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Investing in rural people

PBAS formula and procedures

Note to Evaluation Committee members

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For: Approval

Contents

Abbreviations and acronyms

CLE	corporate-level evaluation
CPIA	country policy and institutional assessment
DSF	Debt Sustainability Framework
EMC	Executive Management Committee
GNIpc	gross national income per capita
IDA	International Development Association
IFI	international financial institution
IRAI	IDA Resource Allocation Index
IVI	IFAD Vulnerability Index
LIC	low-income country
LMIC	lower-middle-income country
MDB	multilateral development bank
MFS	most fragile situation
MVA	modified volume approach
OMC	Operational Management Committee
PAD	portfolio performance and disbursement
PAR	portfolio-at-risk
PBAS	performance-based allocation system
PoLG	programme of loans and grants
PPP	potential problem project
RSP	rural sector performance
TWG	technical working group

Recommendation for approval

The Executive Board is invited to take note of the progress made by the Working Group on the Performance-Based Allocation System and Management in reviewing the PBAS formula. The Executive Board is further invited to approve that the Working Group continue its review and revision of the PBAS framework and that the final conclusions and recommendations be presented to the Executive Board for approval at its September 2017 session.

PBAS formula and procedures

I. Introduction

1. In line with the approaches adopted by all other major international financial institutions (IFIs), the Governing Council of IFAD, at its twenty-fifth anniversary session held in February 2003, approved the adoption of a performance-based allocation system (PBAS) with a two-fold purpose: to increase the effectiveness of the use of IFAD's scarce resources, and to establish a more transparent basis and predictable level of future resource flows.[1]

2. The PBAS has allowed IFAD to allocate its loan and grant resources to country programmes annually on the basis of the country score, which is determined by two components: (a) a country needs component, made up of two variables: rural population and gross national income per capita (GNIpc); and (b) a country performance component, composed of three variables: broad policy framework, portfolio performance and rural-sector performance.

3. In 2006 the Executive Board agreed to replace total population with rural population and reduce the weight assigned to rural population in the country needs component of the formula.[2] And in 2007 it adopted the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF).[3] With those exceptions, the PBAS system has remained largely unchanged. The current PBAS formula is as follows:

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[1] Document GC 26/L.4, p.9. Prior to adoption of the PBAS, IFAD allocated its resources for financing country programmes on the basis of perceived strategic opportunities for rural poverty reduction, weighted by each country's absorptive capacity.

[2] During the first PBAS allocation cycle (2005-2007), the Executive Board noted that the large variations in population among IFAD's Member States resulted in large differences in country scores and allocation. Consequently, in 2006 the Board agreed to reduce the influence of population in the formula and changed the "total population" variable in the country needs component of the formula to "rural population", with an exponent of 0.45 instead of 0.75. The new level was regarded as a "point of balance", where population still carried significant influence as a determinant of "needs" in the formula, but at the same time allowed performance and GNI per capita to have a strong role (document EB 2006/89/R.48/Rev.1, p.1).

[3] The DSF was introduced to govern the form of IFAD's financial assistance to countries eligible for highly concessional lending and to enable Member States to reduce the risk of high future debt levels. In terms of debt sustainability, IFAD uses the country classification developed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in their country debt sustainability analyses. According to the DSF, the IFAD extends financial support to projects and programmes governed by the PBAS on the following basis: (i) for countries with low debt sustainability: 100 per cent grant; (ii) for countries with medium debt sustainability: 50 per cent grant and 50 per cent loan; and (iii) for countries with high debt sustainability: 100 per cent loan (document EB 2007/90/R.2). Implementation of the DSF foresees application of a modified volume approach (MVA), which at IFAD involves a discount of 5 per cent of the value of the DSF grants extended. All proceeds of the MVA discount are redistributed according to PBAS allocation rules to all countries. IFAD committed itself in 2010 to "prepare and present a paper on its experience and the experience of other multilateral institutions since their adoption of the DSF, with regard to actual and estimated net losses in service charge payments, and present proposals on future approaches to compensation as required" in the context of the Consultation on the Eleventh Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (IFAD11) (document EB 2010/100/R.28/Rev.1).

Box 1
Current PBAS formula

$$\underbrace{Ruralpop^{0.45} \times GNIpc^{-0.25}}_{\text{Country needs component}} \times \underbrace{(0.2\ CPIA + 0.45\ \ RSP + 0.35\ PAR)^{2}}_{\text{Country performance component}}$$

Note: CPIA = country policy and institutional assessment; RSP = rural-sector performance score; PAR = portfolio-at-risk.

4. Many multilateral development banks (MDBs) and the Global Environment Facility allocate concessional financing through performance-based systems. These systems share common variables, including: (a) a population measure, representing the extent of need; (b) GNIpc, as a measure of poverty; (c) a measure of the quality of country policies and institutions; and (d) a measure reflecting the performance of MDB-financed operations in the country. While, over time, some MDBs have added further variables, and while the methodology underpinning the common variables may differ (as in the case of portfolio performance variables), a substantial degree of harmonization exists across MDB allocation systems. MDBs share lessons and innovations in their PBA systems through the MDB working group on PBAS, of which IFAD is an active member.

5. The corporate-level evaluation (CLE) of IFAD's performance-based allocation system (document EB 2016/117/R.5), conducted by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) in 2015 and 2016, found that the PBAS has enhanced the Fund's credibility as an IFI by providing a more transparent, flexible and predictable approach to resource allocation.[4] It also pointed out areas for further improvement regarding two main topics: the formula and the PBAS management process.[5]

6. At its April 2016 session, the Executive Board acknowledged the findings of the evaluation and agreed that the PBAS needed adjustment to better fit IFAD's mandate, role and evolving policies and the IFAD Strategic Framework 2016-2025. The Board further underlined that the system should be able to assess food and nutrition security, economic and social inclusion, climate change and other vulnerabilities, and fragility, as these indicators would contribute to a better reflection of rural poverty.[6]

7. The general agreement was that the revised PBAS should be kept simple and easy to understand. To this end, the process was divided into two complementary phases. A first, normative phase was to assess the relevance and effectiveness of each variable in capturing country needs and country performance and the PBAS management process. A second, more quantitative phase, would consist of submitting a revised formula to include a specific proposal on variables and weights and the final PBAS mathematical equation.

8. In line with the spirit of the CLE recommendation to enhance learning and ownership of the PBAS process within the organization, Management established a cross-departmental technical working group (TWG)[7] in May 2016 to work on the PBAS review, with the objective of taking advantage of in-house expertise and

[4] CLE ratings for each evaluation parameter were as follows: relevance: 4.6, effectiveness: 4.2, efficiency: 4.1.
[5] See pp. 70-75 of the CLE and the associated response of IFAD Management, pp. 4-5 (document EB 2016/117/R.5/Add.1).
[6] Minutes of the 117th Session of the IFAD Executive Board.
[7] The Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA), Environment and Climate Division (ECD), Partnership and Resource Mobilization Office (PRM), Treasury Services Division (TRE), Financial Management Division (FMD), Strategy and Knowledge Department (SKD), and Programme Management Department (PMD) divisions nominated focal points for the TWG, who are responsible for liaising with their organizational units to facilitate their active engagement in the PBAS fine-tuning.

making the PBAS review a participatory process. This group has worked under the guidance of the Operations Management Committee (OMC) and the Executive Management Committee (EMC), with oversight by the Executive Board Working Group on the Performance-Based Allocation System (PBAS Working Group).[8] In its work, the TWG has been guided by four principles: simplicity, efficiency, transparency and focus on rural poverty,[9] and has sought to make relevant adjustments to the formula and allocations, in line with the understanding within the PBAS Working Group.

9. The results of the first phase were reviewed by the Executive Board in December 2016.[10] At that session, the Executive Board endorsed Management's proposal to incorporate the IFAD Vulnerability Index (IVI) within the needs component of the formula,[11] and to eliminate the International Development Association (IDA) Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) score – which is based on the results of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) exercise covering IDA-eligible countries – from the country performance component of the formula.

10. During the second phase of the review, Management has finalized the enhancement of two of the current variables – the rural-sector performance (RSP) score, and the portfolio-at-risk (PAR) value – and refined the IVI calculation methodology. Management also made necessary adjustments to the formula to accommodate inclusion of the IVI and exclusion of the IRAI, reviewing the weights of the individual variables and the two formula components, and exploring options for allocating resources more effectively to countries in fragile situations.

11. This document summarizes the main findings of the second phase and proposes changes to the formula weights for Executive Board consideration, including the final PBAS mathematical equation. Lastly, it outlines enhancements to the effectiveness and efficiency of the PBAS management process and governance.

II. Finalizing variable enhancements[12]

12. The CLE recommended refining the RSP score variable by revisiting its underlying indicators and questions in order to capture IFAD's focus and mandate in the country allocation process. Management initiated refinement of the RSP assessment during phase one and concluded it during phase two. This process is described below and details can be found in appendix I. In relation to the PAR, the CLE assessed positively the fact that this variable is based on a well-established measure (projects-at-risk) that is part of IFAD's self-evaluation system. This PAR feature remains unchanged. Instead, Management has made changes in how the PAR is incorporated within the PBAS formula, to enhance the objectivity of the process.

A. Rural-sector performance assessment

13. The RSP assessment is designed to provide a measure of the performance of countries' policy frameworks in areas applicable to the rural poor. The proposed changes to RSP assessment are described in annex I of the "Approach to the review of the performance-based allocation system", reviewed by the Executive Board in December 2016.[13] The changes are in line with the recommendation of the CLE of IFAD's PBAS to revisit RSP indicators and questions, so as to "reflect emerging

[8] See document EB 2009/97/R.48/Rev.1 for the PBAS Working Group's terms of reference. The group held two meetings in 2016, on 10 June and 20 September, and two in 2017, on 23 January and 3 March. The current composition of the working group is as follows: France, Ireland, Japan, Sweden (List A); Nigeria, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (List B); Ghana (List C1); China (List C2); and the Dominican Republic (List C3).
[9] See document EB 2016/119/R.5 for further description.
[10] Document EB 2016/119/R.5.
[11] The introduction of the IVI within the needs component of the formula addressed the CLE recommendation to strengthen the rural poverty focus, in particular by assessing how measures of vulnerability and fragility, income inequality and non-income poverty can be included.
[12] Annex I contains a full description of all variables included in the revised formula.
[13] Document EB 2016/119/R.5.

priorities, opportunities and challenges in the rural sector".[14] They also reflect the decision to eliminate the CPIA, given that unavailability of the CPIA score for numerous countries currently leads to distortions in the formula, and that strong correlation exists between the ratings associated with the questions within the RSP and CPIA.[15] The detailed questionnaire and scoring guidance for the enhanced RSP assessment are provided in appendix I.

14. The enhanced RSP assessment: (i) maintains the focus on rural people, policies and institutions that the previous version embodied; (ii) maintains all categories of questions in the current RSP assessment, albeit in a more condensed fashion to reduce repetition; (iii) improves questions to eliminate the high degree of correlation between questions and subquestions present in the current version; (iv) updates questions to reflect current best practice and new metrics and indicators (i.e. on rural financial inclusion and policies for gender equality); and (v) adds new questions responding to IFAD's current business model and strategic objectives on the environment, climate change and nutrition.

15. Moreover, enhanced RSP assessment provides better guidance regarding data sources to be used to enhance objectivity, and sets forth a more robust process for peer review. Since RSP ratings reflect the quality of policies and institutions that typically do not change radically over short periods of time, and with a view to efficiency, as part of the enhancement process it is proposed that the RSP assessment take place once per replenishment cycle, in the year before the cycle begins.

16. Within the PBAS, the enhanced RSP assessment will affect country allocations through assessment of a country's performance in establishing a policy and institutional framework conducive to sustained poverty reduction, taking into account the multidimensionality of rural poverty. Moreover, a methodology is being developed to enable assessment of country performance over time. This is an innovative feature, which will be tested when the first enhanced RSP scoring takes place. Moreover, RSP assessment will also provide an opportunity to engage in policy dialogue with country authorities, notably during the design and revision of country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs) and country strategy notes.

B. Portfolio-at-risk variable

17. All major IFIs use the project-at-risk concept as a basis for annual assessment of their portfolios based on various implementation aspects. This assessment results in a rating used to generate the overall portfolio-at-risk (PAR) value included in their PBASs. This is also the case at IFAD.

18. The Fund is currently revising the criteria it uses to identify problem projects, as part of the ongoing enhancement of the IFAD Supervision and Implementation Support (SIS) Guidelines. For the purposes of the PBAS, key principles concerning this variable comprise: (i) with a view to efficiency, the process for identifying projects at risk remains within the organization's procedures for assessing and reporting on project performance; (ii) the process is explicit, transparent and consistent; and (iii) the frequency of updating ensures that changes in portfolio performance can be reflected in the yearly PBAS allocation exercise. The approach Management has adopted in updating the project-at-risk concept within the SIS Guidelines is in line with these principles.

[14] Document EB 2016/117/R.5.

[15] Document EB 2016/117/R.5, appendix, p.72, paragraph 307: "… while the evaluation recognises that the CPIA is a measure of a country's broader policy and institutional environment, whereas the RSP assesses the policy and institutional environment in the agriculture and rural sector, there is a close relationship between the scores of these two variables. Hence, given IFAD's mandate and focus on the rural sector, and assuming the RSP indicators and process is improved moving forward, it could be argued that using both variables in the IFAD PBAS might not be so compelling."

19. Currently, in order to factor the performance of IFAD-financed ongoing operations into the PBAS, IFAD uses a transformation matrix that takes into account individual project performance (“not at risk”, “potential problem project” “actual problem project”) and transforms it into a 1-6 rating scale. In doing this, the transformation matrix takes the overall portfolio size into account. A three-year weighted average of this value is used in the PBAS calculation to prevent high year-on-year variations.[16]

20. The proposed methodology for producing the enhanced portfolio performance and disbursement (PAD) value is outlined in detail in annex II. It diverges from the current methodology in three aspects: (i) it excludes potential problem projects (PPPs) from the calculation; (ii) it includes a measure of disbursement performance at the portfolio level, so that a low disbursement rate will result in a lower PAR value; and (iii) it takes into account the age of individual projects in the portfolio, as we know that the pace of disbursement of younger projects is slower, and that it increases as projects age.

21. PPPs are excluded so as not to penalize early identification of potential challenges and to incentivize mobilization of additional operational support before projects become an actual risk. The inclusion of a disbursement measure underlines the ability to disburse resources promptly and efficiently, to finance project implementation, as a predictor of project success. Thus the PAR rating for portfolios that lag behind in disbursing their financing will be reduced. In doing this, the age of the portfolio will be taken into consideration. The proposed methodology ensures objectivity in the calculation process, as it is based on a formula. In line with the current methodology, the three-year PAR average will be used in the PBAS formula to reduce volatility in year-on-year allocations.

III. Developing the formula

22. In developing the enhanced formula, Management faced three initial challenges: (i) how to address exclusion of the CPIA from the country performance component; (ii) how to include the IVI in the needs component; and (iii) normalizing the rural population variable. In addition, when building scenarios to simulate the impact of the options tested on the overall distribution of allocations, Management applied some clearly defined constraints:

    (a) Application of a minimum allocation (US$1 million per year);

    (b) Application of a maximum allocation (5 per cent of each year’s total PBAS allocation);

    (c) Application of a DSF MVA;

    (d) Two-thirds of core resources allocated under highly concessional terms;

    (e) 40-45 per cent of core resources to be allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.

23. The application of minimum and maximum allocations is in line with current PBAS methodology. The application of the MVA is part of the DSF methodology approved by the Executive Board.[17] The share of resources to be allocated on highly concessional terms was determined in the Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing approved by the Governing Council in 2013.[18] The share of resources to be

[16] Document EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1, annex II.
[17] Document EB 2007/90/R.2.
[18] Document GC 36/L.9.

allocated to sub-Saharan Africa is a Ninth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (IFAD9) commitment.[19]

24. In addition, in line with the aim of the PBAS review, Management has assessed whether the tested options provide additional resources to the most vulnerable countries and to those with the most fragile situations (MFS).[20]

25. At the fifth meeting of the PBAS Working Group, Management shared a formula that, when tested on the IFAD10 PoLG, provides effective solutions for inclusion of new or revision of existing formula variables, while at the same time complying with the constraints described above. The detailed results of the testing and scenarios produced are shown in appendix II, and the formula is as follows:

$$\left.\left[\, (\text{Rural Population})^{0.40} \times \text{GNI}_{pc}^{-0.25} \times (1+\text{IVI}) \,\right] \times \quad\right\} \text{NEEDS}$$
$$\left.\left[\, (0.65\text{RSP} + 0.35\text{PAR})^{2} \,\right] \quad\right\} \text{PERFORMANCE}$$

26. The following sections describe the testing done to arrive at this initial formula proposal.

27. Eliminating the CPIA from the country performance component. During phase I of the PBAS review process, Management tested the impact of simply eliminating the CPIA from the formula. As is explained in document EB 2016/119/R.5, this resulted in significant allocation variations for those countries that score well on macroeconomic stability, which the CPIA tends to reward. To overcome this, Management decided to fold the relevant CPIA macro dimensions into the revised RSP score (as explained in section II above). Macroeconomic questions now make up about 25 per cent of the RSP questionnaire. Second, in order to maintain the current overall weight of the country performance component in the formula, Management added the weight the CPIA currently holds within the formula (0.2) to the RSP weight (0.45). For testing purposes, therefore, the weight of the current RSP exponent was increased to 0.65.

28. Testing shows that increasing the weight of the current RSP variable to compensate for the CPIA removal substantially reduces the impact on allocations distribution obtained by removing the CPIA (other things being equal) making this a viable solution. Moreover, merging the two variables has the advantage of simplifying the formula, as recommend by the CLE.

29. Including the IVI. Management considered two methods for including the IVI in the PBAS calculation process. Both were assessed based on the impact they have on allocations to the most vulnerable countries.[21] First, Management tested the use of the IVI as a discount factor.[22] This resulted in a negligible impact on allocations of about one per cent overall. A second test was then done to include the IVI within the country needs component of the formula. By doing so, allocations to the 40 most vulnerable countries increased by some 10 per cent overall. This is thus considered a more efficient solution for channelling a more substantive amount of resources to the most vulnerable countries.

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[19] Document GC 35/L.4: "In IFAD9, the Fund's operational focus will continue to be on low-income countries, where the need for development assistance remains most critical. Given the good prospects in sub-Saharan Africa to increase agricultural productivity and achieve the MDGs, and considering the urgency to address the impact of climate change, during the IFAD9 period and in accordance with its performance-based allocation system (PBAS), IFAD expects to spend 40-50 per cent of its resources in this region."

[20] All testing used the IFAD10 allocations as a reference, without the capping applied by Management to countries with portfolio performance or absorptive capacity constraints.

[21] These are the countries in the two top quintiles of IVI scores. The IVI ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the highest vulnerability.

[22] This test replicated for the IVI the methodology used when applying the MVA to countries benefiting from the DSF.

Box 2
IFAD Vulnerability Index

The IVI was created to better reflect the multidimensionality of rural poverty in the country needs component of the PBAS formula. Thus indicators within the IVI were selected to reflect IFAD's specific focus on poor rural people. In broad terms, the IVI provides an indication of well-being in rural areas, factoring in the effects of climate change. The indicators are organized around the three elements that determine climate vulnerability (exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity), and each of them can be associated to one or more of the IVI focus areas (food security, nutrition, inequality and climate vulnerability). The IVI will be produced once per PBAS cycle, to feed into the first-year allocation calculations.

30. Normalizing the rural population variable. The CLE of IFAD's PBAS found that the rural population is by far the indicator with the largest range of variability, and is also the variable in IFAD's PBAS formula that has the strongest correlation with country allocations.[23] It also noted that the current weight of this variable results in allocations to the largest Member States that are greater than the established maximum allocation. This leads to the application of maximum capping (5 per cent of the total yearly PBAS allocation), which introduces some degree of arbitrariness into the formula.[24]

31. Management tested two methods for normalizing, i.e. reducing the variability, of the rural population variable. First, it tested substituting the rural population with its logarithmic measure.[25] This resulted in substantially reduced or increased allocations for all countries,[26] as all allocations converged towards a reduced range of allocations, as shown in figure 1. While this achieves the result of eliminating minimum and maximum allocations, it flattens all allocations, resulting in small allocation differences between countries with small and large rural populations.

32. Management also tested normalizing this variable by modifying its exponent, which currently stands at 0.45. Tests were carried out by gradually changing the exponent by 0.05 points, reaching a minimum exponent of 0.20. The results of the testing show that the best performing scenario is that in which a 0.40 exponent is applied to the rural population, as figure 1 shows. The advantages of this solution are: (i) maximum allocations become aligned to about 5 per cent of the total resource envelope; this means that there is no longer a need to apply the 5 per cent capping in all cases;[27] (ii) the lowest allocations reach US$1.5 million per year, without the need to increase them as is currently the case to reach the present minimum allocation;[28] (iii) allocations increase for countries that currently have minimum allocations due to their small rural population; and (iv) the formula remains simple. Management thus proposes to reduce the rural population variable exponent to 0.40.

[23] Document EB 2016/117/R.5, appendix - annex IV.
[24] However, the CLE recognizes that the distortion created by determining a maximum allocation (in percentage terms) ensures the concerned country a relatively sizable allocation, but, at the same time, frees up some resources for other recipient Member States. The CLE finds that this is an important feature of the IFAD PBAS, given that all recipient countries are potentially included.
[25] As explained in the CLE, "… this form of the population variable has the natural effect of making the distribution of population values closer to linear – that is, it reduces the range of variation and can bring allocations for the largest countries sufficiently in line to avoid the need for an artificial cap".
[26] Document EB 2016/119/R.5, pp. 4-5.
[27] It is important to note that the need for a maximum percentage ceiling for allocations will remain, as the rural population is a variable that can grow indefinitely.
[28] Currently, the minimum allocation stands at US$1 million per year.

Figure 1
Options for normalizing the rural population variable



IV. Sensitivity analysis

33. The sensitivity analysis is a set of statistical tools that can be used to assess different aspects of a model.[29] The aim of the sensitivity analysis is to answer the question "what if?". It assesses the robustness of a formula to potential shocks and future changes in the values of the variables within it. In the case of the PBAS, since it is not a model but a multiplicative formula, the sensitivity approach has been used to examine the extent to which the uncertainty (or potential change) of each variable affects the outcome of the formula.

34. Since the PBAS foresees that the distribution of allocations is based on the country score calculated through the PBAS formula, Management tested how allocations changed in relation to changes applied (see table 1) in turn to:

(a) All variables – test (i);

(b) Individual variables – tests (ii) and (iv);

(c) The size of the PoLG – test (iii); and

(d) A combined set of variables, namely rural population and GNIpc – test (v).

35. The set of hypothetical changes to the formula tested through simulations is described in table 1. When assessing the results of each sensitivity analysis, the impact on the share of allocations to countries borrowing on highly concessional terms was considered, together with the share of core resources allocated to sub-Saharan Africa, to the most vulnerable countries and to countries with the most fragile situations. The formula proved to be stable in all cases, while it is very sensitive to changes at the individual country level. This is a positive result, as it

[29] In the process of assessing the most suitable model for a set of observations, sensitivity analysis is commonly used to determine: (i) which parameters require additional research for strengthening the knowledge base, thereby reducing output uncertainty; (ii) which parameters are insignificant and can be eliminated from the final model; (iii) which inputs contribute most to output variability; (iv) which parameters are most highly correlated with the output; and (v) once the model is in production use, what consequence results from changing a given input parameter. D.M. Hamby, *A review of techniques for parameter sensitivity analysis of environmental models*, Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, vol. 32, pp. 135-154 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1994).

means that country allocations reflect changes in both needs and performance variables, even though they do not translate into corresponding changes in allocations by country groupings, since countries compete among themselves within the PBAS exercise.

Table 1
Sensitivity analysis of the proposed new PBAS formula

Test no.	*Change applied*	*Aim of test*	*Methodology*	*Results*
i.	Shocks on all variables at the same time	Assess stability in terms of allocations of the PBAS over time and its responsiveness to realistic changes	All variables have been shocked by an amount proportionate to their historical 15-year trend (GNI/pc and rural population) or to their actual range (1-2 for IVI, 1-6 for RSP and PAR), in both directions (±)	The formula is stable as a system and maintains the overall distribution level among country groupings
ii.	Shocks on one variable at a time	Assess elasticity of single variables, i.e. how each individual variable impacts allocations to country grouping	Variables have been shocked, one at a time, by: • GNI/pc and rural population: 3 times the annual growth rate for each country • IVI: ± 0.3 • RSP: ± 0.9 • PAR: ± 1.7	Shocks to single variables do not affect the distribution of allocations to country groupings
iii.	Shocks to PoLG size	Assess implications of increases or decreases of the PoLG envelope for the overall allocations' distribution	IFAD10 PoLG has been shocked by ± 13% and 25%, which are the amounts that will be considered within IFAD11 replenishment discussions	The formula is stable at the distribution level, but it implies considerable changes at the country level
iv.	Shocks on one variable at a time for a selected pool of countries	Assess responsiveness of allocations to changes in single variables at the country level	The universe of active countries has been split into three groups around the median allocation: upper, median and lower. One country from each group was shocked to set a representative sample	Allocations are highly sensitive to shocks to single variables
v.	Shocks to rural population and GNI/pc variables	Assess stability of the formula over time	As rural population and GNIpc are the variables influencing final allocations the most, a trend analysis has been conducted to forecast their future values in the next two replenishment cycles. The estimated values were tested within the proposed formula, *ceteris paribus.*	The formula shows stability over time as a system, while fluctuations are foreseeable at the country level.

V. Balancing the needs and performance components

36. The CLE of IFAD's PBAS found that the current PBAS formula is needs driven, and final allocations are determined 65 per cent by the needs variables and 35 per cent by the performance variables. It recommended reassessing the balance between the country needs and country performance components of the PBAS formula. Management agreed that it would assess the formula with the intention of strengthening its effects as an incentive to better performance.[30] In its response to the CLE, Management noted, however, that "although counterintuitive (because this is a composite formula), a larger (or even much larger) weight in the formula for one variable (or component) does not necessarily imply that countries that have better scores in that variable receive more resources, even if that variable scores better than any other variable in the formula. Whether the effect is positive or negative depends on the ratio of the score of that variable to the scores of other variables in comparison to other countries".[31]

37. Management's own analysis confirmed the needs-driven nature of the formula. However, it also proved the consideration made in the Management response. Changes to the weights of individual variables or the weights of the components do not lead to a linear result in a single direction. This is due to the multiplicative nature of the formula, since the result obtained for each country will affect the

[30] Document EB 2016/117/R.5/Add.1.
[31] Ibid.

result achieved for every other country included in the calculation, in an interdependent relationship.

38. Thus there are limitations in trying to separate the effect of needs and performance subcomponents in determining the final allocations, as the multiplicative nature of the formula adds a combined effect to the isolated contribution of each component. Hence, the results presented in this section regarding the balance between needs and performance constitute an estimate. Based on this, some considerations can be made regarding the effect of changes to the weight of formula variables on allocations distribution among groups of countries.

39. Four scenarios are presented below for Executive Board consideration.[32] The scenarios evolve from the formula presented to the PBAS Working Group at its fifth meeting. They were developed by gradually increasing the weight of the country performance component, which was at the core of the recommendations of the CLE on PBAS. The purpose of this was to increase the elasticity of the performance component in all proposed scenarios.

40. All four scenarios proposed comply with IFAD commitments in terms of financing on highly concessional terms, and resource allocation to sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, for each scenario, the impact on allocations distribution was assessed based on country income categories. The share of allocations to countries with MFS was also assessed.

41. The charts on the left, presented below, show the distribution of allocations (in percentage terms) by needs and performance quintiles under each scenario. The needs quintiles (1 = neediest) are mapped horizontally and the performance quintiles (1 = best performers) vertically. The ideal distribution would see a higher concentration of resources around the neediest and best-performing countries. The charts on the right show the distribution of resources resulting from each scenario to low-income countries (LICs), lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), upper-middle-income countries and countries with MFS.

42. Scenario 1. SC1 uses the formula discussed at the fifth meeting of the PBAS Working Group in January 2017:

$$[RurPop^{0.4} \text{ X } GNIpc^{-0.25} \text{ X } (1 + IVI)] \text{ x } (0.65 \text{ X } RSP + 0.35 \text{ X } PAD)^2$$

43. Similarly to the current PBAS formula, in SC1 formula allocations are still driven by needs. The needs variables determine 56 per cent of the allocations in this scenario, and the remaining 44 per cent are determined by the performance variables. Moreover, 82 per cent of resources are allocated to LICs and LMICs.

Chart 1
SC1 needs, performance, income and MFS allocations distribution (% of total)



[32] The proposed scenarios use the 2015 RSP assessment ratings, and the new PAD.

44. Scenario 2. In SC2 the needs component maintains a comparatively higher weight (54%) but performance matters significantly (46%) through an increase in the weight of the PAD value, which assumes a higher weight than the RSP for the first time, enhancing the focus on the performance of IFAD-financed operations:

$$[RurPop^{0.4} \times GNIpc^{-0.25} \times (1 + IVI)] \times (0.40 \times RSP + 0.60 \times PAD)^{2}$$

45. This shift to a more operational (rather than policies and institutions) focus has no impact on allocations distribution by income group, compared to SC1, but provides a stronger incentive for improved performance in the performance variable that is more related to IFAD-financed operations. While this scenario is a step in the direction of incentivizing better performance, the allocations distributions by quintile shows that there is still a significant concentration of resources away from the convergence of needs and performance.

Chart 2
SC2 needs, performance, income and MFS allocations (% of total)



46. Scenario 3. Following the path of rebalancing components, two further scenarios have been tested. SC3 shifts the weight between the components of the formula towards performance, while maintaining a good balance between the two (48 per cent needs and 52 per cent performance). In the formula this is reflected through a further increase in the PAD and a substantial increase in the exponent of the performance component, as follows:

$$[RurPop^{0.4} \times GNIpc^{-0.25} \times (1 + IVI)] \times (0.20 \times RSP + 0.80 \times PAD)^{4}$$

47. As we move in this direction, allocation distribution shifts towards best performers while allocating a substantial share of resources to the neediest, as can be seen in chart 3. Moreover, because of the increased weight of the PAD, this scenario provides a clear incentive to country and project teams to improve the performance of the IFAD-financed portfolio by enhancing project implementation. For all these reasons, Management proposes that the Executive Board consider approving the formula associated with scenario 3.

Chart 3
SC3 needs, performance, income and MFS allocations (% of total)



48. Scenario 4. The last scenario, SC4, is the one with the strongest focus on performance, with the weight of the performance component considerably greater than that of the needs component (55 per cent and 45 per cent respectively). The formula for this scenario maintains the substantial increase in the weight of the PAR applied in SC3 and doubles the exponent of the performance component as a whole:

$$[RurPop^{0.4} \text{ X } GNIpc^{-0.25} \text{ X } (1 + IVI)] \times (0.20 \text{ X } RSP + 0.80 \text{ X } PAD)^{8}$$

49. While this scenario shares some of the positive features of scenario 3, its increased focus on performance rewards best performers, but reduces the allocations to the neediest countries.

Chart 4
SC4 needs, performance, income and MFS allocations (% of total)



VI. PBAS management process and governance

50. In its response to the CLE of IFAD's PBAS, Management committed to a series of enhancements in relation to the PBAS management and governance process.

51. Reporting to the Executive Board. In 2016, the depth of reporting deepened to enhance the transparency of the system. In addition to reporting on country scores, allocations and RSP ratings, the annual PBAS report to the Board included information on active countries, the capping rationale, the use of maximum and minimum allocations, the countries that entered and exited the cycle, and reallocations.[33] Management will continue to provide the Board with this broader overview of PBAS implementation.

52. Governance. The CLE also recommended that IFAD should take a more corporate approach to the PBAS in general. Such an approach has been in place since 2014, when for the first time PBAS allocations were approved by IFAD's main coordination bodies, the OMC and EMC. This practice will continue in the future.

53. RSP update. As regards the processes associated with the PBAS, the CLE recommended that the RSP score be done less frequently, rather than on an annual basis as is current practice. Management has embraced this recommendation, since countries' policies and institutional environment typically do not change radically over a short period of time. The RSP will thus be updated once per PBAS cycle.

54. Minimum, maximum and capped allocations. Other practices related to PBAS management that will continue regard the establishment of minimum and maximum allocations, and the capping of countries that are unlikely to absorb their entire allocation. The use of maximum allocations will ensure that member countries continue to receive allocations adequate to the size of their rural populations, while also preventing excessive absorption by countries with the largest rural populations. Minimum allocations will ensure that a meaningful operational programme can be developed for smaller countries.

55. Management's discretion in capping countries' allocations will be maintained, but the principles by which such discretion can be applied will be made explicit in the PBAS manual that Management will produce once the PBAS review process has been completed. In line with current practice, such principles will include issues related to absorption capacity, portfolio performance, or severe delays in the implementation of the existing portfolio. Management will provide details of countries capped and the reasons why in the annual report to the Executive Board on PBAS implementation.

56. Learning. The CLE recommended that IFAD generate more PBAS-related learning. In December 2016 Management organized the first learning event on PBAS for IFAD staff. As mentioned, once the review process has been completed, Management will develop a PBAS manual for internal and external dissemination to enhance transparency in and knowledge of PBAS allocations and the management process.

57. PBAS information technology system and simulator. To strengthen the transparency of the allocation calculation process, Management is working in partnership with the Information and Communications Technology Division team on the development of an IT system that would calculate allocations automatically. Moreover, it is planning to expand the functionality of the system to allow partner countries to simulate the allocation process and resulting country allocations.

58. The DSF and the MVA. The working of the DSF at IFAD is currently being reviewed in the context of the IFAD11 Replenishment Consultation. This may result in modifications to the current MVA applied in the PBAS to countries classified as red and yellow in debt sustainability analysis.

[33] Documents EB 2016/119/R.2/Rev.1 and EB 2016/119/R.2/Add.1.

VII. Conclusion

59. The PBAS Working Group, at its sixth meeting, took note of:

- The four scenarios presented above, which reflect differing weights of the agreed variables in the revised PBAS formula;
- Management’s explanation that all four formulas enhance the focus on performance when compared to the current formula, while reflecting different balances between the needs and performance components.
- Management’s confirmation that all scenarios are in line with commitments in relation to financing on highly concessional terms and to sub-Saharan Africa.
- Management’s recommendation that scenario 3 be approved as the option that provides a better balance between the needs and performance components (48 per cent for needs and 52 per cent for performance) and tends to concentrate the allocations on the countries that need them most and that perform best, as shown in chart 3.
- Management’s view that the increased weight of the PAD together with the increase in the exponent of the performance component provide a clear incentive to country and project teams to improve the performance of IFAD-financed portfolios.

60. The PBAS Working Group recognized the hard work done by Management in undertaking the analysis and developing the scenarios. It acknowledged Management’s proposal regarding scenario 3 and recommended that the Executive Board extend the time frame for finalizing the PBAS review so that it can be discussed for approval at the Executive Board in September 2017, in order to deepen the analysis of a few specific issues.[34]

VIII. The way forward

61. Moving forward – and to finalize management commitments in relation to the PBAS review – Management will continue working to automate the calculation process, facilitate simulations and aggregate information in dashboard format. It will also produce the PBAS manual, which will describe the calculation process and managerial rules in order to increase consistency and transparency. Moreover, Management will issue procedures and user guidance on the new rural sector performance scores to be piloted before IFAD11. Lastly, it will work on operationalization of the definition of “most fragile situations” to ensure consistent application and adequate linkages with the PBAS.

[34] The areas to undergo further analysis will be indicated in the minutes of the sixth meeting of the PBAS Working Group.

Variables included in the revised PBAS formula

	Rural population	*Gross national income per capita*	*IFAD Vulnerability Index*	*Rural-sector performance*	*Portfolio performance and disbursement*
Description	Rural population of a country	Per capita gross national income	A vulnerability measure focusing on rural poverty, food security, nutrition and climate change	Rural-sector performance score, ranging from 1 to 6	Portfolio-and-disbursement rating, ranging from 1 to 6
What it captures	Magnitude of needs related to the number of affected people	Level of average individual wealth	Susceptibility of a country to key enablers of rural poverty	Level of efficiency of policies specifically related to the rural sector and of policies at the macro level that have a direct influence on it	Level of risk for projects in the country portfolio
What it measures	Proportion of a country's total population that actually lives in rural areas	Per capita income per year, expressed in United States dollars	This index of 12 equally weighted indicators measures rural vulnerability in terms of exposure, sensitivity and lack of adaptive capacity to endogenous and exogenous causes and/or events	Responsiveness of policies to the needs of poor rural people under six aspects, through 19 questions, whose average is the final score	Incidence of actual problem projects in the portfolio, taking into account their size, age and level of disbursement
Source	World Bank, World Development Indicators	World Bank, World Development Indicators – Atlas method, US$ conversion	IFAD	IFAD	IFAD

Portfolio performance and disbursement (PAD) variable

1. The current measure of the performance of the IFAD portfolio takes into account diverse aspects/criteria in order to rate projects:

   (i) "Actual problem project" (APP) status;

   (ii) "Potential problem project" (PPP) status;

   (iii) "Not at risk" status;

   (iv) Time persistence of the status;

   (v) Sensitivity to the portfolio size, in terms of number of projects.

2. In order to factor the performance of IFAD-financed ongoing operations into the PBAS, IFAD uses a transformation matrix for the diverse possible performance statuses, as shown in table 1, and translates this into a 1-6-scale rating.

Table 1
Transformation matrix used to score PAR before the review

Portfolio performance rating	*Number of active projects held by borrower*		
	1 project	*2 projects*	*3 projects or more*
6	Project rated "not at risk" for two or more consecutive years	Both projects rated "not at risk" for two or more consecutive years	PAR proportion 0% for two or more consecutive years
5	Project rated "not at risk"	Both projects rated "not at risk" (N+N)	PAR proportion 0%
4	Project rated "potential problem project", but with a sum of implementation progress/development objective scores < 4	One project rated "not at risk" and one rated "potential problem project" (N+P)	PAR proportion 0-34%
3	Project rated "potential problem project" and a sum of implementation progress/likelihood of achieving the development objective scores = 4 (2+2)	Both projects rated "potential problem projects" or one project rated "not at risk" and one rated "actual problem project" (P+P or N+A)	PAR proportion 35-67%
2	Project rated "actual problem project"	One project rated "potential problem project" and one rated "actual problem project" or both projects rated "actual problem project" (P+A or A+A)	PAR proportion 68-100%
1	Project rated "actual problem project" for two or more consecutive years	One project rated "potential problem project" and one rated "actual problem project" or both projects rated "actual problem project" for two or more consecutive years	PAR proportion 100% for two or more consecutive years

3. The proposed new PAR calculation represents a shift from the qualitative approach based on the transformation matrix in table 1, to a formula, which is simpler and based on quantitative measures.

The proposed formula

4. The proposed methodology introduces two main changes:

   (a) It excludes PPPs, so as not to penalize the early identification of potential challenges and to incentivize the mobilization of additional operational support before projects become an actual risk;

   (b) It introduces a measure of the disbursement rate, since the ability to disburse resources promptly and efficiently, to finance project implementation, is considered a predictor of project success.

Calculation of the components of the PAD measure

5. APPs. Given the exclusion of PPPs, the performance of a given country's active portfolio is measured accounting only for APPs, calculated as follows:

- Let us assume that x is the number of APPs in an active portfolio composed of p country projects (p = portfolio size);
- The APPs ratio is then defined as x/p;
- The rating of the APPs variable is calculated as (1-x/p), so that the highest performance value is 1 (when none of the projects is labelled as an "APP") and the lowest is 0 (when all projects are "APPs").

$$APP = \left(1 - \frac{x}{p}\right)$$

6. Portfolio size. The suggested PAD rating methodology differentiates between small and large portfolios, so that the PAD reflects the varying sizes through a logistic function. The function provides a smooth differentiation of the maximum ratings a country can get according to the size of its active portfolio. Thus the function gradually increases the PAD rating with respect to the number of active projects in a given country portfolio, rewarding bigger portfolio sizes, but without penalizing small portfolios.

$$Portfolio\ size = \left(\frac{6}{1 + 0.5e^{-p}}\right)$$



7. Disbursement ratio. The opportunity to weigh the ability to fund the implementation of projects promptly and efficiently led to the inclusion of a disbursement measure, the disbursement ratio (DR). It is measured as a ratio between the actual disbursement value to date and the available disbursement for the ongoing year of implementation:

$$DR = \frac{total\ disbursed\ amount\ at\ date}{disbursable\ amount\ at\ the\ beginning\ of\ the\ year} \qquad \in [0{,}100]$$

8. The DR ranges from 0 to 100 per cent for each project; once it has been computed, it enters the formula as a discounting factor, z, ranging from 0 to 1, together with the portfolio age.

9. Portfolio age. As in the old PAR calculation, the new formula takes into consideration the age of each single project included in the portfolio: the more recent the project, the higher the tolerance on its disbursement ratio.

Inclusion of disbursement ratio and portfolio age into the formula

$$z = \frac{1}{\sum Age\ of\ project} \sum Age\ of\ project(1 - DR)$$

10. The discounting factor is calculated as a weighted average, taking into account both the age and DR of each project within the portfolio. In order not to penalize new projects, the discounting factor increases with age.

The final PAD formula

11. The final formula suggested for the calculation of the PAD rating is:

$$\boldsymbol{PAD = \left(\frac{6}{1 + 0.5e^{-p}}\right)\left(1 - \frac{x}{p}\right) - z}$$

12. Where p is the total number of active projects in the country portfolio (the portfolio size); x is the number of APPs; z is the discount resulting from the disbursement ratio combined with the portfolio age.

Status persistence

13. Once the PAD has been calculated, it is further scored taking into consideration the persistence of each project's status: if in the two previous years the PAD has been lower than 3, it is considered equal to 1; if, conversely, in the two previous years the PAD has been higher than 4, it is considered equal to 6.

14. Finally, in order to prevent missing values and high year-by-year fluctuations, a three year rolling average of PAD is used in the PBAS calculation.

Countries with most fragile situations (MFS) and the revised PBAS formula

1. At its 119th session in December 2016, the Executive Board approved the IFAD strategy for engagement in countries with fragile situations.[35] The strategy proposes a new definition of fragility, and a new approach to identify countries with the most fragile situations. The new definition is as follows:

> "Fragility is a condition of high vulnerability to natural and man-made shocks, often associated with an elevated risk of violence and conflict. Weak governance structures along with low-capacity institutions are a common driver and consequence of fragile situations. Fragile situations typically provide a weaker enabling environment for inclusive and sustainable rural transformation and are characterized by protracted and/or periodic crises, often with implications for smallholder agriculture and food security."

2. In order to identify countries with fragile situations, the strategy uses indicators related to institutional capacity and conflict:

   (i) Institutional capacity: countries with the lowest IFAD rural-sector performance (RSP) scores (approximately the bottom quintile);

   (ii) Conflict: (a) countries in which United Nations/regional peacekeeping forces are present; and (b) countries classified as "very high alert" or "high alert" by the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index.

3. To be classified as most fragile, countries need to comply with one of those three indicators. IFAD's list of countries with the most fragile situations (MFS) for 2016, building on the methodology outlined in the strategy, comprises a total of 30 countries and is reflected in table 1.

4. As part of its review of the current PBAS formula and process, Management committed to explore ways to allocate additional resources to MFS countries. The RSP is the only common element between the PBAS variables and the MFS-defining indicators. Seventeen countries, or 63 per cent of countries with MFS, are classified as such because of their low RSP score. The remaining countries are classified as MFS because they are in line with at least one of the other two indicators.

5. Because RSP is the only common element between the PBAS formula and the MFS-defining indicators, it would seem intuitive to explore how to provide additional resources through the PBAS to MFS through modifications to the RSP variable. However, the RSP variable is part of the performance component of the PBAS formula. Because the formula aims to reward good performers, and by definition countries with MFS have a low RSP score, countries with MFS cannot receive additional resources through an increase in the weight of the RSP variable within the formula. Conversely, reducing the RSP variable weight would achieve the desired effect, but would be contrary to the performance-based nature of the PBAS.

6. As part of the PBAS review, Management has included a measure of vulnerability, the IFAD Vulnerability Index, in the country needs component of the formula. Through this addition, the more vulnerable the country, the higher the IVI score, the higher the impact of the IVI on the allocation. Because there is a partial overlap between the most vulnerable countries and MFS (17 of the 30 MFS countries are also in the two highest quintiles of the IVI), some MFS countries receive additional resources through the introduction of the IVI within the formula. Overall, MFS receive a 3 per cent allocation increase.

[35] Document EB 2016/119/R.4.

Table 1
Most fragile situations (MFS) as at December 2016

Country	*RSP quintiles*	*Alert status*	*Peacekeeping or peace-building mission*	*Allocation variation due to IVI (+/-)*
Afghanistan[a]		High alert	Yes	/
Bosnia and Herzegovina			Yes	-
Burundi	Lowest quintile	High alert	Yes	+
Central African Republic	Lowest quintile	Very high alert	Yes	+
Chad	Lowest quintile	Very high alert		+
Democratic Republic of the Congo[a]	Lowest quintile	Very high alert	Yes	/
Côte d'Ivoire	Lowest quintile		Yes	-
Guinea	Lowest quintile	High alert		+
Guinea-Bissau	Lowest quintile		Yes	+
Haiti	Lowest quintile	High alert	Yes	+
Iraq		High alert	Yes	+
Democratic People's Republic of. Korea[a]	Lowest quintile			/
Lebanon			Yes	+
Liberia	Lowest quintile		Yes	+
Mali			Yes	+
Myanmar	Lowest quintile			-
Niger				+
Pakistan		High alert		=
Papua New Guinea	Lowest quintile			-
Sao Tome and Principe	Lowest quintile			+
Sierra Leone			Yes	+
Somalia[b]			Yes	/
South Sudan	Lowest quintile	Very high alert	Yes	+
Sudan		Very high alert	Yes	+
Syrian Arab Republic[b]			Yes	/
Tajikistan	Lowest quintile			+
Togo	Lowest quintile			+
Uzbekistan	Lowest quintile			-
West Bank and Gaza[b]			Yes	/
Yemen		Very high alert		+

[a] These countries have been capped for IFAD10.
[b] IFAD currently has no operations in these countries.

The enhanced Rural Sector Performance Assessment

Rationale and process for the review of the Rural Sector Performance Assessment

IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment (RSPA) measures the quality of policies and institutions in the rural sector for achieving rural development and rural transformation benefitting the poor. The Corporate Level Evaluation (CLE) of IFAD's Performance-based Allocation System[36] recommended that IFAD refine the RSPA by revisiting the indicators and questions in order to "reflect emerging priorities, opportunities and challenges in the rural sector" as well as strengthen and make more uniform the process through which RSPA scores are determined.[37]

In line with this recommendation, Management has revised the RSPA through an inter-divisional consultative process involving technical specialists in PTA, CPMs, LREs, LPAs and other resource persons to understand content and procedural related challenges when undertaking a RSPA Additionally, extensive discussions were held with the Executive Board Working Group on PBAS. The revised RSPA is hereby presented to the EB for approval.

Review and Changes to the RSPA

In line with the CLE recommendation, Management has revised the RSPA in order to capture robust information about the policy framework of a country, both on paper and in practice, and to focus on areas specific to the rural sector (e.g. the quality and quantity of attention placed on rural development by the government). It also focuses on areas which impact on a country's rural sector (e.g. the macroeconomic setting, including the exchange rate and trade rate regimes). Moreover, the questions included in the RSPA have been updated in order to be consistent with IFAD Strategic Framework 2016-2025, including prioritized cross-cutting issues.

The revised RSPA has been streamlined into 6 (rather than 12) categories, with a more limited set of sub-questions. The new questionnaire (see below) utilizes a similar methodology to that used by the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). It identifies data sources for various topics to guide country teams to make their assessment. Countries will continue to be scored on a 6-point scale. In an attempt to minimize the possible subjectivity in the country scores, IFAD staff that will complete the RSPA will be required to provide a short justification and supporting data.

The country scoring process

Country teams should utilize the attached questionnaire and data guide to gather and structure data in support of their answers. Supporting explanations should be kept relatively short (e.g. 2 short paragraphs) and should cite the specific data. CS are reviewed once every three years in advance of IFAD's replenishment negotiations. However, the assessment criteria may be used to support country policy engagement/dialogue during other periods, notably during the design and revision of country COSOPs and Country Strategy Notes (CSNs).

Once completed, country teams and LREs can benchmark outcomes against other well-known metrics such as the World Governance Indicators, elements of the Doing Business Index, and, where available, the Business of Agriculture Index.

Benchmarked indicators and accompanying assessments should be shared among a peer review group, which operates in two phases. First, LREs conduct a review exercise to ensure that there is a consistent application of the criteria across all countries within their region; second, selected countries (approximately 25% of total countries) are then benchmarked through a peer review system across regions, staffed by PTA / OPE and the regional economists.

[36] EB 2016/117/R.5.
[37] EB 2016/117/R.5., page ix.

Criteria

The RSPA is grouped into six clusters and contain a total of 19 questions (see box below). Scores are provided on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). They are defined at each level for each question. Country scores should reflect a variety of indicators and observations based on country knowledge generated by IFAD, available indicators, specific analytical work, policy discussions, or work done by other agencies, development partners or researchers. Specific sources of data are given for each question.

Policies and legal framework for ROs and rural people
- Policies and framework for rural development and rural poverty alleviation
- Legal frameworks for and autonomy of rural people's organizations
- Representation and influence of ROs and rural people

Rural governance, transparency and public administration
- Quality and transparency of public resources for rural development
- Accountability, transparency and corruption

Environmental policies and practice
- Environmental assessment policies and grievances
- National climate change adaptation policies and cross-governmental coordination
- Access to land
- Access to water

Financial policy, access to services & markets
- Access to rural financial services
- Investment climate for rural business
- Access to agricultural input and produce markets
- Access to extension services

Nutrition and gender equality
- Application of nutrition policy
- Application of gender equality

Macroeconomic management, policies and conditions for rural development
- Monetary and exchange rate policies
- Fiscal and tax policy
- Debt policy
- Trade policy

Questionnaire

Section 1 Policies and Legal Frameworks for rural women and men and their organizations

1.1 Policies and framework for rural development and rural poverty alleviation

To what extent does the government prioritize strategies for and investment in the rural poor, including smallholder farmers, landless peoples and other rural poor? Core indicators are: 1) 5-10 year trends in rural poverty and deprivation; 2) the quality and focus of national development strategies, and rural development strategies, and their application in practice; 3) the presence and application of specific strategies for rural transformation and the development of the rural non-farm economy (RNFE).

Key Sources:

- National statistics on rural poverty
- IFAD documents (project documents, COSOPs) providing trends on rural poverty and qualitative assessment of development priorities
- National development strategies and more specific policies / strategies related to rural development
- Analysis of budgetary allocations for rural development
- Write ups by various agencies, think tanks, academics
-

* Justification should look at 5-10 year trends in rural poverty and deprivation and cite them in addition to a qualitative judgement about policies.*

1. The prioritization of the rural poor and of rural development more broadly is highly unsatisfactory.
2. The prioritization of the rural poor and rural development in the policy framework is unsatisfactory.
3. The prioritization of the rural poor and rural development in the policy framework is moderately unsatisfactory.
4. The prioritization of the rural poor and rural development in the policy framework is moderately satisfactory.
5. The prioritization of the rural poor and rural development in the policy framework is satisfactory.
6. The prioritization of the rural poor and rural development in the policy framework is highly satisfactory.

Score

1.2 Legal frameworks for and autonomy of rural people's organizations

Please determine to what extent rural people can organize into autonomous groups. Core indicators are: 1) facilitation of formation and registration of formalized groups; and 2) autonomy from interference in their ownership, management and financing.

Key Sources:

- National legislation
- IFAD documentation (project / COSOP documentation, previous RSPA)
- Research assessments by international organizations or academic partners
-

* Justification should provide qualitative evidence about registration and autonomy, complemented with data (e.g. days to register) where available.*

Ratings

1. Policy and legal frameworks prevent the formation and registration of grass roots organizations.
2. Policy and legal frameworks allow for the formation and registration of grass roots organizations with significant difficulty and delays; such organizations have heavily restricted autonomy and independence in their ownership, management and financing.
3. Policy and legal frameworks allow for the formation and registration of grass roots organizations with moderate delays and difficulties; such organizations have restricted autonomy and independence in their ownership, management and financing.
4. Policy and legal frameworks allow for the formation and registration of grass roots organizations with minor delays and difficulties, generating incentives to formalization. Such organizations have moderate autonomy and independence in their ownership, management and financing.
5. Policy and legal frameworks allow for the formation and registration of grass roots organizations and set incentives for doing so. Such organizations usually have autonomy and independence in their ownership, management and financing.
6. Policy and legal frameworks allow for the efficient formation and registration of grass roots organizations and set incentives for doing so. Such organizations have full autonomy and independence in their ownership, management and financing.

Score

1.3 Representation and influence of ROs and rural people

Please determine to how well poor rural women and men are represented in local and national policy making processes. Core indicators include: 1) the extent to which poor rural women and men are represented and have power in rural organizations; 2) the influence of rural organizations on governmental decision-making processes.

Key Sources:

- National legislation
- IFAD documentation (project / COSOP documentation, previous RSPA)
- Research assessments by international organizations or academic partners
-

* Justification should provide qualitative evidence about representation and influence, complemented with data where available.*

Ratings

1. Poor rural women and men are not represented in rural organizations. ROs have no influence at all on governmental decision making.
2. Poor rural women and men are unrepresented in rural organizations. ROs have almost no influence on governmental decision making.
3. Poor rural women and men are seldom represented in rural organizations and rarely have influence on decision making. ROs have little influence on governmental decision making.
4. Poor rural women and men are represented to some extent in rural organizations and have some influence on decision making. ROs have some influence on governmental decision making.
5. Poor rural women and men are well represented in rural organizations and have influence on decision making. ROs have influence on governmental decision making.
6. Poor rural women and men are equitably represented in rural organizations and have the same influence on decision making. ROs have substantial influence on governmental decision making.

Score

Section 2: Rural governance, transparency and public administration

2.1 Quality and transparency of resources for rural development

Please determine the quality of public resources available for rural development, and the transparency of their allocation. Core indicators are: 1) whether allocated resources for rural areas (agricultural and non-agricultural) are pro-poor; 2) whether resources are allocated transparently / in a participatory fashion; 3) whether budgeted resources are spent as expected.

Key Sources

- National laws on budgetary process, including level of decentralization
- Analysis of national budgetary data – allocations vs. spend via available public expenditure reviews / surveys or other sources
- PRSP / National development strategy
- Data from the World Bank (e.g. agricultural value added, or work force in agriculture) vs. budgetary allocations or other comparisons (e.g. percentage of national budget allocated to agriculture and rural development)
- Data from FAO on the share of public expenditure being allocated to R&D
- IMF Article IV consultation reports where applicable
- Teams may seek external papers and analysis by academics, IMF, World Bank, regional MDBs, other institutions on public spending in the rural and agricultural sector

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data table with 5-10 year trend on budgetary allocations and spending + qualitative assessment with citations

Ratings

1. The quality and transparency of public spending on the rural sector is highly unsatisfactory in prioritizing the rural poor. Local actors have no say in budgetary allocations and budget allocations are arbitrary and disregard policy priorities. There are major deviations and reallocation of budget with very unclear rules.
2. The quality of public spending on the rural sector is unsatisfactory in prioritizing the rural poor. Local actors have very little say in budgetary allocations and budget allocations are seldom reflect policy priorities. There are important deviations and reallocation of budget with unclear rules.
3. The quality of public spending on the rural sector is moderately unsatisfactory in prioritizing the rural poor. There is weak participation of local actors (including local governments) in budgetary allocations and these allocations respond only weakly to policy priorities. There are some deviations from allocations.
4. The quality of public spending on the rural sector is moderately satisfactory in prioritizing the rural poor. There is some participation of local actors (including local governments) in budgetary allocations and these allocations respond partially to policy priorities. There are few deviations to allocations.
5. The quality of public spending on the rural sector is satisfactory in prioritizing the rural poor. There is participation of local actors (including local governments) in budgetary allocations and these allocations are transparent and mostly respond to well-defined policy priorities. Allocations are largely respected, with deviations undertaken in a transparent manner.
6. The quality of public spending on the rural sector is highly satisfactory in prioritizing the rural poor. There is full participation of local actors (including local governments) in budgetary allocations and these allocations are fully transparent and respond to well-defined policy priorities. There is full transparency about any minor deviations to cover emergency type funding as needed.

Score

2.2 Accountability, transparency and corruption

Please determine the extent to which government is accountable, transparent and honest by assessing the quality of democracy and other well-known indicators of corruption. Core indicators include: 1) the extent to which there are effective checks and balances on power, and 2) the extent to which there is corruption and sanctions for that corruption. Where it is possible to distinguish between the quality of democracy, accountability and corruption at the rural level (rather than at the national level more broadly) and provide justification, this should be done.

Key Sources

- Metrics of democracy, checks and balances and government stability, notably: Freedom House Political Rights index, Polity IV index on democracy and rights, World Bank Database of Political Institutions for variables in the category "Stability and Checks & Balances", especially for legal checks and balances and comparative scores, Transparency International reports.
- Measures of the attention paid to rural issues in parties utilizing the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions for variables including executive and parties of government / opposition (e.g. EXECRURAL).[38]
- National policies on rural development and agriculture and other national specific information about consultation processes and responsiveness to rural smallholder interests.
- Measures of transparency and corruption, notably Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perception Index.
- Specific policy and research papers on issues related to democracy, governance, accountability and corruption at the local level produced by international organizations or research bodies.

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data on governance, democracy, checks and balances and corruption + qualitative assessment with citations which may provide more specificities about rural conditions or IFAD specific conditions (e.g. procurement, access to information) on these topics. TI should be used as the key source for corruption.

Ratings

1. There are no checks and balances on executive power and rural poor women and men have no influence on executive's power and decisions – there is neither responsiveness nor accountability. There is no transparency mechanism in place and no information is made available at the local level. Corruption of public resources and bribery is common – there are no sanctions.

2. There are ineffective checks and balances on executive power and the government is almost never responsive or accountable to rural poor women and men. There is no transparency and information that reaches local levels is minimal. Corruption of public resources and bribery is widespread, not recognized as a problem and sanctions are almost inexistent.

3. There are somewhat effective checks and balances on executive power but the public sector is rarely responsive and accountable to rural poor women and men. There is limited transparency and the information that reaches local levels is of poor quality. Corruption of public resources and bribery often occurs and sanctions are weakly implemented.

[38] Note that this variable should be treated with some caution as declared interest in rural issues is not always consistent with prioritizing the needs of rural development / smallholder agriculture. In many countries over large periods of time, parties with an explicit interest in rural issues have been parties captured by land-holding elites or large scale agricultural producers.

4. There are largely effective checks and balances on executive power and the government is sometimes responsive and accountable to rural poor women and men. There is partial transparency and information that reaches local levels is mostly satisfactory. Corruption of public resources and bribery sometimes occurs and sanctions are implemented in most cases.

5. There is an effective system of checks and balances on executive power and the government is mostly responsive and accountable to rural poor women and men. There is transparency and information that reaches local levels is satisfactory. Corruption of public resources and bribery seldom occurs and sanctions are implemented.

6. There is an effective system of checks and balances on executive power and the government is fully responsive and accountably to rural poor women and men. There is a high degree of transparency and information of high quality researches local levels. Corruption of public resources and bribery is absent and sanctions are systematically applied when occurring.

Score

Section 3: Natural Resources and Environmental Policies and Practices

3.1 Environmental assessment policies and grievance mechanisms

Please determine the extent to which environmental assessment legislation and policies exist and are applied, as well as the extent to which there are ways to bring grievances about environmental policies. Core Indicators include: 1) the extent of environmental assessment legislation; 2) grievance mechanisms for such legislation.

Key Sources

- Environmental indicators from the World Bank
- Environmental performance indicator, Yale University
- Key Environmental indicators from the OECD
- National policies and regulations
- Assessment of Borrowers environmental and social frameworks (MDBs)
- Research assessments on environmental policies from international institutions or research community

Ratings

1. Environmental Assessment (EA) policies and legislation are lacking. There is no grievance and/or judicial system to handle environment concerns.
2. EA policies and legislation exist, but are not applied. There is no grievance and/or judicial system and capacity to handle environment concerns.
3. EA policies and legislation exist, but are often not applied. A grievance and/or judicial system exists, but suffers significant gaps in reach and effectiveness.
4. EA policies and legislation are applied regularly in selected areas, but gaps exist. A grievance and/or judicial system exists, but suffers some gaps in reach and effectiveness.
5. EA policies and legislation are comprehensive and applied consistently, but limited findings are acted upon. There is a grievance and/or judicial system to handle environment concerns, with limited gaps in reach and effectiveness.
6. EA policies and legislation are comprehensive, effectively implemented and findings are acted upon. The grievance and/or judicial system effectively resolve complaints in a fair and timely manner.

Score

3.2 National climate change policies

Please determine the extent to which there is government coordination on issues related to climate change and the extent to which the government has and applies a national climate change policy or strategy. Core indicators include: 1) the existence and application of a national climate change strategy, policy, or action plan; 2) the extent of government coordination on topics related to climate change.

Key sources:

- Reporting to international bodies, such as the UNFCCC, on national progress under the conventions and other treaty like obligations. This includes National Communications and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the UNFCCC, as well as National Adaptation Plans (NAPs, NAPAs)
- National legislation and strategies on climate change
- Research assessments on environmental and climate change policies from international institutions or research community

Ratings

1. There is no consideration of climate related impacts on development plans and investments. Incorporation and consideration of environmental risks and natural resources sustainability and productivity concerns by sector ministries is highly unsatisfactory.
2. A national climate change strategy or policy has been prepared and cost-effective measures to address climate-related risks are being explored. Incorporation and consideration of environmental risks and natural resources sustainability and productivity by individual sector ministries is unsatisfactory.
3. Building on national climate change plans, vulnerable sectors are starting to consider climate –related risks in plans and projects. Incorporation and consideration of environmental risks and natural resources sustainability and productivity concerns by sector ministries is moderately unsatisfactory.
4. Building on national climate change plans, vulnerable sectors weakly incorporate climate risks in plans and projects by allocating specific budgets to climate-related activities. Incorporation and consideration of environmental risks and natural resources sustainability and productivity concerns by sector ministries is moderately satisfactory.
5. Building on national climate change plans, vulnerable sectors incorporate climate risks in plans and projects and assign corresponding budgets to climate-related activities. Incorporation and consideration of environmental risks and natural resources sustainability and productivity concerns by sector ministries is satisfactory; some inter-ministerial coordination takes place.
6. Building on national climate change plans, vulnerable sectors incorporate climate risks in plans and projects, and cost-effective mitigation measures are being implemented. Incorporation and consideration of environmental risks and natural resources sustainability and productivity concerns by sector ministries is highly satisfactory; inter-ministerial coordination is effective.

Score

3.3 Access to land

Please determine the access afforded to rural people via the policy framework to land which is key to their capacity to undergo rural transformation. Core indicators include: 1) the nature of the land tenure system- including gender-based hindrance to land tenure and management; 2) the existence of land markets and the management of communal lands.

Key sources

- World bank indicators on land tenure and water / irrigation
- Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) at country level
- USAID Land Links Country Profiles
- Land Gini coefficient (LGC) to measure land distribution (but not tenure security)
- National statistics, policies and legislation
- National development plans / PRSP
- Research prepared by international organizations or academic organizations on land tenure / land use
- Gender land rights database http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/en/

Ratings

1. The policy framework for land tenure provides highly unequal access to land and no security (including for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is highly inefficient and non-transparent, does not consider customary systems when relevant and land markets are exclusively informal. There is no regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources.

The policy framework for land tenure provides unequal access to land and very limited security (including for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is inefficient with little transparency and weak capacity to address conflicts, does not consider customary systems when relevant, and land markets are mostly informal. There is unclear regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources.

The policy framework for land tenure infrequently provides equal access to land and is seldom secure (including for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration shows major weaknesses and informal land markets are very important. There is unclear regulation and poor enforcement of regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources.

The policy framework for land tenure sometimes provides equal access to land and is sometimes secure (including for women, youth minorities and indigenous people). Land administration shows minor weaknesses, recognizing to some extent customary systems when relevant, and formal land markets exist. There is regulation and enforcement regarding the management and use of common property resources using to some extent customary rules when relevant, but these regulations and enforcement mechanisms are open to interpretation and not always consistent.

The policy framework for land tenure largely provides equal access to land and is mostly secure (including for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is generally efficient and transparent, recognises customary systems when relevant and land markets provide good access for rural poor. There is clear and routinely enforced regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources using customary systems when relevant.

The policy framework for land tenure provides equal access to land and is secure (including for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is efficient and transparent, recognises customary systems when relevant, and rural poor have full access to land markets. There is fully transparent and systematically enforced regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources using customary systems when relevant.

Score

3.4 Access to water

Please determine the access afforded to rural people via the policy framework to water. Core indicators are: 1) whether the policy framework takes a comprehensive view of water access / use for rural livelihoods; 2) whether water resources are managed through representative mechanisms.

Key Sources

- UN Water indicators in the water sector
- FAO Aquastat
- National development plans / PRSP
- National statistics, policies and legislation
- Research prepared by international organizations or academic organizations on water access and use.

Ratings

1. No specific mention of water access and use in the development or rural policy framework. No policy or legal framework to govern water allocation and uses / conservation of water resources exist.
2. Development or rural policy framework makes passing mention of water access and use. Policy and legal framework to govern water allocation and uses / conservation of water resources in a representative manner are inadequate.
3. Development or rural policy framework covers water access and use but is inconsistent or incomplete. Policy and legal frameworks to govern water allocation and uses / conservation of water resources in a representative manner are incomplete.
4. Development or rural policy framework partially covers water access and use. Policy and legal frameworks to govern water allocation and uses / conservation of water resources in a representative manner exist but have weaknesses.
5. Development or rural policy framework covers water access and use adequately and relevantly. Policy and legal frameworks to govern water allocation and uses / conservation of water resources in a representative fashion are adequate.
6. Development or rural policy framework covers water access comprehensively and effectively. Policy and legal frameworks to govern water allocation and uses / conservation of water resources in a representative fashion exist and their use is strongly encouraged by the government.

Score

Section 4: Financial policy, access to services & markets

4.1 Access to and use of rural financial services

Please assess the extent to which the policy and legal framework creates an enabling environment for the provision of inclusive rural financial services. Core indicators include: 1) the extent and quality of the policy framework for rural finance; 2) rural financial inclusion (access and use); 3) the quality of regulation.

Key sources

- Metrics and data on access and usage of financial services (Data sources: WB Global Findex; IMF Financial Access Surveys; WB Payment Systems Survey;)
- Metrics on number and scale of financial service providers (Data sources: WB Global Findex, CGAP, IMF Financial Access Surveys; WB Global Payment System Survey)
- Data on access to informal financial services outreach of rural women and men (source: the Mix(data sources: Microfinance Associations; MIX market) ; Savix ; Finlab; FinScope)
- Metrics on financial capacity of enterprises and households (Data source: WB Enterprise Surveys; WB Financial Capability Surveys and OECD National Financial Literacy and inclusion Surveys; OECD SME scoreboard)
- Signatory and implementation status of the Maya Declaration (Data source: Alliance for Financial Inclusion)
- Other sources: MIX Market, FinScope (14 countries in SSA plus Pakistan and India)
- National policies, regulations and legislation
- IFAD project and supervision reports when related to rural finance
- Research reports from international institutions, private sector providers and academic institutions.

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data table with 5-10 year trend if available + qualitative assessment with citations

Ratings

1. No specific policy or legal framework in place and/or financial inclusion and rural financial services is highly unsatisfactory, i.e. not recognized as a development priority. Framework to promote and regulate rural finance inexistent.

2. Policy and legal framework for rural finance is unsatisfactory and does not encourage the development of sustainable rural financial services (access and usage is very low)[39]. Framework to promote and regulate rural finance weak in design and enforcement.

3. Policy and legal framework for financial inclusion and rural finance is moderately unsatisfactory and access and usage is low.[40] Framework to promote and regulate rural finance shows significant weaknesses in design and / or enforcement.

4. Policy and legal framework for rural finance is moderately satisfactory and rural financial sector is expanding in terms of access and usage[41] as well as household and business financial capacity and quality of services. Framework to promote and regulate financial inclusion and rural finance has some weaknesses in design, implementation or enforcement.

[39] For example, below 30%. All numbers are indicative and not IFAD policy. Such judgements should be complemented with reference to micro indicators which might provide a better sense of the health of the financial inclusion agenda in a given country.
[40] For example, around 45%.
[41] For example, around 60%.

5. Policy and legal framework for financial inclusion and rural finance is satisfactory and rural financial sector is well developed in terms of access and usage[42] as well capacity and quality of services. Framework to promote and regulate financial inclusion and rural finance is appropriate and enforced.

6. Policy and legal framework for financial inclusion and rural finance is highly satisfactory and rural financial sector is strong in terms of access and usage[43] as well capacity and quality of services. Framework to promote and regulate financial inclusion and rural finance is appropriate, enforced and stable (i.e. in place for more than 5 years).

Score

[42] For example, around 75%
[43] For example, around 90%.

4.2 Investment Climate for Rural Business

Please measure the extent to which the government is actively promoting the development of a robust private sector in rural areas through the provision of an appropriate policy and legal framework, the and the subsequent extent to which SMEs or rural businesses are able to register, establish and grow their business.

Key sources

- IFAD documentation – project reports, COSOPs, supervision reports, etc.
- Doing Business Reports -- World Bank
- Enabling business of agriculture index (EBAI) – World Bank
- UNCATAD data on FDI in agribusiness
- Specific national policies, laws and regulations related to establishing/registering a (rural) business or SME

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data table with information from EBAI and other sources (e.g. DBI) if available + qualitative assessment with citations

Ratings

1. Existing policy and legal framework prohibits or severely hampers the establishment and registration of rural businesses or SMEs (through excessive bureaucracy, red tape, bribery, extortion, and other measures that make it extremely difficult to open and establish a private sector business in rural areas).

2. Existing policy and legal framework strongly limits the establishment and registration of rural businesses or SMEs (through heavy bureaucratic constraints and red tape).

3. Existing policy and legal framework partially limits the establishment and registration of rural businesses or SMEs (bureaucracy and red tape are normal impediments but can be overcome)

4. Existing policy and legal framework moderately encourages the establishment/registration of rural businesses or SMEs but some moderate bureaucratic inefficiencies still exist and could be improved.

5. Existing policy and legal framework encourages the establishment/registration of rural businesses or SMEs, has minimal bureaucratic inefficiencies, and may provide incentives to establish a business (e.g. one stop shops to establish a business, tax incentives, subsidized business development services and/or financial incentives to establish a business).

6. Existing policy and legal framework strongly encourages the establishment/registration of rural businesses or SMEs, has no bureaucratic inefficiencies, and provides both financial or non-financial incentives (one-stop shops, tax incentives, subsidized business development services, subsidized finance, etc.)

Score

4.3 Access to agricultural input and produce markets

Please measure the extent to which existing agricultural input markets and produce markets at reliably providing value for money to smallholders for inputs and the highest proportion of the retail price for produce. Core Indicators include: 1) the number of relevant actors in the market; 2) the extent to which the regulatory environment is enabling; 3) the level of competition for optimizing prices for poor producers.

Key Sources:
- IFAD documentation, i.e. supervision reports, COSOPs, project documentation
- Sector policy documents
- Doing business in agriculture index
- Research papers written by other external actors

Justification paragraphs should provide quantitative information about market conditions, citing sources, and add a qualitative assessment about the extent to which the policy framework is enabling.

Ratings

1. Inputs are difficult to find in rural areas. Quality is not assured. Timing of input supply is at times out of sync with production seasons. Prices for inputs are fixed. Produce markets for key commodities are dominated by one buyer; or are characterized by producers having few or unreliable buyers for their produce at rural level.

2. Agricultural input markets are dominated by a single or very few suppliers. Availability, quality, quantity and timing of inputs are unpredictable. Produce markets for key commodities are dominated by one buyer; or are characterized by producers having few or unreliable buyers for their produce at rural level.

3. Agricultural input markets are somewhat competitive and availability, quality, quantity and timing of inputs are reasonable, if producers can afford the inputs. Produce markets for key commodities are dominated by one buyer; or are characterized by producers having few or unreliable buyers for their produce at rural level.

4. Agricultural input markets are somewhat competitive and availability, quality, quantity and timing of inputs are reasonable, if producers can afford the inputs. Produce markets for key commodities are also somewhat competitive and are characterized by formal and informal traders regularly seeking producers' produce at rural level.

5. Agricultural input markets are competitive and availability, quality, quantity and timing of inputs are reasonable. Produce markets for key commodities are also competitive and are characterized by formal traders regularly seeking producers' produce at rural level.

6. Input and produce markets are extremely competitive and reliable. A wide range of seeds, pesticides and fertilizers are reliably available. Certification of new products is fast and regulation of markets is largely apolitical.

Score

4.4 Access to extension services

Please determine to what extent the policy framework adequately provides opportunities for smallholder farmers to access public or private extension services. Core indicators include: 1) The framework for extension service provision; 2) the reach of the extension system; 3) the inclusiveness and quality of the extension system and its messages.

Key Sources

- National policies
- IFAD documentation (projects, COSOPS, previous RSP)

Ratings

1. The policy framework is highly unsatisfactory (in terms of policies, laws, financial and technical support) in the provision of opportunities of poor, rural women and men to access private or public extension services. The extension system is non-existent.

2. The policy framework is unsatisfactory (in terms of policies, laws, financial and technical support) in the provision of opportunities of poor, rural women and men to access private or public extension services. The extension system almost never researches poor farmers.

3. The policy framework is moderately unsatisfactory (in terms of policies, laws, financial and technical support) in the provision of opportunities of poor, rural women and men to access private or public extension services. The extension system seldom reaches poor farmers.

4. The policy framework is moderately satisfactory (in terms of policies, laws, financial and technical support) in the provision of opportunities of poor, rural women and men to access private or public extension services. The extension system sometimes reaches poor, rural women and men; efforts are being made to improve access and the quality of messages.

5. The policy framework is satisfactory (in terms of policies, laws, financial and technical support) in the provision of opportunities of poor, rural women and men to access private or public extension services. The extension system generally reaches poor farmers with mostly appropriate messages.

6. The policy framework is highly satisfactory (in terms of policies, laws, financial and technical support) in the provision of opportunities of poor, rural women and men to access private or public extension services. The extension system efficiently reaches poor farmers and provides appropriate messages.

Score

Section 5: Nutrition and gender equality

5.1 Nutrition policy framework and outcomes

Please measure the extent to which nutrition (rather than, or in addition to, food security) is mainstreamed in government policies and institutions. Core Indicators include: 1) the attention placed on nutrition in national development strategies; 2) the extent to which there is cross-ministerial collaboration in multi-sector teams, policies and working groups, and 3) the existence and implementation status of national nutrition strategies

Key sources

- SUN Country Reports
- Global Nutrition Reports
- National development strategies / PRSP / Multi-sectoral strategies
- Other national policies, regulations and strategies
- Research reports by international organizations and academic sources on nutrition policy in specific countries.

* While justification paragraphs may seek to reference data collected from international sources on micro-nutrient intake adequacy, stunting, wasting, underweight, obesity and dietary diversity, these metrics are captured in the needs aspect of the formula and should only support the qualitative assessments about the specific policy setting as given in the core indicators above.*

Ratings

1. Nutrition is not mentioned in the national development strategy and there is no cross-governmental work. There is no national nutrition strategy or it is achieving highly unsatisfactory outcomes.

2. Nutrition is given minimal attention in the national development strategy and mechanisms for cross-governmental work are very limited and highly ineffective. There is a poorly defined national nutrition strategy which is achieving unsatisfactory outcomes.

3. Nutrition is given minimal attention in the national development strategy and mechanisms for cross-governmental work are limited and often ineffective. There is a poorly defined national nutrition strategy which suffers implementation challenges.

4. Nutrition is given moderate attention in the national development strategy and mechanisms for cross-governmental work are moderate and partially effective. There is a national nutrition strategy which is achieving moderately satisfactory outcomes.

5. Nutrition is prioritized in the national development strategy and mechanisms for cross-governmental work are present and usually effective. There is a national nutrition strategy which is achieving satisfactory outcomes.

6. Nutrition is a core priority in the national development strategy and mechanisms for cross-governmental work are robust and highly effective. There is a national nutrition strategy which is achieving highly satisfactory outcomes.

Score

5.2 Policy framework for gender equality

Please assess the extent to which the policy framework and customary traditions encourage economic empowerment for women and men, equal voice and decision making for women and men and equitable work-loads. Core indicators include: 1) the extent to which rural women and men have the same opportunities and benefits of accessing and controlling productive resources (land, inputs, credit); 2) the extent to which rural women and men can participate in decision making processes (at local and national level); 3) the sharing of economic and social benefits.

Key sources

- Gender Development Index (UNDP)
- Gender Inequality Index (UNDP)
- Social Institutions and Gender Index (OECD)
- Women's empowerment in agriculture index (IFPRI, where available)
- Human Development Report
- National policies, laws and regulations
- Statistics on gender based violence
- Research reports by international organizations and academic sources on gender equality in specific countries.

* Justification paragraphs should cite the GDI, GII, SIGI indexes and other indexes as available, including trends if possible, to support qualitative assessments*

Ratings

1. The policy, legal and customary framework for rural development effectively blocks women's economic empowerment in terms of access and control over productive inputs (land, finance, production inputs, infrastructure and natural resources). Women are usually absent from decision and policy making bodies such as formal organizations, cooperatives, local councils and parliament. Workloads are heavily unequal. GDI/GII ranks generally in group 5. [44]

2. The policy, legal and customary framework for rural development provides significant barriers to women's economic empowerment in terms of access and control over productive inputs (land, finance, production inputs, infrastructure and natural resources). There is strong discrimination against women's participation and voice in decision and policy making bodies such as formal organizations, cooperatives, local councils and parliament. Workloads are unequal. GDI/GII ranks generally in group 4.

3. The policy, legal and customary for rural development provides some barriers to women's economic empowerment in terms of access and control over productive inputs (land, finance, production inputs, infrastructure and natural resources). Women are largely under-represented and unheard in decision and policy making bodies such as formal organizations, cooperatives, local councils and parliament. Workloads tend to be biased towards women. GDI/GII ranks generally in group 3.

4. The policy, legal and customary framework for rural development moderately encourages women's economic empowerment in terms of access and control over productive inputs (land, finance, production inputs, infrastructure and natural resources). Women are slightly under-represented and their voices are discounted in decision and policy making bodies such as formal organizations, cooperatives, local councils and parliament. Workloads are mostly balanced. GDI/GII ranks generally in group 2.

[44] Countries are divided into five groups by absolute deviation from gender parity in HDI values.

5. The policy, legal and customary framework for rural development encourages women's economic empowerment in terms of access and control over productive inputs (land, finance, production inputs, infrastructure and natural resources). Women's representation in decision and policy making bodies is strong and their voice is heard in formal organizations, cooperatives, local councils and parliament. Workloads are balanced in most cases. GDI/GII ranks generally in group 2/1.

6. The policy, legal and customary framework for rural development strongly encourages women's economic empowerment in terms of access and control over productive inputs (land, finance, production inputs, infrastructure and natural resources). Women have equal representation and voice in decision and policy making bodies such as formal organizations, cooperatives, local councils and parliament. Workloads are equal. GDI/GII ranks generally in group 2/1.

Score

Section 6. Macroeconomic policies and conditions for rural development

6.1. Monetary and exchange rate policies

Please determine the coherence and quality of monetary and exchange rate policies and whether this set of policies creates positive conditions for the growth and stability of the rural sector. Core indicators include: 1) the level of internal and external balances and price stability; 2) the response to and capacity to absorb internally and externally determined shocks, including the consistency of policy responses.[45,46]

Key data sources:

- IMF Time Series Data (external balance; inflation as measured by CPI, other; exchange rate)
- IMF Article IV consultation reports
- Economist Intelligence Unit country reports
- Teams may seek external papers and analysis by academics, IMF, World Bank, regional MDBs, other institutions on monetary and exchange rate authorities response to internal and external shocks, particularly food crises

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data table with 5-10 year trend + qualitative assessment with citations

Ratings

1. The monetary and exchange rate policy regime has consistently generated conditions in which there were significant external imbalances, balance of payment crises, price instability and limited buffers to internal and external shocks. Policies are inconsistent (i.e. internally incoherent or subject to large and sudden changes).

2. The monetary and exchange rate policy regime has occasionally generated conditions in which there were significant external imbalances, balance of payment crises, price instability and limited buffers to internal and external shocks. There is significant policy inconsistency.

3. The monetary and exchange rate regime has been occasionally (though inconsistently) been used to maintain short and medium term balance of payments, mitigate price instability and buffer the economy against internal and external shocks. There is some policy inconsistency.

4. The monetary and exchange rate regime pursues and is often (though not always) capable of achieving the maintenance of external balance, price stability and can often mitigate against internal and external shocks. There is only occasional policy inconsistency.

5. The monetary and exchange rate regime prioritizes and is capable of achieving external balance, price stability and can respond rapidly and flexibility to internal and external shocks. There is significant policy consistency.

6. The monetary and exchange rate regime has consistently maintained external balance, price stability and has adequate inbuilt safeguards against internal and external shocks. Policies are consistent.

Score

[45] The stability and longevity of fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes are particularly sensitive to the consistency and flexibility of the policy framework, and should be scored according to their heightened sensitivity to shocks and imbalances.

[46] Monetary policy and exchange rate policies may be set by one or more actors in the economy, in a coordinated or uncoordinated manner.

6.2. Fiscal Policy and Taxation

Please determine the coherence, quality and sustainability of fiscal policy to achieve levels of economic growth that are inclusive and conducive to the country's rural transformation. Core indicators include the extent to which oplicy: 1) encourages stability; 2) allocates resources effectively and efficiently; 3) generates sufficient internal resources through taxation.

Key data sources

- World Bank Database
- World Economic Outlook Database
- National legislation related to management of public budget, e.g. fiscal rules.
- Tax collection figures, e.g. tax burden, ratio of indirect/direct taxation, etc.
- Public expenditure figures reported in domestic and/or international reports
- IMF Article IV Consultations
- Economist Intelligence Unit country reports
- Teams may seek external papers and analysis by academics, IMF, World Bank, regional MDBs, other institutions on fiscal policies

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data table with 5-10 year trend + qualitative assessment with citations

Ratings

1. The fiscal policy regime over the past 5+ years has contributed to macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. high inflation, unsustainable current account deficits, crowding out of private investment, etc.) and shows limited capacity to mitigate shocks. There is no institutionalized attempt (e.g. through balanced budget laws or fiscal stability laws) to give sustainability and predictability to publics pending, or such laws are not applied. Tax collection as a percent of GDP is very low compared to regional standards, and taxation policies are of poor quality and regressive.

2. The fiscal policy regime has led to or is leading to macroeconomic balances and has been insufficient in mitigating shocks. There is limited institutionalized attempt (e.g. through balanced budget laws or fiscal stability laws) to give sustainability and predictability to public spending, or such laws and regulations are not applied. Tax collection is low compared to regional standards and taxation policies are of poor quality and poor redistributive consequences.

3. The fiscal policy regime has sporadically and / or incompletely supported macroeconomic stability and policy response to shocks is often delayed and / or partial. There is some institutionalized attempt (e.g. through balanced budget laws or fiscal stability laws) to give sustainability and predictability to public spending, and/or such laws and regulations are applied unevenly. Tax collection is modest by regional standards, and taxation policies are poor in quality and insufficient redistributive consequences.

4. The fiscal policy regime is consistent with macroeconomic stability and policy response to shocks is somewhat effective. There is an institutionalized attempt (e.g. through balanced budget laws or fiscal stability laws) to give sustainability and predictability to public spending, and such laws are usually applied. Tax collection is still modest but showing signs of improvement over time. Tax policies are improving government's capacity to increase quality and redistributive capacity of public spending.

5. The fiscal policy regime is consistent with macroeconomic stability and policy response to shocks is rapid and effective. There is an institutionalized attempt (e.g. through balanced budget laws or fiscal stability laws) to give sustainability and

predictability to public spending, and such laws are always applied. Tax collection is adequate by regional standards and tax policies are of modest quality and redistributive capacity.

6. The fiscal policy regime has been consistent and supporting macroeconomic stability for an extended (e.g. 3 years +) period of time and policy has adjusted to shocks. Tax collection is strong and spending is of good quality and with positive redistributive consequences.

Score

6.3. Debt Policy

Please determine the coherence and quality of debt policy. Core indicators include the extent to which: 1) debt is contracted in a sustainable fashion at both the national and sub-national level (including, where applicable, domestic as well as international debt); 2) is being effectively serviced at both the national and sub-national level; 3) policies regarding debt limits at the national and sub-national level.

Key sources

- World Bank / IMF for 10 year time series on external debt / GDP, debt / Exports, short term debt as % of all debt, foreign denominated debt as % of all debt, reserve ratio
- Data on the issuance and sustainability of domestic debt, where applicable (e.g. Middle Income Countries with more developed debt markets, or in low income countries where sovereign borrowing may crowd out appetite for corporate borrowing)
- IMF Agreement IV reports
- Economist Intelligence Unit country reports
- Teams may seek external papers and analysis by academics, IMF, World Bank, regional MDBs, other institutions on debt policies

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data table with 5-10 year trend + qualitative assessment with citations

Ratings

1. Government is in debt distress[47] and debt-service ratios are in significant and / or sustained breach of DSF debt thresholds. There is no legal framework for borrowing and data on borrowing is inaccurate or missing. Debt and other macroeconomic policies are not aligned.
2. Government faces high risk of debt distress, and debt service ratios could breach DSF debt thresholds. The legal borrowing framework is partially defined and information about debt levels is sporadic. Debt and other macroeconomic policies are minimally aligned.
3. Government faces a moderately high risk of debt distress, and debt service rations may breach DSF debt thresholds in some scenarios. The legal framework for borrowing is defined and public debt data exists but could be improved. Debt and fiscal policies are sometimes though not always aligned.
4. Government faces moderate risk of debt distress, the legal framework is clearly defined and debt data and analysis exist and are adequate. There is good coordination between debt and other macroeconomic policies.
5. Government faces a moderately low risk of debt distress, the legal framework for borrowing is clearly defined, there is a strategy for debt management and there is coordination within government on debt policy in addition to accurate and timely data and analysis. There is strong coordination between debt and other macroeconomic policies.
6. Government faces a low risk of debt distress, the legal framework for borrowing is clearly defined and stipulates borrowing objectives and debt management is coordinated by the government in addition to timely, comprehensive data and analysis. There is very strong coordination between debt and other macroeconomic policies.

Score

[47] Defined as likelihood of upcoming default, restructuring, arrears, etc.

6.4 Trade Policy

Please determine the extent to which trade policy in the country is distortionary with regards to the rural poor. Core indicators include: 1) the extent to which trade policy is distortionary for the rural poor; 2) the discretion and variability of trade policy.

Key data sources
- WTO Trade Policy Review
- World Bank World Trade Indicators on tariff and non-tariff barriers
- IMF consultations and reports
- Economist Intelligence Unit country reports
- Teams may seek external papers and analysis by academics, IMF, World Bank, WTO, regional MDBs, other institutions on trade policies, tariffs and non-tariff barriers.

Justification paragraph should include quantitative data table with 5-10 year trend + qualitative assessment of coherence, distortions, politically motivated policy changes, etc. with citations

Ratings

1. Trade policies are very distortionary for the rural poor, and there is very high levels of discretion and variability of trade policy.
2. Trade policies are distortionary for the rural poor, and there is high levels of discretion and variability of trade policy.
3. Trade policies are moderately distortionary for the rural poor, and there is moderately high levels of discretion and variability of trade policy.
4. Trade policies are moderately favourable for the rural poor, and there is moderately low level of discretion and variability of trade policy.
5. Trade policies are favourable for the rural poor, and there is low level of discretion and variability of trade policy.
6. Trade policies are very favourable for the rural poor, and there is very low level of discretion and variability of trade policy.

Score

Scenarios: country scores and annual allocations 2016-2018

Scenario 1: $[RurPop^{0.4} \times GNIpc^{-0.25} \times (1 + IVI)] \times (0.65 \times RSP + 0.35 \times PAD)^2$

Table 1

Asia and the Pacific

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Afghanistan	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	408.92	23 589 724	23 589 724	23 589 724	70 769 171
Bangladesh	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	530.53	37 555 271	37 555 271	37 555 271	112 665 814
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	278.39	14 471 534	14 471 534	14 471 534	43 414 601
China	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	538.00	43 848 177	43 848 177	43 848 177	131 544 531
India**	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	295.03	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Indonesia	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	462.70	20 905 123	20 905 123	20 905 123	62 715 370
Iran	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		179.39	7 609 450	7 609 450	7 609 450	22 828 351
Korea Dem Rep	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		94.10	7 281 395	7 281 395	7 281 395	21 844 185
Laos	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	231.51	5 740 757	5 740 757	5 740 757	17 222 271
Malaysia	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		367.53	5 459 920	5 459 920	5 459 920	16 379 759
Mongolia	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	373.98	3 174 012	3 174 012	3 174 012	9 522 035
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	142.47	18 118 350	18 118 350	18 118 350	54 355 051
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	275.00	19 584 773	19 584 773	19 584 773	58 754 319
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	322.64	24 604 923	24 604 923	24 604 923	73 814 768
Papua New Guinea	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	324.10	7 654 113	7 654 113	7 654 113	22 962 338
Philippines	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	535.99	21 798 414	21 798 414	21 798 414	65 395 243
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	268.07	11 202 727	11 202 727	11 202 727	33 608 182
Tonga*	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	370.92	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vanuatu*	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		214.37	1 526 559	1 526 559	1 526 559	4 579 678
Vietnam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	510.32	26 010 179	26 010 179	26 010 179	78 030 537
Total Asia and the Pacific							352 302 068	352 302 068	352 302 068	1 056 906 204
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

** Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 2
East and Southern Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	348.55	9 189 720	9 189 720	9 189 720	27 569 159
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	98.85	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	363.35	11 101 177	11 101 177	11 101 177	33 303 530
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	34.02	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	242.71	10 422 338	10 422 338	10 422 338	31 267 014
Ethiopia	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	311.79	40 721 032	40 721 032	40 721 032	122 163 097
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	261.81	15 143 737	15 143 737	15 143 737	45 431 212
Madagascar	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	469.49	22 376 779	22 376 779	22 376 779	67 130 336
Malawi	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	175.54	14 386 151	14 386 151	14 386 151	43 158 454
Mauritius*	9 710	758 906	1	5		147	3 187 740	3 187 740	3 187 740	9 563 220
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	296.97	17 361 157	17 361 157	17 361 157	52 083 472
Namibia	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		254.23	3 161 159	3 161 159	3 161 159	9 483 477
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	781.22	17 826 840	17 826 840	17 826 840	53 480 521
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1	4.47	4.27	575.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa	6 800	19 279 777	1	4.28		334.87	8 867 406	8 867 406	8 867 406	26 602 217
South Sudan*	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	14.00	2 465 763	2 465 763	2 465 763	7 397 288
Tanzania	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	258.01	17 579 718	17 579 718	17 579 718	52 739 153
Uganda	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	216.84	17 037 901	17 037 901	17 037 901	51 113 703
Zambia	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	218.39	7 968 341	7 968 341	7 968 341	23 905 024
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		211.27	10 914 440	10 914 440	10 914 440	32 743 320
Total East and Southern Africa							234 211 399	234 211 399	234 211 399	702 634 198
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 3
Latin America and the Caribbean

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Argentina	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	370.83	2 919 641	2 919 641	2 919 641	8 758 923
Belize	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	468.58	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	523.78	5 678 738	5 678 738	5 678 738	17 036 215
Brazil	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	803.46	12 429 634	12 429 634	12 429 634	37 288 903
Colombia	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	538.56	5 223 156	5 223 156	5 223 156	15 669 469
Cuba	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	278.96	2 676 086	2 676 086	2 676 086	8 028 259
Dominican Republic*	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	78.07	2 653 599	2 653 599	2 653 599	7 960 798
Ecuador	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	567.33	4 747 990	4 747 990	4 747 990	14 243 970
El Salvador	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	385.54	4 345 377	4 345 377	4 345 377	13 036 130
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	391.88	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	280.83	3 788 601	3 788 601	3 788 601	11 365 802
Guyana	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	506.50	2 419 322	2 419 322	2 419 322	7 257 965
Haiti	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	60.80	2 301 140	2 301 140	2 301 140	6 903 421
Honduras	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	242.70	4 134 974	4 134 974	4 134 974	12 404 921
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	359.14	11 379 582	11 379 582	11 379 582	34 138 746
Nicaragua	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	465.86	3 944 903	3 944 903	3 944 903	11 834 710
Paraguay	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	184.40	3 234 569	3 234 569	3 234 569	9 703 706
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	597.89	7 125 546	7 125 546	7 125 546	21 376 637
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	365.09	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	381.23	3 228 508	3 228 508	3 228 508	9 685 525
Total Latin America and Caribbean							86 731 367	86 731 367	86 731 367	260 194 100
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 4
Near East, North Africa and Europe

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Armenia	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	188.91	2 243 865	2 243 865	2 243 865	6 731 595
Azerbaijan	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	170.36	2 346 567	2 346 567	2 346 567	7 039 701
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	302.50	4 004 384	4 004 384	4 004 384	12 013 152
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	409.75	2 539 010	2 539 010	2 539 010	7 617 031
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	444.83	19 410 586	19 410 586	19 410 586	58 231 759
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	706.67	6 049 775	6 049 775	6 049 775	18 149 324
Iraq	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73		192.68	6 190 847	6 190 847	6 190 847	18 572 540
Jordan	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	197.10	3 474 337	3 474 337	3 474 337	10 423 010
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	427.29	8 191 779	8 191 779	8 191 779	24 575 336
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	238.24	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	601.72	6 500 048	6 500 048	6 500 048	19 500 144
Montenegro	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51		412.60	1 847 614	1 847 614	1 847 614	5 542 842
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	615.49	12 174 049	12 174 049	12 174 049	36 522 148
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	217.89	20 080 799	20 080 799	20 080 799	60 242 396
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	220.25	9 103 860	9 103 860	9 103 860	27 311 580
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	588.67	6 866 157	6 866 157	6 866 157	20 598 470
Turkey	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	541.99	10 969 423	10 969 423	10 969 423	32 908 268
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	256.94	10 069 073	10 069 073	10 069 073	30 207 219
Yemen	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	210.79	9 814 349	9 814 349	9 814 349	29 443 048
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe							143 376 521	143 376 521	143 376 521	430 129 562
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 5
West and Central Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	334.69	11 468 181	11 468 181	11 468 181	34 404 544
Burkina Faso	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	199.30	13 931 040	13 931 040	13 931 040	41 793 120
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	229.92	11 855 841	11 855 841	11 855 841	35 567 524
Cape Verde	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	691.75	2 267 719	2 267 719	2 267 719	6 803 158
Central African Republic*	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	48.20	6 169 262	6 169 262	6 169 262	18 507 785
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	262.06	11 565 055	11 565 055	11 565 055	34 695 164
Congo, Dem. Rep.	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		30.60	13 717 357	13 717 357	13 717 357	41 152 070
Congo, Rep.	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	146.42	1 955 129	1 955 129	1 955 129	5 865 386
Cote D'Ivoire	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	85.74	4 095 362	4 095 362	4 095 362	12 286 086
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	305.83	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	464.41	6 173 517	6 173 517	6 173 517	18 520 552
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	518.66	11 253 823	11 253 823	11 253 823	33 761 468
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	187.68	8 049 830	8 049 830	8 049 830	24 149 490
Guinea Bissau*	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		66.71	1 740 930	1 740 930	1 740 930	5 222 791
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	309.90	7 785 854	7 785 854	7 785 854	23 357 561
Mali	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	201.89	11 049 612	11 049 612	11 049 612	33 148 835
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	399.16	6 038 728	6 038 728	6 038 728	18 116 183
Niger	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	375.70	21 521 469	21 521 469	21 521 469	64 564 408
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	198.27	19 311 440	19 311 440	19 311 440	57 934 321
Sao Tome and Principe*	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	347.68	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	484.83	14 127 843	14 127 843	14 127 843	42 383 530
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	235.84	6 386 097	6 386 097	6 386 097	19 158 290
Togo	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	104.83	3 247 890	3 247 890	3 247 890	9 743 671
Total West and Central Africa							196 711 978	196 711 978	196 711 978	590 135 935
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Scenario 2: [RurPop$^{0.4}$ X GNIpc$^{-0.25}$ X (1 + IVI)] x (0.40 X RSP + 0.60 X PAD)^{2}

Table 1

Asia and Pacific

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Afghanistan	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	19.07	27 059 996	27 059 996	27 059 996	81 179 989
Bangladesh	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	20.15	40 744 304	40 744 304	40 744 304	122 232 911
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	13.48	16 211 458	16 211 458	16 211 458	48 634 373
China	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	18.08	45 516 787	45 516 787	45 516 787	136 550 360
India**	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	12.38	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Indonesia	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	19.57	20 403 496	20 403 496	20 403 496	61 210 489
Iran	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		10.20	6 955 371	6 955 371	6 955 371	20 866 114
Korea Dem Rep	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		7.64	6 655 514	6 655 514	6 655 514	19 966 543
Laos	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	11.67	5 193 659	5 193 659	5 193 659	15 580 976
Malaysia	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		14.06	4 990 606	4 990 606	4 990 606	14 971 818
Mongolia	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	18.72	3 661 634	3 661 634	3 661 634	10 984 902
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	9.30	20 843 602	20 843 602	20 843 602	62 530 807
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	12.17	18 968 943	18 968 943	18 968 943	56 906 830
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	13.95	20 155 581	20 155 581	20 155 581	60 466 743
Papua New Guinea	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	18.18	9 126 735	9 126 735	9 126 735	27 380 205
Philippines	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	18.07	22 559 268	22 559 268	22 559 268	67 677 805
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	12.85	11 872 840	11 872 840	11 872 840	35 618 519
Tonga*	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	18.68	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vanuatu*	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		11.05	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vietnam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	17.86	27 276 740	27 276 740	27 276 740	81 830 219
Total Asia and the Pacific							361 863 201	361 863 201	361 863 201	1 085 589 602
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

** Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 2
East and Southern Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	18.45	10 798 867	10 798 867	10 798 867	32 396 601
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	3.97	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	18.60	9 948 509	9 948 509	9 948 509	29 845 528
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	2.50	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	13.06	11 219 317	11 219 317	11 219 317	33 657 951
Ethiopia	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	13.84	44 924 683	44 924 683	44 924 683	134 774 050
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	11.05	11 703 557	11 703 557	11 703 557	35 110 672
Madagascar	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	19.63	25 021 657	25 021 657	25 021 657	75 064 972
Malawi	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	9.78	12 905 897	12 905 897	12 905 897	38 717 690
Mauritius*	9 710	758 906	1	5		4	2 913 734	2 913 734	2 913 734	8 741 202
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	12.90	15 699 503	15 699 503	15 699 503	47 098 510
Namibia	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		11.92	2 889 438	2 889 438	2 889 438	8 668 314
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	21.95	17 725 217	17 725 217	17 725 217	53 175 652
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1	4.47	4.27	19.58	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa	6 800	19 279 777	1	4.28		13.49	8 105 198	8 105 198	8 105 198	24 315 593
South Sudan*	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	2.07	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Tanzania	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	11.25	14 362 903	14 362 903	14 362 903	43 088 709
Uganda	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	9.63	13 309 152	13 309 152	13 309 152	39 927 456
Zambia	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	11.03	7 184 417	7 184 417	7 184 417	21 553 252
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		10.97	9 976 277	9 976 277	9 976 277	29 928 830
Total East and Southern Africa							224 688 327	224 688 327	224 688 327	674 064 982
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 3
Latin America and the Caribbean

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Argentina	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	14.15	2 150 339	2 150 339	2 150 339	6 451 016
Belize	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	19.62	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	20.09	5 472 789	5 472 789	5 472 789	16 418 367
Brazil	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	22.09	12 283 341	12 283 341	12 283 341	36 850 022
Colombia	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	20.21	4 209 473	4 209 473	4 209 473	12 628 419
Cuba	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	10.99	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Dominican Republic*	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	3.09	1 803 256	1 803 256	1 803 256	5 409 768
Ecuador	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	18.31	3 397 967	3 397 967	3 397 967	10 193 902
El Salvador	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	14.55	4 045 827	4 045 827	4 045 827	12 137 481
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	15.15	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	12.23	2 045 562	2 045 562	2 045 562	6 136 685
Guyana	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	19.95	2 303 625	2 303 625	2 303 625	6 910 874
Haiti	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	6.68	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Honduras	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	12.55	3 520 229	3 520 229	3 520 229	10 560 688
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	14.04	12 025 865	12 025 865	12 025 865	36 077 594
Nicaragua	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	19.60	3 077 647	3 077 647	3 077 647	9 232 942
Paraguay	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	9.01	2 567 312	2 567 312	2 567 312	7 701 937
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	20.68	7 532 985	7 532 985	7 532 985	22 598 955
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	11.79	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	13.98	2 398 881	2 398 881	2 398 881	7 196 643
Total Latin America and Caribbean							76 335 097	76 335 097	76 335 097	229 005 291
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 4
Near East, North Africa and Europe

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Armenia	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	6.61	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Azerbaijan	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	8.83	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	13.22	3 836 739	3 836 739	3 836 739	11 510 218
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	19.07	2 905 516	2 905 516	2 905 516	8 716 549
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	14.52	16 001 929	16 001 929	16 001 929	48 005 788
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	21.46	6 123 260	6 123 260	6 123 260	18 369 781
Iraq	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73		10.53	5 658 705	5 658 705	5 658 705	16 976 116
Jordan*	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	6.89	3 139 712	3 139 712	3 139 712	9 419 137
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	19.24	9 302 376	9 302 376	9 302 376	27 907 129
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	9.64	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	20.71	6 815 187	6 815 187	6 815 187	20 445 562
Montenegro	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51		14.81	1 688 800	1 688 800	1 688 800	5 066 401
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	18.66	10 752 874	10 752 874	10 752 874	32 258 621
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	11.51	22 550 631	22 550 631	22 550 631	67 651 892
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	14.35	11 156 309	11 156 309	11 156 309	33 468 926
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	20.61	7 296 584	7 296 584	7 296 584	21 889 751
Turkey	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	15.81	10 168 299	10 168 299	10 168 299	30 504 896
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	16.49	12 379 656	12 379 656	12 379 656	37 138 969
Yemen	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	10.47	6 975 522	6 975 522	6 975 522	20 926 565
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe							141 252 100	141 252 100	141 252 100	423 756 301
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 5
West and Central Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	304 554.27	12 741 904	12 741 904	12 741 904	38 225 712
Burkina Faso	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	26 931.18	13 468 951	13 468 951	13 468 951	40 406 854
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	92 322.94	13 604 169	13 604 169	13 604 169	40 812 506
Cape Verde	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	1 165 060.37	2 276 831	2 276 831	2 276 831	6 830 493
Central African Republic	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	4 834.78	8 356 328	8 356 328	8 356 328	25 068 985
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	714 318.13	14 718 765	14 718 765	14 718 765	44 156 294
Congo, Dem. Rep.	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		16.16	12 538 265	12 538 265	12 538 265	37 614 796
Congo, Rep.	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	18 899.01	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Cote D'Ivoire	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	9 734.69	3 144 069	3 144 069	3 144 069	9 432 207
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	290 117.41	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	942 881.19	6 916 786	6 916 786	6 916 786	20 750 357
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	998 306.87	11 053 311	11 053 311	11 053 311	33 159 933
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	200 616.60	8 416 526	8 416 526	8 416 526	25 249 578
Guinea Bissau	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		16 701.56	1 591 287	1 591 287	1 591 287	4 773 860
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	772 461.29	9 556 739	9 556 739	9 556 739	28 670 217
Mali	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	27 157.74	9 407 798	9 407 798	9 407 798	28 223 394
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	873 529.24	6 961 346	6 961 346	6 961 346	20 884 037
Niger	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	847 748.11	25 227 443	25 227 443	25 227 443	75 682 329
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	56 193.28	21 263 833	21 263 833	21 263 833	63 791 498
Sao Tome and Principe	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	816 261.14	1 686 371	1 686 371	1 686 371	5 059 112
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	963 953.90	15 593 145	15 593 145	15 593 145	46 779 434
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	106 831.83	5 883 102	5 883 102	5 883 102	17 649 307
Togo	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	13 046.57	1 787 640	1 787 640	1 787 640	5 362 921
Total West and Central Africa							209 194 608	209 194 608	209 194 608	627 583 824
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Scenario 3: [RurPop$^{0.4}$ X GNIpc$^{-0.25}$ X (1 + IVI)] x (0.20 X RSP + 0.80 X PAD)^{4}

Table 1

Asia and the Pacific

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Afghanistan	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	940.28	35 717 903	35 717 903	35 717 903	107 153 709
Bangladesh**	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	1 005.09	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	365.43	21 245 730	21 245 730	21 245 730	63 737 190
China	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	704.05	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
India	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	267.57	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Indonesia	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	970.10	15 570 491	15 570 491	15 570 491	46 711 473
Iran	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		179.39	3 584 358	3 584 358	3 584 358	10 753 074
Korea Dem Rep	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		94.10	2 484 142	2 484 142	2 484 142	7 452 425
Laos	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	248.27	2 838 682	2 838 682	2 838 682	8 516 046
Malaysia	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		367.53	3 681 233	3 681 233	3 681 233	11 043 699
Mongolia	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	919.69	4 548 126	4 548 126	4 548 126	13 644 378
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	147.69	24 101 668	24 101 668	24 101 668	72 305 004
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	261.74	15 560 875	15 560 875	15 560 875	46 682 625
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	381.48	8 401 362	8 401 362	8 401 362	25 204 085
Papua New Guinea*	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	888.32	11 345 523	11 345 523	11 345 523	34 036 569
Philippines	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	703.29	29 617 169	29 617 169	29 617 169	88 851 508
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	317.72	12 690 649	12 690 649	12 690 649	38 071 947
Tonga	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	917.84	1 584 713	1 584 713	1 584 713	4 754 139
Vanuatu	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		214.37	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vietnam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	693.48	36 311 076	36 311 076	36 311 076	108 933 228
Total Asia and the Pacific							382 783 700	382 783 700	382 783 700	1 148 351 099
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

** Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 2
East and Southern Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	904.02	13 548 216	13 548 216	13 548 216	40 644 647
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	7.64	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	913.22	4 298 735	4 298 735	4 298 735	12 896 205
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	2.83	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	351.48	11 137 975	11 137 975	11 137 975	33 413 925
Ethiopia	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	377.66	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	193.57	4 154 859	4 154 859	4 154 859	12 464 576
Madagascar	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	973.73	33 725 941	33 725 941	33 725 941	101 177 824
Malawi	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	157.58	6 360 446	6 360 446	6 360 446	19 081 337
Mauritius*	9 710	758 906	1	5		5	2 841 815	2 841 815	2 841 815	8 525 445
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	306.75	9 846 798	9 846 798	9 846 798	29 540 393
Namibia	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		254.23	1 772 633	1 772 633	1 772 633	5 317 900
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	1 116.55	22 986 068	22 986 068	22 986 068	68 958 203
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1	4.47	4.27	884.22	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa	6 800	19 279 777	1	4.28		334.87	5 706 829	5 706 829	5 706 829	17 120 488
South Sudan*	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	2.75	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Tanzania	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	207.36	6 147 033	6 147 033	6 147 033	18 441 098
Uganda	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	133.02	4 773 022	4 773 022	4 773 022	14 319 067
Zambia	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	211.52	3 915 678	3 915 678	3 915 678	11 747 033
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		211.27	5 579 342	5 579 342	5 579 342	16 738 027
Total East and Southern Africa							193 462 056	193 462 056	193 462 056	580 386 169
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 3
Latin America and the Caribbean

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Argentina	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	373.58	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Belize	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	973.25	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	1 001.72	4 439 038	4 439 038	4 439 038	13 317 115
Brazil	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	1 125.43	15 905 486	15 905 486	15 905 486	47 716 457
Colombia	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	1 009.06	1 711 260	1 711 260	1 711 260	5 133 780
Cuba	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	183.51	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Dominican Republic*	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	3.13	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Ecuador	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	714.93	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
El Salvador	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	402.40	3 236 033	3 236 033	3 236 033	9 708 098
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	456.71	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	263.46	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guyana	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	993.00	1 727 519	1 727 519	1 727 519	5 182 558
Haiti*	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	74.32	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Honduras	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	308.63	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	369.94	15 569 482	15 569 482	15 569 482	46 708 446
Nicaragua	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	971.79	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Paraguay*	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	115.74	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	1 037.46	9 987 956	9 987 956	9 987 956	29 963 868
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	201.59	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	353.65	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total Latin America and Caribbean							72 076 774	72 076 774	72 076 774	216 230 322
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 4

Near East, North Africa and Europe

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Armenia*	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	36.39	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Azerbaijan*	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	112.64	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	329.38	2 998 228	2 998 228	2 998 228	8 994 684
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	940.75	3 803 705	3 803 705	3 803 705	11 411 114
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	371.41	9 195 655	9 195 655	9 195 655	27 586 964
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	1 085.75	7 846 542	7 846 542	7 846 542	23 539 626
Iraq	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73		192.68	3 022 222	3 022 222	3 022 222	9 066 666
Jordan*	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	41.46	2 536 163	2 536 163	2 536 163	7 608 490
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	950.69	12 261 894	12 261 894	12 261 894	36 785 681
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	126.70	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	1 039.23	8 784 754	8 784 754	8 784 754	26 354 263
Montenegro*	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51		412.60	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	732.18	8 343 924	8 343 924	8 343 924	25 031 771
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	243.78	28 269 112	28 269 112	28 269 112	84 807 335
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	494.69	14 516 687	14 516 687	14 516 687	43 550 061
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	1 033.15	9 749 759	9 749 759	9 749 759	29 249 276
Turkey	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	447.75	10 346 284	10 346 284	10 346 284	31 038 853
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	718.90	15 424 533	15 424 533	15 424 533	46 273 599
Yemen	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	180.37	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe							144 599 461	144 599 461	144 599 461	433 798 383
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 5
West and Central Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	551.86	15 913 439	15 913 439	15 913 439	47 740 318
Burkina Faso	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	164.11	9 851 275	9 851 275	9 851 275	29 553 825
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	303.85	17 861 958	17 861 958	17 861 958	53 585 875
Cape Verde	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	1 079.38	2 773 395	2 773 395	2 773 395	8 320 184
Central African Republic*	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	69.53	9 982 353	9 982 353	9 982 353	29 947 058
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	845.17	19 559 474	19 559 474	19 559 474	58 678 423
Congo, Dem. Rep.*	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		4.02	4 576 090	4 576 090	4 576 090	13 728 270
Congo, Rep.*	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	137.47	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Cote D'Ivoire	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	98.66	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	538.63	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	971.02	9 306 722	9 306 722	9 306 722	27 920 167
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	999.15	9 592 137	9 592 137	9 592 137	28 776 411
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	447.90	5 018 117	5 018 117	5 018 117	15 054 352
Guinea Bissau*	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		129.23	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	878.90	12 869 237	12 869 237	12 869 237	38 607 711
Mali	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	164.80	4 177 181	4 177 181	4 177 181	12 531 544
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	934.63	9 170 483	9 170 483	9 170 483	27 511 450
Niger	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	920.73	33 669 342	33 669 342	33 669 342	101 008 025
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	237.05	22 794 005	22 794 005	22 794 005	68 382 014
Sao Tome and Principe*	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	903.47	2 168 003	2 168 003	2 168 003	6 504 010
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	981.81	20 499 772	20 499 772	20 499 772	61 499 316
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	326.85	3 128 358	3 128 358	3 128 358	9 385 074
Togo	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	114.22	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total West and Central Africa							220 411 342	220 411 342	220 411 342	661 234 027
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Scenario 4: [RurPop$^{0.4}$ X GNIpc$^{-0.25}$ X (1 + IVI)] x (0.20 X RSP + 0.80 X PAD)[8]

Table 1

Asia and the Pacific

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Afghanistan**	670	23 315 165	1.76	3.69	5.82	884 117.35	42 648 316	42 648 316	42 648 316	127 944 947
Bangladesh**	1 080	105 761 094	1.51	4.15	5.85	1 010 206.09	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Cambodia	1 020	12 183 722	1.49	3.86	5.81	133 541.98	25 807 658	25 807 658	25 807 658	77 422 974
China	7 380	621 970 693	1.25	4.56	5.87	495 686.79	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
India	1 570	876 057 482	1.50	4.22	5.00	71 593.07	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Indonesia**	3 630	119 586 112	1.45	3.90	4.45	941 099.74	7 802 922	7 802 922	7 802 922	23 408 766
Iran*	5 780	21 212 092	1.49	3.66		32 179.92	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Korea Dem Rep	583	9 831 767	1.51	3.11		8 855.23	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Laos*	1 650	4 177 401	1.44	3.85	3.77	61 636.48	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Malaysia	10 760	7 771 529	1.30	4.38		135 076.81	1 908 537	1 908 537	1 908 537	5 725 611
Mongolia	4 280	837 403	1.54	3.53	5.64	845 834.82	4 773 281	4 773 281	4 773 281	14 319 843
Myanmar	1 270	35 508 458	1.54	3.43	5.45	21 813.72	22 001 591	22 001 591	22 001 591	66 004 772
Nepal	730	23 034 809	1.61	4.11	4.62	68 505.98	9 116 212	9 116 212	9 116 212	27 348 637
Pakistan	1 410	114 166 773	1.59	4.10	3.28	145 526.28	1 672 549	1 672 549	1 672 549	5 017 646
Papua New Guinea	2 020	6 494 432	1.46	3.30	5.64	789 120.66	11 428 111	11 428 111	11 428 111	34 284 332
Philippines*	3 470	55 033 870	1.37	4.55	5.83	494 618.58	40 298 771	40 298 771	40 298 771	120 896 314
Sri Lanka	3 400	16 857 935	1.47	3.91	5.26	100 948.56	11 065 808	11 065 808	11 065 808	33 197 423
Tonga*	4 290	80 634	1.36	3.52	5.66	842 427.64	1 671 409	1 671 409	1 671 409	5 014 227
Vanuatu*	3 130	192 047	1.54	3.83		45 952.89	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Vietnam	1 890	60 833 558	1.38	4.46	5.87	480 914.10	49 847 436	49 847 436	49 847 436	149 542 307
Total Asia and the Pacific							388 042 600	388 042 600	388 042 600	1 164 127 799
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

** Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 2
East and Southern Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Angola	4 850	13 743 305	1.55	3.42	5.67	817 254.24	14 162 938	14 162 938	14 162 938	42 488 813
Botswana*	7 240	950 422	1.37	4.31	0.80	58.36	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Burundi	270	9 544 689	1.57	3.49	3.35	833 962.16	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Comoros*	820	552 907	1.42	3.28	0.60	8.01	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Eritrea	680	3 976 283	1.82	3.65	5.06	123 535.49	8 197 328	8 197 328	8 197 328	24 591 984
Ethiopia	550	78 509 424	1.59	4.04	5.89	142 624.92	50 666 667	50 666 667	50 666 667	152 000 000
Kenya	1 290	33 559 306	1.55	4.25	3.02	37 468.88	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Madagascar**	440	15 447 015	1.64	3.93	5.89	948 148.93	43 440 729	43 440 729	43 440 729	130 322 186
Malawi*	250	14 006 983	1.51	3.72	3.58	24 832.69	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mauritius*	9 710	758 906	1	5		24	2 575 815	2 575 815	2 575 815	7 727 445
Mozambique	620	18 525 030	1.64	4.13	4.04	94 094.38	3 755 193	3 755 193	3 755 193	11 265 579
Namibia*	5 680	1 305 281	1.58	3.99		64 631.29	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Rwanda	700	8 183 945	1.48	4.90	5.80	1 246 684.72	32 351 532	32 351 532	32 351 532	97 054 595
Seychelles*	13 990	42 506	1	4.47	4.27	781 842.69	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
South Africa	6 800	19 279 777	1	4.28		112 136.18	2 695 781	2 695 781	2 695 781	8 087 343
South Sudan*	940	9 696 776	1.61	2.44	0.80	7.55	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Tanzania	930	35 808 913	1.57	4.17	3.33	42 997.18	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Uganda*	680	31 826 108	1.55	4.18	3.04	17 695.19	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Zambia*	1 680	9 358 601	1.45	3.87	3.76	44 739.51	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Zimbabwe	830	10 290 800	1.62	3.81		44 635.34	1 662 797	1 662 797	1 662 797	4 988 391
Total East and Southern Africa							176 008 779	176 008 779	176 008 779	528 026 337
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

** Country receiving the maximum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 3
Latin America and the Caribbean

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Argentina*	14 160	3 608 603	1.32	4.38	2.81	139 562.52	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Belize	4 660	196 519	1.44	3.93	4.35	947 206.38	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bolivia	2 910	3 368 503	1.42	4.13	4.59	1 003 448.06	2 561 824	2 561 824	2 561 824	7 685 472
Brazil	11 530	30 019 367	1.22	4.96	5.80	1 266 592.05	22 524 300	22 524 300	22 524 300	67 572 899
Colombia	7 970	11 392 990	1.28	4.18	3.24	1 018 207.68	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Cuba*	5 890	2 620 609	1.50	4.40	1.22	33 674.95	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Dominican Republic*	6 030	2 282 960	1.35	4.25	2.29	9.79	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Ecuador	6 070	5 802 020	1.31	4.65	2.81	511 129.54	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
El Salvador	3 950	2 061 045	1.33	4.39	4.56	161 922.96	1 915 739	1 915 739	1 915 739	5 747 217
Grenada*	7 850	68 510	1.27	4.31	4.25	208 581.76	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guatemala*	3 410	7 829 174	1.32	4.14	1.25	69 410.06	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guyana	4 170	546 497	1.44	4.07	4.41	986 042.43	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Haiti*	820	4 499 878	1.62	2.68	0.90	5 523.06	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Honduras	2 280	3 651 465	1.35	3.76	3.26	95 249.71	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mexico	9 860	26 367 387	1.33	4.33	5.78	136 852.25	19 997 564	19 997 564	19 997 564	59 992 692
Nicaragua	1 870	2 498 240	1.46	3.92	2.84	944 383.64	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Paraguay*	4 380	2 659 274	1.36	4.00	3.00	13 396.48	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Peru	6 370	6 725 819	1.26	4.38	5.85	1 076 315.26	13 448 037	13 448 037	13 448 037	40 344 111
Uruguay*	16 350	165 778	1.19	4.84	1.26	40 638.57	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Venezuela*	12 890	3 394 430	1.38	4.48	2.93	125 065.37	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total Latin America and Caribbean							82 947 464	82 947 464	82 947 464	248 842 391
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 4
Near East, North Africa and Europe

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Armenia*	3 780	1 117 929	1.49	4.68	1.00	1 324.29	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Azerbaijan*	7 590	4 353 539	1.40	3.89	1.27	12 687.37	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Bosnia and Herzegovina*	4 780	2 305 192	1.35	4.10	4.51	108 490.09	1 620 471	1 620 471	1 620 471	4 861 414
Djibouti	1 690	199 224	1.61	3.69	5.80	885 004.74	4 481 777	4 481 777	4 481 777	13 445 332
Egypt	3 050	50 998 602	1.55	4.75	3.86	137 948.24	3 440 747	3 440 747	3 440 747	10 322 240
Georgia	3 720	2 095 848	1.39	4.70	5.76	1 178 862.82	10 504 303	10 504 303	10 504 303	31 512 908
Iraq*	6 320	10 666 149	1.57	3.73		37 124.27	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Jordan*	5 160	1 093 657	1.34	4.69	4.58	1 718.89	1 605 973	1 605 973	1 605 973	4 817 920
Kyrgyzstan	1 250	3 758 100	1.45	3.76	5.82	903 820.83	14 797 271	14 797 271	14 797 271	44 391 813
Lebanon*	9 800	560 617	1.47	4.38	1.61	16 052.41	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Moldova	2 550	1 958 687	1.51	4.39	5.77	1 080 008.38	11 310 149	11 310 149	11 310 149	33 930 448
Montenegro*	7 240	224 893	1.55	4.51		170 238.44	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Morocco	2 980	13 670 584	1.46	4.81	4.49	536 084.08	5 061 341	5 061 341	5 061 341	15 184 024
Sudan	1 710	26 119 531	1.82	3.76	5.68	59 428.97	31 315 738	31 315 738	31 315 738	93 947 215
Tajikistan	1 080	6 081 514	1.55	3.18	5.76	244 721.56	15 478 643	15 478 643	15 478 643	46 435 929
Tunisia	4 210	3 667 916	1.40	4.35	5.88	1 067 392.22	13 235 290	13 235 290	13 235 290	39 705 869
Turkey	10 840	20 584 500	1.33	5.00	5.14	200 476.12	9 981 346	9 981 346	9 981 346	29 944 037
Uzbekistan	2 090	19 589 736	1.33	3.09	5.63	516 813.26	15 018 212	15 018 212	15 018 212	45 054 635
Yemen*	1 330	17 274 157	1.70	3.92	2.33	32 533.33	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total Near East, North Africa and Europe							146 851 262	146 851 262	146 851 262	440 553 785
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1

Table 5
West and Central Africa

Country	GNI Per Capita 2015	Rural Population 2015	(1+IVI)	RSP 2015	PAD 2016	Country Performance Rating	2016 Annual Allocation	2017 Annual Allocation	2018 Annual Allocation	Total
Benin	810	5 986 659	1.52	3.83	5.67	304 554.27	17 750 222	17 750 222	17 750 222	53 250 667
Burkina Faso*	710	12 484 109	1.62	3.90	4.36	26 931.18	4 600 299	4 600 299	4 600 299	13 800 897
Cameroon	1 360	10 516 806	1.46	3.68	5.80	92 322.94	21 094 317	21 094 317	21 094 317	63 282 952
Cape Verde	3 450	180 689	1.41	4.66	5.62	1 165 060.37	3 394 769	3 394 769	3 394 769	10 184 306
Central African Republic*	330	2 894 168	1.43	2.44	5.48	4 834.78	7 957 543	7 957 543	7 957 543	23 872 629
Chad	980	10 551 569	1.64	2.96	5.81	714 318.13	20 765 434	20 765 434	20 765 434	62 296 302
Congo, Dem. Rep.*	380	43 446 648	1.44	3.08		16.16	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Congo, Rep.*	2 710	1 578 674	1.54	3.52	1.43	18 899.01	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Cote D'Ivoire*	1 460	10 307 708	1.45	2.96	2.07	9 734.69	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gabon*	9 450	220 748	1.29	3.69	2.70	290 117.41	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Gambia	440	790 273	1.49	3.91	5.88	942 881.19	11 914 432	11 914 432	11 914 432	35 743 297
Ghana	1 600	12 484 698	1.41	4.11	4.75	998 306.87	6 157 377	6 157 377	6 157 377	18 472 132
Guinea	470	7 772 864	1.52	3.00	3.93	200 616.60	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Guinea Bissau*	550	926 364	1.46	2.46		16 701.56	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Liberia	370	2 228 701	1.47	3.22	5.86	772 461.29	14 666 555	14 666 555	14 666 555	43 999 664
Mali*	660	10 398 040	1.60	3.91	3.39	27 157.74	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Mauritania	1 270	1 617 424	1.56	3.65	5.81	873 529.24	10 836 201	10 836 201	10 836 201	32 508 602
Niger	420	15 583 614	1.75	3.54	5.85	847 748.11	39 958 377	39 958 377	39 958 377	119 875 131
Nigeria	2 970	94 165 209	1.34	3.62	5.26	56 193.28	18 961 140	18 961 140	18 961 140	56 883 420
Sao Tome and Principe*	1 670	66 131	1.54	3.41	5.74	816 261.14	2 360 516	2 360 516	2 360 516	7 081 548
Senegal	1 040	8 305 694	1.63	3.99	5.82	963 953.90	25 566 047	25 566 047	25 566 047	76 698 140
Sierra Leone	710	3 816 028	1.45	3.66	3.72	106 831.83	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Togo*	570	4 306 879	1.57	3.15	1.00	13 046.57	1 500 000	1 500 000	1 500 000	4 500 000
Total West and Central Africa							219 483 229	219 483 229	219 483 229	658 449 688
Total IFAD							1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	1 013 333 333	3 040 000 000

*Country receiving the minimum allocation

Rural sector performance score: Inputs provided by regional divisions

Portfolio at risk: Project at risk input from regional divisions, Portfolio at risk calculation is based on PBAS methodology as described by the EB document: EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1