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Investing in rural people

República Federal de Nigeria
Evaluación del programa en el país

Nota para los miembros del Comité de Evaluación

Funcionarios de contacto:

Preguntas técnicas:

Oscar A. Garcia
Director
Oficina de Evaluación Independiente del FIDA
Tel.: (+39) 06 5459 2274
Correo electrónico: o.garcia@ifad.org

Johanna Pennarz
Oficial Superior de Evaluación
Oficina de Evaluación Independiente del FIDA
Tel.: (+39) 06 5459 2558
Correo electrónico: j.pennarz@ifad.org

Envío de documentación:

William Skinner
Jefe
Oficina de los Órganos Rectores
Tel.: (+39) 06 5459 2974
Correo electrónico: gb_office@ifad.org

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Para examen

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Agradecimientos

La presente evaluación del programa en el país (EPP) se realizó bajo la dirección de Johanna Pennarz, Oficial Principal de Evaluación de la Oficina de Evaluación Independiente (IOE) del FIDA, y ha contado con las valiosas aportaciones de Nicholas Chapman (consultor superior) y otros consultores, entre ellos Ifyinwa Achike (agrónomo), Nicholas Bourguignon (analista de investigación de evaluación), Stella Odiase (gobernanza) y Aderemi Osijo (sector Privado). Los asistentes de evaluación de la IOE Shaun Ryan y Christina Spagnolo proporcionaron apoyo administrativo.

En la evaluación se han tenido en cuenta las observaciones formuladas por varios funcionarios de la IOE, quienes examinaron el borrador del documento conceptual y el borrador del informe final.

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Resumen

A. Antecedentes

1. Esta evaluación, efectuada en 2015, es la segunda evaluación del programa en el país (EPP) de la República Federal de Nigeria. La evaluación abarca el período comprendido entre 2009 y 2015 y tiene dos objetivos principales: i) evaluar los resultados y el desempeño de la asociación entre el FIDA y el Gobierno a la hora de reducir la pobreza rural, y ii) generar hallazgos y recomendaciones que guíen la asociación futura entre el FIDA y la República Federal de Nigeria. La presente EPP se ha llevado a cabo de acuerdo con el Manual de Evaluación elaborado por la Oficina de Evaluación Independiente del FIDA (IOE) (primera edición) y servirá de base para preparar el nuevo programa sobre oportunidades estratégicas nacionales (COSOP) en 2016.

2. La misión principal al país tuvo lugar en septiembre de 2015 y abarcó numerosas visitas sobre el terreno a nueve estados de la franja central y del sur (Abia, Benue, Cross River, Edo, Lagos, Oyo, Nasarawa, Níger y Rivers), así como reuniones con partes interesadas en Abia, Abuja, Ibadan, Lagos y Port Harcourt. En el marco de la evaluación de los resultados del Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y Rural de Base Comunitaria ya se habían realizado visitas sobre el terreno a cuatro estados del norte (Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi y Sokoto).

B. Programa sobre oportunidades estratégicas nacionales (COSOP) del FIDA

3. Pertinencia del COSOP. El segundo COSOP del FIDA (2010-2015) coincidía en líneas generales con las prioridades normativas del Gobierno de Nigeria fijadas por la última administración en 2010. En este segundo COSOP, el programa dio un giro estratégico hacia el eje principal de la labor del FIDA, la agricultura, sin dejar de tener en cuenta la ventaja comparativa del Fondo, que estriba en luchar contra la pobreza y la penuria de las comunidades por medio de la creación de activos y fortaleciendo las capacidades a nivel comunitario. Este giro supuso dejar de lado las amplias inversiones de índole social y económica basadas en un enfoque de desarrollo impulsado por la comunidad para centrarse en temas relacionados con las cadenas de valor de productos básicos orientadas al mercado y la financiación rural.

4. En el segundo COSOP se siguió un método coherente para seleccionar los sectores, las regiones y los grupos objetivo. En el norte, el FIDA promovió las instituciones y los servicios comunitarios con el acento en la agricultura. Dado que esta es la zona del país con menor cobertura de servicios e infraestructuras del Gobierno, la estrategia de invertir en el empoderamiento de las comunidades y en infraestructuras fue acertada. En el Delta del Níger, la densidad demográfica es elevada y hay un mejor acceso a los mercados, por lo que resultó apropiado crear empleo rural para la gran proporción de jóvenes y las mujeres que seguían viviendo en el medio rural y promover las empresas rurales agrícolas y no agrícolas. En la franja central, donde hay grandes extensiones de tierra poco explotadas y un buen acceso a los mercados, la estrategia de aumentar los rendimientos proporcionando tecnologías, insumos y servicios de crédito fue pertinente.

5. Eficacia del COSOP. Durante el período abarcado por el COSOP, los programas respaldados por el FIDA llegaron a 9,2 millones de beneficiarios de los 14,2 millones previstos. Esta cifra representa alrededor del 10 % de la población rural, estimada en 98 millones de habitantes, de los que la mayoría reside en zonas remotas con escasos recursos. La EPP muestra que el FIDA ha contribuido eficazmente a mantener la tendencia general de reducción de la pobreza en el país, sobre todo en los estados más pobres del norte, donde las operaciones del FIDA fueron esenciales para respaldar los medios de vida de las comunidades a las que

se dirigía la ayuda. Aunque el número de beneficiarios fue inferior al previsto en la evaluación ex ante, el enfoque de concentrar los esfuerzos en un número limitado de aldeas permitió que la ejecución en estos lugares fuera satisfactoria, eficiente y a menudo sostenible. Sin embargo, teniendo en cuenta el tamaño del país, la escala del impacto sigue siendo limitada, y las estadísticas sobre la pobreza reflejan en general una brecha cada vez más grande entre las zonas rurales y urbanas, y entre ricos y pobres.

C. Resultados de la cartera de proyectos

6. La cartera del FIDA en curso comprende cuatro operaciones: el Programa de Ordenación Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger, el Programa de Creación de Instituciones de Financiación Rural, el Programa de Desarrollo de las Cadenas de Valor, y el Programa de Adaptación al Cambio Climático y Apoyo a los Agronegocios en el Cinturón de la Sabana.

Pertinencia

7. Diseño del programa. Los programas se caracterizan por presentar, de un modo u otro, diseños excesivamente complejos y ambiciosos. Esto incluye ámbitos geográficos muy amplios, disposiciones de ejecución de múltiples niveles, una colaboración con una gran variedad de asociados o una combinación ambiciosa de inversiones y actividades. Aunque este enfoque garantiza que las intervenciones tengan una base amplia y puedan abordar distintas necesidades y dimensiones de la pobreza, también dificulta su ejecución, sobre todo conociendo las capacidades de los estados y las administraciones locales.

8. Modificaciones al diseño Los programas del FIDA tenían una duración larga (alrededor de diez años, incluyendo prórrogas), razón por la cual se han debido introducir múltiples ajustes en el diseño según iba evolucionando la estrategia del Fondo en el país o cuando las misiones de supervisión ponían de relieve necesidades específicas en este sentido. Este aspecto ha repercutido considerablemente en la pertinencia: los programas más antiguos han tenido que volver a diseñarse o reajustarse en sumo grado para que sean acordes con la orientación estratégica general del FIDA. Estos cambios han creado confusión sobre el terreno y reducido los plazos de ejecución. Los planes que ya se habían puesto en común con las comunidades tuvieron que modificarse a instancias del FIDA, lo que debilitó el sentido de apropiación local, y el personal estatal tuvo que adaptar la orientación en cuestiones técnicas.

9. Focalización en la pobreza. La ambición del FIDA en un país tan extenso y económicamente diverso como Nigeria es lograr llegar a las comunidades más pobres y evitar los estados y regiones más prósperos. En consecuencia, el FIDA ha centrado más su apoyo en las regiones más pobres del norte y reducido las inversiones en el sur, en mejor situación económica. Ante la ausencia de datos fiables sobre la pobreza a nivel subestatal, la focalización dentro de los estados y las administraciones locales siguió siendo un desafío. En los programas se emplearon métodos participativos para seleccionar los lugares y los hogares más pobres, pero a juzgar por la documentación empírica disponible, el proceso que tuvo lugar efectivamente fue más bien poco claro. Los criterios de focalización directa señalaron como beneficiarios a las mujeres y los jóvenes.

10. Conflictos y fragilidad. Aunque Nigeria ha dejado de considerarse un Estado frágil, existen zonas en determinadas regiones en las que reina un clima de grave inseguridad e insurrección. Dada la escala de intervención del FIDA, los programas han sido vulnerables a los conflictos, las rebeliones y los disturbios, ya fuera en el nordeste con Boko Haram, en la franja central por los conflictos entre pastores y agricultores o en la región del Delta por la violencia y los disturbios. La mayor parte de los programas no incluye un análisis de conflictos o una evaluación de riesgos sobre la forma en que los cambios introducidos por el FIDA afectarían a las situaciones de conflicto e inseguridad, ya sea positiva o negativamente, ni tampoco

medidas de mitigación. Cuando se propone una estrategia de mitigación en el diseño, el principal objetivo es seleccionar administraciones locales o aldeas que se encuentren fuera de las zonas conocidas de conflicto y hallar lugares seguros desde donde fortalecer las capacidades del personal y los beneficiarios ubicados en áreas conflictivas.

Eficacia

11. La consecución de resultados se ha visto afectada por un lento desembolso de los fondos, los trastornos ligados a las modificaciones del diseño y los cambios en las normas relativas al desembolso de los préstamos. En consecuencia, el alcance no ha sido el esperado en el caso del Programa de Expansión del Cultivo de Raíces y Tubérculos y del Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y Rural de Base Comunitaria, ha sido satisfactorio en el caso del Programa de Ordenación Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger e incierto en el caso del Programa de Creación de Instituciones de Financiación Rural por presentar cifras cuestionables. En el ámbito del acceso a los servicios financieros, el fortalecimiento de capacidades de las comunidades y la creación de empleo se registraron logros notables. En los lugares seleccionados, los beneficios generados en materia de creación de activos y difusión de tecnologías han sido muy buenos. La focalización geográfica podría haber sido más rigurosa, pero la focalización en la población pobre, las mujeres y los jóvenes en el seno de las comunidades ha sido buena.

12. Retrasos. Los programas sufrieron retrasos en la ejecución debidos a problemas vinculados primero con los convenios de préstamo y cuestiones de eficacia, y después al lento desembolso o bloqueo de los fondos de contrapartida. En promedio, el retraso en la efectividad de los préstamos para los programas examinados en la presente EPP fue de 32 meses y 26 días, más del doble de la media del FIDA, de alrededor de un año. Los programas iniciados más recientemente se están retrasando tanto como los que forman parte de la cartera desde hace tiempo. Ello se debe, entre otros motivos, a retrasos a la hora de obtener acuerdos legislativos a nivel federal y estatal, de cumplir las condiciones de los préstamos, (por ejemplo, nombramientos de personal) y de abrir las cuentas bancarias necesarias. Las demoras experimentadas en los primeros años de vida del programa pueden acabar provocando que no se desembolsen los fondos de préstamo del FIDA o que su reposición sea lenta.

13. Fondos de contrapartida. Pese a saberse por operaciones previas del FIDA que el nivel de compromiso de los gobiernos estatales era variado y, por lo general, bajo, algunos programas de seguimiento siguieron dependiendo en gran medida de esas contribuciones de contrapartida. El motivo subyacente de la reticencia de muchos estados a proporcionar los fondos de contrapartida convenidos fue la baja prioridad otorgada a la agricultura en contraposición a los sectores sociales, el transporte o la fabricación, especialmente en el sur. Incluso cuando el FIDA redujo el porcentaje de financiación estatal, el lento e imprevisible flujo de fondos de contrapartida siguió minando los resultados de la cartera.

Eficiencia

14. Supervisión. Aunque las misiones fueron regulares y las conclusiones se documentaron de forma rigurosa, la EPP concluyó que los miembros de las misiones no siempre tenían la suficiente experiencia o esta no siempre fue empleada de manera sistemática, con una gran heterogeneidad en el personal y los ámbitos de especialización. Este aspecto afectó a los programas de mayor duración, ya que el diseño tuvo que modificarse considerablemente a mitad de período e incorporar numerosos ajustes técnicos menores en respuesta a las misiones de supervisión. Al introducir cambios imprevistos en los programas se generó ineficiencia, lo que a su vez redundó en un desperdicio de recursos.

15. Cambios políticos. Otro factor similar de ineficiencia tiene que ver con los efectos derivados de los frecuentes cambios políticos en los distintos niveles de gobierno causados por procesos electorales, retrasos burocráticos y otros trastornos. La renovación de personal asociada al ciclo electoral creó la necesidad de justificar y defender una y otra vez el enfoque del programa ante las nuevas autoridades, muchas de las cuales llegaban con prioridades nuevas y un deseo comprensible de que las personas a las que representaban se beneficiaran de los proyectos financiados por los donantes.

16. Gastos generales de gestión. El gran número de estados y administraciones locales involucrados en los programas elevó los gastos generales de gestión. Las unidades de coordinación de los programas tenían sus recursos saturados, por lo que les era complicado trabajar eficazmente en tantos estados y administraciones locales. En consecuencia, los gastos generales asociados al seguimiento, la supervisión y la promoción ante los dirigentes locales fueron elevados. Los costos de gestión representaron más del 20 % del costo total en todos los programas. Los programas de desarrollo impulsado por la comunidad generaron costos de gestión de casi el 30 %; esto se debió a una administración descentralizada de los fondos donde cada estado procesaba un elevado número de solicitudes de retiro de fondos para efectuar gastos autorizados de cuantías relativamente pequeñas.

17. En cuanto al uso óptimo de los recursos, los programas de desarrollo impulsados por la comunidad tuvieron un mejor desempeño que los demás: se sirvieron de mano de obra directa y utilizaron algunos materiales locales para crear activos. El FIDA casi nunca recurrió a contratistas, sino que dejó que las comunidades administraran directamente las inversiones con el apoyo del gobierno local y el personal de los programas; este aspecto permitió reducir los gastos generales y de subcontratación. La comunidad utilizó materiales locales siempre que fue posible, ya fuera para construir escuelas, granjas piscícolas o hacer perforaciones. En relación con la eficiencia en la asignación de los recursos, los programas impulsados por la comunidad aprovecharon bien los recursos porque los fondos se invirtieron en activos basados en preferencias expresadas por la comunidad, en lugar de proporcionados por el gobierno local u otras entidades sin tener debidamente en cuenta las prioridades locales.

D. Impacto en la pobreza rural

18. Ingresos y activos de los hogares. Se ha registrado un incremento notable de los activos en las aldeas destinatarias de los programas, especialmente en las zonas de intervención del Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y Rural de Base Comunitaria y el Programa de Ordenación Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger. El gran volumen de inversión social y económica canalizado en los últimos diez años, y su concentración en un determinado grupo de comunidades, ha permitido aumentar los activos y los ingresos de numerosos beneficiarios directos. En muchas zonas más remotas, el apoyo del FIDA fue la principal fuente de actividades de desarrollo. Al estar el proceso impulsado por la comunidad, era más pertinente y logró suscitar un mayor sentido de apropiación entre los beneficiarios que en otras zonas. Sin embargo, el impacto podría haber sido mayor si las modificaciones a los diseños no hubieran reducido el período de ejecución previsto para obtener resultados más trascendentales a mayor escala.

19. Capital humano y social y empoderamiento. La formación de grupos, la transferencia de las labores de planificación y toma de decisiones de inversión a los comités de aldea, y el principio de que los menos privilegiados tengan acceso a estos activos y puedan opinar sobre su uso han impulsado el capital social y empoderado a la población más pobre en las comunidades seleccionadas. En el marco del Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y Rural de Base Comunitaria, 8 280 grupos de agricultores representantes de distintos intereses, oficios y ramas permitieron que las comunidades asumieran la responsabilidad de su desarrollo y aumentaron la capacidad de acción colectiva. En el Programa de Ordenación

Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger, la importancia atribuida al empoderamiento de los jóvenes fue un logro destacado. El aumento de los ingresos fomentó la confianza de estos grupos y, para algunos, ha tenido una repercusión fundamental en sus vidas. Entre otros beneficios sociales importantes se observó también una reducción de la emigración juvenil a medida que aumentaban las oportunidades laborales y una disminución de la delincuencia y el vandalismo.

20. Seguridad alimentaria y productividad agrícola. Los estudios de impacto indican que se ha producido un aumento notable de la producción y la productividad en las zonas de intervención de los programas. Sin embargo, se desconoce en qué medida pueden atribuirse estos cambios al FIDA. En los estados donde se llevan a cabo los programas del FIDA existen otros programas de apoyo a la agricultura y no es fácil separar la influencia de estos del apoyo prestado por el FIDA. La gran envergadura del sector y el papel bastante limitado del gasto público (contando tanto el gasto interno como la ayuda extranjera) en la promoción del crecimiento parecen indicar que el incremento de la producción agrícola se debió, en su mayor parte, a las inversiones privadas.

21. Instituciones y políticas. Los programas del FIDA han influido considerablemente en las instituciones locales y, a través de ellas, también en una serie de servicios que benefician a la población pobre, entre ellos, los servicios de apoyo social, a la producción y de crédito. La institucionalización de las asociaciones de desarrollo comunitario como un cuarto nivel de gobierno es un resultado importante del Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y Rural de Base Comunitaria. Si bien las asociaciones centrales de desarrollo de productos básicos creadas en el marco del Programa de Ordenación Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger son recientes, ya gozan de una amplia aceptación. En mayor o menor medida, estas estructuras de desarrollo comunitarias a nivel de aldea han sido adoptadas de forma generalizada dentro y fuera de las zonas de intervención de los programas. Aun cuando existan injerencias políticas en la selección de las localidades y los líderes, estos grupos actúan como órganos de propiedad local que canalizan recursos y facilitan la expresión de las opiniones y prioridades de aquellos que suelen vivir en comunidades remotas y desvalidas. En los estados de Katsina, Kebbi y Sokoto se han introducido disposiciones legislativas y asignado fondos para reproducir el enfoque de asociaciones de desarrollo comunitario en las administraciones locales que no reciben apoyo del FIDA, así como en nuevas aldeas dentro de las administraciones locales respaldadas anteriormente por el Fondo.

E. Otros criterios relativos a los resultados

22. Igualdad de género y empoderamiento de la mujer. Por lo general, la capacidad de los programas para involucrar a las mujeres en las actividades ha sido cada vez más eficaz. La cuestión relativa a la sostenibilidad de la inclusión y el empoderamiento de las mujeres es más difícil de verificar, pues hay pocos datos empíricos que muestren cómo las mujeres han aprovechado las oportunidades brindadas por los programas para mejorar su estatus económico y social. Las evaluaciones realizadas sobre el terreno en el marco de la EPP parecen indicar que, aunque los programas del FIDA han aumentado la participación de las mujeres en las actividades de desarrollo comunitario, su impacto en las esferas de toma de decisiones, empoderamiento y cambio social no es tan grande. Quizás la limitación más importante de las estrategias de los programas en materia de género ha sido no haber tenido debidamente en cuenta las diferencias étnicas y religiosas. A la hora de definir enfoques eficaces para abordar la igualdad de género y el empoderamiento de las mujeres, es fundamental entender la diversidad étnica y religiosa de Nigeria y cómo influye en el reparto de funciones entre hombres y mujeres y en los procesos socioeconómicos (por ejemplo, en las cadenas de valor y la inclusión financiera).

23. Innovación y ampliación de escala. La expansión del enfoque de desarrollo impulsado por las comunidades es la innovación más importante de los programas del FIDA basados en estos contextos. Las inversiones del Fondo proporcionaron la estructura y los principios para la aplicación de este enfoque en las aldeas. En el caso del Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y Rural de Base Comunitaria, estos esfuerzos influyeron en la modalidad de trabajo entre el gobierno local y el cuarto nivel de gobernanza que acababa de instituirse. Otro logro importante de este programa ha sido la demostración de un modelo a gran escala de producción de semillas certificadas de calidad procedentes de agricultores de Yobe y Jigawa. La iniciativa juvenil "Jóvenes en la Agricultura" fue una estrategia bien concebida para abordar el problema de la delincuencia y el desempleo entre los jóvenes del Delta. Sin embargo, el éxito del FIDA a la hora de promover la reproducción y la ampliación de escala de esas innovaciones fue limitado. El Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y Rural de Base Comunitaria parece ser el único que logró extender considerablemente el enfoque de desarrollo impulsado por la comunidad.

24. Las cuestiones relativas a los recursos naturales, el medio ambiente y el cambio climático no ocuparon un lugar destacado en la cartera del FIDA durante el período abarcado por la EPP, y la proporción de fondos destinados a estas esferas en las comunidades fue muy reducida. La creación de empleo rural por medio del fomento de actividades empresariales en ámbitos como la piscicultura, la producción de arroz y yuca, y la cría de aves de corral ha sido beneficiosa para el medio ambiente al disminuir la incidencia de prácticas más destructivas. Por otro lado, al desplazar el eje de trabajo a las cadenas de valor, la financiación rural, los procesos de elaboración y comercialización, se ha hecho menos hincapié en el desarrollo de sistemas de producción agrícola más sostenibles. El norte de Nigeria está particularmente afectado por el cambio climático y la relación entre la creciente presión que sufren las comunidades pastoriles y agrícolas y la variabilidad del clima es cada vez más evidente. En el marco del Programa de Adaptación al Cambio Climático y Apoyo a los Agronegocios en el Cinturón de la Sabana está previsto efectuar un análisis exhaustivo de las implicaciones del cambio climático en el Sahel, y actualmente se está prestando mayor atención a esta esfera. La donación del Programa de Adaptación para la Agricultura en Pequeña Escala (ASAP) se destinará específicamente a medidas relacionadas con el clima para los agricultores. No obstante, los múltiples objetivos del programa (comercialización, empresas, gobernanza) pueden reducir las oportunidades de abordar el cambio climático dadas las prioridades concurrentes de estas esferas.

F. Actividades no crediticias

25. Actuación normativa. El establecimiento de una oficina del FIDA en el país en 2008 permitió que surgieran posibilidades más eficaces y rentables de participar en diálogos sobre estrategias de desarrollo y actividades del programa. Por conducto de su oficina en el país, el FIDA ha participado activamente en el Grupo de Trabajo de los Socios en el Desarrollo Agrícola, cuyas reuniones mensuales copreside desde 2015. En este grupo, los donantes pueden intercambiar buenas prácticas y conocimientos, organizar actividades de seguimiento conjunto y acordar la división del trabajo siguiendo un enfoque armónico del tratamiento de cuestiones y prioridades en materia de políticas relacionadas con la agricultura y el desarrollo rural. En 2012, por medio de la donación titulada "Apoyo al diseño de una estrategia y plan de acción para incrementar el impacto de las cadenas de valor de productos básicos en Nigeria" se crearon vínculos normativos positivos en el marco del Programa de Transformación Agrícola del Ministerio Federal de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural. También vale la pena destacar la contribución del FIDA al diálogo sobre políticas relacionadas con la microfinanciación, las cadenas de valor y el desarrollo comunitario.

26. Gestión de los conocimientos. Ha habido un notable aumento de las actividades de gestión de los conocimientos emprendidas por la oficina del FIDA en el país, apoyado por una estrategia específica y el uso eficiente de los recursos disponibles. La atención se ha centrado en intercambiar conocimientos sobre el enfoque de desarrollo impulsado por la comunidad a fin de promover el diálogo sobre enfoques participativos y animar a los gobiernos locales a trabajar con las comunidades. Además, se intercambiaron conocimientos prácticos con las comunidades locales para aprender de las experiencias y desarrollar procedimientos apropiados con respecto a este enfoque; este ejercicio ha ayudado en la elaboración de programas posteriores, como el Programa de Ordenación Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger y el Programa de Desarrollo de las Cadenas de Valor. Sin embargo, teniendo en cuenta la experiencia considerable del FIDA en aplicar este tipo de enfoques en Nigeria, la documentación de estas actividades de gestión de los conocimientos realizadas a la que puede accederse públicamente es prácticamente inexistente.

27. Creación de asociaciones. Desde que el gerente del programa en Nigeria está destinado en el país, se han incrementado los esfuerzos para crear asociaciones con un amplio abanico de partes interesadas. Sin embargo, al no contar con una estrategia de asociación, los contactos han sido ocasionales y determinados por las circunstancias, y se han centrado en las necesidades de programas específicos en lugar de establecerse a un nivel más estratégico. A nivel local, las asociaciones entre los programas respaldados por el FIDA son muy escasas y, pese a la consolidada presencia del Fondo en ciertos estados y administraciones locales, los pactos en materia de cofinanciación son muy escasos. A nivel nacional, los progresos del FIDA en la creación de asociaciones se han visto obstaculizados por la falta de recursos y la necesidad de dar prioridad a los programas con retrasos en la ejecución. La ausencia del sector privado, especialmente en la cartera anterior, es un factor crítico teniendo en cuenta que toda la cartera se ha reorientado hacia los mercados y las actividades de elaboración. La cofinanciación de los programas por parte de otros donantes no ha sido un aspecto característico de las asociaciones del FIDA en Nigeria y es una deficiencia importante porque fue una de las recomendaciones más destacadas del examen a mitad de período del COSOP. En su lugar, las asociaciones con otros agentes de desarrollo han sido especialmente positivas en lo que respecta a la ejecución conjunta y el intercambio de conocimientos.

28. Donaciones. En el período abarcado por la EPP, se han concedido 20 donaciones por un total de USD 39,19 millones. Las donaciones giran en torno a temas importantes de la cartera de Nigeria, como la mejora de los cultivos alimentarios y las cadenas de valor para reducir la pobreza y la vulnerabilidad en las zonas rurales. Las donaciones relacionadas con la investigación para el desarrollo tuvieron cierta repercusión a escala nacional, pero los esfuerzos por aprovechar y compartir esos conocimientos para que pudieran aplicarse inmediatamente en los proyectos respaldados por el FIDA en el país fueron limitados. El uso eficaz de esos conocimientos requeriría contar con servicios de extensión para distribuir estas tecnologías, pero estos se ven afectados por las restricciones presupuestarias y de capacidad ligadas a la pérdida de relevancia del Programa de Desarrollo Agrícola y la disminución de los fondos gubernamentales. Han sido pocas las donaciones utilizadas para crear asociaciones con ONG, pero ofrecen buenos ejemplos de aprendizaje y han creado vínculos con otras operaciones, en especial las donaciones concedidas al Centro Songhai (Benin) para promover el desarrollo de los jóvenes de las zonas rurales y los negocios agrícolas y crear oportunidades para los jóvenes de las zonas rurales.

G. Conclusiones

29. Focalización geográfica. La focalización geográfica y la atención a la pobreza han mejorado en la cartera del FIDA asociada al segundo COSOP, pero el alcance amplio en numerosas regiones (27 de los 36 estados del país) generó disparidades y no pudieron establecerse sinergias entre los programas. En los estados en que se llevan a cabo diferentes programas del FIDA, un mejor enfoque del solapamiento geográfico podría llevar a un uso más eficiente del personal capacitado, a aprovechar las capacidades de los gobiernos locales y a mejorar la sostenibilidad de los activos y los grupos existentes en las comunidades.

30. El fortalecimiento de la oficina del FIDA en el país impulsó la labor asociativa y la participación en la elaboración de políticas. Sin embargo, habida cuenta del tamaño del país y la complejidad del sistema federal, las capacidades disponibles parecen seguir siendo insuficientes para abordar múltiples funciones, entre ellas el apoyo a la ejecución, el diálogo sobre políticas y la creación de asociaciones. A nivel estatal, se emprendieron pocas actividades de análisis o asesoramiento normativo acerca de cuestiones contextuales que influyen en los resultados de la cartera, como la gobernanza y la lucha contra la corrupción, los conflictos sociales y la legislación estatal de apoyo al crecimiento de las empresas y mejora de la seguridad alimentaria. Las asociaciones se forjaron en su mayoría en el marco de los programas para abordar temas específicos de estos como la investigación sobre agricultura y microfinanciación, la capacitación de los agricultores y la financiación rural. La inexistencia de asociaciones sólidas con otros actores influyentes como el Banco Mundial, el Ministerio Británico para el Desarrollo Internacional (DFID) y la Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) a través de programas cofinanciados ha limitado la capacidad de movilización del FIDA a nivel federal y estatal.

31. Persisten problemas importantes que ya se señalaron en la última EPP (2008). Ante todo, la complejidad administrativa continuó siendo un factor que dificultó las operaciones del FIDA, puesto que dio lugar a retrasos en el flujo de fondos y un escaso apoyo de las contrapartes. Los programas se vieron afectados también por los problemas relacionados con la mala gobernanza. La concesión de crédito a los gobiernos estatales no resolvió el problema de la financiación de contrapartida debido a la falta de apropiación y responsabilidad de los estados. El problema de la financiación de contrapartida es crucial y, si no se halla una solución, seguirá perjudicando gravemente a los resultados de la cartera en Nigeria. Otro problema conexo es la dispersión geográfica de las actividades, distribuidas en un gran número de estados, que limita el impacto de la financiación del FIDA.

32. A nivel federal sigue habiendo problemas de capacidad y funciones de coordinación deficientes. Pese a la proliferación de asociados a nivel federal, no se ha avanzado demasiado en la ampliación de la estructura de ejecución y coordinación más allá del Ministerio Federal de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, la Comisión Nacional de Planificación y el Consejo Nacional de Semillas Agrícolas. La falta de una unidad de coordinación de políticas bien estructurada en el seno del Ministerio Federal de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural es un gran obstáculo a la eficacia de la actuación normativa y la difusión de los resultados entre los contrapartes gubernamentales. La ausencia de una función de coordinación sólida en el Ministerio Federal de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural o en la Comisión Nacional de Planificación también ha dificultado la creación de asociaciones estratégicas. En cuanto al personal específico de los programas, no se ha avanzado lo suficiente en conseguir la combinación de experiencia y competencia necesaria que se ajuste a la nueva orientación temática. Por ejemplo, para gestionar las actividades relacionadas con la financiación rural y las cadenas de valor se necesita contar con suficiente personal con experiencia en el sector privado.

33. Aún deben establecerse mayores sinergias entre préstamos y donaciones, como se recomendó en la última EPP. Algunas donaciones se utilizaron para respaldar la aplicación de políticas a nivel federal con buenos resultados. Sin embargo, la mayoría de las donaciones seguían teniendo un enfoque regional, lo que limitaba los vínculos entre el principal receptor de las donaciones del FIDA (el Instituto Internacional de Agricultura Tropical [IITA]) y las operaciones respaldadas por el Fondo. La utilización de donaciones de contrapartida para subvencionar inversiones extraordinarias es insostenible y no se corresponde con las orientaciones técnicas y la documentación sobre buenas prácticas del FIDA.

34. La eficacia de la gestión de los conocimientos se vio limitada por el uso de sistemas deficientes de seguimiento y evaluación (SyE). El FIDA podría aportar una inmensa experiencia sobre el terreno al discurso normativo sobre la base de la recopilación sistemática de datos empíricos de sus operaciones. Sin embargo, las lagunas de información percibidas y la ausencia de una evaluación empírica sólida del impacto indican que los datos derivados del SyE de los programas han de utilizarse con prudencia para apoyar el discurso normativo. Los estudios de referencia y los estudios del impacto elaborados en el marco de varios programas no colmaron las expectativas, por lo que su aplicación ha sido muy restringida. La ausencia de estudios temáticos también ha hecho difícil determinar la eficacia y el impacto de los programas respaldados por el FIDA.

35. Los programas tampoco propiciaron lo suficiente la participación del sector privado. Teniendo en cuenta la nueva orientación de la cartera hacia los mercados y la elaboración, es fundamental contar con la colaboración del sector privado en la ejecución. Los propios informes del Programa de Transformación Agrícola también subrayan la necesidad de movilizar asociaciones con el sector privado en materia de fertilizantes, semillas y procesos de elaboración. La participación del sector privado ha aumentado, especialmente en el Programa de Creación de Instituciones de Financiación Rural y el Programa de Creación de Instituciones de Financiación Rural. Sin embargo, las estructuras de ejecución de estos programas siguieron apoyándose demasiado en entidades públicas del plano federal y local. Podía haberse aprovechado la oportunidad de incluir a inversores privados en calidad de cofinanciadores, pero no se ha hecho. Incluso en el ámbito normativo tampoco se ha dedicado suficiente atención a favorecer la intervención del sector privado en el sector agrícola.

36. La decisión de llevar a cabo programas más grandes hizo aún más difícil abordar problemas relacionados con la gobernanza local, la fragilidad y la diversidad cultural. Este giro no mejoró la eficiencia general de la ejecución, como se había previsto, porque los equipos de coordinación y los fondos de los programas estaban repartidos en un gran número de estados. Además, la diversidad política y cultural del país hizo difícil intervenir en cuestiones de gobernanza local. En el diseño y la ejecución de la cartera se han pasado prácticamente por alto aspectos cruciales de la gobernanza, como la fragilidad y los conflictos. El proceso de inclusión de los estados en los programas debería haber integrado un análisis más profundo de las cuestiones de gobernanza local.

37. Aunque la selección de los estados que se incluirían en los programas corrió a cargo del Gobierno nacional, el FIDA podría haber proporcionado criterios más claros con los que determinar el compromiso y la voluntad política de apoyar un programa conjunto, como: la estabilidad política, prioridades comunes (por ejemplo, desarrollo comunitario o agricultura en pequeña escala) y buenos antecedentes (por ejemplo, en materia de reforma del sector público, rendimiento financiero o rendición de cuentas por los resultados de desarrollo). El logro de un fuerte sentido de apropiación parece estar asociado a unidades geográficas más pequeñas y zonas de intervención más homogéneas, como ocurrió en el caso de programas anteriores en el norte. Si se hubiera prestado suficiente atención a los aspectos relacionados con la gobernanza, el FIDA podría haber desarrollado un

enfoque más adaptativo a nivel estatal. Este tipo de enfoque debería permitir fomentar las asociaciones, fortalecer el sentido de apropiación local, mantener el compromiso y responder de forma proactiva a las crisis y los imprevistos.

H. Recomendaciones

38. Aparte de las recomendaciones formuladas en la última EPP, la presente evaluación ofrece las recomendaciones siguientes.

39. Recomendación 1. Aumentar la concentración geográfica, transformar las asociaciones a nivel estatal y plantear niveles realistas de financiación de contrapartida.

Deberían explorarse las siguientes opciones:

a) Desarrollar un mecanismo transparente de selección de estados adoptando criterios claros que tengan en cuenta los indicadores de pobreza y gobernanza sobre la base de un análisis sólido.

b) Llevar a cabo una evaluación adecuada de la gobernanza y las finanzas públicas del estado en cuestión durante la evaluación institucional que se realiza en la fase de diseño antes de extraer conclusiones sobre su compromiso y su capacidad de contribuir (“conoce a tu cliente”).

c) Adoptar estrategias para atraer la atención de los gobernadores de los estados y obtener su compromiso, como por ejemplo: i) ejercer presión a través de los asociados federales; ii) dirigir mayores inversiones a menos estados; iii) ofrecer recompensas a los estados que obtengan mejores resultados; iv) aumentar la presencia del FIDA en estados clave; v) mantener la financiación de contrapartida en niveles viables, por ejemplo, un tanto por ciento del mínimo o cero, y que la contribución de los beneficiarios sea indispensable para desembolsar los fondos.

d) Concebir estrategias para fortalecer el sentido de apropiación local, por ejemplo, desarrollando programas que se concentren en menos estados y abarquen una zona geográfica más pequeña o más homogénea.

e) Fortalecer la actuación normativa a nivel estatal para garantizar que los programas respaldados por el FIDA ocupen un lugar prioritario en la agenda política.

40. Recomendación 2. Aumentar la capacidad de movilización y la presencia en las operaciones.

El FIDA puede mejorar su eficacia y eficiencia cambiando la forma en que presta apoyo a la ejecución.

a) Hay opciones para establecer lazos más coherentes entre diferentes programas y entre estos y actividades no crediticias, por ejemplo, vinculando las iniciativas de financiación rural del Programa de Creación de Instituciones de Financiación Rural con las actividades en cadenas de valor del Programa de Creación de Instituciones de Financiación Rural, especialmente a nivel local. Estos vínculos deben ir acompañados de un mecanismo de coordinación más integrado a nivel estatal.

b) Las misiones de supervisión deberán mejorar la coherencia de las recomendaciones y una comprensión progresiva de las cuestiones, por ejemplo, estableciendo un equipo principal al que se incorporarán especialistas en temas específicos según sea necesario. Siempre que se recomienden cambios de enfoque habrá que tener debidamente en cuenta la repercusión que tendrán en los compromisos ya asumidos en el marco del programa y su comprensión por parte de la comunidad.

c) El FIDA debería destinar capacidades técnicas a afianzar las relaciones con estados clave. Debería estudiarse la manera adecuada de descentralizar el personal del Fondo en estados y regiones clave, con la función de impulsar el diálogo estratégico sobre políticas con los gobiernos estatales y las administraciones locales.

d) Para aumentar la capacidad de movilización de la oficina en el país, el FIDA también necesita establecer contactos de alto nivel con representantes clave de los gobiernos entrantes (por ejemplo, nuevos ministros) a fin de promover un diálogo sobre orientaciones de política.

e) El FIDA también debería aprovechar los debates que mantiene sobre los resultados del sector rural y los resultados de la cartera en el marco de su sistema de asignación de recursos basado en los resultados (PBAS) para actuar a un nivel de políticas más alto.

41. Recomendación 3. Destinar recursos a cuestiones transversales que requieran mayor atención y un análisis más detenido a fin de facilitar la sostenibilidad de los resultados de los programas.

Dada la complejidad y dificultad del contexto, para entender las cuestiones transversales es necesario efectuar más análisis y que además sean más exhaustivos. Estos análisis deberían basarse en la elaboración de estudios y la extracción de enseñanzas en el marco de los programas y las donaciones. Su objetivo debería ser encontrar cauces para intervenir de manera más eficaz en cuestiones transversales más allá del día a día de la ejecución. Entre las cuestiones transversales más importantes cabe destacar:

a) Jóvenes. A este respecto se han emprendido algunas iniciativas loables, por ejemplo en el Programa de Ordenación Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger, que podrían servir de base para otras y cuya continuidad debe respaldarse. Asimismo, las experiencias que de ellas se deriven deberían documentarse y compartirse.

b) Género. Adoptar estrategias en materia de género culturalmente apropiadas: abordar los roles de género y los problemas conexos en el contexto local (por ejemplo, la trata, trabas sociales para ocupar cargos públicos, la propiedad de la tierra) adaptándose a las capacidades existentes.

c) Conflictos. Integrar el análisis de los conflictos en el diseño de los programas y en los informes de situación, tanto a nivel operacional como del COSOP.

d) Pastores. Los pastores son uno de los grupos más pobres y vulnerables de Nigeria. El FIDA debería hallar maneras de abordar los problemas entre agricultores y pastores e integrar a estos últimos en la ejecución de los programas.

e) Gestión de los recursos naturales y medio ambiente. Efectuar análisis más especializados e identificar inversiones más sustanciosas y más focalizadas en esta esfera por medio del ASAP.

42. Recomendación 4. Desarrollar las asociaciones existentes y forjar otras nuevas, especialmente con actores no gubernamentales.

a) El FIDA debería forjar lazos con actores de la sociedad civil para tener más oportunidades de garantizar la sostenibilidad y el empoderamiento sobre el terreno (por ejemplo, con agricultores jóvenes en el Programa de Ordenación Comunitaria de los Recursos Naturales – Delta del Río Níger o con asociaciones de financiación rural en el norte). El hecho de crear asociaciones más estratégicas con organizaciones de la sociedad civil, más allá de la prestación de servicios, favorecerá la sostenibilidad y permitirá que sigan participando una vez finalizados los programas. Las donaciones del FIDA también deberían respaldar explícitamente estos esfuerzos. Cuando sea

posible, estas partes deben ser identificadas en la fase de diseño y figurar por escrito en el convenio de préstamo o en los posteriores memorandos de entendimiento.

b) El FIDA debe facilitar la participación del sector privado en la agricultura de manera mucho más eficaz. Ello exige medidas como contratar a personal del sector privado para ejecutar los programas, junto con personal del gobierno, y utilizar asesores del sector privado que actúen como mentores de los funcionarios públicos actuales. También requiere aplicar acuerdos tripartitos entre el sector privado, los agricultores y el FIDA en programas como el Programa de Desarrollo de las Cadenas de Valor y el Programa de Adaptación al Cambio Climático y Apoyo a los Agronegocios en el Cinturón de la Sabana, de modo que los fondos del FIDA se utilicen para atraer a inversores privados, como se contempla en la nota de orientación técnica del FIDA sobre las donaciones de contrapartida.

c) El FIDA debe tratar de concertar acuerdos de cofinanciación con sus principales asociados (el Banco Mundial, USAID, DFID, etc.) para mejorar su capacidad de movilización, sobre todo en el diálogo sobre políticas, atraer financiación de contrapartida y aumentar el nivel de ejecución en los sectores prioritarios del FIDA.

43. Recomendación 5. Seguir consolidando la estrategia de gestión de los conocimientos del FIDA mejorando la calidad de los datos empíricos que se recaban sobre el terreno.

En primer lugar, es necesario mejorar la evaluabilidad en la fase de diseño: elaborar teorías del cambio claras y lógicas y diseñar marcos prácticos de SyE que se ajusten a las capacidades del personal, así como minimizar los indicadores del sistema de gestión de los resultados y el impacto (RIMS). Por otro lado, se deben intensificar los esfuerzos y el rigor en la evaluación. El FIDA debería promover el uso de tecnologías (realizar entrevistas por ordenador y aprovechar los teléfonos móviles y las herramientas web) así como métodos participativos. También debería velar por que las encuestas en las que se basan los estudios de referencia o impacto más importantes se diseñen y analicen de manera rigurosa y hacer un seguimiento de los estudios temáticos encargados a terceros para asegurarse de que logran sacar a la luz los factores que inciden en cómo y por qué se genera el impacto, y cómo afectan estos a determinados grupos vulnerables. Para fortalecer el sistema nacional de SyE dentro de la orientación general de mejorar la eficacia del desarrollo, el FIDA debería considerar respaldar el establecimiento de mecanismos institucionales y el desarrollo de capacidades en el seno del Ministerio Federal de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural.

Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country programme evaluation

Agreement at Completion Point

Introduction

1. This is the second country programme evaluation (CPE) undertaken by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) of the IFAD-Nigeria partnership. The CPE covers the period 2009-2015 and had two main objectives. These are to: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-Government partnership to reduce rural poverty; and to (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The CPE includes an assessment of the 2009 IFAD country strategy for Nigeria, six IFAD-finances projects and programmes, grant-funded activities, and non-lending activities (knowledge management, policy dialogue and partnership building).

2. The Agreement at Completion Point (ACP) reflects the understanding between the Government of Nigeria and IFAD Management of the main Nigeria CPE findings and recommendations. In particular, it comprises a summary of the main evaluation findings in Section B, whereas the agreements are contained in Section C. The ACP is a reflection of the Government's and IFAD's commitment to adopt and implement the CPE recommendations within specific timeframes.

3. The implementation of the recommendations agreed upon will be tracked through the President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions (PRISMA), which is presented to the IFAD Executive Board on an annual basis by the Fund's Management.

4. The ACP will be signed by the Government of Nigeria (represented by Mrs Kemi Adeosun, Honourable Minister for Finance) and IFAD Management (represented by Perin Saint Ange, Associate Vice-President, Programme Management Department). IOE's role is to facilitate the finalisation of the ACP. The final ACP will be submitted to the Executive Board of IFAD as an annex to the new COSOP for Nigeria. It will also be included in the final Nigeria CPE report.

B. Key findings

5. The Government-IFAD partnership has grown stronger over the current COSOP period. The 2010-15 COSOP provided a reasonably aligned and coherent instrument to guide the IFAD lending and non-lending programme in Nigeria, with strong points around the balance approach, building on previous experience, a growing geographical focus and the fit with IFAD and Nigeria policy frameworks. The IFAD-supported portfolio has become better focussed on Government priorities in agriculture.

6. Efforts to reach the poorest communities and to avoid states or regions that are better off had led to a greater focus of support on the poorest regions of the North, while reducing investments into the better-off South. Poverty targeting within states and within LGAs remained a challenge due to the lack of credible poverty data at sub-state level.

7. But the broad multi-region coverage (of all but 9 out of 36 states) created gaps and prevented synergies between the programmes. The thin geographical spread across a large number of states limits the influence of IFAD's financing. Better geographical overlap in the states supported by different IFAD programmes would make efficient use of trained staff, build on capacitated local governments and sustain already existing community assets and cadres.

8. Over the COSOP period, the IFAD-supported programmes reached 9.2 million beneficiaries out of the 14.2 million targeted. Beneficiary outreach was less than

targeted at appraisal, but concentration of efforts in a limited number of villages has delivered interventions that were successful, efficient and often sustained. Notable achievements were recorded with regard to access to financial services, community capacity-building and job creation. Within the locations, delivery of benefits in terms of building assets and spreading technology has been very good. Still, the scale of the impact remains limited given the size of the country, and poverty statistics overall show an increasing divide between the urban and the rural and the wealthy and the poor.

9. The programmes have been vulnerable to various forms of conflict, insurgency or unrest, whether in the North East from Boko Haram, from pastoralist-farmer conflicts in the middle belt or violence and unrest in the Delta region. Most programmes do not include any conflict analysis or risk assessment and where a mitigation strategy is put forward at design, it is largely to avoid working in known conflict zones by selecting LGAs or villages outside of known areas of disturbance, and by bringing staff and beneficiaries located in conflict zones to attend capacity-building or other sessions in safer programme locations.

10. IFAD's operations continued to be affected by the administrative complexity that led to funding delays and weak counterpart support and they struggled with issues of weak governance. Lending to state governments did not solve the issue of counterpart funding due to the lack of ownership and responsibility at state level. Additional measures would have been needed to penalize under-performing states more stringently while rewarding more strongly those that do deliver. The issue of counterpart funding is fundamental and, unless a solution is found, will continue to seriously hamper the performance of the Nigeria portfolio.

11. A similar aspect of inefficiency surrounds the effects of frequent political changes in different levels of government because of elections and other disruptions or bureaucratic delays and obstructions. The turnover caused by the electoral cycle has led to a repeated need to justify and defend the programme approach to incoming leaders, many of whom have new agendas and an understandable desire to see their constituency benefit from donor projects.

12. The large number of states and LGAs involved in the programmes increased management overheads. For the Nigeria programme, management costs, as a proportion of the total programme costs, are way above the IFAD average. Having larger programme did not reduce the management overhead.

13. The move towards larger programmes made it even more difficult to address issues of local governance, fragility and cultural diversity. Deeper analysis of local governance issues would have enabled a more adaptive approach at state level, for example through nourishing strategic partnerships, strengthening local ownership, sustaining commitment, and responding to crisis and disruptions in a proactive way.

14. The establishment of the IFAD country office in 2008, created better and more cost-effective opportunities to engage in policy discussions on development strategies and programme operations. There has been a marked increase in knowledge management activities instigated by the ICO team, underpinned by a strategy and efficient use of available resources. Yet programme M&E data are not available in sufficient quality and quantity to support evidence-based policy discourse. The absence of thematic studies has also limited the understanding of the effectiveness and impact of IFAD-supported programmes.

15. In the absence of a partnership strategy, engagement has been somewhat opportunistic and ad hoc and built around the needs of individual programmes rather than at a more strategic level. At local level, partnership between IFAD-assisted programmes themselves is very limited, and despite the long presence in certain states and LGAs, there is limited partnering in the sense of a joint, co-

funding relationship. At national level, IFAD's progress in developing partnerships has been hampered by a shortage of resources for this area and the need to devote a great deal of energy to overcoming delays in programme implementation.

16. A missing partner, particularly in the earlier portfolio, has been the private sector, crucial given the move towards markets and processing across the portfolio. Even the ATA reports highlight the need to mobilize a range of public-private partnerships around fertilizer, seeds and processing. Failure to include private investors as co-financers seems a missed opportunity. Even in the policy work there has not been sufficient attention to providing support for private sector engagement in the agriculture sector.

17. Co-funding of programmes by other donors has not been a feature of IFAD's partnerships in Nigeria and is a significant gap, considering this was a key recommendation of the COSOP Mid-term Review. Instead, partnership-building with other development partners has achieved more around co-implementation and knowledge sharing.

18. The absence of a well-structured policy coordination unit within FMARD is a major constraint for effective policy engagement as well as dissemination of results to government systems and institutions. The lack of a strong coordinating function or office in either FMARD or NPC has also limited the development of strategic partnerships. At the level of individual programme staff, insufficient progress has been made in securing a mix of experiences and skills in line with the changed thematic focus. For example, a sufficient number of personnel with more private sector experience would be required to manage the rural finance and value chain operations.

19. Under the CPE period, 20 grants received an overall amount of US$39.19 million amongst all types of IFAD grants. The grants revolve around key themes within the Nigeria portfolio, such as improved food crops and value chains to reduce rural poverty and vulnerability. Only a few grants were used to build partnerships with non-governmental organizations, but they provide positive examples of learning and linkages with operations, such as the grants for Songhai-Benin for Rural Youth and Agricultural Business Development and for Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth. Some grants were successfully used to support federal level policy implementation. The majority of grants continued to have a regional focus and therefore linkages between the main recipient of IFAD grants, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, and IFAD-supported operations were not systematically promoted. The use of matching grants to subsidise one-off investments is unsustainable and not aligned with IFAD's technical guidance and good practices documented elsewhere.

C. Agreement at Completion Point

20. IFAD and Government will prepare a new COSOP for Nigeria, which will build on the findings and recommendations of this CPE and provide the foundation of the main areas of intervention in the context of a renewed partnership and cooperation between the Fund and Nigeria.

21. The 1st CPE has provided a number of findings and recommendations that still remain valid and should be considered. In addition this CPE offers five critical recommendations that should be included into the new COSOP: (1) address issues of state commitment; (2) increase leverage and presence in operations; (3) dedicate resources to important crosscutting issues outside day-to-day implementation; (4) expand existing and develop new partnerships particularly outside of government; and (5) continue to build on IFAD's knowledge management strategy by improving the quality of evidence from the field.

22. Recommendation 1. Address issues of state commitment through increased geographic focus, transformed state-level partnerships and realistic levels of

counterpart funding. The CPE recommends that the COSOP should explore the following strategies to strengthen state commitment: (a) adoption of a transparent mechanism for selection of states through clear selection criteria that consider poverty and governance-related indicators based on a robust analysis; (b) proper assessment of state governance and public finances as an input into the selection process; (c) strategies to raise attention and sustain commitment from state governors; (d) strategies to strengthen local ownership; and (e) increased policy engagement at state level.

23. While the selection of states is done by the Federal Government, IFAD should provide some clearly defined criteria to assess the commitment and political will for a joint programme, such as political stability, shared priorities (e.g. community development, smallholder agriculture), track record (e.g. public service reform, financial performance, accountability to development results).

24. IFAD will also need to adopt a wider range of strategies to get the attention and commitment of state governors such as: (i) pressure from federal partners (ii) increasing the size of investment in fewer states (iii) mechanisms rewards for better performing states, (iv) increasing IFAD presence in key states, (v) keeping counterpart funding at feasible levels, e.g. % to minimum or zero, and making beneficiary contribution the trigger for release.

25. The National Roundtable Workshop held at the end of the CPE has identified a number of possible strategies to sustain political commitment from participating states. This includes (i) alignment with the state development priorities through high level engagement from the beginning in all participating states; (ii) strengthening community ownership of programmes as driver for continuity; (iii) engagement with key influencers and change champions such as NGOs and CBOs within in the states who could facilitate access to high level advocacy meetings and follow-up on government action in the States.

26. The National Roundtable recommended that in post conflict areas in Nigeria, IFAD would need to rely heavily on people who are very familiar with the areas in question and possibly on community based organizations and faith based organizations, who already have some experience working in the affected areas. In post conflict settings, it is also crucial that target beneficiaries are actively engaged in the project cycle. The tendency to neglect to do this are usually high in an environment where trust for political leadership has been destroyed, livelihoods disrupted and traditional forms of governance have altered

27. With the programmes in the South coming to an end, this provides an opportunity for the COSOP to prepare a sound contextual analysis together with a strategy that will enable greater geographic focus, based on governance and poverty focus. The CPE recommends that the geographic scope covered by any new programme should be reduced to minimise the political, cultural and agro-ecological diversity that will have to be managed. The CPE has highlighted evidence that larger programmes did not perform better, in particular on efficiency indicators. Furthermore, experience shows that smaller and more homogeneous programme units will enable better cohesion and stronger local ownership.

28. IFAD and Government response to Recommendation 1: Government of Nigeria and IFAD concur to this recommendation.

29. The Results Based Country Strategy Opportunities Paper (COSOP), which is to be developed by the Government of Nigeria and IFAD for the period 2017-2022 will agree upon and include a mechanism for selection of states through clear selection criteria that consider poverty and governance-related indicators. Before designing ant new IFAD investment, the criteria for selection, such as political stability, priorities and proven track records, would be shared with the states and those that have complied with criteria will be selected. During implementation, IFAD Country

Office in consultation with the Federal Ministry of Finance and Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development will develop strategies to raise and sustain commitment from State Governors and visits would be made on an annual basis to programme states. Through the support of the IFAD-assisted programmes and IFAD country office, there would be increased policy engagement for project related issues at state level.

30. Timeline for implementation: COSOP will be submitted to Executive Board in December 2016 and the selection of states will happen during the design process of the investment programmes. Raising and maintaining state commitment would happen through annual visits.

31. Responsible: Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and IFAD.

32. Recommendation 2. Increase leverage and presence in operations. There is scope to improve operational effectiveness and efficiency through the way IFAD delivers its implementation support. Given the scale of the country programme and the complexity of the federal system, stronger engagement at state level and improved implementation support will ultimately require capacities to be added to the country office. The CPE recommends that IFAD should: (a) improve linkages between programmes and between programmes and grants where they work on similar issues or in the same states; (b) ensure continuity in supervision for improved consistency of recommendations and progressive learning; (c) dedicate technical capacity for engagement with key states, for example through decentralized posting of IFAD staff; (d) engage with incoming government leaders in a timely manner; and (e) create opportunities for high-level policy engagement, e.g. Performance-based Allocation System (PBAS) discussions.

33. IFAD and Government response to Recommendation 2: Government of Nigeria and IFAD concur to this recommendation.

34. A Programme Officer position is being proposed for Nigeria IFAD Country Office to enhance capacity of the IFAD Country Office. There will be enhanced focus on sharing of implementation experience between programmes on operational issues, like procurement, monitoring and evaluation, financial management as well as more technical areas like value chain development and financial services provision through workshops and training events regularly organised by the IFAD Country Office. Supervision missions will work with a dedicated group of resource persons to keep the recommendations from IFAD consistent. Given that the IFAD Country Office will maintain a lean structure, to manage the much required interaction with the states, we will identify technical partners focussing particularly on the states that are facing implementation challenges. IFAD Country Office will work much more closely with the Technical Departments of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

35. Timeline for implementation: Programme Officer would be identified late 2016 or early 2017. Trainings and workshops on common thematic areas for programmes will be implemented at least on a bi-annual basis. During programme implementation, IFAD Country Office would identify technical partners that could engage at the State level to address implementation challenges.

36. Responsible: Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and IFAD Country Office.

37. Recommendation 3. Dedicate resources to important crosscutting issues outside day-to-day implementation that require further analysis and focus for a joint-up engagement and sustainable programme results. Analysis of crosscutting issues should not only be part of the contextual analysis conducted at design stage. It is also part of programme M&E to understand the factors that help or hinder achievement of programme results. In addition, the CPE highlights the need to

explore important cross-cutting issues that require joint-up approaches within Government and with other development partners to be addressed in a meaningful way. These issues are youth, gender, natural resource management, pastoralism and conflict and fragility. Because of the complexity and difficulty of the context, the understanding of these crosscutting issues requires more and deeper aimed at identifying opportunities for more effective engagement on crosscutting issues outside day-to-day implementation.

38. IFAD and Government response to Recommendation 3: Government of Nigeria and IFAD concur to this recommendation.

39. Youth and gender are crosscutting issues for the IFAD country programme in implementation; Rural Finance Institution Building Programme (RUFIN) and Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP) have started some studies on gender and youth. IFAD Country Office will provide technical support and guide the required impact assessments and thematic studies, particularly as they pertain to relevant crosscutting issues for the Programme Completion process for RUFIN. Under the Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme (CASP), assessments will be carried out particularly for resource management, conflict and fragility.

40. Timeline for implementation: During programme implementation, resources will be dedicated to relevant studies and assessments.

41. Responsible: Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and IFAD Country Office.

42. Recommendation 4. Expand existing and develop new partnerships particularly outside of government. IFAD should link with civil society actors to widen opportunities for achieving on-the-ground sustainability and empowerment (e.g. Young farmers in CBNRMP; rural finance associations in the North). Building more strategic partnerships with civil society organizations, rather than only for service provision, would encourage sustainability and extend their engagement beyond a programme's duration. IFAD needs to facilitate the private sector in agriculture much more effectively. This requires measures such as hiring from the private sector as well as from government for programme implementation, and using private sector advisors as mentors for existing government staff. It also requires implementing tripartite agreements between the private sector, farmers and IFAD in programmes such as VCDP and CASP, so that IFAD funds are used to crowd-in private investors, as envisaged by IFAD's technical guidance note on matching grants. Finally, IFAD needs to seek co-funding arrangements with its major partners (World Bank, United States Agency for International Development, Department for International Development, etc.) in order to improve leverage, especially around policy dialogue, counterpart funding, and increasing levels of delivery in IFAD's priority sectors.

43. The National Roundtable recommended the review and strengthening of the current Government (Federal, State and Local Government Areas LGA's) coordinating desk or unit for all donor supported programmes; where this is not in existence yet such a desk or unit should be created. It also recommended institutionalization of a regular review of all agricultural related projects at Federal, State and LGA level.

44. IFAD and Government response to Recommendation 4: Government of Nigeria and IFAD concur to this recommendation.

45. The IFAD programmes will work with civil society organisations; VCDP is to develop master trainers for youth on enterprise development and business planning; CASP will organise Financial Service Associations in the North of Nigeria. VCDP has identified over 20 off-takers linked to target group producers. IFAD Country Office will continue to facilitate linkages with larger off-takers. RUFIN will continue to work with Microfinance Banks and some select commercial banks, identifying

'winners' that are ready to provide financial services in the rural space. During the RB-COSOP development, development partners active in the agricultural sector will be consulted to identify partnership and cofinancing opportunities. IFAD would support coordination efforts in the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

46. Timeframe for implementation: During RB-COSOP development (June – November 2016) and programme implementation.

47. Responsible: IFAD assisted Programmes and IFAD Country Office.

48. Recommendation 5. Continue to build on IFAD's knowledge management strategy by improving the quality of evidence from the field. This first requires improving evaluability during design - developing clear and logical theories of change, and designing practical M&E frameworks matching staff capacity, while minimising RIMS indicators. It then requires greater effort and rigour for evaluation. IFAD should support use of improved technology (such as computer-assisted personal interviewing, and the use of mobile phones and web tools), and also participatory methods. It should ensure rigorous survey design and analysis for major baseline or impact studies, and also follow up on the commissioning of thematic studies to ensure they are conducted in a way that reveals underlying factors as to how and why impact occurs, and how these affect particular vulnerable groups. To strengthen country M&E systems within the overall move to improved development effectiveness, IFAD should consider providing support to building institutional mechanisms and capacities within FMARD.

49. The National Roundtable recommended that coordinating mechanisms should be strengthened within the existing structure of FMARD. The capacity of the Planning and Policy Coordination (PP&C) department to effectively coordinate and monitor policy implementation across different departments and division should be strengthened. Furthermore, good practices from the former PCU should be revisited. The implementation of a sector-wide M&E system will require clear roles and responsibilities. It should be linked to the M&E framework developed by the Ministry of Budget and Planning. The PP&C department in FMARD should strengthen its capacity to coordinate sector-wide M&E data collection and analysis.

50. To address the issue of counterpart funding, FMARD should adopt a proactive approach to communicating and coordinating requests for new programmes in the agricultural sector with all stakeholders concerned well in advance. The National Roundtable recommended regular meetings between FMARD and FMF to streamline requests for incorporation into the borrowing plan for approval by the National Assembly.

51. IFAD and Government response to Recommendation 5: Government of Nigeria and IFAD concur to this recommendation.

52. To improve M&E under the IFAD assisted programmes, emphasis would be laid on using time-tested Monitoring Information System (MIS) to collate data from the field and generate sound data analysis. IFAD Country Office would work with the IFAD assisted programmes to carry out capacity building of the M&E staff. All IFAD assisted programmes would be requested to carry out outcome assessments and thematic work to highlight lessons and build on implementation experience to develop knowledge management tools. Strong coordination within the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development would lead to sector-wide M&E data collection, feedback on implementation as well as coordinated requests for new programmes. The IFAD supported Central Communication Unit would support IFAD assisted programmes on their Knowledge Management (KM) strategies and improving KM products.

53. Timeline for implementation: During programme implementation.

54. Responsible: Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, IFAD assisted Programmes and IFAD Country Office.

Signed by:



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for Mrs Kemi Adeosun
Honourable Minister for Finance
Federal Ministry of Finance
Government of Nigeria

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Perin Saint Ange
Associate Vice-President
Programme Management Department
IFAD, Rome

Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country Programme Evaluation

Main Report

Contents

Annexes

Currency equivalent, weights and measures

Currency equivalent

Currency unit = Nigeria Naira (NGN)
1 US$ = 198.8 NGN (March 2016)

Abbreviations and acronyms

ADP	Agricultural Development Programme
ADWG	Agriculture Development Partner Working Group
ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture
ATA	Agricultural Transformation Agenda
BOA	Bank of Agriculture
CADA	commodity apex development association
CASP	Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt
CBARDP	Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CBNRMP	Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme – Niger Delta
CDA	community development association
CDD	community-driven development
CDF	community development fund
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CPE	country programme evaluation
CPM	Country Programme Manager
EU	European Union
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
FMARD	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
FSA	financial service association
GDP	gross domestic product
GNI	gross national income
IITA	International Institute for Tropical Agriculture
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
LEEDS	Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
LGA	local government area
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MFB	microfinance bank
MTR	mid-term review
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NARI	national agricultural research institute
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NDDC	Nigeria Delta Development Commission
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NIRSAL	Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending
NPC	National Planning Commission
ODA	official development assistance
PBAS	performance-based allocation system
PCR	project completion report
PMP	performance monitoring plan
PPA	project performance assessment
RTEP	Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme
RUFIN	Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme

SEEDS	State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
SSO	state support office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VCDP	Value Chain Development Programme
WCA	West and Central Africa Division of IFAD

Map of ongoing IFAD-supported operations

Nigeria

IFAD-funded ongoing operations

Country programme evaluation

IFAD

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 01-06-2015

Map of IFAD-supported operations closed since 2008

Federal Republic of Nigeria
Country Programme Evaluation

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. In line with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Evaluation Policy[1] and as approved by the 113th session of the IFAD Executive Board,[2] the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertook the second country programme evaluation (CPE) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2015. The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the results and performance of the ongoing country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) (2010-2015) and to generate findings and recommendations for the upcoming COSOP to be prepared in 2016. This CPE takes into consideration the agreements at completion point of the first CPE for Nigeria (2008).

Table 1
A snapshot of IFAD operations in Nigeria since 1985

First IFAD-funded project	1985
Number of approved loans	10
On-going projects	4
Total amount of IFAD lending	US$317.9 million
Counterpart funding (Government and beneficiaries)	US$280 million
Co-/parallel financing amount	US$197.6 million
Total portfolio cost	US$795.3 million*
Lending terms	Intermediate from 1985–1988; highly concessional from 1990 to 2014; currently blended
Focus of operations	Agricultural development, credit and financial services, fisheries, research/extension/training, and rural development,
Main co-financiers	World Bank, domestic financial institutions, UNDP, EU, Ford Foundation
COSOPs	2001 and 2010
Past Cooperating institutions	IBRD, UNOPS, IDA
Country Office in Nigeria	Country presence since Dec. 2005. Country office approved in 2004, present in Abuja since 30 Sept. 2008. Host Country Agreement since 23 Jan. 2012. The ICO is currently, staffed with a Country Programme Manager (CPM), Country Programme Officer (CPO) and Country Programme Assistant (CPA)
Country programme managers	2 CPMs since 2010, including the current CPM, Ms Atsuko Toda, based in Abuja since 2012
Main government partner	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; Ministry of Finance

(*) Any differences are due to rounding

2. Overview of IFAD-supported programme. IFAD's involvement in Nigeria began in 1985 (table 1), and was brought under the guidance of the first COSOP from 2001-07, focussing on the following major strategic thrusts: empowerment of the rural poor, particularly women, and access to and management of resources, infrastructure and services. The second COSOP was prepared in 2010. With a total of US$317.9 million (active and closed portfolio) in 2014, Nigeria had the largest portfolio in IFAD's West and Central Africa Division (WCA) (12.4 per cent) and the second largest in the Africa Region (2.3 per cent of total IFAD as of June 2014). The average amount per loan is the highest in WCA and the Africa portfolio

[1] IFAD (2011) Evaluation Policy.
[2] EB/2014/113/R.2

(US$24.20 million compared to the average of US$13.70 million for the WCA region and US$ 12.20 million for IFAD average).[3]

3. The Government of Nigeria and programme beneficiaries have provided US$280 million (35.2 per cent of total portfolio costs). Major external co-financiers have included the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the European Union (EU). These, along with domestic financial institutions, have provided US$197.6 million in co-financing (24.8 per cent of total portfolio costs). At least 20 grants with activities focused in Nigeria were in force or approved as of 2008, mainly within the Global/Regional category (annex III). IFAD has had a country office presence in Nigeria since 2005; the Country Programme Manager has been out-posted since 2012.

4. The ongoing IFAD portfolio includes four operations: the Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme – Niger Delta (CBNRMP); the Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme (RUFIN); the Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP), and the Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt (CASP).

5. The Government's coordinating ministry is the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF). The lead implementing agency for IFAD-funded operations is the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), previously the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR). At state-level, IFAD programmes use the facilities provided by the Agricultural Development Programme (ADP), which was intended as a shared platform for coordinating donor projects. The ADP system, which was introduced in the 1970s as a state-level arm for channelling government and donor funding for agricultural investment and extension services, has continued to operate but with fewer resources and remains dependent on external funding.

6. Sectoral allocation of IFAD's support (figure 1) over the ongoing COSOP period was overwhelmingly dedicated to local capacity building and rural infrastructure (together 58 per cent). Local capacity building included strengthening institutions, farmers' organisations, and community development associations (CDAs). Rural infrastructure included community and market infrastructure, and community funds. Other important components included project management[4] (11 per cent of approved funds), input supply, technical support and research[5], and rural financial services (6 per cent of approved funds each). Loans were provided to the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) on highly concessional terms.[6]

[3] IFAD Country Summary Sheet (July 2013-June 2014)
[4] Project management components include credit to MFIs and support of the Central Bank of Nigeria, management and co-ordination, M&E, and policy support and development
[5] Technical support and research components include technology development, technology transfer, and processing
[6] IFAD lends on highly concessional, intermediate or ordinary terms. Between 1985 and 1988 IFAD loans to Nigeria were on intermediate terms

Figure 1
IFAD-supported programmes in Nigeria 2008-2014: Investment per component at approval



Source: IFAD GRIPS

B. Objectives, methodology and process

7. The CPE covers the period 2009-2015 and has two main objectives. These are to: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-Government partnership to reduce rural poverty; and to (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The CPE follows the IFAD Evaluation Policy[7] and the IFAD IOE Evaluation Manual (1st edition). It adopts a set of internationally recognized evaluation criteria and a six-point rating scale (annex IV). The findings, lessons and recommendations from this CPE will inform the preparation of the new COSOP in 2016.

8. Scope. The CPE assesses the results and performance of the activities conducted since the last CPE (2008). It identifies the factors that contributed to the achievement of strategic objectives and results, including the management of project activities by IFAD and the government. It also reviews IFAD's strategic position in Nigeria, in particular its comparative advantage and positioning in a large middle income country such as Nigeria and the extent to which IFAD has effectively and efficiently influenced Nigerian policies, strategies and development interventions with regard to rural development, poverty reduction and agriculture transformation.

9. The portfolio in Nigeria has been developing slowly and because this is the second CPE after only 6 years, any changes that could be observed at the portfolio and strategic level were rather incremental. Only two new operations have been approved since the last CPE where the design could realistically have responded to the last CPE's findings and recommendations. Five programmes reviewed by the current CPE had already been assessed by the last CPE, albeit an early stage of implementation. One programme that has closed under the current COSOP had even predated the previous COSOP in its design. The report thus distinguishes between the different design phases wherever appropriate. Still, the programmes conceptual frameworks, implementation focus and the partnership approaches have evolved over the same period. To detect any changes and trends for individual performance criteria and activities the analysis had to apply a high level of granularity. Unfortunately, the data situation has hardly improved and the evidence to conduct this analysis was limited (see below under limitations). Furthermore, there is only one IOE project performance assessment (PPA) available for this CPE.

10. Table 2 below lists the programmes covered by the CPE, and shows the lengthy period to achieve effectiveness as well as the latest loan disbursement percentage.

[7] http://www.ifad.org/pub/policy/oe.pdf

It also indicates which of the standard evaluation criteria will be used against each programme.

Table 2
Evaluability of projects covered by the 2015 CPE

Project Name	*Board Approval*	*Effective*	*Status*	*Completion*	*Disbursed*	*CPE 2008 Criteria*	*CPE 2015 Criteria*
Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (ROTEP)	09 Dec 1999	31 Jul 2001	Closed	30 Sept 2012	60%	All criteria	All criteria
Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP)	12 Sep 2001	31 Jan 2003	Closed	31 Mar 2013	98%	All criteria	All Criteria
Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme (RUFIN)	14 Sep 2006	20 Jan 2010	Ongoing	31 Mar 2017	57%	Relevance	Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency
Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRMP)	11 Dec 2002	06 Jun 2005	Ongoing	30 Sept 2015	97%	Relevance	All Criteria
Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP)	03 Apr 2012	14 Oct 2013	Ongoing	31 Dec 2019	57%	n/a	Relevance
Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt (CASP)	11 Dec 2013	25 Mar 2015	Ongoing	31 Mar 2021	5%	n/a	Relevance
Rural Microenterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP)	13 Dec 2007	n/a	Cancelled	n/a	n/a	Relevance	Relevance

11. The grants portfolio for the CPE period includes five loan component grants, two country-specific grants and 15 regional grants that covered Nigeria (see list of grants in annex III). Grants will not be rated as such, but the activities they supported (policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership building) will be assessed as part of the country programme strategy implementation.

12. In addition to the pertinent issues of COSOP alignment and coherence, the CPE approach paper has identified five important thematic issues that permeated the performance of IFAD's portfolio across the usual evaluation criteria. These issues have been systematically reviewed across operations and activities. The following box below presents the selection of thematic issues and the key evaluation questions to address them.[8]

[8] The CPE Approach Paper includes the full set of evaluation questions in the Evaluation Framework (Annex 1 of the CPE Approach Paper).

Box 1
Key Evaluation Questions for this CPE

COSOP alignment and coherence: Did the 2010-2015 COSOP enable greater relevance and alignment with Nigeria's new strategic priorities in the agriculture and rural development sector (Agricultural Transformation Agenda vision)? How coherent and consistent is IFAD's engagement and activities in relation to the activities of other development partners and the private sector?

Community-driven development approach: How relevant, effective and sustainable is IFAD's support to 4th tier institutions? Have the 4th tier institutions (community development associations (CDAs), financial service associations (FSAs)) been maintained or replicated? Has this '4th tier' of government resulted in better service delivery to and empowerment of remote villages?

Political and social conflict: To what extent did issues of insecurity affect the outreach and sustainability of IFAD-supported programmes? How well have risks been understood and managed, in particular those relating to corruption, poor governance and fragility?

Governance context: How effective was IFAD's engagement at federal and state levels? How did country presence support the COSOP strategic objectives, influence policies and enhance programme coordination and collaboration with Government, sector ministries and strategic development partners? To what extent did it enable stronger engagement at state level?

Women and youth: Which mechanisms were most effective in supporting economic inclusion of women and rural youth?

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): What are the main reasons for the underperformance of M&E systems? Why did M&E systems not respond satisfactorily to the challenge of capturing project results and impacts? How reliable a basis for tracking project performance is the IFAD ratings system?

13. Evaluation process. The CPE was conducted in several phases. The key issues for the CPE to focus on were identified through a preliminary desk review of the available programme documentation. The issues papers have informed the preparation of the CPE Approach Paper which specifies the evaluation questions and methodology. They also helped to identify the key issues for the PPA of the Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP), which IOE conducted in preparation for this CPE in June-July 2015. The PPA provided an in-depth assessment of one programme that was also part of this CPE.[9]

14. IOE conducted a preparatory country mission to Abuja in July 2015 to consult with key stakeholders, such as FMARD and the Federal Ministry of Finance, on the focus and scope of this CPE, which together with the experiences from the PPA led to the finalisation of the CPE methodology and approach paper. The main country mission took place in September 2015, which included extensive field visits in nine states in the Middle Belt and in the South (Oyo, Lagos, Edo, Rivers, Abia, Cross Rivers, Benue, Nasarawa and Niger) as well as stakeholder meetings in Abuja, Ibadan, Lagos, Abia, and Port Harcourt. The PPA had earlier covered four northern states through field visits (Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa and Kebbi). The CPE main mission concluded with a wrap-up meeting in Abuja on 17 September.

15. The final (desk-based) phase of this CPE involved a further documents review and extensive analysis of primary and secondary data obtained during the country missions. This included data from field visits, programme M&E data as well as official statistical data. The resulting draft report was then peer reviewed within IOE. It was thereafter shared with IFAD's West and Central Africa Division and the Government of Nigeria.

16. Evidence. The evidence for this CPE was derived from multiple sources: (i) the CPE conducted an extensive review of the available COSOP and programme documentation (e.g. COSOPs, annual reports, portfolio reviews, programme design documents, mid-term reviews (MTRs), supervision reports, project completion reports (PCRs)) as well as country background documentation and research studies on relevant issues; (ii) the CPE analysed statistical data obtained from the National

[9] The PPA report is available as a separate publication.

Bureau of Statistics (NBS) at Federal and, where available, at state level; (iii) the CPE used programme M&E data, impact assessments and performance self-assessments where available and to the extent possible; (iv) the CPE triangulated and complemented those data with findings and observations obtained during field visits, stakeholder meetings and interviews; (v) the CPE drew on detailed findings from the PPA of CBARDP conducted in early 2015; (vi) the CPE conducted a systematic survey of community assets, using the asset verification form developed for the PPA of CBARDP; and (vii) the CPE also commissioned two research papers, on agro-business development and governance, as additional analysis and to complement the existing evidence base on how well IFAD addressed governance and private sector issues across the portfolio.[10]

17. Self-assessment tools. The CPE designed four self-assessment tools that focussed on selected evaluation criteria and questions from the CPE framework that were used to guide the interactive group discussions during the CPE mission. The design of those tools was led by the following considerations: They should: (a) complement the CPE assessment on those questions where the internal programme perspective will add value (e.g. alignment with current policies and programmes, aspects that have limited outreach of the programme); (b) add to (not duplicate) the existing programme documentation; and (c) provide a basis for discussion with the CPE team during the main mission. At the level of individual operations, the template provided a structure for the CPE team to answer key questions on the standard evaluation criteria, as applicable. For the non-lending portfolio, the template provided key questions with regard to policy dialogue, knowledge management, partnerships and grants. At the COSOP level, the template provided questions with regard to relevance and effectiveness. In addition, the CPE used an ICO capacity self-assessment tool for an interactive discussion for the ICO team in Abuja.[11] The tools were useful in structuring the interaction between the CPE team and programme staff, and helped progress towards a shared understanding as far as the credibility and availability of the existing evidence base for this CPE is concerned.

Limitations

18. M&E data. Overall, the programme has kept fair records on use of funds, activities and outputs. However, throughout the COSOP period, the quality of evaluation data on outcomes and impacts were found to be poor. The CPE analysis was hampered by missing data and inconsistent data even on basic parameters, such as beneficiary numbers. Wherever possible, the CPE revisited the original data sets and complemented it with data from other sources (e.g. government data) and field visits.

19. Impact studies are available for several programmes. For the CBARDP, baseline, mid-term and impact surveys were done, but having carefully examined these reports and spoken to those involved[12] as part of the PPA, there are a number of flaws which lead to doubts over the validity of the data. For the Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (RTEP), no impact study was available but several ex-post academic research studies with very small samples were conducted for a number of states, mainly focussing on productivity gains. The CBNRMP impact study has a more rigorous design, allowing comparison between baseline and impact data. RUFIN conducted an impact study in 2015 – two years before programme closure – with only limited analysis available. The CPE has attempted to make some comparisons between programme areas and control areas, where common variables exist (see Annex VI).

[10] Stella I. Amadi. IFAD CPE Governance Background Paper. September 2015. Aderemi Osijo. CPE Background Paper on Private Sector, Agro-Business, Value Chains Development. September 2015.
[11] The Capacity Assessment Tool is based on the McKinsey Capacity Assessment Grid for NGOs, which addresses several dimensions of capacity (aspirations, strategy, organisational skills, human resources). We used this format, but added “incentives” as an additional dimension and integrated criteria of development effectiveness into the assessment grid.
[12] These include members of the IS team, SSO staff, the data analyst for the IS and the IFAD country team involved.

20. Government statistics. A difficulty encountered in analytically comparing project performance across the different states was the lack of state-level and year-on-year government statistics. The latest annual NBS (National Bureau of Statistics) datasets are from 2012, and exploratory analyses of these revealed wide fluctuations in year-on-year indicators including unemployment, absolute poverty, and adult literacy. The absence of any causal explanations for such fluctuations did not reflect an accurate picture of the situation on the ground and therefore could not be used as sources for a comparative analysis of socioeconomic changes. In the absence of a single source of credible data, any judgement on plausible poverty impacts had thus to rely on a more holistic assessment based on multiple sources, such as programme M&E data, official statistics and field verification.

21. Security concerns have to a large extent guided the selection of sites for field visits. Already the PPA was unable to visit the North East because of security concerns. For the CPE, parts of the Delta Region had to be excluded from field visits. To some extent the CPE was able to mitigate those shortcomings by organising wider stakeholder meetings with representation from conflict areas. In addition, information obtained from other Development Partners, NGOs and government agencies working in the same areas has provided additional insights as far as the overall situation is concerned.

Key points

- This is the second IFAD CPE in Nigeria. The first CPE was conducted in 2008.
- The main purpose of this CPE is to assess the results and performance of the ongoing COSOP (2010–2015) and to generate findings and recommendations for the upcoming COSOP to be prepared in 2016.
- The CPE assesses the results and performance of the lending and non-lending activities conducted since the first CPE.
- With only two new operations approved since 2008, changes at the portfolio level have been rather incremental under the new COSOP. Five projects were already covered by the previous CPE.
- The grants portfolio for the CPE period includes five loan component grants, two country-specific grants and 15 regional grants that covered Nigeria

II. Country context

A. Overview

22. Nigeria is located in West Africa, and borders Benin in the west, Niger in the north, Chad and Cameroon in the East, and the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean in the south. The country occupies a total area of 923,768 km^2 which consists of 910,768 km^2 of land and 13,000 km^2 of water bodies as well as an extensive coastal region that is very rich in fish and other marine products. Of the available arable land, only 320,000 km^2 (or 46 per cent) is cultivated. Its geography and climate varies from equatorial lowlands in the south to arid plains in the north.

23. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with a population of 173.6 million. Between 2009 and 2014 the population has been growing at 2.7 per cent per year, fuelled by a fertility rate above 5.9 births per woman since the year 2000. As of 2014, 53.1 per cent of the population lived in rural areas, an 8.7 per cent decrease from 2004.[13] Nigeria is home to over 250 ethnic groups. Ethnic majorities are found in three regions: the Hausa and Fulani (29 per cent of total population) in the north, the Yoruba (21 per cent) in the South West, and the Igbo in the South-East (18 per cent). An estimated half of the population are Muslim, 40 per cent are Christian, and 10 per cent follow indigenous beliefs.

24. Nigeria, owing to its size and geography, has a wide range of agro-ecological zones. This provides it with a diversity of crops and animal husbandry options. The dry northern savannah grows sorghum, millet, maize, groundnut and cotton. The main

[13] Population statistics from World Bank World Development Indicators data, 2015

food crops in the Middle Belt and the South are cassava, yam, plantain, maize and sorghum. Low-lying and seasonally flooded areas increasingly produce rice. The main cash crops in the South are oil palm, cocoa and rubber (the latter two being Nigeria's highest non-food commodity exports by value). As a result, Nigeria's major crops by production are maize, sorghum, millet and rice. Nigeria is also the world's largest producer of cassava and yams.[14]

25. Due to the size of its population and economy, Nigeria is a regional power in sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and a subscriber to the 2009 ECOWAP (ECOWAS Agricultural Programme)/CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Programme) charter, enacted through the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) and which commits the federal government to achieve a 10 per cent annual budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector. Nigeria is also a member of the West African Monetary Zone, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, a non-standing peacekeeping force made up of armed forces personnel from member states.

B. Economic, agricultural, and rural development processes

26. Rapid economic growth in the early 1970's due to high oil export revenues led to the expansion of several industry and service sectors, which fed urban migration and the stagnation of the agricultural sector and associated cash crop exportations. This led to the importation of basic commodities for domestic consumption which continues to mark the Nigerian economy to this day. The 1980s saw continued dependence on oil for government revenue coupled with falling prices and output. Ballooning public expenditure and austerity measures led to declines in gross national income (GNI) per capita from 1983 to 1995[15] which led in turn to Nigeria being classified a low-income country. A structural adjustment programme was introduced in 1985, a democratic government was elected in 1999 and the economy rebounded.

27. Economic growth has mainly been driven by rising global oil prices, although the level of oil rents as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has been descending, from highs above 30 per cent in the mid-2000's to a current (re-based) level of 13.6 per cent of GDP in 2013.[16] Oil and gas revenue accounted for 70 per cent of government revenue in 2011, down from 89 per cent in 2005. Growth in the sector weakened in the past two years as a result of higher energy prices, reduced budgets[17] and growing insecurity. However, despite being Africa's biggest oil producer, Nigeria imports more than 80 per cent of its domestic fuel, owing to a lack of refining capacity, which makes the country's fuel consumers vulnerable to fluctuating international fuel prices.

28. Nigeria's GDP is now the largest in Africa, having overtaken South Africa in 2014.[18] GDP growth rates have been relatively stable and robust, growing at an average of 6 per cent between 2008 and 2013. Due to population growth, per capita rates have been lower. Annual GDP per capita has been on average growing at 3.1 per cent in the same period, and annual GNI per capita at 3.6 per cent.[19] Nigeria was classified a lower middle income country and obtained debt-relief from the Paris Club in 2005.[20] Table 3 shows the main macro-economic indicators between 2008 and 2014.

[14] Ibid, total food production in US$ value has increased by 66% from 1997 to 2012, worth US$ 37.5 billion US$ at 2004-2006 value
[15] (Atlas method, current US$) World Bank World Development Indicators data, 2015
[16] NRGI (2013); World Bank (2015): World Development Indicators
[17] The 2014 federal budget reduced capital spend by 30% from the previous year.
[18] This has mainly to do with the fact that in 2014 the NBS had changed the way GDP was calculated changed. The Economist (a), 2014
[19] Calculated using data from World Bank (2015): World Development Indicators
[20] African Economic Outlook 2014 – Nigeria, AfDB, OECD, UNDP, pg. 8

Table 3
Nigeria macro-economic indicators between 2008-2014

Indicator	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*	*2014*
GDP growth (annual %)	6.3	6.9	7.8	4.9	4.3	5.4	6.3
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)	1,160	1,160	1,460	1,720	2,470	2,700	2,970
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)	4,170	4,320	4,750	4,940	5,140	5,380	5,710
Total investment (% of GDP)	16.0	21.6	17.3	16.2	14.9	14.7	15.2
Agriculture, value added (annual % growth)	6.3	5.9	5.8	2.9	6.7	2.9	4.3
Industry, value added (annual % growth)	-1.6	2.9	5.9	8.4	2.4	2.2	-12.1
Services, value added (annual % growth)	13.2	12.0	12.4	4.9	4.0	8.4	15.8
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)	10.8	-4.3	103.8	9.5	9.3	5.9	4.7
Gross savings (% of GDP)	25.6	14.7	25.5	25.8	33.3	*n.a.*	*n.a.*
General Government gross debt (% of GDP)	7	10	10	10	10	10	11
Current account balance (% of GDP)	9.0	5.1	3.9	3.0	4.4	3.9	2.2
Total reserves (includes gold, current US$, billions)	53.6	45.5	35.9	36.3	47.5	46.3	37.5
Oil rents (% of GDP)	32.0	23.7	16.4	19.1	16.5	13.6	*n.a*

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2015; IMF World Economic Outlook 2015

29. Public sector finance. Nigeria's current account has performed positively since 1999, and has been consistently above US$12 billion every year since 2004. Government debt as a percentage of GDP between 2008-2014 is not high in comparison to sub-Saharan African or emerging markets averages.[21] As of 2015, the external debt was valued at US$10.3 billion and the 2013 domestic debt at US$53.5 billion. The FGN took on 79.7 per cent of the domestic debt, with states incurring 20.3 per cent.[22] Government has recognised the need to diversify economic growth. Agriculture is one of the largest sectors in the Nigerian economy contributing 20.2 per cent of the GDP in 2014 (figure 2).[23] Since 2008, agricultural GDP growth was on average 5 per cent. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the 2010 rebasing of GDP projections, agriculture's share of GDP is declining as services expand faster. Agricultural spending as part of total federal spending has been on a downward trend, shrinking to 0.9 per cent in 2015.[24]

[21] IMF World Economic Outlook 2015.
[22] Debt Management Office of Nigeria, Nigeria's Public Debt Stock as at June 30, 2015 <http://www.dmo.gov.ng/oci/pubd/docs/Total%20Public%20Debt%20Stock%20as%20at%2030th%20June_%202015.pdf> accessed 21 October 2015
[23] World Bank World Development Indicators data, 2015; Nigeria Economic Report, No.2 July 2014, World Bank 89630
[24] This does not include spending from development partners in the agriculture sector which has been increasing.

Figure 2
Sectoral shares of Nigeria GDP, 2000-2014



*Rebasing year of Nigerian GDP estimates
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2015

30. Growth in the agricultural sector has been limited by expensive agricultural inputs and limited access to credit, lack of mechanization and little use of fertilizer in agriculture. There are an estimated 98.1 million farmers in Nigeria in 2011, 90 per cent of them are smallholders with production primarily oriented towards meeting subsistence needs.[25] The share of the rural population has steadily been decreasing, from 58.3 per cent in 1999 to 48.5 per cent in 2014. Due to urban migration, labour shortages exist in peak periods, driving hiring costs up. This results in a national per capita food output that stays stagnant, especially since fewer Nigerians are farming. Agricultural production per agricultural worker has grown by only 7 base points from 2006, and national food production per capita has descended to 1997 base point levels.

31. Nigeria is presently one of the world's largest food importers. In 2014, Nigeria imported 3.8 million tonnes out of 3.9 million tonnes of wheat consumed, and 2.9 million tonnes of rice out of 5.7 million tonnes consumed.[26] High dependence on food imports has made the country vulnerable to global price fluctuations. As a result of the global food price crisis, the general food price index in Nigeria had doubled in 2008 compared to the 2002-2004 period. Top food imports were wheat and rice, while top food exports were cocoa beans and sesame seeds. The top 5 commodities available for consumption in terms of kilocalories per capita per day in 2011 were rice, yams, cassava, maize, and sorghum.

32. Nigeria's environment and agricultural sector is under increasing threat from climate change and natural disasters. Desertification is becoming more severe in the North East and North West, with sand dunes, silting of lakes (most evident in lake Chad), and gully erosion increasing in the South. It is estimated that 351,000 ha of the Nigerian landmass is lost to desert conditions annually.[27] Savannah zones are moving southwards and rains are becoming more sporadic, start later and finish earlier. Storms along the coast are becoming more intense and frequent,[28] most dramatically experienced in the 2012 floods which affected 30 of 36 states and displaced 2.1 million people. Nigeria had the world's highest rates of deforestation in 2005, with 410,000 ha of forest loss between 2010 and 2015, and

[26] FAO Food Price Index data; FAO 2014.
[27] Great Green Wall for the Sahara and Sahel Initiative: National Strategic Action Plan 2012, Ministry of Environment, Federal Republic of Nigeria
[28] Report by the Advisory Committee on Agricultural Resilience in Nigeria (2014), National Agricultural Resilience Framework – Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Government of Nigeria

87 per cent of wood removals used as fuel.[29] These changes are expected to highly impact food production, water availability, and food insecurity, increasing the vulnerability of Nigeria's small-holder farmers since most agricultural production is rain-fed. By 2050, there are high probabilities of declines in yields in all cereals in all agro-ecological zones aside from millet and maize. Roots and tuber yields are more uncertain.

C. Poverty characteristics

33. Economic growth has contributed to a slight reduction of poverty in Nigeria, although the positive trends have partly been offset by population growth and increasing inequality both nationally and regionally. The absolute number of poor has increased by 22.1 million between 2004 and 2010, though that growth has stabilised between 2010/2011 and 2012/2013, at about 58 million.[30] At the same time, there has been a sharp increase in inequality.[31] Poverty is far more concentrated in rural areas. The urban poverty rate is 12.6 per cent, while in rural areas the poverty rate is 44.9 per cent. Regional disparities are striking, with the three Northern regions having between 31 per cent and 50 per cent of the people living below the poverty line, compared to 16 per cent and 29 per cent in the South (see Map 1). Recent analysis suggests that 52 per cent of the poor are living in the North East. Regional Gini indices also point to increasing inequality within the North East and North West, as well as within the South South.[32]

Map 1
Percentage of population living in poverty per state in 2012-2013



Source: IMF Country Report No. 15/85 – Nigeria Selected Issues Paper, March 2015: Figure 1 (source: World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report 2014 – GHS 2012/2013)

34. Economic growth has relied on the oil industry and has not generated sufficient employment to absorb the population growth. Unemployment rates are high, particularly amongst the youth. The overall unemployment rate was 28.5 per cent in 2013 (ILO data). Unemployment of women and young people is particularly high (23.3 per cent and 41.6 per cent respectively in 2009).[33] Unemployment was significantly lower in the southern states (18.4 per cent compared to 29.1 per cent in the Northern states in 2011).[34] Since 2013 the National Bureau of Statistics has

[29] Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015: How are the world's forests changing?, FAO
[30] World Bank Nigeria Economy Report 2014, pg. 17
[31] World Bank World Development Indicators data, 2015; UNDP Human Development Reports 2015 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient> accessed 23 October 2015
[32] Reassessments of GDP and GHS survey data from 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 have significantly reduced poverty incidence estimates in Nigeria. Data from the recent GHS (2012/2013). World Bank Nigeria Economy Report, 2014
[33] ILO data, 2015; NBS Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2012
[34] This is calculated using data from NBS Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2012

stopped publishing unemployment data, focusing on job creation which has seen increases in service sectors, though not in agriculture.[35]

35. With regard to human development, Nigeria still ranked 152 out of 187 countries in 2013, although its human development index has increased from 0.466 in 2005 to the latest figure of 0.504.[36] Human development indicators are generally worse in the North. Child malnutrition is still rampant and under-5 mortality rate has been increasing. Due to its population size, Nigeria ranked 3rd for the highest number of people living with HIV in 2009.[37]

36. Food insecurity remains an issue, although Nigeria has drastically reduced the number of undernourished people under the Millennium Development Goal 1c hunger target.[38] Nonetheless, other dimensions of food insecurity have worsened. A 2013 WFP analysis found that, though food is produced in varying degrees by all livelihood groups, market procurement is the norm, with subsistence farmers purchasing 50 per cent of their food.[39]

37. Regional food poverty rates correlate with broader poverty rates. In 2010 the highest food poverty incidences occurred in the North West and North East, with 3 states registering food poverty rates above 90 per cent. The South West and South East experienced average food poverty rates 10 per cent below their northern counterparts. Only Niger State, in the North Central, had a rate below 60 per cent. Food poverty rates in rural areas were 77.7 per cent, over 5 points higher than urban areas.[40]

D. Public policies for rural poverty reduction

38. The slower pace of growth in agriculture as part of the GDP is consistent with the slow progress in poverty reduction and welfare improvements in rural areas in Nigeria. At the turn of the millennium, new approaches were adopted that focused on empowerment, private sector-led growth, and reforms to government service delivery. National strategies and policies that cover the CPE period include the vision 20:2020, and the Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA), though these were influenced by earlier policies. While ATA is nested within the broader transformation agenda as a mid-term development strategy, which in turn feeds into the vision 20:2020's long term strategy, both the vision and ATA are informed by earlier National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) policies.

39. National Visions. The first, vision 2010, was designed in 1996 and implemented in 2002 through to 2009. It aimed to set Nigeria en-route to becoming a developed nation, by increasing political stability, economic prosperity, and social harmony.[41] In 2010, the plan was replaced by Vision 20:2020, which lays the overarching policy framework for Nigeria to become one of the top 20 economies in the world by year 2020. This would require an annual economic growth of 13.8 per cent and a transformation of a primary products oriented economy (agriculture and crude oil production) to a diversified, industrial manufacturing and services oriented economy.[42] The vision uses existing frameworks to coordinate planning efforts, and is harmonized with the key principles and thrusts of NEEDS, the MDGs and the Seven-Point Agenda.[43]

40. Rural Development Strategy. The Rural Development Strategy was launched in 2001. Its core principles were a participatory approach to cater for community

[35] Economic Note: The Nigeria's Paradox of Growth amidst High Poverty Incidence, BGL Research & Intelligence 2012
[36] UNDP Human Development Report, 2014
[37] National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2010-2015, January 2010; HIV Prevalence Rate by States, National Agency for Control of AIDS (NACA) http://naca.gov.ng/content/hiv-prevalence-rate-states accessed 23 October 2015
[38] The State of Food Insecurity in the World (2015) – Meeting the 2015 international hunger targets: taking stock of uneven progress, FAO, IFAD & WFP, pg. 13
[39] Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Nigeria 2013, IFPRI & WFP
[40] NBS Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2012
[41] Human Rights Watch – Vision 2010 https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/nigeria/Nigeria-08.htm
[42] Nigeria Vision 20:2020: Economic Transformation Blueprint December 2009, National Planning Commission
[43] Nigeria Vision 20:2020: Abridged Version December 2010, National Planning Commission, pg. 23

needs and capacity, developing a vehicle for transferring resources to local communities, policy dialogue and support for decentralization, sector reforms aiming at empowerment of rural communities, and equity amongst groups by gender.

41. NEEDS, SEEDS, and LEEDS. Following swiftly, between 2003 and 2007, Government introduced its own Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the NEEDS programme.[44] Agriculture, food security and economic growth were given priority, and enacted through the complementary State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS) and the Local Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (LEEDS). In terms of strategies, SEEDS and LEEDS focused on smallholder farmers, agricultural extension, inputs, and irrigation.

42. NEEDS was a reform program designed to improve the standard of living of Nigerians via industry deregulation, market liberalization, privatization of the economy, and institutionalization of transparency and accountability in government.[45] NEEDS has been successful in creating a stable macroeconomic environment, enacted civil service reforms, reforming the civil service, strengthening due process, consolidated the banking sector, and pursued privatisation and liberalization.[46] But, it did not accomplish desired poverty reduction, employment generation, or increased power supply, and was weak in monitoring and evaluation, and in effective coordination. This led to the formulation of long-term strategies as seen in Vision 20:2020.[47]

43. Transformation Agenda and ATA. The 2011-2015 Transformation Agenda brought agriculture once again to the forefront of Nigeria's approach to poverty reduction. It set policies for seven growth drivers in the real sector. For agriculture and food security, policy aims would enhance growth through greater exports and import substitution, increase value addition for increased industrialization and employment, increase efficiency, and enhance technology development and dissemination. Over NGN 500 billion (6.96 per cent of the Agenda's budget) would be dedicated to this sector.[48] The goals of ATA are to increase demand for Nigeria's food staple crops by 20 million metric tons and create 3.5 million jobs in agriculture by 2015. It will achieve this through increasing productivity through better access to inputs, reduction in crop losses, and linkages with industry.

44. Agricultural input markets have also been the focus of policy revisions within ATA, and have been assisted with new schemes and tools. The encompass seeds and fertilizer markets targeted through the Growth Enhancement Support Scheme (GESS), as well as the microfinance sector through the Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) Fund. Infrastructure and value chain development is the focus of the Staple Crop Processing Zone (SCPZ), which intend to stimulate the production and processing of ATA priority agricultural products.

45. Microfinance Policy. Government started to respond to the demand for microfinance in 2005 with the launch of the New Microfinance Policy, which was meant to boost delivery of financial services for the rural poor.[49] The policy was revised in 2011, in light of the 2009 consolidation and crisis of the microfinance sector. The revised objectives focus on promoting a savings culture in rural areas, as well as in building capacity and fostering financial knowledge, and in specifically promoting employment opportunities through the effects of delivering financial services. Microfinance schemes that specifically target the agricultural sector include NIRSAL, aimed at reducing risk in lending to the agricultural sector. Its

[44] Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, IMF Country Report No. 05/433, December 2005
[45] Remi (2015) 'Background Paper on Private Sector, Agro-Business, Value Chains Development', pg. 1
[46] Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Progress Report August 2007, IMF Country Report No. 07/270
[47] Nigeria Vision 20:2020: Abridged Version December 2010, National Planning Commission
[48] The Transformation Agenda 2011-2015: Summary of Federal Government's Key Priority Policies, Programmes and Projects, National Planning Commission
[49] Microfinance Policy, Regulatory and Supervisory Framework for Nigeria, December 2005, Central Bank of Nigeria

goal is to promote agricultural industrialization by encouraging banks to lend into value chains. With US$ 500 million at its disposal, NIRSAL aims to reduce risk by sharing losses on agricultural loans, encourage private insurance schemes and product development, technical assistance provision to agriculture sector borrowers, bank rating mechanisms, and bank incentives mechanisms.[50]

46. The figure below provides a timeline of major policies and events over the COSOP period.

Figure 3
Timeline of major policies and events over the two COSOP periods



E. Governance and conflict

47. Nigeria has a decentralized federal system of government comprising a federal capital territory (FCT), 36 states and 774 local government areas (LGAs). Nigerian states operate with a high degree of legal and de facto autonomy. The federal structure implies a complex fiscal system, which requires many extra-budgetary funds. All oil and gas revenue and most of non-oil revenues are pooled and shared by the three tiers of government.[51] With the vertical revenue allocation formula, state and local governments are heavily reliant on the pooled resources and there is little incentive to mobilize internal resources to fulfil their statutory functions.

48. Further decentralization to local governments has stalled. Attempts to strengthen fiscal autonomy and capacity at local government level through constitutional reform met resistance by the state governments and the legislature. Local governments have limited autonomy to control their finances and thus are often constrained in meeting their obligations with development partners.

49. The strengthening of 4th tier institutions as a subset of the local governments to lead participatory community development processes has met clear limitations. There is no constitutional requirement for this level to be acted on and therefore it is left to the agency of the individual states to act on these. Progress made can be

[50] NIRSAL, (n.d.), Central Bank of Nigeria http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/2012/PUBLICATIONS/REPORTS/DFD/BRIEF%20ON%20NIGERIA%20INCENTIVE-BASED%20RISK%20SHARING%20FOR%20AGRICULTURAL%20LENDING.PDF

[51] The sharing formula prescribed by a constitutionally created body, the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). Thirteen per cent of the oil and gas revenue is allocated to the oil producing areas and the remainder is shared out as follows: federal government (52.7%), state governments (26.7%) and local governments (20.6%).

dismantled depending on new governors' interest in the area, and is therefore dependent on political interest and election cycles.[52]

50. Corruption. The country's dependence on oil for state budgets has led to the collapse of other income sources and exacerbated grand corruption associated with oil-funded budgets. The Mo Ibrahim Index placed Nigeria in the lower half among African countries (31th out of 52 countries in 2014).[53] The Corruption Perception Index ranks Nigeria 136th out of 175 countries (2014).[54] Corruption pervades local, state and federal structures, causing low public trust, poor social welfare, and uncertainty in future economic activities.

51. Fragility and conflict: Poverty is seen as the root cause of violence and anger in both the North and South. Income shocks and rising fuel prices have aggravated the situation. There is also a close correlation between youth unemployment and rising armed violence.[55] Nigeria's death toll from acts of armed violence has been on a sharp increase since 2010 (see figure 4). Current national estimates place the number of internally displaced people attributable to the insurgency at 1.14 million. Security concerns in some parts of Northern Nigeria have led to less farming activities in previously vibrant agrarian communities such as Konduga and Dikwa in Borno State. In the Niger Delta conflict has been fuelled by widespread feelings of injustice that oil revenues are not being used for local development and that the local population is bearing the costs of the serious environmental degradation caused by the exploitation of oil reserves. Peace initiatives in the region have been successful in reducing conflict since the mid-2000's, which included a government amnesty programme for militants in 2009.[56] In the Middle Belt the latent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over land use have led to a surge of violent interactions since 2009 (see box 2 on page 28).

Figure 4
Reported fatalities by violent events in Nigeria between 2005-2014



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data 2015

F. Official Development Assistance

52. Nigeria is the largest recipient of official development assistance (ODA) in West Africa. The 2008-2013 average amount of ODA Nigeria received was US$1,870.1

[52] Amadi, S: CPE Governance Background Paper, September 2015
[53] Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2015), accessed 1/7/2015 (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/data-portal/)
[54] Transparency International Data Research (2015a), accessed 1 July 2015 (http://www.transparency.org/country/#NGA_DataResearch)
[55] Abidoye and Calì, 2014; Alozieuwa, 2012; NRSP, 2014
[56] This includes disarmament and payment of monthly stipends to ex-militant beneficiaries.

million, increasing to a substantial US$2,530 million in 2013. Despite these remarkable amounts, Nigeria is not aid dependent. Given the size of the economy, ODA constitutes only 0.5 per cent of the GNI.[57] Development aid between 2008 and 2012 has, on average, represented 8.1 per cent of government expenditure. Other sub-Saharan African countries show averages of 57.8 per cent and 50 per cent in the same year.[58]

53. For Nigeria, funding from the private sector has become the most important source of development finance; in 2012 nearly 70 per cent of the financial flows were non-ODA, though descending to 46 per cent in 2013.[59] Furthermore, Nigeria has been the largest receiver of personal remittances in sub-Saharan Africa, having received US$20.6 billion in 2012, representing 73.8 per cent of all personal remittances to the region in the same year.[60] From 2005 to 2009, personal remittances to Nigeria have represented over 9 per cent of GDP and, though the absolute value keeps increasing, the share of GDP they represent has fallen to an average of 4.9 per cent between 2011 and 2013 due mainly to the rebasing of GDP figures, though also to GDP growth.[61]

Figure 5
Comparison of GDP, annual GDP growth, personal remittances received and ODA received in Nigeria between 2005-2013



Source: OECD DAC data 2015; World Bank World Development Indicators data, 2015

54. ODA is however still an important source of funding for projects to reduce poverty at local level. In 2013, the top three national funders were the USA, the UK and the EU institutions. The top three International Financial Institution funders were the World Bank, the Global Fund, and the African Development Fund.[62] The biggest bilateral donors are USAID and DFID. Together with IFAD, the World Bank, USAID, DFID, and AFDB are also active in the agricultural sector.

[57] World Bank data 2015; OECD DAC data 2015
[58] World Bank World Development Indicators data, 2015
[59] OECD DAC data 2015
[60] World Bank World Development Indicators data, 2015
[61] The high ratio early on may also be attributed to a revision of baseline prices being updated from 1990 prices to 2010 prices (The Economist (b), 2014)
[62] The amount of funds provided were: World Bank (US$ 633.1 million), the USA (US$ 485.1 million), the UK (US$ 372.3 million), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (US$ 214.7 million), the EU institutions (US$ 131.7 million), and African Development Fund (US$ 103.6 million). Source: OECD DAC data 2015

Key points

- Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and it has now the largest GDP, having overtaken South Africa in 2014.
- Economic growth has contributed to a slight reduction of poverty, but this has been offset by high population growth and increasing inequality.
- Nigeria has about 58 million poor people, the largest number in Africa.
- Economic growth has mainly been driven by rising global oil prices. This growth did not generate sufficient employment to absorb the high population growth.
- Agriculture still contributes 20 per cent of the GDP. But Federal Government spends less than 1 per cent on agriculture.
- The 2012 ATA brought agriculture back to the forefront as a key sector for growth and poverty reduction.
- Poverty is the root cause of the rampant violence and conflicts in the North, South and Middle Belt.
- Because of the size of its economy, Nigeria is not aid-dependent, although it is the largest recipient of ODA in West Africa. Funding from the private sector has become an even more important source of development finance.

III. Description of the COSOP and operations

55. Prior to the 2001 COSOP, IFAD programmes in Nigeria followed three main thrusts. These were: (a) promoting productivity increases in food production through a food-security and commodity approach through the Multi State Agriculture Development - Cassava Multiplication Project and RTEP, (b) improved natural resource management through a sub-sectoral and natural resource management approach, and (c) involvement of rural communities and the poor in the design as well as the implementation of field activities (Katsina State and Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Projects. The programme from this period that still falls within the CPE timeframe is RTEP. RTEP was implemented in 26 states in partnership with the Federal Ministry for Agriculture and various research organisations. Non-lending strategies focused on increasing linkages with NGOs through IFAD grants, while policy dialogue was limited to micro-level initiatives.

Table 4
Programmes approved before the 2001 COSOP (US$ million)

Programme title	*Total cost*	*IFAD loan financing*	*Overall development goal*
Roots & Tubers Expansion Programme	36.1	23	Sustainable cropping systems development; research and extension service support; processing techniques and marketing support

56. The 1st COSOP for Nigeria was approved in April 2001 for the seven-year period 2001-2007. It was aligned with government rural poverty reduction policies, such as the Community Action Programme for Poverty Alleviation and the Rural Development Strategy, and had a strong focus on strengthening rural institutions. The main strategic thrusts of the strategy were: (a) empowering target smallholder farmers, the landless, rural women, CBOs and civil society organisations in order to generate sustainable incomes from on and off-farm activities; (b) supporting pro-poor reforms and local governance in order to expand access to information and communication, village infrastructure and technologies; and (c) improving access of the poor to financial as well as social services. The CBARDP focussed on impoverished communities in the northern states, while the CBNRMP targeted communities in the Delta States. RUFIN operated in 12 states and 3 LGAs per state but without a pre-selected community level focus.

Table 5
Programmes approved within the 2001 COSOP (US$ million)

Programme title	*Total cost*	*IFAD loan financing*	*Overall development goal*
Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme	81.4	42.9	Empower poor rural women and men to effectively manage their own development; rural community and service provider capacity for community development strengthened; support sustainable social, agricultural and economic development.
Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme (Niger Delta)	74	15	Standard of living and quality of life improved for at least 400 000 rural poor with emphasis on women and youth through: strengthening rural community and service provider capacity for community development; community development fund established and disbursing.
Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme	40	27.6	Reduce poverty among the rural poor (especially women, youth and the physically challenged) through enhancing their access to financial services to expand and improve productivity of agriculture and rural micro- and small enterprises by: strengthening MFIs through linkages to formal institutions to create a viable, sustainable rural financial system

57. Response to CPE. The first Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) (2008) confirmed IFAD's role as an important development partner for Nigeria focusing on sustainable agriculture and rural development as a means of reducing rural poverty. But the CPE found that IFAD had not devoted adequate attention to agricultural activities, given the centrality of agriculture in the overall economy and as means of income and food security for the rural poor. The vast geographic coverage of IFAD's activities in Nigeria, with near national coverage, was raised as a concern with regard to synergies within and across programmes, as well as to the sustainability of benefits. The Agreement at Completion point includes five recommendation for the 2nd COSOP: (1) Renew focus on agricultural development for rural poverty reduction; (2) Adapt institutional framework and partnership, to solve pending issues of coordination, division of labour and implementation and increase lending to state governments under subsidiary loan agreements; (3) Promote pro-poor innovative solutions; (4) Strengthen local governance; and (5) Adapt IFAD's operational model, to strengthen country presence and move towards fewer and larger projects.

58. 2nd COSOP. The second COSOP covering the period 2010-15 brought a greater focus on agriculture, while building on the food security, environmental and community-driven development (CDD) themes of its predecessor. The COSOP defined two strategic objectives (SO): (1) Improving access of rural poor to economically, financially, and environmentally sustainable production, storage and processing techniques, markets and support services; and (2) Strengthening community involvement in local planning and development, and promoting support for rural infrastructure. In line with the Government's policy framework for agriculture, the ATA, SO1 prioritizes smallholder agriculture through value chains, job creation and a focus on women and youth.

59. Under the umbrella of the COSOP, IFAD still has a broad and ambitious agenda covering research, micro-finance delivery and regulatory reform, technology, value chains, climate mitigation/adaptation, natural resource management (NRM), job creation, and infrastructural development (covering health, education, water, roads). It strives to influence institutions and policy processes, including the policy reform on land and to build up an articulated sustainability framework for strategic program. Environmental support has evolved to tackle climate change adaptation in the most recent operation (CASP) in Northern Nigeria while expanding NRM in the South through CBNRMP.

60. For the ongoing COSOP, the earlier programmes had been retrofitted to support the strategic objectives.[63] The intended impact pathway for SO1 is that under CBARDP incomes will increase through production changes following improved use of technology, access to finance, land area increase, less waste, market linkages, dry season farming and off farm jobs. Under CBNRMP support for individual and group enterprises especially aimed at youth and women and through RUFIN's micro-credit will help to increase incomes. Second, food security will be improved through seeds and other technology for staple crops as well as livestock breed improvement under CBARDP (and now CASP), while CBNRMP will contribute to higher productivity from food crop enterprises, livestock and fisheries. For SO2, the pathway for community strengthening is through support to various commodity and farmer groups and financial service structures, and through local management of infrastructure projects (CBARDP, CBNRMP). RUFIN works to build existing credit and savings group capacity.

Table 6
COSOP strategy overview

	1st COSOP (2001)	*2nd COSOP (2010)*
Strategic objective	1) **Productive capacity** (on and off-farm) sustainably increased. 2) **Communities and rural development institutions** developed and accessible to rural poor. 3) Agricultural and rural development **policy reforms** incorporated into the policy dialogue. 4) **Database gender disaggregated** for the incidence of rural poverty and household food insecurity.	1) The access of rural poor to economically, financially and environmentally sustainable **production, storage and processing technologies, market performance and access, and support services** are improved. 2) The **engagement of rural community groups in planning and development** at the local government area level and government support to rural infrastructure are strengthened.
Strategic thrusts and intended impact pathways	1) **Policy advocacy** in agriculture and rural development to expand access of the rural poor to resources, village infrastructure, technology and services. 2) Developing effective financial, social, public and private **institutions** that are responsive to the needs of the rural poor. 3) Improved productivity and natural resource management, in particular through **participatory technology development**.	1) **Enabling policy environment for value-chain development** to increase farm and non-farm value chain income for smallholder farmers and rural poor; 2) **Productivity enhancement** with greater access to rural infrastructure, improved agricultural production technologies, input markets and support services, rural finance, land and security of tenure and climate change resilience 3) **Community groups development/ strengthening**, awareness-raising, capacity-building and support of commodity and rural finance structures with increased gender and youth empowerment and inclusion
Geographic focus and coverage	Aim at **national coverage**, but match and complement other donor resources.	Targeting the three major **poorest rural and peri-urban** areas most affected by **social conflict and fragile ecological conditions**: the arid/semi-arid zone, savannah zone, and the Niger Delta.
Collaboration with other donors	World Bank, AfDB, DFID, USAID, FAO	World Bank, AfDB, USAID, GIZ, JICA
Grants strategy	Cooperation with selected **agricultural research institutions** for technology development	1) Developing **appropriate technologies** and **innovative approaches** to sustainable agricultural development 2) Enhancing the capacity to predict, prevent or minimize impact of **weather and climate change** 3) Strengthen **public-private partnerships** 4) Improve **institutional coordination and collaboration**

[63] According to the MTR 2013 (p6), CBARDP and CBNRMP were extended and re-focused (on agriculture and service delivery) to better deliver the SOs, while RUFIN has been simplified and VCDP and CASP were introduced to respond to the SOs and the ATA.

Policy dialogue	**Rural financial** policies and regulatory framework **Decentralization** policies and local government budgetary reforms **Governance** and **accountability**	Influence policy and strategy on **smallholder agriculture, rural finance and climate change** and **empower community-based and local institutions** through participation in existing national forums
Country programme management	Full-time country portfolio manager Improve work planning, disbursement, procurement, internal audit and M&E World Bank partnership for supervision	Annual COSOP monitoring IFAD country office to strengthen oversight and implementation support Strengthen CO capacity (CPM outposted)
Risks identified	None	**Corruption and poor governance** **Social and political conflicts** in Niger Delta **Environmental degradation and climate change** in the South and North **Delays in counterpart funding** and project start-up

61. Expected results for the COSOP by 2015 are:

a. SO1: 25 per cent increase in both household income and in food security. 25 per cent increase in credit leveraged. 30 per cent adoption of sustainable improved agriculture practices. 50,000 jobs created in production and processing, and 7,000 viable enterprises established.[64] 30 per cent farmers and fishers adopt measures.

b. SO2: 30 per cent of rural communities participating in planning, implementation and maintenance of infrastructure.

62. Two programmes were approved under the current COSOP: VCDP and CASP. The combined budget illustrates the increased focus on input supply, marketing and micro-enterprises. At the same time, the support to rural infrastructure, capacity development and rural finance has been reduced.

Table 7
Programmes approved within the 2010 COSOP (US$ million)

Programme title	*Total cost*	*IFAD loan financing*	*Overall development goal*
Value Chain Development Programme	104.4	74.9	Incomes and food security of poor rural households engaged in production, processing and marketing of rice and cassava are enhanced on a sustainable basis through: agricultural market development; smallholder productivity enhancement
Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt	93.6	85.5	Reduce rural poverty, increase food security and accelerate economic growth on a sustainable basis through: increased incomes; enhanced food security and reduced vulnerability for smallholder farmers, particularly women and youth; creating jobs.

63. Geographic focus. The portfolio implemented under the 2nd COSOP continued to have a broad geographical coverage with almost all states[65] benefiting from an IFAD operation. In the past, this has brought complexities in management and implementation, as well as in measuring results.

64. The COSOP targets the three major rural and peri-urban areas most affected by conflict and fragile ecological conditions for crop, livestock, fisheries and forestry production: the Arid/Semi-arid zone, the Savannah zone, and Forest and Coastal Swamps of the Niger Delta.

[64] Revised COSOP RMF MTR Report 2013
[65] Only two were not involved in the IFAD portfolio: Gombe and Kano

a. In the North, IFAD programmes promoted community institutions and service delivery with an agricultural focus. As this is a seriously underserviced area of the country a comprehensive mix of community-level interventions, including capacity development, infrastructure and (in Zamfara and Katsina) also rural finance, was considered as the right strategy to address issues of poverty.

b. In the Niger Delta, with high population densities and better market access but a deteriorating natural resource base, the approach included rural employment creation for rural women and youth, promotion of agro-enterprises and non-farm enterprises to improve living conditions.

c. In the middle belt, with large tracts of lands being under-utilized with relatively good access to markets, the strategy was to enhance yields through access to higher quality agricultural production technologies, farm inputs and support services for staple crops.

65. Community-driven development, improved access to rural finance, productivity enhancement and market access were major themes for interventions in the arid/semi-arid zone and the Niger Delta region.

66. Subsector focus. Analysis of programme funding illustrates the progression of the Nigeria country portfolio. Before the 2001 COSOP, there was a clear focus on technical support and research. Under the 1st COSOP, emphasis shifted to rural infrastructure and local capacity building. Analysis of programme funding for the 1st COSOP period illustrates the focus on rural infrastructure and capacity building. The 2nd COSOP then reinstated the focus on agriculture with an increased attention to marketing by including funding for input supply, marketing and micro-enterprises.

Figure 6
Sub-component funding share of all programmes at approval (percentage of total)

Before 2001 COSOP



Within 2001 COSOP***



Within 2010 COSOP



* Composed of Credit to MFIs and Support of the Nigeria Central Bank, Management and Co-ordination, and M&E
** Composed of Technology development, Technology transfer, Processing, and Policy Support and Dialogue
*** Project management
Source: IFAD GRIPS *(2015)*

67. Main partner institutions. Partnership strategies have evolved from a focus on the World Bank, NGOs and farmer organizations in the pre-COSOP period, to broadening the participation of national and local government, other donors, research institutes, CBOs, and the private sector under the 1st COSOP. The 2nd COSOP followed similar lines to the 1st COSOP, though delineating partnership strategies according to its 2 strategic objectives. Along its first objective, the COSOP envisioned partnerships between smallholders, national agricultural research institutes (NARIs), and international agricultural research organizations; new donor funding for private enterprises; and collaboration with multilateral and bilateral donors on dedicated value chain segments. The second objective's partnerships envisioned partnerships with government, civil society, and NGOs at the local and national level, including involvement of regional-level ministries. It also envisioned partnering with NARIs and extension services to strengthen farming for environmental conservation.

68. Targeting approach. Targeting and geographic focus in the pre-COSOP period were sectorial and poverty based, with focus on cassava, fisheries, and the North. The 1st COSOP broadened the geographical and sectorial scope, aiming to be both flexible and have national coverage, and be multi-sectorial. At the same time it focused direct targeting to smallholder farmers, the landless, rural women and community-based organizations. Finally, enabling measures focused on strengthening the decentralized planning process. In contrast to the 1st COSOP, the

2nd COSOP focused geographical targeting by adding criteria to geographical targeting strategies which included poverty incidence, social conflict, environmental degradation, and climate change. Direct targeting criteria also became more focused, were nested in community driven approaches, and singled out women and youth as beneficiaries. Criteria were based on individuals' socioeconomic indicators, value chain position and participation, and on business-based community groups. Self-targeting measures were also community-based, intending to reach more vulnerable community members. Enabling measures also broadened out, and were based on three priorities: farmer's organizations and rural communities; LGC capacity building within common property management and maintenance; and rural financial institutions.

69. Performance-based Allocation System (PBAS).[66] During the CPE period Nigeria's PBAS allocation was as follows: (i) 2007-2009: US$45.0 million (zero usage due to the cancellation of the Rural Microenterprise Development Programme (RUMEDP)); 2010-2012: US$83.2 million (US$ 88.35 in approved loans); and 2013-2015: US$ 88.5 million (US$70.5 million in approved loans). The large increase from the 2007-2009 to the 2010-2012 allocation period reflects IFAD's strong 8th replenishment.

70. Mix of instruments. IFAD operations have for the most part seen a continuous strategy regarding financing instruments since before the COSOP period, while novelties were presented in the increased use of grants. Loan conditions for all designed, effective and completed loans have been highly concessional[67] since 1990, whereas future loans will be on blended terms. Another continuous practice, starting with RTEP, and reinforced by the 2008 CPE recommendation, is the use of subsidiary loan agreements between the government and participating states. Inspired by the World Bank's own multi-state projects, these were designed as a way of guaranteeing compliance with stipulated counterpart funding, as well as avoiding delayed loan effectiveness due to individual states not accelerating conditions for loan implementation. The CPE also saw it as a means of increasing ownership and giving greater direct responsibility to facilitate the flow of funds and allocation of counterpart financing by the state authorities. Programmes from RTEP onwards have used this mechanism with participating states, whether they are called subsidiary loan agreements, or Memorandums of Understanding. It also places the responsibility of repayment of assigned portions of the loan on the participating state, on the same terms as the IFAD-government loan agreement. Most recently it seems that this practice has been discontinued, apparently as an attempt to increase flexibility in the allocation of funding to individual states.[68]

IV. Performance and impacts of the lending programme

A. Programme description

71. The CPE covers programmes approved and activities undertaken in the period 2009-2015. It assesses two closed projects, the Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP), and the Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme (RTEP); and two programmes that have been ongoing for at least five years: the Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRMP) and the Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme (RUFIN). These four programmes form the principal source of data on progress, performance and ratings of the key evaluation factors.

[66] The PBAS, introduced in 2003, revised in 2006, and given an overview by IFAD management (PMD) in 2014, provides a performance incentive for member countries, particularly with regard to the quality of policies and institutions in the rural sector. With its rural sector clusters and indicators, the rural sector performance score (RSP) and project at risk (PAR) indicators provide a country performance assessment in establishing a policy and institutional framework conducive to sustained rural poverty reduction.

[67] free of interest but a service charge of 0.75% per annum and have a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years

[68] According to ICO information VCDP does not contain any provisions at design of subsidiary loan agreements. CASP design document (vol. 1: para. 109) states that MoUs have to be signed with State Accountant Generals as a condition for disbursement so as to build country capacity and reduce financial management risks.

72. The CPE also considers three further programmes: one that was cancelled in 2010, RUMEDP[69], and two that are only recently fully effective: VCDP, effective 2013, and CASP, effective March 2015. These programmes are considered only in terms of their quality of design and consistency with the emerging framework of government and IFAD policies and strategies.

73. The geographical spread of IFAD-assisted interventions can be summarized as follows: RTEP covered the entire Central and Southern part of the country, with 26 states included. CBARDP covered seven states in the northern semi-arid dryland region (Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Borno, Katsina, Jigawa and Yobe States). The CBNRMP covered nine states in the Delta region (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers). RUFIN covers 12 states, seven of which are in the South (Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Benue, Edo, Imo, Lagos and Oyo) and five in the Centre, East and North (Adamawa, Bauchi, Katsina, Nasarawa and Zamfara). VCDP covers just six states (Ogun, Anambra and Ebonyi in the South, Niger, Benue and Taraba in the Middle Belt). CASP will cover the same states as CBARDP.

B. Portfolio performance: relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

Relevance

74. The portfolio shows good alignment with the Nigerian government's evolving policy agenda, as reflected in first the Rural Development Strategy (RDS), then National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and finally the ATA and the Nigeria Vision 20:2020.[70] At the turn of the millennium, and following failed structural adjustment policies, the government shifted to new approaches to overcome persistent rural poverty. These encompassed empowerment, private sector-led growth and reforms to government service delivery.

75. The emphasis on participatory, community-led initiatives was highlighted in the RDS formulated in 2001. IFAD's COSOP in 2001-09 drew on these ideas and set the framework for a range of community-chosen and implemented investments encompassing capacity building as well as broad-based infrastructure covering health, education, water, agricultural and other activities. The objectives of both CBARDP and CBNRMP (formulated in 2001-2) were therefore well aligned to these approaches towards rural development. Their emphasis was on strengthening local actors down to village level and enabling communities to determine their own development and to manage their own and counterpart funds from IFAD and government. The continuation of IFAD's leadership in CDD through CASP is appropriate especially as CASP will deliver the COSOP objectives in the most remote and resource-poor communities found in the poorest states in Nigeria (those in the North).

76. Nigeria's policy direction shifted with the NEEDS (2003 – 2007) [71] and emphasis was placed more on agriculture, food security and economic growth, and these were then adapted at state and local government level through the SEEDS and LEEDS.[72] These priorities were emphasised further under the ATA, which brought agriculture once again to the forefront of Nigeria's approach to poverty

[69] RUMEDP was cancelled following almost a two year delay (2008-09) on the part of the Federal Government in approving the financing agreement. See IFAD President Letter to Minister of Finance Nigeria, May 2010

[70] RTEP however sprang from an earlier more traditional agriculture focus that hinged on the state level Agricultural Development Project (ADP) delivery model, and building on the Cassava Multiplication Programme's (CMP) successes on productivity.

[71] As enshrined in Part Three, Chapter Six (Sectoral Strategies) of NEEDS, the policy thrusts of Nigeria's agriculture and food security are: (i) to modernize agriculture and create an agricultural sector that was responsive to the demands and realities of the Nigerian economy in order to create more agricultural and rural employment opportunities which will increase incomes; (ii) strive towards food security and a food surplus that could be exported; and (iii) invest in improving the quality of the environment in order to increase crop yields.

[72] State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS) and Local Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (LEEDS). Their policy thrust was economic growth through participation, empowerment, wealth creation, employment generation and poverty reduction. In terms of strategies, SEEDS and LEEDS focused on smallholder farmers, agricultural extension, inputs, irrigation.

reduction.[73] RUFIN and VCDP align very well with the ATA, specifically for RUFIN with the pillar on agricultural finance strategy known as NIRSAL (Nigeria Incentive-based Risk Sharing for Agricultural Lending).[74] VCDP also fits with ATA's emphasis on increasing productivity through better access to inputs, reduction in crop losses and linkages with industry.

77. IFAD priorities too have similarly evolved over the first and second COSOPs (2001-09, 2010-15). The history of the programme portfolio reflects the strategic shift towards IFAD's core business (agriculture), as stipulated in the latter COSOP, while taking into consideration IFAD's comparative advantage in tackling poverty and deprivation at community level through building community assets and capacities. This has meant a move away from CDD-based, broad social and economic investments to themes around market-led, commodity-based, value chains (RUMEDP, VCDP), and rural finance (RUFIN).

78. All of the programmes are in general characterised in one way or another by over-complex and ambitious designs. Some have ambitious geographical scope (RTEP), multi-tiered implementation (RUFIN), engagement with a wide range of partners (RTEP, RUFIN), or tackle a challenging mix of investments such as social and economic infrastructure, a range of agricultural commodities, natural resource management, and capacity building at community and government level (CBNRMP, CBARDP and CASP). While this ensures that they are broad-based and can address different needs and dimensions of poverty, it does, at the same time, make them difficult to implement, especially given the known capacities at state and LGA level.

79. IFAD's programmes have had long timespans (around 10 years including extensions for RTEP, CBNRMP and CBARDP) necessitating multiple design adjustments as IFAD's country strategy evolved or as supervision missions emphasised specific design adjustments. The older programmes have had to straddle the two COSOPs with their differing objectives. This has had a major influence on relevance, as CBARDP, CBNRMP and RTEP have all been substantially re-designed or retro-fitted to match the overall strategic direction. RTEP shifted in its second phase from covering all areas within the 26 selected states to 9 LGAs and in those 9 communities, and from a focus on crop research and production to processing and marketing. CBARDP and CBNRMP both moved from broad socio-economic investments to a concentration on agriculture and marketing.

80. While the more recent programmes are still to be implemented largely at community level, the shift in emphasis has seen a reduction in focus on area-based CDD. The switch to a focus on group-based activity and then more towards individual-led enterprises has been at the expense of sustaining a commitment to the so-called fourth tier of government (village level) and to governance issues more widely. This is an important shift, but one based on a recognition that the socio-cultural context in the southern states is one that fits with more individual/household-led and small enterprise-based approaches. In Northern Nigeria, in contrast, CASP is set to build on CBARDP's CDD achievements and extend the coverage to new communities, while incorporating existing CDAs, albeit with a more economic, market-led slant as well as stronger environmental actions targeted to climate change resilience and adaptation.

81. This re-design turbulence led to confusion in the field and to short implementation time frames.[75] In other words, strategy re-alignment took priority over implementation consistency. RTEP, CBARDP and CBNRMP all underwent refocusing at mid-term and again at final stages of implementation or during loan extension phases. These were sometimes helpful - as when new disbursement

[73] Agricultural Transformation Agenda: We Will Grow Nigeria's Agricultural Sector, FMARD, September 2011.
[74] No. 33, "Agricultural Transformation Agenda: We Will Grow Nigeria's Agricultural Sector – Draft Blue Print for Discussion", FMARD, Abuja, September 9 2011.
[75] The RTEP tri-term review was conducted in 2004-05 but only finalised by 2007. The loan amendment was signed in 2009, with retroactive effect to 2007. Then a new PIP had to be prepared, so that by the time implementation began for Phase 2, there were only two years left before loan closure in 2009.

rules came in that overcame delays in execution caused by lack of counterpart funding.[76] But in other cases, such shifts sent confusing signals both to programme staff and to communities, as when community level investments moved from mainly social to mainly economic investments (CBARDP) and from working with beneficiaries at community level (through community-based animation teams or CBATs) to commodity apex development associations (CADAs) which integrate individual enterprise groups (under CBNRMP). These changes meant that already agreed community plans had to be changed at IFAD's behest and this in turn weakened the sense of community ownership, while state staff had to adjust their technical guidance.

82. Geographical coverage at national level and within programmes has reduced over time, following the last CPE recommendations. Under RTEP and CBARDP, all but four states in Nigeria were covered, whereas after the closure of CBNRMP in 2016, IFAD's support will be concentrated in 21 of the 36 states (by CASP, RUFIN and VCDP).[77] Individual programmes have also reduced in their coverage from RTEP's 26 states to VCDP's six.

83. As noted in the previous CPE[78], the portfolio has seen very limited geographical overlap in the states supported by different IFAD programmes, making linkages difficult and design and implementation efficiency low. Better overlap would make efficient use of trained staff, build on capacitated local governments and sustain already existing community assets and cadres. While design documents for more recent programmes stated that they would build on the achievements of past programmes, opportunities to build in stronger linkages were also missed, for example between RTEP and CBNRMP and between RUFIN and VCDP. RTEP's second phase concentrated on processing and marketing, but there were limited connections made with CBNRMP, whose initial focus was on mobilisation and social infrastructure, albeit in 9 of RTEP's 26 states. Equally, RUFIN's support for rural finance and VCDP's presence as a vehicle to mobilise actors around a selected commodity should be complementary. However they only overlap in two states (Benue and Anambra) while operating in 16 other states independently. Finally RUMEDP had limited overlap with other IFAD operations, since it proposed to work in Imo, Benue, Kaduna and Kano, with last two being states new to IFAD.

84. IFAD's ambition in a large and economically diverse country like Nigeria is to aim to reach the poorest communities and to avoid states or regions that are better off. The CPE has examined the degree of alignment between overall state poverty rates and IFAD's programme allocations during the CPE period.

85. Southern states in Nigeria generally experience substantially less poverty compared to northern states according to recent national statistics. The latter show rates between 45 and 50 per cent, while the middle belt are 31 per cent, and South South are 24-28 per cent and South West 16 per cent. IFAD's ongoing portfolio does not reflect this particularly but the newer programmes with CASP in particular show a better alignment, except for the South East (see figure below).

[76] CBARDP and CBNRMP were allowed to spend 100% of IFAD's funds on certain community investments in the last two years of their life
[77] Although RUMEDP, had it been approved, would have covered an additional three states.
[78] CPE 2009, para 90

Figure 7
Resources committed by IFAD under COSOP 1 and 2 per region (US$ millions)



Source: President's Reports for RTEP,CBARDP, CBNRMP, RUFIN, VCDP and CASP

86. While all the portfolio addresses rural poverty alleviation, poverty targeting within states and within LGAs is not based upon reliable poverty data. The choice of LGAs and the choice of village areas is meant to be guided by the level of poverty, as detailed for example in the CBNRMP appraisal papers.[79] However, the availability of reliable sub-state poverty data is inadequate to make this an objective exercise.[80] Efforts are made to use participatory methods to select the poorest locations, but the actual process from the documentary evidence available remains somewhat opaque. The baseline surveys often do not help in this regard, because they are usually executed in the already selected LGAs and communities.

87. While targeting of the poorest at state level raises questions, the portfolio set out to have good overall outreach, in terms of numbers of poor to be assisted. The design documents all carefully define the characteristics of the poor, including sub-groups such as the 'poorest', the 'core poor' or 'better off' rural households. Strategies are then defined that aim to meet the capacities and needs of these cadres. However, strategies for targeting other specific groups are not so well defined, such as for rural youth and women, and this has to some extent hampered the ability of the programmes to effectively reach and support them (see gender section below). The more recent programmes, RUMEDP, RUFIN and VCDP, adopted a more flexible approach to the selection of beneficiary groups by allowing state programme staff to identify existing savings groups or enterprises within selected local government areas, based on viable levels of production. VCDP has yet to put in place a robust profiling system to select farming groups that meet IFAD's poverty criteria, although it has set out gender and youth targeting criteria that were absent in previous programmes.

88. Although Nigeria is no longer regarded as a fragile state[81], there are serious areas of insecurity and insurgency in particular regions, and IFAD's portfolio needs to recognise these issues in the design of its interventions and provide mitigation measures, especially where they are operating in locations particularly exposed to conflict. In the CPE's judgement, conflict issues have not been fully recognised in portfolio design. Given the scale of IFAD's engagement, its programmes have been vulnerable to various forms of conflict, insurgency or unrest, whether in the North

[79] See Working Paper 1, Targeting Considerations, Appraisal Report 2002, p.25ff
[80] In CBNRMP for example there are 9 States, 185 LGAs and between 8,444-10,555 villages – hence the cost of assembling screening data on this scale would be prohibitive.
[81] IFAD included Nigeria in its fragile state list in 2013, and then removed it in 2014. (IFAD's Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected States and Situations, May 2015, para 164)

East from Boko Haram, from pastoralist-farmer conflicts in the middle belt or violence and unrest in the Delta region. Most programmes, (RTEP, CBARDP, RUFIN and RUMEDP), do not include any conflict analysis or risk assessment of how changes introduced by IFAD would affect conflict or insecurity either in a positive or negative way, or mitigation measures, with the notable exception of CASP, a new programme that will operate in the conflict-ridden north. For CBNRMP, while no conflict analysis was undertaken at design, other risks such as corruption and poor governance were recognised, as well as political instability and ethnic violence in the Niger Delta, but no accompanying mitigation strategy was identified. The VCDP design does include insecurity in its risk assessment and proposes mitigation measures that include emphasizing capacity building of actors, close monitoring and supervision, promotion of sustainable land and water management practices, and strengthening women's and farmer's organizations.

89. In general, where a mitigation strategy is put forward at design, it is largely to avoid working in known conflict zones by selecting LGAs or villages outside of known areas of disturbance (such as in CBARDP and CASP), and by bringing staff and beneficiaries located in conflict zones to attend capacity building or other sessions in safer programme locations (as in CBNRMP). Only the CASP design suggests active conflict mitigation measures, including CDA mediation and third party monitoring. Working at community level is correctly assumed to address local divisions between community groups, and by building capacity and decision-making at this level, to increase confidence and resilience in facing external threats.

90. The approach at programme level does not appear to take into consideration the historical nature of most of these conflicts (see box 2 below); their capacity to spread into areas formerly designated as 'non - conflict' areas; and also the possibility of direct and/or indirect effects of these conflicts in IFAD intervention areas. Also, there is no scenario building process embedded in the various programmes, with potential remedial actions suggested in the event of conflict related 'spill over' or eventualities.

Box 2
History of pastoral conflict in Nigeria

The dynamics of pastoral resource governance in Nigeria, but more particularly in the North Central Region, go back to the 1960s. Fulani pastoralists have been present in Nigeria since the 19th century, but pushed southwards to greener, more productive pastures, at the time that control of the tse-tse fly was possible. At the same time, sedentary farmers pushed northwards, and claimed land ownership rights over previous official stock migration routes. Within this setting, policy contradictions set the stage for subsequent conflict between the Fulani pastoralists and sedentary farmers. The 1978 National Land Use Decree allowed state and local governments to decide how to assign and lease land, which led to (more literate) farmers obtaining land certificates rather than the Fulani. The 1988 National Agricultural Policy aimed to protect 10 per cent of all national land for grazing reserves, but was not enforced. These latent conflict led to a surge of violent events happening in the Middle Belt since 2009 (see figure 8 below and annex VI, table 1 on Pastoral Conflict).

Figure 8
Number of armed conflict events and fatalities involving Fulani and Tiv Militias in the North Central Region (1998-2014)



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data, 2015

Source: Anna L Okello, Ayodele O Majekodunmi, Adamu Malala, Susan C Welburn and James Smith (2014) 'Identifying motivators for state-pastoralist dialogue: Exploring the relationships between livestock services, self-organisation and conflict in Nigeria's pastoralist Fulani' Pastoralism.

91. Corruption and governance. Despite the fact that corruption and weak governance are identified as one of the main causes of poverty in the COSOP 2010, which 'must be addressed by policies and development programmes', there is very little said in the portfolio design documents on how programmes will address or mitigate risks in these areas. As the CPE Governance Background Paper[82] explains, these are important risks recognised widely (for example in Pillar 6 of the ATA), that influence implementation and sustainability at all levels. While IFAD's programmes include strong internal regulatory controls covering financial and procurement arrangements, and regular supervisory attention in this area, there are less effective measures put in place to mitigate misuse of government contributions intended for programme support or of assets funded by IFAD but then appropriated for other uses. VCDP makes more explicit mention in its programme implementation manual of measures, which align with the Nigerian government's 'Good Governance Agenda'.[83]

92. Varying and mostly poor level of state government commitments was a known lesson from earlier IFAD operations such as RTEP, yet some follow-on programmes retained a high dependency on such counterpart funding contributions (CBARDP, CBNRMP). CBARDP sought to address the issue by instigating state-level loan agreements, with some success, although Kano State chose not to participate. Underlying many states' reluctance to provide agreed counterpart funding is the

[82] Stella I. Amadi. IFAD CPE Governance Background Paper. September 2015.
[83] VCDP Programme Implementation Manual, Chapter 3.3

low priority given to agriculture as opposed to the social sectors or transport or manufacturing, especially in the southern states. Growth in the sector has been difficult with little policy coherence, weak institutions and the negative effects of subsidies and import bans.[84] IFAD's relatively minor presence as a donor has also reduced the level of attention wealthy states give.

93. IFAD reduced the state funding percentage in RUFIN, VCDP and CASP, but having done this, the design documents did not then identify more effective mechanisms to ensure that even the reduced contributions would be paid in a timely fashion. RUFIN has been particularly affected (as discussed below), with low disbursement (only 33 per cent of approved funding has been released by partners in March 2014), so it seems evident that appropriate mechanisms are hard to design. Avoiding subsidiary loan agreements at state level has added scope for flexibility of funding. In addition, it will require effective monitoring of state performance in combination with a wider set of measures to be able to penalise under-performing states more stringently and reward those that do deliver.

94. While IFAD has led the way on instilling CDD approaches within local government, its decision to work with government staff in designing and implementing interventions that are typically market and private sector driven (processing/value chain/finance) is a questionable design choice. The last CPE raised concerns that IFAD was not well positioned to do this.[85] For VCDP the notion of asking bureaucrats to develop value chains and of providing matching one-off grants is a questionable approach[86] and runs counter to previous experience[87] and the approaches of other development partners such as USAID and DFID. For RUFIN, the design is more appropriate in that it is in a highly relevant sector given the major gaps in rural credit provision, and focuses on capacity building rather than direct investment. RUFIN includes a wide range of partners from all levels of government, a wide range of commercial actors (Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), formal and non-regulated banks) and community actors, and following a redesign at mid-term, specific strategies to work with national, middle (MFIs) and bottom tier actors (local government and savings and credit groups) have been identified.

95. Moreover, VCDP is not in line with IFAD's technical guidance on matching grants[88] which stresses that grants should not subsidize investments and should be used only when they can mobilize or be linked with non-grant investments or loans. Even though the PDR refers to the IFAD policy note, the detailed design does not build a sound case for the use of this instrument. In the field, the VCDP programme staff are designing a range of on-farm production and off-farm processing investments with farmer groups, modelled on modalities used by the World Bank Fadama 3 project. The agreements provide for a one year injection of IFAD funding to provide inputs or equipment, but no involvement of any private sector co-investor or real value addition – only bulk purchasing.

96. Overall, the portfolio is moderately satisfactory (4) with regard to relevance, even though this rating hides strong variation. Also, there is no clear trajectory that relevance has improved with time. RTEP's relevance was lower because its scope was too ambitious and its redesign to support processing and marketing came with too little implementation time to be effective. CBARDP and CASP are rated higher because of their consistency with past initiatives and their sound, innovative and well-designed commitment to promoting community-led development in a challenging environment. On the other hand, CBNRMP's relevance is rated lower because of its unrealistic reliance on high state funding levels, its greater re-design

[84] Nigeria Country Assistance Evaluation, IEG, World Bank, 2010, p.64ff
[85] The last CPE rated the phase 2 re-design of RTEP as moderately unsatisfactory, because the authors felt that working through ADP / government-staffed implementation units would hamper the intended move to a market-led private sector driven approach.
[86] Stella I. Amadi. IFAD CPE Governance Background Paper. September 2015.
[87] For example, Socio Economic Study of Rice, Cassava and Palm Oil Value Chains, E. Osijo, IFAD research paper, 2010
[88] Matching Grants, Technical Note, 2012, IFAD

turbulence and its weak linkages with previous projects, such as RTEP. RUFIN and RUMEDP are moderately satisfactory because while they reduced the coverage and counterpart funding levels, and addressed critical sectors affecting the rural farming community, they had weaknesses in terms of lack of conflict analysis and targeting. Finally, VCDP has important flaws in terms of targeting, provision of subsidies and the over-dependence on government to lead what is essentially a private sector activity and thus is only moderately unsatisfactory (3).

Effectiveness

97. This section considers whether the outcomes and outputs of programmes under review, including CBARDP, CBNRMP, RTEP and RUFIN, have been or are being effectively achieved within the allocated resources. [89]

98. The evidence available on results demonstrates that the level of effectiveness is mixed and varies significantly in magnitude between programme locations and over time. The quality of data is also often inconsistent or inaccurate, and this is largely due to weaknesses in the M&E systems of the programmes (see box 3). As noted in the PPA of CBARDP, which looked at this issue in some detail, this raises important questions over the veracity of the results claimed. The quality of data was also recognised as unsatisfactory by IFAD's West and Central Africa Division in their status report ratings (see annex VI, table 2).

Box 3
The challenge of M&E

Across the CPE portfolio, design documents provide an elaborate and usually over-ambitious architecture for M&E, often demanding a strong participatory element. Well-qualified and experienced M&E staff needed to be recruited and trained to implement these designs. As a result of delayed start-up, key activities such as baselines and MIS designs were usually late. Good staff were in some cases recruited (especially at national programme office level), but at state level there was a shortage of candidates and subsequent high turnover. IFAD's RIMS system was adopted and drove M&E data collection in a way that reinforced a top-down, rather rigid indicator-driven approach. The strain on implementing this system with limited counterpart funding was evident. For example, the number of monitoring visits in CBARDP was only 52 per cent of target. Weak community understanding of how to do participatory M&E has meant that, as noted by supervisions and PCRs, the M&E function was limited to measuring achievements of activities against targets. Any deeper analysis of performance results was missing, and thematic studies that could have provided richer insights, though budgeted for, were not undertaken.

99. Achievement of objectives: According to the indicators and self-assessments, the programmes have made good progress towards achieving the stated objectives. Levels of achievement vary though. As for the earlier programmes, the achievements were mainly around productivity gains. RTEP reports state that achieved objectives include increased returns on labour for processing (by 124 per cent) and a decrease in the number of farmers selling at farm-gate prices (by 71 per cent). The yields and outputs for roots and tubers increased according to targets. The number of farmers that have added value to root and tuber crops was below target (176,207 against a target of 200,000).

100. The community-based programmes designed under the 1st COSOP, CBARDP and CBNRMP, had their objectives focussed on community capacity development. These were generally achieved. CBARDP by and large achieved its three objectives on (1) empowerment of poor rural women and men (2) institutionalization of programme policies and processes, and capacity building of public and private sector service providers, and (3) supporting balanced sustainable social, agricultural and economic development interventions.[90] CBNRMP, being in its final year, has achieved most of its objectives. The first objective centres on the strengthening of rural community and service provider capacity for community development, and is measured by the number of community groups strengthened and applying the CDD approach. It has nearly been achieved. The second objective states that the community development fund be established and effectively disbursing. 88 per cent

[89] CBARDP, CBNRMP, RTEP and RUFIN are included because they have either been completed or are at an advanced stage of implementation.
[90] See CBARDP PPA chapter III, section A - Effectiveness

of beneficiary households increased their income by 60 per cent (against a target of half of beneficiaries increasing incomes by a quarter). 36 per cent of households have improved drinking water sources and sanitation for households (against a 30 per cent target). The only indicator not being satisfactorily achieved is job creation (nearly 67,000 jobs created against a target of over 97,500).

101. The last programme, RUFIN, presents a confusing picture in terms of its indicators, with differing figures in its work plans, RIMS tables and progress reports, which makes it hard to judge the extent of progress made. Three modifications have been made to the logframe and appraisal targets have been modified, so leading to inconsistent progression in measurable indicators. Sampled state level RIMS data contain numerous errors and contradict other programme-wide tracking tools, which makes it unclear how actual numbers reported are reached. Keeping the aforementioned issues in mind, reported results stated in supervision missions and self-assessments suggest that the four current objectives are being achieved. At the national level RUFIN has catalysed policy dialogue amongst sector players leading to partnerships between CBN, Bank of Agriculture (BOA) and microfinance banks (MFBs), cooperative policy and law development by the Federal Department of Cooperatives and refinancing through NAPEP. BOA and CBN's acceptance of the mandate to deliver rural credit is a critical step to changing the landscape of financial service provision to the rural poor. Overall, while RUFIN still has 2 years to run (closing in 2017), the programme has moved ahead substantially since the mid-term review (MTR) and has exceeded several targets already, but it still faces the challenge of bringing the formal banking sector closer to the poor rural borrower and overcoming the risks of coverage of remoter areas.

102. Outreach: As the PPA for CBARDP has pointed out, IFAD's programmes are not very transparent in defining beneficiaries and counting them in an accurate way that avoids double counting across categories and over time. The requirement by RIMS to count different types of activity achieved against targets, and to record numbers of beneficiaries for each in an exclusive way, has made it difficult to estimate actual numbers. Given these words of caution, the levels of achievement against appraisal target are summarised in table 8, detailed in table 5 in annex VI, and discussed in detail below.

Table 8
Achievement against targeted beneficiaries for RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP and RUFIN

Programme	Direct beneficiaries targeted	Direct beneficiaries reached	% against target
RTEP	5 200 000	1 004 999	19%
CBARDP	2 500 000	1 207 909	48%
CBNRMP	2 800 000	2 782 859	99%
RUFIN	2 070 000	4 167 001	201%

Source: RTEP Loan Agreement, May 2000, pg. 14; CBARDP President's Report, September 2001, pg. 12; CBNRMP RIMS data 2015; RUFIN Supervision Report June 2014; VCDP Design Report Volume I, 2012, pg. 30; CASP Final Programme Report 2013, pg. xvi; CASP President's Report 2013, pg. 8; RTEP PCR 2010, pg. 2; CBARDP PCR 2014, pg. viii; CBNRMP RIMS data 2015; RUFIN Supervision Report June 2015

103. RTEP under-performed against expected outreach. The project completion report (PCR) reports that of the target of 5.2 million beneficiaries, only a 1 million (772,244 male and 180,955 female) received support. The reduced result was largely due to lack of counterpart funds and stretched capacity across a vast area of Nigeria. For CBARDP, while investments exceeded targets, beneficiary outreach was disappointing. Agricultural and economic investments generally fell below the appraisal target, while social investments were mostly above.[91] A total of 28,116 investments were made in infrastructure, agriculture, rural enterprise and finance, many targeting women and vulnerable groups. In almost all cases the numbers of

[91] RIMS report 2010

such investments achieved exceeded targets substantially[92], with the greatest delivery achieved when additional funds and different disbursement rules occurred in the loan extension period (2010-13). CBNRMP's outreach was hampered by receiving only 16 per cent of the expected contributions from state governments. This severe lack of support has been the overwhelming reason why most of the appraisal targets for outputs were not met. Although the level of delivery was very good in the communities that were reached and higher than in CBARDP, RIMS data show between 50-70 per cent achievement for second tier indicators by the end of 2014.[93] RUFIN RIMS 2015 data suggest that over 4.1 million people out of the targeted 2 million at appraisal are receiving programme services, in the sense of support for group formation and training (though not credit), indicating an achievement of around 201 per cent.

Box 4
CBARDP Beneficiary estimation

The appraisal target was to reach 400,000 households estimated to contain 2.8 million people. With the withdrawal of Kano state, the target would have fallen to 2.4 million. The estimate for the actual number of direct beneficiaries given in the PCR is 1.2 m or some 43 per cent of the original planned figure, or around half of the revised target. As the PCR states, the number of indirect beneficiaries would include many more people such as those who were able to take part in the awareness and capacity building activities, those who were household members of direct beneficiaries, as well as people who generally benefited from road improvements, health services and water supplies, which could reach the entire village area population and beyond in some cases.

Not acknowledged by the PCR, however, is the possibility of double counting. There is no doubt that when a range of investments are clustered within a single village area, that many of the same households would be likely to benefit from different assets. In general, the underlying basis for the beneficiary numbers given in the PCR is not given, and when one compares the number of beneficiaries per activity type there are some unlikely results. For example, the average direct beneficiaries per educational and health facility is 14, for roads it is 9 but in contrast per agricultural activity it is 56.

Source: IOE. 2015. PPA of CBARDP

104. Food crop varieties: A traditional focus of IFAD in Nigeria has been to support the development and dissemination of new food crop varieties within the loan portfolio and through grants (see Chapter VI). RTEP introduced new crop production technology and improved varieties, including new 12 varieties of cassava and 13 varieties of yam. These were multiplied and distributed to 18,750 farmers who received 453,543 bundles of improved cassava cutting, 1,081,638 seed yam, 716,040 cocoyam corms and 711,422 sweet potato vines. Adoption rates were reportedly high (70-80 per cent) for recommended cassava varieties, which is impressive, but the effect on production was constrained by sub-optimal husbandry practices, particularly poor weed control and low fertilizer use. New varieties were introduced in CBARDP, but the process of adoption has not been systematically documented through supervision. CBNRMP also introduced new varieties. The latest supervision states progress is below target; only 17.2% of the beneficiaries adopted new technologies (against a target of 30%).

105. Access to credit: A major focus for the programmes designed under the 1st COSOP was to enable access to credit for the rural poor. The community-based programmes established community development funds (CDFs). This model was a particular success in CBARDP where the number of people accessing loans increased from 5,127 in 2004 to 78,825 in 2012, and the loan amounts rose from NGN 2 million to NGN 74 million over the same period. The model has not been successful in CBNRMP; instead the programme focussed on establishing linkages with the non-banking institutions (DAC, LAPO). Still, achievements in terms of access to financial services remained below target. RUFIN's approach was instead to facilitate linkages for the savings groups with various financial service providers. 10,005 mostly existing savings/credit groups have been strengthened (as against the targeted 7,500). Around NGN 780 million (as against around NGN 275 million

[92] Although the origin of these targets as noted already is unclear.
[93] The PCR is still under preparation, and the final results may show higher levels of achievement.

targeted) have been mobilized as savings or deposits by beneficiaries. Credit provision stands at almost 377,000 clients (against a target of 80,000) with the volume of credit disbursed at NGN 2.2 billion as against the targeted NGN 930 million.[94]

106. A major challenge which RUFIN tried to address is linking groups of the 'unbankable' poor with financial service providers (who cannot be reached by formal banks because of remoteness or lack of assets). In this respect, non-banking institutions, such as DEC and LAPO, have played a critical role in reaching this key IFAD target group, because of their extremely effective, low-cost and small-scale outreach approach (see box on DEC microfinance below)

Box 5
DEC microfinance

Out of the MFIs involved in Benue, the Development Exchange Centre (DEC) is the only one that explicitly provides service to women producers and traders through financial support, microcredit, savings mobilization, and other loans products namely: on lending loans, loans insurance, micro enterprise support and equipment loans. As of 2013 it had 90 offices and 924.6 million Naira in deposits, and in 2014 it had provided 13,8 million Naira in loans and had 120,413 borrowers. It also provides pre-disbursement training, as well as trainings in record keeping, loan utilization, and business development. In Benue, DEC has been the most successful institution in reaching out to women (41 per cent of all borrowers were DEC women clients) and in providing loans (69 per cent of loan value was DEC's). Though their loan to savings ratio is 349 per cent, compared to the MFB's ratio of 57 per cent, DEC gives small loans that recycle into new loans quickly, so their clients are always borrowing. Nonetheless, the small scale of lending and slow increase in each cycle that they offer prevents upscaling for those with higher demand.

107. These impressive figures hide some inherent weaknesses of the RUFIN approach. First, indigenous forms of microfinance have a long history in Nigeria and have led to the existence of a large number of community savers and credit groups.[95] RUFIN's approach was basically to pick up those existing groups, provide them with training and link them to the existing banking and non-banking institutions. Second, the access to formal financial services facilitated through RUFIN falls short of the existing demand. RUFIN RIMS data suggests that the extent to which the demand for credit has been covered varies from 18 to 94 per cent. States with high poverty rates and low presence of the formal banking institutions have been lagging behind. Data provided to the CPE mission in Benue show that credit outreach is far lower in this state, reaching only seven per cent.[96] In other locations where a larger number of development finance actors are servicing the same beneficiaries, for example in Lagos State, it is difficult to attribute results to the programme because some of the RUFIN beneficiaries are also being serviced by other programmes.[97]

Box 6
RUFIN has supported small groups to obtain production and marketing loans

The BOA Doma branch, Nasarawa has successfully provided a total of N11.6 million in loans to 10 savings and credit groups that have been trained and linked through RUFIN. These loans are either through BOA's microcredit window, and include a farming credit window at 12 per cent interest p.a. over 20 months for cassava, or a shorter term marketing loan window at 20 per cent interest p.a. RUFIN has helped the groups meet the bank's loan conditions which include being registered as a co-operative, having operational records for 6 months, and have saved 20 per cent of the loan value.

Source: CPE field visit

[94] Despite the impressive figures, large gains in achieving and surpassing targets are not satisfactorily explained in supervision missions, and when crosschecked with a sampled state, the claims made in outreach raise doubts that cannot be verified with the available data provided (see table 3 in annex VI on RUFIN outreach in Benue state).
[95] Michael T. Marx & Hans Dieter Seibel. 2012. The evolution of financial cooperatives in Nigeria – Do they have a place in financial intermediation? In: Onafowokan O. Oluyombo (ed.), Cooperative Finance in Developing Economies. Lagos, Soma Prints Ltd., 2012
[96] Using the same method as stated at MTR: 25% of people in credit and savings groups served by RUFIN would each have a demand of 50,000 NGN. Refer to Annex VI Table 3 for data provided.
[97] Such as the Commercial Agriculture Programme of the World Bank. Indeed some of them are already linked to MFBs and even commercial banks before/prior to RUFIN Some MFBs like Bowen have separate records/ledgers for RUFIN, State government and non-intervention assisted clients and it easy to see the same beneficiaries in these three records. This is despite the effort of the state officials to reduce duplication of assistance.

108. Sustainable infrastructure. Some of the older programmes had a heavy focus on infrastructure, which has not always been productive and sustainable. Under RTEP's Phase 2, 575 processing centres were planned, but only 354 were built, and of these only 166 are operational. These centres processed a total of 2 million tons of cassava roots and generated about 0.5 million tons of processed products of which 90 per cent was processed cassava (garri). A similar picture emerges from the CBNRMP which has only built and maintained a relatively small part of the social and economic infrastructure planned.[98] On the other hand, the infrastructure built under CBARDP in the northern states was overall effective and sustainable. The programme had set up CDAs to maintain the social and community infrastructures provided, which continued to function well.

109. Community capacity development has been a major focus. Results are well documented for CBARDP which established 207 CDAs across 7 states. The CDAs implemented a wide range of development activities chosen and managed by the communities directly. CBNRP also focussed a lot of resources on community capacity development, with all communities drawing up community action plans. Nonetheless, these did not translated into effective implementation, as evidenced by the low achievements on beneficiary outreach and financial services above.

110. Job creation has been a consistent theme through which IFAD made a modest contribution to rural employment. In RTEP, some 7,790 individuals were gainfully engaged in cassava processing activities, 95 per cent of them women. For CBARDP, 1,588 jobs have been created in off-farm enterprises. CBNRMP created 68,858 jobs (below the target of 97,584). RUFIN provided 57,300 jobs (exceeding the target of 33,000).

111. Saturation versus outreach. Several of IFAD's older programmes (CBARDP, CBNRMP, RTEP (phase 2)) selected a number of LGAs and within them a limited number of communities to receive assistance, in an attempt to target the poorest and to provide intensive support, which once successful could be replicated by government and others. From field evidence, this has produced good results in CBARDP's 207 and CBNRMP's 243 village areas, and given that IFAD is the main actor in these places, attribution of results to IFAD support is usually very clear. Moreover, many locations reached are remote and beyond normal government service access. At the same time, the selection process has proved fraught for programme staff, as political pressures at state and LGA level have made it difficult to maintain a focus on targeting the very poorest areas, and weak statistical data at LGA level has also made it difficult to select the poorest areas in an objective way.

112. A less concentrated and more opportunistic approach was adopted with RUFIN, VCDP and the first phase of RTEP, where all LGAs were eligible for support. Selection of groups was determined in RTEP's case by production and marketing potential and latterly by the existence of registered producer groups, and in RUFIN's case by the presence of existing savings groups and by better road linkages allowing MFIs to reach their clients.

113. There have been concerns that some elite capture has occurred and more remote and poorer communities have not been so effectively reached. The community-based animator teams (CBAT) used in CBARDP and CBNRMP were sometimes dominated by village leaders and in RUFIN too, support was hi-jacked by inappropriate beneficiaries such as civil servants (MTR, p.17). This trend has been addressed however by the formation of more representative associations that are tied to specific enterprises in CADAs and by improved training and supervision. Recent figures from the preliminary impact study conducted by the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) for RUFIN also indicate that this imbalance is being addressed.

[98] e.g. 18 out of 48 school buildings; 5 out of 25 health centres; 97 out of 120 boreholes; 39 out of 120 kilometres of rural roads; 16 out of 52 small bridges; 2 out of 10 landing jetties; 37 out of 90 agro-processing facilities

114. Re-design turbulence has influenced effectiveness significantly. As noted already, CBARDP's achievements were weaker in 2010 when the programme was originally intended to close, but with the re-design and change in disbursement rules, allowing IFAD to fund 100 per cent of community investments, a major change in outreach and hence effectiveness occurred. RTEP too sought to address market gluts through introducing processing and marketing, but its effectiveness was limited because of the belated change and the slow delivery of counterpart funding. For CBNRMP, the shift towards agriculture and rural enterprise and a similar change in disbursement rules also changed the level of outreach, with cumulative loan disbursement jumping from 50 per cent in 2012 to 75 per cent in 2014. But as pointed out in paragraph 81, the design changes also led to disruption in delivery as modalities and target groups changed and implementation periods shortened. These factors off-set the improved speed of delivery and reduced effectiveness.

115. Insecurity and conflict have affected effectiveness locally. The Boko Haram insurgency in the North East principally occurred from 2009 on, and supervision missions, which mainly took place from 2003-11 before the major period of conflict, make little mention of its influence on CBARDP's operations or programme delivery. Curfews as well as the influence of displaced people have more recently affected development activities in the North East. [99] Bornu has been more affected by the insurgency than Yobe, though Yobe programme vehicles were taken in 2014 and supervision of remote villages had to be suspended.

Table 9
Comparison of CBARDP achievement rates at completion and violent attacks between 2009-2013

State	Overall Cumulative Achievement against Target	Attacks (2009 – 2013)
Jigawa	58%	1
Borno	80%	346
Yobe	91%	59
Zamfara	98%	N/A
Kebbi	104%	3
Katsina	111%	2
Sokoto	117%	2

Source: Armed Conflict location and Event data project (ACLED) 2015; CBARDP RIMS 2012

116. The less widely reported conflict between Fulani pastoralists and Tiv farmers in Benue and Nasarawa has had a major influence on RUFIN and to some extent VCDP, particularly in 2013-14, when beneficiary groups suffered death, injury and displacement.[100] The outcome of the current conflict has reportedly displaced 10,000 people and large tracts of farmland have been abandoned. In the most recent incursion from Gwer East LGA, the conflict resulted in an estimated 16 people dead and several more injured.[101] Conflict mapping analysis as well as CPE field evidence of the incursions also point at military involvement (annex VI table 1 on pastoral conflict).[102] There are no programme numbers or reports that mention or assess the impact of the conflict, though RUFIN's MFI performance in

[99] Interview with B.Odoemena, former IFAD Country Programme Officer.
[100] CPE field mission met with several credit and farming groups in Gwea East, Gwea West and Guma LGAs in Benue and in Doma LGA Nasarawa State where members had suffered in these ways
[101] Action on Armed Violence (2013); 'The Violent Road: Nigeria's North Central' AOAV and NWGAV, <https://aoav.org.uk/2013/the-violent-road-nigeria-north-central/> accessed 13 October 2015
[102] Page 19 of - Women Environmental Programme, 'Final Report of the Conflict Mapping into the Incessant Crises Between the Tiv Farmers and the Fulani Herdsmen in Gwer West, Makurdi & Guma Local Government Areas of Benue State' IPCR & UNDP, October 2012

Benue LGAs that have experienced conflict (Gwer West and Apa) show that they underperform significantly in financial service outreach.[103]

117. Conflict in the Delta region has had less influence on CBNRMP outreach, partly because the LGAs selected were not in areas prone to violence, and because of the success of various peace initiatives in the region throughout the programme lifetime, in particular the Federal Government's Amnesty Initiative.[104]

118. Summary: Overall, effectiveness tells a mixed story. Delivery of results has been influenced by funding release, re-design turbulence and changes in loan disbursement rules. As a consequence, overall outreach has been disappointing for two of the programmes (RTEP, CBARDP), satisfactory for one (CBNRMP) and unclear because of questionable figures for the fourth (RUFIN). Notable achievements were recorded with regard to access to financial services, community capacity building and job creation. Within the locations, delivery of benefits in terms of building assets and spreading technology have been very good. But, area targeting could have been stronger, for example through the careful use of within-state baseline poverty assessments as part of the baseline. Within the communities targeting of the poor, women and youth has been good. Therefore, the CPE rates effectiveness as moderately satisfactory (4). Conflict has been a factor in limiting effectiveness locally, and programme management should have been better at mitigating conflict by analysing the underlying causes and preparing strategies to address these. For example, in the middle belt, IFAD could have sought to balance crop production investments that mainly benefit the settled farming community with support for pastoralists.

Efficiency

119. Efficiency measures how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results and benefits. The CPE reviewed four programmes: CBARDP, CBNRMP, RTEP and RUFIN in terms of their efficiency. The key messages discussed below are around: delayed implementation, inconsistent guidance and supervision, better value for money during use of funds, saturation helping implementation efficiency, high management costs, big variation in costs per beneficiary.

120. All the programmes under review experienced implementation delays due to loan agreement and effectiveness issues and then slow or no release of counter-part funds. The average 'effectiveness lag' for the whole Nigeria portfolio is 32 months and 26 months for those programmes reviewed here, which is more than twice the IFAD average of around 1 year. The more recent programmes are taking as long as older ones in the portfolio (Table 10). It is remarkable that with regard to project effectiveness the trend shows no improvement since RTEP. The reasons for these delays are a combination of factors including delays in obtaining Federal and state legislature agreement, in fulfilling loan conditions such as staff appointments and in opening necessary bank accounts.

[103] Apa and Gwer West combined do not reach half of the total of any of the outreach criteria (number of savers, savings mobilised, number of borrowers, credit disbursed)

[104] Started in 2009 by President Yar'Adua, this initiative has been seen as largely a successful attempt at demobilising militias and reducing levels of violence. Niger Delta: A Critical Appraisal of the Amnesty Programme and Social Political Development in Nigeria, Ejovi, A. & Ebie .C. S., Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol.3, No.22, 2013

Table 10
Delays in programme effectiveness

Programme	*Time from loan approval to effectiveness (months)*	*Time from loan signing to effectiveness (months)*
RTEP	20	15
CBARDP	17	14
CBNRMP	31	24
RUFIN	41	17
VCDP	19	14

121. During implementation there are also delays in execution particularly in the early years of programme life, connected with various factors, the most common being late counterpart fund release, lack of familiarity with IFAD procedures and slow establishment of accounting and operational procedures (see chapter V).

122. These delays in turn lead to non-release or slow replenishment from IFAD loan funds, particularly reflected in CBARDP and CBNRMP through the high Withdrawal Application (W/A) counts and low average W/A values (figure 9). Changes in disbursement rules later in programme life helped overcome serious underspend but at a cost of local ownership. W/A rates increased by 200 per cent towards the end of the CPE period (2010-13) (see figure below).

Figure 9
Comparison of Average W/A value (in US$) and W/A count as processed per Programme between 2008 and 2015



Source: IFAD flexcube data

123. For RTEP, severe delays in commencement had a major impact on various aspects of the programme.[105] RTEP was beset by slow replenishment turn-around, insufficient and untimely counterpart funding, and 48 per cent shortfall/variance in annual budget proposals vis-à-vis the amounts released. CBARDP also suffered a significant delay before reaching effectiveness at 17 months. This was due to delays in appointing staff, opening accounts and initial counter-part payments. The programme continued to suffer difficulties in release of counterpart funds, particularly from Borno state. Since this slow start, however, the disbursement rate and volume of funds disbursed accelerated dramatically from 2010 when the loan extension occurred and the disbursement rules changed,[106] and has outperformed other IFAD operations (figure 10).

[105] Though the loan was approved in 1999, it was only made effective in 2001. Due to delays in counterpart fund releases, implementation really only started in 2003. The first tri-term review in 2004-05 itself took much longer than expected and led to loan amendments that were only agreed in 2009 and so were applied retrospectively to 2007.
[106] programme was extended from 2010 to 2013 and added US$16.9 million additional funds, with IFAD providing US$13 million

Figure 10
Comparison of cumulative loan disbursements (in US$) for IFAD operations 2008-2014



N.B. AWPB IFAD loan financing targets are based on available AWPB data. Only 2 RTEP AWPBs had IFAD loan targets. CBNRMP's final AWPB (for 2014) is excluded since it is a rolling plan that comprises both 2014 and 2015. RUFIN, CBARDP and CBNRMP had IFAD loan targets in NGN, which in some cases had exchange rates to USD. There were no exchange rates available from 2010 onwards. NGN to USD conversions for given years were based on the NGN-USD exchange rate on 31st December of the previous given year, since AWPBs are generally finalised by the end of the previous year.
Source: IFAD flexcube data; Naira-US$ exchange rates based on January 1st each year between 2010-2014

124. CBNRMP witnessed serious delays in start-up and then in counterpart funding at state level throughout its life. Reasons for delay in effectiveness included the slow appointment of programme staff and opening of accounts.[107] Thereafter across the nine states, commitment varied immensely (figure 11). This was largely due to the varying priorities of State Governors, and to a lesser extent the ability of the programme staff to lobby the political leadership. The proportion of funding expected from state level resources (45 per cent of total costs) was unrealistic in the view of programme personnel. It also proved difficult to persuade decision-makers of IFAD's focus on a few LGAs and communities within the state, especially given that other donors had broader coverage and also requested lower funding contributions from government. For example, the World Bank's Fadama II project operated under the umbrella of the same ADP system but delivered investments in every LGA.

[107] According to the programme coordination team, delays also occurred because of the unwillingness of the CPM to visit insecure States in the Delta to resolve issues

Figure 11
LGA Funding contributions by state for CBNRMP 2006-15 (NGN million)



Source: CBNRMP SPO data

125. RUFIN witnessed the most serious effectiveness lag of 41 months. Delay or non-release of counterpart funds by states and the Federal Government seriously affected programme implementation in terms of start-up activities such as awareness/sensitization, trainings and linkages. The initial delay in processing W/As affected implementation, but this was rectified after midterm review in 2013. 55 per cent of approved financing (from all partners) has been disbursed as at October 2015.[108]

126. Supervision While the quality of supervision is addressed under partner performance later, the way supervisions are conducted can also directly affect efficiency because of their influence on programme direction and operations and so in turn can improve (or reduce) value for money. While missions have been regularly conducted and findings thoroughly documented, the CPE has found that mission members were not always sufficiently experienced or consistently used, with significant variation in personnel and in areas of expertise. As an illustration, for the 11 missions undertaken for CBNRMP from 2007-15, a total of 74 different experts have been used, 40 of whom only attended one mission and a further 17 attended two missions. The average number of missions undertaken by any given individual is only 2. From feedback received by the CPE from programme staff in the field, this pattern of mission composition has led to problems with regard to lack of familiarity with the programme, and also and more importantly to varying messages and inconsistent recommendations. This affected the longer running programmes, CBARDP, CBNRMP and RTEP, all of which went through both major re-designs at mid-term but also a range of smaller technical adjustments according to the priorities raised by particular supervisions. This at times has led to inefficiency in terms of introducing unexpected changes to programme delivery that in turn led to wasted resources.

127. A similar aspect of inefficiency surrounds the effects of frequent political changes in different levels of government because of elections and other disruptions or bureaucratic delays and obstructions. The SPO in Cross River State in his 10 year tenure has had to deal with 32 local government chairman, four State Governors as well as four CPMs. The turnover caused by the electoral cycle has led to a repeated need to justify and defend the programme approach to incoming leaders, many of whom have new agendas and an understandable desire to see their constituency benefit from donor projects. CBNRMP's National and State

[108] Page 53, Appendix III, "Country Strategic Opportunities Programme", for review by Executive Board, 99th Session, Rome, April 2010.

Support staff as a result have had to devote time that could have been spent on supporting field implementation instead on advocacy work with state and local government political leaders. Despite these efforts, many states did not contribute funds, and this led to major inefficiencies in terms of underused staff and equipment.

128. The wide geographical coverage and the multi-tiered management structure also has had an impact on the efficiency of the portfolio. Due to fact that the flow of funds was managed in a decentralised way for CBARDP, with the funds being allocated directly to each of the seven participating states, each state was consequently accounting for and submitting W/As individually. This appeared to support greater local ownership but lowered efficiency compared to other programmes where loan applications and withdrawals were handled by the national programme office. CBNRMP also had a lower proportion of eligible expenditures financed from the loan (22-25 per cent as against 50 per cent for CBARDP) and more stringent withdrawal conditions.

129. The large number of states and LGAs involved in the programmes resulted in a large number of small W/As which reduced efficiency. The lack of consolidation of withdrawal applications for CBARDP resulted in a total of 465 such applications being made. This was much higher than normal for IFAD, and represents a high transaction cost for both IFAD and the Government. The speed of IFAD's processing of W/As was a source of complaint from some programmes but this situation has improved as W/A quality has improved and new systems have been introduced in IFAD.[109]

130. The wide coverage and multi-tiered nature of RTEP, CBARDP and CBNRMP also meant that programme coordination units were stretched in working effectively across so many states and LGA partners. This caused high overheads in terms of follow-up, supervision, and advocacy with leaders. Given also the changing focus of the programmes, the PMO/SPOs had to re-engage partners and revise their understanding. These issues have been addressed somewhat in RUFIN and VCDP with their smaller coverage and use of zonal offices.

131. An analysis of management costs as a proportion of the total programme costs reflects these issues (see Table 11), with all programmes using over 20 per cent of their resources on management and coordination, with CBARDP and CBNRMP the highest at almost 30 per cent.

[109] Average processing time for the 8 W/As was 39 days, with 32 days for IFAD processing. Variations stand out though: the lengthiest overall processing time for a W/A was 161 days, and the shortest 7. For IFAD processing, the lengthiest processing time was 81 days, while the shortest was 1 day. Data for CBARDP W/A processing times is only available for 2013. No comparison with previous years can be made due to IFAD changes in processing time methodology.

Table 11
Project management cost as a percentage of total programme cost for CPE programmes

Programme	*Percentage of costs devoted to project management*
RTEP	25.5
CBARDP	29.3
CBNRMP	29.7
RUFIN	15.8
VCDP	16.1
CASP	12.4

N.B. due to CBARDP and CBNRMP not having components dedicated to project management and monitoring and evaluation, estimates were made using stated O&M, M&E and salaries in the CBARDP PCR, and from available AWPBs' breakdown of O&M, M&E and salaries in AWPB's for CBNRMP
Source: IFAD flexcube for RTEP, RUFIN, VCDP and CASP; CBNRMO AWPBs; CBARDP PCR.

132. In terms of value for money the portfolio shows mixed performance when compared to each other but generally favourable compared with similar programmes or benchmarks. The CDD programmes (CBARDP, CBNRMP) used direct labour contribution and some local materials for assets. One estimate found that roads, irrigation schemes, dams, boreholes, clinics and schools were all built 50 per cent cheaper than would have been the case if supplied by Government using contractors.[110]

133. For CBNRMP, evidence suggests that IFAD was more cost effective than comparators such as the World Bank's Fadama III and the EC Micro Project Programme in the Niger Delta States. This is because IFAD rarely use contractors but let the community manage investments directly, with the support of local government and programme staff, and this therefore avoided overheads and commissioning costs. Whether building schools, fish-farms or boreholes, the community also used local materials for building wherever possible.

134. While comparable costs per unit between IFAD programmes and other government or donor programmes are hard to source, some evidence was obtained that indicated greater efficiency compared to World Bank and government implemented assets.[111] From the physical assets visited by the CPE mission in ten states across the country, on the whole the quality of construction appeared sound and the asset was mostly still being used. The PPA for CBARDP conducted a survey on asset quality and use (see next section on Sustainability), which found a high proportion of assets, especially for health, education and water provision being built for an appropriate cost and still in use. In terms of allocative efficiency, the community-led programmes in particular represent good value in the sense that funds were used on assets that were based on choices expressed by the community, rather than being supplied by local government or by others without due consideration of local priorities.

135. Cost per beneficiary There is a high variation across the portfolio in terms of spend per beneficiary (table 12). This is explained by the different forms of investment and the levels of outreach. The CDD programmes involve infrastructure that served whole communities (roads, water, schools, etc.) while RTEP had a smaller target group of root and tuber producers and processors. Cost per RTEP beneficiary, according to the CPE 2008, was estimated at US$300, but this depends on how beneficiaries are counted. One million beneficiaries are stated in the PCR so

[110] "The Community Driven Development Approach – Building Fourth Tier of Government where there was none", A Kankia, 2013
[111]. For example, CBARDP irrigation hand pumps cost on average NGN0.2 million while for the same units the River Basin Development Authority paid N1.2million; solar water panels supplied to IFAD cost NGN5-6 million while the state government paid NGN10 million. Eight schools of two each were inspected across four states with all of them built between 2005-2010. Their average cost two classroom blocks was NGN1.6 million, compared to a government cost of NGN5.5millon and a Community-based Poverty Reduction Project cost of NGN2.2 million (PPA report of CBARDP).

at US$30 million expenditure the cost per beneficiary is US$30 per head.[112] CBARDP has higher spend per beneficiary because communities in the North are harder to reach. The relatively lower costs for reaching and servicing communities in the more densely populated Delta region made CBNRMP more efficient. Within the context of the WCA region, the CPE's total project cost per beneficiary is low, compared to the total regional average of US$290, as well as to IFAD's total portfolio of US$396.[113]

Table 12
Estimated programme expense per beneficiary (US$)

Project	*Design*		*Completion*	
	Total Project	IFAD contribution	Total Project	IFAD contribution
RTEP	12.9	8.2	30.2	14.0
CBARDP	45.4	17.2	68.0	35.0
CBNRMP	31.4	6.0	14.2	5.9
RUFIN	23.2	16.0	5.3 (after 5 yrs)	3.8

Source: Calculated from data in annex VI, tables 4 and 5.1

136. Cost-benefit. A powerful measure of efficiency ex-post is a financial or economic cost benefit analysis that established in broad terms whether the investment made by a programme was recovered through benefits generated. However, few of the documents produced at completion contain such analysis. RTEP's PCR estimates rates of return, while other programmes assess benefit costs at farm level. The RTEP PCR claimed a very high ERR of 37 per cent compared to 24 per cent at appraisal, and various enterprise models showed highly positive returns (PCR, p4), but the accompanying analysis is not available to justify such positive results. CBNRMP impact data show significantly higher financial returns to beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries in the order of $4.5 per day across all enterprises, though no rate of return, and CBARDP's PCR also indicates some positive returns.

137. Overall, significant delays in effectiveness and implementation had a major impact on efficiency. High overheads and management costs that were above IFAD average also indicated low efficiency. On the other hand, the CDD projects have been more cost efficient and delivered good value for money. The overall rating is moderately unsatisfactory (3).

C. Rural poverty impact

138. For the various impact evaluation criteria included under the CPE, only CBARDP, CBNRMP and RTEP are assessed. CBARDP and CBNRMP have PCRs and impact studies for evidence as well as the CPE's own field evidence and interviews. For RTEP, only a short PCR is available plus some ex-post academic research articles on production. As noted in the PPA of CBARDP, the reliability of the available baseline and impact studies is considered low. [114] CBNRMP's impact study does examine the significance of results and has a more rigorous design.

139. Household and physical assets and income: The available evidence points to a marked increase in assets in the targeted villages especially in CBARDP and

[112] VCDP has a much higher planned spend per beneficiary because of the anticipated greater scale of investment in processing and marketing support, including markets, roads and machinery. Nevertheless, VCDP has the lowest number of beneficiaries (40,000) and so represents a very different model.
[113] Based on IFAD GRIPS data available as of December 2015
[114] In CBARDP's case, the surveys do not present an analysis of data quality or of statistical accuracy (such as number of error cases, level of precision of sample estimates). No explanation was given as to the exclusion of Borno State and the low sample obtained in Kebbi State. The impact survey report used a data set of around half of the original sample, implying that there were considerable data cleaning problems. The mission interviewed three of the consultants involved in the impact study and the data analyst. Several problems were apparent including the budget, team composition and fieldwork arrangements that give cause for concern.

CBNRMP. The large number of social and economic investments that occurred over the past 10 years, and their concentration in a selected set of communities, provide a strong case for there being a growth in assets, and a rise in income for many direct beneficiaries. Making any kind of quantified estimate of income change is difficult though given the varying quality of empirical evidence, and attribution will depend on the presence or absence of other development actors in the target locations. Certainly in many remoter locations, IFAD's support was the main source of development activity and being community-led has been more relevant and shown greater beneficiary ownership.

Box 7
Microenterprises in Cross River State

In Yala LGA and in Akpabuyo LGA (Ikot Nakanda village, Cross River State) significant changes in income and assets were observed through delivery of social assets by CBNRMP (such as water supply) and also a range of enterprises particularly yam minisett and rice enterprises and sewing. One resident received assistance to set a sewing business. She has paid back the loan and has employed an apprentice

140. Whether other LGAs and village areas that were not supported by IFAD programmes saw rises in income or assets is not always clear. There is limited evidence on this point from RTEP and CBARDP, although the series of research studies on RTEP farmers reviewed below under agricultural impact do contain references to some income improvements. CBNRMP's impact report claims significant differences on beneficiary income. Beneficiaries' average household incomes from all sources was estimated at NGN265,524 per season compared to NGN170,642 observed for the non-beneficiaries and NGN166,033 recorded at baseline. The CBNRMP study includes an analysis by poverty quintile which reveals that the "well-being within the core poor which are supposed to be the primary target of the programme was not superior to that of the non-beneficiaries" (p.43). This implies therefore that IFAD had least impact on the poorest.

141. Both CBNRMP and CBARDP impact data show improvements in housing quality, asset ownership and access to credit. The CBNRMP impact study shows that asset ownership improved amongst both beneficiary and non-beneficiaries, but at an even higher rate for beneficiary households. Only in one state, housing ownership among beneficiaries remained behind the control group (Akwa Ibom). Improvements in other assets owned were lower for programme beneficiaries in three states (Cross River, Abia, Ondo) (table below). It should be noted that these states are also among those in the South that are most affected by conflict (except Ondo), worsening poverty rates and increasing inequality (see table 8.3 in annex VI).

Table 13
CBNRMP impact on household assets by state, 2007-2013

Region	*State*	*Difference within difference analysis beneficiaries vs. control group*			
		Thatch roof (% of respondents)	Other roof (% of respondents)	GSM (% of respondents)	Motorcycles (% of respondents)
South East	Abia	18.3	8.4	15	-1
South South	Akwa Ibom	11.3	-4.8	15.4	7.3
South South	Bayelsa	8.3	10.7	6.7	2.4
South South	Cross River	-27.5	7.3	0	-8.2
South South	Delta	0.6	4.2	8.4	8.7
South South	Edo	1.3	1.6	4.5	13.4
South East	Imo	-	-	2.6	0.5
South West	Ondo	-11.3	8.1	2.4	-9.4
South South	Rivers	3.6	4.1	2.1	14.4

Source: CBNRMP 2007 baseline survey; CBNRMP 2013 impact survey; plus annex VI, tables 6.1 and 6.2 below

142. Within some of the programme localities, there were several other development actors delivering improvements. The CPE field visits noted that often newer structures funded by other programmes such as the Millennium Development Goals programme, UNDP, UNICEF and others were installed in CBARDP and CBNRMP areas, while the state Government also supplemented IFAD investments especially for schools, clinics, roads and water supplies. The implication is that IFAD should be cautious of claiming that the observed changes in the target communities are due to IFAD alone and not also partly due at least to other actors.

143. Overall, while the statistical evidence from some of the impact studies is questionable, the evidence base generally provided from RIMS (with some exceptions such as RUFIN) and from field visits and interviews is sound enough for us to state that in those targeted locations where IFAD programmes operated, human and physical assets have improved.

144. The impact could have been greater if re-design had not reduced the period for deeper and wider delivery. The lack of careful M&E design and statistically sound survey evidence that distinguishes between IFAD and non-IFAD groups limits our ability to say if target villages enjoyed greater asset and income changes than the general population. Overall the rating on this dimension is therefore moderately satisfactory (4).

145. Social capital and empowerment: Under this domain, there is good evidence that group formation, the transferring of planning and investment decisions to village committees, and the principle that the under-privileged have access to these assets and a voice in their use, have driven forward social capital and empowered the poorest in the selected communities. CBARDP and CBNRMP have a strong record in this domain. RTEP only turned to this aspect in Phase 2 which lasted three years) when it delivered support through community-led initiatives, but there is little documentary evidence on the achievements in this domain.

146. CBARDP's CDD approach has made a contribution to building social capital. Prior to CBARDP, the communities had few social groups; not more than two or three and comprising only male members who only meet when the need arises. A total of about 8,280 farmer groups with male and female participation have been formed in 69 LGAs across the seven states. These farmer and community groups were formed under 207 CDAs that further identified the constraints and opportunities facing their community and prioritized their needs in order to prepare community action plans for each CDA. Having up to about forty or more groups representing different interests, trades and businesses in a village area makes the communities more able to take responsibility for their development and has increased the capacity for collective action.

147. For CBNRMP, while mobilisation approaches have gone through an unsteady path (from CBATs to CADAs and from social investments to group and then individual enterprises), and the understanding of CDD has been less rounded than in CBARDP, the focus on youth empowerment has been a significant achievement, especially towards the later stages. Pigs, poultry, fishing and bee-keeping have attracted youth, while spraying kits and crop processing have also provided suitable ventures. The choice of investments has often benefited the poorer and women, through for example poultry, vegetables or sewing. Through increased incomes, these groups have grown in confidence and for some the impact has been life-changing. Important social benefits are also reported, as for example a reported reduction in youth migration as employment opportunities have risen, and less crime and vandalism. In Yala LGA, Cross River, the local government even reported a fall in girl trafficking, which had been a serious problem in the past.

148. Overall, a rating of moderately satisfactory (4) is given for this domain based on CPE field evidence from CBARDP and CBNRMP.[115]

149. Food security and agricultural productivity: There are positive claims from various programme studies demonstrating achievements in this domain. Impact studies from both CBARDP and CBNRMP report marked increases in production and productivity. The final CBARDP Supervision Mission in 2013 for example provides very positive figures for crop production changes (although not for livestock or fish production) and notes their contribution to ATA targets.[116] The PPA of CBARDP however raises important doubts over the reliability of the impact survey results, after examining the original data set. It also questioned how far the changes observed can be attributed to CBARDP given the presence of a number of other development initiatives. As a result the PPA recorded an unsatisfactory rating.

150. For CBNRMP, the survey data are more robust and show very positive changes in productivity for major crops between the beneficiary and control farmers, with maize, rice and cassava of between 50-100%. Difference in difference analysis shows that the beneficiary farmers have seen higher increases as a result of the programme. CBNRMP had less significant changes in crop yields in several states, for example Imo, Ondo and Rivers. These data are supported by the programme's self-assessment and the CPE's own field visits. (table below and annex VI tables 6.1-6.3)

[115] Further justification should come from the forthcoming PCR for CBNRMP.
[116] N1.2 billion are said to have been injected into the hands of small farmers as a result (which pro rata equates to about $20 per household), but no sources are given for these figures. The PCR repeats these figures as does the CASP design documentation.

Table 14
CBNRMP impact on crop yields, 2007-2013 (kg)

Region	*State*	*Difference within difference analysis beneficiaries vs. control group*			
		Maize	Rice	Cassava	Yams
South East	Abia	26	458	-251	229
South South	Akwa Ibom	7		32,399	67
South South	Bayelsa	11		-7,214	651
South South	Cross River	19	25	-664	422
South South	Delta	26		736	
South South	Edo	109		150	4,882
South East	Imo	-48		2,708	-175
South West	Ondo	-10	203	-3,162	-454
South South	Rivers	-121		17,280	-1,610

Source: CBNRMP 2007 baseline survey; CBNRMP 2013 impact survey; plus annex VI, table 6.3 below

151. Independent evidence available from studies undertaken from 2010-2014 by researchers into RTEP farmers versus non-RTEP farmers shows a statistically significant difference in cassava adoption and production rates in Plateau, Kwara, Lagos and Ogun, though less so for a sample from Nasarawa and Benue: see annex VI table 7 for details. For other root crops there is less evidence, although the PCR does claim a national doubling of sweet potato and cocoyam and 50 per cent increase in yam production from 2000-2009, although the extent to which RTEP is responsible is not clear. More widely, RTEP added value to the knowledge of roots and tubers production technologies in West and Central Africa and many analytical studies, case studies and research publications have emerged (supervision mission 2009).

152. The issue of attribution arises strongly in this domain. There are a range of other programmes supporting agriculture in the states where IFAD programmes have operated, and because these are not often discrete, visible investments (such as schools or clinics), it is not easy to detect or separate their influence from IFAD's support. For example, the World Bank FADAMA programme operated in Kebbi, Imo, Ogun and Kwara States (where IFAD also operates), supporting supply of irrigation equipment and improved techniques and seeds, and its PCR reported sharp income increases for its beneficiaries.[117] Also, subsidised fertilizer supplied through the federal government's successful ATA Growth Enhancement Support programme was distributed to many farmers across all the states. The high adoption rates given in the IFAD impact reports for fertilizer use will to some extent be due to this initiative.

153. More widely, the sector has been growing strongly in the past decade, with some estimates stating a three-fold growth between 2002 and 2012, and an annual growth of 5.9 per cent.[118] Roots and tubers, fish production and vegetables have shown the greatest growth. To some extent, IFAD's investments will have contributed towards this trend, particularly in the communities supported; however the vast size of the sector and the fairly limited role that public expenditure (including both government and foreign aid) plays in supporting such growth suggest that most of the rise in agricultural production has come as a result of investments from both large and small private investors.

154. In summary, there are strong claims from programme sources that there has been a marked contribution to improved food security and agricultural productivity. However, in some cases the evidence base is weak and the attribution question is

[117] Implementation Completion and Results Report, Second Fadama Development Project , July 2012
[118] Analysis of Agricultural Public Expenditures in Nigeria IFPRI Discussion Paper 01395 December 2014

not addressed. At individual community level where IFAD has operated there have been marked impacts on food production and security, but the wider impact of this on the rural economy remains limited. Therefore, the CPE gives a rating of moderately satisfactory (4) for this domain.

155. Natural resources, the environment and climate change: this has not been a highlight of IFAD's portfolio during the CPE period, and the proportion of community funds devoted to this domain has been very small – in CBARDP's case, just 2 per cent of the CDF was devoted to environmental and sanitation projects. Isolated examples exist of better resource management, through tree nurseries, woodlots, bee-keeping, solar energy and disposal of cassava processing waste. CBARDP and CBNRMP included investments in water and sanitation, soil conservation and pasture management, and the CPE saw some examples in the field, but the overall impact is judged as somewhat limited. Indirectly, creating rural employment through intensification of production in enterprises such as fish farming, rice, cassava, poultry and many others, will have benefited the environment through reducing more destructive farm practices. But the shift in focus towards value chains, rural finance, processing and marketing has reduced the space for a sustained emphasis on a more balanced rural development approach.

156. Under CASP, a detailed analysis of the implications of climate change in the Sahel zone is set out in the design, and greater attention is now planned on this theme (in particular the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture (ASAP) grant funding will explicitly support climate-related measures for farmers). But there is little evidence presented of what CBARDP achieved or lessons that should be learned in this domain (see, for example, working paper 7 of the CASP appraisal document). Furthermore, given CASP's multiple objectives (marketing, enterprises, governance), the opportunity to address climate mitigation or adaptation within this competing agenda may be restricted. In summary, due to limited impact and paucity of evidence in this domain, a rating of unsatisfactory (2) is given.

157. Institutions and services: IFAD's programmes can claim significant impact on local institutions and through these, changes to a range of services benefiting the poor either in the form of social, production or credit support. The institutionalisation of the CDAs as a 4th tier of government can be regarded as an important impact of CBARDP; while CADAs in CBNRMP, though more recently created, are widely accepted. To varying degrees this village-level form of community-based development architecture has been widely adopted within programme areas and beyond. Despite some level of political interference in selection of localities and of leaders, they act as locally-owned organs that have channelled resources and brought forward the views and priorities of those living in often remote and disempowered communities. For many of those visited by the CPE team, such local institutions were keeping records and accounts, and had made payments to contractors, and ensured the quality of services. They have mostly obtained formal status through registration under co-operative legislation, and are on the way to financial independence although the growth in their assets has been modest.

158. At local and state government levels, considerable capacities have been built. However, limited budgets and low prioritisation of agriculture have impeded sustained service delivery. RTEP has had less institutional impact since it operated through separate national and state implementation units, which have not survived. RTEP state offices were embedded within the ADP structures, and as the ADP system has seen reduced levels of support in recent years, so RTEP has struggled to maintain an operational presence at state level. Various research bodies received RTEP grants but without any institutional strengthening, while other bodies such as the State Agro-Processing and Marketing Expansion Group (SAMEG) have been discontinued. At local level, too, there is little documentary evidence that community processing groups have survived.

159. Rural finance outreach through CBARDP's financial service associations (FSAs) has been a notable success in the targeted 207 communities across the north of the country, and these have continued to provide credit, though mainly to traders and middlemen than to the village poor and 'unbankable'. As noted earlier under Effectiveness, RUFIN is also providing support to increase credit outreach with some successes, though some of the figures are questionable.

160. To conclude, developing new forms of community leadership (and in turn political representation) takes time. Building participatory governance at the local level may run counter to years of a totally different kind of political culture in Nigeria. Signs of replication of the IFAD-championed fourth tier of government have occurred (see Sustainability above), but wider impact will require new forms of trust and collaboration, new skills and capacities, new models of leadership and power sharing. The CPE rates progress in this domain as moderately satisfactory (4) overall.

161. Overall poverty impact: The contribution of the lending portfolio assessed here (CBARDP, CBNRMP, RTEP) to poverty is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4) overall. But at the same time the programme had a particular impact on the poorer members of rural society, on women and on youth and those living in remoter areas. In some cases, IFAD's programmes have made substantial differences to living standards, albeit in discrete communities receiving intensive support. These improvement appear small against the backdrop of broader poverty trends[119] that find (i) an overall decline in poverty over the period nationally, but (ii) deepening poverty in the North West and North East with over half of all the poor in Nigeria living in these two regions, (iii) growing inequality between rich and poor in all regions except in the South West.

D. Other evaluation criteria

Sustainability

162. For sustainability, the CPE reviewed CBARDP, RTEP and CBNRMP.[120] Of these, the PPA for CBARDP provides an opportunity for a more in depth field verification of sustainability of assets, services and community institutions.[121] The issue of sustainability should be addressed from both a government, a private sector and community perspective.

163. At national level, the federal government's commitment to agriculture was strengthened under the previous president. The ATA gave increased emphasis to the sector, and its pursuit of a more commercial approach to agriculture has built greater inclusivity so that poor farmers can increasingly join the formal sector both in terms of credit, input access and processing. Nevertheless public expenditure on agriculture has shrunk over the past five years, with federal funding for capital expenditure in agriculture and rural development declining from 4 to 0.9 per cent of the budget between 2008 and 2015, and Nigeria's public expenditure on agriculture has been much lower than in other comparable economies.[122] Against this, the production and exports arising from the sector continue to grow (chapter II), and private sector investments are growing. These trends, by shifting the responsibility for growth from the government to private sector, in general enhance the sustainability of IFAD's programmes.

164. On the other hand, although reliance on oil revenues has been declining, the fall in oil prices can be expected to have an impact on the long-term sustainability of IFAD's investments particularly from lower state and LGA revenues.[123] Alongside

[119] The most recent Government poverty statistics at state level compare 2004 with 2010, but these have been rebased (although only at regional level) following analysis by the World Bank of the General Household Surveys (GHS) in 2010/11 and 2012/13.
[120] The first two have closed and should have findings on this dimension, while CBNRMP has stopped operations at end September 2015 and loan closure is in March 2016.
[121] PPA of CBARDP, 2015 pp 25-26 and Annex IV
[122] Analysis of Agricultural Public Expenditures in Nigeria, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01395, Dec. 2014.
[123] According to the IMF: "with oil and gas exports representing 95 percent of exports and 70 percent of government

this, not all states place agriculture at the centre of their development planning or budgets, particularly in the South.

165. Some state governments have maintained a degree of budget support for programme activities, particularly under CBARDP, although the use of decaying ADP structures indicates how limited state resources are. The political electoral cycle leading to the turnover of governors and LGA chairpersons every 3-4 years has had an effect on implementation as noted in para 127 above, but will also affect sustainability. Once IFAD support has ended, there is little local government support for maintaining programme assets or retaining staff. IFAD Programme offices, vehicles and equipment attached to state ADPs are often left unmaintained. In Abia State, RTEP has remained a budget line item in the ADP since loan closure, however no funds have been released by the state government since 2011.

166. Important coordinating structures that had responsibility for planning and supporting the sustained use of programme results in the sector have closed or been merged. The Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit and the Agricultural Projects M&E Unit that operated since the 1980s were merged into the PCU, for example, and where before these entities had large staff numbers at national, zonal and state level, these capacities grew much weaker in the past five years. But they have not been replaced effectively in the current administration leaving a vacuum in guiding how donor programmes should be effectively followed up. Equally the National Planning Commission's (NPC) role in driving ministry and state performance had been strong during the last administration. This had led to the introduction of performance scorecards and to greater ministerial accountability for results However with a change of minister in 2012, the momentum has been reduced, and the leadership shown by NPC has been reduced in the past three years. NPC's critical role has been handicapped by staff changes and reduced funds to coordinate and make field visits.

167. In terms of private sector and community support for sustainability, PPA field evidence from CBARDP indicated three-quarters of the observed social and economic assets (schools, clinics, irrigation, roads, skill centres, etc.) were being maintained and in use.[124] The lower cost assets had better sustainability ratings – often these were economic assets run by individuals as village businesses (welding, sewing, threshing, milling, irrigation). They had continued successfully after IFAD support, and had given the targeted poorer beneficiaries significant increases in income. Under CBNRMP, RIMS figures also report that around 60 per cent of assets were operational in 2014, the final year of programme operation. This evidence, plus the CPE field visits and stakeholder meetings, indicate positive prospects for sustainability, especially in many of the small and medium enterprises started under the programme (such as pig and fish farming, rice milling, cassava processing, tailoring, crop spraying).

168. For RTEP, while the previous CPE gave a moderately unsatisfactory rating of 3, at closure the PCR Digest painted a better picture with a moderately satisfactory rating (4) on the basis that there was some likelihood of RTEP technologies being retained by farmers – although the evidence base in the PCR is very thin and no consolidated impact study was ever produced for RTEP. Since then, there is limited new evidence of sustainability driven by private actors. The continued use of improved planting materials and technologies appears to be reasonable, based on various independent studies discussed in the section below on poverty impact, and some of the cassava processing centres established by RTEP are reported to be still in operation.[125] Nevertheless the final supervision noted in 2009 that there were still weak linkages between producers, processors and markets because the final

revenues, a sustained reduction in oil prices would impact significantly the external current account and fiscal revenues and stymie the recent growth momentum" IMF Country Report 14/85 March 2015.

[124] This compares rather poorly though with the World Bank Community-based Poverty Reduction Project which had 90% still operational four years after completion including 95% in Yobe. (PPAR, p22).

[125] Based on interviews with two former programme staff

phase of RTEP had not moved far enough in developing a true value chain approach. It noted that 'while professing centres are still in existence, it is likely that only a few have any marketing or financing plan, and insufficient working capital to expand.' This was partly because the request for a loan extension was not approved by IFAD in 2010, and this hampered sustainability of existing processing centres or of organising links to RUFIN, which would have been appropriate way to resolve the lack of working capital.

169. In terms of community organisation, the community structures established by IFAD in the North continue to operate, and have been extended into new LGAs by state legislation. For example, CDAs supported by CBARDP maintain their existence, electing leaders and holding meetings. On the other hand, maintenance sub-committees are often weak or inactive and the formation of new associations within the same community is reportedly limited. Under CBNRMP, the formation of CADAs has occurred only since 2013, and though this is a short time frame, the CPE's field visits found them to be actively engaged in implementing and maintaining assets and supporting enterprise groups. While they are not recognised as a 4th tier of government in the way that CDAs have been, de facto they operate as a community level body to manage funds and prioritize investments. [126]

170. The community based programmes were to instil the reflow of investments funds so that further cycles of beneficiaries would receive capital to start enterprises. From CPE field experience, this is yet to happen, and most groups including CDAs and CADAs have been unable to maintain surplus funds, and where reflows have happened they tend to be to existing group members rather being extended to new beneficiaries.

171. As noted earlier under relevance, the design turbulence experienced by programmes such as RTEP, CBARDP and CBNRMP has strongly affected sustainability. With the periodic substantial changes in programme direction introduced by MTRs or some supervision missions, the timeframe for structures to be understood and take root has been reduced to 2-3 years. CBNRMP's CADAs or RTEP's processing centres for example have not had sufficient time to become self-dependent. The supervision mission for CBNRMP in 2015 noted that the first phase of training for 146 CADAs has been completed and manuals prepared but handover to state/LGAs or to the Nigeria Delta Development Commission (NDDC) remains pending.[127] The recommendations emerging at this point sound last minute and unrealistic, expecting huge leaps of faith for CADAs to become self-sufficient or brought under the wing of government. The issue of revolving the CDF under CBARDP and CBNRMP seems to have found limited traction. From field evidence, enterprise groups have recycled funds within their membership but so far not beyond this to new members of the community.

172. The effect of conflict and insecurity on sustainability of assets is a mixed narrative. While across Northern Nigeria, in particular Borno and Yobe States, there has been a dramatic increase in insecurity since 2009 as a result of the Boko Haram movement, the effect on assets and services delivered with IFAD support appears to be localised. Uncertainty over the outcome of the North East insurgency will have an effect on CBARDP sustainability as well as CASP implementation, particularly given the volume of refugees and displaced people. Equally the implications of the farmer and pastoralist conflicts in the Middle Belt areas such as Nasarawa and Benue States where RTEP and now RUFIN and VCDP operate are yet unclear. Interviews with beneficiary groups in Benue that were displaced by the agro-pastoralist conflict in 2014 pointed to an international dimension in the conflict that might have critical implications for the sustainability of IFAD assets and groups.

[126] At a CBNRMP workshop for the CPE in Songhai on 31 August 2015, the majority of participants from all nine States expressed strong support for the CADA structures and their prospects for sustainability.
[127] CBNRMP, supervision mission report 2015 p.5

Summary: At national level, although President Buhari campaigned strongly in support of helping Nigeria's farmers, the new government is yet to establish a firm position on agriculture, either in terms of continuing the ATA policy platform or establishing a new policy framework. At the time of this CPE, it was difficult to assess what resources will flow to the sector and how this will in turn affect the sustainability of investments from IFAD's portfolio.[128] At state level, the governors are mostly new as well, and have varying commitment to small scale farmers and many focus on more visible large-scale investments. At local level, community associations are widely recognised as a sound legacy that continue to support assets built by IFAD's programmes, and small and medium enterprises have continued to grow. But larger scale private sector actors, particularly in credit provision, processing and marketing, are yet to link up effectively with the numerous scattered farm enterprises and producer groups. These are important opportunities for the more recent programmes (RUFIN, VCDP and CASP) to fill, but these potential synergies are yet to be properly exploited. We therefore rate the portfolio as moderately satisfactory (4), giving due emphasis to the fact that the two community based programmes have been able to build local mechanisms to support and continue the achievements.

Gender equality and empowerment of women

173. The Government of Nigeria has made several commitments at international and regional levels to ensure that gender equality is integrated in developing, implementing and evaluating government policies and programmes. Nigeria signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2000 (ratified in 2004). In the same year, 2000, Government adopted the National Policy on Women which specifies the overriding principles that underpin its commitment to equality of women and men before the law. This was followed by the Gender Policy (2006) which states that gender equality is critical to the achievement of national development goals and objectives and must be integrated at all levels of policy, planning and implementation. Under NEEDS, policy implementation at each level entailed mainstreaming of gender into socio-political and economic interventions to achieve reduction in poverty levels and discrimination against women. The agricultural sector started targeted spending on girls and women in 2011 with the launch of the ATA.

174. The CPE period covers two IFAD policies that focus on gender and women's empowerment, the 2003 Gender Action Plan (GAP), and its successor the 2012 Policy for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (PGEWE). Overall, IFAD's approach to address gender equality was relevant in Nigeria. The programmes acknowledge the importance of women in agriculture and target women through progressive strategies (table 15), which are highly relevant given the levels of gender inequality in rural areas and in agriculture.

175. CBARDP and CBNRMP were approved before IFAD gender policies were put into effect, and their gender strategies were to foster women's participation through a gender-sensitive CDD approach, very much in line with the national NEEDS programme. Under the GAP, RUFIN presents a second generation gender strategy, integrating gender equality concerns throughout the programme and also targeting men. RTEP, RUFIN and VCDP had specific strategies, quotas and targeted products and services to address gender gaps and promote participation of women. RUMEDP also explicitly targeted women with a proportional target, though was vaguer in its design on how to achieve these targets compared to RUFIN.

176. VCDP and CASP were approved under the PGEWE which required an augmented approach to integrating economic empowerment, participation and voice of women into IFAD's programmes. This is put into practice through the Gender Action Learning System (GALS) which addresses gender inequality by recognising power

[128] At the Council on Agriculture Conference held on (10 Feb 2016), the new Minister of Agriculture unveiled his Agenda, which states that the Ministry will continue to invest in initiatives aimed at improving the livelihoods of smallholders, with a particular focus on youth and women.

differentials across value chains, raising gender awareness and building capacities within and outside the programme. GALS has been piloted amongst village savings and credit groups in RUFIN, and is fully integrated into VCDP's design. CASP (designed after VCDP) is only piloting GALS in one state. The effectiveness of the GALS has not been reviewed yet.

Table 15
Comparison of gender empowerment strategies across CPE portfolio

IFAD Policy Timeline	*National policy Timeline*	*Project*	*Strategy*
No policy	National Women's policy (2000)	RTEP	Women targeted through mobilization, sensitization, capacitation and empowerment processes, particularly in root and tuber processing and research subcomponents, and through capacity building of ADPs. No quotas used.
GAP (2003)	NEEDS (2003)	CBARDP	Gender-sensitive CDD approach integrated 9 gender and poor-specific strategic interventions into programme components (capacity building, gender analysis & mainstreaming in CDD design, direct targeting, self-targeting, and gender-sensitive M&E). Community-specific gender-disaggregated CDD targets.
		CBNRMP	Gender-sensitive CDD approach integrated 9 gender and poor-specific strategic interventions into programme components (capacity building, gender analysis &mainstreaming in CDD design, direct targeting, self-targeting, and gender-sensitive M&E). Proportional quotas (40 per cent women beneficiaries) decided through stakeholder agreement.
	National Gender Policy (2006)	RUFIN	A broad gender mainstreaming strategy based on five sub-strategies including products targeted to women, creating gender awareness, capacity building, quotas (40 per cent women beneficiaries), and gender-sensitive M&E to be monitored by a gender and training specialist
PGEWE (2012)		VCDP	3 pillar strategy using the GALS: Self-targeting of women through specific value chain activities; proportional minimum (35 per cent) quotas in programme resources for women, women's group participation, and women participating in groups; and a dedicated gender/youth officer.
		CASP	Gender-mainstreaming strategy building on CBARDP's CDD approach, synthesizing the 9 gender and poor specific strategic interventions into 5 mechanisms - informed participation and consultation, proportional quotas for all programme activities (between 30 – 50 per cent women and women-led group targets), gender-sensitive M&E, creating enabling environments through gender-appropriate communication tools, and recruitment of staff gender specialists.

Source: RTEP Appraisal Report Volume I 1998; RTEP PCR 2010, pg. 2; CBARDP Formulation report Volume I 2001; CBNRMP Formulation report Volume I 2001; CBARDP MTR 2007; CBNRMP President's Report 2002; RUFIN Design Report Volume I 2006; RUFIN Design Report Volume I, Appendix XVIII; RUMEDP Appraisal Report Volume I: Main Report and Appendices 2007; VCDP Design Report Volume I 2012; CASP Final Programme Report (main report and appendices) 2013, Appendix 2, Tables 4 and 5

177. Levels of participation show a positive trajectory indicating that overall the programmes have increasingly succeeded in mobilising women to participate. Across the portfolio women participated at an increasing rate, starting from RTEP's 19 per cent, to CBARDP, CBNRMP (40 per cent and above), with RUFIN notably reaching 55 per cent of total beneficiaries (figure 12). At the same time, where gender-specific targets were included, they became less ambitious over time.

Figure 12
Comparison of Proportions of Targeted and Actual Women Beneficiaries per CPE Programme



Source: RTEP Loan Agreement, May 2000, pg. 14; CBARDP President's Report, September 2001, pg. 12; CBNRMP RIMS data 2015; RUFIN Supervision Report June 2014; VCDP Design Report Volume I&II, 2012, pg. 30; CASP Final Project Report 2013, pg. xvi; CASP President's Report 2013, pg. 8; RTEP PCR 2010, pg. 2; CBARDP PCR 2014, pg. viii; CBNRMP RIMS data 2015; RUFIN Supervision Report June 2015

178. For RTEP, although 26,800 women were reached in the crop processing component (92 per cent of the component), overall they only represented 18 per cent of beneficiaries. 73,353 women farmers used improved production technology, 65 women's groups were involved and 54 groups were led by women. The gender-based research component was found wanting by supervision missions[129] and researchers and extension staff did not consider gender issues in training.

179. CBARDP saw increased women's participation in programme activities (40 per cent of beneficiaries), with trainings, women-led groups and women saving activities all exceeding targets. CDAs were ground-breaking for many women involved, though, making them participants in community-wide activities for the first time. Impact studies for CBARDP suggest a positive impact on gender equity through women's active engagement in and use of health, education and water infrastructure. There are many examples of women being able to generate their own income, yet still burdened with having to look after their homes and children with limited resources. The PPA field visits found that little has changed in terms of women's role in the community and their use of time and labour.

180. CBNRMP achieved a similar level of women's participation, with women representing an overall 41 per cent of beneficiaries. By component, the programme achieved considerable progress in reaching out to women. RIMS data shows women were 48 per cent of the direct beneficiaries in training, receiving jobs, and in group formation, and were a majority of the beneficiaries of agricultural infrastructure investments. Similarly, targets for training in enterprise development and job creation are close to being achieved. Low achievement rates in livelihood development opportunities for women, including processing activities, access to financial services, and groups led by women, are below 60 per cent target achievement, suggesting that access to inputs and actions fostering social change for women are having a reduced impact.

181. RUFIN achieved significant outreach to women, particularly after the MTR, when 2,000 women's groups were financially linked. Women constitute about 50 per cent

[129] Women as a focus in research approaches were not duly considered in processing activity research, or in extension agents not being empowered to contribute to helping farmer and women's groups of their new control of inputs (i.e. fertilizers) (RTEP Supervision Mission 2005)

of the active borrowers. Among the voluntary savers, women only represent 37 per cent of beneficiaries. However, women constitute a majority of beneficiaries in savings/credit groups formed/strengthened, and individuals receiving programme services, and a significant majority of internal borrowers (76 per cent). Other components targeted women through research. Nonetheless, efforts at mainstreaming gender issues both within the programme and within communities were reported in supervision missions to not be progressing as intended.

182. Sustainable inclusion and empowerment of women is harder to ascertain. M&E data focus mainly on beneficiary numbers. There is little evidence to show how women have used the opportunities provided by the programmes to improve their economic and social status. Yet, women's take up of similar activities (figure 13) differed across programmes. Women's participation in training plateaued across the programmes and overall more men participated in training than women. RUFIN, due to its focus on women's financial inclusion and targeting approach, has been particularly successful in mobilising women savers. CBARDP's main achievement was the high number of groups led by women. Little is said on the levels of empowerment of women-led groups in CBNRMP, but numbers are low in comparison to CBARDP and RUFIN. RUFIN's approach is expected to increase Overall, RUFIN's focus on women seems to indicate a positive trajectory and the number of women-led groups might even be increasing, considering it is currently in year 5 of the programme.[130]

Figure 13
Comparison of women to total beneficiaries in trainings received, savers, and outreach in groups led by women between CBARDP, CBNRMP and RUFIN



Source: RIMS data (CBARDP 2012, CBNRMP 2014), RUFIN supervision mission 2014.

183. Field assessments by the CPE suggest that while IFAD's programmes have increased women's participation in community development activities, their impact on decision-making empowerment and social change is not as great. However focus group discussions held by the CPE team with CBARDP and CBNRMP women beneficiaries found that gender roles in agriculture and in the domestic environment remained unchanged.

184. The issue of women's workloads did not receive sufficient attention. Although the programmes identify increased workloads as a result of project intervention and/or due to changing environment or male out-migration as a potential issue, this is not systematically monitored. Baseline and impact studies do not provide data for an assessment. Only, RUFIN reports reduced workloads against non-beneficiaries

[130] However, mixed groups are recommended in the last RUFIN supervision mission to overcome barriers due to female illiteracy.

although it is not clear what the causal linkages with the programme's interventions are.

185. Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the gender strategies has been the lack of consideration given to ethnic and religious differentiations. In both design and supervision reports, ethnic dimensions are not discussed, and while religious ones are acknowledged there are no clear strategies of how women would be targeted. Nigeria's religious and ethnic diversity, and the role these play in shaping gender roles and in socio-economic processes (i.e. value chains, financial inclusion, etc.) place greater demands on understanding these roles and devising specific approaches.

186. Overall, programmes have by and large followed the trajectory of IFAD and national gender policy development, moving from quantitative gender targets to a mainstreaming approach to addressing gender equality gaps. While there is little evidence yet on the effectiveness of these strategies, overall the CPE concludes that effective strategies to address gender equality concerns in a country as heterogeneous as Nigeria will require culturally appropriate strategies that match the available capacities. Overall, the performance with regard to gender equality and women's empowerment is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4).

187. Youth empowerment. Nigeria's large youth population and issues that affect rural youth, including urban migration of youth and women trafficking, have received more attention in Nigeria with the launch of the National Youth Policy in 2009. [131] Objectives include, among others, the establishment of a framework to provide guidelines on all youth development matters, approach youth problems comprehensively, promote youth participation in democratic processes, and reduce youth unemployment. It also establishes priority groups amongst youth based on vulnerability, significantly female youth and rural youth.

188. This is mirrored by the increasing attention which IFAD gives to targeting rural youth since 2003[132], and especially under the last Strategic Framework (2011-2015). The Nigeria COSOP considers gender and youth a strategic focus due to high youth unemployment and youth restiveness in rural areas. For the recent programmes, strategies for targeting rural youth claim to follow the 2009 National Youth Policy's (2009) direction, but only CBNRMP paid sufficient attention to youth at design. Nonetheless, as observed by an earlier IOE synthesis,[133] the monitoring of youth involvement is weak. Within the Nigeria portfolio, monitoring of youth participation is mixed, but overall there has been some progress. RTEP had one indicator collecting activity results for training of youth. CBARDP did not track youth numbers in its RIMS, though documents claim increased youth employment. CBNRMP tracks youth as target beneficiaries in its logframe, though RIMS does not contain youth-disaggregated indicators. RUFIN was far more detailed in its monitoring of youth-directed activities with age-disaggregated indicators. RUMEDP had no logframe performance indicators for youth. The final two projects, VCDP and CASP, also exhibit the same quota system for targeting of youth as for women (see tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 in annex VI showing the trends in targeting and achievement according to gender and age by project).

189. Results for youth are therefore not as well documented especially in the earlier programmes, such as RTEP and CBARDP. Across the portfolio, over 1.09 million direct and indirect beneficiaries were identified as youths (627,000 young men and 460,000 young women, representing 39 per cent of beneficiaries). More youth were direct beneficiaries than adults, and received more jobs (54 per cent) than

[131] Youth are citizens of Nigeria aged between 18 – 35 years of age - Second National Youth Policy Document of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2009, pg. 6

[132] The 2014 IOE Rural Youth Evaluation Synthesis annex II lists IFAD policies, strategies, and guidelines that increasingly dedicate more attention to rural youth, notably the 2004 Rural Enterprise Policy, the 2011-2015 Strategic Framework, the 2013 Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy, and especially the most recent 2013 Policy brief on improving young rural women's and men's livelihoods, and the 2013 Guidance note on Designing projects that improve young rural people's livelihoods

[133] IOE Rural Youth Evaluation Synthesis, May 2014, pg. 4-5

adults. They also benefitted more from social and agricultural infrastructure. For RUFIN, youth constitute 18 per cent of beneficiaries. Over 21,000 jobs have been created for youth, surpassing targets.

190. There is some evidence that programmes were successful in attracting rural youth. The CPE field visits observed some trends of educated youth (male and female) moving back to rural areas and becoming beneficiaries of CBNRMP. The observed youth profile benefitting from such programme interventions was not the poorest of the poor, but the better educated including university graduates.[134] SPOs defended the involvement of such youths by arguing that they would set an example and encourage other youth to replicate these enterprises in other communities, in collaboration with ATA's N-Agripreneur programme. Field interviews indicated that poorer youth are following the initiative, though it is too early to tell how successful the scheme will be.

Innovation, replication and scaling up

191. These aspects are considered for the programmes of longer duration: RTEP, CBARDP and CBNRMP.

192. There is reasonable evidence that IFAD has contributed to innovations in several areas. In technology, there have been useful research improvements in new varieties and practices, particularly under RTEP. Research at the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and elsewhere has led to a number of new cassava and yam varieties, and processing techniques (such as High Quality Cassava Flour). New uses of cassava flour such as in bread making (10 per cent) was promoted. On the other hand, no new varieties were released for cocoyam, sweet potato or Irish potato.

193. The expansion of CDD must count as the most significant innovation arising from IFAD's community-based programmes. These investments provided the structure and principles for how CDD would work at village level and in the case of CBARDP how local government would work with this newly formalized fourth tier.[135] The hierarchy of CDA committees and sub-committees and the authority invested in these entities by virtue of their transparent democratic structure, and because they were entrusted with dispensing programme funds, has given them credibility. As the CASP design says: "a process of grass-roots mobilization championed by groups and CDAs has empowered community members to access and use resources to improve their livelihoods".[136] The approach to CDD under CBNRMP has also been innovative in the way that CADAs have been formed with a strong focus on enterprise development by commodity groups. VCDP's apex value chain clusters follow a similar structure to CBNRMP's CADAs.

194. In addition, the demonstration of large scale production of quality certified seeds from producers in Yobe and Jigawa has been a notable achievement under CBARDP. Other examples include windmills and use of solar panels which have improved the reliability of water supply and irrigation systems. Paravet clinics and small agro-input shops are regarded as important village level innovations run by locally-trained entrepreneurs that provide easily accessible minor treatments and inputs. Finally (FSAs) have been seen as a CBARDP innovation creating a locally owned and run credit facility at village level that is connected to micro banks.

195. With CBNRMP, the programme can claim to be moderately innovative, especially in its youth initiative 'Youth in Agriculture', which was a deliberate strategy to address the problem of crime and unemployment amongst younger people in the Delta (see section on Youth). Also, the more successful agri-business ventures have been heralded as champions or models for others to follow. From a technology

[134] Visits to Cross River and Abia State
[135] IFAD's capacity to promote replicable innovations and its scaling-up, Dr. J. Egwuonwu, IOE, IFAD, 2009.
[136] CBADRP I, PDR Appendix 1

perspective, new methods have been introduced around bee-keeping, fish farming and processing.

196. On the other hand, IFAD's success in promoting replication or scaling up of those innovations is rather limited. CBARDP seems to be the only programme that has achieved significant scaling up of the CDD approach. State legislation and funding have been introduced in Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina States to support the replication of CDAs in LGAs not supported by IFAD, as well as in new villages within former IFAD-supported LGAs.[137] The follow up programme, CASP, is intending to build on this through 'horizontal scaling up', with plans to replicate further the CDD approach in new and existing LGAs.[138]

197. Beyond CBARDP, the CPE struggles to find other solid examples of successful replication. Under CBNRMP, the recent focus has been on CADAs, yet there is no evidence of CADAs being replicated outside of IFAD areas so far. While the NDDC has been invited to continue funding for 2-3 years from 2016 after the IFAD loan ends, to extend the programme, there is no firm response yet as the Commission leadership is awaiting a mandate under the new federal administration. At local level, there has been some replication of successful enterprises, such as the fish clusters by Bayelsa and Delta government, groups using yam mini-sett techniques and vegetable groups in Cross River. For RTEP, the programme became more concentrated after the Tri term review, reducing coverage to selected LGAs and communities, and there is little evidence of any scaling up of RTEP's activities after loan closure.

198. Overall, the CPE gives a rating of moderately satisfactory (4).

E. Overall assessment of lending programme

199. Overall assessment of the portfolio is moderately satisfactory (4). Comparing the ratings with WCA from ARRI averages, the CPE ratings are better except for relevance. This rather middling assessment does hide substantial variation across the different programmes (see table 16). The worst performing of the completed operations is RTEP, which is moderately unsatisfactory across most domains. It provided many lessons for future operations, some of which but not all were heeded. Lessons that were taken on board in the subsequent portfolio included reducing the number of states covered, reducing the proportion of funding spent on management, having well–designed community driven approaches and targeting the most vulnerable, especially women.

200. But there were several lessons that subsequent operations did not take on board as well as they might have. These included: introducing substantial design changes without allowing sufficient time to see them through; avoiding start-up delays; overcoming weak state funding; tackling weak M&E; relying on government staff to carry out market-driven approaches; and recognising and mitigating conflict and insecurity.

201. IFAD's operations have covered a 26/32 states of Nigeria, an ambitious scope given the size of the country and IFAD's relatively modest resources. Yet coverage actually is much more modest because of the tight focus on a few selected LGAs and communities within each of the selected states. The portfolio reflects good policy alignment overt the period, and responded well to the last CPE recommendations and the current COSOP. With long timeframes and complex designs, the implementation challenges were considerable given the capacities especially at state and local levels. While the move from CDD-based approaches to investments that were enterprise-based, value-chain driven reflected the policy direction, delivery suffered from this turbulence and time-frames to achieve success were shortened.

[137] See Box 6 in PPA report

[138] The coverage of 69 LGAs and 207 village areas under CBARDP would become 104 LGAs and 727 village areas. This represents 60% of the total 163 LGAs in the 7 States.

202. The portfolio targets poverty reasonably well, especially with the programmes in the North and Middle Belt. Within each state, successful targeting requires strong support from programme teams who must work with and convince local government to select the remotest or most vulnerable communities. This has not been easy given the limited number of LGAs and villages that can be funded and the rapid political cycle and opportunism that exists at state and LGA level. While targeting has been a challenge and hampered by weak disaggregated poverty statistics, outreach has been good across the portfolio, and the role of women and youth have been recognised.

203. IFAD's grasp of governance issues could have been stronger and so helped to reduce political interference in targeting, redress funding shortfalls and ameliorate interference in staffing appointments or misuse of programme assets. IFAD also did not analyse the effects of conflict and insecurity on the portfolio or seek to mitigate these factors during execution other than avoiding risky locations.

Table 16
Summary Portfolio Ratings

Criterion	Current CPE Rating	ARRI average project ratings in WCA 2002-2014 (48 projects included in ARRI 2015)
Relevance	4	4.4
Effectiveness	4	3.6
Efficiency	3	3.5
Impact	4	3.8
Sustainability	4	3.5
Innovation and up-scaling	4	3.9
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	4.2
Overall Assessment	4	3.8

Key points

- From 2009-15, IFAD's portfolio had a wide though reducing coverage (operating in all but 9 of 36 states). It evolved slowly because of delays in reach effectiveness, with just two new operations approved since the most recent COSOP.
- The portfolio showed good alignment with Government and IFAD policies, but underwent substantial re-design and retro-fitting. This improved focus on agriculture and value chain approaches, and overcame counter-part funding gaps; but reduced the time for embedding approaches and affected local ownership.
- Overlaps between programmes have been sub-optimal, except in the northern states. This was because of changes in geographical focus and delays in start-up of newer programmes.
- Portfolio design and execution has not fully recognised the need to build in conflict analysis and mitigation. Nor has it been successful in managing aspects of weak governance. Designs were complex and over-estimated the willingness of local governments to contribute.
- Effectiveness and efficiency was reduced by uncertainty of counterpart funding, and though IFAD's disbursement rates have improved with changes in its lending rules, the turbulence following these re-design has also affected delivery. While beneficiary outreach was less than targeted at appraisal, the policy of concentrating efforts in a limited number of villages meant that delivery in these locations was successful, efficient and often sustained.
- Decentralised fund management has supported local ownership at a cost of reduced efficiency in CBARDP compared to programmes were loan applications and withdrawals were handled by the national programme office.
- Weak M&E reduced the accuracy of indicators, and the absence of thematic studies has limited understanding of effectiveness and impact.
- Political and institutional changes have affected sustainability. Key coordinating mechanisms have disappeared, and the private sector has not stepped in as needed to build on the linkages established between producers and the market. Yet at community level, local programme structures have persisted and in some areas been replicated.
- Impacts are recorded for empowerment, assets creation and institutions, but the scale remains limited given the size of the country, and poverty statistics overall show increasing divide between the urban and the wealthy and the rural and the poor. The impact could have been greater if re-design had not reduced the period for deeper and wider delivery of community assets in the CDD programmes.
- IFAD's contribution in the context of the scale of rural poverty is small.

V. Performance of partners

204. Overview. The key partners affecting the formulation of the country strategy, the design, implementation and monitoring of the portfolio in Nigeria are IFAD and the federal, state and local governments. As noted in preceding sections, and indeed in the previous CPE, these partners are closely involved in the processes of loan preparation, negotiation, agreement and effectiveness and then in programme fund disbursement, implementation and completion.

205. For all operations covered in this CPE, the timely execution of these different stages has been problematic. One operation, RUMEPD, has been suspended due to long delays in finalising loan agreements, while another, RAISE, has been postponed until NDDC as a partner is prepared to take on another programme. All others have faced a lag of between two to three years from design to start-up, and have then been affected by slow disbursement by one or other co-financier. Loan adjustments have been made towards the later stages of the loan period that have led to substantial increases in disbursement.

A. IFAD

206. The performance of IFAD has been good in several areas. The quality of strategy and programme design was high, with detailed technical proposals, analysis and implementation plans. The adjustment in programme designs following the MTRs and the previous CPE and the subsequent COSOP in 2010 proved appropriate in refocusing and improving relevance to new policy priorities and in improving disbursement. IFAD also made commendable efforts during

COSOP preparation to consult with stakeholders and use their views the shape the document.

207. But IFAD's programme design was not without problems. While designs were aligned and relevant, they were also complex and overambitious, given the known capacities of Government staff available to implement them. State programme teams were expected to deliver results across a wide range of sectors (for example, CBNRMP and CBARDP covered health, education, agriculture, fisheries, community development, environment and roads) and over immense geographical areas, especially in the North and the Middle Belt. A more thorough assessment of capacities and, as important, the governance risks at COSOP and programme design particularly around corruption would have been helpful.[139] Conflict has been treated as an external risk to be avoided rather than an intrinsic feature of a fragile state that needs to be managed in a proactive way.

208. The radical re-design of the past and ongoing programmes led to implementation confusion and short timeframes to achieve new targets. Staff in RTEP, CBARDP and CBNRMP had to adjust the expectations of communities and alter their priorities, moving, for example, from social investments serving the whole community to economic enterprises serving specific sets of producers. The change in loan conditionality at the end of the programme period that occurred with these older operations was a recognition that excessive demands on state counterpart funding were inappropriate without the means to encourage their compliance.

209. IFAD's portfolio has been regularly monitored with supervision missions twice a year. Since 2007, IFAD took direct responsibility for supervisions and this has had a positive effect on ensuring closer attention to IFAD's concerns. With the establishment of a country office in 2008, supervision has also been better coordinated with Government and other partners, saving time and costs in doing supervision work (see chapter VI).

210. The overall quality of IFAD's supervision has been good in terms of regularity and level of detail and this improved when IFAD took direct responsibility for supervisions from 2007. The establishment of the country office in 2008 also strengthened supervision, speeded up disbursement and helped overcome barriers to implementation, especially at federal level. Nevertheless, despite this presence, recent programmes such as RUFIN and CASP have still faced delays in approval and effectiveness. As noted earlier in chapter IV (Efficiency), supervision missions have had very varied composition, and while fresh insights are important, at times they have introduced too many adjustments in approach that have caused implementation difficulties for programme staff as well as beneficiaries.

211. IFAD also proved ineffective in ensuring the soundness of M&E. There was little success in tackling data gaps and managing the high turnover of M&E staff. IFAD did give sufficient support to either the better design or use of the expensive baseline and impact surveys, and did not ensure that planned thematic studies were conducted. These studies could have shed light on how and why benefits were or were not affecting different target groups and built stronger knowledge and lessons. Many supervision missions commented on the problems with M&E, yet no solutions were found.

212. While RIMS has provided a standardised tool for estimating beneficiary numbers and impacts, the selection of RIMS indicators is largely top down, and was found difficult to track by the programmes. There was insufficient support to the programme teams to set up well-defined and practical beneficiary tracking systems at the start of implementation, and participatory methods were not successfully introduced or used.[140] Often the personnel responsible for M&E, especially at state-

[139] Stella I. Amadi. IFAD CPE Governance Background Paper. September 2015.
[140] For example in CBARDP training by the West African Rural Foundation on participatory M&E was only given to programme staff. It was delivered too late (in 2009) and, from the report of the training, involved no practical experience. See also discussion on grants in Ch VI.

level, did not have appropriate experience or resources, and in interviews with the CPE team said that they found the task overwhelming. The introduction of the performance monitoring plan (PMP), however, developed by the CBNMRP in 2013, has successfully simplified and concentrated monitoring methods.

213. A final area of concern has been the selection of programme staff with inappropriate experience. Key programme staff appointments were sometimes not made on merit but as a result of political or local influence,[141] while in other cases, government staff have been seconded in preference to personnel with more appropriate private sector experience, especially for the rural finance and value chain operations. IFAD did not manage this issue effectively, for example through use of its no-objection authority.

214. Strengthening ICO capacity was a recommendation of the last CPE, and the out-posting of the CPM has clearly enabled better engagement with partners. The most recent addition to the ICO is a junior professional officer in charge of knowledge management. The role of the ICO is perceived very positively by Government and development partners and it has helped IFAD to confirm its leading position in the agriculture sector, as evidenced by the co-chairing of the Agriculture Development Partner Working Group (ADWG) monthly meetings since 2015.

215. With regard to ICO capacity, the self-assessment indicates some limitations. While the mandate of the ICO appears to be clear within IFAD, partners do not fully understand its role and sometimes have unrealistic expectations that cannot be met, given the existing capacities. There is clear direction from WCA to focus ICO capacity on state-level implementation support. This focus on implementation is however not always understood by other development partners, who expect IFAD to be represented at a large number of meetings. The distinct role of the country programme manager, whose main role is to support programme implementation, differs from that of other organisations whose representative or director has a clear mandate to focus on donor coordination and policy dialogue. Other UN organisations were also disappointed that IFAD was not in a position to sign the UNDAF in Nigeria because of the financial implications.

216. The ICO staff level is on the low side, given the size of the portfolio and its wide geographic spread. In particular, the number of staff was found insufficient, while existing skills appear in line with the above mentioned focus on implementation support. But ICO staff indicated that there is scope to enhance and make better use of national staff capacities. They felt that the incentives for national staff are limited, through lack of recognition, restrictions on staff mobility and growth, and fewer opportunities for learning compared to HQ colleagues.

217. To conclude, although there have been positive developments, IFAD's role and influence is partial, as a result of limited ICO capacities, but also due to the wide geographic and thematic spread of the portfolio and overambitious programme designs, which are out of step with the existing partner capacities. IFAD's performance is thus rated as moderately satisfactory (4).

B. Government

218. The Federal Government has been represented in IFAD's programme mainly through FMARD. Their role has been to coordinate national and local involvement, provide funding, monitor and supervise implementation and support the implementation units. The task is complex given the number of states involved and the different modalities and tiers of implementation. Coordination at federal level rested with a central Projects Coordinating Unit (PCU) that later was absorbed by the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA). Decentralised PCUs have also been set up for RTEP, CBARDP and CBNRMP, remote from the national capital. More recent programmes like VCDP and RUFIN have their own management coordination unit

[141] According to a retired IFAD senior staff interviewed by the CPE team

based in Abuja. RUFIN also has zonal offices to decentralise implementation support, so that it operates at national, zonal, state and community level.

219. Financial management across the portfolio has generally seen improvements from the beginning of programme cycles to their end, though there is also a general improvement across programmes over time, as evidenced by supervision mission observations on RTEP and VCDP. By the end of RTEP there were inadequate financial management systems that could not process W/As and had difficulties in maintaining accurate state-level financial accounts. In contrast, VCDP in its first year already has for the most part IFAD-compliant operations in place. CBARDP, CBNRMP and RUFIN also saw improvements in financial management, though common limitations were state and LGA staff capacities in record keeping, long learning curves in adopting new IFAD accounting practices, and limitations derived from unpredictable counterpart funding. RUFIN also had the particular challenge of operating an accounting system that reflected multiple funding sources which its staff were not trained to do. Loan covenants have generally been observed by the programmes, except those requiring promised disbursement by counterparts (particularly for CBNRMP).

220. Procurement has also performed better as the different programme staff developed their procedures and manuals, though the following of IFAD guidelines has been at times problematic and disbursement problems also led to procurement delays in all programmes, and documentation of decentralized community procurement has been poor (CBNRMP and RUFIN). Auditing also generally saw improvements over programme lifecycles, particularly for RUFIN, CBARDP and CBNRMP. Nonetheless RUFIN at its early stages had issues in compliance with IFAD standards and practices. RTEP had issues in applying audit recommendations and VCDP has yet to contract an external consultant.

221. Federal funding has shown mixed performance, and has often been slow during start up, though it has improved. Overall, actual federal funding contributions have matched or exceeded the design for RUFIN, CBARDP, CBNRMP and RTEP (figure 14).

Figure 14
Design and actual counterpart funding across four programmes*



*Yearly LGA and state government funding have been adjusted to December USD exchange rates
Source: Annex VI, table 4

222. Government has not been effective at supporting good M&E systems. Since the closure of APMEU, due to withdrawal of funding by the World Bank and FGN, the NPC takes lead responsibility yet it has had limited influence on bringing up standards. It was able to introduce a mandatory performance scorecard for ministries and agencies from 2010, which was seen as effective, but the initiative has foundered with ministerial changes in 2012, and NPC's resources remain insufficient and its mandate relatively weak for it to play a more comprehensive role. At state level, the Ministries of Agriculture gave ADPs prime responsibility for

planning and M&E of all investments including those of IFAD, but their capacities have declined in recent years and M&E personnel have left or retired, leaving a largely skeletal system with few resources.

223. State governments have shown mixed performance, but generally have been poor at providing the planned counterpart funding for IFAD's programmes on time. The required amounts on the other hand especially for CBNRMP were set at quite high levels (US$4 million per state), and in general IFAD has assumed that state and local government have more capacity than they do in reality. Equally, states are highly dependent on federal funding.

224. State governments often place agriculture low on their agenda, especially in the southern states where urban development and industry make higher demands. This has resulted in dramatic fluctuations in year to year releases (figure 15) for CBNRMP in particular, and indicates how difficult implementation is with such funding uncertainty. In the case of CBARDP, the overall government contribution at closure was higher than planned (103 per cent of target). Compared with CBNRMP, RUFIN and RTEP, government performance from this perspective has been strong. Continuing investment in CBARDP activities has also occurred in some states such as Sokoto, Katsina after programme closure.

225. After funding from government and from the communities, the next largest contributor to IFAD's operations is the NDDC. It has provided the required funding contributions to CBNRMP, although these represent a very small share of its overall budget.[142] While seen at design as an appropriate partner for IFAD's work in the Niger Delta, because of its role as supporting all development in the region, it has long been recognised as weak in capacity for developing smallholder agriculture and vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption. The CPE's view is based on external assessments[143] and past IFAD supervision missions that expressed concerns about NDDC's limited involvement or understanding of CDD approaches (it is essentially a commissioner of large infrastructure works) or how it will internalise the programme. The situation is one of real concern as the programme seeks an exit strategy before its closure in March 2016.

226. Based on the evidence discussed above, the Government's performance at federal and state based on slow loan effectiveness, weak M&E and mixed funding support is rated overall as moderately unsatisfactory (3).

Figure 15
CBNRMP Federal, State and NDDC contributions 2006-2014



Source: Annex VI, Table 4 – from working tables using data provided by CBNRMP PO

[142] US$15m over 5 years which is around 0.75% of the NDDC's current annual budget for 2015 of N200 billion.
[143] Stella I. Amadi. IFAD CPE Governance Background Paper. September 2015.

227. Communities. Given the central role of communities in IFAD's programmes, it is relevant also to assess their performance. From a financial perspective, there are consistent references to community contributions equalling and often exceeding the planned percentage of investment costs in CBARDP and CBNRMP. Mostly in the form of labour and materials, various assets have been built with these community inputs. Operation of the finished assets has been then been mostly in the hands of village members thereafter, and the CPE field visits provided many examples of how these assets were being successfully run and maintained in working order.

228. The CDAs and CADAs are registered, meeting regularly and managing the assets. However, it was a general finding that financial management and record keeping was not in good order. Current records are either not kept or are unreliable, and there was little written proof of any remaining funds from the reflows from economic assets.

Key points

- The quality of programme strategy and design was high, albeit overly complex and ambitious, given the known capacities. Governance issues, in particular corruption and conflict, were not proactively understood and managed.
- Radical re-design of past and ongoing programmes led to implementation confusion and moving targets.
- The poor performance of M&E was recognised, but no solutions were found in tackling data gaps and managing the high turnover of M&E staff. Support to set up a functioning beneficiary tracking system was insufficient.
- The establishment of the country office in 2008 has helped to improve financial management. But, delays in approval, effectiveness and implementation continued to affect the performance of the country programme.
- Federal government's financial management and levels of contribution have been fair, but its co-ordinaton of M&E has been weak.
- State Governments generally have been poor at providing the planned counterpart funding, with the notable exception of CBARDP. Agriculture is often low on the agenda, especially in the South.
- NDDC has provided the required funding to CBNRMP, but there are concerns about its suitability as IFAD partner, mainly because of its weak capacity to promote smallholder agriculture and to the known risk of corruption.
- Community contributions equalled and often exceeded the planned contributions in CDD programmes. The CBAs and CADAs are registered and continue to function.

VI. Assessment of non-lending activities

229. Non-Lending activities comprise Policy Dialogue, Knowledge Management (KM) and Partnerships as well as grants to support investments, research, knowledge generation and capacity building through programmes, research centres and other development institutions. These activities are intended to enhance IFAD's in-country performance and the development effectiveness of its supported interventions. Policy dialogue, partnership-building, and knowledge management are discrete activities, but they should be mutually reinforcing and help advance the strategic objectives contained in the COSOP.[144]

230. IFAD included in its 2010-2015 COSOP policy linkages, knowledge management, and national and international partnerships. It also invested in country-specific as well as global and regional grants. Together these aimed at allowing IFAD HQ and the country office to engage in policy dialogue, develop knowledge-based publications and communication products, disseminate lessons from field-based experiences and advocate for policy changes in Nigeria.

231. The mix of policy dialogue, partnership-building and KM, as outlined in the COSOP, is appropriate and relevant. However, as highlighted in the subsequent COSOP MTR

[144] COSOP Source Book 2014, p. 90

in 2013, further efforts were needed to develop a strategy for policy dialogue with the FMARD planning and research department, as well as with the private sector. IFAD's more recent programmes did include dedicated components to pursue policy dialogue and sustained partnerships, such as with RUFIN on national microfinance policy and VCDP on policy and regulatory issues around cassava and rice, but at the same time they could have explored further partnerships with the private sector and field-based actors including NGOs. More broadly, while relevant areas such as agricultural research, value chains and planning and management were the subject of grants and one-off partnerships, other areas of importance to IFAD such as women and youth, conflict resolution, anti-corruption, good governance, environmental protection and climate change received insufficient attention under the non-lending portfolio.

232. The alignment of the non-lending activities with the COSOP strategic objectives was clearly presented, but there was no articulated 'theory of change' to link the expected outcomes from these activities to the ultimate country development objectives.[145] A coherent country strategy for non-lending activities, beyond the IFAD-supported programmes, with a concrete action plan and dedicated resources including monitoring and evaluation with dashboard indicators was also missing.

A. Policy dialogue

233. IFAD defines policy dialogue as direct influencing of policy makers, while policy engagement refers to working with partner governments and other national stakeholders to influence or inform policy priorities that can shape the economic opportunities for large numbers of rural people to move out of poverty.[146]

234. IFAD's support represents a very small proportion of total development aid. Opportunities for policy leverage are limited, but have been improved by a long-term engagement with the agricultural sector, by the establishment of a permanent country office, and by the IFAD President's close links with the country. President Kanayo F. Nwanze, who was elected for a first four-year term in 2009, has played an important role in bringing issues of smallholder agriculture to the attention of high-level policy makers in Nigeria (see box below). His access to the highest political levels provides a unique opportunity for policy influence for IFAD. For example, he met President Buhari soon after he took over in April 2015.[147] He also consistently advocates issues that are of key concern for IFAD. For example, during his visits to Delta State and to IITA in Ibadan in 2014 he emphasised the importance of agriculture and advocated support for initiatives such as Youth in Agriculture and Youth Agripreneurs. This type of policy dialogue is instrumental in a country where agriculture may not always be at the top of the agenda for policy makers.

> "In Nigeria, we must not just make agricultural development a priority on paper, but we should work assiduously to make it a reality. There must, for instance, be rural roads, electrification, water, just as the government in Ethiopia did when it strategically decided to focus on agriculture for its growth and development."
>
> "I don't think we have invested rightly in agriculture. You cannot expect a sector to be productive if you have not invested in it. What does IFAD expect, why do we invest in the rural population? Because we believe it will help them to grow out of poverty, so in return, we expect rural transformation to take place, to pave the way for agricultural development."
>
> "There is no question in my mind about the agricultural potential of our country Nigeria. But it has to be done as a business. We need a change in mind-set, when I am talking about agriculture, I am talking about agriculture business. From growing the crop to when it is in the market and you buy it and it becomes food. You look at agriculture as a food system where along that value chain, there are huge opportunities to investment."

[145] The Approach Paper for this CPE developed a Theory of Change which attempts to do this in order to aid the analysis.
[146] IFAD 2014: IFAD's emerging approach to country-level policy engagement.
[147] http://www.channelstv.com/2015/08/07/buhari-says-nigeria-must-cease-to-depend-on-oil-and-gas/

Source: Ogidan, Ade (The Guardian Nigeria) 'How to diversify Nigeria's economy through agribusiness, by Nwanze, IFAD's boss', 18th January 2016 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2016/01/how-to-diversify-nigerias-economy-through-agribusiness-by-nwanze-ifads-boss/

235. The 2010 COSOP included a commitment to pursue policy dialogue based on the experiences and lessons from the field. It stated the intention to take advantage of national fora such as the Federal Agricultural Development Project Executive Committee, the Microfinance Advisory Board (for rural finance) and the Consultative Committee on the National Policy on Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (for rural enterprise development) to influence policy and strategy on smallholder agriculture and to strengthen community-based and local institutional authority. More specific topics for policy dialogue were not mentioned nor did the strategy refer to any political economy analysis which would help identify the avenues for influence. IFAD should also have considered that key themes of its policy work were not under the mandate of its principle interlocutor - FMARD (such as rural finance, community development, gender). A concrete strategy for undertaking policy dialogue is thus missing in the 2010 COSOP, and what actually IFAD has pursued falls under the definition of policy engagement.

236. Thus, 2013 COSOP MTR included recommendations on how to enhance country-level policy engagement (in its Appendix 5) using implementation support and supervision,[148] and also identifies potential partners for such work. The 2010 COSOP stated also the intention to strengthen CDD knowledge and outlined some broad areas of action, like media events, workshops and websites. A concrete plan for action however was not included, and given that this was a key recommendation from the last CPE, the COSOP response seems inadequate.

237. The establishment of the IFAD country office in 2008, created better and more cost-effective opportunities to engage in policy discussions on development strategies and programme operations. The CPM took up post in Abuja in 2012 and this further enhanced the opportunity for policy engagement, especially during the implementation of on-going programmes (RUFIN, CBNMRP) as well as the preparation of new programmes (VCDP, CASP). These have stimulated policy analysis and discussions around rural infrastructure, rural finance, agricultural productivity, market access and the effects of climate change on agriculture. However, other areas of policy such as the potential impact on the rural poor of conflict and insecurity and of governance and transparency in managing public resources were not part of the policy agenda.

238. Positive policy linkages occurred within the FMARD ATA reform framework through which a grant 'Support to the design of the strategy and action plan for high impact commodity value chains in Nigeria' was extended in 2012.[149] This helped Government policymakers to engage in consultations with value chain stakeholders including smallholder farmers and private sector operators. The engagement of consultants in each of the key value chains (called the 'ATA Task Force') supported knowledge sharing through workshops and other communication platforms, and assisted the Ministry's preparation of the ATA strategic framework and action plan for the transformation of key value chains.

239. Other noteworthy IFAD contributions to policy dialogue arising through the IFAD-supported portfolio are in microfinance (box 8), value chains and community development. The value chain stakeholders' platforms formed under the VCDP coordination between federal and state governments provided the opportunity for a policy dialogue on value chain development.[150] IFAD has also provided policy advice

[148] Including: making the link between the projects and the ATA more explicit, involving coordination units in policy processes, through their M&E, KM and management processes, identifying possible policy issues arising from the implementation experience.
[149] Relevant areas of policy and institutional reform under ATA are shown in the 2013 COSOP-MTR.
[150] VCDP included activities aiming at improving the policy and regulatory framework for value chain development in the country such as the assessment of existing capacity for public/private sector dialogue (PPD) on agricultural value chain development, contribution to/co-funding of relevant discussion fora, and capacity building of VC organisations in

on how to develop the legislative framework for the establishment and strengthening of a fourth tier of government, using the community associations (CDAs) under CBARDP, as well as the establishment of commodity groups including their apexes associations (CADAs) under CBNRMP. So far only seven states in the North have adopted the legislative framework to implement this fourth tier of government.

Box 8
IFAD's policy work on rural finance (RUFIN)

1. The policy dialogue with the CBN has contributed to the revised microfinance policy and strategy and in promoting rural financial inclusion, for example through joint work on a MFI baseline study and the co-founding of the MFI and non-bank MFI apex institutions in 2010. A sub-regional investor forum for Nigerian and regional MFIs and policy-makers was organized by RUFIN that has highlighted the factors that have to financial exclusion in rural areas, including the uneven distribution of microfinance banks and the poor lending record of commercial banks to small farmers, the limited skills in microfinancing and the important role that informal microfinance institutions have to play due to inadequacy of funds for the formal bank sector in rural areas.

Policies adversely affecting microfinance institutions have been revised by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2010 as a result of RUFIN intervention, in order to create an enabling microfinance environment by strengthening MFIs along with their apex organisations. The support under RUFIN of the village Savings and Credit Groups using the Rural Business Plan (RBP) approach is helping rural communities to increase their access to MFIs finance. IFAD and CBN pioneered the strengthening of the two APEX Associations (NAMB and ANMFIN) and provided policy advice and support during the preparation of their strategy documents and corporate scorecards. IFAD also supported the CBN in the elaboration of its financial inclusion strategy.

2. The annual policy dialogue forum for microfinance actors/investors established in 2014 examines issues such as the high cost of lending, high capitalization requirements of MFBs, the lack of incentives for MFIs to develop branches in remoter areas and limited access to the MSME Development Fund.

3. The revision of the Cooperative policy and law in 2011 was conducted by the Federal Department of Cooperatives (FDC), alongside RUFIN's Central Programme Management Unit (PCMU) for the development of RMFIs and cooperatives.

240. IFAD, through its country office, has also been active in the Agriculture Development Partner Working Group (ADWG), and since 2015 co-chairs the monthly meetings. This group allows donors to share good practices/knowledge, organize joint follow-up actions and /or division of work while discussing in a more harmonised manner policy concerns and priorities related to agriculture and rural development. In this respect, IFAD has contributed[151] to the preparation of a joint policy position paper , including with the UN agencies[152] on the agricultural sector for the incoming Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. Nevertheless, the policy discussions of the ADWG have not systematically involved FMARD policymakers, and have yet to leverage up into concrete policy changes with the Government.

241. While the above achievements are important, there are other areas where gaps in policy engagement exist. PBAS discussions for example could have offered an opportunity to engage in high level policy dialogue with the Nigerian authorities. The PBAS indicators (policy and legal framework for rural organizations, dialogue between government and rural organizations, access to land and water for agriculture, research and extension services, education of women in rural areas and allocation and management of public resources, accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas),[153] are highly relevant to the COSOP and ATA agendas.

242. It is also notable that very little policy analysis or advisory activities were undertaken at state level, for example in the areas of governance and anti-

advocacy for improved business environment. A collaboration with the UNDP-funded Facility for Inclusive Markets was also sought.

[151] IFAD CPM coordinated the ADWG preparation of a policy paper for the New Administration 2015: Transforming the Agricultural Sector in Nigeria: Challenges and Priorities for 2015 and Beyond. June 2015

[152] UN System Engagement with the new Administration (UNCT Nigeria): Sector Policy Note/Synopsis: A Submission to the Incoming Administration, June 2015

[153] Overview of the performance-based allocation system, IFAD (EB 2014/111/INF.6), March 2014.

corruption, social conflicts, or around state-level legislation to support enterprise growth or food security. While the feasibility of this is limited due to time constraints and limited ICO staff, it is still a formal avenue of engagement and advocacy not only to facilitate programme implementation but also for policy reform within the state governments' remit.

243. It is difficult to trace the extent to which IFAD's policy engagement activities have been translated into actions in the absence of a well-structured policy coordination unit within FMARD. The creation of an effective donor coordination office in the FMARD is key to ensuring stronger better policy engagement as well as dissemination of results to government systems/institutions. Similarly, the use of programme examples gathered from the field to inform policy discussion requires reliable evidence. The CPE has noted elsewhere in this report that programme M&E data has gaps and concerns over reliability, and as such, has to be used with caution for policy discourse.

244. The level of impact of IFAD's country presence has been constrained by lack of additional resources for this task and by the WCA management's concern to address implementation issues as a priority- understandable given the record of lengthy delays in loan effectiveness. The CPM team, while respected for their understanding of sector issues and energetic engagement in programme delivery and in the ADWG, also does not have the necessary policy analysis skills or sufficient time to undertake more effective policy work compared to other donors such as the World Bank. Insufficient support from headquarters for high level policy engagement[154] has also undermined IFAD's country office ability to gain greater visibility as a strategic policy advisor and knowledgeable development partner in these areas.

245. Overall, policy engagement within the IFAD-supported programmes has contributed to achievements in supporting the design of the ATA, microfinance policy, and a legislative framework for community associations. However, given the limited policy engagement in the key areas of governance and anti-corruption policies, conflict, food security and climate change and the absence of engagement at state level in order to strengthen political commitment to IFAD's programmes the rating for policy dialogue is moderately unsatisfactory (3).

B. Knowledge management

246. IFAD has the potential to bring immense field experience into the policy discourse on development in Nigeria. Therefore, harnessing these experiences by highlighting success stories and presenting grounded analysis of what has worked and what has not worked are key areas for IFAD's knowledge management (KM).

247. While the ICO has recently been increasing its efforts and presence in presenting this experience, its resources are stretched to sustain some of the good initiatives started. To this end, the ICO drafted a KM and communication strategy in 2013 for IFAD-supported programmes, and established a Communication and Knowledge Sharing Platform with a dedicated staff member and website (www.nigeriaifad.org). It has also historically benefitted from FIDAfrique's regional website (www.fidafrique.net), which provides a wider platform in both French and English to present both regional and Nigeria-specific success stories, programme descriptions, grant programmes, and events. Each IFAD programme also has a website, which has improved over time in presenting relevant case studies, success stories, progress information and other products. However, to take advantage of these tools, both the Nigeria IFAD and FIDAfrique websites need to be continuously updated, with special efforts to showcasing workshops and events, particularly for FIDAfrique, whose most recent Nigeria-

[154] According to the IFAD's emerging approach to country-level policy engagement (January 2014), it stated that where requested, the PTA policy advisor helps CPMs address country-level policy engagement more effectively, offering ideas and experience as well as resources – both in terms of technical support and funds – to help CPMs get to grip with policy issues. In some cases, the advisor's role may be to assist CPMs by demonstrating to their in-country counterparts that there is "an institution behind the CPM."

specific information dates back to 2012. Similarly, while it is acknowledged that the ICO website is a recent creation, more efforts are needed to present IFAD's Nigeria-specific knowledge, for the benefit of both local and international users.

248. Building on this, the IFAD CPO has organized a range of KM workshops for disseminating knowledge products on design, implementation, best practices and success stories, and has worked with capable partners such as Songhai in this respect. Over the past two years, the IFAD CPO has also been involved in workshops organised by IFAD HQ as well as other partners and organizations in which programme knowledge has been shared. Workshop themes have covered gender justice, youth employment, M&E, policy engagement, research coordination, and private sector service providers.

249. Nonetheless, stronger linkages are needed with the research and capacity building initiatives supported by IFAD's extended grants, such as FIDAfrique and the WCA Innovation Programme.[155] Attention has rightly been paid to CDD knowledge sharing in order to enhance dialogue on participatory approaches and to encourage local government to work with communities. Practical knowledge was shared with local communities to learn from experience and develop appropriate CDD procedures and these have also helped inform subsequent programmes such as CBNRMP and VCDP. However, considering IFAD's long trajectory in implementing CDD approaches in the country, little documented evidence of these KM activities from Nigeria is publically available.

250. Other KM activities include value chain research activities, including extensive studies of value chains in Nigeria from RTEP to VCDP. A Central Communication Unit has been started, housed by VCDP, for harnessing knowledge products and promoting knowledge sharing among IFAD programmes, but is yet to be fully implemented. Supervision missions have also been used as opportunities for disseminating programme-specific knowledge to the wider public, though sharing of knowledge and best practices between programmes is not well-documented. Knowledge sharing between donors has been increasingly effective through a donor-programmes review meeting in 2015 and the ADWG meetings. An example of this was of the FAO using CBARDP community seeds as a positive practice of seeds management during a workshop on revising the Nigeria seeds policy. Nonetheless these knowledge sharing events are not well-documented within IFAD.

251. These various activities have been efficient from a cost perspective, since much of the work has not required additional funds or used programme funds. Additional resources would enable greater media presence, more substantive analysis and knowledge sharing events. Policy discussions using knowledge generated by research studies, project success stories, experience sharing avenues for horizontal communication did not take place as no specific resources were allocated for the country office to meet these high expectations. Finally, independent research has produced a wealth of information using programme data, particularly in RTEP (see annex VI, table 7) and CBARDP. In itself, this research broadcasts IFAD knowledge to interested parties, but has yet to be systematically collected and presented by IFAD itself.

252. Considering the aforementioned current lack of documented evidence on knowledge management, the results achieved so far, as well as the recent knowledge management strategy, it is clear that the ICO team uses knowledge generated to support programmes, and shares it with interested parties and the media. This is due to the substantial institutional memory that rests with individual staff members. Systemic documentation of this knowledge is crucial for security and back-up, capacity building of human resources, as well as for IFAD's in-house management and external collaboration through partnerships.

[155] The WCA initiative is to capture, share and disseminate innovations that may provide practical solutions to farmers issues, specifically women and youths in the impoverished rural areas.

253. A key area for KM is the collation and use of M&E data from IFAD operations, since these should generate reliable evidence of the delivery of benefits and what factors explain the success or failure of interventions. Here the experience has been poor, since the baseline and impact studies produced by several programmes have been disappointing, as noted in the PPA of CBARDP, and with RUFIN where several different surveys were conducted with changes in coverage and methodology.[156] The CPE's verification of M&E data also highlights serious concerns over data reliability.[157] IFAD has not paid sufficient attention to M&E data quality or in storing, analysing and publishing M&E results beyond RIMS figures. RIMS indicators are mainly for corporate needs, and programme staff have given these priority over undertaking thematic studies or qualitative research to explore how impacts affect different population groups. Although the recently introduced PMP has been a positive step simplifying RIMS requirements. Finally, while it is beyond IFAD's mandate and resources to fund M&E capacity building for the NBS, the sharing of programme M&E data with NBS state offices can help boost local M&E capacity.

254. In sum, although there has been a marked increase in KM activities instigated by the CPO team, underpinned by a strategy and efficient use of available resources, further KM initiatives are still required. This will depend on dedicated resources and specialized KM staff within the projects and at the ICO, and better use of M&E data. Working more closely with donor agencies and other stakeholders, research institutions and universities and other partners on KM for scaling up and dissemination as well as for innovations in rural businesses may be the solution. The rating for knowledge management is moderately satisfactory (4).

C. Partnership-building

255. Under the current COSOP, partnerships were sought at all three levels of government, and with a range of active donors in the rural development sector, Nine were targeted in the COSOP MTR (USAID, World Bank, AfDB, FAO, UNDP, UNIDO, DFID, Gates Foundation, GIZ). In addition, private-sector institutions (including the financial apex agencies, NGOs and commercial firms), community-based organizations (CBOs), and farmers and producers' organizations were targeted. However neither the COSOP nor its MTR provided or referred to any deeper analysis or partnership strategy to help prioritize partner choices. As a consequence, the most active and relevant work in terms of partnerships has taken place at programme level and along programme-specific themes, centred around agricultural and micro-finance research, farmer training and rural finance.

256. IFAD's programmes have demonstrated quite innovative partnerships, particularly with NGOs, government research institutes and in the credit sector. This is demonstrated in CBARDP and CBNRMP's work with Songhai technology centre in delivering successful business and agricultural training, or with RTEP's links with research bodies such as IITA and NRCRI that produced relevant new varieties. CBARDP also worked effectively with ICRISAT and IAR on developing new technologies for dryland agriculture. RUFIN has been catalytic in building national and local partnerships around credit provision under the Nigerian Microfinance Policy Framework, bringing together the key actors in this sector such as CBN, BOA, DEC and supporting NIRSAL.

257. Analysis of the number of partnerships[158] sustained by IFAD illustrate a marked shift under the current COSOP (figure 16). While the first COSOP (RTEP, CBARDP

[156] The initial baseline study had to be repeated as IFAD requested RIMS missing indicators be included, and as a result a 'pre-impact study' was then mounted in the same year.
[157] see ch. IV and annex VI table 2.1, plus the PPA for CBARDP
[158] The analysis involved reviewing all programme documents, including design reports, supervision missions, mid-term reports, and project completion reports. Any further information supplied to the mission by POs and the ICO was also included. Partnerships were categorised along 6 criteria – Federal government (ministries, national institutions, and projects), Regional/State government (States, State-level ministerial organisations, regional committees), International donors (multilateral and bilateral), Research institutions (international and national), Civil society (international and national), and the Private sector (international corporations, national companies, Microfinance banks). Numerical

and CBNRMP) mainly depended on partnerships with regional and state governments, which due to both the wide geographical spread resulted in a high number of partnerships, the second COSOP has been able to focus on fewer but more varied partnerships. This included international donors and, to a lesser degree, the private sector. Overall there are fewer partnerships with research institutions compared to the previous COSOP and overall partnerships with civil society organisations are still underrepresented, despite some positive cases like those cited above.

Figure 16
Realized programme partnerships during the COSOP 1 and COSOP 2 periods (absolute number)



Source: figures compiled from data in annex VI, table 11

258. The overwhelming number of partnerships has been initiated for the purpose of programme implementation, which includes the 21 states covered by the country programme. Only for this purpose, IFAD had to sustain partnerships with 21 states. Partnerships for sub-contracting included the whole range of public, private, community and research institutions.

Figure 17
Realized partnerships for all programmes per category and type (absolute number)



Source: compiled from data in annex VI, table 11

259. On the Government side, partnerships have been largely piecemeal, constrained by the lack of a strong coordinating function or office in FMARD or NPC. Institutional coordination with IFAD may have been limited due to the dismantlement of NPC's project coordination unit in 2007, but other institutions

scores were given per partnership mentioned, and these were multiplied in cases where there were multiple known partnerships (i.e. with State governments).

and working groups that IFAD partnered with (such as the national food reserve agency (NAFRA) or the Agricultural and Rural Development Consultative Forum (ARDCG)) have suffered the same fate. As such, there has been little cross-over between IFAD programmes and partner government institutions which may have otherwise deepened partnerships and prolonged institutional memory between IFAD and government. Nor has there been documented evidence of intended partnerships materializing with other ministries besides FMARD, NPC, and the National Agricultural Seed Council (NASC).

260. On the other hand, and despite institutional turbulence, useful partnerships were initiated with the ATA Value Chain Task Forces on Rice and Cassava, while links with the Advisory Committee for Adaptation and Resilience of Nigeria (ACARN) is potentially useful to CASP as a policy platform for climate change in the FMARD. These task forces offer useful arenas for IFAD's engagement, but they are essentially discussion groups that require ministerial leadership to turn into policy. The partnership with CBN has promoted an enabling environment for MFIs to provide financing for smallholder farmers and enterprises supported under RUFIN. A strong partnership in terms of co-financing has been achieved with NDDC for CBNRMP, yet this is an unusual partner for IFAD given that its focus is on large infrastructure investments in the Delta region and has very little experience with CDD and smallholder agriculture. There is a reputational risk for IFAD too, because of the public perception of a lack of transparency and reports of financial mismanagement associated with this body.[159]

261. Co-funding of programmes by other donors has not been a feature of IFAD's partnerships in Nigeria and is a significant gap, considering this was a key recommendation of the COSOP MTR. The Federal Ministry of Finance and state governments co-funded all programmes, while the LGA disbursement issues encountered in CBARDP and CBNRMP saw subsequent programmes either severely reduce or eliminate that funding source. RUFIN sought to broaden funding from other sources even further, namely through four other government or national institutions,[160] as well as foreign funding through the Ford Foundation. These either had low disbursement rates or did not materialise. Instead partnership-building with other development partners has achieved more around co-implementation and knowledge sharing as detailed elsewhere in this chapter.

262. Partnerships in support of the COSOP SO1 involve national and international agricultural research institutes (NARIs, IITA, International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology and Africa Rice Centre). These were relevant in aiming to develop affordable and appropriate technologies to raise smallholder productivity. Continued use of research outputs from these partnerships in earlier programmes, particularly RTEP's, were applied in the newer programmes. With the move towards market-led investments, collaborations on value chain research have been pursued especially with the World Bank, AfDB, FAO and USAID. Microfinance and policy formulation research was spearheaded by the CBN and associated institutions (NIRSALS) within RUFIN.

263. Farmer training has been successfully supported in CBARDP and CBNRMP with specialist agencies like the Songhai Institute. Equally on rural finance under RUFIN, there has been relevant and effective joint work with the World Bank, UNDP and BMGF to reform rural finance policy and key institutions such as the BOA. Most effective has been IFAD's partnering with credit-based NGOs, which have provided rapid credit outreach to IFAD's target groups (especially women savings and credit

[159] The NDDC has long been the subject of calls for investigation into financial and procurement mismanagement. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria is involved in an investigation into procurement irregularities, and the Auditor General's has issued a report over the misappropriation of N183bn in NDDC accounts.
[160] These were the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), The Federal Department of Cooperatives (FDC), the CBN, and the Bank of Agriculture (BoA).

associations) in several states. The most effective were DEC and LAPO, which had already been partners in CBARDP and CBNRMP respectively.

264. A missing partner, particularly in the earlier portfolio, has been the private sector, crucial given the move towards markets and processing across the portfolio. Past partnerships centred on sub-contracting agro-inputs as seen in Notore Chemical Group for CBARDP and Dizengorff in CBNRMP. Links are currently being made with some major national and international processors and industries (such as Nigeria Starch Mill, Onyx Rice, Unilever, Syngenta, and Chevron) focusing on subcontracting agro-inputs, training, investment funds and technology, but these are still at an early stage.

265. Partnerships in support of SO2 included local government councils, considered as key to the CDD approach, as well as NGOs and CBOs involved in community mobilization, and farmers and producers' organizations. In selected states and LGAs, IFAD has been working for more than 10 years and has built up a strong history of partnership based around joint programme delivery and building of government staff capacity. Furthermore, CDAs (under CBARDP) and CADAs (under CBNRMP) have provided effective structures to build partnerships with local groups and NGOs. Yet overall partnership-building at state level has had varying degrees of success, due to weak capacity within the ADP structures and state planning commissions, unrealistic funding expectations on the part of IFAD, and frequent changes in political leadership. While there have been some instances of cross linkages between IFAD's programmes (for example between CBARDP and RUFIN in Zamfara and Katsina), this area of partnership-building also needs further attention.

266. There are also active partnerships with some regional and global grants to facilitate knowledge sharing in youth engagement on agribusiness (Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth (CORY), as well as in the Cassava Value Chain under VCDP (Increasing the Performance of the Cassava Industry in West and Central Africa (IPCI and Nestle). The role of the ICO was to improve common understanding by both parties (grant and loan) of activities, facilitate communication, endorse agreement on the key areas that the grants would focus on, and then follow up on the implementation progress. Being the first year of VCDP partnership implementation with delays during the launching, this appears as a work in progress. However, some difficulties have already appeared in accompanying local NGOs in facing their operational costs and overheads in support of these partnerships.

267. In terms of global partnership, IFAD, through its country office, is making efforts to implement Paris Declaration principles, with, however, limited success, particularly in harmonising policies and strategies and using country systems such as for M&E. Moreover, IFAD country office's engagement seems to be minimal with limited reporting on concrete actions undertaken towards harmonization, coherence and alignment. Furthermore, strategic partnerships with NGOs active in women and youth empowerment, conflict resolution, governance and anti-corruption, displacement and resettlement, post-conflict and climate change are yet to be put in place.

268. Partnerships with other UN organisations increased with the newer cohort of IFAD programmes (RUFIN, VCDP and CASP). Other partnerships included UNDP, UNOPS and UNIFEM, and planned activities sought with UNIDO under CASP. IFAD's collaboration record with other Rome-based Agencies is mixed. IFAD has interacted with FAO in several fields, including food security, seed policy, value chain and climate change work. FAO collaborated in RTEP with its Special Programme for Food Security. Recent attempts at reviving the partnership include utilizing farm data methodologies for policy formulation in VCDP and exploring collaboration with CASP. Other interactions are in co-chairing the food security working group and an attempt at formulating a rapid response programme for

emergency food distribution efforts in North Eastern Nigeria. There has been no documented partnership with the WFP.

269. Among the multi-lateral organisations, the most active partnership was with the World Bank, which was the co-operating institution for RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP and RUFIN until 2007, and cooperated with all programmes through capacity building and sharing resources from its own programmes (i.e. Fadama).

270. With the out-posting of the CPM, increased efforts to initiate partnerships with a wide array of stakeholders, but in the absence of a partnership strategy, engagement has been somewhat opportunistic and ad hoc, and built around the needs of individual programmes rather than at a more strategic level. At local level, partnership between IFAD-assisted programmes themselves is very limited, and despite the long presence in certain states and LGAs, there is limited partnering in the sense of a joint, co-funding relationship. At national level, IFAD's progress in developing partnerships has been hampered by a shortage of resources for this area and the need to devote a great deal of energy to overcoming delays in programme implementation. The absence of a strong coordinated response from its main partner, Government, has led to limited results mainly at programme level, and more concrete actions could be undertaken towards harmonization, coherence and alignment. The partnership-building is therefore rated moderately unsatisfactory (3).

D. Grants

271. Under the CPE period, 20 grants received an overall amount of US$39.19 million amongst all type of IFAD grants. Of these, US$22.8 million (or 7.2 per cent of the loan portfolio) was committed to 13 grants under the Global/Regional grant window, in support of the COSOP strategic objectives as well as to contribute to the WCA national and regional development results including the Grants co-financed by WCA or directly managed by PTA. Eight grants (with a value of US$15.6 million) constituting 60 percent of the grants portfolio value were committed to the IITA, a CGIAR consortium member based in Ibadan, Nigeria. The IITA is the main CGIAR partner in Sub-Saharan Africa, conducting research for development on key tropical food crops, such as banana and plantain, maize, cassava, soybean, cowpea, tree crops, and yam. A further amount of US$16.4 million for grants related to on-going and yet-to-be disbursed IFAD-supported projects were provided as loan-component grants for RUFIN, RUMEDP, VCDP and CASP, the last of which included one ASAP grant with a value of US$15.0 million (see list in annex III).

272. The grants revolve around key themes within the Nigeria portfolio that broadly align with the Theory of Change developed in the CPE Approach Paper –improved food crops and value chains to reduce rural poverty and vulnerability- but the results and synergies have not yet been systematically reviewed. The focus of the grants has also progressed under the current COSOP, from the development of new varieties and technologies to the support of value chains for selected food crops. Hence, the grants are classified according to the following themes: (i) access to new technologies, processes and pro-poor cropping systems supporting pro-poor investment; (ii) value chain development including capacity building and agri-business entrepreneurship development; and (iii) support to rural policy and strategy.

273. The research for development grants, although they revolve on important themes like access to new technologies, processes and pro-poor cropping systems and may have created some impact nationally, their capitalization, cross-fertilization and knowledge for immediate use and application through IFAD-supported country projects, either in terms of technological or processes innovation or scaling up, did not effectively materialize. These include six grants totalling US$14.7 million extended to IITA for intensifying of pro-poor cropping systems based on cassava, yams and legumes. Two of these grants are still ongoing while five have closed. Though the

grants had a global research focus for the selected crops, they were also highly relevant to IFAD-supported interventions in Nigeria such as RTEP, CBNMRP and CBARDP. They were expected to have an impact on technology development, productivity and nutrition for smallholders. The objectives of the grants are highly relevant to COSOP SO1 in seeking to overcome production constraints for poor farmers, including women and youth, using integrated soil fertility management (ISFM) approaches. Their effective use would depend on extension services delivering these technologies, yet there are capacity and budget constraints in this system following the decline in the ADP system and reduced government funding. Nevertheless, the technical programme staff seconded to IFAD's operations would provide a channel for dissemination in those localities supported.

274. The partnership between IITA and IFAD in Nigeria had a particular focus on improving cassava varieties. In the past, cassava was characterised by low average yields per hectare and it was prone to disease. IITA and the Nigerian National Root Crops Research Institute (NRCRI) developed several improved varieties of cassava, which were disease-resistant, and had higher yields. This in turn led to an improved quality. Between 1987 and 1996 the IFAD-supported Roots and Tubers Expansion Programme distributed enhanced varieties, which are now widespread throughout the country.

275. A wide range of stakeholders in different countries are involved in conducting the research and sharing the results. Research papers have been delivered and published and some field assessments undertaken. However for the completed grants, there is limited evidence of the outcomes anticipated in the grant proposals. For the older grants, such as the Yam Systems grant (GIR 704) and Cowpea (GIR 975), only financial statements and audits are available, so it is difficult to assess results. For others targets were very ambitious (and probably unmeasurable). For example, for the "intensification of pro-poor cropping systems based on cassava, yams and legumes" grant, the targets for a two year research grant of €2 million. They included raising cassava and yam yields by 100 per cent, legume yields by 700 kg/ha and household income by US$400 for 50,000 households in Nigeria, Benin DR Congo (North and South Kivu Provinces), Rwanda and Kenya.

276. Grants to support value chains could potentially inform IFAD operations. These include two grants to IITA for improving quality and use of cassava flour in bread in West Africa that build on RTEP's achievements and will contribute to VCDP. Another regional grant is led by the Natural Resources Institute (NRI) (2014-17) and also aims to improve the performance of the cassava industry. It builds on RTEP's experience and will research and share innovative and best practices for cassava processors to be taken up by IFAD programmes in the WCA.

277. Building on this success of the past, the programme for Enhancing the Competitiveness of High-Quality Cassava Flour (HQCF) Value Chains in West and Central Africa aims at developing new uses and marketing options beyond the national market to increase competitiveness of the cassava sector in Nigeria. The transformation of cassava roots into high quality edible flour is a relatively new technology. The grants to IITA aim to increase cassava-based household incomes, contribute to employment creation and a reduction in wheat import expenditure.

278. The grant supports the Government's flagship programme to develop the cassava bread subsector which is coordinated by the Ministries of Trade and Investment and FMARD and co-financed by the Bank of Industry (BoI) and Nigerian Agriculture and Rural Development Bank. The aim is to implement the government policy on the 10 per cent replacement of wheat flour with HQCF in bread as part of an effort to stabilise basic food prices. The grant has supported training for over 350 bread bakers, caterers, extension and research staff on HQCF so far. Most of the studies are under implementation. Follow on activities for replication and dissemination have yet to take place.

279. The programme is expected to be linked to several ongoing IFAD initiatives, such as VCDP, RUFIN and the CBNRMP. The CBNRMP provides support for new small-scale entrepreneurs in the cassava sector to purchase the necessary technical equipment. RUFIN supports local organizations to access rural microfinance. However, the synergies between the grant and the loans are not documented.

280. Only few grants were used to build partnerships with non-government organisations, but they provide positive examples of learning and linkages with operations. The Songhai-Benin for Rural Youth and Agricultural Business Development has valuables links with CBARDP and CBNRMP; while the grant to Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth (CORY) is seeks to build youth capacity in agri-business. SONGHAI-Benin has successfully provided access for rural youth to entrepreneurial, leadership and management skills required for investing in commercially-viable small-scale agribusinesses. On the basis of good results, Songhai has turned into a regional centre of expertise, with approximately 3000 young women and men trained and 15 similar centres have opened in Nigeria, Benin, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.

281. The grant extended to National NGOs for Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth in West and Central Africa (CORY) is in its second year of implementation, and aims to enable young rural women and men to create sustainable farm and non-farm businesses by building their entrepreneurial capacities through peer learning/coaching and access to complementary business development services. The programme has already targeted 120 youths involved in CBNRMP and VCDP and has training for trainers. However, covering administration costs and overheads is an issue.

282. As noted earlier, the ICO has worked with VCDP and CBNRMP to support the sharing of results and cross-fertilization of CORY, SONGHAI and other capacity building grants to good effect. These linkages demonstrate the value of networking between grant and loan activities, and that greater in-country awareness of the whole grants portfolio could help achieve better integration, combining both technical and capacity building skills for agribusiness development.

283. Grants were successfully used to generate policy-level recommendations, but the mechanisms for learning policy relevant lessons are weak. This include a flagship grant valued US$0.5 million to FMARD to support the design of a strategy and action plan for high impact commodity value chains in Nigeria. The action plans cover value chains of rice, cassava, cocoa, sorghum, cotton, fisheries and aquaculture. Participatory meetings and consultations with value chain stakeholders including smallholder farmers and private sector operators, and engagement of consultants in each of the key value chains (called the 'ATA Task Force'), took place to develop specific strategies and implement their actions plans for each of those crops. The grant created a platform for stakeholder interaction and was seen as an important contribution to operationalise the ATA. However, a key lesson from the grant completion report was that FMARD has not yet learned the operational lessons from value chain projects supported by IFAD and other development partners and government bureaucracy really has hindered ATA's performance in the last four years. One recommendation from the report was that Government should discontinue to finance ATA's value chain activities, but rather attract private sector investment by demonstrating that there can be positive returns on investments into agriculture.

284. The portfolio also included a grant (US$1.0 million) to improve IFAD Project Performance in West and Central Africa (through WARF-Senegal) by reinforcing the project management and implementation capacity of staff in IFAD-funded projects in the region, and enhance exchange of experiences and good practices by setting up a hybrid continuing-education formula that combines distance-learning with direct project support. There has been good delivery of outputs, but there is some evidence (from CBARDP PPA and PPR 2010) to suggest that, at least for M&E, the

training is rather generic and has not helped improve performance in this area significantly.

285. Links between grants and loans continue to be weak. Although the (potential) links between grants and loans are alluded to in most grants documents, it is difficult to detect tangible linkages on the ground, with the exception of Songhai. The COSOP OSC minutes (2010) recommended that based on the past success stories, IFAD's intervention should strengthen links between grant-funded innovations and investment loans through successive PBAS cycles. This raises the issue of strategic linkages of these grants to the COSOP and mainstreaming the grant allocations into the country PBAS while ensuring their potential impact on the country development results.

286. The learning and knowledge generated by the capacity building grants have - from the evidence available so far - not all benefited the IFAD-supported operations, with the notable exception of SONGHAI, CORY and HQFC. Furthermore, some HQ-managed grants (global or regional) seem to be off the country office radar screen even though some of their activities were happening in the field, such as the grant to the World Bank for gender equality and productivity and the grant to IITA for youth agribusiness development.

287. In fact, grant allocations for the regional programme were not sufficiently streamlined and their intended impact on the country development results was not fully anticipated or reflected in the COSOP, while their progress was not followed up by the country office as part of the COSOP management activities. Without a clear reporting line and mainstreaming of these grants into the country office work plan, these grants were not anchored into the country strategy and programme.

288. Loan component grants. A new feature is the emergence of loan component grants, worth between 260,000 and 330,000 SDR, during the 2nd COSOP period. These were to cover consultancy services, workshops and partnerships. Significantly, CASP will be accompanied by an ASAP grant worth SDR 9.8 million, a fifth of the CASP loan itself. Innovative solutions were also sought in areas of support to the strategic objectives, taking advantage of IFAD's grant window. These included improving farmer productivity and production in response to soaring commodity prices; developing appropriate technologies and identifying innovative approaches to sustainable agricultural development; limiting the negative effects of weather and climate change; strengthening public-private partnerships benefiting smallholders; and improving institutional coordination and collaboration within government and development partners. Ongoing grants to international research institutions and regional organisations aim to facilitate research, communications, innovation, learning, capacity-building and interactions with ongoing projects and government.

289. Summary. The grants have been relevant as they contribute directly to the achievement of the WCA high-level development objectives and results, as well as to the COSOP specific strategic objectives. However, as also highlighted by the IOE-CLE on grants, not all the grants included in IFAD-supported programmes (VCDP, CASP, RUFIN) were for innovation and capacity building as some were used to finance project management activities or project components (such as consultancy services) or activities that should be funded by the administrative budget. This raises the question of consistency and compliance to IFAD's grant policy. In terms of results, completed/closed grants have achieved most of their immediate objectives (most IITA grants, Songhai), while the on-going grants such as CORY and HQFC have implemented most of their activities and started to yield immediate results. The major difficulties facing these grants relate to their synergies, first among themselves, and second with IFAD-supported projects and programmes. Hence, the rating of the grants portfolio is moderately satisfactory (4).

E. Overall assessment

Table 17
Assessment of non-lending activities

Non-lending activities	*Rating*
Policy dialogue	3
Knowledge management	4
Partnership building	3
Overall	3

Key points

- The 2010 COSOP did not include a strategy for undertaking policy dialogue. The action plan developed in the follow-up of the 2013 MTR is judged as tardy and inadequate, given that this was a key recommendation from the last CPE.
- The out-posting of the CPM in 2012 led to positive linkages with the FMARD ATA reform framework and IFAD co-chairing the Agricultural Development Partner Working Group (since 2015). Other noteworthy IFAD contributions to policy dialogue are in microfinance, value chains and community development.
- On the other hand, opportunities to engage in high level policy dialogue were missed, such as the PBAS discussions. At state level, little policy analysis or advisory activities were undertaken, for example in the areas of governance and anti-corruption, social conflicts, or around state-level legislation to support enterprise growth or food security.
- A major constraint for effective policy engagement is the absence of a well-structure policy coordination unit within FMARD. Also, the CPM team does not have the necessary policy analysis skills or sufficient time to undertake more effective policy work, and there is insufficient support from headquarters for high level policy engagement.
- IFAD has the potential to bring immense field experience into the policy discourse. Attention has rightly been paid to CDD knowledge sharing and value chain research. M&E should have provided lessons from the field, but here the baseline and impact studies produced by several programmes failed to deliver.
- Partnerships have mainly taken place at programme level and along programme-specific themes, such as agricultural and micro-finance research, farmer training and rural finance. On the Government side, partnerships have been largely piecemeal, constrained by the lack of a strong coordinating function or office in FMARD or NPC. A missing partner, particularly in the earlier portfolio, has been the private sector, crucial given the move towards markets and processing across the portfolio.
- Co-funding of programmes by other donors has not been a feature of IFAD's partnerships in Nigeria and is a significant gap, considering this was a key recommendation of the COSOP MTR.
- The main recipient of IFAD grants has been the IITA, a CGIAR consortium member based in Ibadan, Nigeria. The research has been relevant and new technologies have been shared and published. However dissemination to farmers, at least within Nigeria, has been of mixed success, given the weak extension system under ADPs.
- Grants were successfully used to support federal level policy implementation, for example on promoting high-quality cassava flour in bread or strategies to operationalise value chains within the ATA.
- But, some grants were used to finance project management activities or project components (such as consultancy services) or activities that should be funded by the administrative budget.

VII. COSOP performance and overall partnership assessment

A. COSOP performance

290. The assessment of COSOP performance focuses on the last COSOP (2010-15), as the previous CPE examined the performance of the previous COSOP (2001-07). The discussion on relevance covers seven elements: alignment of the strategic

objectives, geographic priority, sub-sector focus, partner institutions, the mix of aid instruments (loans, grants and non-lending activities), the targeting approach, and country programme and COSOP management. The chapter then examines effectiveness and the extent to which the strategic objectives have or will be achieved.

291. Preparation of 2010 COSOP was both inclusive and extensive, with consultations and workshops in Nigeria and in IFAD from 2008-09. Through these interactions, a wide cross-section of stakeholders gave their views and validated the approach.

Relevance

292. The COSOP was broadly aligned with the Nigeria government's policy priorities that emerged under the last political dispensation in 2010. The Strategy built on the existing NEEDS/SEEDS framework and the seven point agenda for poverty reduction. These were precursors to the Government's new policy framework for the country, the Vision 20: 2020, and within that for agriculture, the ATA, which from 2011 has been the main blueprint for the COSOP period. The ATA emphasises rural finance, market deregulation, building value chains, treating agriculture as a business and building private sector partnerships and investments.

293. The two COSOP Strategic Objectives (SOs) were well-balanced and built on IFAD's twin strengths: supporting agricultural growth and technology for the poor with an emphasis on local participatory development. SO1 prioritizes smallholder agriculture through value chains, job creation and a focus on women and youth and as such fits well with the ATA priorities. SO2's focus on community development matches the government's view that there needs to be a decentralised approach to the development and implementation of pro-poor programmes (Vision 20: 2020, p.8)[161] , but is less of an area of focus under the ATA. Nevertheless it remains relevant in terms of ensuring sustainability of IFAD's investments at local level.

294. The COSOP also responded to the last CPE recommendations by returning IFAD towards a prioritization on agriculture, especially on employment and food security through a market-led approach, while maintaining an emphasis on community-led development. The need to work more strongly through different partnerships was recognised and greater in-country presence correctly supported. Yet the actual means to build more strategic partnerships (other than those arising through in country presence and for specific programme design and implementation needs) were not specified.

295. The COSOP MTR in 2013 adjusted the Results Management Framework (RMF) to fit more closely with the ATA's priorities (which emerged after the COSOP was released), and so added indicators around value chains, delivery mechanisms for improved technology, jobs, and private sector engagement. The RMF was expanded in a relevant way, therefore, but the MTR failed to address the question of how to collect these additional indicators, including who would do the work and what resources would be made available.

296. The MTR highlights two important gaps that existed in the COSOP and in the view of this CPE are still to be addressed by IFAD's programmes: private sector engagement and land reform. Neither within the programmes, which largely engage with government entities at federal and local level, or in its policy work, has there been sufficient attention to providing support for private sector engagement in the agriculture sector. Yet the government's scorecard and ATA reports highlight a range of public-private partnerships around fertilizer, seeds and processing. In land reform, there is a similar story, with limited scope outlined in the COSOP either for policy dialogue or programmatic action.

297. The COSOP fits well with several elements of IFAD's own policy guidance, though not in all areas. It has reflected IFAD's policy evolution around community-driven development, gender, rural finance, climate change and value

[161] Nigeria Vision 20: 2020 Abridged Version Dec 2010

chains. RUFIN, CASP, VCDP are vehicles that adhere well to these areas, and provide investments to reinforce them. In some policy areas there is less clear alignment. The COSOP's approach to conflict is only weakly aligned with IFAD's policy at the time (the Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery 2006). This policy committed IFAD to develop new instruments for analysing (e.g. using conflict risk assessments) and strategically assisting in crisis-prone and crisis-affected countries. While the COSOP recognises the presence of conflict and targets areas affected (such as the Niger Delta), it does not provide any further analysis or specific engagement strategy other than through supporting participatory community development and promoting the role of women. Matching grants are another example of weaker policy fit, as illustrated by the VCDP design (see chapter IV).

298. While the Vision 20:2020 and the ATA call for innovative as well as less discrete/projectized approaches to sector support, IFAD's choice of aid instruments has remained conventional – project loans and grants. The COSOP did not envisage uptake of alternatives such as joint funding, SWAps or basket funding modalities as is the case elsewhere (e.g. Tanzania) to reduce the transaction costs for its partners in line with the aid effectiveness agenda, although opportunities in Nigeria are restricted. Yet the COSOP has been more aligned in its innovative approach to financial inclusion under RUFIN, in targeting a limited number of priority value chain crops (rice and cassava), and in its increasing focus on youth and women.

299. Geographical and poverty focus has increased, with a reduction in the number of states covered over time from 31 (with RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP, RUFIN) in 2010 to what will be 21 from 2016 with (CASP, RUFIN, VCDP). This also shifts the focus towards the markedly poorer North East and North West regions as well as the poorer states in the central region, although there is still engagement in the less poor states in the South South and South West regions under RUFIN and VCDP.

300. The shift to a value-chain oriented approach has been embedded in the COSOP, although the practicalities were not further elaborated in the document itself. That this presents a substantive shift of approach, in particular within the ongoing CDD programmes, was not mentioned, either in the COSOP or in the COSOP MTR (2013). The value-chain oriented CDD approach only emerged from a process of learning by doing under CBNRMP. In the original design, CBNRMP was expected to implement the CDD approach using traditional forms of community organisations, which had worked well in the North. As it turned out, this approach met some resistance in the South, in particular within the local government. Following the 2013 supervision mission, the CBNRMP started to promote a new form of organisation - the commodity apex development association - which was outside of the traditional structure, as the main vehicle for the CDD approach in the South.

Box 9
CBNRMP value-chain oriented CADAs

CADAs are commodity apex associations that are formed by a number of production and enterprise groups. Since the refocusing of CBNRMP activities towards agriculture and agri-related infrastructure, CADAs channel resources to their constituent groups. These and the CADAs themselves are advised by Community Development Units (CDUs), CDAs or by traditional rulers. By 2015 there were 146 CADAs created by the programme across the same number of communities, representing 2,215 individuals. CADAs cover 20 commodities, including staple food crops, commercial crops, vegetables, fruits, insect and animal rearing, and aquaculture. One example of a group within a CADA was the Youth initiative for Sustainable Agriculture (YiSA) of tropical blossom honey producers in Abia State. They were constituted in 2013 and made up of 13 young male graduates and 2 young female undergraduates. This group has trained a further 50 people in bee-keeping, who had replicated the model in other communities. Group members report making a good income from the sale of honey and wax.

Coherence

301. The COSOP had a fairly coherent approach in terms of the choice of sectors, regions and target groups. In the North, IFAD promoted community institutions and services with an agricultural focus. As this is the area of the country with the least reach by Government services and infrastructure, investment in community empowerment and infrastructure was the right strategy. In the Niger Delta, population densities are high and market access is better, hence rural employment creation for the large youth population and the women remaining in rural areas, as well as the promotion of on and off farm enterprises was appropriate. In the middle belt, where there are large tracts of under used land and access to markets is good, enhancing yields through technologies, inputs and credit also makes sense.

302. The COSOP's identification of these major regional challenges and opportunities was relevant, reflecting a coherent if ambitious agenda, but given the limited resources available to IFAD in such a large country, the broad multi-region coverage also created gaps. Synergies between different programmes could have been explored further in the COSOP, especially in terms of the need for greater geographical overlap between programmes, and more sharing of lessons and expertise. IFAD's desire to maximise outreach came at the expense of looser coherence across the programme.

303. The relationship between the lending and non-lending arms of the COSOP shows only partial coherence. The involvement of national and CGIAR research agencies through grants to develop relevant crop technologies fits well with the programme loans that depend on improved varieties and cropping practices. Informing policy through field-based evidence from IFAD's programmes is an important link, but only if the quality of the evidence stands up to scrutiny, and here the COSOP did not critically address or provide support for stronger M&E beyond its own programme and RIMS needs. This is indicated by the ambitious list of RMF indicators and the absence of any support for state or national planning and statistical systems that would generate and use much of the required data.

304. Greater synergies between loans and grants were recognised as an important lesson from the evaluation of the previous COSOP. Yet while the desire is captured in the 2010 COSOP, it is hard to see how such synergies were to be operationalised; while the MTR provides a more detailed assessment of where such links could be made but only in relation to other development partners. The need to build links between IFAD's regional grant making and the Nigeria portfolio is not sufficiently analysed for example. Not foreseen in the COSOP is the emergence of the largest planned synergy between loan and grant resources, at least in value terms, which is the integration of the ASAP grant of US$15m for CASP, which will provide additional financing for communities to build climate resilience measures.

305. In terms of the relevance of approach to country programme management under the COSOP, the formation and strengthening of the ICO was relevant to bringing greater engagement in partnership and policy work. Equally, continuing direct supervision by IFAD would correctly maintain understanding of programme activities and ensure closer alignment. Nevertheless, given the size of the country and the complexities of the federal system, the level of capacity provided by IFAD to the ICO team to achieve the ambitious multiple roles of programme implementation support, policy dialogue and partnership building is insufficient.

306. The proposed measures to strengthen programme implementation were only partially sound. They addressed the need to build coordination at federal level and were appropriate in seeking to simplify designs and concentrate on smallholder agriculture. But there was a gap in not addressing well known issues of weak ownership and capacity at state and LGA level, so that programme implementing teams continue to be vulnerable to unpredictable and weak counterpart funding.

307. Overall, the 2010 COSOP provides a balance response to Nigeria's poverty reduction challenges given the comparative advantages that IFAD brings. It built on the previous COSOP experiences and the last CPE findings, and aligned reasonably well with national as well as IFAD policy frameworks, albeit with some gaps. Given the gaps in coverage, and IFAD's resources, stronger attention to co-funding would have been helpful, as well as clearer links between lending and grants. The overall relevance of the COSOP is rated moderately satisfactory (4).

Effectiveness

308. Our assessment of the COSOP's effectiveness covers the achievement or the likelihood of achieving the strategic objectives through both lending and non-lending activities and the extent to which the RMF indicators have been met. As noted in chapter IV, the ability to assess IFAD's effectiveness depends mainly on the quality of M&E data, supported by CPE field observation, interviews and secondary data.

309. The COSOP RMF contains a set of quantified yet broad indicators specifying desired targets for changes in income, production, food security, credit and employment, but does not indicate how the indicators will be tracked and aggregated or by who. The RMF also states that a baseline survey will provide a means for comparing progress achieved against the COSOP starting year. Yet there are no funds or arrangements mentioned for conducting this baseline. Without this benchmark, tracking the actual achievements of the COSOP is not feasible.

310. The result of the absence of an overarching mechanism to incorporate the results of lending and non-lending investments into a national-level COSOP information system, guided by a sound theory of change such as the one developed by this CPE in its Approach Paper, means that the CPE's assessment of COSOP effectiveness must be based on a more qualitative analysis supported by quantitative evidence, where available, of the main interventions. The MTR recognised this evidence gap but does not offer a remedy, and indeed increases the measurement challenge by adding several ATA-compliant indicators (as noted above), without reducing any of the existing ones. It is not surprising therefore that the annual COSOP reviews do exactly this, drawing out the achievements programme by programme based on a patchwork of performance results from the three main programmes in operation during the COSOP timeframe (CBARDP, CBNRMP and RUFIN).

311. 9.2 million beneficiaries out of the 14.2 million targeted have been reached by IFAD's four programmes spanning the COSOP period (RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP and RUFIN) (table 5 in annex VI). Performance is mixed with CBARDP and RTEP severely under target while CBNMRP met and RUFIN exceeded their targets (although there are concerns over the RUFIN data as already noted in chapter IV). Nevertheless, this total roughly represents some 10% of the estimated 98 million rural population, the majority moreover falling into the most poor category often residing in remote and resource poor areas.

312. The most recent statistics on poverty are for 2012/13 capturing national and regional trends. As noted in chapter IV the figures show reduced poverty levels overall, but a growing disparity between northern and southern states. The CPE's qualitative judgement is that IFAD's contribution has been effective in helping support this overall trend in lowering poverty, and that in the poorer northern states, IFAD's operations have helped maintain or improve livelihoods at least in those specific communities assisted. As noted in chapter IV effectiveness could have been even stronger if a number of implementation deficiencies had been addressed, including weak M&E, re-designs that reduced the period for achieving impact, and funding delays and shortfalls.

313. Table 18 sets out the CPE's assessment of the achievements by COSOP objective and RMF indicator. A more detailed analysis is presented in annex VI.

Table 18
Results for Selected RMF Indicators by COSOP Objective

SO1: Improving access of rural poor to economically, financially, and environmentally sustainable production, storage and processing techniques, markets and support services (in line with ATA, focus on value chains, job creation and a focus on women and youth).

Indicator	Result over COSOP period
• 25 per cent increase in both household income and in food security.	CBARDP/CBNRMP – evidence suggests significant rises of 50% - 60% in income and over 100% in production depending on crop (drawing from impact studies, PCR and CPE field visits) in the 450 communities targeted. Within the context of the wider population and farm area the impact is so far modest and there is limited analysis on IFAD's contribution. RUFIN – strong claims for outreach leading to reduced poverty (39% rise in income), but the NISER impact studies have methodological flaws[162] and the evidence is that while outreach has been strong, impact on incomes is yet to be reliably established.
• 25 per cent increase in credit leveraged.	CBARDP has increased credit access FSAs, while RUFIN has enabled improved credit delivery through different formal and informal channels and their 2014 results claim to have reached their target of 347,000 borrowers.
• 30 per cent adoption of sustainable improved agriculture practices.	If this means 30% of the target population then it is likely this has been achieved. CBARDP, RTEP and CBNRMP have all increased adoption of agricultural practices amongst their target farmers. Figures are hard to find but for CBNRMP it is given as 75%.
• 50,000 jobs created in production and processing,	On and off farm employment is reported in CBARDP and CBNRMP that exceed this figure. (CBARDP alone claims 140,800 off farm jobs, while CBNRMP 82,544 and RUFIN 27,300 to date)
• 7,000 viable enterprises established.[163]	This target has been met. CBNRMP reports that 6,841 enterprises have been established of which 1,000 are 'champion' or model examples, while CBARDP recorded 9,061. RTEP also contributed here but numbers are not available.
• 30 per cent farmers and fishers adopt conservation measures.	For the groups targeted, there has been increasing use of agro-forestry, waste treatment and other measures. CBNRMP reports 384 ha of land brought under sustainable management. Overall however this target which implies some 3 million farmers adopting is unlikely to have been reached given the available evidence.

SO2: Strengthening community involvement in local planning and development, and promoting support for rural infrastructure

Indicator	Result over COSOP period
• 30 per cent of rural communities participating in planning implementation and maintenance of infrastructure	For CBARDP and CBNMRP, within their 450 communities this has been achieved, and most of the CDAs and CADAs are implementing and maintaining the infrastructure and other assets financed under the programmes, except where LGAs have responsibility as in the case of roads or schools. RUFIN also has met its target of strengthening 10,000 savings groups with internal lending rising from NGN30 mill to over NGN6billion.

314. Despite the last CPE's concerns over administrative complexity that led to funding delays and weak counterpart support, the more recent operations have not successfully tackled this challenge. Equally there has also been limited progress in achieving co-financing of IFAD's operations. However the in-country presence has been largely an effective measure to improve implementation efficiency and build local partnerships particularly within programmes. Senior IFAD management regularly visited Nigeria during the CPE period, and provided critical engagement with the highest levels of government around solving loan effectiveness and implementation issues. Supervision has been regular and well-resourced to tackle technical and administrative issues, even though the composition of missions has been highly varied as noted in chapter IV.

[162] NISER made a presentation to the CPE team of their 'mid-term impact study'. Sampling method is not clear, and analysis does not compare beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries, and for beneficiaries what kind of benefit received (training, credit or other).
[163] Revised COSOP RMF MTR Report 2013

315. In terms of the country programme management effectiveness, the overall view is of a positive result from the decision to set up an in country presence. The office has improved IFAD's profile at central, state and even local level through more intensive engagement in government and donor structures, supervision work and ongoing improvements in knowledge management. RUFIN especially has led to new areas of interaction beyond FMARD to CBN and other financial partners. Yet there are still important gaps related to limited capacity and funding for strengthening engagement beyond programme issues. Policy dialogue is still an area where IFAD falls behind other donors, for example working more closely with the new administration to influence the new Minister's agenda. Equally, there is scope for the ICO to integrate the non-lending operations with the lending side to build in greater synergies. Reaching beyond government to work with NGOs and private sector actors - not just as service providers but as partners - remains a challenge. Finally there is also room to improve the way the performance of the ICO team is measured – choosing better indicators and deliverables that can inform WCA how effectively they are working.

316. The COSOP's performance is being tracked carefully on an annual basis using the Annual Impact Review process, and this provides detailed results on the SOs and the RMF. However, they do not specifically compare the RMF outcome targets systematically, and where percentage targets are stated, it is not always clear whether these refer to changes within the whole population or just the target population residing in the selected communities.

317. At federal level, the FMARD has tracked progress of the ATA against a selected set of key performance scorecard indicators. These cover food security, rural income growth, exports and imports, employment and planning and policy. Latest results are for 2013, and show strong growth in production and productivity for cassava, maize, rice and others.[164] 15 million tons of food collectively had been added under ATA by 2012 reaching 77 per cent of the 20 million tons targeted by 2015. The report claimed 1.4 million jobs were created in nine commodities, particularly rice and maize. IFAD's operations have been contributing to this achievement both through its programmes but also through its grants and other channels such as by membership of the Eminent Persons Group seeking to promote the ATA and crowd in global and national private sector investors. Based on this level of food production, Nigeria has met the MDG of halving the number of hungry people two years ahead of the 2015 deadline.

318. Overall, therefore, despite the measurement problems and lack of a baseline, from the programme information available the COSOP is likely to reach the targets set for the two SOs. We therefore rate it as moderately satisfactory (4).

Table 19
Overall COSOP Assessment

Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4
Performance	4

B. Overall partnership assessment

319. The Government-IFAD partnership has grown stronger over the current COSOP period. The 2010-15 COSOP provided a reasonably aligned and coherent instrument to guide the IFAD lending and non-lending programme in Nigeria, with strong points around the balance approach, building on previous experience, a growing geographical focus and the fit with IFAD and Nigeria policy frameworks.

[164] FMARD ATA Scorecard Report 2013

Greater synergies could have been sought between grants and lending, and between the different programmes, and also between partners in terms of co-funding. Given the fragile nature of the rural areas where IFAD chose to work, a closer conflict analysis and inclusion of mitigation measures was needed.

320. The IFAD-supported portfolio has become better focussed on Government priorities in agriculture. The CPE judgement on what was achieved over the period is handicapped by poor data availability, making a collective assessment of impact difficult. But across the portfolio a not insignificant proportion of the rural poor have been reached, their production systems strengthened and their livelihoods improved. IFAD's overall contribution is largely observed in this arena, because of the rather weaker delivery around policy engagement and on partnerships.

321. Overall, the Government-IFAD partnership is rated moderately satisfactory (4).

Table 20
Overall assessment of Government-IFAD partnership

Portfolio performance	4
Non-lending activities	3
COSOP performance	4
Overall Government-IFAD partnership	4

Key points

- The COSOP returned IFAD towards a prioritization on agriculture, while building on its twin strengths in Nigeria: supporting agricultural growth and technology for the poor with a community-led development. It was broadly aligned with Government's policy priorities since 2010, in particular the ATA which has been the main blueprint for the COSOP period.
- The COSOP reflects also IFAD's policy evolution around CDD, gender, rural finance, climate change and value chains. But the COSOP's approach to conflict is only weakly aligned with IFAD's policy at that time (2006). Matching grants are another example of weaker policy fit.
- Neither within the programmes nor in its policy work IFAD has been giving sufficient attention to the support for private sector engagement in the agriculture sector.
- While Government's policies call for less projectized approaches to sector support, IFAD's choice of aid instruments has remained conventional.
- The COSOP had a coherent approach in terms of the choice of sectors, regions and target groups. Geographic and poverty focus has increased, with a marked shift towards the poorer North. Still, the multi-region coverage remained broad, creating gaps and prevented synergies between different programmes. IFAD's desire to maximise outreach came at the expense of less coherence across the programme.
- Greater synergies between loans and grants, as recommended by the last CPE, are yet to be operationalised.
- The strengthening of the ICO brought greater engagement in partnership and policy work, but given the size of the country and the complexities of the federal system, the level of capacity still seems inadequate to cover multiple roles of programme implementation support, policy dialogue and partnership building.
- IFAD's contribution has been effective in helping support the overall trend in lowering poverty. In the poorer northern states, IFAD's operations have helped maintain or improve livelihoods at least in those specific communities assisted.
- IFAD's operations have not been successful in tackling the administrative complexity that led to funding delays and weak counterpart support, key concerns raised by the last CPE. There has also been limited progress in achieving co-financing. The in-country presence has been largely an effective measure to improve implementation efficiency and build local partnerships particularly within programmes.
- The in-country presence has been largely an effective measure to improve implementation efficiency and build local partnerships particularly within programmes. The strengthening of the ICO also led to moderately greater engagement in partnership and policy work, but given the size of the country and the complexities of the federal system, the level of capacity is inadequate to cover multiple roles of programme implementation support, policy dialogue and partnership building.

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

322. Storyline. There is no doubt that for any development partner, Nigeria presents a complex and immense challenge. While the newly elected government represents a striking democratic achievement and national economic growth continues to be robust, tackling increasing inequality and growing rural poverty while working within a context of social and climate insecurity is no easy task. Yet it is one that IFAD is especially well placed to support given its record of engagement in Nigeria and its global mandate to reduce poverty through rural development.

323. Overall, the Nigeria country programme is relevant and it addresses the priorities of Government and the beneficiaries. The portfolio targets poverty reasonably well, especially with the programmes in the North and Middle Belt. The grants directly contributed to the achievement of the WCA high-level development objectives and results, as well as to COSOP strategic objectives. The overall performance of the portfolio is moderately satisfactory (4). There are some notable successes and achievements at the level of operations, in particular with regard to the CDD programme in the North. But across the different evaluation criteria performance has not dramatically improved over the COSOP period. While the effectiveness of the early operations was limited because of the broad outreach (RTEP), the most

recent operations suffered from unrealistic expectations with regard to counterpart contributions and flaws around the value chain design (RUFIN, VCDP).

324. Programme designs were complex given the known capacities for implementation, and they over-estimated the willingness of local governments to contribute. State governments generally have been poor at providing the planned counterpart funding, with the notable exception of CBARDP. A main reason is that agriculture is often low on the agenda of state leaders, especially in the South. Uncertainty of counterpart funding has reduced programme effectiveness and efficiency, and though IFAD's disbursement rates have improved with changes in its lending rules, the turbulence following these re-designs has also affected delivery.

325. Meanwhile, there has been limited success in managing aspects of weak governance. Political uncertainties caused by changing governments and the institutional complexities within the federal system were major factors that affected the performance of the programme. Key coordinating mechanisms have disappeared, and the private sector has not been able to step in as needed to build on the linkages established between producers and the market. IFAD's continued engagement with government as the lead implementer of its market-based programmes has crowded out private sector involvement.

326. The establishment of the country office in 2008 and the following out-posting of the CPM in 2012 has brought some improvements in implementation efficiency. But, delays in approval, effectiveness and implementation continued to undermine the performance of the country programme.

327. A major success has been IFAD's support of CDD, in particular in the North were several states have continued to support the community driven approaches. Local programme structures have persisted and in some areas been replicated. The CDAs and CADAs are registered and continue to function. More systematic links with grassroots initiatives and stronger engagement at state level would be needed to effectively scale up the positive experiences.

328. Islands of results. IFAD's contribution has been effective in helping support the overall trend in lowering poverty. In the poorer northern states, IFAD's operations have helped maintain or improve livelihoods at least in those specific communities assisted. While beneficiary outreach was less than targeted at appraisal, the policy of concentrating efforts in a limited number of villages meant that delivery in these locations was successful, efficient and often sustained. Impacts are recorded for empowerment, assets creation and institutions, but the scale remains limited given the size of the country, and poverty statistics overall show an increasing divide between the urban and the wealthy and the rural and the poor.

329. The CPE Nigeria found a clear trajectory of an evolving country programme that reflects deliberate efforts to adapt to changing priorities, realities and needs. The 2nd COSOP has built on the strengths of IFAD in Nigeria, while refocussing the programme on agriculture, in line with Government's policy priorities (as manifested in the ATA). CDD has been a trademark feature of IFAD's portfolio (under the 1st COSOP) and this has been continued through the community-based programmes (CBARDP, CBNRMP) throughout the 2nd COSOP period. Focus on agricultural productivity and strong engagement with research institutions has been another defining feature of the portfolio even before 1st COSOP, although it has retreated to the background under 2nd COSOP, given the new focus on value chains. The 2nd COSOP saw a successful transition to the support of value-chains in ongoing and new operations and with this a strong alignment with the ATA.

330. Under the 2nd COSOP IFAD's portfolio has improved geographic and poverty focus, but the broad multi-region coverage (of all but 9 out of 36 states) created gaps and prevented synergies between the programmes. Better geographical overlap in the states supported by different IFAD programmes would make efficient use of trained

staff, build on capacitated local governments and sustain already existing community assets and cadres.

331. IFAD's portfolio evolved slowly because of delays in loan effectiveness. Only two new operations have been approved since the last CPE (2008) which means that changes at the level of the portfolio have been rather incremental and overall progress in addressing strategic issues has been slow. However, efforts to better align the ongoing operations with the policy priorities resulted in substantial re-design and retro-fitting, which caused implementation confusion and affected local ownership.

332. The strengthening of the ICO brought greater engagement in partnership and policy work, but given the size of the country and the complexities of the federal system, the level of capacity still seems inadequate to cover multiple roles of programme implementation support, policy dialogue and partnership building. At state-level, little policy analysis or advisory activities were undertaken on contextual issues that affect portfolio performance, for example in the areas of governance and anti-corruption, social conflicts, or around state-level legislation to support enterprise growth or food security. Partnerships have mainly taken place at programme level and along programme-specific themes, such as agricultural and micro-finance research, farmer training and rural finance. The failure to build strong partnerships with other influential players (World Bank, DfID, USAID) through co-funded programmes has limited IFAD's leverage at federal and state levels.

333. The country programme has been moderately successful in addressing the key issues noted by the last CPE (2008) (see annex VIII). Above all, IFAD's operations have not been successful in tackling the administrative complexity that led to funding delays and weak counterpart support. Nor has it been successful in managing aspects of weak governance. Lending to state governments did not solve the issue of counterpart funding due to the lack of ownership and responsibility at state level. The choice of the NDDC as a financially potent partner to overcome counterpart funding issues has been questionable for other reasons, noted elsewhere in this report. The issue of counterpart funding is fundamental and, unless a solution is found, will continue to seriously hamper the performance of the Nigeria portfolio. A related issue is the thin geographical spread across a large number of states and the resulting low financial clout that limit IFAD's influence.

334. Capacity issues and weak coordination functions continue to exist at Federal level. The previous CPE recommended stronger attention to skills, competencies and experiences in the selection of federal partners. Despite the proliferation of partners at federal level, limited progress has been made in expanding the implementation and coordination structure beyond FMARD, NPC, and the National Agricultural Seed Council (NASC). The absence of a well-structure policy coordination unit within FMARD is a major constraint for effective policy engagement as well as dissemination of results to government systems/institutions. The lack of a strong coordinating function or office in either FMARD or NPC has also limited the development of strategic partnerships. At the level of individual programme staff, insufficient progress has been made in the mix of experiences and skills in line with the changed thematic focus. For example, a sufficient number of personnel with more private sector experience would be required to manage the rural finance and value chain operations.

335. Greater synergies between loans and grants, as recommended by the last CPE, are yet to be operationalised. Some grants were successfully used to support federal level policy implementation. The majority of grants continued to have a regional focus and therefore linkages between the main recipient of IFAD grants, IITA, and IFAD supported operations were not systematically promoted. The use of matching grants to subsidise one-off investments is unsustainable and not aligned with IFAD's technical guidance and good practices documented elsewhere.

336. Effective knowledge management is hampered by poorly performing M&E systems. IFAD has the potential to bring immense field experience into the policy discourse, based on systematic collection of evidence from operations. Yet the observed data gaps and lack of sound empirical impact assessment , programme M&E data can only be used with caution for policy discourse. The baseline and impact studies produced by several programmes were disappointing and as such have not been widely used. The absence of thematic studies has limited the understanding of the effectiveness and impact of IFAD-supported programmes.

337. The programme did not create sufficient opportunities for the private sector to participate. Involvement of the private sector in implementation is crucial given the move towards markets and processing across the portfolio. Even the ATA reports highlight the need to mobilise a range of public-private partnerships around fertilizer, seeds and processing. The private sector has been increasingly engaged with, particularly under RUFIN and VCDP. However, through their implementation structure these programmes continued to heavily rely on government entities at federal and local level. Failure to include private investors as co-financers seem a missed opportunity. Even in the policy work there been sufficient attention to providing support for private sector engagement in the agriculture sector.

338. The move towards larger programmes made it even more difficult to address issues of local governance, fragility and cultural diversity. Neither did it improve overall implementation efficiency as expected, because programme coordination and funds were spread over a larger number of states. This was compounded by the political and cultural diversity which made engagement with issues of local governance more challenging. Critical aspects of weak governance, including fragility and conflict, have been virtually ignored in portfolio design and execution. The inclusion of states into the programmes has been done without a deeper analysis of local governance issues. While the selection of states is done by the Federal Government, IFAD could have provided some clearly defined criteria that would have served as a proxy for the commitment and political will to support a joint programme, such as political stability, shared priorities (e.g. community development, smallholder agriculture), track record (e.g. public service reform, financial performance, accountability to development results). In addition, strong local ownership appears to be closely linked to smaller geographic units and more homogeneous programme areas, as they have been the case in the earlier programmes in the North. With sufficient attention to governance related issues IFAD could have developed a more adaptive approach at state level: An approach that involves nourishing partnerships, strengthening local ownership, sustaining commitment, and responding to crisis and disruptions in a proactive way.

B. Recommendations

339. Beyond what have been the recommendations of the last CPE, this CPE offers the following most critical recommendations.

340. Recommendation 1. Increase geographic focus, transform state-level partnerships and identify realistic levels of counterpart funding. The following possible options should be explored:

(a) Develop a transparent mechanism for selection of states through adoption of clear selection criteria that consider poverty and governance-related indicators based on a robust analysis.

(b) Conduct a proper assessment of the governance and public finances of the state as part of the institutional assessment during design, before drawing conclusions on the commitment and the ability to contribute (“know your client”).

(c) Adopt strategies to get the attention and commitment of state governors, such as (i) pressure from federal partners (ii) increasing the size of

investment in fewer states (iii) have rewards for better performing states, (iv) increasing IFAD presence in key states, (v) keeping counterpart funding at feasible levels, e.g. % to minimum or zero, and making beneficiary contribution the trigger for release.

(d) Develop strategies for strengthening local ownership, for example by creating programmes focussed on fewer states covering a smaller and more homogeneous geographic area.

(e) Strengthen policy engagement at state level, to make sure that IFAD-supported programmes get on the top of the political agenda.

341. Recommendation 2. Increase leverage and presence in operations. There is scope for IFAD to gain traction on effectiveness and efficiency by changing the way it delivers implementation support.

(a) There are opportunities to link programmes with each other and with non-lending activities in a more cohesive way for example linking rural finance initiatives under RUFIN with value chain work under VCDP especially at local level. These linkages need to go along with a more integrated coordinating set-up at state level.

(b) Supervision missions should improve the consistency of recommendations and progressive understanding, for example by keeping a core team with changes in subject matter specialist as appropriate. Any recommendations for changes in approach should take due cognisance of their impact on existing programme commitments and community understanding.

(c) IFAD should dedicate technical capacities to strengthen engagement with key states. A suitable arrangement should be explored for decentralising the posting of IFAD staff in key states/regions, whose role would be to focus on policy and strategic dialogue with state governments and LGAs.

(d) To strengthen ICO leverage, IFAD also needs high level engagement with incoming government key people (e.g. new ministers) for dialogue on policy direction.

(e) IFAD should also use its PBAS discussions on rural sector performance and the portfolio performance as an opportunity for high-level policy engagement.

342. Recommendation 3. Dedicate resources to crosscutting issues that require further analysis and focus for sustainable programme results. Because of the complexity and difficulty of the context, the understanding of crosscutting issues requires more and deeper analysis. The analysis should be built up through studies and lessons-learning within programmes and grants. It should aim at identifying opportunities for more effective engagement on crosscutting issues outside day-to-day implementation. Important crosscutting issues include:

(a) Youth - Valuable initiatives have been started, e.g. in CBNRMP, which should be built on. The initiatives themselves need to be sustained. Also the experiences should be documented and shared.

(b) Gender – Adopt culturally appropriate gender strategies: Address gender roles and issues within the local context (e.g. trafficking, social constraints on public roles, land ownership) and in a way that is tailored to existing capacities.

(c) Conflict – Integrate conflict analysis into the programme design and progress reporting, both at operational and COSOP levels.

(d) Pastoralism –Pastoralists are among the poorest and most vulnerable groups in Nigeria, and IFAD should explore ways to address farmer-pastoralist issues and integrate pastoralists into programme delivery.

(e) NRM/environment - bring more dedicated analysis and identify more substantial and explicit investments in this field through ASAP.

343. Recommendation 4. Expand existing and develop new partnerships particularly outside of government.

(a) IFAD should link with civil society actors to widen opportunities for achieving on-the-ground sustainability and empowerment (e.g. young farmers in CBNRMP; rural finance associations in the North). Building more strategic partnerships with CSOs rather than only for service provision would encourage sustainability and extend their engagement beyond a programme's duration. IFAD grants should also explicitly support this endeavour, such as with CORY, while ASAP could be used to work with key CSO actors under CASP in this way. Where feasible such roles should be identified at design and written into the loan agreement or subsidiary MOUs.

(b) IFAD needs to facilitate the private sector in agriculture much more effectively. This requires measures such as hiring from the private sector as well as from government for programme implementation, and using private sector advisors as mentors for existing government staff. It also requires implementing tripartite agreements between private sector/farmers/IFAD in programmes such as VCDP and CASP, so that IFAD funds are used to crowd in private investors, as envisaged by IFAD's technical guidance note on matching grants.

(c) IFAD needs to seek co-funding arrangements with its major partners (World Bank, USAID, DFID, etc.) in order to improve leverage especially around policy dialogue, counterpart funding, and increasing levels of delivery in IFAD's priority sectors.

344. Recommendation 5. Continue to build on IFAD's knowledge management strategy by improving the quality of evidence from the field. This first requires improving evaluability during design - developing clear and logical theories of change, and designing practical M&E frameworks matching staff capacity (such as the CBNMRP PMP and KPIs), while minimising RIMS indicators. It then requires greater effort and rigour for evaluation. IFAD should support use of improved technology (such as computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI), use of mobile phones and web tools), and also participatory methods. It should ensure rigorous survey design and analysis for major baseline or impact studies, and also follow up on the commissioning of thematic studies to ensure they are conducted in a way that reveals underlying factors as to how and why impact occurs, and how these affect particular vulnerable groups. To strengthen the country M&E system within the overall move to improved development effectiveness, IFAD should consider providing support to building institutional mechanisms and capacities within FMARD.

Ratings of IFAD-funded project portfolio in Nigeria[a]

	Pre-COSOP	*1st COSOP*			*2nd COSOP*			
Evaluation Criteria	RTEP	CBARDP	CBNRMP	RUFIN	VCDP	CASP	RUMEDP	Overall
Relevance	3	5	3	4	3	5	4	4
Effectiveness	3	5	4	4				4
Efficiency	3	4	3	4				3
Project performance	3	4.7	3.3	4				3.7
HH Income and assets	4	3	4					4
Social Capital and Empowerment	3	4	4					4
Food security & agricultural productivity	4	2	4					4
NR & Environment	2	2	2					2
Institutions & policies	3	5	4					4
Rural poverty impact	4	2	4					4
Sustainability	3	4	4					4
Pro-poor Innovation, replication and scaling up	3	5	3					4
Gender equality and women's empowerment	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	4
Overall project portfolio achievement	3	4	4	4	3	5	4	4
Partner performance								
IFAD	3	4	4	4				4
Government	3	4	2	4				3

[a] Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

[b] Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

[c] This is not an average of ratings of individual impact domains.

[d] This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability, innovation and scaling up, and gender.

[e] The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

IFAD-financed projects in Nigeria

Project Id	*Project name*	*Project type*	*Total cost (in US$ million)**	*IFAD financing*	*Cofinancing*	*Government funding*	*Cofinancier*	*Board approval*	*Loan effectiveness*	*Project completion*	*Current status*
177	Multi State Agriculture Development - Cassava Multiplication Project	Agriculture dev	256.4	12	162	82.4	World Bank	05/12/1985	25/09/1987	31/03/1998	Closed
236	Artisanal Fisheries Development Project	Fisheries	19.7	15	0.5	4.2	UNDP	30/11/1988	05/04/1991	18/09/1998	Closed
273	Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Project	Agriculture dev	28.81	12.19	11.1	5.32	UNDP, Domestic institutions	12/12/1990	08/07/1993	31/01/2003	Closed
307	Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Project	Rural dev	17.24	9.62	4.68	2.63	European Union, UNDP	08/09/1992	04/11/1994	31/03/2002	Closed
339	Benue and Niger States Agricultural Support Project	Agriculture dev		27.77			AfDB	02/12/1993		31/12/2002	Cancelled
1016	Roots & Tubers Expansion Programme	Research/extension/ training	36.1	23.05		13.03		09/12/1999	31/07/2001	26/06/2012	Closed
1196	Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme	Rural dev	81.5	42.9	3.2	31.5	To be Determined	12/09/2001	31/01/2003	27/06/2014	Closed
1260	Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme	Rural dev	78.4	15	15	44	NDDC**	11/12/2002	06/07/2005	31/03/2016	Ongoing
1212	Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme	Credit and financial services dev	40	27.57	5.26	6.18	Ford Foundation, Domestic institutions	14/09/2006	20/01/2010	30/09/2017	Ongoing
1337	Rural Microenterprise Development Programme	Agriculture dev	57.9	43.16		14.4		13/12/2007		20/05/2010	Cancelled
1594	Value Chain Development Programme	Agriculture dev	104.73	74.9	2.8	24.6	To be Determined	03/04/2012	14/10/2013	30/09/2013	Ongoing
1692	Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt	Rural dev	93.55	85.46	0.92	5.77	To be Determined	11/12/2013	25/03/2015	30/06/2020	Approved

* Discrepancies between Total cost and IFAD, Co-financing and Government funding is accounted for by beneficiary contributions to total programme costs
**NDDC = Niger Delta Development Commission

IFAD-funded grants in Nigeria

Grant Number	*Recipient*	*Approval date*	*Programme Name*	*Type of grant*	*Grant Amount (US$ at Design)*
Country specific grant					
G-I-R-1350-	Ministry of Agriculture - Nigeria	20/01/2012	Support to the Design of a Strategy and Action Plan for High Impact Commodity Value Chains in Nigeria		500,000
Global-Regional grants					
2000000473	University of Greenwich NRI - UK	13/09/2014	Increasing performance of the cassava industry (IPCI)	Global/Regional - Large	1,582,978
2000000467	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	17/12/2013	Achieving development impact and environmental sustainability through intensification of pro poor cropping systems based on cassava, yams and legumes.	Global/Regional - Agricultural Research for Development	3,241,875
2000000289	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	28/11/2013	Improving Quality, Nutrition and Health Impacts of Inclusion of Cassava Flour in Bread Formulation in West Africa (Nigeria and Ghana)	Global/Regional - Small	458,745
2000000216	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	22/10/2013	Youth Agribusiness Development Iniative (YADI) A Private-Public Partnership to Advance Participation of Youth in Agriculture	Global/Regional - Small	402,500
2000000180	Centre for Entrepreneurship, Education and Development - Canada	27/12/2013	Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth in West and Central Africa (CORY)	Global/Regional - Large	1,950,000
2000000175	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	09/12/2013	Integrated Systems for humid tropics	Global/Regional - Agricultural Research for Development	2,500,000
G-I-R-1443-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - USA	18/12/2011	Gender Equality and Productivity - Identifying Opportunities for Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa	Global/Regional - Small	329,292
G-C-ECG-57-	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	17/12/2013	Achieving Development Impact and Environmental Sustainability through Intensification of Pro-Poor Cropping Systems based on Cassava, Yams and Legumes	Global/Regional - Large	1,301,790

Grant Number	*Recipient*	*Approval date*	*Programme Name*	*Type of grant*	*Grant Amount (US$ at Design)*
G-I-R-1245-	SONGHAI - Benin	05/12/2010	Rural Youth and Agricultural Business Development in West and Central Africa	Global/Regional - Large	1,800,000
G-I-R-1247-	WARF - Senegal	05/12/2010	Support to Improve IFAD Project Performance in West and Central Africa	Global/Regional - Large	1,000,000
G-C-ECG-28-	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	18/12/2008	2008 EC Contribution to the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research	Global/Regional - Large	5,017,292
G-I-R-975-	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	12/09/2007	Participatory Development, Diffusion and Adoption of Cowpea Technologies For Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods in West Africa	Global/Regional - Large	1,200,000
G-I-R-704-	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture - Nigeria	09/09/2004	Productive and Competitive Yam Systems - Phase II	Global/Regional - Large	1,500,000
Loan component grants					
2000000727	Nigeria	06/06/2014	Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme	Loan Component Grant	480,000
2000000725	Nigeria	06/06/2014	Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme	Adaptation for Small-holder Agriculture Grant	15,000,000
G-I-C-1358-	Nigeria	03/04/2012	Value Chain Development Programme	Loan Component Grant	500,000
G-I-C-995-	Nigeria	13/12/2007	Rural Microenterprise Development Programme	Loan Component Grant	400,000
G-I-C-870-	Nigeria	14/09/2006	Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme	Loan Component Grant	400,000
Other types of grants					

Grant Number	*Recipient*	*Approval date*	*Programme Name*	*Type of grant*	*Grant Amount (US$ at Design)*
2E+11	Rainforest Resource and Development Centre - Nigeria	28/11/2013	NFC 1313 RRDC		23,961

Methodological note on country programme evaluations

1. A country programme evaluation (CPE) conducted by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) has two main objectives: assess the performance and impact of IFAD-financed operations in the country; and generate a series of findings and recommendations that will inform the next results-based country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP). It is conducted in accordance with the directives of IFAD's Evaluation Policy[1] and follows the core methodology and processes for CPEs outlined in IOE's Evaluation Manual.[2] This note describes the key elements of the methodology.

2. Focus. A CPE focuses on three mutually reinforcing pillars in the IFAD-government partnership: (i) project portfolio; (ii) non-lending activities; and (iii) the COSOP(s). Based on these building blocks, the CPE makes an overall assessment of the country programme achievements.

3. With regard to assessing the performance of the project portfolio (first pillar), the CPE applies standard evaluation methodology for each project using the internationally-recognized evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and rural poverty impact - including impact on household income and assets, human and social capital, food security and agricultural productivity, natural resources and the environment (including climate change[3]), and institutions and policies. The other performance criteria include sustainability, innovation and scaling up, and gender equality and women's empowerment. The performance of partners (IFAD and the government) is also assessed by examining their specific contribution to the design, execution, supervision, implementation-support, and monitoring and evaluation of the specific projects and programmes. The definition of all evaluation criteria is provided in annex V.

4. The assessment of non-lending activities (second pillar) analyses the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts of IFAD and the government to promote policy dialogue, knowledge management, and partnership building. It also reviews global, regional, and country-specific grants as well as achievements and synergy with the lending portfolio.

5. The assessment of the performance of the COSOP (third pillar) is a further, more aggregated, level of analysis that covers the relevance and effectiveness of the COSOP. While in the portfolio assessment the analysis is project-based, in this latter section, the evaluation considers the overall objectives of the programme. The assessment of relevance covers the alignment and coherence of the strategic objectives - including the geographic and subsector focus, partners selected, targeting and synergies with other rural development interventions - , and the provisions for country programme management and COSOP management. The assessment of effectiveness determines the extent to which the overall strategic objectives contained in the COSOP were achieved. The CPE ultimately generates an assessment for the overall achievements of the programme.

6. Approach. In line with international evaluation practices, the CPE evaluation combines: (i) desk review of existing documentation - existing literature, previous IOE evaluations, information material generated by the projects, data and other materials made available by the government or IFAD, including self-evaluation data and reports; (ii) interviews with relevant stakeholders in IFAD and in the country; and (iii) direct observation of activities in the field.

7. For the field work, a combination of methods are generally used for data gathering: (i) focus group discussions with a set of questions for project user and comparison groups; (ii) Government stakeholders meetings – national, regional/local, including

[1] http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-7-Rev-1.pdf.
[2] http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf
[3] On climate change, scaling up and gender, see annex II of document EC 2010/65/W.P.6 approved by the IFAD Evaluation Committee in November 2010: http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/ec/e/65/EC-2010-65-W-P-6.pdf

project staff; (iii) sample household visits using a pre-agreed set of questions to household members, to obtain indications of levels of project participation and impact; (iv) key non-government stakeholder meetings – e.g. civil society representatives and private sector.

8. Evaluation findings are based on triangulation of evidence collected from different sources.

9. Rating scale. The performance in each of the three pillars described above and the overall achievements are rated on a scale of 1 to 6 (with 1 being the lowest score, and 6 the highest), enabling to report along the two broad categories of satisfactory (4, 5, and 6) and unsatisfactory performance (1, 2 and 3). Ratings are provided for individual projects/programmes, and on that basis, for the performance of the overall project portfolio. Ratings are also provided for the performance of partners, non-lending activities, the COSOP's relevance and effectiveness as well as the overall achievements of the programme.

10. In line with practices of international financial institutions, the rating scale, in particular when assessing the expected results and impact of an operation, can be defined as follows - taking however due account of the approximation inherent to such definition:

Highly satisfactory (6)	The intervention (project, programme, non-lending, etc.) achieved - under a specific criteria or overall –strong progress towards all main objectives/impacts, and had best practice achievements on one or more of them.
Satisfactory (5)	The intervention achieved acceptable progress towards all main objectives/impacts and strong progress on some of them.
Moderately satisfactory (4)	The intervention achieved acceptable (although not strong) progress towards the majority of its main objectives/impacts.
Moderately unsatisfactory (3)	The intervention achieved acceptable progress only in a minority of its objectives/impacts.
Unsatisfactory (2)	The intervention's progress was weak in all objectives/ impacts.
Highly unsatisfactory (1)	The intervention did not make progress in any of its objectives/impacts.

11. It is recognized that differences may exist in the understanding and interpretation of ratings between evaluators (inter-evaluation variability). In order to minimize such variability IOE conducts systematic training of staff and consultants as well as thorough peer reviews.

12. Evaluation process. A CPE is conducted prior to the preparation of a new cooperation strategy in a given country. It entails three main phases: (i) design and desk review phase; (ii) country work phase; (iii) report writing, comments and communication phase.

13. The design and desk review phase entails developing the CPE approach paper. The paper specifies the evaluation objectives, methodology, process, timelines, and key questions. It is followed by a preparatory mission to the country to discuss the draft paper with key partners. During this stage, a desk review is conducted examining available documentation. Project review notes and a consolidated desk review report are prepared and shared with IFAD's regional division and the government. The main objective of the desk review report is to identify preliminary hypotheses and issues to be analysed during the main CPE mission. During this

stage both IFAD and the government conduct a self-assessment at the portfolio, non-lending, and COSOP levels.

14. The country work stage entails convening a multidisciplinary team of consultants to visit the country, holding meetings in the capital city with the government and other partners and traveling to different regions of the country to review activities of IFAD-funded projects on the ground and discuss with beneficiaries, public authorities, project management staff, NGOs, and other partners. A brief summary note is presented at the end of the mission to the government and other key partners.

15. During the report writing, comments and communication of results stage, IOE prepares the draft final CPE report, shared with IFAD's regional division, the government, and other partners for review and comments. The draft benefits from a peer review process within IOE including IOE staff as well as an external senior independent advisor. IOE then distributes the CPE report to partners to disseminate the results of the CPE. IOE and the government organize a national round table workshop that focuses on learning and allows multiple stakeholders to discuss the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The report is publicly disclosed.

16. A core learning partnership (CLP), consisting of the main users of the evaluation, provides guidance to IOE at critical stages in the evaluation process; in particular, it reviews and comments on the draft approach paper, the desk review report and the draft CPE report, and participates in the CPE national round table workshop.

17. Each CPE evaluation is concluded with an agreement at completion point (ACP). The ACP is a short document which captures the main findings of the evaluation as well as the recommendations contained in the CPE report that IFAD and the government agree to adopt and implement within a specific timeline.

Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	*Definition*[a]
Project performance	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design in achieving its objectives.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
Rural poverty impact[b]	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
Household income and assets	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
Human and social capital and empowerment	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grassroots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
Food security and agricultural productivity	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
Natural resources, the environment and climate change	The focus on natural resources and the environment involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment as well as in mitigating the negative impact of climate change or promoting adaptation measures.
Institutions and policies	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
Other performance criteria	
Sustainability	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The criterion assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
Performance of partners IFAD Government	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. It also assesses the performance of individual partners against their expected role and responsibilities in the project life cycle.

[a] These definitions have been taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).
[b] The IFAD Evaluation Manual also deals with the 'lack of intervention', that is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or the mention 'not applicable') is assigned.

Complementary tables to chapters IV and VI

Table 1

Background and context of pastoralism in Nigeria, with a case study of pastoralist/farmer conflict Benue State

Pastoralism is a common livelihood approach in sub-Saharan Africa, with about 50 million people rely on pastoralism for their only or a main part of their livelihoods. About half are located in the Sahel and the Saharan fringes, and of these about 70 percent are poor. In Nigeria, there are an estimated 12 million Fulani pastoralists, whose pastoral activity provides sectoral employment and added value in different livelihoods such as the sale, transport, processing and marketing of Fulani livestock products, which include meat, milk, skins and draught power.

Pastoral economies and lifestyles are characterised by their non-sedentary, mobile nature. In dryland climates that have sporadic, uneven rainfall, cattle-rearing is a form of low-input asset creation that nonetheless does not readily translate to high income generation. The mobile nature of the pastoral economy and lifestyle permits variable choices in an unpredictable climate and which also is characterised by pastoralist communities crossing borders and developing regional interactions. This mobility also makes pastoral communities being historically relatively isolated from public administrations, and incidentally with resource governance. This is most evident when resource governance is shared with sedentary farmers.

The dynamics of pastoral resource governance in Nigeria, but more particularly in the North Central Region, go back to the 1960s. Fulani pastoralists have been present in Nigeria since the 19th century, but pushed southwards to greener, more productive pastures, at the time that control of the tse-tse fly was possible. At the same time, sedentary farmers pushed northwards, and claimed land ownership rights over previous official stock migration routes. Within this setting, policy contradictions set the stage for subsequent conflict between the Fulani pastoralists and sedentary farmers. The 1978 National Land Use Decree allowed state and local governments to decide how to assign and lease land, which led to (more literate) farmers obtaining land certificates rather than the Fulani. The 1988 National Agricultural Policy aimed to protect 10% of all national land for grazing reserves, but was not enforced. These latent conflict led to a surge of violent events happening in the Middle Belt since 2009.

With this backdrop, the interactions between farmers and pastoralists eventually erupted in conflict in Benue State/Middle Belt.

Benue is located in the North Central region of Nigeria, sharing borders with Nasarawa State to the North, Taraba to the East, Cross River, Enugu and Ebonyi to the South, and Kogi to the west. The State's capital is Makurdi. Created in 1976, the predominant languages spoken in the State are Tiv, Idoma, Igede and Etulo. As of 2006 Benue State has a population of 4,253,641 people. It has 23 local governments, and its predominant ethnic groups are Tiv, Idoma and Igede. Benue is largely an agricultural and rural state. About 80% of the population derives its income from agriculture.

Conflict between Fulani pastoralists and Tiv farmers in Benue erupted in 2006, though it goes back to the 1980s. Its epicentre is in Gwer West Local Government Area, though also affects Makurdi and Guma Local Government Areas, and involves Nasarawa State. The nature of the conflict is described as a struggle over 'the green of the land', where on the one hand there has been increasing demand for farmland following increased farmer settlement in productive areas, and on the other an increasing influx of cattle for pasture. Cattle influx from Nasarawa to Benue is on the increase at a rate of 3 – 4% annually, 1.5 – 2% leave the valley every year, while 0.5 – 0.8% is consumed as meat in abattoirs. Fulani pastoralists would pay Tiv traditional rulers for the right to pasture, but the increasing size of farms and number of farmers in the 1980s limited cattle ranging opportunities, leading to ranging on farmland. Tiv attacks on Fulani cattle in the 1980's is consequently seen as being avenged by the Fulani in the current conflict. The outcome of the current conflict has displaced 10,000 and large tracts of farmland have been abandoned. In the most recent incursion from Gwer East, the conflict resulted in an estimated 16 people dead and several more injured. Reports of the perpetrators of the incursions also point at military involvement. Socioeconomic impacts include increased subsistence farming lower educational attainment of the displaced, and greater erosion rates in land farmed intensely by the displaced. The conflict broke inter-community relations, with Fulani pastoralists considering Gwer West a 'no go zone'.

IFAD is present in Benue through RUFIN and VCDP. Beneficiaries of the projects are amongst those displaced by the conflict. Though IFAD has analysed pastoralist-farmer conflicts in design papers for RTEP, it did not do so for either RUFIN or VCDP. Furthermore, while there are projects that incorporated conflict resolution in their design and components (i.e. CBNRMP), the portfolio fails to take into consideration the historical nature of most of these conflicts; their capacity to spread into areas formerly designated as 'non - conflict' areas; and also the possibility of direct and/or indirect effects of these conflicts in IFAD intervention areas. IFAD in general pays poor attention to pastoralists, and needs to do far more to include both pastoralist communities and conflict analysis, resolution, and mitigation strategies if it wants to succeed in reaching out to the poorest of the poor.

Table 2

Average Status Report Ratings by IFAD for five indicators across the Nigeria Portfolio 2008 - 2014

Ratings	Programmes				
	RTEP	CBARDP	CBNRMP	RUFIN	VCDP
Counterpart funds	3.0	3.8	2.9	3.4	3.0
Performance of M&E	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.5
Gender focus	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.2	4.0
Overall implementation progress	4.0	4.7	4.0	4.0	4.0
Likelihood of achieving the development objectives	4.3	4.7	4.1	4.2	4.0

Source: IFAD PSRs between 2008 and 2015

Table 2.1

Comparison and analysis of RUFIN indicators on savings, loans and groups at appraisal, MTR, supervision missions, and with Benue State data

Indicators		Programme revised appraisal	RUFIN Total			Benue State	
			MTR 2013	Supervision Mission 2014*	Programme Actual (implementation mission) 2015*	Benue May 2015 (M&E officer)	Benue August 2014 RIMS**
Voluntary savers***		54 996	44 660	668 240	447 892	45 283	4 253
volume of savings mobilised (NGN)		275 113 500	165 188 547	12 028 306 831	13 428 946 550	80 828 399	13 479 199
Average savings per saver (NGN)		-	3 699	18 000	29 983	1 785	3 169
Active borrowers		20 000	10 741	301 747	377 404	14 754	778
Amount of whole credit disbursed by formal Banks (NGN)		930 000 000	377 024 392	1 370 000 000	4 741 530 000		15 339 750
Volume of credit leveraged for beneficiaries	Individual	150 000 000			90 000		
	Groups	600 000 000			24 188 760 400		
Amount of loan extended to Savings & Credit Groups				21 188 760 400		105 520 628	
Average credit per borrower (NGN)		46 500	35 101	4 540	12 564	7 152	19 717
People in credit/savings groups		252 500	166 507	252 000	400 200	20 842	17 835
Ratio of savers per people in credit/savings groups		21.8%	26.8%	265.2%	111.9%	217.3%	23.8%
Ratio of borrowers per people in credit/savings groups		7.9%	6.5%	119.7%	94.3%	70.8%	4.4%
Credit to deposit ratio		3.38	2.28	0.11	0.35	-	1.14
Credit demand (50,000 NGN/HH for 25% of group members)		3 156 250 000	2 081 337 500	1 375 000 000	5 002 500 000	260 525 000	-
Ratio of credit supply/credit demand		29.5%	18.1%	99.6%	94.8%	40.5%	
Number of groups linked			4022				399
Number of groups served		7500	7139	7 900	*10,005*	412	
Ratio of people in groups to number of groups linked		33.67	23.32	31.90	40.00	50.59	44.70

Cells in grey are RUFIN data. Cells in blue are CPE Team analysis

* stated figures come from text. Italicised numbers refer to figures not corresponding with RIMS indicator figures, which are higher in the same document

** people in credit savings group comes from Benue Key Performance Indicator tracker

*** Figure in red refers to a decrease in beneficiaries rather than an increase

Source: RUFIN MTR Report, 2013; RUFIN Supervision Mission 2014; RUFIN Implementation Support Mission June 2015; RUFIN M&E data - Benue State updated MFI perfomarnce template and BoA Report, August 2014; Benue Key Outcome Indicators August Monthly Report, 2015; RUFIN M&E Officer Report for CPE Mission, September 2015

Table 2.2
Benue State MFI performance template analysis - savings

NAME OF MFB/NGOMFI, Financial coop. (pls specify the state)	LGA COVERED	NO. OF GROUPS LINKED	%	OUTREACH											
				VOLUNTARY SAVERS (No.)						SAVINGS (DEPOSIT) MOBILIZED (Naira)					
				Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%	Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%
OTUKPO MFB, BENUE	Apa	87	21.8 %	306	21.2 %	495	17.6 %	801	18.8 %	955 025	32.9 %	1 544 974	14.6 %	2 499 999	18.5 %
GBOKO MFB, BENUE	Logo	148	37.1 %	293	20.3 %	1 238	44.0 %	1 531	36.0 %	1 072 634	36.9 %	4 527 366	42.8 %	5 600 000	41.5 %
ZION MFB, BENUE	Gwer West	50	12.5 %	389	27.0 %	257	9.1%	646	15.2 %	228 732	7.9%	151 268	1.4%	380 000	2.8%
PILLAR MFB, BENUE	Apa	3	0.8%	33	2.3%	29	1.0%	62	1.5%	7 982	0.3%	7 018	0.1%	15 000	0.1%
APA MFB, BENUE	Apa		0.0%												
DEC OTUKPO, BENUE	Apa	1	0.3%			14	0.5%	14	0.3%			280 000	2.6%	280 000	2.1%
DEC ZAKI-BIAM, BENUE	Logo	13	3.3%			231	8.2%	231	5.4%			1 685 200	15.9 %	1 685 200	12.5 %
DEC MAKURDI, BENUE	Gwer West	4	1.0%			78	2.8%	78	1.8%			1 059 000	10.0 %	1 059 000	7.9%
BOA ZAKI - BIAM	Logo	78	19.5 %	420	29.1 %	470	16.7 %	890	20.9 %	640 000	22.0 %	1 320 000	12.5 %	1 960 000	14.5 %
BOA MAKURDI	Gwer West	5	1.3%												
BOA OTUKPO	Apa	10	2.5%												
TOTAL	**TOTAL**	399	100. 0%	1 441	100. 0%	2 812	100. 0%	4 253	100. 0%	2 904 373	100. 0%	10 574 826	100. 0%	13 479 199	100. 0%

N.B. totals modified to reflect real addition, not stated
source: Benue State updated MFI performance template and BoA report, August 2014

Table 2.3
Benue State MFI performance template analysis – credit

NAME OF MFB/NGOMFI, Financial coop. (pls specify the state)	LGA COVERED	NO. OF GROUPS LINKED	%	OUTREACH														
				ACTIVE BORROWERS (No.)						LOAN DISBURSED (Naira)						Loan Paid	OUSTANDING LOAN BALANCE (Naira)	
				Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%	Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%			%
OTUKPO MFB, BENUE	Apa	87	21.8%	5	2.7%	20	3.4%	25	3.2%	100 000	5.3%	400 000	3.0%	500 000	3.3%	200 000	-	0.0%
GBOKO MFB, BENUE	Logo	148	37.1%	180	97.3%	250	42.2%	430	55.3%	1 800 000	94.7%	2 500 000	18.6%	4 300 000	28.0%	3 804 510	495 490	7.7%
ZION MFB, BENUE	Gwer West	50	12.5%															
PILLAR MFB, BENUE	Apa	3	0.8%															
APA MFB, BENUE	Apa		0.0%															
DEC OTUKPO, BENUE	Apa	1	0.3%			14	2.4%	14	1.8%			280 000	2.1%	280 000	1.8%	280 000	-	0.0%
DEC ZAKI-BIAM, BENUE	Logo	13	3.3%			231	39.0%	231	29.7%			5 929 250	44.1%	5 929 250	38.7%	2 045 000	3 884 250	60.7%
DEC MAKURDI, BENUE	Gwer West	4	1.0%			78	13.2%	78	10.0%			4 330 500	32.2%	4 330 500	28.2%	2 311 000	2 019 500	31.6%
BOA ZAKI - BIAM	Logo	78	19.5%															
BOA MAKURDI	Gwer West	5	1.3%															
BOA OTUKPO	Apa	10	2.5%															
TOTAL	**TOTAL**	399	100.0%	185	100.0%	593	100.0%	778	100.0%	1 900 000	100.0%	13 439 750	100.0%	15 339 750	0.0%	8 640 510	6 399 240	100.0%

N.B. totals modified to reflect real addition, not stated
source: Benue State updated MFI performance template and BoA report, August 2014

Table 2.4
Savings by MFIs and LGAs in Benue State

Overall MFI

LGA COVERED	NO. OF GROUPS LINKED	%	OUTREACH											
			VOLUNTARY SAVERS (No.)						SAVINGS (DEPOSIT) MOBILIZED (Naira)					
			Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%	Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%
MFB	288	72.2%	1 021	70.9%	2 019	71.8%	3 040	71.5%	2 264 373	78.0%	6 230 626	58.9%	8 494 999	63.0%
DEC	18	4.5%	-	0.0%	323	11.5%	323	7.6%	-	0.0%	3 024 200	28.6%	3 024 200	22.4%
BoA	93	23.3%	420	29.1%	470	16.7%	890	20.9%	640 000	22.0%	1 320 000	12.5%	1 960 000	14.5%
Total	399	100.0%	1 441	100.0%	2 812	100.0%	4 253	100.0%	2 904 373	100.0%	10 574 826	100.0%	13 479 199	100.0%

source: compiled from Benue State updated MFI performance template and BoA report, August 2014

Overall LGA

LGA COVERED	NO. OF GROUPS LINKED	%	OUTREACH											
			VOLUNTARY SAVERS (No.)						SAVINGS (DEPOSIT) MOBILIZED (Naira)					
			Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%	Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%
Apa	101	25.3%	339	23.5%	538	19.1%	877	20.6%	963 007	33.2%	1 831 992	17.3%	2 794 999	20.7%
Logo	239	59.9%	713	49.5%	1 939	69.0%	2 652	62.4%	1 712 634	59.0%	7 532 566	71.2%	9 245 200	68.6%
G/West	59	14.8%	389	27.0%	335	11.9%	724	17.0%	228 732	7.9%	1 210 268	11.4%	1 439 000	10.7%
TOTAL	399	100.0%	1 441	100.0%	2 812	100.0%	4 253	100.0%	2 904 373	100.0%	10 574 826	100.0%	13 479 199	100.0%

source: compiled from Benue State updated MFI performance template and BoA report, August 2014

Table 2.5
Credit by MFIs and LGAs in Benue State

Overall MFI

LGA COVERED	NO. OF GROUPS LINKED	%	OUTREACH														
			ACTIVE BORROWERS (No.)						LOAN DISBURSED (Naira)						Loan Paid	OUSTANDING LOAN BALANCE (Naira)	
			Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%	Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%			%
MFB	288	72.2%	185	100.0%	270	45.5%	455	58.5%	1 900 000	100.0%	2 900 000	21.6%	4 800 000	31.3%	4 004 510	495 490	7.7%
DEC	18	4.5%	-	0.0%	323	54.5%	323	41.5%	-	0.0%	10 539 750	78.4%	10 539 750	68.7%	4 636 000	5 903 750	92.3%
BoA	93	23.3%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	0.0%	-	-	0.0%
Total	399	100.0%	185	100.0%	593	100.0%	778	100.0%	1 900 000	100.0%	13 439 750	100.0%	15 339 750	100.0%	8 640 510	6 399 240	100.0%

source: compiled from Benue State updated MFI performance template and BoA report, August 2014

Overall LGA

LGA COVERED	NO. OF GROUPS LINKED	%	OUTREACH														
			ACTIVE BORROWERS (No.)						LOAN DISBURSED (Naira)						Loan Paid	OUSTANDING LOAN BALANCE (Naira)	
			Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%	Male	%	Female	%	TOTAL	%			%
Apa	101	25.3%	5	2.7%	34	5.7%	39	5.0%	100 000	5.3%	680 000	5.1%	780 000	5.1%	480 000	-	0.0%
Logo	239	59.9%	180	97.3%	481	81.1%	661	85.0%	1 800 000	94.7%	8 429 250	62.7%	10 229 250	66.7%	5 849 510	4 379 740	68.4%
G/West	59	14.8%	-	0.0%	78	13.2%	78	10.0%	-	0.0%	4 330 500	32.2%	4 330 500	28.2%	2 311 000	2 019 500	31.6%
TOTAL	399	100.0%	185	100.0%	593	100.0%	778	100.0%	1 900 000	100.0%	13 439 750	100.0%	15 339 750	100.0%	8 640 510	6 399 240	100.0%

source: compiled from Benue State updated MFI performance template and BoA report, August 2014

Table 3

Benue Case Study on financial inclusion

Financial inclusion statistics sets Nigeria above average for sub-Saharan Africa, and close to the average for lower middle income countries, with 34% of women, 35.7% of young adults (15-24 years old), and 39.4% of adults in rural areas having accounts. The Nigerian financial sector has recently emerged from a crisis in 2009, following consolidation of the main actors into 20 banks, though the sector is still limited in providing access to finance to small and medium-sized businesses, thereby limiting development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). This is captured in table 3.1, which details number of bank locations per 10,000 people in each state, and which highlights regional variations, with there being some levels of correlation between decreasing bank establishment density per inhabitant and increasing poverty severity in the Northern Regions:

Table 3.1

Nigeria Bank Locations per 10,000 inhabitants per state in 2014, with RUFIN states in Brown

Region	State	Bank Locations/10,000 people (2014)	Severity of poverty (2003-04)
North Central	**Average**	**2.2**	**14.4**
	FTA	8.5	8.0
	Kogi	1.9	16.7
	Nassarawa	**1.5**	**15.9**
	Niger	1.2	7.7
	Benue	**0.9**	**20.3**
	Plateau	0.7	17.4
	Kwara	0.6	15.0
North East	**Average**	**0.9**	**20.2**
	Taraba	2.3	12.9
	Gombe	0.9	29.4
	Bauchi	**0.8**	**20.1**
	Adamawa	**0.7**	**23.9**
	Yobe	0.3	24.6
	Borno	0.3	10.2
North West	**Average**	**0.7**	**19.4**
	Kaduna	1.3	13.2
	Sokoto	1.0	23.8
	Zamfara	**0.9**	**13.9**
	Kebbi	0.6	13.7
	Kano	0.3	20.4
	Jigawa	0.3	34.3
	Katsina	**0.3**	**16.2**
South East	**Average**	**1.8**	**7.6**
	Enugu	2.2	12.6
	Ebonyi	1.9	27.2
	Anambra	**1.9**	**15.0**
	Abia	1.6	6.8
	Imo	1.4	6.3
South South	**Average**	**1.1**	**11.5**
	Delta	1.9	10.6
	Rivers	1.3	13.8
	Edo	1.2	12.7
	Cross River	0.9	10.6
	Bayelsa	0.9	8.2
	Akwa Ibom	**0.5**	**6.6**
South West	**Average**	**1.0**	**12.2**
	Lagos	**2.5**	**9.1**
	Osun	0.8	11.9
	Ondo	0.7	11.6
	Ogun	0.6	8.3
	Oyo	**0.6**	**6.4**
	Ekiti	0.5	4.3
National Average		**1.1**	**14.6**

Calculated from Mixmarkets (2014 data); NBS Population (2006) and poverty Severity data (2003-4) from NBS Annual Abstract 2012

Table 3 continued

Benue is statistically just below the national average in terms of bank establishment density per inhabitant, and the state that suffers the most severe poverty in the Middle Belt, though at the national level it places 8th on the most severe poverty scale. It was selected as one of the RUFIN states, despite it's close to average level of bank/population density. Benue sits just below the national average of 431 MFI locations, with 403 locations itself. With an estimated population of 4.25 million people in 2006, there are 0.95 locations per 10,000 people in Benue, just above the national average of 0.92. RUFIN's presence in Benue State is represented through support given to 11 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs): 5 Micro-Finance Banks (MFBs), 3 Development Exchange Centre (DECs) chapters, and another 3 Bank of Agriculture (BOA) chapters. All three are present in the three LGAs (Apa, Gwer-West, and Logo) that RUFIN operates in within Benue State. In terms of performance and outreach, Logo LGA achieved the highest rates of outreach in group linkage, savings and loans out of all the LGAs.

By August 2014, RUFIN linked 399 groups to these institutions, with the MFBs having linked 72.2%, the BOAs 23.3% and DEC 4.5% (see annex VI – table 2.5). There were 4,253 voluntary savers, of which 66.1% were women, saving for the most part (71.8%) in MFBs. Total savings mobilized were 13.5 million Naira, with women (78.5%) once again saving the most, and depositing 58.9% of their savings in MBFs (58.9%), followed by DECs (28.6%). There were 778 people who took out loans, worth 15.3 million Naira in total. Once again women (76.2%) were the largest recipients of loans, and MFBs lent out to slightly more women (59.3%), and DEC did not lend out any loans to men whatsoever. Furthermore, DEC lent out 10.5 million Naira (68.7% of all Benue loans emitted) to women. Despite the outreach, DEC also has the lion's share of outstanding loans (92.3%). In this respect, the MFB's proportion of outstanding loans is 10.3%, compared to DEC's 56%. Outstanding loan patterns also follow the proportion of outreach at the LGA level, with MFIs in Logo having 68.4% (or 4.4 million Naira) of outstanding loans. Testimonials from Logo LGA show that beneficiaries use credit for goat-rearing, borehole drilling, and commerce in fabrics.

Out of the MFIs involved in Benue, DEC is the only one that explicitly provides service to women through financial support, microcredit, savings mobilization, and other loans products namely: on lending loans, loans insurance, micro enterprise support and equipment loans. As of 2013 it had 90 offices and 924.6 million Naira in deposits and in 2014 it had provided 13,8 million Naira in loans and had 120,413 borrowers. It also provides pre-disbursement training before disbursement, apart from other trainings in record keeping, loan utilization and business development. Overall, DEC has been the most successful institution in reaching out to women and in providing loans, though taking on considerable risk, as evidenced by a worrying loan to savings ratio of 349%, compared to the MFB's ratio of 57%. The impact is nonetheless limited when regarding the number of savers (4,253) and borrowers (778) compared to the total population of the state (4.25 million).

Despite attempts at outreach, Gwer-West was an LGA that experienced the agro-pastoralist conflict and displacement of beneficiaries, especially during the dry season. This is evidenced by the low number of groups linked compared to the other LGAs (59, or 14.8% in Benue), as well as having the lowest number of savers and savings. Interestingly, there were no men borrowers, but there were more women borrowers than in Apa LGA, and they took out 4.3 million Naira (or 28.2% of total) in loans. T*here are no testimonials regarding how women used these loans.*

Table 4
Design and actual funding commitments by financier per programme (USD)

Financier	RTEP		CBARDP		CBNRMP		RUFIN		VCDP	CASP
	Design	**Actual**	**Design**	**Actual**	**Design**	**Actual**	**Design**	**Actual**	**Design**	**Design**
IFAD	23 047 937	14 115 670	42 900 001	42 250 000	15 000 000	16 471 450	27 575 300	15 999 133	74 900 000	85 456 027
*All government counterparts**	-	-		39 890 000	-	-	-	-	-	
Federal Government of Nigeria	7 187 069	9 719 022	2 900 000	-	3 800 000	6 636 000	6 176 568	4 159 062	9 900 000	5 774 691
*State governments & local government councils***			28 600 000							
State governments		6 516 727	-	-	8 200 000	2 078 541	-	2 062 043	10 400 000	
Local government councils	5 845 972				32 000 000	4 740 131	-	-	4 300 000	
Beneficiaries	8 455		3 837 500	-	4 400 000	-	985 100	-	2 100 000	1 405 400
Other*			3 200 000	-	15 000 000	9 637 733	5 262 211	1 971 000	2 800 000	922 928
TOTAL	36 089 433	30 351 420	81 437 501	82 140 000	78 400 000	39 563 854	39 999 179	24 191 238	104 400 000	93 559 046

N.B. Yearly government, state, local government council and Niger Delta Development Commission actual payments for CBNRMP and RUFIN were received by the mission from POs in NGN. These **were exchanged to USD using exchange rates from the 1st of January of the given year.**

* The 'All government counterparts' financier category is the sum of federal government of Nigeria, state governments, and local government councils

** The 'State governments & local government councils' financier category is the sum of state governments and local government councils

Tables 5 - **Beneficiary targets and achievements in CPE period**

Table 5.1
Comparison of beneficiary targets at design and achieved in portfolio

Project	Overall		Men		Women		Youth		Male youth		Female youth		Physically challenged		Women and youth	
	Design	Actual	Design	Actual	Design	Actual	Design	Actual	Design	Actual	Design	Actual	Design	Actual	Design	Actual
RTEP	5 200 000	1 004 999	-	772 244	-	180 955	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CBARDP	2 500 000	1 207 909	-	724 749	-	483 160	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CBNRMP	2 800 000	2 782 859	640 000	1 003 412	471 000	692 483	1 689 000	1 087 004	984 000	626 957	705 000	460 047	-	-		-
RUFIN	2 070 000	4 167 001	1 035 000	1 171 586	1 035 000	2 995 414	1 519 000	1 607 274	-	-	-	-	41 400	-	-	-
VCDP	87 400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CASP	1 592 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	997 000	-
TOT	14 249 400	9 162 768	1 675 000	3 671 991	1 506 000	4 352 012	1 689 000	2 694 278	984 000	626 957	705 000	460 047	41 400	-	997 000	-

Source: RTEP Loan Agreement, May 2000, pg. 14; CBARDP President's Report, September 2001, pg. 12; CBNRMP RIMS data 2015; RUFIN Supervision Report June 2014; VCDP Design Report Volume I, 2012, pg. 30; CASP Final Programme Report 2013, pg. xvi; CASP President's Report 2013, pg. 8; RTEP PCR 2010, pg. 2; CBARDP PCR 2014, pg. viii; CBNRMP RIMS data 2015; RUFIN Supervision Report June 2015
N.B. For CBNRMP, the 'Youth' column is the sum of male/female youth. 'Overall' is the sum of adult men and women, and male and female youth

Table 5.2
Achievement against targeted beneficiaries for RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP, and RUFIN

Project	Overall	Male	Female	youth	Male youth	Female youth
RTEP	19.3%					
CBARDP	48.3%					
CBNRMP	99.4%	156.8%	147.0%	64.4%	63.7%	65.3%
RUFIN	201.3%	113.2%	289.4%	105.8%		
TOT	64.3%	219.2%	289.0%	159.5%	63.7%	65.3%

Table 5.3
Proportion of total beneficiaries for RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP, and RUFIN

Project	Male	Female	youth	Male youth	Female youth
RTEP	77%	18%	-	-	-
CBARDP	60%	40%	-	-	-
CBNRMP	36%	25%	39%	23%	17%
RUFIN	28%	72%	39%		
TOT	40%	47%	29%	7%	5%

Tables 6 - **Comparison of change between baseline and impact surveys in CBNRMP across 3 socioeconomic indicators, contrasted with GHS regional results**

Table 6.1
Difference within difference analysis of roof type differentiated by beneficiary and non-beneficiary households per state (percentage of respondents with roof type)

Region	State		Thatch				Aluminium/Ordinary Zinc/Zinc/Long Span				Other (unspecified)			
			Baseline 2007 (A1)	Impact 2013 (B1)	Difference (C1=B1-A1)	Difference within difference (C1 Be - C1 Nbe)	Baseline 2007 (A2)	Impact 2013 (B2)	Difference (C2=B2-A2)	Difference within difference (C2 Be - C2 Nbe)	Baseline 2007 (A3)	Impact 2013 (B3)	Difference (C3=B3-A3)	Difference within difference (C3 Be - C3 Nbe)
South East	Abia	Beneficiary (Be)	12.7	3.2	-10	18	87.3	87	-1	-26.6	0	10.3	10	8
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	34.3	6.5	-28		63	89	26		2.8	4.7	2	
South South	Akwa-Ibom	Beneficiary (Be)	36.5	3.5	-33	11.3	57.6	84.7	27	-9	5.9	9.4	4	-4.8
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	60.8	16.5	-44		26.8	62.9	36		8.2	16.5	8	
South South	Bayelsa	Beneficiary (Be)	14.7	2.9	-12	8.3	76.5	67.6	-9	-20	8.8	29.4	21	10.7
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	25	4.9	-20		66	76.9	11		7.6	17.5	10	
South South	Cross River	Beneficiary (Be)	33.9	0.9	-33	-27.5	59.8	82.1	22	20	4.5	13.4	9	7.3
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	8.6	3.1	-6		88.3	90.6	2		3.1	4.7	2	
South South	Delta	Beneficiary (Be)	0	0	0	0.6	73.5	63.5	-10	-6	16.3	25	9	4.2
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	3.4	2.8	-1		85.2	80.8	-4		7.4	11.9	5	
South South	Edo	Beneficiary (Be)	7.7	1.7	-6	1.3	88.9	94.9	6	-1	0.9	2.5	2	1.6
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	27	19.7	-7		61.5	68.9	7		10.7	10.7	0	
South West	Ondo	Beneficiary (Be)	14.7	2	-13	-11.3	75.5	73.5	-2	-3	4.9	13.7	9	8.1
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	2.8	1.4	-1		89.6	90.3	1		6.2	6.9	1	
South South	Rivers	Beneficiary (Be)	7.7	7.7	0	3.6	72.3	52.3	-20	-11.2	15.4	29.2	14	4.1
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	13.3	9.7	-3.6		63.7	54.9	-8.8		8	17.7	9.7	

Source: CBNRMP 2007 Baseline survey; CBNRMP 2013 Impact survey

Table 6.2

Difference within difference analysis of asset ownership differentiated by beneficiary and non-beneficiary households per state (percentage of respondents owning asset)

Region	State		GSM				Bicycle				Motorcycle			
			Baseline 2007 (A1)	Impact 2013 (B1)	Difference (C1=B1-A1)	Difference within difference (C1 Be - C1 Nbe)	Baseline 2007 (A2)	Impact 2013 (B2)	Difference (C2=B2-A2)	Difference within difference (C2 Be - C2 Nbe)	Baseline 2007 (A3)	Impact 2013 (B3)	Difference (C3=B3-A3)	Difference within difference (C3 Be - C3 Nbe)
South East	Abia	Beneficiary (Be)	31.1	82	51	15	25.1	24	-1	-19.8	16	21.9	6	-1
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		67	36			44	19			22.9	7	
South South	Akwa-Ibom	Beneficiary (Be)	27.2	82.4	55	15.4	45.3	65.9	21	4	26.8	58.8	32	7.3
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		67	40			61.9	17			51.5	25	
South South	Bayelsa	Beneficiary (Be)	35.2	62.9	28	6.7	4.4	2.9	-2	0.1	6	11.4	5	2.4
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		56.2	21			2.8	-2			9	3	
South South	Cross River	Beneficiary (Be)	31	81.2	50	0.0	33.2	25.9	-7	7.1	25.2	34.8	10	-8.2
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		81.2	50			18.8	-14			43	18	
South South	Delta	Beneficiary (Be)	24	82.1	58	8.4	22.2	10.7	-12	-0.5	8.7	23.2	15	8.7
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		73.7	50			11.2	-11			14.5	6	
South South	Edo	Beneficiary (Be)	49.5	87.3	38	4.5	44.2	39.8	-4	9.5	38.9	56.8	18	13.4
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		82.8	33			30.3	-14			43.4	5	
South East	Imo	Beneficiary (Be)	34.5	77	43	2.6	52	57.4	5	2.7	21.7	47.5	26	0.5
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		74.4	40			54.7	3			47	25	
South West	Ondo	Beneficiary (Be)	31.2	72.5	41	2.4	11.1	11.8	1	-16	25.6	39.2	14	-9.4
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		70.1	39			27.8	17			48.6	23	
South South	Rivers	Beneficiary (Be)	47.8	75.4	28	2.1	57.5	35.4	-22	10.4	28	30.8	3	14.4
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)		73.3	25.5			25	-32.5			16.4	-11.6	

Source: CBNRMP 2007 Baseline survey; CBNRMP 2013 Impact survey

Table 6.3
Difference within difference analysis of crop yield differentiated by beneficiary and non-beneficiary households per state (kg)

Region	State		Maize				Rice				Cassava				Yam			
			Baseline 2007 (A1)	Impact 2013 (B1)	Difference (C1=B1-A1)	Difference within difference (C1 Be - C1 Nbe)	Baseline 2007 (A2)	Impact 2013 (B2)	Difference (C2=B2-A2)	Difference within difference (C2 Be - C2 Nbe)	Baseline 2007 (A3)	Impact 2013 (B3)	Difference (C3=B3-A3)	Difference within difference (C3 Be - C3 Nbe)	Baseline 2007 (A4)	Impact 2013 (B4)	Difference (C4=B4-A4)	Difference within difference (C4 Be - C4 Nbe)
South East	Abia	Beneficiary (Be)	352	613	261	26	1 247	2 038	791	458.00	801	2 625	1 824	-251	1 203	1 717	514	229
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	276	511	235		967	1 300	333		700	2 775	2 075		1 083	1 368	285	
South South	Akwa-Ibom	Beneficiary (Be)	205	1 988	1 783	7					13 950	36 769	22 819	32399	280	1 176	897	67
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	130	1 905	1 776						12 024	2 444	-9 580		260	1 090	830	
South South	Bayelsa	Beneficiary (Be)	13	28	15	11					1 703	1 388	-315	-7214	881	2 246	1 365	651
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	22	26	4						1 600	8 500	6 900		636	1 350	714	
South South	Cross River	Beneficiary (Be)	112	186	74	19	111	159	48	24.86	456	2 112	1 656	-664	1 266	1 853	587	422
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	107	162	55		105	128	23		400	2 720	2 320		1 323	1 488	165	
South South	Delta	Beneficiary (Be)	165	298	133	26					1 316	2 099	784	736				
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	161	268	107						884	931	48					
South South	Edo	Beneficiary (Be)	1 333	1 522	189	109					3 677	11 961	8 284	150	4 448	21 444	16 996	4882
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	1 310	1 390	80						2 696	10 831	8 135		2 220	14 335	12 114	
South East	Imo	Beneficiary (Be)	847	1 077	230	-48					6 056	10 157	4 101	2708	2 200	3 310	1 111	-175
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	750	1 028	278						7 805	9 198	1 393		1 503	2 788	1 286	
South West	Ondo	Beneficiary (Be)	1 139	1 427	288	-11		1 104	1 104	203.20	6 427	8 537	2 110	-3162	2 212	5 791	3 580	-454
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	873	1 172	299			901	901		5 465	10 738	5 273		1 519	5 552	4 033	
South South	Rivers	Beneficiary (Be)	1 454	1 651	197	-122					15 974	49 936	33 962	17280	5 686	5 726	40	-1610
		Non-beneficiary (Nbe)	966	1 285	319						9 761	26 443	16 682		4 076	5 726	1 650	

Source: CBNRMP 2007 Baseline survey; CBNRMP 2013 Impact survey

Table 7
Overview of various independent RTEP impact studies (2010-2014)

Location	*Sample*	*Result*	*Source*
Plateau State	1020 farmers in sample frame in 5 LGAs: sample of 102 RTEP and 102 non-RTEP.	RTEP farmers showed high production and productivity in all indicators	*Journal of Agriculture and Veterinary Science*
Oyo State	100 farmers	RTEP has contributed to the level of production of cassava and yam famers as well as their income level through processing and marketing	*Journal of Agriculture, Forestry and the Social Sciences*
Ondo and Ogun States	157 farmers (no control group)	High adoption rates shown	*New York Science Journal 2013;6(2)*
Benue State	204 farmers (no control?)	No link in sample to participation in RTEP so its effects cannot be determined	*Management and Administrative Sciences Review*
Nasarawa State	60 RTEP and 60 non RTEP sampled in 3 ADP zones.	No significant difference found between farmers in productivity terms, but RTEP farmers were more 'technically efficient'	*Nasarawa State University*
Kwara State	60 RTEP and 60 non RTEP sampled in 1 ecological zones.	RTEP farmers have higher adoption rates and productivity	*Journal of Agriculture and Social research*
Lagos and Ogun States	200 farmers	RTEP technologies had significant impact on productivity	*OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development*

Tables 8 - **State-disaggregated poverty indicators for 2003-2004 and 2009-10**

Table 8.1
Severity of poverty by state with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10

State	Region	Projects present	Severity of Poverty		
			2003-04	2009-10	Difference between 2009-10 and 2003-04
Abia	South East	RTEP, CBNRMP	6.4	7.6	1.2
Adamawa	North East	RUFIN	21.6	23.9	2.3
Akwa Ibom	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP, RUFIN	10.6	10.6	0
Anambra	South East	RTEP, RUFIN	4.8	6.8	2
Bauchi	North East	RUFIN	24.1	20.1	-4
Bayelsa	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	7.3	6.6	-0.7
Benue	North Central	RTEP, RUFIN	12.5	20.3	7.8
Borno	North East	CBARDP	10.8	10.2	-0.6
Cross River	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	15.2	13.8	-1.4
Delta	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	15.3	12.7	-2.6
Ebonyi	South East	RTEP	12.8	27.2	14.4
Edo	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP, RUFIN	9	11.5	2.5
Ekiti	South West	RTEP	11.5	11.9	0.4
Enugu	South East	RTEP	7.6	15	7.4
FCT(Abuja)	North Central	RTEP	9.5	8	-1.5
Imo	South East	RTEP, CBNRMP, RUFIN	8.2	6.3	-1.9
Jigawa	North West	CBARDP	35.4	34.3	-1.1
Kaduna	North West	RTEP	7.7	13.2	5.5
Katsina	North West	CBARDP, RUFIN	15.6	16.2	0.6
Kebbi	North West	CBARDP	25	13.7	-11.3
Kogi	North Central	RTEP	45.3	16.7	-28.6
Kwara	North Central	RTEP	37.7	15	-22.7
Lagos	South West	RTEP, RUFIN	22	4.3	-17.7
Nassarawa	North Central	RTEP, RUFIN	11.7	15.9	4.2
Niger	North Central	RTEP	11.2	7.7	-3.5
Ogun	South West	RTEP	9	12.2	3.2
Ondo	South West	RTEP, CBNRMP	12	11.6	-0.4
Osun	South West	RTEP	6.9	6.4	-0.5
Oyo	South West	RTEP, RUFIN	4.4	8.3	3.9
Plateau	North Central	RTEP	16.1	17.4	1.3
Rivers	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	11.4	8.2	-3.2
Sokoto	North West	CBARDP	19.1	23.8	4.7
Taraba	North East	RTEP	11.1	12.9	1.8
Yobe	North East	CBARDP	22.8	24.6	1.8
Zamfara	North West	CBARDP, RUFIN	22	13.9	-8.1
All state average			15.2	14.0	-1.3

Note: per capita measure
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard – NBS Annual Abstract 2012

Figure 8.1
Severity of poverty by state with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10, in descending order by difference between 2003-2004 and 2009-10



Source: Compiled from National Bureau of Statistics, Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard – NBS Annual Abstract 2012

Table 8.2
Severity of Poverty by Region with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10

Region	*Number of projects present*	*Severity of Poverty*		
		2004	2010	Percent change from 2004 to 2010
North Central	9	20.6	14.4	-6.1
South West	9	11.0	9.1	-1.9
North West	8	20.8	19.2	-1.6
South South	14	11.5	10.6	-0.9
North East	5	18.1	18.3	0.3
South East	9	8.0	12.6	4.6

Source: Compiled from National Bureau of Statistics, Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard – NBS Annual Abstract 2012

Figure 8.2
Severity of poverty by Region with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10, in descending order by difference between 2003-2004 and 2009-10



Source: Compiled from Nigeria Poverty Profile 2009/2010, NBS

Table 8.3
Income inequality by state with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10

State	Region	Projects present	Income Inequality		
			2004	2010	percent change from 2004 to 2010
Abia	South East	RTEP, CBNRMP	0.43	0.40	12.6
Adamawa	North East	RUFIN	0.44	0.43	-1.7
Akwa Ibom	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP, RUFIN	0.36	0.44	20.2
Anambra	South East	RTEP, RUFIN	0.35	0.38	7.6
Bauchi	North East	RUFIN	0.47	0.33	-28.9
Bayelsa	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	0.33	0.34	1.1
Benue	North Central	RTEP, RUFIN	0.39	0.41	4.6
Borno	North East	CBARDP	0.36	0.38	6.7
Cross River	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	0.40	0.44	9.8
Delta	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	0.36	0.47	31.1
Ebonyi	South East	RTEP	0.36	0.43	18.1
Edo	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP, RUFIN	0.37	0.42	11.6
Ekiti	South West	RTEP	0.37	0.48	30.7
Enugu	South East	RTEP	0.40	0.43	7.5
FCT(Abuja)	North Central	RTEP	0.41	0.51	26.0
Imo	South East	RTEP, CBNRMP, RUFIN	0.38	0.43	10.6
Jigawa	North West	CBARDP	0.34	0.40	18.1
Kaduna	North West	RTEP	0.37	0.40	9.2
Katsina	North West	CBARDP, RUFIN	0.42	0.37	-10.4
Kebbi	North West	CBARDP	0.30	0.33	7.0
Kogi	North Central	RTEP	0.49	0.41	-15.7
Kwara	North Central	RTEP	0.48	0.36	-25.9
Lagos	South West	RTEP, RUFIN	0.50	0.37	-26.2
Nassarawa	North Central	RTEP, RUFIN	0.35	0.34	-2.7
Niger	North Central	RTEP	0.37	0.37	0.3
Ogun	South West	RTEP	0.40	0.41	2.3
Ondo	South West	RTEP, CBNRMP	0.33	0.39	18.2
Osun	South West	RTEP	0.35	0.39	10.7
Oyo	South West	RTEP, RUFIN	0.33	0.39	19.1
Plateau	North Central	RTEP	0.42	0.40	-5.8
Rivers	South South	RTEP, CBNRMP	0.41	0.46	13.9
Sokoto	North West	CBARDP	0.36	0.36	-0.7
Taraba	North East	RTEP	0.37	0.52	43.0
Yobe	North East	CBARDP	0.33	0.52	59.3
Zamfara	North West	CBARDP, RUFIN	0.35	0.34	-3.1
All state Average			0.38	0.41	7.9

Source: Nigeria Poverty Profile 2009/2010, NBS

Figure 8.3
Income inequality by Region with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10, in descending order by difference between 2003-2004 and 2009-10



Source: Nigeria Poverty Profile 2009/2010, NBS

Table 8.4
Income inequality by Region with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10

Region	Number of projects present	Income Inequality		
		2004	2010	Percent change from 2004 to 2010
North East	5	0.39	0.44	15.68
South South	14	0.37	0.43	14.62
South East	9	0.39	0.41	11.28
South West	9	0.38	0.4	9.13
North West	8	0.36	0.37	3.35
North Central	9	0.42	0.4	-2.74

Source: Compiled from Nigeria Poverty Profile 2009/2010, NBS (see Table X)

Figure 8.4
Income inequality by Region with IFAD presence between 2003-2004 and 2009-10



Source: Compiled from Nigeria Poverty Profile 2009/2010, NBS

Table 9
Comparison of gender and youth empowerment strategies across CPE portfolio

IFAD Policy Timeline	*National Policy Timeline*	*Programme*	*Strategy*	
			Gender equality and women's empowerment	*Youth empowerment*
No policy	National Women's Policy (2000)	RTEP	• Women's groups involved in root and tuber processing • Research on gender-specific roles in processing • No gender mainstreaming	• No strategy • School Youth Project activity
	NEEDS (2003)	CBARDP	• 9 Strategic interventions mainstreamed into project components through CDD approach	
		CBNRMP	• 9 Strategic interventions mainstreamed into project components through CDD approach • CBATs later replaced by CADAs	• Target differentiated youth by socioeconomic status • 1 Strategic intervention mainstreamed into project components through CDD approach
GAP (2003)	National Gender Policy (2006)	RUFIN	• Emphasize participation of rural women and youth in capacity building of new and existing RMFIs	
			• Women targeted through microfinance as a tool to improve their status and lead to higher incomes outside the home • Gender perspective in IFAD operations incorporated at design • Trainings in groups and RMFIs would cover gender roles and needs, and empowerment • HIV/AIDS training and awareness	
		RUMEDP	• Target women-headed households and youths from vulnerable and poor families, stating these as a special target (60% of beneficiaries)	
PGEWE (2012)		VCDP	• target women/youth groups as producer/processor clusters, with women and youth emphasized as small-holders and small-scale processors/traders. • Rural microenterprise business development services to provide vocational training for self-employment opportunities • Matching grant schemes, prioritise women (35%) and youth (25%) • Gender Learning Action Systems (GALS) to reinforce gender mainstreaming and recognising power differentials across value chains	
			• Reinforce women's roles in value chains to facilitate access to assets, strengthen groups, and ease workloads	• Encourage production, processing and marketing enterprises
		CASP	• capacity building of enterprises and provision of starter packs • GALS to be piloted in only one northern state	
			• Targeting: expand economic and decision-making opportunities and tackle unequal workloads through five mechanisms - informed participation, quotas, gender-sensitive M&E, gender-appropriate communication tools, and recruitment of staff gender specialists.	• Targeting through entrepreneurial activities: economic empowerment through inclusive finance and entrepreneurial opportunities, supported by sensitization and outreach, increased voice in decision-making in community investment decisions, supported by youth-sensitive M&E and policy advocacy.

Source: RTEP Appraisal Report Volume I 1998; RTEP PCR 2010, pg. 2; CBARDP Formulation report Volume I 2001; CBNRMP Formulation report Volume I 2001; CBARDP MTR 2007; CBNRMP President's Report 2002; RUFIN Design Report Volume I 2006; RUFIN Design Report Volume I, Appendix XVIII; RUMEDP Appraisal Report Volume I: Main Report and Appendices 2007; VCDP Design Report Volume I 2012; CASP Final Programme Report (Main report and appendices) 2013, Appendix 2, Tables 4 & 5

Table 11.1
Programme partnership matrix by partner type and programme

Realized partnership type	*Main implementation period*				
	COSOP 1			COSOP 2	
	RTEP	CBARDP	CBNRMP	RUFIN	VCDP
Ministry government	2	10	12	3	2
Government Institution	4	2	4	9	2
National programme	2	0	2	2	0
Federal government	8	12	18	14	4
Regional/State government	46	14	19	12	7
Multilateral donor	2	5	3	3	1
Bilateral donor	0	1	2	3	0
International donors	2	6	5	6	1
Research institutions	8	6	6	0	2
International NGO	0	0	0	3	1
Civil Society	0	2	6	1	0
Civil society	0	2	6	4	1
Private sector	0	3	3	15	1
Sum of all Partnerships	64	43	57	51	16

Source: Design reports, President's Reports, supervision missions, mid-term reviews, project completion reports from RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP, RUFIN, VCDP, CASP, RAISE; self-assessments from ICO

Table 11.2
Programme partnership matrix broken down into implementation, service provision, collaboration, dialogue and co-funding typologies

Partnership type	*Partnership category*															
	Implementation			Service Provision			Collaboration			Dialogue			Co-funding			
	realized	planned	not realized	realized	planned	not realized	realized	planned	not realized	realized	planned	not realized	realized	planned	not realized	
All Partnerships	140	23	4	45	21	9	19	18	9	19	5	0	10	1	1	
Federal government	25	3	4	12	9	3	1	1	0	14	0	0	6	1	0	
Regional/State government	95	14	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	
International donors	8	4	0	5	1	0	4	9	7	4	4	0	1	0	0	
Research institutions	9	2	0	2	3	0	9	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	
Civil society	0	0	0	5	3	1	5	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	
Private sector	3	0	0	19	5	5	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Source: Design reports, President's reports, Supervision Missions, mid-term reviews, project completion reports from RTEP, CBARDP, CBNRMP, RUFIN, VCDP, CASP, RAISE; self-assessments from ICO

Table 11.3
IFAD engagement in partnerships

Project	*Partnering Institutions*	*Purpose of the partnership*	*IFAD engagement (policy dialogue, institutional capacity building, research grant, knowledge management, etc.)*	*Assessment (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)*	*Potential for future engagement & partnership development*
Community Based Natural Resource Management Programme (CBNRMP)	Songhaï Regional Centre	To facilitate training of youth and women on hands-on agriculture and enterprise management	(a) Regional grant through UNIDO initially (b) Knowledge sharing	(a) Effective for the women and youth farmers that have been trained on various business and enterprise areas. An indicator based MoU that guided and provided focus on the operation and implementation of the partnership. (b) Sustainability of smallholder agribusiness	(a) Other IFAD supported projects can also partner with the Songhai Regional Centre for women and youth entrepreneurship training. (b) Increasing interest by youth in agribusiness (c) Establishing of Songhai Centre in other states provides good opportunities to replicate the success of partnership in other states States like Delta has shown interest on using the CBNRMP model to engage idle/unemployed youth in gainful jobs
	USAID funded MARKETS II project	To enhance productivity, processing and marketing of selected commodities, taking a market based approach in the Niger Delta areas.	Knowledge sharing and institution building on implementation and capacity building for IFAD programme target group	Effective, CBNRMP has signed a results-oriented MoU to improve market access for fish producers in the Niger Delta. Economic and financial suitability has been achieved by some enterprises that are making over N1million net profit per annum and linked to financial institutions.	Other IFAD supported projects like VCDP can also partner and scale up the technologies of Markets-II as the orientation and approach are similar and there are complementarities. NDDC is keen in continuing with the principles of CBNRMP agro-business model and this is an opportunity to upscale the proceeds of Songhai partnership

Project	*Partnering Institutions*	*Purpose of the partnership*	*IFAD engagement (policy dialogue, institutional capacity building, research grant, knowledge management, etc.)*	*Assessment (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)*	*Potential for future engagement & partnership development*
	LAPO Microfinance Bank through Rural Finance Institution-Building Programme (RUFIN)	To improve farmer access to credit and enhance the capacity of rural savings and credit groups to access funds for operations	Providing microfinance services to IFAD programme target group	Effective, CBNRMP farmer groups have been able to leverage credit to their members. Through a RUFIN supported Micro Finance Banking (MFB), access to credit was provided to CBNRMP project beneficiaries.	This is a positive example of synergy between IFAD supported projects. This needs to be up-scaled or replicated by encouraging other IFAD projects to use the RUFIN model to engage financial providers in their effort to improve credit access by poor rural farmers.
				Economic and financial sustainability of some enterprise groups that are benefiting from the services of LAPO. Those groups will continue to leverage credit to finance their businesses after CBNRMP.	Emerging agribusiness will have opportunity to leverage financial credit without relying on development partners.
	National Root Crops Research Institute (NCRI) Umudike	To supply improved cassava varieties to CBNRMP farmers	Access to higher quality inputs	CBNRMP farmers were able to record 40tons/ha using new varieties against 15tons/ha, which represents a 160% increase in output level per hectare	The government policy of 25% cassava inclusion in confectionaries is expanding investors interest in the cassava subsector and provides opportunity for more engagement with the research institutes
		Increase productivity at farm level	Linkage facilitation	Efficiency: Development of farmer groups as out-growers to reduce distance between farmers and source of planting material	The VCDP is another opportunity for the partnership with the research institutes by benefiting states
				Sustainability after programme life as famer and farme groups will continue to access high yielding planting material even after programme life	

Project	*Partnering Institutions*	*Purpose of the partnership*	*IFAD engagement (policy dialogue, institutional capacity building, research grant, knowledge management, etc.)*	*Assessment (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)*	*Potential for future engagement & partnership development*
	Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria (CRIN), Forest Research Institute of Nigeria (FRIN) and the National Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFRO)	To facilitate farmer access to reliable planting material Productivity increase	Access to higher quality inputs	Effective but not formalized as MoUs were not signed, hence in some cases, operationally inconvenient	Depending on the Value Chain that is being promoted, a linkage between the Project and the appropriate Research Institution needs to be strengthened
Rural Finance Institution-Building Programme (RUFIN)	Central Bank of Nigeria	To create a conducive policy and institutional framework for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to thrive in rural areas so that financial services are made available to the rural populace.	Policy dialogue Knowledge sharing Capacity building and promotion of rural microfinance initiatives	Effective for support to the National Microfinance Policy and Guidelines. RUFIN is also supporting NIRSAL, an insurance and refinancing initiative of the CBN Institutional sustainability among key players in the microfinance sector is being achieved	There is potential for improvement of the partnership to ensure sustainability and continued validity of ongoing policies and institional framework for MFIs.
	Bank of Agriculture (BoA)	To strengthen the BoA's management and practices to enable them to provide sustainable access to financial services in the rural areas through the Bank of Agriculture Rural Business Initiative (BoARBI)	Policy dialogue Knowledge sharing Capacity building and promotion of rural microfinance initiatives	Not yet effective, management support has been strong, there has been little results on the ground of rolling out the BOARBI	If the 3 incubation units of BOARBI are a proven model of rural financial service delivery, it will create a fundamental shift in the way BoA works in rural areas and the clientele that it is able to reach.
	USAID funded MARKETS II project and UNDP	To train groups capacity in rural finance and access to services	Knowledge sharing on implementation and capacity building for IFAD programme target group	Effective, RUFIN has benefited from the technical assistance of USAID funded MARKETS II, and UNDP Institutional sustainability of the savings and credit groups	There is a need for a stronger coalition in the microfinance space by the projects and development partners through the anchor of CBN.

Project	*Partnering Institutions*	*Purpose of the partnership*	*IFAD engagement (policy dialogue, institutional capacity building, research grant, knowledge management, etc.)*	*Assessment (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)*	*Potential for future engagement & partnership development*
	Microfinance Banks	Improve credit delivery and financial liquidity in the rural communities	Policy dialogue Knowledge sharing Re-financing Capacity enhancement	Effectiveness in terms of improvement in loan size, number of loans and volume of money accessed as loan by rural people	State government have developed interest in RUFIN activities. RUFIN is working with about 74 MFBs. Nigeria has more than 800 MFBs
Value Chain Development Programme	African Development Bank (AfDB) funded Agricultural Transformation Agenda Support Programme – Phase I (ATASP-1)	To promote Value Chain development and capacity building for producers' organizations, cooperatives, value chain actors in production, post-harvest reduction methods, processing and entrepreneurship.	Complementarities in implementation for greater impact and results. Knowledge sharing	Not yet effective, as the partnership is developing between the Programme Management Units of the ATASP-1 and VCDP.	As the ATASP-1 has a focus and funds for rehabilitation of irrigation water conveyance canals, feeder roads, community markets and storage facilities, etc., VCDP has great potential for complementarities in promoting the priority value chains.
	World Bank-supported FADAMA and Commercial Agriculture Development Programme (CADP) and West Africa Agriculture Productivity Project (WAAPP)	To promote Value Chain development and capacity building for producers' organizations, cooperatives, value chain actors in production, post-harvest reduction methods, processing and entrepreneurship.	Complementarities in implementation for greater impact and results.	Effective, partnership has started around inputs (high quality varieties), guidelines for implementation (MoU for contract farmers, business plan development, etc.)	Partnership with FADAMA, WAAPP and CADP has great potential for complementarities in promoting the priority value chains.
	JICA supported RIMAPP	To upscale proven technologies on post-harvest and processing techniques through VCDP	Knowledge sharing and scaling up proven lessons.	Not yet effective, the partnership is focused in Niger State and discussions under way.	Potential for strong partnership given that the farmers groups are being capacitated on the methods for scaling up.
	Organized Private Investors (Nigeria Starch Mills Anambra State, Onynx Rice Mills Niger State, etc	Provision of reliable market outlets for small cassava and rice producers	Institutions Development Knowledge sharing	The partnership is still in its first year but effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of farmers operation are expected	Increasing private sector interest in rice and cassava in Nigeria; government policy support for the two commodities

Project	*Partnering Institutions*	*Purpose of the partnership*	*IFAD engagement (policy dialogue, institutional capacity building, research grant, knowledge management, etc.)*	*Assessment (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)*	*Potential for future engagement & partnership development*
	GIZ supported Competitive African Rice Initiative (CARI)	To expand economic opportunities through connecting farmers to off-takers and increasing commercialization through private-sector led and market-driven growth and development	Complementarities in implementation for greater impact and results and support for the programme beneficiaries.	Currently the partnership is focused in Niger State. Being the 1st year of implementation for VCDP, there have been some delays in smooth partnership.	Potential for partnership is there. VCDP needs to ensure that it can deliver in a timely manner to the CARI groups.
IFAD Country Office (ICO)	FAO, World Bank, USAID, DFID, JICA, GIZ, EU, AfDB, AFD	To promote evidence based policy dialogue around implementation of rural development targeting smallholder farmers, particularly women and youth	Consensus around priority topics in agriculture	Effective, ICO is co-chairing the Agriculture Development Working Group (ADWG) where topics are discussed.	Potential for partnership around policy issues requires that the Government establishes a strong receptive mechanism in the future.
	Federal Government of Nigeria, NDDC and State Government	Poverty reduction through agriculture and rural development in Nigeria	Policy dialogue, institutional capacity building, and knowledge sharing	Relevance, effective and sustainability	Ongoing Programmes, 2016 RB-COSOP and New Programmes in 2017

Source: ICO, September 2015 for CPE mission

Table 12
COSOP effectiveness: a synthesis assessment of achievement

Strategic Objective	Key Expected Results	Synthesis Assessment of Achievement
SO1: Improving access of rural poor to economically, financially, and environmentally sustainable production, storage and processing techniques, markets and support services	Household income increased by 25%	**RTEP** The increment in total revenue ranged from 27.3% for yam/cowpea enterprise to 3l% for yam/cassava/maize enterprise **CBRNMP** 88% of beneficiaries affirmed an improvement in their income status compared to 65% under the non-beneficiary group. Daily net income per capita derived from the net annual income reported by the programme beneficiaries across the various enterprises promoted, averaged US$9.02. This ranges from $7.05 among plantain enterprise beneficiaries to $12.69 among aquaculture enterprise beneficiaries in targeted communities **CBARDP** No credible data available. Up to 50- 60% increase in income has been reported by the benefiting households according to CPIS **RUFIN** 73.8% of the programme beneficiaries recorded income increase.
	Household food security increased by 25%	**RTEP** Food insecurity reduced from 65% to 45%. **CBNRMP** 85% of the households interviewed affirmed that their nutritional status changed compared to 68% that reported for the non-beneficiaries **CBARDP** Impact assessment not credible: (expected agricultural productivity enhancement through the introduction and distribution of seeds of improved crop varieties (rice, sorghum, millet, maize, cowpea and soya beans) and fertilizers **RUFIN** 69.1% of the programme beneficiaries recorded improvement in food security
	Production of priority commodities increased by 25%	**RTEP** The RTEP intervention had positive impact on the production of the major roots and tubers. From the crop production enterprises analysis.
	Productivity of priority commodities increased by 25%	**RTEP** The incremental rate for the beneficiary farmers ranged from 3.3to 25To. **CBRNMP** Direct average productivity impact on the programme beneficiaries' yields stood at an average of about 62% while it varied from about 45.3% for plantain to 103.5% for cassava. Overall, 86.6% of the beneficiaries reported that the enhanced productivity recorded is as a result of the trainings received from CBNRMP **CBARDP** Up to 98,505 farmers adopted improved technologies
	50,000 Jobs created in production and processing enterprises (disaggregated by women and youth)	**CBRNMP** Over 9,500 agro-enterprises representing 63,858 (20,462 Male youth, 14,903 Female youth, 14,244 Men, 14,249 Women. Deliberate policy of targeting at least 40% women membership in group formation and leadership positions and at least 60% male and female youth composition amongst programme beneficiaries. Data on job creation for instance shows that from a total of 63,858 jobs created 29,091 (45.5%) were women beneficiaries while 35,261 (55.2%) were male and female youth beneficiaries. On beneficiary outreach also, a total of 626,957 male youth and 460,047 female youth have benefitted from programme interventions **CBARDP** Some 140,800 jobs are reported to have been created in off-farm enterprises. Processing activities are reported to be the leading off-farm income generating activity, and this improvement was especially effective in reaching and benefitting women **RUFIN** A total of 27,300 jobs created by the programme since inception. These consist of 10,920 jobs in on-farm agricultural activities, 9,555 jobs in off-farm agricultural activities and 6,825 jobs in off-farm non-agricultural activities
	7,000 viable enterprises established in priority commodity value chains	**RTEP** Some 7,790 individuals were gainfully engaged in cassava processing activities, 95% of them women **CBRNMP** Over 9,500 agro-enterprises representing 63,858 (20,462 Male youth, 14,903 Female youth, 14,244 Men, 14,249 Women

Strategic Objective	Key Expected Results	Synthesis Assessment of Achievement
	Volume of commodities marketed by rural enterprises increased by 25%	**CBARDP** 2,547 income generating activities were implemented by the programme out of which 51% are females and 10% vulnerable male. **VCDP** Priority clusters under which Value Chain Action Plans (VCAPs) are being promoted
	Volume of credit leveraged disaggregated for farmers and rural enterprises increased by 25%	**RTEP** Development Fund (90% RTEP, 10% other Stakeholders) **CBARDP** The number of people that were linked to financial institutions increased from 5127 in 2004 to 78,825 in 2012. In addition, the amount of loans given increased from N2 million in 2004 to N74 million in 2012 **RUFIN** Average credit per individual borrower increased from 6,000 in May 2011 to 100,000 in May 2015.
	Sustainable and improved agriculture practices adopted by at least 30% of farmers and fishers	**RTEP** The major contributory factor to the increased yield and total production is the use of improved crop varieties and improved management practices. Higher productivity is expected with adequate provision for requisite production inputs, especially inorganic fertilizers; good weed control and price incentives **CBNRMP** 8,617 rural small and medium individual enterprises and 662 group enterprises operating within the on, off and non-farm sub sectors. A total of 1,827 community groups and associations involved in the management of rural infrastructures, NRM , savings and credit and marketing were also formed and strengthened with 1,189 (65%) of them operational and functional
	Key Milestone Indicators	
	Number of productive and processing infrastructures are established/rehabilitated	**RTEP** A total of 354 cassava processing sheds/centres had been established/upgraded and at different stages of completion/functionality. 166 centres were functional, processing a cumulative total of 2,034,150t of cassava roots and generating about 490,715t of products
	Farmers groups established and functional in priority commodities	**RTEP** Groups have been formed and beneficiaries have learned to work together for common benefits. Dynamism and savings mobilization has been inculcated in about 354 RTEP groups
	Improved seeds and agro-inputs made available to smallholder farmers	**RTEP** In many cases the ADPs and research institutes have not been able to meet their approved targets in AWPB. This is often due to fund limitation as a result of late/non-release of their share of counterpart fund contributions by FGN and state governments There is under-utilization of inputs owing to non-availability and high cost
	Linkages created and established between smallholders, farmers organizations, processors, traders, research institutes and financial services	**RTEP** ADPs and research institutes have not been able to meet their approved targets in AWPB. This is often due to fund limitation as a result of late/non-release of their share of counterpart fund contributions by FGN and state governments **RUFIN** As at the end 2013 a total number of 100 MFIs are in the various communities in the participating LGAs with all the LGAs having between 2-3 MFIs each. 72,316 number of loans have been extended to rural poor target beneficiaries with 95-100% recovery rate thereby establishing high level confidence between the MFIs and the rural poor beneficiaries. This has resulted in many success stories of many beneficiaries lifted out of poverty.
	Improved production, postharvest and processing technologies and management practices are made available and accessible	**RTEP** 12 varieties of cassava with excellent yield qualities (average 36.8t/ha potential/research, as against 16t/ha presently obtainable by farmers, 12.9t/ha projected at appraisal and only 9t/ha baseline yield level prior to RTEP) and acceptable characteristics for both culinary and industrial uses; 13 varieties of yam (29.8t/ha potential/research, 12t/ha average yield presently obtainable by farmers); three (3) sweet potato varieties (7.7t/ha average yield); and (d) three (3) Irish potato varieties (5.7t/ha average yield. Collaborating research institutions: National Root Crop Research Institute (NRCRI) and Institute for Tropical

Strategic Objective	Key Expected Results	Synthesis Assessment of Achievement
		Agriculture (IITA) relating to germplasm collection, breeding and selection; zonal research institutes for farming systems coverage, adaptive field testing, as well as multiplication and distribution of planting materials; and Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute (NSPRI) for storage and post-harvest handling.
	Improved environmental management practices are available to enhance climate resilience	**CBRNMP** Use of organic manure, cover crops, crop rotation, contour farming, mixed-farming, minimum tillage, plantation crops, agro-forestry were promoted to protect degrading land resources. The programme also contributed to the reforestation of forests corresponding to about 567 ha of land
SO2: Strengthening community involvement in local planning and development, and promoting support for rural infrastructure	At least 30% of rural communities in participating local government participate in planning, development and maintenance of village rural infrastructure	**CBRNMP** The target of establishing 154 operational commodity apex development associations (CADA) has been met with up to 1000 champion enterprises identified out of the over 9,500 established and being used as expansion and replication models **CBARDP** Commodity groups, and financial service association (FSA), which represent pathways for rural development. 207 CDAs, 108 FSAs and 7302 commodity groups have been formed and strengthened by the CBARDP. There has been scaling up of the CDD approach to other local governments by the states governments.
	At least 50% of participatory plans implemented	**CBRNMP** A total of 1180 community action plans against a target of 1180 representing 100% were established (RIMS)
	Key Milestone Indicator Training is provided to community groups on local development planning	**CBRNMP** 68% of targeted population trained (8917 against 13000) **CBARDP** 3,475 training and awareness raising events are recorded over the 10 years of the programme, as against a target of 2,975. Of this number, 509 classified as community training accounting for 13% of the cost of this component, while the others were for workshops and conferences (25% of the cost), in house training (31%), study tours (7%), as well as media campaigns, reviews and linkages. Training provided under the various sub-components, according to the impact survey, had a significant outreach, reaching between 20% and 56% of the respondents in sample communities. Some 7,000 staff and service providers were trained **RUFIN** 10,005 village savings and credit groups consisting of 400,200 people (22.5% male, 40.2% female, 37.3% male & female youth) have been formed and strengthened by programme since inception **VCDP** Farmer Organisations (FO) are helped to develop business plans

Source: Portfolio performance, RIMS, CPIPs, project units self-assessments

2010-2015 RB COSOP Theory of Change



2008 CPE recommendations and follow up

2008 CPE main recommendations	Specific recommendations/suggestions	Follow up
1. Renew focus on agricultural development for rural poverty reduction **Fully addressed**	i. Adopt value-chain approach ii. Address needs of both subsistence and market-oriented farmers iii. More narrowly defined geographic concentration of IFAD operations iv. Balance engagement at federal and state levels v. Rural poverty and gender inequality examples of criteria for choosing the intensity of support to states and LGAs	i. COSOP renewed focus on agriculture; value chain. CBARDP and CBRNMP projects were refitted to align with COSOP strategic objectives; new projects and grants with focus on value chain. ii. Broader targeting group (up to 5 ha); Rural poverty, Gender and Youth confirmed by COSOP as main criteria for selection of states and LGAs. iii. Geographic focus reduced: before 24 states; focus through new projects: VCDP (6 states); CASP (northern states); iv. Limited progress on improving the engagement at state and local levels due to lack of clear approach, effective modalities and tools for state-level engagement. v. see (ii)
2. Adaptation of institutional framework and partnerships **Partly addressed**	vi. Increased lending to state governments under the Subsidiary Loan Agreements with the Federal Ministry of Finance vii. Select federal partners according to skills, experience and competencies viii. Mutual understanding on pending institutional issues (coordination, division of labour and implementation)	vi. Lending to state government increased but did not solve the issue of shortage of counterpart funding due to lack of ownership of states. New modalities introduced for less stringent state counterpart funding. vii. New partnerships with selected research institutions; federal partners in value chain; consolidated relationship with micro-finance partners in RUFIN (CBN, NAMB, ANBMFI); VCDP: facilitation at federal level; at state level, still depends of ADPs with weak capacities; VCDP uses service providers, including for extension (still with limited capacity enhancement) ; lack of private sector skills in programme management teams. viii. Institutional issues for coordination, division of labour and implementation have been an ongoing challenge in CBNRMP. At Federal level, issues of coordination (on lending and non-lending activities) are yet to be resolved.

3. Promote pro-poor innovative solutions Hardly addressed	ix. More systematic approach to finding and piloting innovations x. Greater attention to policy dialogue, knowledge management and development of strategic partnerships xi. Link grants to loan-funded investment projects xii. More attention to private/public sector partnerships, donor coordination and policy dialogue xiii. Consider partnering with National Food Security Programme	ix. Limited progress. x. Through donor project review meetings at federal level, e.g. CADA as platform for sharing innovations. Limited progress in developing strategic partnerships for increased leverage (co-funding); role of private sector and civil society limited; some progress on knowledge management, but limited progress on effective policy engagement. Cross-fertilisation and learning (across states) mainly within projects. xi. Project component grants used for projects to take off, reach implementation readiness and compensate for low counterpart funding commitment. Not all the grants included in IFAD-supported projects were for innovation and capacity building. Synergies between investment projects and regional or global grants are still insufficient xii. See (x) xiii. Not followed up. NFSP was the umbrella for all programmes (7-8 years ago); then all DPs programmes were moved to National Coordinator of Rural Development within FMARD.
4. Strengthen local governance Partly addressed	xiv. Attention to positioning CDD within broader local governance framework xv. Reinforce grassroots and local government capabilities in development planning, delivery and improvement of service provision xvi. Policy dialogue and knowledge management to support empowerment and progressive devolution xvii. Strengthen farmer association	xiv. CDD platform in CBARDP has been taken up by some states and legally recognised as a fourth tier. CADA in CBNRMP is very new and while accepted in targeted communities has had limited wider effect on local governance at this stage. xv. CASP and VCDP to continue institutional capacity building at grass roots level. xvi. Policy dialogue still insufficient at state level. Knowledge management to support empowerment and progressive devolution is starting to take place through communication and dissemination of success stories (dedicated KM CPO). xvii. At local level through VCDP and CASP
5. Adapt IFAD's operating model Fully addressed	xviii. Strengthen country presence xix. Financing fewer projects with larger loan amounts	xviii. Country presence strengthened. Out posting of CPM increased opportunities for engagement with other development partners at federal level. IFAD is member of the donors ADWG and engaged in policy dialogue with, however, limited influence Government policies due to a lack of FMARD coordination capacity and commitment to meeting the provisions of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. xix. Fewer projects with larger loan amounts financed under 2nd COSOP.

List of key people met

Government

Dr Akinwumi Ayodeji Adesina (HMA), Honorable Minister, Federal Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development

Architect Sunday T. Echono, Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development

Kanya Williams, Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria

B.A.G. Amoo, Research Department - Head of Rural Sector Division, Central Bank of Nigeria

C.N. Anyanw, Research Department - Assistant Director, Central Bank of Nigeria

Mr Godwin Emefiele, Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria

J.A.A. Attah, Head, Strategy Coordination Office, Financial Inclusion Secretariat, Development Finance Department, Central Bank of Nigeria

Aisha M. Liman, Financial Services, Central Bank of Nigeria

Adedeji J. Adesemoye, Assistant Director - Financial Services, Central Bank of Nigeria

Dr Tony Bello, Senior Agribusiness Advisor and members of the Agribusiness Team, Federal Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development

Joseph Attah

A. A. Adeleke, Microfinance Management Office, Development Finance Department, Central Bank of Nigeria
I.S. Usoro, Head DFO, Central Bank of Nigeria
Nemi Okujagu, Technical Advisor to the Statistician-General of the Federation, National Bureau of Statistics

Dr G. C. Amadi, Director, Agricultural and Fisheries Directorate, Niger Delta Development Commission

Mr Damilola Emmanuel Eniaiyeju, Director, Federal Department of Agriculture, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Dr Martin Fregene, Chief Technical Advisor to the Agricultural Transformation, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Mr Michael Kasu, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Engr. A.G. Aubokar, Director, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ms Aniefiok Udo, Director, General Services, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

M Olasaju Akeju, Director, Engineering and Mechanisation, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ayodeji Balogun, Country Manager, AFEX Commodities Exchange Limited

Ms Rabi Adamu, Director, Planning & Policy Coordination, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Mr Muyiwa O. Azeez, Director, Federal Department of Rural Development; Programme Coordinator, Federal Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development; IFAD RUFIN Programme

Ms Ademola Abiri, Director Special Duties, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ms Babangida, Acting Director Federal Ministry of Agriculture HQ, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Dr Jide Olumeko, Director of Strategic Grain Reserve Department, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Victor Ajieroh, PhD, Senior Advisor on Food Security and Nutrition, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ms Asabe Asmau Ahmed, Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ms Rita Rakiya Ibrahim, Director, Reform Coordination, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Alh. Haruna Mohammed, Director, International Economic Relation Department (IERD), Federal Ministry of Finance

Mr Olalekan Quadri, Deputy Director, IERD, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Ms Aisha Omar, Deputy Director, IERD, Federal Ministry of Finance

Dr Aisha Ndayako-Mohammed, Assistant Director, IERD, Federal Ministry of Finance

Mr Walter Ahrey, Consultant, Central Bank of Nigeria/IFAD

Mr Benjamin Egem-Odey, Federal Ministry of Finance

Dr Ngozi-Okonjo-Iweala, Coordinating Minister of the Economy and Honorable Minister, Federal Ministry of Finance

Ms Anastasia Mabi Daniel-Nwaobia, Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance

Emuesiri Ojo, Special Adviser, National Bureau of Statistics

Dr Yemi Kale , Statistician General of the Federation and Chief Executive Officer, National Bureau of Statistics

Toya Wale, Special Assistant, National Bureau of Statistics

Ejuma Akpa, Assistant, National Bureau of Statistics

Bassey O. Akpanyung, Secretary to the Council, National Economic Council

Dr Abubakar O. Sulaiman, Minister, National Planning Commission (NPC)

Lawal Zakariah, Director, Monitoring & Evaluation National Planning Commission (NPC)

Engr. I.O. Adegun, Director, Economic Growth, National Planning Commission (NPC)

Mr Oladimeji Shogbuyi, Assistant Director, National Planning Commission (NPC)

Aso Patrick Vakporaye, Assistant Director - International Cooperation, National Planning Commission (NPC)

Nwodo Isaac Chika, Political Economist, National Planning Commission (NPC)

Ahmed Mohamed Kelso, Deputy Governor, Niger State

National Directorate for Employment (NDE)

Ministry of Health - HIV/AIDS Programme Development Project

International and donor institutions

Enrique Delamonica, Chief of Social Policy & Gender Equality, UNICEF Nigeria Country Office

Denis Jobin, Chief Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, UNICEF Nigeria Country Office

Xavier Preciado, Agriculture & Food Security Officer, USAID

Doreen Magaji, Orphans and Vulnerable Children Program Manager, USAID

Children of Hope Project, USAID

Dr Mairo Mandara, Country Representative Nigeria, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

Indira Konjhodzic, Acting Country Director, World Bank - Nigeria Country Office

Bayo Awosemusi, Acting Country Manager, World Bank - Nigeria Country Office

Olojoba Africa, Task Team Leader for CBNRMP, World Bank

Louise Setshwaelo, Representative, FAO

Chuma Ezedinma, Acting Head, Regional Office in West Africa; Programme Officer, UNIDO

Kate Kanebi, Project/International Coop. Officer, European Union

Yawar Naeem, PSD Advisor, DFID

George Mavrotas, Programme Leader - Nigeria Strategy Support Program, IFPRI

Chude Okafor, Task Team Leader for CBARDP, World Bank

Elh. Adama Touré, Lead Agricultural Economist, World Bank

Daouda Touré, Resident Coordinator, UNDP

Robert Asogwa, Team Leader for Inclusive Growth, UNDP

Rabe Mani, Assistant Representative, Programmes, FAO

Patrick Kormawa, Head, Regional Office in West Africa, UNIDO

Carola Jacobi-Sambou, Country Director, GIZ

Sylvie Hoster, Deputy Head of Program, GIZ

Horst Bauernfeind, Head of VCD Unit, GIZ

Solomon Enebi Agamah, Operations Manager, GIZ

Stefan Kachelriess-Matthess, Programme Director, GIZ-CARI

Eamon Cassidy, Country Director, DFID

Alefia Merchant, Agric Officer, USAID

Sabiu Auwal, Senior Agricultural Economist, USAID

Nduka Okaro, Agriculture and Environment Specialist, USAID

Roland Oroh, Trade Project Officer, USAID

Kayode Faleti, Markets, USAID

Pascal Medieu, 1st Secretary, DFATD

Ian Masias, Country Programme Manager - Development Strategy & Governance, IFPRI

Margaret Adesugba, Senior Research Assistant, IFPRI

Sumi Yoshitaka, Resident Representative, JICA

Masako Yamamoto, JICA

Chie Shimodaira, Assistant Representative, JICA

Hiroshi Kodama, Senior Representative, JICA

Ibrahim A. Amadou, Chief Agricultural Economist, AfDB

Ousmane Dore, Resident Representative, AfDB

Danladi Ebbah, Agricultural Engineer, AfDB

Joseph Kaltungo, Consultant, AfDB

Mairo Mandara, Country Representative, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)

James Nyoro, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)

Jacob Mignouna, Senior Program Officer, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)

Nteranya Sanginga, Director General, International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)

Dr Robert Asiedu, Director West Africa, CGIAR/IITA- Research for Development

Adam Suleiman, President, African Evaluation Association (AfrEA)

Mandisa Mashologo, DCD-P, UNDP

Dr S.B. Audu, Regional Manager - South-South, Bank of Agriculture (BoA)

Babatunde O.A. IGUN, Executive Director, Bank of Agriculture (BoA)

Dr Eke Okoro, National Root Crops Research Institute (NRCRI)

Dr Isaiah Foby, FADAMA III Project - South-South

Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research (NIFOR)

Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN)

Femi Jegede, Managing Director/CEO, Excel Microfinance Bank Ltd

Directorate

Onyeaka Kelechi, Deputy National Coordinator, Youths Initiative for Sustainable

Agriculture (YISA) Nigeria

Nnameka C. Ikegwuonu, Executive Director, National Program Coordinator- CORY-

Smallholders Foundation

Chukwudi Anyanaso, Program Manager, Smallholders Foundation, Owessi, Imo State

Non-governmental organizations and associations

Tunde Ojei, Country Programme Manager, Oxfam GB

Abdulazeez Musa, Research Policy& Advocacy Coordinator, Oxfam Nigeria

Okeke Anya, Senior Program Officer, Regional and International Institution, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)

Kolawole Banwo, Senior Program Officer, Extractive, Environment & Security, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)

Salaudeen Hashim, Program Officer, Security, Human Rights/Migration, Agriculture/Livelihood, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)

Lovelyn Agbor , Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)

Abimbola S. Okoilu-Miro, Secretary/Assistant Program Officer, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)

Ken Ukaoha, President, National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS)

Dr Alexander Ayodeji Coker, Susman & Associates

Professor Joseph Yayock

Valentine Whensu, President, National Association of Microfinance Banks (NAMB)

Abdel-Rahman M, Ag. ES, National Association of Microfinance Banks (NAMB)

Ken Ukoaha, President, National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS)

Umogbai Favour, Association of Non-bank Microfinance Institution of Nigeria (ANMFIN)

Chilota Regina, Head of Administration, Association of Non-bank Microfinance Institution of Nigeria (ANMFIN)

Ochi Godwin, Head of Account, Association of Non-bank Microfinance Institution of Nigeria (ANMFIN)

Godbless Safugha, Executive Secretary, Association of Non-bank Microfinance Institution of Nigeria (ANMFIN)

Dr Maryam Yaro, Assistant Director, Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL)/Central Bank of Nigeria

Abisoye Onikori, P.A. to the Executive Officer, Association of Non-bank Microfinance Institution of Nigeria (ANMFIN)

Emmanuel Iyaji, ANMFIN/RUFIN

Mr Nnaemeka Ikegwuonu, Imo State, Small-Holder Foundation

Mr Jaia, Songhai Integrated Farming Center, Bunu Tai. Port Harcourt. Rivers State, Songhai

Prof. Lawrence Ega, Consultant, Impact study

Alfred Tambe, Development Economist, MOET

Mezuo Nwuneli, MD, Sahel Capital

Senator (Alhadji) U. K. Umar, Chairman, Lanyo Luggage & Travelling Bags LTD

Emmanuel Aneke, Dizengoff W.A.

News Agency of Nigeria (NAN)

IFAD country office

Atsuko Toda, Country Programme Manager, West and Central Africa Division

Benjamin Odoemena, Country Programme Officer, West and Central Africa Division

Thokozile Newman, Associate Programme Officer, West and Central Africa Division

Patricia Wills-Obong, Country Programme Assistant, West and Central Africa Division

IFAD project staff

Mohammed Lawal Idah, Acting Programme Coordinator, IFAD CBARDP Programme

Irene I. Jumbo-Ibeakuzie, Programme Coordinator, IFAD CBNRMP Programme

Nurudeen Mohammed Lawal, Programme M&E Advisor, IFAD VCDP Programme

Ibrahim M. Bello, State Programme Officer , IFAD CBARDP Programme - Kebbi Support Office

Ikponmwosa Ian Gbinigie, Programme M&E Specialist, IFAD CBNRMP Programme

Jerus Uvieghara, Programme Analyst, IFAD CBNRMP Programme

Dr Friday Ameh Onoja, National Programme Coordinator, IFAD VCDP Programme

Esinulo Basil Kennedy, Marketing & Enterprise Development Advisor (MEDA), IFAD VCDP Programme

Sanni Abiodun, Procurement Officer, IFAD VCDP Programme

Unamma Victor Chyka, Agricultural Production Advisor (DPA), IFAD VCDP Programme

Kabir Rabe Charanchi, State Programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Hussaina Yusuf Mashi, State Gender and Vulnerable Group Development Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Mohammed Sa'idu Mohammed, State Capacity Building Management and Training Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Dikko Sirajiddeen, State Sustainable Agricultural Development Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Suleiman Umar, State Programme Accountant, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Ibrahim Idah State Community Infrastructure Engineer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Hussaini Shehu Shema, State Community Driven Development Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Abdulkarim Abdu, Assistant Capacity Building Management and Training Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Hauwa Gambo, Assistant State Gender and Vulnerable Group Development Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Binta Tukur Umar, Assistant SREDFLS Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Kasim Muhammad Sada, Former State Programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Ibrahim Yusuf Saulawa, Former SREDFLS Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Abdurraham A.A, Former State Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Abubakar Abdullahi Saulawa, Former State Community Driven Development Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Mainasara Shehu Bakura, State programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Zamfara Support Office

Umaru Othman, State programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Borno Support Office

Prof. Ahmed L. Ala, Programme Support Office, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Katsina Support Office

Umar Madaki Abubakar, State Programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Jigawa Support Office

Joel Aiki, State Programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Kebbi Support Office

Aminu Aliyu Dogon Daji, State Programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Sokoto Support Office

Mainasara Shehu Bakura, State Programme Officer, IFAD CBARDP Programme - Kebbi Support Office

Mohammed Koro, Program Analyst, IFAD RUFIN Programme

Edwin Uche, Training Specialist, IFAD RUFIN Programme

Taye Agboola, M&E Officer, IFAD RUFIN Programme

Jide Oyebanji, M&E Officer, IFAD RUFIN Programme

Uneku Ufaruna, Programme M&E Specialist, IFAD RUFIN Programme

Farmers' Organizations, Benue State (VCDP)

Aondover Tortis, Rice Professor, Giner East

Killiam Uvertse, Cassava production, Guma

Maria B. Ojobi, Cassava processing, Okpokwu

Juliet Ukura, Rice production, Guma

Uta Ronald N., Rice production, Logo

Albert Aligba, Rice production, Logo

Visit to Government of Benue State

David Olofu, Honourable Commissioner

Samuel Ortom, Executive Governor

Hon. Dorcas Ukpe, Director General, Economic Planning

Barr. Mrs Mwuese Mnyim, Commissioner, Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development

Isaac Shaapera, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture

Tsenongo Hiam Abancha, Special Advisor

Emmanuel Igbaukum, State Programme Coordinator, VCDP

Visit to the deputy governor of Niger State

Alh. Ahmed Muhammed Ketso, Deputy Governor

Muhammadu Danlami Ibrahim, Perm. Sec. Agric.

Dr Mathew Ahmed, SPC IFAD-VCDP

Audu Usman, State Programme Accountant (SPA)

Danladi Zubairu Isah, Deputy chief of staff

Rt. Rev. Jonah G. Kolo, Bida

Barr. Oluwole Oluranti

Tim I. Jiya

Rev. J. N. Adams

Ezra Kolo Abel, IFAD/VCDP extension officer

Adamu Mamman Chado, Liaison Officer Bida Lga

Tabawa Ahmed, Laison Officer Katcha LGA

Peter Hassan Sheshi, Onyx Rice Mill, Bida

Mamudu Suleiman Danlami, Gbakogi Cluster Katcha Local Government

Fatima Abdullahi, Soko Enyaya o Women CMPS, Lokogoma

Ms Aisha Y. Faruk, NATA Women CMPS, Shabawoshi - Kpaya.

Edo State

Ogbeifun Peter, Dmo, Benin
Nse Inyang, Zonal Co-Ordinator, Owerri
Erhunmwonsere Sunday, Smfo, Benin
Adeyoyin O.A., AGM trustfund MFB, Benin
Oviawe I.M, Admin./clo, Benin
Ikponmwonsa Eghosa, Lapo, Benin
Evbaymo Margaret, Lapo, Benin
Osaro Oneshije, Lapo, Benin
Oviawe I.M, admin./Clo, Benin
Osemwengie Moses, Ecf Savings & Credit Loan, Orhionmwon
I. Obayagbona, Permanent Secretary, Benin
M.I Anogie, dir. Agric. Services, Benin
Erhunmwonsere Sunday, SMFO, Benin
Obigho Thompson, Dir.Finance& Account, Benin
Joseph Okaka, Amfo, Uromi
Helen Okoruwa, Data Clerk, Uromi
Born Ebosele, Brec (Chairman), Uromi
Cecilia Ebosele, Brec (Member), Uromi
Peter Iyoha, Brec (Member), Uromi
Helen Okoruwa, Data Clerk, Uromi
Okhudeighe Friday, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Mr Felix Omoifoh, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Nse Inyang, Zonal Co-Ordinator, Owerri
Christopher Okoh, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Raymond Azegbeobor, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Edward Ehizokpowor, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Sunday Izeih, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Anthony Ebhohinmhen, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Ejonomhonehi Saturday, Odozoghughu, Uromi
Dennis Oko, Odozoghughu, Uromi
Isaac Ibhalainekemal, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Felix Okoh, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Ejonobneih Anthonia, Ozoghughu, Uromi
Joseph Okaka, Amfo, Uromi
Ezeigbebe Ivie, Icta, Benin
Ojiomwan Ezekiel, Anmfin Chairman, Benin
Osha E.A, CBN DFO, Benin
Osemwengie Moses, Cf Savings & Loan, President/Ceo

Epe and Ikorodu Local Governments (Lagos State)

Isoko Women Group, Ikorodu, Lagos

Friday Patience, President
Ogunneye Oluwaseun, Secretary
Taiwo Edega, treasurer ,
Samuel Patience, Assistant Treasurer
Joy Obiaku, Member
Eze Chinyere, Member

God Is Able Farmers Group

Omolara Obasi, President
Joseph Ososanya, Secretary General

Lofo Women Group

Kafayatu Yekini, President
Agbeloba Cams
Adenike Charles

CBARDP
Jigawa State
Dr Idris Danzomo, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Dutse
Umar Madaki Abubakar, SPO, SSO Dutse
Isa Mohammed, HPFMU, Federal Ministry of Finance
Ainau Ibrahim, SGVGO, IFAD
Ado Nasiru, SCIE, SSO Dutse
Isyaku Hamza Taura, PO, Taura LG
Muhammed Ahmed G, PO, Guri LG
Muhd B. Birniwa, PO, Biniwa
Isyaku Garba Mohd, PO, Buji LG
Ahmed Zakar Auyo, PO, Auyo LG
Kabiru Haruna Garki, PO, Garki LG
Saidu Ali Garki, Media, JARDA
Lawan B. AhmedPO, Kiyawa
Magaji GaladimaSCDDO, SSO Dutse
Muhammad I Alhaji, I.A, SSO
Aliyu Saleh, STS, Dutse
Muazu Abdulmumini, PO, Gwiwa
Mohd Uba, SADO, SSO Dutse
Shayau Umar, Cashier, SSO

Yakubu Sule, PO, Dutse LG
Yahaya Buba, SREDFLSO, SSO Dutse
Alhaji M. Garba, DPRS, MO Env.
Bashir Isah, SPA, SSO Dutse
Yau Nuhu Katanga, SMEO, SSO Dutse
Mohammed Idris Hdj DD Dutse
Abdullahi Ayuba K., DPO, SSO Dutse
Adamu Bala Isa, SCBMTO, SSO
Gambo Ibrahim Aliyu, MD-JARDA, Dutse
Village areas
Dan Gambo, Dutse, Kwadiya
Maimuna, Dutse, Kwadiya
Amina, Dutse, Kwadiya
Muhammad Maishago, Auyo, Auyokayi
Hudu Magaji, Auyo, Auyakayi
Danladi, Auyo, Shawara-Auyakay
Garba Hassan, Auyo, Kwadiya
Hamza Kofa, Taura, Bardo
Umar Mohamed, Taura, Bardo
Sokoto
Aminu Aliyu D/Daji, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Prof. A. L. Ala, Usman Dan Fodiyo University Sokoto
Sani Abubakar Zaki, Feed The Nation Future
Muhammad Kabir Sani, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Bello Malami, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Yahaya Hassan Gangara, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Abdullajhi Asada, AgroChemical Agency Ltd
Ya'u s. Baki, Elmihien Ltd
Nura Garba k., Ministry For Rural Development
Olaniyi Idowu Femi, Premier Seeds Nigeria Ltd
Muhmmmad Abdullahi Janzomo, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Lydia k. Musa, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Mansur Sa'idu Kilgori, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Abubakar Naiya Muhammad, Ministry For Local Government & Community Development
Ishaq M.K Jabo, Sokoto Agricultural Development Project
Bello Mode Jabo, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto
Prof. Bello Zaki Abubakar, Usman Dan Fodiyo University Sokoto
Shehu M. Sifawa, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Aliyu A. Garba, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Sani Salihu, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Musa Abdullahi Kajiji, Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA)

Bello Shehu Yabo, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Ibrahim Muhammad Babangida, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Jamilu Mani Isa, Rep. Ministry of Agriculture Sokoto

Aminu Alhassan, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Abubakar Sama'ila, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Umar Abu Dagawa, Fadama III Sokoto

Dr Galadima Bagodu, chairman all famers association Nigeria (CAFAN)

Bashir A. Gagi, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Village areas

Halima S. Rima, Goronyo

Garba Marafan Awakala, Goronyo

Abdulsalam, Rimawa

Ummi Sirajo, Rimawa

Bashir Bala Zango, ADP

Iyal Abdulkadir, ADP

Salisu Yusuf Daura, KSACDP

Kasim Sada, former SPO CBARDP

Tukur Auwalu Bindawa, KSACDP

Lawal Idah, CBARDP/IFAD

Ahmed Gaiwa, Department of Fisheries

S. Dara, Ministry of Works

Kabir Rabe, SPO/CBARDP

Yahaya Yunusa, CBARDP

Salisu M 'Ya-Aduwa, CADP

Magaji Abubakar Bakori, Fadama

Iyal Nasir, CBARDP/IFAD

Hauwa Gambo, CBARDP

Amina Yusuf Mashi, Ministry of Women Affairs

Husaina Y Mashi, CBARDP/Gender

Binta Fatima Tukur, CBARDP

Zainab Abdulrahman, CBARDP

Ibrahim Idah, CBARDP/Engineer

Suleiman Umar, CBARDP/Accountant

Abba S Jamu, ADP

Dikko Sirajidden, CBARDP/IFAD

Tunde Abdulhakkem, CBARDP/IFAD

Alhassan Hashimu, ADP

Iyal Nasir, CBARDP/IAF

Ammani Dahiru, Kaita, Abdallawa

Alh HassanKaita, Abdallawa

Rabi, Kaita, Abdallawa

Dahara, Kaita, Abdallawa

Mama Hadiza, Kaita, Abdallawa

Hore Sani, Kaita, Yanhoho

Hussaini Abashi, Kaita, Yanhoho

Zainab, Kaita, Yanhoho

Ramatu, Kaita, Yanhoho

Iya, Kaita, Yanhoho

Maryam Hamisu, Jibiya, Daga

Saadatu Audu, Jibiya, Daga

Baraka, Jibiya, Gaiwa

Yahanasu Hassan, Bindawa, Gaiwa

Duduwa Badamasi, Bindawa, Gaiwa

Atiku Kado, Bindawa, Gaiwa

Muhamed Nasiru, Bindawa, Gaiwa

Masaudu Ismail, Bindawa, Gaiwa

Mal Jamilu, Bindawa, Yanhoho

Lawal Abubakar, Kaita, Yanhoho

Rabe Sani, Kaita, Yahoho

Adamu Bello, Kaita, Yahoho

Sani Abdul, Kaita, Yahoho

Sani Abdu, Kaita

Kebbi

Key Staff (Officers) of the Kebbi State Support Office of IFAD-CBARDP

Joel Aiki, State Programme Officer (SPO)

Abdulrasheed Umar, State Programme Accountant (SPA)

Garba Salihu Danko, State Community Infrastructure Officer (SCIE)

Bala Mohammed Birnin Kebbi, State Rural Enterprise Development and Financial Linkage Services Officer (SREDFLS)

Garba Usman Argungu, State Capacity Building, Management and Training Officer (SCBM&TO)

Emmanuel Bonde, State Sustainable Agricultural Development Officer (SSADO)

Hafsat A.Abuga, State Gender and Vulnerable Groups Officer (SGVGO)

Shehu A. Bello, State Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (SMEO)

Aliyu Dan Hakimi, State Community Driven Development Officer (SCDDO)
Sani Jega, State Internal Auditor
Ibrahim Mamud Jega, Deputy Monitoring and Evaluation
Sabatu Ereh, Deputy Gender
Abia
Ngozi Queen Obioma, SPO CBNRMP Abia State
Uko Ogbo Nnoya, Fish Farmer, Akoli Imenyi Village, Umuahia, Abia
Mrs Nene Eze Ikpe, Umuahia LGA Planning officer
Sam Epo, CADA Chairman and Piggery Owner, Amizi village Abia
Steve Agu, Planning Officer, Abia ADP
Cross River
Chris Ekpor, Capacity Building Officer, SSO CBNRMP Cross River State
Frank Nja, Engineer, SSO CBNRMP Cross River State
Helen Effiom, Rural Enterprise, SSO CBNRMP Cross River State
Odoy Ikongha, M&E Officer, SSO CBNRMP Cross River State
Innocent Ogbin, SPO, SSO CBNRMP Cross River State
Martina Obi, Programme Manager, CRS ADP
Dr F C Adi, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture Cross River State
Francis Monay, CADA Secretary, Alangkel, Ogoja LGA
Dennis Akata, Leader Yam Minisett Group
Lucia Akata, Seamstress
Ochiche David, Young Farmers , Egbeja Village, Yala LGA
Peter Egorp, Director of Agriculture Yala LG Cross River State
Esther Inyang, Chief Regstrar, Ministry of Coopertives
Margaret Nja, Director of Womens Affairs
Felix Okwejie, State coordinator for Youth in Agriculture, Ogoja

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