its policy engagement work, by promoting application of a rich set of tools and guidance for the design, implementation, monitoring, and performance measurement of policy engagement initiatives.</p> <p>Evidence from individual country evaluations suggests mixed results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In Ethiopia, IFAD’s impact on institutions and policies was moderately satisfactory. The three projects evaluated made “a significant contribution to the development of institutions”, and “rely on planning and implementation at the lowest administrative level, thus supporting the Governments decentralization thrust”. It is not known yet if the policy studies undertaken have had any effect, but at the time of the evaluations “the impact...on institutions and policy development has been mixed”.</li> <li>• In the DRC, policy dialogues were, in practice, “largely confined to active participation by the CPM in donor-government co-ordination mechanisms. Topics covered were closely related to project intervention areas such as funding CLERs and promoting seed production”, and several opportunities for dialogue were missed. While the evaluation found that the outcomes of dialogue “remain modest to date, but the voice of farmers’ confederations in political fora has certainly increased”.</li> <li>• The country evaluation of Turkey found: “The overall policy environment has been supportive, and the Government is generally open to new ideas from IFAD. However, the agriculture sector has been heavily subsidized for decades, and a supply-driven approach still permeates public programmes in agriculture”</li> </ul>	4, 25, 54, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 88
<b>MI 9.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 9.4: Interventions assessed as having helped improve gender equality and the empowerment of women</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The recent Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment synthesis found that in many cases IFAD "has addressed the root causes of gender inequality and powerlessness, in particular illiteracy, exclusion from access to resources and limited social capital" and that "there is no doubt that IFAD interventions have created significant benefits for women. The provision of general infrastructure and in particular water has important gendered aspects and can address some root causes of gender inequality, such as time poverty". However, the synthesis also notes most benefits were realised at the individual level and that "only very few examples where IFAD interventions enabled formal systemic change, for example on laws, policies and government capacities, and this is where a major gap exists at the moment".</p> <p>The last three ARRI (2015, 2016, 2017) demonstrate that performance against IFAD's 'gender equality and women's empowerment' criteria has been consistently strong. For example, out of 13 criteria assessed in the 2017 ARRI, GEWE was the third highest scoring. But the ARRI also suggest some room for improvement. The 2016 ARRI suggests that a "substantive increase in the percentage of highly satisfactory projects could be achieved through gender strategies that cater for complex and heterogeneous contexts and through the development of gender action plans as part of the whole annual planning and reporting processes". The 2017 ARRI report indicates that "women's specific constraints and needs were not always sufficiently analysed and incorporated into programme design and planning", that "there is scope to better target the diversity of women along lines of ethnicity, religion and life cycle through specific targeting strategies", and that specific targeting strategies are required to address the needs of different groups of women "more likely to be left behind". While IFAD does apply gender markers to assess gender sensitivity during project implementation and at completion, the Evaluation Synthesis Report on "what works for gender equality and women's empowerment – a review of practices and results" (ESR on GEWE) points out that, as yet, there is no agreed definition or operationalisation of gender transformative approaches at IFAD.</p>	4, 50, 54, 70, 76, 88
<b>MI 9.4 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>
<b>MI 9.5: Interventions assessed as having helped improve environmental sustainability/helped tackle the effects of climate change</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>

<b>MI 9.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The ENRM Synthesis states that “IFAD’s commitment to ENRM has clearly evolved in recent years” with “significant steps at the corporate level [mirroring] the evolution of IFAD’s commitment to ENRM issues”. However, the report highlighted several areas that were contributing to IFAD’s poor performance including: poor co-ordination with government partners, inadequate budgets and monitoring of loans, environmental risks overlooked in projects, lack of linkages between ENRM, poverty and livelihoods, inadequate monitoring systems for ENRM, poor alignment with country strategies, lack of prioritisation in COSOPs, and climate change prioritised over ENRM. However, it should be noted that the ENRM Synthesis evaluated many programmes, some of which were very dated at the time of the synthesis evaluation (2016).</p> <p>These results are echoed by the 2017 ARRI which demonstrates that ratings for ENRM projects rated as moderately satisfactory or better since 2013-15 have declined, “ENRM declined to 77 per cent [from 82 per cent]. Of the 28 projects including the new criterion adaptation to climate change, and completed in the period 2013-2015, 74 per cent were rated moderately satisfactory or better. Due to the [adaptation] criterion’s novelty and resulting limited evidence, tracking adaptation to climate change experiences is more difficult than the more well-established ENRM criterion”. The adaptation criterion was scored lowest out of 13 criteria in the 2017 ARRI, with the ENRM scoring 9th out of 13 criteria.</p> <p>The Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) Progress Review (2015) is more positive, stating that “ASAP’s impact has been strong in two areas... internal policy and project design process has become much more robust within IFAD on climate change as clear M&amp;E targets have been included in new project designs...[and] IFAD has created a strong, internationally recognised brand on climate adaptation for rural smallholder farmers, combining IFAD’s existing credibility on agriculture with strategic partnerships with international institutions leading on climate change in this field.”</p>	4, 54, 68, 87, 88
<b>MI 9.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 9.6: Interventions assessed as having helped improve good governance (as defined in 2.1.c)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 9.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Overall, the ARRI’s are generally positive on IFAD’s performance with respect to governance. For example, the 2016 report notes that “the contribution of IFAD operations to the quality and performance of institutions, policies and regulatory frameworks that influence the lives of the poor, is assessed as moderately satisfactory or better in 84.3 per cent of the projects exiting the portfolio in 2012-2014.”</p> <p>The ARRI 2017 highlights that components of good governance have been supported through the economic and social empowerment of poor rural people and building the capacity of grass roots institutions and organizations, “IFAD’s hallmark approach of enhancing the capabilities of rural poor people, by bringing together smallholder farmers into grass-roots institutions and organizations and improving their access to basic amenities and productive resources, as well as fostering their participation in local governance processes.” The ARRI 2017 also indicates another area where IFAD is comparatively strong on governance. Under the qualitative analysis of IFAD’s ‘rural poverty impact’ criterion, the ARRI notes that IFAD’s “support to institutions and policies that are focused on enterprise development and trade have the highest ratings, whereas general agricultural policy has less notable ratings”.</p>	4, 54, 71, 73, 74, 88

<p>While the ARRI are generally positive with regards to governance and identify several strong results, the reviewed CPEs confirmed that influencing and achieving improvements to governance was not always successful:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In Bangladesh, IFAD has undertaken several actions to help improve corruption including: “i) preparation of a country- wide analysis of governance issues and preparation of an action plan for all ongoing projects; and ii) a deliberate attempt to work with organizations which have an international reputation for zero corruption”, but the results of this work are not clear.</li> <li>• One project in Ethiopia attempted to improve grassroots capacity through “extensive awareness and capacity development initiatives with the project training almost 412, 000 small farmers”, however, the expected results in terms of mobilisation for community-based institutions was not met.</li> <li>• Likewise, in Turkey “the [intervention] contributed to enhancing social capital through its support to several farmers’ organizations, but the support provided was insufficient to achieve major progress in local institutional development”.</li> </ul>	<p>4, 54, 71, 73, 74, 88</p>
<p><b>MI 9.6 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>Medium confidence</b></p>
<p><b>MI 9.7: Interventions assessed as having helped improve human rights</b></p>	<p><b>Score</b></p>
<p><b>MI rating</b></p>	<p><b>Satisfactory</b></p>
<p><b>MI score</b></p>	<p><b>2.5</b></p>
<p><b>MI 9.7 Analysis</b></p>	<p><b>Source document</b></p>
<p>Though IFAD’s results are not framed in the context of human rights, there are several areas where it contributes towards including gender equality, women’s empowerment, and the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources.</p> <p>Against that background, the ARRI’s assessment of the ‘rural poverty impact’ criterion includes qualitative assessment of the sub-domain of ‘human and social capital and empowerment’. While not exclusively focused on human rights, performance against this sub-domain is strong. At the same time, one weakness identified in the 2017 ARRI is IFAD’s targeting strategy and a sometime “insufficient clarity on the target group”. The ARRI goes on to discuss the effects of this shortcoming, which in turn implies reduced effectiveness when it comes to human rights: “although positive results have been achieved in this impact sub-domain, these results were mostly for the better off and to a lesser extent among the extreme poor”. Previous ARRI indicate that this is a consistent theme. The ARRI 2016 observed that of the evaluations reviewed “project activities are often not sufficiently refined to meet the needs of all intended beneficiaries, in particular those at risk of being excluded, such as indigenous peoples, pastoralists, landless people, migrants and other vulnerable groups”. The ARRI 2015 similarly notes weaknesses within IFADs programmes including, “Uneven understanding of the particularities of pastoral development and indigenous peoples’ issues” as well as “Insufficient attention to proper institutional analysis, sound socio-cultural and vulnerability analysis of different social groups, tailored and differentiated approaches to build on the culture, identity and knowledge of indigenous peoples’ and pastoral communities.”</p> <p>There is an intention to explicitly incorporate human rights within the next iteration of the SECAP.</p>	<p>4, 54, 61, 88, 90</p>
<p><b>MI 9.7 Evidence confidence</b></p>	<p><b>Medium confidence</b></p>

<b>KPI 10: Relevance of interventions to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, and extent to which the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.83</b>
<p>The relevance of IFAD interventions is consistently one of the highest scoring criteria assessed through ARRI. The value of targeting for ensuring project relevance is well recognised, with evaluations and ARRI regularly identifying the most relevant interventions as those with well-defined targeting strategies.</p> <p>But the ARRI also find that the inverse applies, with a weak approach to targeting directly affecting project relevance. Recent ARRI have identified weaknesses here, noting that “project activities are often not sufficiently refined to meet the needs of all intended beneficiaries, in particular those at risk of being excluded, such as indigenous peoples, pastoralists, landless people, migrants and other vulnerable groups” and that “a recurrent issue... is that IFAD and its implementing partners need to ensure that projects have a specific targeting strategy to reach the most vulnerable people, based on a sound vulnerability analysis, and leading to differentiated support according to the needs of vulnerable groups, youth and women in particular”.</p> <p>The contribution of COSOPs to delivery of national goals and objectives is also routinely assessed through ARRI, which measure COSOP relevance, effectiveness and performance. The assessments of COSOP relevance are positive, with relevance consistently scoring higher than the other two criteria. However, scores for COSOP relevance have dropped slightly in recent years. Although not as strong as COSOP relevance, COSOP effectiveness and performance still score relatively well (and consistently) in the most recent ARRI.</p>	
<b>MI 10.1: Interventions assessed as having responded to the needs/priorities of target groups</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 10.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Relevance is consistently one of the highest scoring (and often the highest scoring) criterion assessed through ARRI. Moreover, the trajectory is positive, with an increasing proportion of projects rated ‘satisfactory’, and – in recent years – a number of projects attaining the (rare) rating of ‘highly satisfactory’.</p> <p>The ARRI consistently highlight the value of targeting for ensuring project relevance, noting that well-performing projects are those with well-defined targeting strategies. These projects are often “highly relevant to the socio-economic context, beneficiaries’ requirements and institutional priorities”. This is confirmed in the 2017 ARRI, which states that “targeting is a key driver of performance in relevance.”</p> <p>But the ARRI also find that the inverse applies, with weak targeting directly affecting project relevance. The ARRI 2017 notes that constraining features to relevance are often linked to “limitations in project preparation and design, including the lack of (i) a proper targeting strategy (ii) ownership of the project by the respective implementing agencies and (iii) insufficient analysis of the socio-economic and political context of the project area and (potential) partners and institutions involved.” The ARRI 2016 observed that of the evaluations reviewed “project activities are often not sufficiently refined to meet the needs of all intended beneficiaries, in particular those at risk of being excluded, such as indigenous peoples, pastoralists, landless people, migrants and other vulnerable groups”. These results are echoed by the ARRI 2017, which suggests that projects have continued to not adequately target vulnerable beneficiaries, “A recurrent issue mentioned in the 2016 evaluations is that IFAD and its implementing partners need to ensure that projects have a specific targeting strategy to reach the most vulnerable people, based on a sound vulnerability analysis, and leading to differentiated support according to the needs of vulnerable groups, youth and women in particular”.</p>	4, 54, 88
<b>MI 10.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 10.2: Interventions assessed as having helped contribute to the realisation of national development goals and objectives</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 10.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>ARRIs provide an aggregate assessment of COSOPs, comprising review of COSOP (i) relevance, (ii) effectiveness, and (iii) performance. The assessments of COSOP relevance are positive, with relevance consistently scoring higher than the other two criteria. However, the 2017 ARRI indicates that the score for COSOP relevance has dropped slightly since 2015 and 2016 (from 87 to 82.5). As noted above, COSOPs are also assessed via the criteria of 'COSOP effectiveness' and 'COSOP performance', while not as positive as COSOP relevance, these two criteria nevertheless score relatively well (and consistently) in the last three ARRIs (2015, 2016, 2017).</p> <p>ARRIs routinely provide qualitative examples of where and how IFAD has (or has not) delivered relevant contributions to national goals. For example, the ARRI 2016 finds that in some cases, projects did not have a lasting impact on national development goals and policies as "clear roadmaps and strategies towards informing policies and converging with national development programmes are missing". This was also linked to "insufficient attention to sustainability, limited budgets and low prioritization of agriculture emerge as factors constraining performance". As an illustrative example, it was found that for one intervention "upon completion activities were not prioritized into government programmes. In addition to the low performance and early closure, the programme design failed at understanding the rapidly transitioning economic situation of the country, which resulted in a preference for the growing manufacturing and service sectors over the agriculture sector".</p>	4, 57, 58, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 88
<b>MI 10.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 10.3: Results assessed as having been delivered as part of a coherent response to an identified problem</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 10.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>Partnerships – particularly those with governments – are foundational to IFAD's operating model. Consequently, IFAD's overall results performance is closely linked to its ability to build and work in partnerships, a point regularly reflected on across all evaluation products.</p> <p>The ARRIs report mixed performance on the partnership elements of IFAD's work. On the one hand, IFAD's <i>performance as a partner</i> is steadily improving (as is the performance of IFAD's government partners), yet on the other hand the 2017 ARRI notes a decline in IFAD's <i>partnership-building performance</i>, with this trend apparent since 2009-2011. Within the ARRIs and across all evaluations, partnerships with governments are generally found to be effective, but there is scope for improvement regarding other forms of partnerships (with other UN entities and IFIs, with private sector, with civil society). IFAD clearly recognises the importance of building performance here, with the current Strategic Framework identifying partnership as a principle of engagements, and as a means for strengthening country engagement. The accelerated decentralisation process is also partly driven by the objective of strengthening partnerships and responsiveness. The general trajectory is therefore positive.</p>	4, 37, 54, 65, 66, 77, 84, 87
<b>MI 10.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>

<b>KPI 11: Results delivered efficiently</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	<b>2</b>
<p>ARRIs have consistently rated efficiency as one of the weakest performing of IFAD's evaluation criteria. Several factors contribute to this relatively poor performance, including slow disbursement rates, high costs per beneficiary and high costs of project management. Despite the relatively weak performance on efficiency (when compared to other IFAD criteria) the ARRIs do also suggest that a slightly positive trend is evident, as the proportion of projects gaining 'satisfactory' efficiency ratings is increasing. Also important to consider is the challenging environments within which IFAD works, often with the most isolated and disadvantaged populations.</p> <p>Country evaluations also routinely address cost efficiency, with reported results indicating a mixed performance: reasonable efficiency in some countries, poor efficiency in others, and varied performance within individual countries.</p> <p>The ARRIs' assessment of efficiency includes assessment of timeliness. In this regard ARRIs regularly pinpoint slow disbursement rates as a persistent problem for IFAD, acknowledging the potential (negative) influence this could have on IFAD's results: "big time lags between project approval and entry into force...may result in delaying project implementation and benefits to the rural poor people". In response to this persistent difficulty, IFAD have developed a corporate disbursement action plan in 2016, with this plan currently under implementation.</p>	
<b>MI 11.1: Interventions assessed as resource/cost efficient</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 11.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The ARRI 2017 notes that "operational efficiency remains the weakest performing criterion" which echoes the results of the 2015 and 2016 ARRIs. ARRIs consistently identify a number of cost-related factors inhibiting operational efficiency, e.g. "poor use of resources through under-spending and over-spending for the project components; High cost per beneficiary; High cost of project management; Low internal rate of return". However, ARRIs also consistently highlight the influence of context on efficiency, with difficult / fragile contexts invariably incurring higher management costs: IFAD work in challenging environments, often with the most isolated and disadvantaged populations.</p> <p>Despite the relatively weak performance on efficiency (when compared to other IFAD criteria) the ARRIs do also suggest that a slightly positive trend is evident, as the proportion of projects gaining 'satisfactory' efficiency ratings is increasing, and some recent projects have obtained the (rare) 'highly satisfactory' rating.</p> <p>Country evaluations considered cost efficiency, with mixed performance across countries. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In Bangladesh, efficiency of all country projects included in the CPE was assessed as satisfactory as "the programme has made good use of resources, projects have disbursed almost all funds allocated within the assigned time period, and the fund flow to the projects has been smooth".</li> <li>• In the Ethiopia and Turkey CPEs, the efficiency of all country projects included was assessed as moderately satisfactory. For Ethiopia, "unit costs were lower than comparators for practically all the projects" however the "lack of data on the benefits generated ... precludes cost-benefit analyses".</li> <li>• In Turkey "cost per beneficiary for farm-household level investments was high" however, infrastructure projects were seen to be "highly efficient", "generally well-managed and cost-effective".</li> <li>• In the DRC CPE, project efficiency was unsatisfactory overall due to the "disproportionately high management expenses in relation to activities and results, significant implementation delays, and cumbersome beneficiary support systems".</li> </ul>	4, 54, 71, 72, 73, 74, 88
<b>MI 11.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High confidence</b>

<b>MI 11.2: Implementation and results assessed as having been achieved on time (given the context, in the case of humanitarian programming)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>MI 11.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The ARRI's assessment of efficiency includes assessment of timeliness. In this regard ARRI regularly focus on the importance of disbursement rates. A key, representative lesson identified within the 2017 ARRI (and evident across the other ARRIs) is that "disbursement delays commonly foreshadow project extensions" which in turn "add to the management and supervision costs of a project". The potential influence of disbursement rates on IFAD's results is noted in the 2016 ARRI: "big time lags between project approval and entry into force... may result in delaying project implementation and benefits to the rural poor people".</p> <p>The main source for timeliness / disbursement related data is the RIDEs, which routinely report on RMF indicators for disbursement and timeliness of implementation. The 2017 RIDE summarises overall performance here: "Disbursement-related matters have been a consistent issue for the institution and this is reflected in the disbursement results. Since its inclusion in the RMF in IFAD8, the average time between project approval and first disbursement has not met the target of 14 months and currently stands at just below 17 months. The disbursement ratio has also been a challenge for the Fund, and despite the lowering of the target to 15 per cent in December 2016, the ratio continues to be around 13 per cent both for the overall portfolio and in fragile situations".</p> <p>Results reported within country evaluations confirm the difficulties faced with disbursement, with country programmes showing mixed performance on time efficiency. In Bangladesh, almost all projects included in the CPE were achieved on time, with the exception of one project due to a delay in the start-up phase. For Ethiopia, most projects "suffered from slow start-up and long gestation", in Turkey and the DRC interventions were "affected by significant implementation delays". Overall, one of the major factors inhibiting operational efficiency of the evaluations included in the ARRI 2017 was "Significant start-up delays and approval to effectiveness lag".</p> <p>In response to this persistent difficulty, IFAD have developed a corporate disbursement action plan in 2016, with this plan currently under implementation.</p>	4, 6, 54, 55, 71, 72, 73, 74, 88
<b>MI 11.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>KPI 12: Sustainability of results</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<p>ARRIs acknowledge that sustainability is one of IFAD's weakest areas when compared to other metrics. In the latest assessment, sustainability was the third poorest performing of IFAD's evaluation criteria after efficiency and adaptation. Limited ownership and a lack of exit strategies were identified as two of the most important contributing factors to this comparatively weak performance.</p> <p>At the same time, there are several notable examples of IFAD interventions building sufficient institutional capacity and/or IFAD interventions being mainstreamed into government activity. Moreover, although sustainability is still one of IFAD's weakest performing criteria, there is a positive trend, with ARRI scores for sustainability of benefits improving steadily in recent years.</p>	
<b>MI 12.1: Benefits assessed as continuing or likely to continue after project or program completion or there are effective measures to link the humanitarian relief operations to recovery, to resilience and eventually to longer-term development results</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>

<b>MI 12.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The 2017 ARRI acknowledges that sustainability remains one of IFAD's weakest areas, with fewer projects rated satisfactory and none as highly satisfactory. Furthermore, the sustainability of benefits delivered through IFAD's work programme has been hampered due to limited ownership and lack of exit strategies: "while performance in sustainability of benefits has shown improvement, progress is slowing due to recurrent issues of fragile results at completion, limited beneficiary ownership and the absence of clear project exit strategies". These were also issues that the 2015 and 2016 ARRI indicated needed addressing.</p> <p>Although sustainability is one of the weakest criteria assessed by ARRIs, the Scaling Up Synthesis notes that IFAD's self-assessment of its PCRs is more positive: "scaling-up performance has improved and corporate targets are being met". Evidence for this claim is provided by the greater number of PCRs which were rated moderately satisfactory or higher since 2009: "The percentage of projects rated as moderately satisfactory or better increased from 73.7 per cent in 2009-2011 to 91.3 per cent in 2013-2015, out of which 40.6 per cent are satisfactory or better". Along a similar line, sustainability of benefits has been seen to have improved steadily from 2009, e.g. "Sixty-five percent of the projects completed in 2013-2015 rated moderately satisfactory or better versus a low of 56 per cent of projects in 2009-2011". The 2017 ARRI supports this, reporting that the indicator on "innovation and scaling up" - which reflects IFAD's contribution to systemic/policy change and expanded impact beyond the programmes it finances - has seen a statistically significant improvement and performance is exceeding targets, "the percentage of projects rated as moderately satisfactory or better increased from 73.7 per cent in 2009-2011 to 91.3 per cent in 2013-2015.</p>	4, 25, 54, 65, 88
<b>MI 12.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium confidence</b>
<b>MI 12.2: Interventions assessed as having built sufficient institutional and/or community capacity for sustainability, or have been absorbed by government</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 12.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>The ARRI 2016 notes that "empowerment is one of the key principles of engagement of IFAD and a crucial requirement to the long-term reduction of poverty and hunger" and that "the 2016 ARRI confirms the positive contribution that the Fund has made over the years in enhancing the capabilities of rural poor people, by bringing together smallholder farmers into grass-roots institutions and organizations and improving their access to basic amenities and productive resources, as well as fostering their participation in local governance processes". Individual positive examples are also identified within ARRIs. In the 2016 ARRI "the evaluation of the [intervention] ... provides an excellent example of long-term sustainable human and social capital building, empowerment, and inclusiveness", in terms of an inclusive pasture reform, where "social mobilization and capacity-building activities underlying the reform set in motion a vigorous and irreversible process which resulted in the co-ordination of pasture management planning processes by community-level organizations which are still used today". An important point made here is that where other groups had ceased operating after project completion, was that "these groups were not federated into apex institutions so as to generate "critical mass" which would give them enhanced legitimacy as village institutions and create better linkages with banks, markets and mainstream institutions". The ARRI 2016 indicates that there are systemic issues which affect sustainability and impact, and one of these is where capacity building is not tailored to include the poorest rural people.</p>	4, 54, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 88

However, ARRI also identify common challenges. The 2016 report notes that “the most recurrent issues...relate to the discontinuation of government support and the limited availability of well-articulated exit strategies, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of IFAD, government and other partners after project completion”. The ARRI 2017 learning theme recognises the challenge of ensuring governmental agencies’ fiduciary responsibility: “reliance on national systems and the uneven capacities of government institutions, particularly in procurement, is an issue for IFAD loan projects that contributes to slow implementation progress, affecting project performance. Given the diverse country contexts in which IFAD operates, addressing this situation requires tailored procedural approaches to financial compliance, driven by national institutions with IFAD’s implementation support. This allows IFAD to maintain rigour in managing its fiduciary responsibility without constraining smooth implementation.”

Country level programme evaluations provide examples of how sustainability has (or has not) been achieved:

- The Turkey CPE demonstrates that the sustainability of benefits has been poor due to weak operating arrangements and limited collaboration with the rural financial sector “Despite adequate sustainability mechanisms introduced in the projects and continued government support, the scope for sustainability is limited by weak operation and maintenance arrangements and insufficient collaboration with the rural financial sector. Sustainability is therefore rated moderately satisfactory”. Innovation and scaling up were also not improved due to poor government adoption as, “In most cases, innovations were incremental and there was limited evidence of their adoption by the Government, private sector or financial institutions. The promotion and scaling up of successful innovations have not been strength in the IFAD-supported programme in Turkey”.
- Poor sustainability was also seen in the DRC CPE due to ongoing conflict and related groups in the country: “continuity in this transformation is under threat because apex organizations (unions and federations) are still immature and their leaders do not always hold their member farmer organizations’ interests at heart”.
- However, the Ethiopia CPE was assessed as satisfactory for sustainability “with seven out of the eight projects examined over the COSOP period having met or likely to meet their development objectives”. In particular, there were three aspects which the country was seen to perform well on including: “(i) the continued policy attention from the Government which included the projects in its long-term investment plan; (ii) the strong stake that beneficiary communities have in the programmes; and (iii) the fact that the same communities are responsible for operation and maintenance of the facilities created by the projects”. Furthermore, the government was seen to be committed to the programme and valued IFAD as a development partner: “The Government has shown strong commitment to the programme, considers IFAD to be among its most important development partners and is appreciative of the collaboration. The Government is noted by all donors as having a strong mechanism in place for aid co-ordination”.
- The Bangladesh CPE was rated at moderately satisfactory overall for sustainability due to key factors including: “continuous ownership of various initiatives by the Government of Bangladesh and other stakeholders; and strong political support at various levels, including local Members of Parliament, ministries, line departments and local administrations”.

4, 54, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74,  
88

<b>MI 12.3: Interventions assessed as having strengthened the enabling environment for development</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>MI 12.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Source document</b>
<p>IFAD's RMF and corporate evaluations do not routinely explore the Fund's influence on enabling environments for development. However, some elements from the 2017 ARRI indicate that IFAD has identified approaches that should strengthen the enabling environment for development. For example, the ARRI 2017 learning theme on financial management and fiduciary responsibilities has identified five major lessons drawn from evaluation reports that would contribute to improving the enabling environment in terms of fiduciary management. A range of enabling and constraining factors have been identified in relation to scaling-up, in particular country policies. With regard to programme partnerships, and particularly public-private partnerships the ARRI found that "well-defined roles and responsibilities, with adequate incentives crafted to motivate and support smallholder empowerment, capacity development and market access were key to successful programme partnerships". IFAD has evidence that where it was identified that essential organisational elements for implementation were missing, the overall potential success of the project can be compromised: "The unplanned absence of a steering committee in [the intervention] deprived the project of adequate guidance and coherence, with repercussions on fiduciary compliance".</p>	54
<b>MI 12.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Little to no confidence</b>

## Annex 2. List of documents

All document listed below are IFAD publications or official open access documents, unless indicated otherwise.

1. IFAD (June 2015), *Annual Report for 2015*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
2. IFAD (April 2016), *IFAD Strategic Framework*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
3. IFAD (December 2014), *Results and Impact Management System Handbook*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
4. IFAD (December 2016), *Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
5. IFAD (December 2015), *IFAD's Operational Framework for Scaling Up Results*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
6. IFAD (September 2016), *Reports on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (RIDE)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
7. IFAD (October 2016), *Gender Mainstreaming in IFAD*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
8. IFAD (n.d), *An Overview of Managing for Development Results at IFAD*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
9. IFAD (2010), *IFAD Policy on the Disclosure of Documents 2010*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
10. IFAD (April 2015), *Policy for Grant Financing*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
11. IFAD (2012), *IFAD Partnership Strategy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
12. IFAD (2012), *Private Sector Strategy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
13. IFAD (2011), *IFAD Country Policy and Strategy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
14. IFAD (January 2015), *IFAD's 2015 Results-Based Programme of Work and Regular and Capital Budgets*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
15. IFAD (2017), *Divisional Management Plan (APR)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
16. IFAD (2015), *Revised IFAD Evaluation Policy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
17. IFAD (2009), *Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
18. IFAD (2008), *IFAD Policy on Enterprise Risk Management*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
19. IFAD (2005), *IFAD's Anticorruption Policy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
20. IFAD (2011), *IFAD Operational Procedures for Project and Programme Audits*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
21. IFAD (2014), *General Conditions for Agricultural Development Financing*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
22. IFAD (2015), *IFAD Procurement Handbook*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
23. IFAD (2012), *Financial Regulations of IFAD*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
24. IFAD (2013), *Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
25. IFAD (2017), *Country-Level Policy Engagement in IFAD Guide Book*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
26. IFAD (2016), *Annual Report on Investigation and Anticorruption Activities During*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
27. IFAD (2013), *Update on IFAD's Accountability Framework*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
28. IFAD (2010), *Climate Change Strategy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
29. IFAD (2012), *Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
30. IFAD (2015), *IFAD Medium Term Plan 2016-2018*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
31. IFAD (2014), *IFAD Knowledge Management Framework 2014-2018*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
32. IFAD (2016), *IFAD Knowledge Management Action Plan 2016-2018*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
33. IFAD (2017), *Corporate Performance Report Q1 Jan-Apr 2017*, International Fund for Agricultural Development
34. IFAD (2017), *Strategic Update Note (SUN): Corporate Planning and Budgeting for 2018*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.

35. IFAD (2017), *IFAD Corporate Risk Register*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
36. IFAD (2016), *IFAD's Approach to Global Engagement*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
37. IFAD (2015), *Report of the Consultation on the Tenth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
38. IFAD (2016), *Proposed Refinements to the IFAD10 Results Management Framework*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
39. IFAD (2016), *IFAD's Approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
40. IFAD (2016), *Development Effectiveness Framework*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
41. IFAD (2017), *Taking IFAD's RIMS to the Next Level*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
42. IFAD (2017), *Tailoring Operations to Country Context – A Holistic Approach*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
43. IFAD (2015), *Sovereign Borrowing Framework*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
44. IFAD (2017), *Performance Based Allocation System Formula and Procedures*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
45. IFAD (2016), *IFAD's Corporate Decentralisation Plan*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
46. IFAD (2011), *IFAD's Environmental and NRM Policy*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
47. IFAD (2016), *Project Audit Reports for Fiscal Year 2015*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
48. IFAD (2016), *IFAD Risk Based Assurance Framework and Guidelines*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
49. IFAD (n.d.), *Evaluation Manual 2015 (Including IFAD Theory of Change)* (International Fund for Agricultural Development).
50. IFAD (2016), *Measuring IFAD's Impact: Background to the IFAD9 Impact Assessment Initiative*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
51. IFAD (2016), *A Guidance Note for in-house CPMTs from a QE perspective*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
52. IFAD (2017), *HR Implementing Procedures*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
53. IFAD (2017), *Preparing the 2018 Strategic Workforce*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
54. IFAD (2017), *Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
55. IFAD (2017), *Reports on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (RIDE)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
56. IFAD (2017), *Annual Report 2016*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
57. IFAD (2012), *Bangladesh COSOP 2012*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
58. IFAD (2014), *Myanmar COSOP 2014*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
59. IFAD (2017), *Memo – Enhanced Operational Approach to RBM*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
60. IFAD (2017), *IFAD's 2017 Results-Based Programme of Work and Regular and Capital Budgets*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
61. IFAD (2014), *Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
62. IFAD (2016), *Operational Procedures on Country Strategies*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
63. IFAD (2014), *Institutional and Organizational Analysis and Capacity Strengthening: A Field Practitioner's Guide*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
64. IFAD (2017), *Financial Management and Administration Manual*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
65. IFAD (2017), *IFAD's Support to Scaling Up of Results: Evaluation Synthesis*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
66. IFAD (2016), *IFAD's Decentralization Experience: Corporate-Level Evaluation*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
67. IFAD (2016), *IFAD's Performance-based Allocation System: Corporate-Level Evaluation*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.


68. IFAD (2016), *Environment and Natural Response Management: Evaluation Synthesis*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
69. IFAD (2016), *Smallholder Access to Markets: Evaluation Synthesis*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
70. IFAD (2016), *Synthesis of IFAD9 Impact Assessment Initiative*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
71. IFAD (2015), *Bangladesh Country Programme Evaluation*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
72. IFAD (2015), *DRC Country Programme Evaluation*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
73. IFAD (2015), *Ethiopia Country Programme Evaluation*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
74. IFAD (2015), *Turkey Country Programme Evaluation*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
75. IFAD (2017), *Country-Level Dialogue Evaluation Synthesis*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
76. IFAD (2017), *What Works for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment – A Review of Practices and Results: Evaluation Synthesis*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
77. IFAD (2011), *Guidelines for Project Design Report*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
78. IFAD (2016), *PASIDP II: Final programme design report*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
79. IFAD (2016), *Update on IFAD's country presence*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
80. IFAD (2017), *PBAS formula enhancements*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
81. IFAD (2018), *Revision of the Charter of the IFAD Office of Audit and Oversight*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
82. IFAD (2016), *Collaboration among the United Nations Rome-based Agencies: Delivering on the 2030 Agenda*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
83. WFP (2017), *Progress report on Rome-based agencies collaboration*, World Food Programme.
84. IFAD (2007), *Supervision and implementation support of projects and programmes funded from IFAD loans and grants*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
85. IFAD (2017), *President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions (PRISMA)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
86. IFAD (2018), *Report of the Consultation on the Eleventh Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (IFAD11)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
87. ODI (2015), *Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP): Progress Review*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
88. IFAD (2015), *Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
89. IFAD (2018), *IFAD Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Harassment, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
90. IFAD (2017), *Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP)*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
91. IFAD (2011), *Framework for Delegation of Authority*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
92. IFAD (2017), *IFAD's 2018 Results-Based Programme of Work and Regular and Capital Budgets*, International Fund for Agricultural Development.

## Annex 3. Results of Mopan’s Partner Survey


### Response profile

**Number of survey responses: 115**

#### Number of survey responses by country:




#### Respondent type:




## Staffing


### IFAD has sufficient staffing to deliver results




### IFAD has sufficiently skilled and experienced staff



### IFAD has sufficient continuity of staff to build relationships




### IFAD staff can make critical strategic and programming decisions locally




### Managing financial resources


#### IFAD provides transparent criteria for financial resource allocation




#### IFAD provides predictable financial allocations and disbursements



### IFAD financial cooperation is coherent/not fragmented




### IFAD has flexible resources




## Interventions (programmes, projects, normative work)


### IFAD interventions are fit national programmes and results of partner countries




**IFAD interventions are tailored to the needs of the local context**




**IFAD interventions are based on a clear understanding of comparative advantage**




**IFAD can adapt or amend interventions to changes in context**




### IFAD interventions take in to account realistic assessments of national/regional capacities



### IFAD interventions appropriately manage risk in a given context




### IFAD designs and implements its interventions to sustain effect and impact over time




### Interventions (cross-cutting issues)


#### Familiarity with gender strategy of IFAD



#### Familiarity with environmental sustainability strategy of IFAD, including addressing climate change




#### Familiarity with strategy for setting out how IFAD intends to engage with good governance




### Interventions (cross-cutting issues, organisational performance)


#### IFAD promotes gender equality



#### IFAD promotes environmental sustainability/addresses climate change




#### IFAD promotes principles of good governance




## Managing relationships


### IFAD prioritises working in synergy/partnerships




### IFAD shares key information with partners on an ongoing basis




### IFAD uses regular review points with partners to identify challenges




### IFAD organisational procedures are synergised with partners




### IFAD works well on shared agendas with the other RBAs




### IFAD provides high quality inputs to country dialogue




**IFAD views are well respected in country policy dialogue**




**IFAD conducts mutual assessments of progress with national/regional partners**




**IFAD channels resources through country systems as the default option**




**IFAD builds capacity in countries where systems are not up to the required standard**



**IFAD organisational procedures do not cause delays for implementing partners**




**IFAD knowledge products are useful for my work**




## Performance management


### IFAD prioritises as results-based approach



### IFAD uses robust performance data when designing and implementing interventions




### IFAD bases its policy and strategy decisions on robust performance data




### Evidence base for planning and programming


#### IFAD has a clear statement on which of its interventions must be evaluated




#### Where required, IFAD ensures that evaluations are carried out




#### IFAD participates in joint evaluations at the country/regional level




**IFAD intervention designs contain a statement of the evidence base**




**IFAD identifies under-performing interventions**




**IFAD addresses any areas of intervention under-performance**



### IFAD follows up evaluation recommendations systematically



### IFAD learns lessons from experience rather than repeating the same mistakes







For any questions or comments, please contact:

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