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الاستثمار في السكان الريفيين

جمهورية الهند

تقييم أثر برنامج النهوض بأحوال القبائل في

جهازخند وشاتيسغارا

مذكرة إلى السادة أعضاء لجنة التقييم

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لجنة التقييم – الدورة الثامنة والثمانون

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للاستعراض

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## عرض عام

### أولاً - الخلفية

- 1- كما قرر المجلس التنفيذي للصندوق، أجرى مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق عملية تقييم لأثر برنامج النهوض بأحوال القبائل في جهارخند وشاتيسغارا المدعوم من الصندوق في الهند في الفترة 2015/2014.
- 2- ويرد الأساس المنطقي واختصاصات عملية تقييم الأثر هذه في وثيقة النهج<sup>1</sup> وتضم وثيقة النهج هذه موجزا لتصميم تقييم الأثر، بما في ذلك منهجيته وعمليته، ومسائل التقييم الرئيسية، وأساليب جمع البيانات، والعملية، والحدود الزمنية، وخطط نشرها، والموارد البشرية المعبأة، وغير ذلك من المعلومات وثيقة الصلة بالموضوع.

### ثانياً - البرنامج

- 3- تم تنفيذ البرنامج في ولايتين متجاورتين هما جهارخند وشاتيسغارا. وفي نيسان/أبريل 1999، وافق المجلس التنفيذي في الصندوق على قرض من أجل برنامج النهوض بأحوال القبائل في بيهار ومادهايا براديش والذي أعيدت تسميته لاحقا ليصبح برنامج النهوض بأحوال القبائل في جهارخند وشاتيسغارا، في أعقاب تكوين ولايتين جديدتين في عام 2000 (جهارخند وشاتيسغارا) اقتطعتا من ولايتي بيهار ومادهايا براديش.
- 4- أصبح القرض نافذا في يونيو/حزيران عام 2001، واستكمل في 1 يناير/كانون الثاني عام 2010 في شاتيسغارا، وفي 30 يونيو/حزيران عام 2012 في جهارخند. وقدرت التكاليف الإجمالية للبرنامج بحوالي 47 مليون دولار أمريكي، بما في ذلك قرض من الصندوق بقيمة 23 مليون دولار أمريكي. وعند نهاية البرنامج، كانت التكاليف الفعلية حوالي 33.3 مليون دولار أمريكي، بما في ذلك قرض من الصندوق قيمته حوالي 20.8 مليون دولار أمريكي. لذا فإن قرض الصندوق كان أصغر من المبلغ الذي أقره المجلس في أول الأمر. وتناقش أسباب هذا التخفيض في التقرير الرئيسي.
- 5- **منطقة البرنامج.** في الهند حوالي 100 مليون نسمة من السكان القبلين. وتشكل الولايتان معا موطنا ل 16.25 في المائة من قبائل الهند المصنفة. ويعيش ثلاثة أرباع هؤلاء السكان القبلين في المناطق الريفية. وحين دخل البرنامج حيز النفاذ في عام 2001، كانت جهارخند تحتوي على ثاني أعلى نسبة من القبائل المصنفة (26.3 في المائة) بعد شاتيسغارا (31.8 في المائة).
- 6- تعتبر جهارخند إحدى أكثر الولايات تصنيعا في الهند، وكلا الولايتين غنية بالمعادن. إلا أن التنمية الصناعية لم تحقق الازدهار لسكان جهارخند وشاتيسغارا خلال السنوات الخمسين الماضية. وما زالت غالبية السكان القبلين تعتمد على النشاط الريفي القائم على الغابات. وهم غير معندين بشكل خاص على المجتمع العام، بما في ذلك تنميته الاقتصادية، وسياسته، وممارساته الثقافية. ومع تأميم الغابات والنزوحات المصاحبة عبر السنين، أصبحت القبائل المصنفة أكثر اعتمادا على الزراعة، وإلى حد صغير، على الوظائف التي لا تتطلب مهارات في المناطق الحضرية.
- 7- تعيش نسبة خمسة وثمانين من السكان الريفيين تحت خط الفقر (1.25 دولار أمريكي في اليوم)، وتصنف كلا الولايتين في الفئة "المقلقة" وفقا للمؤشر العالمي للجوع<sup>2</sup> نظرا إلى المستويات المرتفعة نسبيا لسوء التغذية ونقص

<sup>1</sup> انظر: [www.ifad.org/evaluation/public\\_html/eksyst/doc/approach/jctdp.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/approach/jctdp.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> تصنف الدرجة بين 29.9-20.0 ضمن الفئة "المقلقة" بحسب المؤشر العالمي للجوع للمعهد الدولي لبحوث السياسات الغذائية.

- التغذية. ويعاني ما يقرب من 50 في المائة من الأطفال دون سن الخامسة من العمر في شاتيسغارا ، و 57.1 في المائة في جهارخند من نقص الوزن، ويعد السكان القبليون في المناطق الريفية بين الأكثر تضررا.<sup>3</sup>
- 8- من بين الأسباب الرئيسية لنمو التطرف اليساري في العديد من الولايات في الهند، بما في ذلك جهارخند وشاتيسغارا، التنمية البطيئة، ومحدودية الحكم الذاتي، والكفاح من أجل إعادة توزيع الأراضي والموارد الطبيعية. وما يسمى بحركة التمرد الماوي-الناكسالي موجودة بوجه خاص في الغابات الكثيفة والمناطق القبلية النائية والأقل نموا في أرياف جنوب وشرق الهند. وتاريخيا كان الناكساليون نشطين جدا في شاتيسغارا وجهارخند. ومع إصدار قانون أحكام مجالس البناشايات (توسيع المناطق المصنفة) لعام 1996، استهدفت حكومة الهند تغيير المشهد الاجتماعي والسياسي في المناطق المصنفة، والقضاء في النهاية على الدعم الشعبي للحركة الماوية-الناكسالية.
- 9- **أهداف البرنامج.** للبرنامج ثلاثة أهداف رئيسية هي: (1) تمكين وبناء قدرات الجمعيات الشعبية القبلية ومجموعات المستخدمين؛ (2) تعزيز نظم سبل العيش من خلال الأنشطة التي تولد زيادات مستدامة في إنتاج وإنتاجية موارد الأراضي والمياه؛ (3) توليد مصادر بديلة للدخل من خارج الزراعة، ولا سيما بالنسبة للأشخاص المعتمدين من ملكية الأراضي.
- 10- يتألف البرنامج من المكونات التالية: (1) **تمكين المستفيدين وبناء قدراتهم:** وخاصة الجمعيات الشعبية القبلية ومجموعات المستخدمين، وتمويل زيادة الوعي بالحقوق القبلية وقضايا المساواة بين الجنسين، والتدريب التقني القائم على المزارعين، وتعزيز المهارات الإدارية والقانونية للمجموعة المستهدفة؛ (2) **تعزيز نظم سبل العيش:** مع التركيز بشكل خاص على البنية الأساسية، وإدارة الأراضي والمياه الريفية، وإدارة الغابات المجتمعية، وتحسين الإنتاج الحيواني، والتمويل الصغري الريفي، والخدمات الصحية والتغذوية، ووضع برنامج للبحوث المحاصيلية؛ (3) **إدارة البرنامج:** تستهدف بشكل رئيسي تعبئة المجتمعات المستفيدة وبناء روابط عمل مع الجهات المانحة، والمنظمات غير الحكومية، والموظفين الحكوميين. ويرد الإطار المنطقي للبرنامج في الملحق الرابع للتقرير الرئيسي.
- 11- **المجموعة المستهدفة.** تتألف المجموعة المستهدفة من جميع الأسر في القرى والنجوع والمستوطنات التي تشكل فيها المجتمعات القبلية، والمجموعات القبلية شديدة الضعف، والطوائف المصنفة، ما لا يقل عن 50 في المائة من مجموع السكان، والتي تعيش غالبية الأسر فيها تحت خط الفقر. وكان لا بد من إيلاء اهتمام خاص بالمجموعات الضعيفة، مثل النساء القليات، والمعدمين وشبه المعتمدين من ملكية الأراضي، وأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة، ومزارعي التلال، والطوائف المصنفة، والمجموعات القبلية شديدة الضعف.
- 12- **الترتيبات المؤسسية.** أنشئت جمعيات التنمية القبلية المستقلة على مستوى الولاية في شاتيسغارا وجهارخند للتأكد من أن البرنامج سيكون له نظام تنفيذ فعال وكفؤ. وعملت جمعية التنمية القبلية المستقلة على مستوى ولاية جهارخند ضمن الإطار العام لإدارة الرعاية الاجتماعية في الولاية، في حين عملت جمعية التنمية القبلية المستقلة في شاتيسغارا ضمن الإطار العام لإدارة التنمية القبلية.
- 13- تم إنشاء وحدة لإدارة البرنامج داخل كل جمعية تنمية قبلية مستقلة على مستوى الولاية، يرأسها مدير للبرنامج على مستوى الولاية مسؤول عن الإدارة اليومية العامة للبرنامج. وتم إنشاء ما مجموعه أربع وحدات لتنفيذ المشاريع على مستوى الأقسام، يرأس كل منها مدير مشاريع على مستوى الأقسام.

<sup>3</sup> المعهد الدولي لبحوث السياسات الغذائية (2009).

- 14- ساعدت ثلاثة وثمانين من المنظمات غير الحكومية الميسرة وحدات تنفيذ المشاريع على مستوى الأقسام في التنفيذ الشامل للبرنامج على مستوى القرية، من خلال تعبئة المنظمات القروية الشعبية وصلل القدرات القيادية المحلية، جنبا إلى جنب مع تعزيز التخطيط والإدارة اللامركزيين. وتم تنظيم المجتمعات المحلية في مجموعات للمساعدة الذاتية، ومجموعات للمصالح المشتركة من أجل أنشطة الثروة الحيوانية وتربية الأحياء المائية، ومدارس المزارعين الحقلية، واللجان المختلفة المسؤولة عن تخطيط وتنفيذ أنشطة البرنامج المحددة.
- 15- يسر البرنامج إنشاء عمليات ديمقراطية لصنع القرار من خلال دعم المجالس القروية (غرام سابها)، وهي هيئات صنع القرار الأكثر أهمية على مستوى القرية. وكان لكل من هذه الهيئات لجنة تنفيذية للمشاريع، مسؤولة عن دمج الخطط الصغرى التي يتم إعدادها من قبل المنظمات القروية الشعبية في خطة المجلس القروي لإدارة الموارد الطبيعية وسبل العيش.

### ثالثا- أهداف ومنهجية وعملية التقييم

- 16- **الأهداف.** الأهداف الرئيسية لهذا التقييم هي: (1) تقدير أثر البرنامج بطريقة كمية، مع إيلاء الاهتمام الواجب أيضا للجوانب النوعية؛ (2) توليد النتائج والتوصيات التي يمكن استخدامها في تصميم وتنفيذ تدخلات مماثلة في الهند وأماكن أخرى في المستقبل.
- 17- **المنهجية.** يشمل تقييم الأثر هذا جميع معايير التقييم المعتمدة من قبل مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق:<sup>4</sup> الأهمية، والفعالية، والكفاءة، والأثر، والاستدامة، والمساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة، والابتكار، وتوسيع النطاق، وأداء الشركاء (الصندوق والحكومة). وهذا يعني أنه في حين أن تركيز التقييم هو بشكل حاسم على معيار الأثر، إلا أنه تم تقدير أداء البرنامج أيضا مقابل جميع المعايير الأخرى. وهذا يسمح لتقييم الأثر بأن يوفر تقديرا أكثر استراتيجية وشمولا لأداء البرنامج.
- 18- في بداية عملية التقييم، ولتحديد المنهجية الأكثر ملائمة لاعتمادها، أجرى المكتب تقديرا دقيقا لقابلية تقييم البرنامج. وقد سمح هذا بفهم أفضل لتوافر وجودة البيانات الموجودة (مثل بيانات خط الأساس، والبيانات من نظام إدارة النتائج والأثر من أجل تقييم الأثر) من أجل تقييم الأثر.
- 19- استنادا إلى نتائج تقدير القابلية للتقييم، قرر المكتب اتباع نهج مختلط الأساليب في تقييم الأثر هذا، وذلك باستخدام تقنيات شبه تجريبية تنطوي على مزيج من التحليل الكمي والنوعي. وقام التقييم باستخدام واسع النطاق لكل من البيانات والمعلومات الأولية والثانوية.
- 20- نتيجة للجودة المتواضعة لبيانات خط الأساس وعدم اكتمالها، اعتمد تقييم الأثر في المقام الأول على تحليل "مع وبدون" لتقدير أثر البرنامج. ولم يكن بإمكانه استخدام نهج "قبل وبعد" لاستكمال تحليل "مع وبدون"، جزئيا لأنه سيكون من الصعب للغاية إعادة بناء البيانات الأساسية (على سبيل المثال، من خلال تقنيات الاستدعاء) لبرنامج تم تصميمه قبل ما يقرب من 20 سنة.
- 21- استخدم التقييم المواعمة القائمة على التقدير كأسلوب شبه تجريبي لمواعمة مجموعة فرعية من الأسر مع وبدون تدخل البرنامج وفقا لمجموعة من الخصائص<sup>5</sup> من غير المحتمل أن تكون قد تأثرت بالبرنامج.<sup>6</sup> فإذا كان الفرق

<sup>4</sup> سيتم تصنيف جميع المعايير على مقياس متدرج من 1 إلى 6، حيث: (1) غير مرض للغاية؛ (2) غير مرض؛ (3) غير مرض إلى حد ما؛ (4) مرض إلى حد ما؛ (5) مرض؛ (6) مرض للغاية).

<sup>5</sup> لغرض هذا التقييم، تم اختيار المتغيرات التالية: الطائفة التي تنتمي إليها الأسرة؛ موضعها من خط الفقر؛ نسبة القدرة على القراءة والكتابة؛ الانخراط في الأنشطة الزراعية؛ والمشاركة في اجتماعات المجلس القروي غرام سابها.

<sup>6</sup> أسلوب المواعمة القائمة على التقدير يحد إلى أدنى حد المتغيرات التي قد تؤثر بشكل سلبي (إما بدرجة أكبر أو أقل) على نسب الأثر إلى البرنامج.

بين المجموعات الخاضعة للتدخل ومجموعات المقارنة المقابلة بشأن متغير ما معتبرا، يمكن أن يعزى هذا الفرق إلى البرنامج.

22- لذا كان أحد المكونات الرئيسية لتقييم الأثر هذا تصميم مسح أثر لجمع البيانات الأولية من المجموعات الخاضعة للتدخل ومجموعات المقارنة،<sup>7</sup> والذي يغطي 8 804 عينات أسرية في الولايتين. واستخدم التقييم عددا من تقنيات جمع البيانات لجمع البيانات النوعية، مثل مناقشات الأفرقة المتخصصة، والمقابلات مع مصادر المعلومات الرئيسية، والملاحظات الميدانية. ويمكن معاينة المزيد من المعلومات عن طرق جمع البيانات والنهج المستخدمة لتحديد حجم العينة واستراتيجية أخذ العينات في القسم الثاني من التقرير الرئيسي (انظر الجداول 1-3).

23- وقد قيم التقييم ليس فقط ما "إذا"، ولكن أيضا "كيف" و"ماذا"، كان للبرنامج، أو لم يكن له، أثر على الأسر والمجتمعات المحلية المختارة في منطقة البرنامج. وتحقيقا لهذه الغاية، قام التقييم لاحقا بإعادة بناء نظرية البرنامج للتغيير جنبا إلى جنب مع أصحاب المصلحة ذوي الصلة، والتي ترد في الملحق الأول من التقرير الرئيسي. وتوضح نظرية التغيير الروابط والافتراضات العارضة لتحقيق الأثر والأهداف العامة للبرنامج.

24- وبعد ذلك، وضع المكتب مصفوفة مؤشرات لوصف آثار البرنامج على طول سلسلة النتائج. وقد وجهت هذه المصفوفة إعداد إطار تقييم مفصل يتضمن المسائل الرئيسية لعملية التقييم، فضلا عن أدوات البحث الكمية والنوعية لجمع البيانات الأولية. وترد مصفوفة المؤشرات في الملحق الثاني، وإطار التقييم في الملحق الثالث من التقرير الرئيسي.

25- العملية. بدأت عملية التقييم باستعراض مكتبي شامل للبيانات والوثائق المتاحة. وبعد ذلك، أوفد المكتب بعثة تحضيرية إلى الهند في يونيو/حزيران 2014، لإطلاق عملية تقييم الأثر. وفي أعقاب البعثة التحضيرية، تم اتباع إجراءات استدراج العطاءات في الصندوق لتحديد واختيار شركة وطنية لجمع البيانات وتحليلها.

26- وتم إيفاد بعثة ثانية من قبل المكتب في ديسمبر/كانون الأول عام 2014، لاختبار واستكمال أدوات جمع البيانات في أقسام وتجمعات مختارة من منطقة البرنامج. وجرت عملية جمع البيانات الأولية وتحليلها بين ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2014 وفبراير/شباط 2015.

27- بعد ذلك، وبين شهري مارس/آذار وأبريل/نيسان، وضع المكتب التقرير النهائي لتقييم الأثر، الذي تم استعراضه أولا من قبل الأقران داخل المكتب. وقد تمت مشاطرة مسودة التقرير مع إدارة الصندوق والحكومة للتعليق عليه في مايو/أيار. كما أجرى مكتب التقييم في منظمة الأغذية والزراعة للأمم المتحدة أيضا استعراض أقران لمسودة التقرير النهائي.

28- نظم مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق حلقة عمل للتعلم في نيودلهي في 11 يونيو/حزيران 2015، وذلك بهدف تقاسم النتائج والدروس المستفادة من التقييم مع أصحاب المصلحة الرئيسيين. وإضافة إلى ذلك، عقد المكتب حلقة عمل للتعلم في الصندوق في 24 يونيو/حزيران 2015 مع إدارة الصندوق وموظفيه. ونوقش تقرير تقييم الأثر، مع استجابة الإدارة الخطية عليه، ضمن لجنة التقييم في نهاية يونيو/حزيران 2015.

29- أخيرا، وبالنسبة لوسائل الاتصال والنشر، فقد تم نشر التقرير وإتاحته في القسم المخصص للتقييم على موقع الصندوق على شبكة الإنترنت. وتبذل جهود خاصة لضمان إيصال أوسع للدروس والتوصيات الرئيسية للتقييم إلى المستفيدين من البرنامج من خلال وسائل الاتصال المتاحة والفعالة (مثل الإذاعة والتلفزيون، الخ).

<sup>7</sup> تشمل المجموعة الخاضعة للتدخل المستفيدين من البرنامج، بينما تشكل مجموعة المقارنة أولئك الذين لم يستفيدوا من خدمات ومدخلات البرنامج.

- 30- **القيود.** في حين أن مسوحات خط الأساس كانت متاحة في كل من جهارخند وشاتيسغارا، إلا إنها لم تجر في بداية البرنامج، وفي حالة جهارخند لم تتضمن مجموعة للمقارنة.<sup>8</sup> وقد تم التغلب على هذا التحديد باستخدام نهج مختلط الأساليب وتقنيات التثليث، والتي تستلزم جمع وتحليل معلومات وبيانات من أكثر من ثلاثة مصادر، وذلك باستخدام أدوات مختلفة، قبل إصدار الأحكام التقييمية النهائية.
- 31- فيما يتعلق بمنهجية جمع البيانات وتحليلها، في حين أن المواعمة القائمة على التقدير استخدمت على نطاق واسع، فإن لهذا الأسلوب أيضا بعض القيود، من أكثرها وضوحا أن المزاوجة بين الأسر "مع وبدون" البرنامج يمكن أن تتم فقط استنادا إلى خصائص "يمكن ملاحظتها". فإذا اختلفت الأسر مع وبدون البرنامج فيما يتعلق بخصائص أخرى لا يغطيها المسح أو النموذج الإحصائي، عندئذ يمكن للنتائج أن تكون متحيزة إلى حد ما.
- 32- في حين يمكن للمواعمة القائمة على التقدير التحقق من وجود آثار للتلوث والتجاوز، إلا أنه لا يمكنها القضاء نهائيا على هذا التحيز، وخاصة في برنامج يتداخل مع العديد من تدخلات التنمية الحكومية "الشاملة". وللتغلب على هذا التقييد إلى أقصى حد ممكن، ومن أجل التحقق من النتائج وضمان اتساقها، استخدمت أساليب مواعمة أخرى، مثل "مواعمة كرنيل" لحساب متوسط تأثير التدخل، وأسلوب "أقرب جار". وقد حققت كلتا الخوارزميات نتائج مماثلة.
- 33- وحقيقة أنه تم تنفيذ البرنامج كعمليتين منفصلتين في ولايتين مختلفتين شكلت أيضا بعض التحديات بالنسبة لعملية التقييم. إذ كان على المكتب دراسة مجموعتين من وثائق وبيانات المشروع، ومقابلة المسؤولين الحكوميين، والقيام بالعمل الميداني في ولايتين، كل ذلك بميزانية مخصصة لعملية واحدة لتقييم الأثر. وقد تم التغلب على هذا التقييد عن طريق صقل بعض عناصر عملية التقييم، عندما وحيثما كان ذلك ممكنا. فعلى سبيل المثال، طلب المكتب من مدرء البرنامج في كلا الولايتين الحضور إلى نيودلهي لاجتماع مشترك في بداية عملية التقييم، بدلا من السفر إلى ولايتين مختلفتين، الأمر الذي قد يترتب عليه المزيد من الوقت والموارد.

#### رابعا - النتائج الرئيسية للتقييم

- 34- **أداء البرنامج.** تتماشى أهداف البرنامج بشكل وثيق مع سياسات واستراتيجيات الحكومة والصندوق ذات الصلة، مثل خطط التنمية الوطنية الخمسية للهند والاستراتيجيات القطرية للصندوق، وكذلك مع احتياجات السكان الفقراء. ومع ذلك، كان تصميم البرنامج يعاني من بعض نقاط الضعف الكامنة. على سبيل المثال، فإن تغطية ولايتين منفصلتين في إطار قرض واحد دل على أن البرنامج كان في الواقع بمثابة مشروعين، الأمر الذي أدى إلى تقييد تنفيذه ونواتجه.
- 35- علاوة على ذلك، كانت مكونات البرنامج معقدة وتشتمل على العديد من الأنشطة في قطاعات فرعية مختلفة، من المتوقع لها أن تولد نتائج متعددة. وشملت بعض أنشطة البرنامج البنية الأساسية المجتمعية، وإدارة الأراضي والمياه الريفية، والإدارة المجتمعية للغابات، والإنتاج الحيواني، والتمويل الصغرى الريفي، والخدمات الصحية والتغذوية، ووضع برنامج للبحوث المحصولية. وقد شكل هذا تعقيدات بالنسبة للتنفيذ، والتنسيق، والرصد، والإشراف، والتقييم، وكانت أوجه التآزر بين الأنشطة محدودة. وقد تفاقم الوضع بسبب القدرات المؤسسية الضعيفة نسبيا للولايتين.
- 36- علاوة على ذلك، فإن تصميم البرنامج لم يأخذ في الحسبان بما فيه الكفاية عامل الصراع السائد في الولايتين ومضامين ذلك على التنفيذ. على سبيل المثال، كان أحد أسباب النجاح المحدود للبرنامج التناوب العالي لمدرء

<sup>8</sup> أجريت مسوحات خط الأساس بعد حوالي خمس سنوات من دخول القرض حيز النفاذ.

المشاريع والموظفين الرئيسيين الآخرين، الذين وجدوا العمل في المناطق الريفية النائية المتضررة من العنف صعبا للغاية والذين قدمت لهم مجموعة تعويضات غير جذابة.

37- فيما يتعلق بالفعالية، كان البرنامج قد وصل إلى 86 888 أسرة في وقت الإغلاق، بالمقارنة مع الـ 86 000 أسرة التي تم توقعها في مرحلة التصميم. ومع ذلك، تبقى تغطية الأسر المشاركة في مجموعات المساعدة الذاتية منخفضة بعد إنجاز البرنامج. وفي الواقع، فإن نتائج تحليل المواعمة القائمة على التقدير تبين أنه في وقت التقييم، بالمقارنة مع المستوى المستهدف الإجمالي أثناء التصميم، وهو 70 في المائة، لم تشارك سوى نسبة 53 في المائة و43 في المائة من المستفيدين في المجموعة الخاضعة للتدخل في جهارخند وشاتيسغارا في مجموعات المساعدة الذاتية (انظر الجدول 9 في التقرير الرئيسي). ومع ذلك، فإن هذه النسب أعلى في المجموعات الخاضعة للتدخل في كلا الولايتين منها في مجموعات المقارنة.

38- كان للبرنامج نتائج إيجابية من حيث التعبئة المجتمعية وتمكين وتنمية التمويل الصغري. فقد أنشأ مجموعة من المؤسسات القروية، مثل مجموعات المساعدة الذاتية، ولكنه لم يفعل ما يكفي للتأكد من أنه يمكن لها الانضمام إلى اتحادات منظمات رئيسية تعمل بشكل جيد، والذي من شأنه أن يوفر لها مزيدا من النفوذ في إقامة روابط مع الأسواق والمؤسسات المالية الرسمية. وتمكن البرنامج من إنشاء هياكل للأراضي والمياه، وترتيب الأنشطة الزراعية، وتنظيم أنواع مختلفة من التدريب التقني والمعني بالتنوع. ولكنه في الوقت ذاته لم يحقق إلا جزئيا أهدافه الإنمائية. ويرجع ذلك جزئيا إلى أنه لم يكن ناجحا في تعزيز تنوع المحاصيل والقاعدة الاقتصادية لفقراء الريف، وجزئيا إلى أن نهج استهدافه وتدخلاته الإنمائية لم يمايزا سوى بين السكان القبليين وغيرهم، دون إيلاء الاهتمام الكافي لتصميم أنشطة تراعي عدم تجانس هذه المجموعات المختلفة.

39- كانت تكلفة البرنامج لكل أسرة ولكل مجموعة مساعدة ذاتية منخفضة، وهو عامل إيجابي.<sup>9</sup> ومع ذلك، كانت كفاءة البرنامج ضعيفة على العموم، وذلك إلى حد كبير بسبب ارتفاع نسبة التكاليف التي استهلكتها إدارة البرنامج (20 في المائة من إجمالي التكاليف)، وانقضاء فترة طويلة بين الموافقة وصرف أول دفعة، والتأخير في التنفيذ مما تسبب بزيادة التكاليف الإدارية للصندوق، وتدفق الأموال في غير أوانها وخصوصا في السنوات الأربع إلى الخمس الأولى من التنفيذ (انظر الرسم البياني 1 بشأن صرف القروض في التقرير الرئيسي). وقد أدى هذا العامل الأخير أيضا إلى الإلغاء النهائي لجزء من قرض الصندوق. وعلى العموم، يخلص تقييم الأثر إلى أن أهمية وفعالية البرنامج كانت مرضية إلى حد ما، في حين كانت كفاءته غير مرضية إلى حد ما.

40- الأثر على الفقر الريفي. ويخلص التقييم إلى أن البرنامج كان له أثر إيجابي على المجموعة المستهدفة، على الرغم من أن حجم الأثر كان محدودا نوعا ما.

41- وبنهاية البرنامج، كان عدد أقل من الناس في المجموعة المستهدفة يعيشون تحت خط الفقر (1.25 دولار أمريكي)، بالمقارنة مع أولئك الذين لم يتلقوا دعما من البرنامج.<sup>10</sup> وبالمثل، كانت الدخول الشهرية لأعضاء المجموعة المستهدفة أعلى (بمقدار 6.49 دولار أمريكي في جهارخند و5.22 دولار أمريكي في شاتيسغارا)، كما كان إنتاجهم وإنتاجيتهم من الأرز أعلى أيضا. ويخلص التقييم إلى أن هذه الاختلافات ذات أهمية من الناحية الإحصائية. وفيما يتعلق بالأصول المالية، خلص التقييم إلى أن مجموعات المساعدة الذاتية كانت نشطة أساسا بالنسبة للمدخرات والائتمانات الصغيرة في المنطقة الخاضعة للتدخل.

<sup>9</sup> انظر الجدول 16 في التقرير الرئيسي.  
<sup>10</sup> انظر الجدول 18 في التقرير الرئيسي.



- 42- استنادا إلى مؤشر مستوى المعيشة، وهو الدرجة الإجمالية لـ 33 من الأصول الأسرية وخصائص السكن، وجد التقييم أن ملكية الأصول على مستوى الأسرة كانت أفضل قليلا في المجموعة الخاضعة للتدخل. وهذا يعكس حقيقة أن المجموعة الخاضعة للتدخل لديها مستويات دخل أفضل من مجموعة غير المستفيدين. وعلاوة على ذلك، وجد مسح الأثر أن 27 في المائة من الأسر لاحظت تحسنا في الوصول إلى مصادر المياه خلال فترة البرنامج، بالمقارنة مع 24.1 في المائة في المناطق غير الخاضعة للتدخل.
- 43- استخدم التقييم درجة الاستهلاك الغذائي كمؤشر رئيسي لقياس الأمن الغذائي.<sup>11</sup> وتغطي درجة الاستهلاك الغذائي التنوع الغذائي وكذلك تواتر استهلاك أنواع مختلفة من الطعام على مدى الفترة المرجعية. ويبين الجدول 27 في التقرير الرئيسي توزيع الأسر في مختلف فئات الاستهلاك الغذائي استنادا إلى نمط الاستهلاك، ويظهر حالة أفضل قليلا من الأمن الغذائي في المناطق المقارنة.
- 44- لم يحقق البرنامج الكثير من حيث تعزيز الحقوق القبلية (على سبيل المثال فيما يتعلق بالحصول على الأراضي) أو الوعي بالمخططات الحكومية الرئيسية والاستحقاقات ذات الصلة. ويظهر التقييم التغذوي للأطفال دون سن الخامسة اختلافا بسيطا بين المناطق الخاضعة للتدخل والمناطق المقارنة. وعلى الرغم من الإنجازات الجيدة في بناء المؤسسات الشعبية، فإن مجموعات المساعدة الذاتية والمجموعات الأخرى ذات المصالح المشتركة لم تكن مرتبطة على نحو فعال ومستدام بإطار الحكم المحلي. ولم يفتح البرنامج فرصا للإنتاج المضيف للقيمة أو يضمن قدرا أكبر من الوصول إلى أسواق المدخلات أو المخرجات، كما ذكر سابقا أيضا.
- 45- على العموم، ومع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار الفرق بين المجموعة الخاضعة للتدخل ومجموعة المقارنة، وخاصة من حيث دخل الأسرة والأصول، ومؤشر مستوى المعيشة، ورأس المال البشري والاجتماعي، والتمكين، يخلص تقييم الأثر إلى أن الأثر الإجمالي للبرنامج على الفقر الريفي كان مرضيا إلى حد ما (4). ويتم توفير التحليل الكامل لتقييم أثر البرنامج في القسم السادس من التقرير الرئيسي.
- 46- **الاستدامة** لا تزال تشكل تحديا وهناك عدة أسباب لذلك. أولا وقبل كل شيء، فإن البرنامج لم يضع استراتيجية للخروج، الأمر الذي كان من شأنه أن يساعد على توضيح أدوار ومسؤوليات مختلف المؤسسات والجهات الفاعلة في ضمان تلقي المستفيدين للمدخلات والخدمات اللازمة بعد إنجاز البرنامج. إذ لم يجر ضمان تشغيل وصيانة البنية الأساسية الريفية، والأراضي والأصول التي طورها البرنامج. ولم يعد العديد من اللجان القروية ومجموعات المساعدة الذاتية المنشأة في إطار البرنامج نشطة بشكل كامل. وفي حين خلص التقييم إلى أنه تم تمكين السكان القبليين وغيرهم على المستوى الفردي، فإنه لم يتم إيلاء اهتمام كاف لتنمية رأس المال الاجتماعي الجماعي التي كان من شأنها أن تمكنهم من التعبير عن أولوياتهم بشكل فعال في عمليات صنع القرار وتخصيص الموارد في المستقبل. كما أنه لم يتم السعي وراء التقارب مع برامج التنمية الزراعية والريفية الوطنية الرئيسية التي تنفذ في الولايتين. لذا، يخلص التقييم إلى أن استدامة فوائد البرنامج غير مرضية إلى حد ما.
- 47- **الابتكار وتوسيع النطاق**. عزز البرنامج بعض الابتكارات في كل من المجالات التقنية والمؤسسية. وكان إنشاء جمعيات للتنمية القبلية فكرة مثيرة للاهتمام تهدف إلى ضمان التنفيذ السريع. وقد واجهت هذه الجمعيات تحديات عديدة، بما في ذلك المعرفة والفهم غير الكافيين لسياسات وعمليات الصندوق، والنقص في استمرارية التوظيف. كما أن الجمعيتين اللتين أنشئتا على مستوى الولاية والجمعيات التي أنشئت على مستوى الأقسام لم تبذل سوى

<sup>11</sup> درجة الاستهلاك الغذائي هي درجة للتنوع الغذائي المرجح التواتر تحتسب باستخدام تواتر استهلاك مجموعات الأغذية المختلفة التي تستهلكها أسرة على مدى فترة سبعة أيام. وتصنف أنواع الأغذية إلى تسع مجموعات أغذية رئيسية: الحبوب؛ الجذريات والدرنيات النشوية؛ البقول والجزر؛ اللحوم والأسماك والدواجن والبيض؛ الخضروات (بما في ذلك الأوراق الخضراء)؛ الفاكهة؛ الزيوت والدهون؛ الحليب ومنتجات الألبان؛ والسكر والحلويات. واستنادا إلى درجة الاستهلاك الغذائي، يمكن تصنيف المجتمع إلى ثلاث فئات هي: فئة ذات درجة استهلاك غذائي منخفضة، وفئة ذات درجة متوسطة، وفئة ذات درجة كافية.

القليل من الجهد للتعلم من بعضها البعض ولتبادل الخبرات. وقد عزز البرنامج بعض الابتكارات التقنية. على سبيل المثال، استحدثت شاتيسغارا عملية لاستحواذ أرصدة الكربون في إطار آلية تنمية نظيفة، وشملت المبادرات الأخرى استخدام الطاقة الشمسية وتعزيز الغاز الحيوي، ولكن انتشار هذه المبادرات كان محدودا للغاية. ومن حيث توسيع النطاق، قام الصندوق بتمويل برنامج مماثل آخر في جهارخند؛ ولكن على العموم لم يجد التقييم دليلا على أن الصندوق سلك نهجا استباقيا في تحديد مسارات لتوسيع نطاق بعض من السمات الإيجابية للبرنامج. ويخلص تقييم الأثر إلى أنه قد تم تحقيق نتائج مرضية إلى حد ما في تعزيز الابتكار وتوسيع النطاق.

48- **المساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة.** حقق البرنامج إسهامات مفيدة لجهة تعزيز المساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة. وقد استخدم التقييم درجة لتمكين المرأة استنادا إلى ثلاثة مؤشرات مترابطة، وهي: (1) الاستقلال والسلطة في صنع القرار، فيما يتعلق بعملية اتخاذ القرارات المالية والأسرية الداخلية؛ (2) عضوية وقيادة مجموعات في المؤسسات على مستوى القرية؛ (3) الاستعداد لرفع صوتهن بصدد القضايا الاجتماعية والمنزلية. وفي كلتا الولايتين، كانت درجات تمكين المرأة أفضل في المناطق الخاضعة للتدخل منها بين المجموعات التي لم تستفد من البرنامج (انظر الجدول 35 في التقرير الرئيسي).

49- تظهر المؤشرات الأخرى المستخدمة في التقييم أيضا بعض الإنجازات الإيجابية، مثل تحسين الدخل بين الأسر التي ترأسها النساء في المناطق الخاضعة للتدخل. على سبيل المثال، وعلى الرغم من أن حجم العينة الفرعية صغير وأن النتائج لا توفر بالتالي سوى مؤشر للأثر، فإن الدخل الشهري للأسر التي ترأسها النساء في جهارخند هو 31 دولارا أمريكيا في المجموعة الخاضعة للتدخل، بالمقارنة مع 18 دولارا أمريكيا في مجموعة المقارنة، بينما الأرقام في شاتيسغارا هي 20 دولارا أمريكيا و16 دولارا أمريكيا على التوالي.

50- وفي الوقت ذاته، لم يكن للبرنامج استراتيجية بشأن المساواة بين الجنسين، ولم يتم إيلاء اهتمام كاف لتدريب الرجال لتوعيتهم تجاه القضايا الأوسع للعلاقة بين الرجل والمرأة، ودور التحول الذي يمكن للنساء أن يقمن به في أنشطة التنمية الاجتماعية والاقتصادية الأوسع. وكان بالإمكان إيلاء المزيد من الاهتمام لتخفيف أعباء عمل المرأة من خلال توفير المياه للاستخدام المنزلي والحد من استخدام الحطب للطهي. وعلى الرغم من تعزيز المدخرات الشخصية ومستويات الدخل بسبب تنوع الأنشطة المدرة للدخل، تبقى النساء بين أكثر أفراد المجتمع فقرا وحرمانا. وفي الختام، كان الأثر في هذا المجال مرضيا إلى حد ما.

51- **أداء الشركاء.** كان الإشراف ودعم التنفيذ واستعراض منتصف المدة عموما من نوعية جيدة، على الرغم من أنه كان بإمكان الصندوق التدخل بصورة أكثر استباقية في الأوقات الحرجة أثناء التنفيذ لمعالجة الاختناقات، مثلا فيما يتعلق بتدفق الأموال، الأمر الذي أعاق التنفيذ. وكان بإمكانه إجراء التعديلات اللازمة لتصميم البرنامج، بعد أن أصبح واضحا أن المنحة الكبيرة نسبيا لوزارة التنمية الدولية في المملكة المتحدة (المفتق عليها أثناء التصميم) لن تتحقق. وكان بإمكان الصندوق أيضا بذل المزيد من الجهود لإقامة روابط مع الوزارات التقنية المعنية على المستوى المركزي، وتشجيع المزيد من التقارب بين البرنامج وتدخلات التنمية المحلية.

52- أظهرت وزارة المالية اهتماما نشطا في البرنامج وتدخلت في اللحظات الحاسمة، وذلك تمشيا مع نطاق اختصاصها الشامل. ولعبت حكومات الولايات دورا أساسيا من خلال إنشاء جمعيات التنمية القبلية. ومع ذلك، عانى البرنامج من ضياع الوقت والقيادة خلال تشكيل حكومات الولايات الجديدة. وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن عدم انتظام تدفق الأموال من شاتيسغارا وعدم كفاية تدفق الأموال من جهارخند إلى البرنامج كان محل قلق أثر على سرعة التنفيذ. ويتم تقدير كل من أداء الصندوق والحكومة على أنه مرض إلى حد ما.

53- **الرصد والتقييم.** واجه البرنامج العديد من التحديات في هذا المجال. وعلى الرغم من إجراء مسوحات خط الأساس، إلا أن جودتها كانت ضعيفة. وكان الإطار المنطقي للبرنامج ضعيفا ولم يستخدم من قبل إدارة البرنامج كأداة لرصد أو إدارة النتائج. وتركزت الجهود في الغالب على رصد المخرجات، مع إيلاء اهتمام أقل لتقدير النواتج، كما لم يتم أيضا جمع وتحليل بيانات نظام إدارة النتائج والأثر بشكل صحيح. كما أن الكفاءات والخبرة المحدودة لموظفي الرصد والتقييم أثرت أيضا على الأداء. وأخيرا، وعلى الرغم من أن البرنامج قام ببعض الدراسات أثناء التنفيذ، فإن مكون التقييم لنظام الرصد والتقييم لم يستخدم بما فيه الكفاية من أجل التعلم والتحسين المستمر.

## خامسا - الاستنتاجات

54- على الرغم من نموها وتتميتها المثيرين للإعجاب، ما زال لدى الهند أكبر عدد من الفقراء في العالم، مع حوالي 300 مليون شخص يعيشون على أقل من 1.25 دولار أمريكي يوميا في حالة تعادل القوة الشرائية. وهذا يمثل نحو 25 في المائة من مجموع السكان، ويعني أن واحدا من بين كل أربعة من الهنود ما زال يناضل من أجل تغطية نفقاته. ويبقى عدم المساواة واسع الانتشار، ويشكل بالتالي مصدر قلق كبير للعاملين وصناع القرار في مجال التنمية. وعلى هذه الخلفية، قرر المجلس التنفيذي تمويل البرنامج في عام 1999، مع التركيز على تنمية السكان القيليين وغيرهم من المجموعات المحرومة، الذين ما زالوا بين أكثر قطاعات السكان فقرا وضعفا.

55- وبالتالي، فإن قرار الصندوق تمويل البرنامج كان مناسباً، وفي أوانه، ومتسقا مع مهمة الصندوق، خصوصا إذا ما أخذنا بعين الاعتبار أن الولايتين المعنيتين فيهما نسب عالية من السكان القيليين والطوائف المصنفة. ويدعم هذا القرار أيضا حقيقة أن الصندوق قد كون ميزة نسبية، وتخصصا، وسجلا حافلا معترف بها على نطاق واسع في دعم التنمية القبلية في البلاد، كما يتضح من ثلاثة مشروعات سابقة ناجحة نسبيا ذات تركيز مماثل (اثتان في ولاية أندرا براديش وواحد في أوديشا) تم تمويلها قبل البرنامج، وعدة مشروعات أخرى في وقت لاحق.

56- حقق البرنامج بعض أهدافه من حيث تمكين المرأة، والتحسينات في إنتاج وإنتاجية الأرز، وبناء المؤسسات الشعبية. ومع ذلك، كان للبرنامج تصميم معقد غطى ولايتين والعديد من أنشطة القطاعات الفرعية، ولم يكن له الأثر المتوقع على الدخل، وتعزيز الروابط مع الأسواق، أو التقارب مع برامج وسياسات وطنية كبرى، والتي تعتبر أساسية لتعزيز التحول الريفي الشامل والمستدام بالمعنى الأوسع. وهذا يشير إلى أن تصميم البرنامج لم يأخذ في الاعتبار على نحو كاف القدرات المؤسسية السائدة في الولايتين لضمان تحقيق نتائج ناجحة.

57- وخلاصة القول عموما أنه كان بإمكان البرنامج أن يحقق ما هو أكثر. كما تعزى النتائج المحدودة جزئيا إلى التحديات التي واجهتها الولايتان المنشأتان حديثا، واللذان كانتا، وما زالتا، في وضع هش بسبب حركات التمرد الجارية. وكان من الممكن للصندوق أيضا أن يتدخل من جانبه بحيوية أكبر، وخصوصا في بداية البرنامج، ولضمان تدفق الأموال في الوقت المناسب واللازمة لتنفيذ كاف، مؤل الصندوق في عام 2012 تبعا للبرنامج في جهارخند وهو مشروع التمكين القبلي وسبل العيش في جهارخاند، والذي يوفر إمكانية متجددة للتعزيز، والبناء على، بعض الإنجازات الأولية للبرنامج، على الأقل في واحدة من الولايتين اللتين يغطيها البرنامج. وعلى العموم، يعتبر البرنامج مرضيا إلى حد ما، وهذا مماثل لتقدير إدارة الصندوق لهذه العملية.

## سادسا - التوصيات

58- يقدم تقييم الأثر التوصيات الأربع التالية:

(1) **التصميم من أجل السياق.** ينبغي أن تشمل جميع تصاميم المشروعات تحليلاً دقيقاً للفقر والمؤسسات، للتأكد من أن الأهداف والتصميم متناسبان مع القدرات والنظم والعمليات على مستوى الولاية لضمان تنفيذ في أوانه وأثر أفضل. وسوف يساعد هذا أيضاً في تحديد نهج الاستهداف المناسبة للتمييز بعناية بين المجموعات الاجتماعية الفقيرة المتنوعة. وبالنسبة للمشروعات المصممة في الأوضاع الهشة، ينبغي أيضاً أن يكون تحليل الهشاشة ممارسة قياسية أثناء التصميم. وعلاوة على ذلك، ينبغي أن تخضع المشروعات لتعديلات مستمرة في التصميم، مع مراعاة تغير السياق أو إدخال أي سياسة مؤسسية تشغيلية جديدة ذات صلة في الصندوق لضمان استمرار أهميتها. وينبغي أن يتم ذلك خصوصاً بالنسبة للمشروعات التي لم تتجاوز بعد منتصف فترة تنفيذها. وأخيراً، لا ينبغي تمويل مشروعات تغطي ولايتين في إطار قرض واحد، ما لم يكن هناك استراتيجية واضحة للتكامل وتلاحق الدروس، وما لم يتم تخصيص ميزانيات معززة للإشراف ودعم التنفيذ.

(2) **التقارب مع البرامج الحكومية.** يُوصى بأن توضح جميع المشروعات كيفية ملاءمتها مع البرامج الرئيسية الوطنية وعلى مستوى الولاية في القطاعين الزراعي والريفي، مثل الرسالة الوطنية لتعزيز سبل العيش الريفية. وهذا أمر ضروري لضمان الاستدامة ويمكن له أيضاً أن يوفر فرصة لتوسيع النطاق بعد إنجاز العمليات التي يمولها الصندوق. وسوف يتطلب السعي لتحسين الالتقاء، والاستدامة، وتوسيع النطاق أيضاً أن تكفل المشروعات التي تنفذ على مستوى الولاية أن الوزارات التقنية المعنية على المستوى المركزي تشارك في تصميمها، ومنخرطة بطريقة مناسبة طوال فترة التنفيذ.

(3) **استراتيجية الاستدامة.** يجب أن تصمم جميع المشروعات الممولة من الصندوق بحيث تضمن استدامة الفوائد. وبهذا الصدد، يجب على جميع المشروعات في الهند وغيرها من الأماكن أن تشترط في اتفاقيات التمويل الخاصة بها وضع استراتيجية خروج قبل وقت طويل من إغلاق المشروع، يوافق عليها الصندوق والحكومة ذات الصلة. وعلى مثل هذه الاستراتيجية إيضاح أدوار ومسؤوليات الحكومات الوطنية وحكومات الولايات، والصندوق، والمجتمعات المحلية، والشركاء الآخرين ذوي الصلة. كما ينبغي على الاستراتيجية أن توضح أيضاً كيفية تغطية أي تكاليف متكررة لازمة من أجل ضمان تشغيل وصيانة السلع العامة التي تم خلقها خلال مرحلة الاستثمار.

(4) **الرصد والتقييم.** من الأهمية بمكان أن يتم تصميم جميع المشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق استناداً إلى نظرية التغيير لضمان نتائج أفضل وتيسير أنشطة الرصد والتقييم. وينبغي للمشروعات إجراء مسوحات أساسية في أقرب وقت ممكن، وينبغي أن تشمل هذه المسوحات مجموعة مرجعية/مقارنة يتم اختيارها بشكل صحيح. وينبغي أن تشارك شعبة التخطيط الاستراتيجي وتقدير الأثر في تصميم مثل هذه المسوحات، من خلال إعطائها فرصة للتعليق على اختصاصاتها. وينبغي أن تشمل اختصاصات العضو في بعثات الإشراف صراحة الاستعراض الشامل لنظم وأنشطة الرصد والتقييم وتقديم توصيات لتحسينها، حسب الاقتضاء. وينبغي إعداد تقرير إنجاز المشروع تمثيلاً مع المبادئ التوجيهية للصندوق، كما ينبغي أن تتعرض جودة التقرير لاستعراض أقران منتظم داخل دائرة إدارة البرامج. وينبغي إشراك ممثل عن المكتب الأمامي لدائرة إدارة البرامج في مثل عمليات استعراض الأقران هذه. وينبغي أن يستخدم الإطار المنطقي بطريقة أكثر استباقية كأساس لرصد جار للإنجازات، ولإدخال أي تعديلات من أجل فعالية أفضل.

# Republic of India

## Impact Evaluation of the Jharkhand – Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme (JCTDP)

### Main report

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## **Appendix**

Impact evaluation survey

*The appendix is available upon request from the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD ([evaluation@ifad.org](mailto:evaluation@ifad.org)).*

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

CFMC	community forestry management committee
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CPM	country programme manager
CTDP*	Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Project
DfID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DPIU	district project management unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCS	food consumption score
FFS	farmer field schools
GSPEC	Gram Sabha Programme Executive Committee
GSRMP	Gram Sabha Natural Resource Management and Livelihood Plans
ICO	IFAD country office
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGA	income-generating activities
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
JCTDP	Jharkhand – Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme
JTDP*	Jharkhand Tribal Development Project
JTELP	Jharkhand Tribal Empowerment and Livelihoods Project
MGNREGS	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NTFP	non-timber forest produce
PESA	Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act 1996
PCR	project completion report
PMU	programme management unit
PRI	Panchayats Raj institutions
PVTG	particularly vulnerable tribal group
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
SHG	self-help group
SDR	special drawing rights currency
TDS	Tribal Development Society
ToC	theory of change

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\* The Jharkhand – Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme was implemented in Jharkhand as the Jharkhand Tribal Development Project (JTDP), and in Chhattisgarh as the Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Project (CTDP). For all practical purposes, they were implemented as two separate projects, though formally financed through one loan approved by the IFAD Executive Board.




## Map showing the programme areas in Jharkhand, India



### Jharkhand state (showing district boundaries)


JTDP Project Districts

1. Ranchi
2. Khunti
3. East Singbhum
4. West Singbhum
5. Saraikela-Kharsawan



Source: IFAD. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delamination of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

## Map showing the programme areas in Chhattisgarh, India



### CTDP Project Districts

1. Surguja
2. Jashpur
3. Raigarh

Source: IFAD.

*The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delamination of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.*

# Jharkhand–Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme Impact Evaluation

## I. Background

1. In line with the IFAD Evaluation Policy (2011)<sup>1</sup> and decision of the Executive Board in December 2013, the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) carried out an impact evaluation of the IFAD-supported Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme (JCTDP) in India in 2014/2015.
2. One of the main reasons, *inter-alia*, for selecting the JCTDP for impact evaluation is because its findings would also serve to inform the India country programme evaluation being undertaken by IOE in 2015/2016. Another key reason is because IOE conducted in 2014/2015 an evaluation synthesis report on IFAD's efforts to support indigenous peoples, and the emerging findings from the impact evaluation of the JCTDP also contributed to the analysis of the evaluation synthesis.<sup>2</sup>
3. The JCTDP was implemented in two contiguous states, namely Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The loan for the programme was approved by the IFAD Executive Board in April 1999. It became effective in June 2001 and was completed in Chhattisgarh on 1 January 2010, and on 30 June 2012 in Jharkhand. The total project cost was estimated at US\$41.7 million, including an IFAD loan of US\$23 million. The actual cost was US\$33 million, including an IFAD loan of US\$20 million. More details on the programme's design, implementation arrangements, cost break downs, and supervision arrangements may be found in section IV.
4. The overall rationale and terms of reference for this impact evaluation are captured in its approach paper.<sup>3</sup> The latter contains a summary of the design for the impact evaluation including its methodology and key questions, data collection techniques, process, timelines, communication, human resources deployed and other pertinent information.

## II. The impact evaluation

### A. Objectives

5. The main objectives of this impact evaluation are to: (i) assess impact in a quantitative manner, while also paying due attention to qualitative aspects; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations that can be used in the design and implementation of similar interventions in India and elsewhere in the future.

### B. Methodology

6. **Lessons learnt from the Sri Lanka - Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme impact evaluation (DZLISPP).** The JCTDP impact evaluation builds on the impact evaluation done by IOE in Sri Lanka of the Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme (DZLISPP) in 2013. There are a number of lessons from the DZLISPP impact evaluation which are summarized in box 1.

<sup>1</sup> The Evaluation Policy may be seen at [www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-7-Rev-2.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-7-Rev-2.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> This is because the focus of JCTCP was on tribal people (who, as per internationally accepted definitions, are considered indigenous peoples).

<sup>3</sup> The approach paper may be seen at: [www.ifad.org/evaluation/public\\_html/eksyst/doc/approach/jctdp.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/approach/jctdp.pdf).

## Box 1

**Lessons learnt from the impact evaluations of the Sri Lanka – Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme (DZLISPP)**

- The absence of a baseline survey required the selection of specific methodologies for ensuring a rigorous impact evaluation;
- IOE adopted a quasi-experimental mix-methods approach (i.e., propensity score matching), allowing the assessment of impact in a quantitative manner while also paying attention to qualitative aspects of IFAD operations;
- Impact evaluations take time and careful *ex-ante* planning is essential to ensure timely completion of the exercise. For instance, villages covered in the impact evaluation that are located in remote rural areas will have implications for logistics and the time taken for data collection. Also, within the IFAD context, hiring a company to collect primary data will require competitive bidding process, which is labour and time intensive.

7. The JCTDP impact evaluation made an attempt to overcome these limitations by: (i) conducting an in-depth technical evaluability assessment of available data at the outset of the evaluation; (ii) implementing the impact survey on a larger sample size; and (iii) recruiting a national company for the collection of primary data through a closed bidding process, thus reducing the costs for data collection as well as the time for the competitive process.
8. **Evaluation criteria.** This impact evaluation covers all evaluation criteria adopted by IOE in its evaluation manual,<sup>4</sup> namely: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation and scaling up, and performance of partners (IFAD and Government). That is, while the focus of the evaluation is decisively on the impact criterion, the performance of the programme has also been assessed across all other criteria. This allows the impact evaluation to provide a more strategic and holistic assessment of JCTDP's performance. It is also worth noting that, in line with IOE's methodology, impact is assessed across five specific domains. These include: (i) household income and assets; (ii) human and social capital and empowerment; (iii) food security and agricultural productivity; (iv) natural resources, the environment and climate change; and (v) institutions and policies.
9. In line with the evaluation manual, all the above criteria will be rated on a scale from 1 to 6, with 6 representing the best and 1 the worst score. Moreover, project ratings falling into the three higher ratings (4-6) will be classified as "satisfactory" while the three lower ratings (1-3) as "unsatisfactory". Ratings have been assigned after a careful process of triangulation, to ensure that assessments are based on credible evidence and data. The ratings from this impact evaluation will inform the 2015 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI),<sup>5</sup> IOE's annual flagship report.
10. **Technical evaluability assessment.** IOE conducted a detailed evaluability assessment of available data at the outset of the process, prior to the development of the impact evaluation's methodology. The assessment revealed that a large amount of data collected by the programme was mostly at the output level, with limited information on outcomes and impact. Moreover, while baseline surveys had been done in each state, they were not usable, also because the sample size covered were extremely small and non-representative of both the treatment (i.e.,

<sup>4</sup> The evaluation manual may be seen at: [www.ifad.org/evaluation/process\\_methodology/doc/manual.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> The 2014 ARRI may be seen at [www.ifad.org/evaluation/arri/2014/arri2014\\_full.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/arri/2014/arri2014_full.pdf).

the beneficiaries) and comparison (i.e., those who did not receive programme services) groups.<sup>6</sup>

11. This implied that the impact evaluation had to reconstruct ex-post the counterfactual. It would therefore only be able to compare the effects of the JCTDP by using the 'with and without' analysis through quasi-experimental methods. This will be described in the paragraphs below.
12. Under these circumstances, the impact evaluation could not use the 'before and after' approach to compliment the 'with and without' analysis, due to the paucity of baseline data. A central component of this impact evaluation was therefore to design an impact survey to collect primary data, from both the treatment and comparison groups.
13. The core of any impact evaluation conducted ex-post and in absence of robust baseline data is the identification of a counterfactual to establish attribution. This is attained by constructing a comparison group (i.e. the group that did not receive services from the programme), which is compared to the treatment group (i.e. the group of beneficiaries) on a set of impact indicators, using quasi-experimental methods.
14. **Mix-methods approach.** The evaluation used a mix-method approach applying quantitative and qualitative tools, as displayed in table 1. The core instrument for the evaluation was the impact survey use to collect primary quantitative data, which was administered to the 8,804 sampled households.

Table 1  
**Evaluation tools**

<i>Quantitative tools</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
Structured impact survey	Administered to all the sampled households for the collection of primary quantitative data.
Anthropometric measurements	Anthropometric measurements will provide height-for-age and weight-for-age calculations for the youngest child (0-60 months) in selected households.
<i>Qualitative tools</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
Focus group discussions (FGDs)	Conducted separately for women and men at the community level to triangulate with quantitative information
In-depth interviews	Conducted with various stakeholders involved in the project implementation. The target stakeholders included: Gram Sabha Program Executive Committee (GSPEC) members Facilitating non-governmental organizations involved in programme implementation Members from the Tribal Development Societies (TDS) in both the states IFAD Management and country office

15. The quantitative part of the evaluation was complemented by a set of qualitative tools, which facilitated the understanding of the processes of change induced by intervention. Table 2 depicts the type and number of qualitative interviews conducted.

<sup>6</sup> The baseline survey conducted in 2005 in Chhattisgarh covered only 495 households in 33 programme villages (15 from each) and 90 households in 9 comparison villages (10 from each), while the one for Jharkhand in 2006 covered 449 households in 28 programme villages, with no comparison group.

Table 2

**Qualitative data collection**

<i>Key respondent</i>	<i>Tool to be administered</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	
		<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Comparison</i>
Tribal Development Societies	In-depth interview	2	NA
Facilitating non-governmental organizations	In-depth interview	10	NA
Gram Sabha Programme Executive Committee (GSPEC)	In-depth interview	55	NA
Community	Focus group discussions	22	6
Central and state governments	One-on-one interviews	20	NA

NA = Not available.

Source: JCTDP Evaluation Methodology Note.

16. **Building blocks.** Given the above, the main building blocks of the JCTDP impact evaluation included: (i) the ex-post reconstruction of the theory of change (ToC) to identify the impact indicators to be measured. For the purposes of the JCTDP, and as outlined in its approach paper, some of the indicators that this impact evaluation assessed included changes in income, assets, nutrition, food security, productivity and gender equality and women's empowerment; (ii) the determination of the sample size and sampling strategy for both the treatment and comparison groups for the collection of primary data; and (iii) the selection of the quasi-experimental method for impact analysis.
17. Theory of change. The evaluation assessed not only "if", but also "how" and "why" the programme has, or has not, had an impact on selected households and communities in the programme area. To this end, the evaluation reconstructed ex-post the ToC of the programme together with relevant stakeholders. The ToC illustrates the casual links, hypothesis and assumptions for the achievement of impact and overall project objectives. The programme's ToC can be seen in annex I.
18. Further to the reconstruction of the ToC, IOE developed an indicator matrix to describe the effects of the programme, along the results chain. This matrix guided the preparation of a detailed evaluation framework containing the key evaluation questions for the evaluation, as well as the quantitative and qualitative research tools for collection of primary data. The indicator matrix is contained in annex II, and the evaluation framework in annex III of this report.
19. Sample size. The ToC identified the income differential in the treatment and comparison areas as one of the key impact indicators. Hence, the evaluation considered the Poverty Head Count Ratio as the indicator for calculating the minimum sample size.
20. The sample size has been computed using the formula below:
- $$n = \frac{D[Z_{1-\alpha}\sqrt{2P(1-P)} + Z_{1-\beta}\sqrt{P_1(1-P_1)+P_2(1-P_2)}]^2}{(P_2-P_1)^2}$$
21. In the above formula: (i) P is the value of the Poverty Head Count Ratio at the time of the baseline survey (51.6 per cent for Jharkhand and 55.1 per cent for Chhattisgarh); (ii) the minimum detectable effect is equal to 5 per cent, (iii) Z is the confidence level at 95 per cent; (iv) the power of test is at 80 per cent, (v) D is



the design effect equal to 1.38;<sup>7</sup> and (vi) the Maximum Error Allowed is equal to 3 per cent.

22. Based on the above formula, the representative total sample size is of 8 804 households, including treatment and comparison groups across both states. The details on the sampled population are summarized in table 3 below.

Table 3

**JCTDP impact evaluation - total sample size**

State		N <sup>o</sup> of villages	Social group	Count	Percentage
Jharkhand	Comparison	110	Scheduled castes	232	10.73%
			Particularly vulnerable tribal groups	25	1.16%
			Scheduled tribes	1 801	83.26%
			Others	104	4.81%
			Sub-total	2 162	100%
	Treatment	110	Scheduled castes	228	10.05%
			Particularly vulnerable tribal groups	27	1.19%
			Scheduled tribes	1 939	85.46%
			Others	75	3.31%
			Sub-total	2 269	100%
Total sample Jharkhand	220		4 431		
Chhattisgarh	Comparison	110	Scheduled castes	142	6.47%
			Particularly vulnerable tribal groups	25	1.14%
			Scheduled tribes	1 931	88.01%
			Others	96	4.38%
			Sub-total	2 194	100%
	Treatment	110	Scheduled castes	163	7.48%
			Particularly vulnerable tribal groups	81	3.72%
			Scheduled tribes	1 837	84.30%
			Others	98	4.50%
			Sub-total	2 179	100%
Total sample Chhattisgarh	220		4 373		
<b>OVERALL SAMPLE</b>			<b>8 804</b>		

Source: JCTDP Evaluation Methodology Note.

23. Sampling strategy. The below paragraphs provide a description of the sampling strategy adopted in determining both the treatment and the comparison groups. Since the intervention took place at block level, the sample of the treatment group

<sup>7</sup> Design effect =  $1 + \alpha(n - 1)$ , where n is the sample selected at lowest level, which we have assumed to be 20,  $\alpha$  is the intra class correlation i.e. correlation between the sample chosen at village level. For a sample to be representative, this value would have to be low and considering other studies of similar nature we can assume the value here to be 0.02, thus design effect is 1.38.

comprised all the blocks in the programme area. In order to achieve the total sample size, 110 villages were selected in the intervention blocks and 110 villages in the non-intervention blocks of each state.

24. As detailed later on in the report, the programme was targeted to tribal groups, including particularly vulnerable tribal groups (PVTGs) which are among the poorest and most vulnerable in the programme areas. In order to include in the sample an adequate representation of the PVTGs, the villages in the intervention blocks were categorized into the ones inhabited by a percentage of PVTGs and the ones without any presence of PVTGs.
25. Therefore, the sampling of the villages within each block was done by applying a multistep sampling process, which entailed: (i) the creation of two strata of villages based on the presence (or non-presence) of PVTGs; (ii) the determination of the number of villages to be covered in each of the stratum to ensure proportionate representation of PVTG and non-PVTG villages across all blocks; and (iii) the selection of non-PVTG villages in every block using the "Probability Proportional to Size" (PPS) method,<sup>8</sup> and selection of PVTG villages using simple random sampling. This process ensured that the final list of PVTG and non-PVTG villages selected in the sample would be proportionate to the treatment universe, which is the total number of villages where the programme was implemented.
26. With regard to the selection of households, to ensure representation of all the communities present in the village, a social mapping exercise was carried out and a village representation map (see picture 1) prepared for each sampled village, in consultation with the members of the Gram panchayat. This helped to understand the village settlement pattern and generated macro details of the socio-demographic distribution. Based on this exercise, each village was divided into various hamlets depending on the socio-demographic distribution. The households were randomly selected across the different hamlets. In PVTG villages, one extra community/hamlet was included in the village representation map to make sure that a representative number of PVTG households was included in the selection. On average, 20 households per village were randomly selected.
27. With regard to the comparison group, the evaluation selected non-intervention blocks by doing an a-priori matching<sup>9</sup> with intervention blocks on the basis of a set of socio-demographic characteristics. Using the proportions of the socio-demographic characteristics, a composite index score was obtained for all blocks in the districts. The closest matching block for each intervention block was selected as the comparison block. The selection of villages and households for the comparison group entailed the same process as followed in the treatment areas.


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<sup>8</sup> Probability proportion to size is a sampling procedure under which the probability of a unit being selected is proportional to the size of the ultimate unit, giving larger clusters a greater probability of selection and smaller clusters a lower probability. In order to ensure that all units (ex. individuals) in the population have the same probability of selection irrespective of the size of their cluster, each of the hierarchical levels prior to the ultimate level has to be sampled according to the size of ultimate units it contains, but the same number of units has to be sampled from each cluster at the last hierarchical level.

<sup>9</sup> The a-priori matching consists in identifying comparison villages similar on key socio-demographic characteristics to the project villages. The aim of a-priori matching is to find the closest comparison group from a sample of non-participants to the sample of program participants in terms of the following observable characteristics for which there are robust secondary data available: (i) % SC population; (ii) % ST population; and (iii) % literate population



Picture 1  
**Village representation map**



Source: JCTDP Evaluation Methodology Note – pilot mission.

28. Selection of the most suitable quasi-experimental method. In the absence of a robust baseline, the evaluation used propensity score matching (PSM) as the quasi-experimental method to match a subset of households with and without programme intervention according to a set of characteristics<sup>10</sup> that are not likely to have been affected by the programme.<sup>11</sup> If the difference between the matched treatment and comparison groups on the variable of interest is statistically significant, this difference can be attributed to the programme.

### C. Process

29. The evaluation process started by a comprehensive desk review of available data and documents on the programme, including the baseline surveys, monitoring and evaluation data and reports, supervision reports, project completion reports (PCR) and previous independent evaluations in India conducted by IOE. This was essential to, among other issues, identify key questions and hypotheses to be addressed in the impact evaluation.
30. Thereafter, a preparatory mission was undertaken by IOE to India in June 2014 to launch the impact evaluation. The main purpose of the preparatory mission was to brief the Government and other key partners on the IFAD Evaluation Policy, the evaluation manual, and the impact evaluation, as well as to listen to their priorities for the evaluation. IOE completed the evaluation's initial design after the preparatory mission, which, as mentioned before, is summarized in the final approach paper for this impact evaluation.
31. The preparatory mission also served to identify local consultants/institutions who could be involved in supporting IOE to conduct the evaluation. In this regard, after thorough and careful consideration, including the undertaking of a bidding process, IOE contracted Sambodhi Research and Communications Private Limited, a company based in New Delhi. Their role was mainly to support IOE in designing and testing the impact survey, as well as data collection and analysis.
32. A second mission was fielded by IOE in December 2014, to test and finalize the data collection instruments in selected districts and blocks of the programme area. The primary data collection and analysis took place between December 2014 and February 2015.

<sup>10</sup> For the purpose of this evaluation the following variables have been selected: Caste of the household; Poverty line status; Literacy percentage; Engagement in agricultural activities; and Participation in gram sabha meetings.

<sup>11</sup> The PSM method minimizes the confounding variables that may adversely (either more or less attribution) effect the attribution of the impact to the programme.

33. Thereafter, IOE drafted the final impact evaluation report between March and April, which was firstly peer reviewed within the division. The draft was shared for comments with the IFAD Management and the Government in May, and the report was finalized after duly considering all comments received. The Office of Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also peer reviewed the draft final report, and their comments have also been taken into account in the final report.
34. IOE organized a learning workshop in Delhi on 11 June 2015, which was attended by representatives of the Government, project authorities, beneficiaries, think tanks, research and academic institutions, IFAD management and others. The main aim of the workshop was to share the results and lessons from the evaluation, and to discuss key issues related to tribal development in India in general.
35. It is worth underlining that the learning workshop was held back to back with the India country programme evaluation inception workshop, to strengthen the synergies between these two IOE evaluations. Moreover, IOE organized an internal learning workshop within IFAD on 24 June 2015. The impact evaluation report together with the IFAD Management's written response was discussed in the Evaluation Committee at the end of June 2015.
36. Lastly, in terms of communication and dissemination, the report has been published and posted as a downloadable file on the evaluation section of the IFAD website. Together with the main report, an evaluation Profile<sup>12</sup> has been produced and disseminated mostly through electronic means. Special efforts are being made to ensure wider outreach of the main lessons and recommendation from this impact evaluation to programme beneficiaries, through affordable and effective communication media (e.g., radio, television, etc.).

#### **D. Limitations**

37. The evaluation faced a number of limitations. First and foremost and as mentioned before, it had to deal with poor quality baseline data. While baseline surveys were available in both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, they had not been conducted at the outset of the programme, and did not include comparison groups. This implied that the impact evaluation could not also use the 'before and after' analysis to generate an indication of the programme's impact. It was also not possible to use memory recall methods to reconstruct the baseline, given the evaluation was done more than 15 years after programme design. As such, the impact evaluation relied largely on the 'with and without' analysis.
38. However, this limitation was overcome by using a mixed-method approach in the impact evaluation, which entailed collecting and analysing information and data using different instruments before making final evaluative judgements. For instance, detailed discussions were held with key informants at both the central government and states levels using semi-structured questionnaires. Similarly, discussions were held with former project directors in each state, to capture their insights and feedback.
39. With regard to methodology for data collection and analysis, while propensity score matching is widely used, the technique also has some limitations. The most obvious is that the pairing of households 'with and without' programme can only be done based on "observable" characteristics. If households with and without programme differ on other characteristics that are not captured by the survey or the statistical model, then the results may still be biased to a certain degree. While propensity score matching can control for contamination and spill over, it cannot completely eliminate this bias, especially in a programme which overlaps with many "blanket"

<sup>12</sup> A profile is a two-page brochure (more or less 800 words) summarizing the main findings and recommendations from the evaluation. They are intended for policy and decision makers, who might not find time to read the entire impact evaluation report.

Government development interventions. To overcome this limitation to the extent possible, and in order to check and ensure the consistency of the results, other matching techniques were used, such as Kernel Matching to calculate the average treatment effect and the nearest neighbour method. Both algorithms have produced similar results.

40. The fact that JCTDP was implemented as two separate projects in two different states also posed some challenges to the evaluation. For instance, IOE had to examine two sets of project documentation and data, and meet government officials and conduct field work in two states, all with the budget assigned for a single impact evaluation. This limitation was overcome by fine-tuning some elements of the evaluation process, as and when feasible. For instance, IOE asked the project directors from both states to come to New Delhi for a joint briefing at the outset of the evaluation, rather than travelling to two different states which would have entailed more time and resources.

### III. Country and states context

41. India is the second most populous country, with around 1.2 billion people, and one of the largest economies in the world. Since independence in 1947, industrial development and gross domestic savings increased substantially, inducing significant improvements in living conditions: doubled life expectancy, quadrupled literacy, improved health conditions, and the emergence of a significant middle class. India has a strongly dichotomous economy with a competitive knowledge economy and middle-class as well as a rain-fed subsistence agricultural economy for a vast number of rural Indians. Poverty is concentrated in such areas and with poverty rates nearly four times higher than those in more developed countries.
42. Although the overall number of poor in the country is declining, with a poverty headcount ratio of 29.8 per cent in 2010 compared to 37.2 per cent in 2005, almost one third of the country's population continues to live below the poverty line. Members belonging to the scheduled<sup>13</sup> castes and tribal people<sup>14</sup> are amongst the poorest people in the country.
43. The scheduled tribes and scheduled castes are groups identified in the Constitution of India. They are historically among the most disadvantaged in terms of poverty, illiteracy, nutrition and health status. The scheduled tribes are also called *Adivasis*. They are indigenous people living deep inside forests, away from society. Based on the 2011 national census, India's total scheduled tribal population is around 104 million, which is just under 10 per cent of total population.
44. The particularly vulnerable tribal groups (PVTGs) are the most isolated among the tribal population groups. They are distinguished on the basis of a number of indicators of backwardness, such as: (i) pre-agricultural level of technology; (ii) low level of literacy; and (iii) stagnant or diminishing population. India has the largest tribal population in the world, with about 532 scheduled tribes with each its own ethnicity and culture.
45. The scheduled castes are also amongst the poorest in the country. They are also known as *Dalits*. Scheduled castes constitute around 16 per cent of the total national population, which is more or less 170 million people, as per the 2011 census. The total number of schedule caste households in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh is 750 000 in each state. Half of them live in rural areas.
46. Due to the increasing poverty and deprivation, the government acknowledged the need for state intervention in poverty alleviation and focused on the empowerment of the above-mentioned communities. To this end, it enacted the Panchayats

<sup>13</sup> The scheduling of communities evolved out of the British colonial era and was first categorized in the constitution through the Government of India (Scheduled Caste) order in 1936.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations Development Programme (2011a).

(Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) in 1996, to cover the "Fifth Schedule areas",<sup>15</sup> which are not comprised in the Panchayati Raj Act<sup>16</sup> of the Indian Constitution. The PESA is a unique legislation providing a self-governance framework for tribal communities, to empower them and preserve their traditions and natural resources, while ensuring greater participation in socio-economic development processes. It also established a dedicated Ministry for Tribal Affairs in 1999 with the objective of providing more focused attention to ensuring integrated socio-economic development of scheduled tribes, in a coordinated and planned manner. This Ministry emerged out of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, who are, amongst others, dedicated to the welfare of the scheduled castes and other backward classes.

47. Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are two adjoining states carved out of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, respectively, in November 2000. The programme, originally approved by the IFAD Board as the Bihar-Madhya Pradesh Tribal Development Programme, was renamed as the Jharkhand Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme.
48. The two states together are home to 16.25 per cent of India's scheduled tribes of which around three-quarter is rural. When the programme became effective in 2001, Jharkhand had the second highest proportion of scheduled tribes (26.3 per cent), after Chhattisgarh (31.8 per cent).
49. Jharkhand is considered one of the most industrialized states in India and both states are richly endowed with minerals. By contrast, industrial development did not bring prosperity to the populations of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh during the last 50 years. The majority of the tribal population still depend on forest-based rural activity. They are not particularly familiar with mainstream society including its economic development, politics and cultural practises. With the nationalization of forests and correlated displacement over the years, the scheduled tribes have become more dependent on agriculture, and to some small extent, on unskilled jobs in urbanized areas.
50. The majority of the population lives under the poverty line (US\$1.25 per day) and both states are in the "alarming" category of the global hunger index,<sup>17</sup> given their relatively high levels of malnutrition and undernourishment. As high as nearly 50 per cent of children under the age of five in Chhattisgarh and 57.1 per cent in Jharkhand are underweight, especially among the tribal people in the rural areas.<sup>18</sup>
51. Slow development, limited self-governance and the struggle for redistribution of land and natural resources are among the primary reasons for the growth of far left-wing extremism in many states in India, including Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The so-called Naxalite-Maoist insurgency/violence movement is particularly spread in dense forests as well as in less developed and remote tribal areas of rural southern and eastern India. Naxalites have historically also been quite active in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand as well. With the introduction of PESA, the Government of India hopes to change the socio-political landscape of the scheduled areas, and eventually eliminate support from the grass roots towards the Naxalite-Maoist movements.

<sup>15</sup> The Fifth Schedule covers Tribal areas in 9 states of India namely Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Rajasthan.

<sup>16</sup> Mahatma Gandhi advocated Panchayati Raj, a decentralized form of Government where each village is responsible for its own affairs, as the foundation of India's political system.

<sup>17</sup> Score between 20.0-29.9 is categorized as alarming in the global hunger index.

<sup>18</sup> International Food Policy Research Institute (2009).

## IV. The Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme

52. **Programme title.** The designs of the Madhya Pradesh Tribal Development and Bihar Community Development projects were formulated separately and completed by July 1997 and October 1997, respectively. The Asia and the Pacific Division then decided that these two projects should be redesigned and integrated into a single programme. This approach was justified on the following grounds: (i) the tribal belt in the two programme areas was geographically contiguous and represented a population belonging mostly to the same tribal groups; and (ii) there were plans, at that time, to merge this tribal belt into one state.<sup>19</sup>
53. The JCTDP was implemented in Jharkhand as the Jharkhand Tribal Development Project (JTDP), and in Chhattisgarh as the Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Project (CTDP). For all practical purposes, they were implemented as two separate projects, though formally financed through one loan approved by the IFAD Executive Board.
54. **Timeline.** As mentioned earlier, the JCTDP was originally approved - as the Bihar-Madhya Pradesh Tribal Development Programme - by the Executive Board in April 1999. It became effective on 21 June 2001, and was completed in Chhattisgarh on 1 January 2010. In Jharkhand, the programme was extended and completed on 30 June 2012. Table 4 summarizes key programme dates of the JCTDP.

Table 4

**Key programme dates of the Jharkhand Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme**

IFAD approval	Signing	Effectiveness	Mid-term review	Original loan closing	Actual loan closing	Original completion	Actual completion
29 Apr 1999	13 Mar 2001	21 Jun 2001	Jan-Feb 2006	31 Dec 2009	31 Dec 2012*	30 Jun 2009	30 Jun 2012 (Jharkhand)
							01 Jan 2010 (Chhattisgarh)

\* Being a single loan, actual loan closing date for JCTDP remains the same, i.e. 31 December 2012. However, Chhattisgarh project was reimbursed till 27 July 2010 while its programme activities ended on 1 January 2010.

Source: IFAD's PCR Validation Mission Main Report (2012).

55. The Executive Board approved a further IFAD-financed project in Jharkhand on 21 September 2012, with an estimated total cost of US\$115.6 million including an IFAD loan of US\$51 million. This project is known as the Jharkhand Tribal Empowerment and Livelihoods Project (JTELP). It has been effective since 4 October 2013 and is expected to complete on 31 December 2021.
56. **Programme area.** Each state in India is divided into districts. Each district is further divided into blocks comprising several villages or village clusters. In Chhattisgarh, the programme covered three districts - namely Surguja, Raigargh and Jashpur, including 13 blocks<sup>20</sup> and 429 villages. In Jharkhand, it was supposed to cover three districts - namely East Singhbhum, West Singhbhum, and Ranchi - but in fact also Khunti and Saraikela-Kharsawan have been covered for a total of 12 blocks and 330 villages.<sup>21</sup>
57. **Objective.** The programme aimed to develop and implement a replicable model that ensures household food security and improves the livelihood opportunities and the overall quality of life of the target group, based on a sustainable and equitable use of natural resources.

<sup>19</sup> Report No: 98/067 IFAD-IND "Bihar.Madhya Pradesh Tribal Development Programme " Reformulation mission - FAO Investment Centre.

<sup>20</sup> Three more than planned at appraisal, information obtained during the preparatory mission to India.

<sup>21</sup> Information obtained during the preparatory mission to India.


58. **Specific objectives.** As mentioned earlier, the programme had three main specific objectives: (i) empowerment and capacity-building of tribal grass-roots associations and users' groups; (ii) livelihood system enhancement through activities that generate sustainable increases in production and productivity of land and water resources; and (iii) generation of alternative sources of income outside of agriculture, particularly for the landless.
59. **Components.** The programme comprised the following components: (i) *beneficiary-empowerment and capacity-building*: especially of tribal grass-roots associations and users' groups, financing awareness-creation on tribal rights and gender issues, farmer-based technical training as well as managerial and legal strengthening; (ii) *livelihood-systems enhancement*: with particular focus on infrastructure, land and rural water management, community-based forest management as well as livestock production improvement, rural micro-finance, health and nutrition services and the development of a crops research programme; and (iii) *programme management*: mainly targeting the mobilization of beneficiary communities and the construction of working linkages with donors, NGOs and government staff. The programme's logical framework can be seen in annex IV.
60. **Target group.** The target group consisted of all households in villages, hamlets and habitations with tribal communities, particularly vulnerable tribal groups and scheduled caste population of not less than 50 per cent of the total population - in which the majority of the households live below the poverty line. Special attention was to be paid to vulnerable groups such as tribal women, landless, semi-landless, small holders, hill cultivators, scheduled caste and particularly vulnerable tribal groups.
61. **Design of the programme institutional delivery system.** The programme pursued its objectives by adopting in both states an integrated watershed management approach, which focused on raising crop productivity, diversification and livelihood improvement in watersheds along with soil and water conservation measures, emphasizing on collective action and community participation, including participation of primary stakeholders through community-based organizations, NGOs and *Panchayati Raj* institutions (PRIs).
62. Two autonomous state-level Tribal Development Societies (TDS) were created in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand to ensure an effective and efficient delivery system for the execution of the programme. The TDS of Jharkhand operated within the overall framework of the Welfare Department of the state, while the TDS of Chhattisgarh within the overall framework of the Tribal Development Department. The board of the TDSs comprised representatives of both governments and representatives of beneficiaries and NGOs.
63. A programme management unit (PMU) was established within each TDS headed by a state programme director and responsible for broader day-to-day programme management, and monitoring the performance of activities and their progress towards targets set. A total of four District Project Implementation Units (DPIUs) were established, each headed by a District Project Manager (DPM) and a small team of sector professionals.
64. Eighty-three facilitating NGOs assisted the DPIUs in the overall implementation of the programme at village level by mobilizing village grass-roots organizations and crafting local leadership capacity along with promoting decentralized planning and management. The local communities were organized into micro-finance self-help groups (SHGs), common interest groups for livestock and aquaculture activities, farmer field schools (FFS), as well as various committees responsible for the planning and implementation of specific programme activities.
65. The programme facilitated the establishment of democratic decision-making processes by supporting the gram sabha, which is the most important decision-making body at village level. Each gram sabha had a project executive committee

(GSPEC), which was in charge of merging the micro-plans prepared by the village grass-roots organizations into the Gram Sabha Natural Resource Management and Livelihood Plans (GSRMP).

- 66. After approval by the gram sabha, the GSRMP was presented to the DPIU for the creation of a district plan containing all the GSRMPs formulated at village level. The district plan was submitted to the TDSs for financing.
- 67. In order to facilitate the understanding of the institutional delivery mechanism, the evaluation created a diagram illustrating the implementation and coordination arrangements between the state, district and village levels (box 2). A more detailed description of the various institutions and responsibilities at state, district and village level can be found in the glossary in annex V.

Box 2

**Programme coordination pattern**




Source: IOE.

- 68. **Programme costs and financing.** As approved by the Executive Board, the expected total cost of JCTDP was US\$41.7 million. This comprised an IFAD loan of US\$23 million on highly concessional terms,<sup>22</sup> US\$4.8 million as contribution of the borrower, and US\$3.4 million as beneficiary contribution. In addition, it envisaged international co-financing of US\$10.5 million by DfID as a grant. Disbursements were projected over an 8 year period, starting at the beginning of June 1999. The flow of funds arrangement of the programme is shown in Box 3.

Box 3

**Fund flow pattern**



Source: IOE

<sup>22</sup> Forty years, including a grace period of ten years, with a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum.

69. **Supervision.** The JCTDP was one of the 15 programmes included in the Direct Supervision Pilot Programme, approved by the IFAD Governing Council in February 1997. Up until the introduction of the Direct Supervision Pilot Programme, all IFAD operations in all countries were supervised by co-operating institutions, such as United Nations Office for Project Services or the World Bank.
70. IOE evaluated the Direct Supervision Pilot Programme in 2005 and recommended that IFAD conduct direct supervision of its operations, rather than continue to outsource this important function to cooperating institutions. The Management and Board agreed with this recommendation and IFAD introduced its Supervision Policy in December 2006, which enabled IFAD to conduct direct supervision of its operations. The key issue is that – unlike most other operations approved by the Board at the time – the JCTDP benefitted from IFAD’s direct supervision and implementation support right from its approval and throughout implementation.
71. **IFAD country office.** The IFAD country office (ICO) in New Delhi, India was established in 2000, before the Field Presence Pilot Programme was approved by the Board in December 2003. India was formally included in the Field Presence Pilot Programme, as one of the 15 countries in all geographic regions, where IFAD would experiment with country presence between 2003-2006.
72. Therefore, throughout implementation of the JCTDP, IFAD had a country office in India. The country office had a range of responsibilities in relation to the JCTDP (and other IFAD-supported activities in the country), including follow-up and monitoring of supervision recommendations and implementation support.

## V. Programme performance

73. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the programme’s performance using internationally recognized evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. In addition and as mentioned before, the programme’s performance is also assessed for innovation and scaling up, gender equality and women’s empowerment, as well as IFAD and government performance. Based on the assessment of each of these criteria, the evaluation provides an integrated assessment of *overall project achievement*.

### A. Relevance

74. IOE defines relevance as the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of programme design and coherence in achieving its objectives. Based on the above definition, this section of the report includes assessing: (i) the relevance of JCTDP objectives; and (ii) the relevance of its design.
75. **Relevance of objectives.** The programme supported women’s empowerment and tribal development, grass-roots building, micro-finance and livelihoods promotion. This three-pronged strategy represents a holistic approach to improving the situation of the rural tribal poor, and has been relevant in terms of its alignment with national policies, IFAD’s strategies, the India country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs) and to the needs of the poor, as described in the below paragraphs.
76. Relevance to national policies. The objectives of the JCTDP are relevant to the Government of India’s national policies and strategies for rural poverty reduction as set out in the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh National Development Plans. The programme’s objectives are also aligned with several government agricultural



- sector policies<sup>23</sup> especially the Forests Rights Act (2006). The latter calls for, *inter-alia*, stimulating agricultural growth in remote rural areas, ensuring that tribal people and other vulnerable groups have access to secure lands, non-timber forest produce and other natural resources, and greater participation of tribal people in local governance, development initiatives and resource allocation processes.
77. Moreover, the programme was designed to assist the state Governments of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in the implementation of the PESA. In the context of this act, the programme sought to establish a basis for the implementation of PESA by building the capacity of grass-roots institutions, such as self-help groups and gram sabhas, and financing a multitude of trainings on awareness-creation on tribal rights and gender and equity issues, through the support and facilitation of local NGOs.
  78. Relevance to IFAD strategies. The JCTDP was consistent with IFAD's regional strategy for Asia and the Pacific of 2002, which had a strong focus on rural microfinance, access to land and natural resources and on reducing poverty by enhancing the capabilities of Indigenous Peoples and other marginalized groups.
  79. The objectives of the programme are also aligned with IFAD's corporate strategic frameworks (1998-2001, 2002-2006 and 2007-2010).
  80. In particular, the programme was designed under the 1998-2001 IFAD Strategic Framework, which had as one of the main long-term objectives to support "programmes driven by beneficiary participation in both design and implementation."<sup>24</sup>
  81. However, bilateral interviews carried out with key stakeholders during the evaluation revealed that the views of some key players were not sufficiently solicited during programme design. In particular, very little consultation was held with the central Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Ministry of Environment and Forests, which both have critical roles in tribal development of the country. Likewise, little dialogue was held with the central Ministry of Rural Development and Ministry of Agriculture, two other key institutions that have a central role in the agriculture and rural sectors of the country.
  82. Given the federal system of governance in India, programmes are implemented at the state level. However, IFAD loans are provided to the central government, which takes the responsibility of repayments to the Fund. Moreover, central government has an important role in policy setting, coordination, and financing of national programmes that also cover tribal areas (e.g., the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme). As such, the JCTDP did not clearly articulate its synergies with such programmes, and opportunities for enhanced convergence with central government interventions were not properly exploited.
  83. Finally, the programme has generally made positive contributions in fostering women's participation and empowerment. However, the programme was not retrofitted during implementation, to allow it to contribute to achieving IFAD's priorities as enshrined in the organization's Gender Plan of Action<sup>25</sup> approved by the Board in April 2003, nor did the JCTDP have a comprehensive gender strategy. Given the JCTDP was in its initial stages of implementation when the Gender Plan of Action was adopted, it would have been appropriate to retrofit the programme to

<sup>23</sup> Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006; National Forest Policy of 1988 and the Joint Forest Management Guidelines of 1990; National Agriculture Policy 2000-2020; National Water Policy, as revised in 2002.

<sup>24</sup> IFAD Strategic Framework 1998-2000, Thrust A <http://www.ifad.org/pub/other/1framework.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> The three main priorities of the gender action plan were to: expand women's access to and control over fundamental assets – capital, land, knowledge and technologies; strengthen women's agencies – their decision-making role in community affairs and representation in local institutions; and improve women's well-being and ease their workloads by facilitating access to basic rural services and infrastructures.

ensure its compliance with an important corporate priority (i.e., the Gender Plan of Action in this case). Nevertheless, this aspect will be further explored in the gender equality and women empowerment chapter of the report.

84. Relevance to COSOPs. The implementation of the programme covered the IFAD COSOPs for India of 2001 and 2005, respectively. The JCTDP's overall objective was relevant to the 2001 COSOP, under which the programme was designed, in terms of: (i) promoting greater participation of beneficiaries; (ii) building the capacity of grass-roots institutions of disadvantaged groups; and (iii) creating access to resources and improved financial services. These key elements were reaffirmed in the subsequent India country strategy of 2005.
85. Relevance of the approach to the local context and the needs of the poor. The watershed management approach adopted by the programme was particularly relevant to the local context as well as to the type of interventions that the Government of India has sponsored and implemented from the early 1970s onwards, especially in fragile and marginal rain-fed areas.
86. However, the programme treated the natural watersheds as an intervention boundary without considering if these villages would be covered in a panchayat. This had severe implications for the sustainability of the programme that will be discussed later in the report.
87. Targeting. Since JCTDP applied a watershed approach in the programme area, it was impossible to restrict support exclusively to the households below the poverty line. Therefore, the targeting approach consisted in the geographical selection of sites where tribal populations exceeded 50 per cent of the total and in which the majority of the households live below poverty line. Both tribal and non-tribal populations were targeted by the programme, but the tribal people had the largest representation.
88. As highlighted in the Evaluation Synthesis on IFAD's Engagement with Indigenous Peoples (2015) by IOE, geographic targeting is more effective in societies that are homogeneous and when supported by an in-depth understanding of the poverty and livelihood dynamics. In the case of the JCTDP, the rural poverty analysis was not carried out at design and different groups have been placed in the same group. The targeting approach differentiated only between tribal people and others (scheduled castes, landless, small and marginal farmers, women, youth, PVTGs). However, programme design did not pay adequate attention to designing activities taking into account the heterogeneities of these different groups and their specific requirements.
89. **Relevance of design**. The JCTDP is a two-state programme, in which two largely separate operations are combined under one IFAD loan. Each operation was implemented by two different state governments with their respective legal frameworks, and administrative services and departments. The states also have different socio-economic and agro-ecological contexts. Each operation had its own independent project management arrangement, with limited opportunities for systematically exchanging knowledge, lessons or implementation experiences.
90. Moreover, IFAD did not provide greater administrative budget for managing the JCTDP (which one would have expected given the aforementioned), thus causing several challenges – for example, in terms of direct supervision and implementation support; coordination of activities; monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results; and the preparation of the project completion reports. A similar conclusion may be found in the recent IOE project performance evaluation (2014/2015) of the Livelihoods Improvement Project in the Himalayas, which also covers two states (Meghalaya and Uttarakhand) under one loan.
91. In addition to the above, the JCTDP had a complex design, as it contained a diversity of components and sub-components including: natural resources and environmental management; agricultural activities; credit and savings; community

- organization; women's development; education; health and nutrition; small infrastructure; marketing; and institution-building. The multiplicity of components and sub-components covering numerous sub-sectors called for enhanced involvement of and coordination across different line departments at the state level and with Ministries in the centre, as well as with NGOs engaged in social mobilization and training. This also caused challenges to IFAD in supervision, as it needed to mobilize experts in a range of thematic areas to ensure adequate supervision, monitoring and implementation support of the programme.
92. Moreover, some JCTDP activities planned in design did not receive adequate attention during implementation, partly due to the dispersed nature of the programme. For instance, the programme design intended to target landless through non-land based livelihood activities, yet the review of programme documents, household survey and interactions at the community level suggest that this was not sufficiently achieved. Similarly, the programme did not have a clear strategy for improving health and nutrition, in spite of its original intentions.
  93. The underlying assumptions in the programme's logical framework were general and the logical framework was not used to articulate the causal links between inputs and outputs, outputs and outcomes, and outcomes and impact. While it is noteworthy that the programme design made an attempt to include a logical framework, its quality was generally weak and it was not used by the programme management and others concerned to monitor results or manage for results.
  94. The programme's theory of change (ToC) suggests that JCTDP had a sound, holistic and inclusive approach. The starting point of the ToC entails promoting self-help activities by small groups, leading to village level increased awareness and mobilization. This would be followed by the development of land, water and forest resources to ensure water security, and thereafter, the introduction of technologies to enhance productivity. The programme would simultaneously undertake income generating activities for landless, marginal farmers and PVTG households.
  95. However, in reconstructing the programme's ToC at the time of evaluation, IOE identified two essential assumptions that were not properly considered in the overall design and implementation arrangements of the programme. These include: (i) the serious fragility and conflict situation in the intervention areas in both states; and (ii) the timeliness and availability of the funds for programme implementation. These two assumptions are discussed in the below paragraphs.
  96. Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh have been for decades affected by the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency movement, causing wide-spread violence especially in remote rural and tribal areas. However, the evaluation did not find any evidence that the programme design was informed by a coherent fragility and/or risk analysis, nor did the logical framework include any specific indicator to measure fragility.
  97. The JCTDP was therefore not adequately customized to the fragile situation in which it was implemented. For instance, the design document made little, if any, reference to security risks, access to communities, supervision requirements, or implications to programme management and implementation in a conflict setting. These aspects will be explored in relevant chapters of the report.
  98. As will be explained and further elaborated in the section on programme efficiency later in the report, JCTDP suffered from untimely and insufficient flow of funds, causing severe delays in implementation and utilization of the funds, especially in the initial phase of the programme. This was partly due to the over-estimation of the institutional capacities in the two newly formed states and their understanding of the flow of funds procedures of a loan-funded intervention by a multilateral development organisation like IFAD.
  99. Another major issue was that the US\$10.5 million grant that DfID was supposed to provide did not materialize, though the provision of these funds was an integral part of the programme's design and its cost structure. DfID decided to withdraw

from the JCTDP soon after the loan was approved by the Board. This was because after loan approval, the operation (which was originally formulated as the Bihar and Madhya Pradesh Tribal Development Programme) covered the newly-formed states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, which were not part of the priority states for DfID intervention in India at that time. However, the evaluation did not find any evidence that the JCTDP design was accordingly adjusted to reflect the non-availability of DfID funding.

100. **Rating.** JCTDP objectives were strongly aligned to government policies, IFAD strategies and the needs of the poor. However, it has several design deficiencies, which in the end compromised its effectiveness and impact. All in all, therefore, the impact evaluation rates relevance as moderately satisfactory (4).

#### Key points

- The programme is assessed as moderately satisfactory for relevance given its holistic approach to improving the situation of the rural tribal poor, and relevance in terms of its alignment with national policies, IFAD's strategies, COSOPs and the needs of the poor.
- The programme pursued its objectives by adopting an integrated watershed management approach in both states, which is found particularly relevant to the local context as well as to the type of interventions that the Government of India has sponsored and implemented.
- The design of this "two-state programme under one loan" was overly complex, not sufficiently participatory and did not consider key assumptions, such as the conflict situation of the two states as well as the untimeliness and unavailability of financial resources.
- The targeting approach differentiated only between tribal people and others, without paying attention to the heterogeneities among indigenous people and the need for appropriate development strategies to meet the respective needs of the target groups.

## B. Effectiveness

101. In assessing effectiveness and in line with the evaluation manual, the impact evaluation aims to determine the extent to which the three specific objectives of the programme were achieved. The analysis and findings in this chapter are therefore organized according to the three JCTDP objectives, as approved by the IFAD Executive Board. Moreover, the evaluation provides an assessment of the effectiveness in the programme outreach and IFAD's targeting approach.
102. **Effectiveness in outreach.** According to the programme data, JCTDP reached 86,888 households at the time of closure, as compared to 86,000 expected at design. This entails a total number of 494,970 beneficiaries as indicated in table 5.

Table 5

Population reached by JCTDP

	Total	Women	Men
Number of beneficiaries	494 970	204 999	213 436

Source: IFAD's PCR mission main report (2012).

103. Towards the end of the programme, the project beneficiaries in Jharkhand included about 82 per cent of scheduled tribes, 3 per cent of scheduled castes, 14 per cent of other background classes and 7 per cent of landless. No reference to the percentage of PVTGs reached is provided. In total, 70 per cent of the beneficiaries were below the poverty line.<sup>26</sup> In Chhattisgarh, more than 50 per cent of the

<sup>26</sup> [10<sup>th</sup> Joint Review Mission, September 12-24, Aide-mémoire \(2011\).](#)

project beneficiaries were below the poverty line, but no specific segregated registration among scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, PVTGs and landless was found in the reports or Results and Impact Management System (RIMS).

104. Given the above, it can be said that the programme reached its overall target in terms of numbers of beneficiaries. The tribal community formed the highest share of the target group, but the programme did not succeed in reaching the poorest. As table 6 shows, the PVTGs are highly underrepresented and benefitted the least from the programme.
105. However, it has to be recognized that the PVTGs and landless were very difficult to reach due to their remote and hilly habitat. It has been proven difficult for the PVTGs and landless to join or form SHGs, which require regular meetings and savings. The landless migrate often and the PVTGs are mainly involved in hunting and gathering. Both groups find it difficult to attend regular weekly meetings, lack affinity with the other social groups or lack the necessary assets, for this reason a more targeted approach would have been appropriate to meet the needs of these two groups.

Table 6

**Summary of households (HHs) targeted by state**

<i>States</i>	<i>HHs target at appraisal</i>	<i>HH's reached</i>
Jharkhand	22 600 (Bihar)	36 648
	of which 1 050 PVTG HH	of which 413 PVTG HH
Chhattisgarh	51 000 (Madhya Pradesh)	50 240
	of which 4.900 PVTG HH	of which 490 PVTG HH
Total	73 600	86 888
	of which about 5.950 PVTG HH	of which 903 PVTG HH

Source: JTDP project completion report (2012) and CTDP project completion report (2011).

106. **Effectiveness in targeting.** The evaluative evidence in assessing IFAD's targeting approach is provided by the probit model, which derives from the analysis of primary data in the impact survey. The analysis offers an indication of the effectiveness of IFAD targeting approach by matching the treatment and comparison groups on a set of salient characteristics that influence the participation of households in the programme.
107. As shown in table 7, scheduled tribes households across both states were found to be positively and significantly correlated with programme participation. Along the same line, the likelihood of participation in the programme of a household below the poverty line is significant. Households engaged in agricultural activities and women involved in gram sabha participation were more likely to have participated in the programme, but this relationship was not found to be statistically significant. On the other hand, households with literate heads were found to have a negative correlation with programme participation. It can therefore be assumed that the programme's targeting strategy focused more on disadvantaged households although PVTGs were less represented.

Table 7  
**Probit estimates for participation in the programme**

	Jharkhand	Chhattisgarh
Caste of the household	.014 (.09)**	.012 (.08)*
Poverty line status	.050 (.007)***	.109 (.0426)***
Household engaged in agricultural activity	.024 (.083)	.373 (.079) ***
Literate household head	-.020 (.073)	-.002 (.074)
Women participation in gram sabha	.093 (.061)	-.011 (.052)
Constant	1.10***	1.06
Pseudo R-Square	.057	0.014

Note: Standard error in parenthesis.

Level of significance: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

108. **Effectiveness in achieving the programme objectives.** The evaluation found it extremely difficult to retrieve quantitative information about the achievement of the programme against its specific objectives. This is due to the weak monitoring system in the programme. First and foremost, there is no reference in the logical framework to JCTDP's three main objectives, and how they are linked with the outputs and indicators stated. Instead, the framework is structured by programme components. Component one and two overlap with objective one and two, while objective three is embedded in component two on livelihood enhancement. Component three is on programme management.
109. Secondly, the targets for the 39 indicators contained in the logical framework are at an aggregated level for the whole programme and mostly expressed in percentages, while the outputs at completion are presented at a segregated level per state, and mostly expressed in absolute numbers in the PCRs and RIMS. Therefore, the comparison between targets at appraisal and outputs at completion was possible for only few indicators for which the two projects established the targets in the respective annual work programmes.
110. Thirdly, the data were collected at output level and therefore no information is provided for the achievements at programme completion at outcome level. Moreover, there are numerous inconsistencies between the outputs reported in the PCRs and in the RIMS and there is no indication of how monitoring data were collected during implementation. With regard to both baseline and endline surveys, no indication is provided for the methodology used for determining the sample size and sampling strategy. This makes the data available scarcely reliable.
111. Given the above, the findings in this chapter are based on the triangulation of several data and information sources, that go beyond the careful review of programme documents, RIMS and monitoring and evaluation data. These include qualitative primary data collected by IOE during this impact evaluation, site visits and inspection of various programme activities, as well as part of the quantitative data collected through the impact survey. Therefore, it can be confidently said that the analysis in this section is based on a vast amount of robust data and information.
112. **Objective 1: Empowerment and capacity-building of tribal grass-roots associations and users' groups.** As described in chapter IV, to facilitate the implementation of the PESA, the programme established an institutional delivery system at state level to mobilize the targeted communities into groups and strengthen the role of tribal grass roots organizations in local development and governance processes. To this end, the programme fostered a participatory bottom-up approach and financed broad-based awareness-creation on tribal rights and gender and equity issues. Discussions with authorities and communities and

the review of programme documents suggest that this model was effective in empowering and enhancing the capacity of grass-roots associations and groups.

113. Table 8 contains the comparison of available targets at design and outputs at completion as relevant to objective (or component) 1.

Table 8

**Objective 1: Programme targets and outputs**

	Jharkhand		Chhattisgarh	
	Target	Output	Target	Output
<b>Component 1: Beneficiary-empowerment and capacity-building</b>				
Establishment of gram sabhas*	430	330	550	437
Establishment of Gram Sabha Programme Executive Committees (GSPECs)	430	330	550	437
Establishment of SHGs	1 600	1 462	1 170	1 021
Gender and equity trainings	1 076	257	2 136	502
Awareness in legal rights trainings	990	326	1 950	381

Source: RIMS and project completion reports

\* Overall target of the programme was 980 and for Chhattisgarh 550.

114. The above table shows that many of the targets were not met, partly due to the reduction in project costs. This also reveals that the targets at design were over-ambitious and did not take into account challenges in the delivery system. The programme contributed to organizing gram sabhas and GSPECs in both states, achieving 76 per cent of the target in both states. Community members were mobilized in 2,483 SHGs across both states - which is almost 90 per cent of the SHG target and covers 50 per cent of the programme households.
115. The quantitative analysis from the impact survey confirms that the coverage of households involved in SHGs remains low after programme completion. In fact, as shown in table 9, at the time of the evaluation only 53 per cent and 43 per cent of the rural poor people below the poverty line in the treatment group of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, is participating in SHGs against an overall target at design of 70 per cent. However, these percentages are higher in the treatment groups of both states and the difference is statistically significant.

Table 9

**Participation in SHGs**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/AT ET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference /ATET	T-stat
<b>SHG membership (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.54	0.36	0.19	3.1***	0.41	0.34	0.07	2.82***
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.54	0.37	0.18	2.99***	0.42	0.34	0.08	2.76***
Overall (matched)	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.36</b>	0.16	3.43***	<b>0.42</b>	<b>0.34</b>	0.08	2.34***
Overall (unmatched)	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.36</b>	0.16	3.88***	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.34</b>	0.09	2.1**

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

116. In Jharkhand, the programme also established 21 Common Interest Groups (CIG), 52 FFS and 78 Community-based Forestry Management Committees (CFMC). During the course of the project, additional committees were set up: 56 Village Marketing Committees (VMC) and 147 Village Health Committees (VHC). There is also mention of women and health committees. However, no information is provided on how many were established, neither for the Watershed Committees and Village Credit Committees created at design. In Chhattisgarh, 157 FFS, 307 farmer groups and 48 village credit committees were established. Village Development Funds (VDFs) were established in each village. Information on other committees is not provided. No targets are provided for these groups.
117. Focus groups discussions and interviews with key stakeholders confirmed that the replication and expansion of the above-mentioned committees and FFS did not receive adequate attention during implementation, due to underperformance and lack of coordination and funds. As a result, the scale of their creation remained very low as compared to the SHGs.
118. While the programme was successful in setting up a self-governance system based on a demand-driven approach, the planning and execution of the activities was often longwinded and unproductive. For example, there were various bottlenecks in prioritizing, approval and budgeting of the individual activities in the village plans among the various decision-making bodies and this resulted in poor utilization of funds and low programme implementation capacity.
119. The programme financed a multitude of technical and awareness-creation trainings which were conducted by the NGOs (see table 8 and 9). 4,787 and 7,529 trainings have been organized in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh respectively. However, some critical issues were only scarcely covered by the trainings, for example literacy and legal rights but also training on book keeping.
120. Creating an enabling environment for the tribal population towards accessing rights and entitlements was one of the cross-cutting themes of programme interventions. In order to make programme beneficiaries aware of their legal rights which are conferred by the constitution, a proposition to set up 7 legal defense funds was suggested in the mid-term review report. While the programme facilitated legal trainings to create awareness regarding their rights and entitlements, the legal defense funds were never constituted.
121. Finally, the programme was supposed to promote exchanges across the states that could not take place in part due to security issues caused by Maoist insurgency in rural areas.
122. **Objective 2. Livelihood system enhancement through activities that generate sustainable increases in production and productivity of land and water resources.** Livelihood enhancement through integrated natural resources management was to be achieved through: (i) land and water management; (ii) community-based forest management; (iii) on-farm activities, including livestock and aquaculture activities; (iv) access to and provision of rural micro-finance services and support to alternative income-generating activities (IGAs); and (v) health and nutrition. Table 10 contains the comparison of available targets at design and outputs at completion as relevant to objective (or component) 2.



Table 10  
Objective 2: Programme targets and outputs

<i>Component 2: Livelihood-system Enhancement</i>	<i>Jharkhand</i>		<i>Chhattisgarh</i>	
	Target	Output	Target	Output
<u><i>Land and water management</i></u>				
Land and water management trainings	120	35	595 persons	1 186 persons
Agriculture trainings	160	437	N/A	5 093 persons
Excavated new pond	619	551	N/A	N/A
Renovated pond	303	256	N/A	N/A
Renovated irrigation water well	16	36	N/A	N/A
Constructed new irrigation canal (length in km)	129	113	N/A	N/A
Established diversion canals	170	128	N/A	N/A
Established water access tanks	391	357	N/A	N/A
Treated watersheds	150 000 ha	70 000 ha	160 178 ha	68 740 ha
Established nr. of village access roads	90	63	N/A	N/A
<u><i>Community-based forest management</i></u>				
Forestry training	485	112	564	146
Establishment of tree nurseries	N/A	N/A	108	Nurseries established in 27 villages
Community forestry management (coverage in ha or acre)	N/A	142.58 acre	280 ha	225 ha
<u><i>Livestock activities</i></u>				
Trainings in Livestock practises and technology	1 245	81	1 560 people	418 people
<u><i>Aquaculture development</i></u>				
Fishery trainings	52	197	3 000 farmers	2 266 farmers
<u><i>Income-generating activities</i></u>				
SHGs accessing microfinance services	25% of all SHGs	350	1041	729
<u><i>Health care and drinking water facilities</i></u>				
Establishment of drinking water wells	89	78	N/A	1 987
Renovation of drinking wells	139	102	N/A	
Establishment of mobile health clinics	N/A	N/A	17	216
Rural health orientation training			101	30
Establishment of low cost toilets	N/A	959	N/A	N/A
Establishment of village health committees	Not envisaged	147	N/A	N/A
Establishment of health awareness camps	N/A	419	N/A	N/A
Women and child immunization	N/A	Around 90%	N/A	N/A
<u><i>Overall health target:</i></u> 60% of concerned villages served by mobile health care facilities three years after block entry.	N/A	N/A	N/A	Output improved in 318 villages

Source: RIMS and project completion reports.

123. The data available show that the programme made good achievements in Jharkhand in creating irrigation structures, wells, ponds and roads, even though the anticipated targets were not met in most cases. Trainings and activities related to soil-improving measures were carried out in Jharkhand. The evaluation cannot comment on Chhattisgarh as the data are not available. However, discussions at community level in both states confirm the PCR finding that the work was quite limited as compared to the potential and needs.
124. While CTDP could cover only 42 per cent of programme villages under land and water management and achieved treatment of 43 per cent of watershed area, JTDP treated 48 per cent of targeted treatable area to be covered.
125. The RIMS does not provide quantitative information on production nor on the hectares of land cultivated with intensive paddy production systems (system of rice intensification) by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). The only quantitative information available is that in the few cases where productivity enhancements were demonstrated, productivity did rise by 50 per cent to 100 per cent. Triangulation with qualitative and quantitative data from the impact survey confirm that the programme managed to improve the intensification of paddy production with new technologies.
126. Livestock production improvement entailed the setting-up of health camps for the various livestock as well as a small scale promotion of livestock income generating activities. 743 and 9,058 beneficiaries received training in livestock production practices and technologies in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, respectively. Despite the number of trainings, the livestock holding of the treatment and comparison groups does not show any significant difference, as table 11 shows.

Table 11

**Households with livestock holding**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/A TET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/A TET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>
	<b>(Yes=1, No=0)</b>							
Scheduled tribe (matched)	.85	.85	-0.3	.05	.82	.83	-0.2	.01
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	.85	.85	-0.4	.07	.83	.83	-0.3	.02
Overall (matched)	.84	.84	0.8	.03	.82	.81	0.2	.02
Overall (unmatched)	.85	.84	0.8	.03	.82	.82	0.2	.02

Level of significance: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

127. The programme also financed forestry activities and community-based forest management, including the establishment of CFMCs. However, the CFMC in Jharkhand were not effective due to lack of a sustained community forest fund, little coordination from the forest department as well as lack of supervision from the programme. In Chhattisgarh, 519 ha of forest land were improved, with no additional information on the management of funds and activities. Overall, the programme did not achieve substantive results, few trainings on natural resources management were conducted, the nurseries were not introduced in Jharkhand, while few positive examples can be found in Chhattisgarh, as the RIMS indicators show.
128. As table 10 above shows, many persons were trained and activities undertaken, however the limited technical input provided and the lack of consistent linkages with extension and research agencies, constrained the effectiveness of this

- component. No information is provided on the number of people that took up the activities for which they were trained.
129. With regard to rural microfinance, the programme facilitated the creation of financial assets through the SHG savings and by promoting the VDFs. The groups in Jharkhand had saved INR 22.94 million and in Chhattisgarh approximately INR 6.55 million. Data at completion in US dollars and targets are not available.
  130. The programme established the SHGs as micro-finance institutions at village level to enable poor households to access financial services and become more self-reliant. As a group, they mobilized small savings and lent those savings to their members. These groups were supported by the facilitating NGOs, who also provided the required trainings in micro-finance.
  131. Initially, the loans were intended to cover consumption needs. However, the long-term goal was to foster financial inclusion by linking the SHGs with commercial banks for productive credit and other financial services and ensure overall livelihood enhancement. Even if the programme succeeded in mobilizing the groups and linking some of them to banks, the programme did not succeed in realizing the full social and economic potential of the SHGs. It did not put enough emphasis on value-addition, promotion of market linkages as well as creation of micro-enterprises. Discussions at the state and village levels suggest that this was due to the lack of a clear strategy on rural enterprise development, which constrained overall outcomes.
  132. Though one of the main objectives of the programme was empowerment and livelihood enhancement, the programme design included a health and nutrition component, which demanded urgent attention in the context of underserved tribal areas without any health facility. Unfortunately, this foresight was not complemented by concerted lines of interventions. Village health committees were not envisaged at design since the implementation was foreseen through specialized NGOs already working in the area and health volunteers. The committees were set up during programme implementation but in low numbers. The programme did however manage to construct and/or rehabilitate 1,987 and 180 drinking water systems in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand respectively, as well as establish low cost toilets, health awareness camps and mobile clinics. Due to the lack of a health strategy, the evaluation could not retrieve clear targets for these interventions.
  133. **Objective 3: Generation of alternative sources of income outside of agriculture, particularly for the landless.** The programme achievement of objective 3 is limited. JCTDP tried to support alternative income generating activities, such as the promotion of backyard poultry, rope making, collection and selling of non-timber forest produce, for a wide range of vulnerable groups, including scheduled caste/scheduled tribe, landless agricultural labourers, small and marginal farmers, women, and young people with no employable skills.
  134. As table 12 shows, the PSM analysis reveals that the number of alternative IGAs undertaken in the treatment areas in the last ten years is very similar to the comparison areas and, in the case of Chhattisgarh, the difference is not statistically significant.
  135. The desk review of programme documents, complemented by discussions at community level, find that the inclusion of this objective in component 2 reduced the attention of the programme and the budget devoted to this objective and that off-farm IGAs could be supported only on a small scale.

Table 12  
**Overview of income-generating activities (IGAs)**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/ ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/ ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>
Scheduled tribe (matched)	3.58	3.43	0.15	2.96**	3.45	3.39	0.06	0.91
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	3.54	3.46	0.08	1.13	3.42	3.40	0.03	0.579
Overall (matched)	3.51	3.31	0.20	3.70***	3.50	3.45	0.05	1.13
Overall (unmatched)	3.44	3.23	0.21	3.65***	3.45	3.45	0.0	0.0

ATET – Average Treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

136. **Rating.** The programme reached a slightly greater number of people than originally planned, helped tribal people get organized in groups, promoted a culture of savings and credit, created rural infrastructure, and contributed to intensification of production systems (livestock and paddy). These are positive achievements.
137. At the same time, however, the activities promoted were not taken to the next level, in order to promote wider rural transformation through backward and forward linkages to markets or greater attention to economic activities that would generate better incomes and livelihoods. It did some ground work towards the diversification of the economic base of the rural poor, but it did not fully achieve this objective. All in all, the evaluation rating for effectiveness is moderately satisfactory (4).

#### Key points

- The programme is assessed as moderately satisfactory for effectiveness given its positive contribution to community mobilization and empowerment as well as micro-finance development.
- The programme drew on the PESA and managed to establish self-governance systems. In this regard, some planning, execution and sustainability issues were highlighted by the evaluation.
- The programme managed to establish land and water structures, mobilize SHGs, arrange on-farm activities and organize various types of technical and awareness trainings. It did however not succeed in achieving the holistic and inclusive livelihood development goal that underpins the programme log frame.
- The programme managed to reach more beneficiaries than envisaged at design. The targeting approach was however less effective for the most vulnerable target groups as the PVTGs and the landless. Programmes with a high variety of social groups require separate targeting approaches and segregated data to monitor their development.
- Challenges in programme implementation – as the availability of funds and fragility of the area – affected the overall effectiveness of the activities and the learning exchanges between the two states.

### C. Efficiency

138. The assessment of efficiency attempts to examine how economically resources and inputs are converted into results. Given the lack of reliable data to conduct cost-benefit analysis at programme completion, the impact evaluation used several proxy indicators to make an assessment of programme efficiency, as described in the below paragraphs.

139. **Approval to effectiveness.** The loan was approved by the Board in April 1999 and became effective in June 2001, more than two years later. This is quite a long time, as compared to other IFAD-financed projects in the country and in the Asia and Pacific region in general. Delayed loan effectiveness, for instance, impinged on efficiency, as IFAD was incurring additional administrative costs (e.g. in terms of travel to the country and time of the Rome-based country programme manager) to follow-up on loan effectiveness conditions. It also implies that the time taken from loan approval to the first disbursement was rather long. This loss in time can be attributed among other reasons to the creation of the two new states and the fact that the new state government leadership and administration required time to settle down.
140. **Economic/financial dimension.** The PCR includes an economic analysis conducted at the time of project closure with respect to three indicators: (i) economic internal rate of return; (ii) net present value; and (iii) benefit-cost ratio (BCR). These were conducted separately for JTDP and CTDP. No consolidated analysis is available at the programme level covering both states. Therefore, the performance indicators at completion cannot be compared with the ones at design.
141. The base case value of the indicators in a 25 year analysis period are summarized for JTDP in table 13 and for CTDP in table 14. The data in these tables show that, under an opportunity cost of capital of 12 per cent and positive net present value, project investments for JTDP are safe, while with a negative net present value for CTDP they are not. Both projects show to be sensitive to both increases in costs and decreases in benefits. Initial investments could not mature in Chhattisgarh, because the activities started late and were not fully completed due to the rejection of the loan extension by state authorities.

Table 13

**Base case values of key performance indicators for JTDP**

Performance indicators	Base case	Costs increase by		Benefits decline by	
		10%	20%	10%	20%
Economic internal rate of return	13%	11%	8%	4%	2%
Net present value at 12% discount rate (million)	18.4	9.9	-34.6	-89.8	-134.2
BCR at 12% discount rate	1.05	1.02	0.94	0.92	0.75

Source: Financial and economic analysis JTDP project completion report (2012).

Table 14

**Base case values of key performance indicators for CTDP**

Performance indicators	Base case	Costs increase by		Benefits decline by	
		10%	20%	10%	20%
Economic internal rate of return	11%	9%	7%	3%	1%
Net present value at 12% discount rate (million)	-15	-39	-117	-204	-282
BCR at 12% discount rate	0.98	0.96	0.88	0.86	0.70

Source: Financial and economic analysis CTDP project completion report (2011).

142. **Proxy indicators of efficiency.** At the time of evaluation, the cost-benefit analysis could not be conducted because of non-availability of appropriate baseline information. Therefore, the evaluation used the cost per individual beneficiary, individual household and SHG, as well as the programme management costs, as proxy indicators of programme efficiency.
143. Table 15 illustrates that at design, the programme outreach overall was estimated at 370,000 beneficiaries. The actual outreach has been 494,970 beneficiaries,

which is almost 34 per cent higher than projected at design. Consequently, the investment cost per beneficiary decreased from US\$112.71 at design, to US\$67.28 at completion.

Table 15  
**JCTDP – proxy indicators of efficiency**

Proxy indicators	At design		At completion	
	Total number	Cost per item in US dollars	Total number	Cost per item in US dollars
Beneficiaries	370 000	112.71	494 970	67.28
Households	73 600	566.58	86 888	383.25

Source: Programme design documents (1999) and project completion report (2012).

144. The evaluation also compared the actual cost per beneficiary household and per self-help group<sup>27</sup> with other IFAD-funded tribal development programmes in India (see table 16). The conclusion is that in the JCTDP, at completion, the costs per household are the lowest and the cost per self-help group the second lowest as compared to the other operations funded by IFAD.
145. Although the above is positive, the overall share of programme management costs has been around 20 per cent of the total programme costs, both at design and completion. These costs are high when compared to other projects in similar socio-economic, geographically disadvantaged and vulnerability contexts. For example, for the IFAD-funded Orissa Tribal Empowerment and Livelihoods Programme, the programme management costs account for around 11 per cent of the total programme costs. The high JCTDP programme management costs reflect the high costs, inter-alia, for implementing a range of activities, training, monitoring and coordination of a programme covering two states.

Table 16  
**Comparison of JCTDP proxy indicators of efficiency with other programmes in the country**

Costs in tribal development projects	Programmes	Total cost	At completion		Total SHGs	Cost per SHG
			Total households	Cost per household		
	Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme	33 000 000	86 888	383	2 483	13 411
	Orissa Tribal Development Project	24 400 000	12 500	1 952	N/A	N/A
	Andhra Pradesh Tribal Development Project	46 500 000	63 370	734	1 231	37 774
	Andhra Pradesh Participatory Tribal Development Project	50 300 000	76 810	655	3 043	16 530
	Orissa Tribal Empowerment & Livelihoods Project <sup>a</sup>	91 200 000	75 000	1 216	3 500	26 057
	North Eastern Region Community Resource Management Project for Upland Areas <sup>b</sup>	32 956 000	20 826	1 582	1 504	21 912
	Livelihood Improvement Project for the Himalayas	71 110 000	87 408	814	5 947	11 957

Source: Various project completion reports and IFAD financial database.


a Data is from 2009. Project is currently expected to close at 31 March 2016.

b Data is from 2013. Project is currently expected to close at 30 September 2016.

<sup>27</sup> The data for average cost per SHG are the total cost of the project divided by the number of SHGs.

146. **Budget utilization and financial delivery.** In the initial years of programme implementation, IFAD's disbursement rate was much lower than expected at appraisal. In 2001, 4.8 per cent of the loan amount was disbursed and till 2006, only around 17 per cent of the amount was disbursed.
147. After the mid-term review in 2006, the disbursement rate increased and 100 per cent of the (reduced) IFAD loan was disbursed by programme closure. This evolution reflects the uptake of the mid-term review recommendation on streamlining the flow of fund and enhanced coordination between partners. The flow of IFAD financing can be seen in chart 1, reflecting the slow disbursement, loan amendment and late spurt of financial delivery towards the end of the programme.

Chart 1

**Disbursement flow of IFAD's loan**

Source: IFAD loans and grants administration.

148. **Fund flow.** Even if the disbursement of IFAD's loan improved over time, the programme had to deal with funds flow issues that occurred between the state governments and the projects. In Jharkhand, the state government only released its annual share of the counterpart funding to the Tribal Development Society (which was responsible for programme management) during the initial 3-4 years, without transferring IFAD's share of funding. Interviews with the IFAD country office and former JTDS Programme Directors confirmed that the limited and slow flow of funds during the initial years of implementation have been the main constraints to an effective and timely implementation of activities in Jharkhand.
149. While the low and slow disbursement was already flagged in the 2006 mid-term review, the problem underlying the flow of funds was only fully recognized in 2008. Before that, it was assumed that the slow flow of funds was due to the lack of a fully operational monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system and proper financial management. According to IFAD project status reports (PSRs), progress in the flow of funds has been noted in 2009. However, in subsequent years, the flow of funds still remained an issue, partly due to weak internal financial controls at the project management level and inadequate M&E systems.
150. Even if Chhattisgarh followed the correct flow of funds process, the release of funds was done in an untimely manner, usually towards the end of the financial year, affecting the pace of implementation of activities throughout project duration. Moreover, the amounts released were much less than projected in the annual work plan and budget of the project, making it difficult for the project to fulfil the established targets.
151. Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter of JCTDP's effectiveness, an excessively long amount of time was taken in consultations between the village and districts levels to agree on activities to be prioritized and the budget allocations for their



implementation. This resulted in unproductive planning, poor utilization of funds (partly due to weak implementation capacities at the local levels), leading to financial allocations being carried over to the next annual work plan and budget cycle.

152. Loan amendment and project extension. The programme was originally intended to complete in June 2009. However, in December 2008, CTDP and JTDP had only used around 45 per cent of their total funds. At that point, it was calculated that, if the two projects would be provided a two-year extension till 2011, they would use up to just over 80 per cent of programme funds. With this in mind, a reallocation of IFAD's loan over the various components and other costs was proposed, resulting in an unallocated amount of SDR 3.4 million (approximately US\$4.6 million). This resulted in a deduction in the original IFAD loan amount of approximately 20 per cent (from SDR 16.95 to SDR 13.55 million) in 2009. In fact, at programme completion, the actual total programme cost inclusive of all financing sources was US\$33.3 million, which is 79.9 per cent of the US\$41.7 million approved at design.
153. An overview of the amendments to the loan is provided in table 17, including equivalent estimates in US dollars.<sup>28</sup>

Table 17

**IFAD loan amendments**

<i>IFAD loan (in million SDR)</i>	<i>Original SDR</i>	<i>Equivalent in million US dollars</i>	<i>Revised SDR</i>	<i>Equivalent in million US dollars*</i>	<i>% disbursed</i>
Chhattisgarh	10.51	14.26	8.40	≈12.91	100
Jharkhand	6.44	8.74	5.15	≈7.91	100
Total	16.95	23.00	13.55	≈20.82	100

\* Twenty per cent loan deduction is reflected in SDR and may not have a commensurate reflection in US dollars due to exchange rate fluctuations.

Source: Programme loan agreement between the Republic of India and IFAD (2001) and loan extension and reallocation for the Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme Memo (2009).

154. Chhattisgarh did not accept the programme extension, and completed its project activities on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2010. Jharkhand accepted the two year extension. Hence, the project's completion date in Jharkhand was 31 December 2011, and closing date was 30 June 2012 (see table 4).
155. All in all, the evaluation concludes that the programme design was over-ambitious in its assessment of the institutional capacities at the state level to manage the resources and ensure timely implementation. Part of the reason is that the JCTDP was the first IFAD-funded operation in the two states, which were actually formed after the programme had been approved by the Executive Board. Hence, at the outset of programme implementation, the state authorities were grappling with governance and administrative issues that any newly formed states would be faced with.
156. High staff turnover. The JCTDP's progress was severely affected by a high turnover of project staff including project directors and M&E officers. Jharkhand had five programme directors throughout implementation, while Chhattisgarh had ten, as detailed in annex VI. This high turnover constrained implementation and efficiency. The turnover of M&E officers adversely affected the programme's data management. When M&E officers or other staff would leave, sometimes the information collected on project progress would get lost with their departure.

<sup>28</sup> Twenty per cent loan deduction is reflected in SDR and may not have a commensurate reflection in US dollars due to exchange rate fluctuations.



157. This high turnover rate was mainly caused by the threat of left-wing extremist violence and the low remuneration and compensation packages of project staff. A similar finding was reported in two project evaluations done by IOE (of the Orissa Tribal Development Project in 1999 and the Andhra Pradesh Tribal Development Project in 2001), and it is unfortunate that the lessons from these evaluations were not properly addressed in the JCTDP. Moreover, at the time, there were many government-sponsored programmes that offered higher salaries and, although the JCTDP's mid-term review recommended an improvement in the compensation package of project staff, very few adjustments were actually made.
158. **Rating.** Notwithstanding the positive cost per beneficiary and cost per SHG, the impact evaluation assesses overall JCTDP efficiency as moderately unsatisfactory (3). There are several reasons for this, including high programme management costs as a proportion of total programme costs, the reduction of the IFAD loan amount due to the poor utilization of funds, high staff turnover, and severe delays from loan approval to effectiveness and first disbursement.
159. Moreover, the extension of the loan by three years in Jharkhand required IFAD to invest greater (than anticipated at design) staff and non-staff costs for administering the programme, including in terms of supervision, monitoring and implementation support. Finally, taking into account the reduction in the IFAD loan amount and noting that the targets were not accordingly adjusted downwards, the JCTDP did not achieve many of its targets established at design in spite of one hundred per cent disbursement of the reduced loan.

#### Key points

- The actual outreach of the programme was higher than envisaged, resulting in a decrease in investment cost per beneficiary and household. Although the target of SHGs was not reached at completion, the cost per SHG decreased due to lower total programme costs than predicted.
- The IFAD loan had a long time lapse from loan approval to effectiveness and first disbursement.
- The institutional capacity in managing the funds was overestimated for this programme. Low disbursement during the initial years, fund flow problems, under spending, unproductive planning as well as high staff turnover significantly affected the efficiency of the programme.
- The programme management costs are high when compared with other investments in similar socio-economic, geographically disadvantaged and vulnerability context.

## VI. Rural poverty impact

160. IOE defines impact as the changes that have occurred – as perceived at the time of evaluation – in the lives of the rural people (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of IFAD interventions.
161. In order to measure the changes and improvements in the quality of life of the rural tribal population in the programme areas, the evaluation carried out a quantitative and qualitative assessment focusing on the five impact domains enshrined in the IOE evaluation manual. The five impact domains were assessed against the indicators in the impact indicator matrix in annex II.
162. **Evaluation approach.** As detailed in the methodology section, the evaluation used a mix-method approach applying quantitative quasi-experimental<sup>29</sup> and qualitative participatory methods. In the absence of a robust baseline, the evaluation used propensity score matching (PSM) to control for bias, and match treatment and comparison groups with high comparability.

<sup>29</sup> In absence of random assignment of treatment, comparison groups with similar characteristics are selected.

163. Hence, if there is a positive difference between treatment and comparison groups, and if this difference is found to be statistically significant, it can be attributed to the programme's intervention, keeping in mind the methodological limitations highlighted in the methodology section of this report.

### A. Household income and assets

164. In line with the IFAD Evaluation Manual, the evaluation in this section assessed household income as the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
165. **Household income.** The next paragraphs provide an assessment of the impact on households income on two metrics: (i) proportion of households above the US\$1.25 a day poverty line; and (ii) household average monthly income.
166. Table 18 shows that the vast majority of the rural population is still living below the poverty line, in both treatment and comparison groups. This confirms that poverty is still rampant in the rural areas of both states, especially if compared to the estimates at both state and national levels.<sup>30</sup> This points to the fact that inequality continues to remain a key concern that has not been addressed. However, the data aggregated at an overall level show that the percentage of households living below the US\$1.25 a day poverty line is lower in the treatment area. The disaggregation of the data at state level confirms this result. A further disaggregation of data for the schedule tribes also shows that the level of poverty in the treatment areas of both states is slightly lower than in comparison areas.

Table 18

#### Households below the poverty line (US\$1.25 per day)

	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
<b>(Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	.85	.92	-0.07	1.73**	.87	.92	-0.05	1.68**
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	.86	.92	-0.06	1.75**	.87	.91	-0.04	1.67**
Overall (matched)	.84	.91	-0.07	1.78**	.87	.92	-0.05	1.69**
Overall (unmatched)	.83	.91	-0.08	1.80**	.87	.91	-0.04	1.68**

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) – Kernel matching

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

167. The evaluation found (see table 19) a higher household monthly income for the treatment group in relation to those part of the comparison group, for both overall levels and specifically for schedule tribes. The difference between the treatment and comparison groups is statically significant.

<sup>30</sup> Forty and forty-four per cent for Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh respectively, 25.7 per cent for India (Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner (2011a,b). Planning Commission, Government of India (2013).

Table 19  
Household monthly income (US dollars)

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
Scheduled tribe (matched)	23.99	17.40	6.59	5.57***	21.36	16.34	5.02	5.2***
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	23.92	17.60	6.32	5.4***	21.30	16.29	5.01	5.18***
Overall (matched)	24.09	17.60	6.49	4.45***	21.76	16.54	5.22	5.45***
Overall (unmatched)	24.10	17.8	6.3	4.65***	21.80	16.58	5.22	5.20***

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) – Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

168. **Drivers of better income levels in the programme areas.** The improvement on income was triggered by the programme mainly through introducing new technologies to enhance paddy productivity, and, to a limited extent, through the increase and differentiation of IGAs, as well as through supporting the access of vulnerable groups to financial services and products.
169. Higher paddy productivity in treatment area. The evaluation found that paddy yields form 95 per cent of the total agricultural production and that 75 per cent of the surveyed households cultivate only paddy. Under both propensity score matching and treatment effect method, positive and significant correlation was found between participation in the programme and higher paddy productivity (table 20).

Table 20  
Paddy productivity (kg/ha)

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
Scheduled tribe (matched)	2 640.6	2 605.1	35.5	0.87	2 261.5	1 961.4	300.1	3.87***
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	2 689.2	2 651.8	37.4	1.43	2213.6	1992.8	220.8	3.9***
Overall (matched)	2 666.5	2 538	128.5	0.78	2 414.8	1 989.03	425.7	4.3***
Overall (unmatched)	2 722.1	2 673.9	48.21	0.82	2 379.9	2 023.5	356.4	4.56***

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) – Kernel matching

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

170. Alternative income-generating activities (IGAs). At an overall level, the impact survey observes a slightly better diversification of IGAs taken up in the last ten years at the household level in the treatment areas (see effectiveness chapter table 12). The qualitative analysis confirms this finding. However, the differentiated portfolio remains mainly composed by on-farm small scale activities, such as collection and selling of non-timber forest produce, and dairy and goat and sheep rearing.
171. **Financial assets.** Rural micro-finance development through the introduction of SHGs is the most viable approach to reach the target group. Micro credit, micro insurance, micro remittance at an affordable rate are the three main components

of micro finance. In this light, the evaluation assessed the household's access to: (i) savings; (ii) credit; and (iii) insurance and remittances.

172. The evaluation found that the use of remittances is very limited in the areas covered by the impact survey, therefore the analysis was conducted only on credit, savings and insurance. The results of the quantitative analysis show that overall, and for schedule tribes, the treatment and comparison show a statistically significant difference only for savings, while they do not show a statistically significant variation with respect to access to credit and insurance, as displayed in table 21. This confirms that rural financial services are mainly used for small savings, as also highlighted in paragraphs 129 – 131 in the effectiveness chapter.

Table 21

**Access to financial services**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
<b>Households accessing financial services - savings (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.66	0.63	.03	2.1**	0.69	0.67	.02	2.02**
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.68	0.64	.04	4.23***	0.70	0.66	.04	4.12***
Overall (matched)	0.65	0.64	.01	.0065	0.70	0.69	.01	0.621
Overall (unmatched)	0.68	0.63	.05	3.73***	0.70	0.66	.04	2.508***
<b>Households accessing financial services – credit (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.32	0.32	-.001	-.087	0.27	0.28	-.01	-.712
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.31	0.32	-.01	-.712	0.29	0.28	.01	.541
Overall (matched)	0.32	0.32	.002	.109	0.28	0.29	-.001	-.074
Overall (unmatched)	0.32	0.33	-.01	-.672	0.29	0.29	.005	.345
<b>Households accessing financial services – insurance (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (Matched)	0.23	0.28	-.05	-2.8***	0.24	0.26	-.02	-1.2
Scheduled tribe (Unmatched)	0.24	0.31	-.07	-3.1***	0.25	0.25	-.001	-.071
Overall (Matched)	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.30</b>	-.05	-4.109***	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.26</b>	-.01	-.006
Overall (Unmatched)	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.30</b>	-.05	-2.994***	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.25</b>	-.007	-.512

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

173. At the time of the evaluation, the utilisation of SHGs for credits and savings is still more extensive in the treatment areas than in the comparison areas across both states, as displayed in table 22 and 23.

Table 22  
**Access to micro-finance services from SHGs - savings**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/ ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/ ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>
<b>Households doing savings in SHG (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.59	0.41	.18	2.57***	0.43	0.37	.06	1.56*
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.6	0.42	.18	2.78***	0.43	0.36	.07	1.92**
Overall (matched)	0.59	0.42	.17	2.65***	0.43	0.37	.06	1.75***
Overall (unmatched)	0.59	0.42	.17	3.01***	0.43	0.37	.06	1.98**

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

Table 23  
**Access to micro-finance services from SHGs - credits**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/ ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/ ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>
<b>Households taking credit from SHGs (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.46	0.26	0.19	4.1***	0.23	0.17	0.07	2.02**
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.47	0.26	0.21	4.08***	0.24	0.17	0.07	1.99**
Overall (matched)	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.29</b>	0.09	2.39***	<b>0.23</b>	<b>0.15</b>	0.08	1.87**
Overall (unmatched)	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.29</b>	0.09	2.12**	<b>0.23</b>	<b>0.15</b>	0.08	1.85**


ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

174. The interviews with the SHGs highlighted that even the poorer members are able to access credit to deal with emergencies and pay off money-lenders. However, chart 2 shows that the dependence on informal sources of credit is still significant. This is a major concern, given the high interest rates and more compressed repayment periods of loans from money-lenders, causing serious distress to the rural poor.

Chart 2  
Sources of credit



Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.

175. Moreover, the household level loan portfolio shows a mix of productive (e.g. purchase of agricultural inputs) and consumptive loans (e.g. ceremonial events, medical emergency, etc.). The impact survey and focus group discussions at the village level suggest that while the SHGs provide consumptive credit and are used mainly for savings, banks and other formal institutions provide mainly productive credit. However, the evaluation did not find much evidence that SHGs have been federated into viable institutions with greater voice and capability to link to formal financial institutions, as had been foreseen at design.
176. The above indicates also that the financial services provided by SHGs are weakly linked to agricultural activities. This has constrained greater impact given the importance of smallholder agriculture in rural areas for food security and better incomes. Moreover, the programme did not enhance the linkages with service providers, livelihood support organizations and markets to enable the self-help groups to reach higher scale and realize their full economic and social potential.
177. **Physical assets.** The evaluation measured the impact on physical capital through the standard of living index,<sup>31</sup> which is an aggregated score of 33 household assets and housing characteristics. Based on the index, the household population has been divided into five equal groups of 20 per cent each (quintiles) where 1 is very low (poorest) and 5 is very high (wealthiest). The standard of living index is considered as a reliable proxy indicator of the availability of capital.
178. As shown in table 24, the proportion of households belonging to a very high standard of living index is higher in treatment group with respect to comparison group in both the states. In particular, scheduled tribes households have better standard of living index levels in the treatment areas. This suggests that ownership of assets at household level is better in the treatment group and resonates the fact that the treatment group has better income levels as compared to the non-beneficiary group.

<sup>31</sup> The standard of living index or wealth index is used by National Family Health Survey-3, India as an indicator of the level of wealth that is consistent with expenditure and income measures (Rutstein, 1999). This uses information on 33 household assets and housing characteristics, such as ownership of consumer items, type of dwelling, source of water, and availability of electricity. It further combines this information into a single wealth index, using a scientific method of assigning weights to individual components. The household population is divided into five equal groups of 20% each (quintiles) at the national level from 1 (lowest, poorest) to 5 (highest, wealthiest).

Table 24  
Standard of living index

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
<b>Standard of living index (High=1, Rest=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.22	0.17	0.05	1.37*	0.22	0.15	0.07	1.47*
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.22	0.16	0.06	1.37*	0.22	0.17	0.05	1.37*
Overall (matched)	0.23	0.2	0.03	1.21	0.22	0.16	0.06	1.4*
Overall (unmatched)	0.24	0.2	0.04	1.23	0.22	0.17	0.05	1.37*

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05,\* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

179. **Rating.** Combining the findings on income and assets as deriving from different methods, and taking into account the better impact on the treatment group, the evaluation rating for this impact domain is satisfactory (5).

## B. Human and social capital empowerment

180. Human and social capital and empowerment entails assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
181. This section of the chapter will therefore provide an assessment of the:  
(i) community based institutions created and supported by the intervention;  
(ii) access to basic amenities like water, sanitation and health; and (iii) capacities of individuals to understand and appreciate community-relevant government acts as a measure of social security and entitlement.
182. **Community-based institutions.** Group formation is crucial to the empowerment of the rural poor and was a distinguished feature of the JCTDP. As noted in the effectiveness chapter (table 9), the quantitative survey confirms that the coverage of households involved in SHGs remains low after programme completion.
183. The focus group discussions with SHGs members in both states highlighted that although the SHGs had a crucial role in empowering scheduled tribes and women and developing livelihood support programmes, they lacked an appropriate long-term vision and linkages with banks, markets and mainstream institutions. As mentioned earlier, this is also because little was achieved in federating SHGs into apex institutions which would have given them enhanced legitimacy as village institutions.
184. At the village level, the results of the survey suggest that 60 per cent of the households report the participation of at least one member in the gram sabha. Attendance of women in gram sabha meetings is slightly higher in the treatment areas of Jharkhand with respect to Chhattisgarh.
185. **Access to basic amenities.** One of the key parameters to assess the impact on social and human capital is the level of access to basic amenities. At an overall level, treatment areas show better access to safe drinking water, as displayed in table 25. The results of the analysis are statistically significant and the impact can be attributed to the programme efforts in creating rural infrastructures, such as water harvesting systems, irrigation systems and wells. On the other hand, the difference in the availability of functional toilets for the groups is statistically significant only for Chhattisgarh and only at overall level.

Table 25  
Access to basic amenities

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
<b>Access to safe drinking water (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.55	0.45	0.10	5.8***	0.52	0.49	0.03	2.65***
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.56	0.45	0.11	5.5***	0.52	0.49	0.03	2.42***
Overall (matched)	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.44</b>	0.11	7.89***	<b>0.52</b>	<b>0.51</b>	0.01	1.82**
Overall (unmatched)	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.47</b>	0.09	6.06***	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.53</b>	0.02	1.413*
<b>Access to HH level functional toilet (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.06	0.06	0.002	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.01	1.7*
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.06	0.06	0	0.02	0.11	0.09	0.02	2.1**
Overall (matched)	0.07	0.06	.01	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.03	3.67***
Overall (unmatched)	0.06	0.06	0.003	0.05	0.12	0.09	0.03	3.4***

ATET – Average Treatment AATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching.


Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

186. **Awareness of key government acts.** The level of awareness of local communities of key government acts determine their capacity to access entitlements and rights deriving from the act. As mentioned in the effectiveness chapter, the programme raised the awareness of local communities on main government acts such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005,<sup>32</sup> the Forests Rights Acts and scheduled caste/scheduled tribe atrocities<sup>33</sup> acts, through a multitude of trainings.
187. In this regard, the evaluation assessed the current level of awareness at two levels: (i) top of the mind recall of the name of the act; and (ii) top of the mind recall of rights and entitlements deriving from the act. At an overall level it is observed that treatment and comparison areas behave very similarly on awareness levels, as chart 3 shows. The relevant PSM table can be seen in annex VII.

Chart 3

**Awareness on government acts**



Source: JCTDP Impact Evaluation Quantitative Survey.


<sup>32</sup> "Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005" (or, MGNREGA), is an Indian labour law and social security measure that aims to guarantee the 'right to work'. It aims to ensure livelihood security in rural areas by providing at least 100 days of wage employment in a financial year to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work.

<sup>33</sup> Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 an Act of the Parliament of India enacted to prevent atrocities against scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.



188. Chart 4 represents the population which are highly aware<sup>34</sup> about different provisions or entitlements deriving from these acts.

Chart 4

**Awareness on rights and entitlements deriving from the government acts**

Source: JCTDP Impact Evaluation Quantitative Survey.

189. The percentage of the population with low and moderate levels of awareness is similar in treatment and comparison groups across both states and is also consistent across different social groups. While quantitative data do not provide separate estimates of PVTG, focus group discussions clearly suggest that PVTG households have the poorest level of awareness about these acts.
190. It is important to clarify that the similar level in awareness can be attributed to the fact that these acts are promoted through “blanket” schemes by the Government of India and respective state departments at the village level across all Indian states. Therefore, any attribution of impact to the programme in quantitative terms is not possible.
191. However, the association with village-level institutions as well as direct interaction with the NGOs and programme staff should have catalyzed higher awareness levels in treatment areas. The qualitative analysis suggests that this has happened to a limited extent, despite the organization of trainings on tribal issues by the programme.
192. **Rating.** This impact sub-domain is therefore rated as moderately satisfactory (4). This is based on the finding that the JCTDP contributed to establishing diverse grass-roots level institutions, but fell short of consolidating them into strong and sustainable organizations.

### C. Food security and agricultural productivity

193. The assessment of food security and agricultural productivity entails the assessment of changes in food security related to the availability, access to food and stability of access, as well as the changes in agricultural productivity which are measured in terms of yields.
194. **Impact on agricultural productivity.** As already mentioned under the income and assets sub-domain, better paddy productivity is observed across the different socio-economic subgroups of the treatment population. With regard to other crops<sup>35</sup>, table 26 shows that the production is higher in the comparison area across both states and results are statistically significant in particular at an overall level.

<sup>34</sup> “Highly aware” households are the ones which are aware about at least 80 per cent of the key provisions of these acts. Top of the mind recall of key provisions of the acts were recorded in the household questionnaire.

<sup>35</sup> Other crops refer to vegetables (e.g., tomatoes, egg plants, cauliflower, etc).

Table 26  
Productivity of other crops

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
<b>Mean productivity of other crops (kg/hectare)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	1 212.8	1 330.9	-118.1	2.27**	934.3	1 026.2	-91.9	1.5
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	1 214.2	1 325.3	-111.1	2.3**	935.5	1 028.3	-92.8	1.47
Overall (matched)	1 282.0	1 422.5	-140.5	2.7***	991.5	1 228.3	-236.8	2.2**
Overall (unmatched)	1 288.0	1 429.3	-141.3	2.8***	998.4	1 235.3	-236.9	2.21**

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

195. In the context of the programme areas, it is safer to intensify the cropping pattern by cultivating the same crop in multiple seasons, rather than diversifying, which entails knowledge about cropping practices, suitability of the land, market potential and risk taking ability of the farmer. Although new crops were introduced with ICRISAT assistance, these have not led to crop diversification on a perceptible scale. This is also partly explained by the fact that tribal and farmers in general are often reluctant to diversify into new crops for consumption purposes, especially non-traditional crops, given their dietary preferences and cultural considerations.
196. In line with the findings at programme completion, the impact evaluation data confirm that at an overall level the impact of the programme on crop diversity is marginal. In fact, areas under the JCTDP have higher cropping intensity with only 25.7 per cent of the households opting for multiple cropping seasons as compared to 24.5 per cent in the comparison areas. On average, treatment areas in Chhattisgarh grow 1.15 crops per cropping cycle as compared to 1.08 in comparison areas. In Jharkhand, the value of crop diversity is comparable (1.8 both in treatment and comparison).
197. As highlighted in the effectiveness chapter, JCTDP introduced a variety of physical assets to improve land management and to potentially enhance farm productivity. However, the analysis indicates that very little work was done to realize the potential of these assets in treatment areas to enhance farm productivity and food security and to build linkages for convergence with government programmes to expand coverage and deepen impact. Farming practices and farm productivity have not changed significantly.
198. **Impact on food security.** The evaluation used food consumption score (FCS)<sup>36</sup> as a key indicator to measure food security. FCS captures diet diversity as well as frequency of consuming different food types over a reference period.
199. Table 27 reflects the distribution of households across different food consumption categories based on the consumption pattern, showing a slightly better food

<sup>36</sup> The FCS is a frequency-weighted diet diversity score calculated using the frequency of consumption of different food groups consumed by a household for a recall period of seven days. The food items are categorized into nine main food groups: cereals; starchy tubers and roots; legumes and nuts; meat, fish, poultry and eggs; vegetables (including green leaves); fruit; oils and fats; milk and dairy products; and sugar or sweets. Based on FCS, community can be divided into three categories namely poor FCS, borderline FCS and adequate FCS.

security situation - in the comparison areas in spite of the food assistance provided by the World Food Programme which was appreciated by members of the treatment group.

Table 27

**Food consumption score**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ ATET	T-stat
<b>Food consumption score categories (Poor=1, Borderline/Adequate)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.06	0.09	-0.03	-2.22**	0.05	0.11	-0.06	-2.18**
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.08	0.11	-0.03	-2.77**	0.04	0.09	-0.05	-2.10**
Overall (matched)	0.07	0.10	-0.03	-2.01**	0.04	0.08	-0.04	-1.97**
Overall (unmatched)	0.06	0.12	-0.06	-2.89**	0.05	0.09	-0.04	-1.83**

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) –Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance\*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Source: IOE impact survey.

200. Nutritional assessment of children under the age of five. The evaluation made an attempt to assess the nutritional status of children through anthropometric measurements. In this regard, the evaluation calculated three standard indices: (i) weight-for-height, WHZ (wasting); (ii) height-for-age, HAZ (stunting); and (iii) weight-for-age, WAZ (underweight).<sup>37</sup> At an overall level, the results in the treatment areas show better results than the comparison areas (table 28). However, the difference is marginal and the presence of blanket government schemes covering all districts and blocks in nearly all Indian states, make the attribution of impact to the JCTDP rather difficult.

<sup>37</sup> The weight-for-height index measures body mass in relation to body length and describes current nutritional status. Children whose Z-score is below minus two standard deviations (-2 SD) from the median of the reference population are considered thin (wasted) for their height and are acutely malnourished. Children whose weight-for-height is below minus three standard deviations (-3 SD) from the median of the reference population are considered to be severely wasted. The height-for-age index is an indicator of linear growth retardation and cumulative growth deficits. Children whose height-for-age Z-score is below minus two standard deviations (-2 SD) from the median of the reference population are considered short for their age (stunted) and are chronically malnourished. Children below minus three standard deviations (-3 SD) from the median of the reference population are considered to be severely stunted. Stunting reflects failure to receive adequate nutrition over a long period of time and is also affected by recurrent and chronic illness. Weight-for-age is a composite index of height-for-age and weight-for-height. It takes into account both acute and chronic malnutrition. Children whose weight-for-age is below minus two standard deviations from the median of the reference population are classified as underweight. Children whose weight-for-age is below minus three standard deviations (-3 SD) from the median of the reference population are considered to be severely underweight.

Table 28  
**Status of nutrition of children under five**

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference/ ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>	<i>Treatment mean</i>	<i>Comparison mean</i>	<i>Difference /ATET</i>	<i>T-stat</i>
<b>Status of nutrition: wasting (WHZ)- proportion below -2SD (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.20	0.21	-0.01	-.25	0.19	0.21	-0.01	-.92
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.20	0.21	-0.01	-.32	0.19	0.20	-0.01	-.91
Overall (matched)	0.19	0.20	-0.01	-.29	0.18	0.20	-0.01	-.53
Overall (unmatched)	0.19	0.20	-0.01	-.67	0.18	0.19	-0.01	-.28
<b>Status of nutrition: stunting (HAZ)- proportion below -2SD (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.55	0.49	0.06	59***	0.54	0.48	0.06	2.45***
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.55	0.49	0.06	31**	0.54	0.48	0.06	2.49***
Overall (matched)	0.55	0.48	0.06	33***	0.54	0.47	0.06	2.52***
Overall (unmatched)	0.55	0.48	0.07	62***	0.54	0.47	0.06	2.57***
<b>Status of nutrition: underweight (WAZ)- proportion below -2SD (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.42	0.34	0.07	61***	0.41	0.34	0.07	3.01***
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.42	0.35	0.07	72***	0.41	0.34	0.07	3.29***
Overall (matched)	0.42	0.34	0.07	45***	0.41	0.34	0.07	3.42***
Overall (unmatched)	0.42	0.35	0.07	52***	0.41	0.34	0.07	3.43***

201. Rating. Based on the above findings, the evaluation consider impact on the agricultural productivity and food security sub-domain as moderately unsatisfactory (3).

#### **D. Natural resources, environment and climate change**

202. This impact domain involves assessing the extent to which the programme contributed to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment as well as mitigating the negative impact of climate change.
203. **Land and water management.** JCTDP has been instrumental in creating water harvesting as well as soil erosion and run-off control structures that would improve the soil moisture content and thus impact its fertility. Moreover, the household survey found that 27 per cent of the households perceived an improvement in the access to water sources over the programme period, as compared to 24.1 per cent in the non-treatment areas.
204. Nonetheless, interactions with rural households reflect that issues pertaining to irrigation have not been addressed completely. The ponds and wells that were created are not always properly maintained, remain dependent on rainfall and get replenished during monsoon season (Kharif) and at the onset of the dry cropping seasons (Rabi and Zaid), in many cases, a significant portion of the harvested water is lost by leaching. Consequently, dependence of the farming households still lays on owners of water sources, diluting the purpose of having such structures in the villages. In fact, interactions with various stakeholders indicate that the

programme focus was more on creating discrete assets rather than focusing on managing the water structures.

205. Also, the promotion of vermicomposting in both states would contribute to the soil fertility and would reduce the dependency on chemical fertilizers. Improvement in the fertility status of the soil during the last ten years is perceived by around 34 per cent of the households in the treatment areas vis-à-vis around 31.6 per cent in the comparison areas.
206. **Environment protective initiatives.** The evaluation has not observed any adverse effects on the environment. On the other hand, it has not observed any real impact of environment protective initiatives either. During the programme, the Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Society had introduced a process to extract carbon credit under a Clean Development Mechanism. The preparatory work was done in 2007-08, with the aim to enable the farmers to adapt to climate change. This initiative lost its track once the project closed in Chhattisgarh in 2010.
207. Other initiatives included the use of solar energy and promotion of biogas, yet both of them had a very limited outreach. Moreover, as table 29 shows the surveyed households in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh almost fully rely on wood as fuel source (94.5 and 98.3 per cent, respectively), which is contradictory to the programme's forest protection activities.

Table 29  
Usage of fuel-wood

	<i>Jharkhand</i>	<i>Chhattisgarh</i>
Fuel wood	94.5%	98.3%
Crop residue	4.4%	0.6%
Dung cakes	0.3%	0.3%
Coal/charcoal	0.3%	0.0%
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)	0.3%	0.5%
Bio gas	0.2%	0.2%
N	2 269	2 179

Source: JCTDP Impact Evaluation Quantitative Survey.

208. **Rating.** Based on the above findings, this impact domain is rated moderately unsatisfactory (3).

## E. Institutions and policies

209. This domain assesses the changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. This chapter focuses on the programme's: (i) role in improving local governance; and (ii) influence in informing relevant policies.
210. **Improvement in local governance.** The aim of the programme was to create sustainable and capable institutions that could strengthen the statutory Panchayats Raj institutions (PRIs). In Jharkhand, this would mean the merge of gram sabhas and its GSPECs into PRIs. In Chhattisgarh, where gram sabhas were already institutionalized, the aim was to have institutional recognition from the states for the GSPECs. This process is still ongoing in both states and not in a formal shape yet. Even if the gram sabhas and their GSPECs had a critical role in the programme implementation and have demonstrated to be a key instrument for community mobilization and social empowerment, their political influence is relatively small, due to the uncompleted recognition process from the states. The underlying reasons for delays in merging these institutions with the PRIs will be further discussed in the sustainability chapter.
211. As already mentioned in the effectiveness chapter, other institutions like the FFS, CFMC, Village Marketing Committee (VMC) and Village Health Committee (VHC) did

not have much impact due to low implementation numbers and the absence of a clear line of intervention.

212. Grass-roots institutions were not effectively and sustainably linked to the end-line department such as tribal welfare department at the state level. Engagement of the line departments at the grass roots level was limited to the training of para-professionals like for example the village health worker. This did not have a far-reaching influence on improving local level governance since they were not officially institutionalized under the gram sabha or gram panchayat.
213. It can therefore be concluded that there was a considerable lack of institutional strengthening beyond the creation of the gram sabhas and GSPECS. The programme has been successful in establishing a good basis for the implementation of the PESA and for setting the reform process in motion, yet without sufficient concern for political empowerment and the adoption in the panchayat system. The programme should have considered a more structured interplay with the PRIs, since they have the permanence and the resources to continue the self-governance framework- and with the respective line departments.
214. **Informing and influencing policies.** Interviews with former programme functionaries confirmed that the programme did not have a robust roadmap to inform or influence policies at the state and central levels. Moreover, interviews with national and state authorities revealed that there is little awareness of the programme outside the central Ministry of Finance or the main state level departments dealing with the JCTDP (i.e. the tribal and welfare departments in the two states).
215. For instance, the programme's marginal role in the adoption of the forest rights act or linking with the state forest department through a formal memorandum of understanding has limited the JCTDP's impact on policies. Focus group discussions with the community as well as in-depth discussions with ex programme personnel indicated that issues associated to forest rights are directly related to livelihoods. For tribal households this resonates also at an emotional level. With empowerment of the tribal community and various forestry activities as a cornerstone of the programme, collaboration and policy dialogue at this level should have been given more importance.
216. Furthermore, the programme has been unable to converge with major government schemes, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). This could have helped in the realization of the livelihood objectives and to ensure large and enduring impact.
217. Stronger policy support from the government, more emphasis on the convergence with national flagship programmes, better interface with PESA as well as more proactive consultation with relevant line departments and ministries could have resulted in more impact in directing the regulatory framework in favour of the target group.
218. **Rating.** Taking the above into account, the evaluation considers impact on institutions and policies to have been moderately unsatisfactory (3).

## **F. Overall impact assessment**

219. The overall assessment of the impact on rural poverty is informed by the assessment and ratings of the five impact domains. The impact evaluation concludes that the programme had a satisfactory (5) impact on household income and assets, and a moderately satisfactory (4) impact on human and social capital and empowerment, but a moderately unsatisfactory (3) impact on food security and agricultural productivity, natural resources, environment and climate change, and institutions and policies.
220. In a broader and more integrated sense, the impact evaluation concludes that the overall rural poverty impact of the JCTDP is moderately satisfactory (4). This also

takes into consideration better incomes, assets, and paddy productivity among the treatment group, as well as better participation in grass-roots institutions (e.g., SHGs) and intensification of production systems (e.g., livestock).

#### Key points

- **Household income and assets.** The study provides evidence on increased household income owing to programme intervention. Treatment areas in both the states have better average household income. This differential is more pronounced for scheduled-tribe households than others. Paddy productivity and, to a lesser extent, the diversification in the household portfolio of income-generating activities and access to financial services are considered as the three key levers of income enhancement. The standard of living index suggest better results for treatment areas and also specifically for the scheduled-tribe households.
- **Human and social capital empowerment.** JCTDP strategy at grass-roots and village levels has contributed to the empowerment of tribal grass roots organizations and make them part of the decision-making processes that influence their livelihoods. However, the programme should have invested more in creating linkages support of tribal rights and awareness of key government schemes and relevant entitlements.
- **Agricultural productivity and food security.** Various programme-based interventions have led to significantly enhanced paddy production and productivity in treatment areas over comparison. The programme has also played a direct role in ameliorating cropping intensification, which in turn has strengthened the agricultural risk portfolio in treatment areas. Crop diversity however is found to be similar across treatment and comparison areas. On the other hand, FCS, an aggregate estimate used in capturing diet diversity and frequency of consumption, suggests marginally better results for comparison areas. Nutritional assessment of children under the age of five does not show much variation between treatment and comparison areas.
- **Natural resources, environment and climate change.** The evaluation has not observed any real impact of environment protective initiatives. Positive results in this domain are limited to the creation of various physical assets towards soil and water conservation. The O&M of these assets remain a challenge.
- **Institutions and policies.** The programme has been successful in establishing a strong institutional delivery system as well as many village level institutions. However, these institutions were not effectively and sustainably linked to the local governing framework. Furthermore, the programme lacked a clear roadmap towards informing policies and converging with national development programmes.

## VII. Other performance criteria

### A. Sustainability of benefits

221. IOE defines sustainability as “the likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the programmes' life”.<sup>38</sup> Based on this definition, this section of the report includes the assessment of sustainability of net benefits from a technical, institutional and social perspective.
222. **Technical sustainability.** Despite the fact that the programme had, for both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, several initiatives towards capacity development of SHGs, farmers, GSPEC members and service providers, a comprehensive sustainability strategy was missing. Field-level interactions confirmed that consequently, many of the trainings ended up being one-off in nature with no mechanism for upgrading their knowledge. This lack of strategy and post-training handhold support resulted in reduced effectiveness of the acquired skills and

<sup>38</sup> IFAD Evaluation Manual.

- knowledge. For instance, the areas where there is still some handhold support by Pradan,<sup>39</sup> farmers showed better uptake of the system of rice intensification.
223. The JCTDP was successful in building small infrastructure development of land and water resources in both states. However, maintenance by the community has not been as expected. Focus group discussions with the community in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh indicated that when the programme was completed, there was lack of clarity about their responsibility for operations and maintenance of village infrastructure. This is also because the executing committees of the various village-level institutions established under the programme were no longer functioning after JCTDP completion. Furthermore, no specific provision was made by the government to fund the necessary recurrent costs for operations and maintenance of the various programme assets.
224. In Chhattisgarh, the GSPECs were recognized as an agency to provide operations and maintenance support, but with the lack of funding and post-programme support, its sustainability could not be ensured. In Jharkhand, where the PESA implementation only started towards project closure, the sustainability of a Village Development Fund (VDF) for the operations and maintenance of physical infrastructure was not given due attention. Furthermore, the issue of water harvesting is currently not addressed when the dams run dry during the dry seasons. Consequently, dependence of the farming households still lay on owners of water sources.
225. The impact survey revealed that agriculture-based income contributes to around 43 per cent of the total overall household income in both states. With a high dependence on agriculture-based income, diversification in agricultural practices is key to cope with risks. Adoption of (horti) cultivation and livestock rearing was especially seen as a means to provide extra livelihood sustainability for the landless and PVTGs. As discussed in the effectiveness and impact chapters, the programme achievements in this respect were rather limited. Links with the public health system and livestock and agricultural service providers severed after the programme ended. For the sustainability and continuous availability of resources, medicines, insurance and other services, strong linkages with line departments are essential. These linkages, as already noted, were not been sufficiently promoted by the programme.
226. Microfinance. Financial linkages and connectivity to markets are still underdeveloped. Programme documents indicate that out of the 1,426 SHGs and 1,021 SHGs that have been formed in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh respectively, the linkage with financial institutions have been observed in 16 per cent of the SHGs. Even if the SHG were merely set up for capacity building, savings and small-scale income-generating activities, the evaluation found that SHGs are currently mostly being used as a medium for saving, consumptive credit or health purposes. This can be ascribed, as reflected in the focus group discussions with SHG members, to the fact that many of the SHGs were unable to identify a long-term strategy for their broader social and economic transformation and development.
227. **Institutional sustainability**. The review of several programme documents along with discussions with programme personnel suggests that Jharkhand was uniquely placed to exploit the institutional infrastructure created at the community level (SHGs, gram sabha, GSPECs and other sub-committees) and at the state level (JTDS).
228. Despite of this potential, interactions with IFAD and states representatives indicate that a strong and consistent leadership at the state level was missing, which should have helped in creating an enabling environment for the institutions to thrive

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<sup>39</sup> Pradan as an NGO was engaged in JTDP in few of the programme blocks.



seamlessly without the programme. In Jharkhand, discussions with several GSPEC members and state officials indicate that the programme did not act sufficiently to ensure that the GSPEC got adopted by the Panchayat Raj institutions. This is decisive for a continued function of the GSPECs and their supervision to the remaining sub-committees. This process is still ongoing, even in Chhattisgarh, where only the gram sabhas received informal recognition. As will later be described in the innovation chapter of the report, this process is taking very long resulting in compromised participation in gram sabhas which is impinging on effectiveness and impact.

229. One of the reasons this merge is not running smoothly is because the programme didn't have a sound exit strategy in both states. Several options were taken into consideration, but the state programme coordination committee, that was supposed to provide policy guidance, did not meet regularly and was unable to establish a viable strategy in time, resulting in limited impact and sustainability. In general, the evaluation found that no overarching exit strategy was prepared to ensure the sustainability of benefits, which would have been useful to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of the state governments, communities, IFAD and the central government. In this regard, the evaluation also did not find any evidence of IFAD taking a leadership role in the development of such an exit strategy.
230. In order to keep the village institutions sustainable, a solid system to mobilize resources and support is essential. Among the possible exit strategies, it was considered to keep the village institutions active and financed through the convergence with MGNREGS<sup>40</sup>, as well as other national and state-financed programs that were planned to be implemented through the Gram panchayats. The challenges that were faced to converge with MGNREGS can be linked back to programme design. The programme had treated natural watershed as an intervention boundary without considering if these villages would be covered in a panchayat. The implementation of MGNREGS and its line departments happens inherently within a statutory panchayat boundary and hence implementation management and supervision would become a challenge, since there might be an uncovered overlap between the watershed area and the statutory panchayat area.
231. Some SHGs have shown to be sustainable after programme closure, however not evenly in both states. In Chhattisgarh, the SHGs are not as cohesive as in Jharkhand. Field-level observations and discussions suggest that this is due to the untimely withdrawal of project support before the SHGs could fully mature and the lack of an exit strategy and post handhold support. Due to the project extension in Jharkhand, its SHGs perform relatively better, although they still require support from second-level institutions and NGOs that remained operative in, or close to the programme area.
232. Sustainability of tribal development societies. The Tribal Development Society, though with operational difficulties, has done well in Jharkhand. It is responsible for implementing the new IFAD-funded loan in the state, the Jharkhand Tribal Empowerment and Livelihood Programme. This will provide the society with a further opportunity to consolidate and become more institutionalized in the provision of services to tribal communities in the state. However, in Chhattisgarh, the Tribal Development Society is currently languishing owing to over dependence on the Department of Welfare, weak personnel and lack of funding.
233. **Social sustainability.** An attitude of collective participation has been triggered, and is still visible. Participation of women in social activities has increased over

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<sup>40</sup> The project undertook land and water management activities through payment of labour wages and food grains. Payment of wages was more prompt by the JCTDP, whereas in MGNREGS the payment is delayed by over 6-7 months, and innovative use of food grain support is not prominent in MGNREGS.

time and they have taken up decision-making roles in various village-level committees. However, the evaluation results resonate the fact that utilization of the various village-level institutions has been more on the personal front in both states than vehicles of broad empowerment of households and communities. Although the members have gained in confidence, the benefits are predicted to remain confined to their personal life with little influence on the broader social and political arena.

234. **Rating.** The absence of an exit strategy, lack of funds and clarity on responsibilities for operations and maintenance, limited linkages to financial institutions and markets, and insufficient diversification of the economic base of programme beneficiaries are some of the major challenges to sustainability. Chances are greater however in Jharkhand, as IFAD has recently financed a new operation in the state. However, due to the aforementioned, and not considering the new operation, the evaluation rates sustainability of the JCTDP as moderately unsatisfactory (3).

#### Key points

- With regard to technical sustainability, operations and maintenance of the land and water assets have not been as expected due to unsustainable executing committees and unclarity on coordination and responsibility. Furthermore, the achievements related to livelihood sustainability are limited due to poor linkages with (governmental) service providers, financial institutions and markets.
- The institutional sustainability is vulnerable, due to ongoing adoption processes of village institutions in the statutory panchayat framework. This is due to discrepancies in the demarcation of natural watershed boundaries and panchayat boundaries as well as insufficient policy dialogue and convergence with government schemes.
- Signs of social sustainability are visible, however the empowerment benefits are predicted to remain confined to personal levels without much impact on the broader social and political arena.

## B. Promotion of innovation and scaling up

235. IOE defines innovation and scaling up as "the extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and other agencies".<sup>41</sup>

### Innovation

236. The JCTDP was the first programme where an autonomous entity, the Tribal Development Society, was created to execute a programme. In most of the similar programmes, the concerned line department is engaged as the nodal execution agency. The creation of autonomous tribal development societies in each state provided nimbleness to decision-making and a single window service for multi-dimensional programme activities. Having said that, the tribal development societies have had their challenges, including weak monitoring and evaluation and frequent turn-over of staff. Another weakness was the lack of exchange between the two tribal development societies in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.

237. Other key innovative programme features are:

- (i) The Gram Sabha Resource Management and Livelihood Plan (GSRMPs) using consultative, participatory and bottom-up planning processes involving village-level institutions can be considered as one of the most innovative elements of the programme.

<sup>41</sup> IOE Evaluation Manual 2009.

- (ii) Creating a pathway for PESA implementation<sup>42</sup> by empowering village institutions that could merge into statutory Panchayat raj institutions.
- (iii) As described in the impact section on natural resources, the environment and climate change, the Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Society had introduced several initiatives towards environment preservation, adaptation to climate change and reduction of fossil fuels. This initiative lost its track once the project closed in Chhattisgarh in 2010. It would have been a huge innovation had it been pursued further, for example in the scaling up phase of the JTDP.
- (iv) In terms of operating model, IFAD should be credited for selecting the JCTDP as the first project in India for direct supervision and implementation support. This innovative feature of the IFAD operating model brought the Fund closer to action on the ground, but more could have been achieved by a greater allocation of resources towards this function. The establishment of the IFAD country office in India is another innovative feature worth underlining, though it was not a specific design feature of the JCTDP.

### Scaling up

238. The evaluation did not find evidence that IFAD made proactive efforts to document and share some of the positive experiences of the JCTDP, so they could be taken up in policies or similar programmes funded by the two state governments, the private sector or other donors. For instance, the Government of India introduced the Forests Act in 2006. But, IFAD did not use that as an opportunity to share its extensive experience from the JCTDP or other IFAD-funded programmes focusing on tribal development to inform the Forests Act, which is very much also concerned with tribal development in the country.
239. Similarly, IFAD has not developed a strong relation with the central Ministry of Tribal Affairs. In fact, interactions with concerned officials in the Ministry by the evaluation team revealed their limited knowledge of IFAD past or ongoing tribal development programmes and activities in the country. This is particularly surprising, in light of IFAD's vast experience, engagement and track record in tribal development in India since the beginning of the 1990s.
240. IFAD did however design a follow-up project - the Jharkhand Tribal Empowerment and Livelihood Project (JTELP) – approved by the Board in 2012. The JTELP has been developed on JTDP's successful demonstration of using gram sabhas in partnership with NGOs as an effective model of implementation as well as strategies of land and water management.
241. The new project is considerably larger, containing nine more districts, about 100,000 extra households and an IFAD loan that is about 3.5 times higher than the amount allocated to the JTDP. The effort to address JTDP's shortcomings in the design of JTELP should be complimented. Among the achievements are: (i) convergence with several government schemes at design; (ii) selection of households within panchayat villages (ensuring involvement of village-level institutions in Ranchayati Raj institutions); (iii) well-defined section on sustainability; and (iv) a separate "livelihood support" component for the support of IGAs and the promotion of market-linked production, amongst others. However, the innovative Clean Development Mechanism for the extraction of carbon credit in Chhattisgarh was not adopted.
242. **Rating.** As discussed in various part of the report, though IFAD introduced some innovative features in the JCTDP, many of them were not successful in the end. Moreover, the true success of a programme being scaled up is if government or others partners scale up a successful IFAD operation or some of its components. This is not the case with the JTELP, as IFAD was the appraising institution for the

<sup>42</sup> Panchayat elections in Jharkhand happened only in 2011.

new programme, which also includes significant IFAD funding and no international cofinancing. There is no evidence at this stage that the programme or its approaches are being scaled up in Chhattisgarh. All in all, however, the evaluation rates innovation and scaling up overall as moderately satisfactory (4).

#### Key points

- This was the first programme where an autonomous entity was created to execute a programme: the Tribal Development Society.
- Key programme features like planning and implementation through the development of village-level institutions (gram sabhas and GSPEC) further stand out as programme innovations, although not always successful in execution.
- The programme had the potential to replicate and upscale several programme activities. This did not happen in absence of convergence with government schemes, minimum collaboration with state departments and lack of shared and consistent thought on scaling up interventions.

### C. Gender equality and women's empowerment

243. Given that the programme was approved in 2001, the reference document for the assessment of the gender equality and women's empowerment impact domain is the 2003 Gender Plan of Action, which articulates IFAD's main operational objectives for promoting and mainstreaming the gender dimension across IFAD operations. The three overarching objectives envisioned in the Plan of Action, are summarized in box 4. It is however important to note that since the Gender Plan of Action, IFAD has developed a new corporate Gender Policy, but this was adopted after the completion of the JCTDP.

Box 4

#### IFAD's gender equality and women's empowerment objectives, 2003

- ❖ Expand women's access to and control over fundamental assets – capital, land, knowledge and technologies;
- ❖ Strengthen women's agencies – their decision-making role in community affairs and representation in local institutions; and
- ❖ Improve women's well-being and ease their workloads by facilitating access to basic rural services and infrastructures.

244. The impact survey comprised a specific section dedicated to women's awareness, status and participation and was administered to at least one female member of each surveyed household. In addition, it was administered to a sub-sample of female-headed households as shown in table 30.

Table 30

#### Sub-sample of female-headed households

	Jharkhand		Chhattisgarh	
	Treatment	Comparison	Treatment	Comparison
Female-headed HHs (unmatched)	248	221	124	135
Female-headed HHs (matched)	171	157	113	125

Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.

245. Since the sub-sample is small as compared to the overall number of households surveyed, the findings provide only an indication of impact. Moreover, the evaluation triangulated the information and findings with qualitative tools, such as focus group discussions and visits to project sites and women's households.

246. **Women's access to and control over fundamental assets.** This section includes the assessment of women's income and assets and income-generating opportunities promoted by the programme. The gender-disaggregated data for the monthly income of female-headed households show better performance in treatment areas across both states (table 31). Focus group discussions revealed

that the diversification in the portfolio of income-generating activities promoted by the programme, and in particular the collection and selling of non-timber forest produce in local markets, contributed to some extent to the enhancement of their income level.

**Table 31**

Female headed households – monthly income (US\$)

<i>Jharkhand</i>		<i>Chhattisgarh</i>	
<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Comparison</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Comparison</i>
31	18	20	16
N 171	N 157	N 113	N 125

Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.

247. However, women still remain among the poorest and disadvantaged members of the community. As also noted by the 2009 India Country Programme Evaluation, the impact evaluation confirms that the programme should have stressed value addition and promoted market linkages to achieve greater impact.
248. Furthermore, the standard of living index is very low for 29 per cent of the sub-sample of female-headed households in the beneficiary group of Jharkhand and 19 per cent for the same group in Chhattisgarh.
249. **Strengthen women’s agencies – their decision-making role in community affairs and representation in local institutions.** Gender equality and women’s empowerment objectives lay strong emphasis on capacity-building for women in leadership and management. In line with both the 2001 and the 2005 COSOPs, that clearly identify microfinance initiatives and women empowerment as one of the broad areas of intervention, the programme aimed to enhance the role of women in community affairs, including their effective integration into village-level institutions like SHGs.
250. The focus group discussions suggest that through the creation of SHGs,<sup>43</sup> the programme assisted women to face social and household constraints by impacting on income and social presence.
251. However, there is not much supporting evidence that women have used the groups beyond a source of small savings and consumptive loans. The focus group discussions suggest that in very few cases, women could start their own business or become completely financially independent through these groups. It can therefore be said that SHGs have essentially been used as a medium for savings and internal credit activities than a vehicle for holistic empowerment.
252. Moreover, the treatment areas reflect 60.5 per cent of the households having women’s participation in the gram sabhas, as compared to 59.1 per cent in the non-treatment areas. This marginal difference between the treatment and the comparison groups show that women would have been involved in gram sabhas even in the absence of the programme.
253. **Improvement of women’s well-being and eased workloads by facilitating access to basic rural services and infrastructures.** This section comprises an assessment of different aspects of women well-being, including the extent to which the programme contributed to: (i) easing their workloads by providing water for domestic use and reduction in the use of fuel wood for cooking; (ii) increasing their autonomy and authority in decision-making; and (iii) enhancing their freedom to raise voice against intra-households and social issues.

<sup>43</sup> 2,483 in total, as reported in the *effectiveness* chapter of this report.

254. Eased workloads. The provision of water and alternative sources for cooking is an important aspect of women well-being as it contributes to easing their workload by preventing women and girls from having to walk long distances to procure water and fuel wood. As such, it should be considered as an integral part of any sound gender strategy.
255. The evaluation found that the programme did not contribute to this aspect of well-being of women, as the vast majority of the households still relies on the provision of water from public sources as well as on the use of fuel wood for cooking, as shown in table 32 and 33.

Table 32

**Main source of drinking water**

	<i>Jharkhand</i>	<i>Chhattisgarh</i>
	T	T
Piped water in residence	0.3%	0.6%
Hand pump in residence	1.5%	1.1%
Well water in residence	1.9%	4.8%
Public hand pump	51.3%	45.9%
Public tap	17.3%	15.6%
Public well	21.8%	16.1%
Bore well	0.9%	10.9%
Canal	2.7%	2.0%
N	2 269	2 179

Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.

Table 33

**Main source for cooking**

	<i>Jharkhand</i>	<i>Chhattisgarh</i>
	T	T
Fuel wood	94.5%	98.3%
Crop residue	4.4%	0.6%
Dung cakes	0.3%	0.3%
Coal/charcoal	0.3%	0.0%
Kerosene	0.0%	0.0%
Electricity	0.0%	0.0%
LPG	0.3%	0.5%
Bio-gas	0.2%	0.2%
N	2 269	2 179


Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.

256. Autonomy and authority in decision-making. The evaluation used financial and intra-households decision-making power, as indicators for measuring this aspect of women well-being.
257. Chart 5 illustrates that across both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, the treatment areas have higher proportion of women with personal savings with respect to the comparison areas. The results of the analysis are significant and can be seen in annex VII.<sup>44</sup> This is not true for their ability to use it independently.

<sup>44</sup> This data derive from the overall sample of matched households with at least one female member, and not only from the female headed households.

258. However, additional evaluation data finds that the highest share of savings (40 per cent in Jharkhand's and 50 per cent in Chhattisgarh's beneficiary groups) derive from money given by their husbands for personal use, while the savings deriving from income-generating activities don't show a sizeable difference across treatment and comparison groups of both states (on average only 30 per cent).

Chart 5

**Autonomy in financial decision-making, in percentages**

Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.


259. As the next step for assessing autonomy in decision-making, the evaluation analysed the intra-household decision-making scenarios. Household-level decision-making and the role of women can be classified into three categories namely authoritative,<sup>45</sup> submissive<sup>46</sup> and consultative.<sup>47</sup> Chart 6 depicts the state wise variation that exists across Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh on the decision-making front. Although the difference between treatment and comparison areas across the two states is marginal, it is important to note that the majority of the decisions for both study areas reflect consultative decision-making with 60-70 per cent. This reflects a high level of gender equality, which is not surprising as tribal societies in India are historically known to be rather egalitarian.

<sup>45</sup> **Authoritative decision making:** when the woman takes the decision herself.

<sup>46</sup> **Submissive decision making:** where her spouse is the decision maker.

<sup>47</sup> **Consultative decision making:** where the woman and her spouse take a consultative decision.

Chart 6  
Type of involvement in intra-household decision-making



Source: JCTDP Impact Evaluation Quantitative Survey.

260. Comfort in raising voice. It is imperative to determine the freedom enjoyed by female household members in matters related to domestic and social constraints. Across the three parameters used for studying the indicator of "comfort in raising voice", it can be seen that the difference across both state and study groups is quite marginal. Table 34 demonstrates that a very small proportion of women has ever protested against domestic violence and favouritism, whereas a very large proportion shows disregard towards dowry.

Table 34  
Voicing of opinion

	Jharkhand	Chhattisgarh
Protest against domestic violence	10.8%	7.7%
Disregard to dowry	96.4%	96.5%
Raising voice against favouritism	10.4%	12.0%

Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.



261. **Women's empowerment score (WE).** The evaluation also provides an overall measure of women's empowerment using three interrelated indicators deriving from the analysis described in the previous paragraphs, namely: (i) autonomy and authority in decision-making with respect to the financial and intra-household decision-making process; (ii) group membership in village-level institutions and leadership; and (iii) comfort in raising voice against social and domestic issues. These indicators have provided the evaluation a metric to measure the level of holistic women empowerment in the form of a composite index: The Women's Empowerment score (WE).<sup>48</sup>
262. All findings related to the three interrelated indicators have been tabulated below in table 35 forming a holistic women empowerment score. The scores lie between 0-1 and are directly related to women empowerment; the higher the score, the more the women are empowered.

Table 35

**Women's empowerment score**

	<i>Jharkhand</i>		<i>Chhattisgarh</i>	
	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Comparison</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Comparison</i>
Women's empowerment score (WE)	0.55	0.49	0.51	0.48
Decision-making ability score	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.98
Leadership and group membership score	0.53	0.36	0.43	0.34
Raise voice against issues score	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.13

Source: JCTDP impact evaluation quantitative survey.

263. As can be observed in the table, the WE scores across both study groups in the two states display better results for the treatment areas. In Jharkhand the overall WE score is higher in treatment areas by 6 per cent with respect to the comparison areas. Also in Chhattisgarh, this score is 3 per cent higher in treatment areas. When the components of the WE score are compared across the study groups of the two states, it can be seen that only the leadership and group membership score is significantly higher in both treatment areas.
264. Even though the impact of the programme on empowerment of women is seen to be positive, as indicated by the higher WE score in the treatment areas, the impact has not been all encompassing with little differential between treatment and comparison areas. Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews indicated that a concrete strategy towards women empowerment and towards the redefining of gender roles was missing. Hence, the JCTDP impact on women empowerment has not been extensive beyond the creation of self-help groups.
265. **Gender equality.** Finally, women's empowerment cannot be adequately addressed without considering the relations between women and men and the level of awareness of men on gender issues.
266. In this regard, the evaluation analysed the views of men about women's empowerment through both the focus group discussions and the impact survey. Overall, the findings of the evaluation reflect the weaknesses of the gender strategy adopted by the programme. Only 51 per cent of men in both beneficiary and comparison groups consider women's empowerment as a condition for social development. Moreover, the share of men that considers women's empowerment as a driver for the economic improvement of the family as a whole is also very low (10 per cent on average) and higher in the comparison groups across both states.

<sup>48</sup> WE= (0.33 x authority in decision-making) + (0.33 x group membership) + (0.33 x comfort in raising voice)

267. **Rating.** Although the programme should have developed a more comprehensive gender strategy looking also at gender equity aspects, based on the above findings, the evaluation assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment as moderately satisfactory (4).

#### Key points

- The impact survey comprised a specific section - dedicated to women's awareness, status and participation - that was administered to at least one female member of each surveyed household in order to provide an indication of impact.
- Despite the enhancement of personal savings and income level due to diversification of income-generating activities, women remain among the poorest and disadvantaged in the community.
- The programme should have stressed better value addition and promoted market linkages to achieve greater impact. In very few cases women could start their own business or become completely financially independent through these groups. SHGs have essentially been used as a medium for savings and internal credit activities than as a vehicle for holistic empowerment.
- The majority of the intra-household decision-making scenarios are consultative, reflecting a high level of gender equality. On the other hand, the view of men about women's empowerment as a condition for social development and economic improvement of the family should be improved.
- Even though the impact of the programme on empowerment of women is seen to be positive, it has not been extensive beyond the creation of SHGs and with little differential between treatment and comparison areas. This is attributable to (i) the lack of a concrete strategy towards women's empowerment and towards the redefining of gender roles; and (ii) the fact that the programme period witnessed activities of the State Rural Livelihood Missions (SRLMs) with a similar agenda and activities.
- More attention should be given to easing women's workloads by providing water for domestic use and reduction in the use of fuel wood for cooking.

## VIII. Performance of partners

268. In line with the IFAD Evaluation Manual, in this section, the evaluation report assesses the performance of IFAD as the lending agency, the central government as the borrower of the loan, and the state governments responsible for JCTDP implementation.

### A. IFAD

269. **Management of the programme by IFAD.** The programme was administered by only three different country programme managers (CPMs) in thirteen years since design until closure, apart from close to two years when the India country programme was managed by a junior Associate Professional Officer (APO). This provided continuity in supervision, implementation support and dialogue with the Government and other partners, even though the assignment of an APO as CPM of the country with the largest IFAD programmes in all regions was in the evaluation's opinion not adequate.
270. IFAD has a country office located in New Delhi. The office currently has three staff and shares offices and technical services with the World Food Programme. The staff is committed, well qualified and competent but severely over-stretched, given the wide range of topics and geographic area covered by IFAD operations, and especially the number of ongoing projects in the country. Discussions with former CPMs and state project directors suggest that it was difficult for the small IFAD country office team to effectively liaise and support the JCTDP at the state level in a timely manner. Moreover, the delays in clearances by the Government is postponing the out-posting of the India CPM from Rome to Delhi, which therefore continues to remain a cause for concern.

271. With regard to the execution of the programme, the evaluation feels that the often-rigid IFAD procurement process restricted the activities in the already delayed implementation of the programme (e.g. the acquisition of pumps and the contracting of an M&E agency), as well as project staff recruitment, tenure and salary. Proactive support to concerned authorities and specialists as well as increased salaries could have slowed down the high staff turnover and the loss of competencies. Although this issue has been brought to IFAD's attention several times in supervision reports and in previous IOE evaluations in India, no adequate action was taken.
272. **Quality of IFAD self-evaluation system.** This section provides an assessment of IFAD supervision and implementation support as well as the quality of the self-evaluation processes of the JCTDP in general.
273. Direct supervision and implementation support. As mentioned earlier, the JCTDP was part of the IFAD Direct Supervision Pilot Programme. Annex VIII contains an overview of the various supervision and joint review missions conducted throughout programme implementation. A total of twelve such missions were conducted in Jharkhand and ten in Chhattisgarh, including five supervision missions, five joint review missions,<sup>49</sup> one mid-term review mission and one PCR validation mission by the Management. The CPM headed the mission in Jharkhand in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2010 (five times) and in Chhattisgarh in 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2007 (four times).
274. From October 2007, these missions were undertaken as joint reviews together with the government and other partners, which enhanced quality and ownership in the process and improved the follow-up on recommendations. However, the programme received only one supervision mission per year, apart from 2007 when a supervision mission took place in February and a joint review mission in November. The average duration of these missions was of two weeks.
275. Although the expertise and number of mission members was not consistent throughout the various joint review missions, the composition of the teams was more comprehensive as compared to the missions implemented in the earlier years of the programme. They included specialists on issues of tribal development, natural resource management, livelihood development, programme management, financial management and gender mainstreaming.
276. This more proactive and participatory approach was well received by the counterparts and enabled IFAD to get closer to the grass roots organizations and gain better understanding of contextual issues as well as the opportunities and challenges related to programme execution. In fact, when the problem underlying the low flow of funds in Jharkhand was recognized in 2008, a financial management specialist was included in subsequent supervision/review missions.
277. The quality of the joint review mission reports is higher in terms of structure, content and analysis as compared to the previous supervision mission reports. This is also due to the in-depth working papers, prepared by the several specialists, which are normally included as annexes in the reports.
278. However, state-level discussions suggest that supervision/review findings and recommendations got skewed towards the specializations of the team members and that a more consistent composition with respect to the team of specialists would have been preferable.
279. Mid-term review. IFAD's mid-term review was in general able to map issues that required attention, in particular concerning the agricultural component and the targeting approach. However, the report is not structured along the evaluation

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<sup>49</sup> Of which only 3 in Chhattisgarh.

criteria and comprises findings and recommendations that are repetitive and similar across both states, as can be seen in annex IX, which includes an overview of key recommendations from the mid-term review. The report could have fine-tuned the recommendations better to the specific context of each state and programme areas. Moreover, the programme was not adjusted to accommodate the recommendations of the mid-term review in critical areas, such as the need for a targeted approach to landless poor people and to sustainable agriculture.

280. RIMS. The evaluation noted in previous chapters the weaknesses and scarce usability of RIMS data.
281. Risk management and monitoring. An appropriate management and monitoring of risks, including the development of an action plan, was not embedded in programme design. As early as 2006, the Government of Chhattisgarh raised the risk that, despite the good project performance, it would cancel the loan as a result of the unavailability of the cofinancing by DfID. The Programme was however not officially flagged to be at risk in IFAD project status reports. In March 2007, the Government of Chhattisgarh wrote to the Ministry of Finance in Delhi to cancel the loan, but in spite of this, the Programme was still not officially flagged to be at risk.<sup>50</sup>
282. Only in 2010 and 2011 the JCTDP was officially flagged to be at risk, even if the risk descriptions from 2009 are largely similar to the ones of 2010. The risks are, amongst others:
- (i) High percentage of loan as a proportion of total project costs, due to the fact that the DfID grant did not materialize, and untimely release of the funds;
  - (ii) Difficulty in distributing funds by components and activities;
  - (iii) Failure of convergence with other schemes and panchayats;
  - (iv) Maintenance of water harvesting and marketing system at risk; and
  - (v) Weak programme management and poor internal control mechanisms due to lack of full time state programme director.
283. In 2012, the JCTDP was no longer flagged to be at risk. However, the report indicates that: (i) the programme management was weak; (ii) the fund release from the Government continues to be a problem; (iii) convergence with MGNREGS could not be accomplished; and (iv) an appropriate exit strategy was still not established, even if the necessity for hand-hold support was acknowledged.
284. **Policy dialogue**. Although IFAD has been successful in establishing a good basis for the implementation of the PESA act as well as in engaging tribal groups and in the promotion of women's empowerment, policy dialogue at the national level and state level has been rather limited. The evaluation noted that outside the positive relationship with the central Ministry of Finance and the welfare and tribal departments at the state levels, there is little awareness of the programme with, for example, the central Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Agriculture or Rural Development.
285. A stronger policy dialogue with the state governments and state programme coordination committee could possibly have contributed towards: (i) more coherence with government schemes and policies; and (ii) the establishment of a clear exit strategy.
286. **Knowledge management**. IFAD supported a number of technical and institutional trainings for state coordinators and programme staff to enable them to effectively address various issues during the programme implementation. Study tours and exposure visits were also undertaken. Moreover, trainings towards knowledge management have been undertaken in both states, for example for the creation of

<sup>50</sup> In the dedicated "Project at Risk" (PAR) box.

programme websites, manuals as well as special pictorial posters for the illiterate and participation in radio talks; the last two being particularly successful in Chhattisgarh.

287. Despite these discrete activities, the evaluation feels that there was minimum inter-learning and exchange of experiences between the two states, villages and NGOs, as well as with other donors or governmental programmes.
288. **Missed partnership opportunities.** As mentioned already in the relevance chapter, a stronger partnership with key stakeholders at design and implementation could have improved the targeting, M&E, output of activities and internal coherence of the programme. Although involving other donors or private sector was not a specific feature of programme design, IFAD could have attempted to bring in other partners, especially when DfID withdrew its participation and funding.
289. IFAD did manage to establish a partnership with ICRISAT and a few similar organizations during programme implementation, but it has not been able to forge a long-term win-win partnership with these organizations. The same applies to the missed opportunity for a stronger partnership with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, both involved in road development to help improve the connectivity of remote tribal regions in Jharkhand. Moreover, the World Bank had a rural poverty initiative in the CTDP districts in Chhattisgarh. There has been very little, if any, dialogue with FAO.
290. In both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, there is a strong presence of large-scale public and private sector corporate entities, who are involved for example in industrial development or mineral extraction. This is affecting the traditional livelihood systems of tribal communities. Using its international standing and credibility, IFAD could have sought opportunities to engage with such institutions under their corporate social responsibility policy, to advance the interests of tribal communities in programme districts. More generally, engagement with the private sector could also have strengthened linkages to banks, markets and in areas of marketing, which was a weak aspect of the programme.
291. **Rating.** Overall, IFAD's performance as a partner in the JCTDP is considered as moderately satisfactory (4).

**Key points**

- The IFAD country office staff is committed, well qualified and competent but severely over-stretched, given the wide range of topics, geographic area and high number of ongoing projects. With respect to the JCTDP, they had to deal with a complex and insecure context and high staff turnover. It was difficult for the small IFAD country office team to effectively liaise and support the JCTDP at the state level.
- The quality of IFAD's self-evaluation system improved over time with the decision to undertake direct supervision, and mostly, with the joint review missions. This decision was well received by the counterparts. However, some issues remain with the uptake of recommendations, repetition of (progress) findings, and the poor quality of the RIMS and risk management.
- IFAD has been successful supporting knowledge management, establishing a good basis for the implementation of the PESA act, delivering results in the promotion of women's empowerment and creating awareness of tribal development.
- Policy dialogue at the national and state levels has been rather limited, which restricted the outreach of results. Stronger policy dialogue could possibly have contributed towards (i) more coherence with government schemes and policies and (ii) the establishment of a clear exit strategy.
- IFAD has not been able to forge long-term win-win partnerships with organizations, donors or the private sector.

**B. Government of India**

292. In this section, the evaluation assessed the role both of the central Government and the two state Governments (Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh).
293. The Ministry of Finance – the co-ordinating Ministry for IFAD in the central Government - has played a useful role in maintaining a good dialogue with IFAD throughout the implementation of the JCTDP including active participation in negotiating the loan/financing agreement of the programme. They have frequently attended the wrap-up meetings of supervision/joint review missions, including the annual portfolio reviews of IFAD-financed projects in India.
294. The Ministry of Finance also intervened as needed to ensure that an extension of the IFAD loan could be granted in a timely manner, even though in the end Chhattisgarh did not wish to extend the project in their state. Moreover, by attending IFAD governing body meetings on a selective basis, the Ministry of Finance has often raised policy and operational issues with the IFAD Management, as and when needed.
295. At the state level, the establishment of the tribal development societies has played an essential role as state level project management units. They did however encounter a high staff turnover and other operational challenges already described in the previous sections. Nevertheless, these societies exemplified an innovative implementation approach with relatively efficient delivery mechanisms. They also took the lead in conducting thematic studies and assessments.
296. The irregular fund flow from the state governments to the programme was an area of concern. Timely release of funds, strong policy guidance in procedural compliance with the PESA and more consistent human resources would have favoured a more solid and stable programme management and implementation, as well as more adequate remuneration to the NGOs. The programme could have achieved greater coverage and impact if it had been able to leverage finances and technical inputs available from various government schemes and/or agencies.
297. The withdrawal of DfID made the state governments reluctant to carry their programmes forward in view of the loan burden it would impose on the states. This resulted in differed implementation performance in the two states, which also did not take responsibility to fill the funding gap left by DfID. In this respect, the evaluation confirms the PCR findings according to which "The main reason why

CTDP could not make similar impacts as compared to JTDP was because the state Government of Chhattisgarh declined to accept the two-year extension granted by IFAD (at the request of the Ministry of Finance) under the same financial terms and conditions (of the central government). The Chief Secretary of Chhattisgarh at that time felt that the IFAD loan might prove to be a heavy liability on the state government without the grant component promised in the design. The state government of Jharkhand took the best advantage of using fully the remaining fund during the extension period of two years. For the extended period, Chhattisgarh wanted back to back loan terms from the central government, but the Ministry of Finance could not approve as the regulations at the time did not permit it".<sup>51</sup>

298. As a result, the Chhattisgarh state Government withdrew all financial and operational support. Even if there was no continued collaboration with IFAD, the state Government could have considered continuing interventions through convergence with existing government programmes as well as supporting the NGOs in the project area. This has unfortunately not been realized.
299. **Monitoring and evaluation.** The IOE preparatory impact evaluation mission<sup>52</sup> confirmed that baseline surveys, M&E data and some impact assessment reports (prepared by the project authorities) are available for both states. The technical assessment on the quality of baseline data however revealed that the usability of available data for any statistically robust impact evaluation was inadequate.
300. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the data collected on JCTDP performance was mostly at the output level, with little information on impact. In light of the above, it can be commented that the M&E system of the JCTDP had both systemic as well as personnel issues. While the frequent absence of personnel during and after the project severely limited data collection, the lack of robust management information systems (MIS) limited the availability of data and the possibility of data collation. The quality of data analysed on the basis of the various M&E documentation also reflects on the inadequate experience of the M&E personnel leading these activities.
301. **Quality of project completion reports (PCR).** IOE assesses the PCRs against four criteria: scope, quality, lessons and candour. The two PCRs prepared by Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are well structured and provide a good overview of the two projects. Despite the availability of separate reports, the information provided is somewhat repetitive and superficial compared to the documented knowledge in the various joint mission reports. Moreover, for some of the important programme features little information was documented, for example on gender and performance of partners.
302. The two reports provide quantitative data deriving from end-line surveys and field studies, which need to be taken with caution given the limitations in the methodology for data collection, as already highlighted in this report. Workshops and consultations were organized to share the results of the programme and this provided a good opportunity to obtain stakeholders' views, which were incorporated in the PCRs. Both reports contain a section on lessons learned and limitations. Finally, the evaluation appreciates the efforts made in the PCRs to recognize and underline the shortcoming of the programme in both states.
303. **Audits.** IFAD procedures do not specifically require internal audit, however, an internal audit (IA) mechanism for the project/PMU has a key role in risk management of IFAD projects. In fact, regular auditing of the PMUs, DPIUs and GSPECs were undertaken by the appointed auditing agency after a pre-audit briefing for the auditors was organized by the IFAD country office. Three types of audits were conducted: (i) an internal audit; (ii) a third-party audit conducted by

<sup>51</sup> PCR, p11-12.

<sup>52</sup> Carried out by IOE at the beginning of June 2014.

chartered accountants (CA); and (iii) an audit by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG).

304. The CAG-conducted audit was independent and followed its own terms and conditions, whereas the CA-conducted audits had the involvement of the Tribal Development Societies (TDS). The indicators for the audits were decided in consultation with the TDS and the CAs. Internal audits by programme staff also formed an important part of the programme.
305. The internal audit reports submitted did not follow the standard IFAD format and lacked thorough project financial statements for each financier and lacked information on internal checks and balances. Furthermore, the lack of audit logs, official approval for procurement transactions, opening of separate accounts for the various committee funds and cash books can feed back to the inadequate and non-recurring trainings.
306. **Rating.** The composite performance of the Government of India is moderately satisfactory (4). This reflects a satisfactory performance of the central government (i.e. the Ministry of Finance), but only moderately satisfactory performance of the state governments. The moderately satisfactory assessment of the state government takes into account the major challenges faced by them at the outset of JCTDP's implementation, given they were established as separate states only in the year 2000 with their own governments, legislatures, and administrations. They also have had to face conflict and violence in some programme districts, which has required them to divert attention at times away from development issues to the restoration of law and order.

#### Key points

- The central government (i.e., the Ministry of Finance) played a constructive role in the design and follow-up of the JCTDP.
- The state governments played an essential role through the establishment of the tribal development societies. These societies exemplified an innovative implementation approach with relatively efficient delivery mechanisms.
- The programme suffered from loss of time and leadership during the formation of the new state governments. Furthermore, the irregular fund flow from Chhattisgarh and inadequate fund flow from Jharkhand to the programme was an area of concern which affected the pace of implementation.
- The state governments were responsible for arranging the M&E of the programme. Several M&E data and some impact assessment reports (prepared by the project authorities) are available for both states. The technical assessment on the usability of baseline data however revealed that the usability of available data for a statistically robust impact evaluation is inadequate.
- The programme managed to set up an internal audit mechanism for the accounts of the GSPEC, DPIU and PMU in both states.

## IX. Overall assessment of programme achievement

307. The rating for *overall programme achievement* of this impact evaluation is moderately satisfactory (4). This rating is a composite assessment of the overall programme, based on the individual ratings of seven criteria<sup>53</sup> used in the evaluation.
308. According to this evaluation, the weakest performing evaluation criteria of the JCTDP are efficiency and sustainability. The programme is considered moderately unsatisfactory in these areas. Five criteria (relevance, effectiveness, impact, innovation and scaling up, and gender) are assessed as moderately satisfactory.

<sup>53</sup> Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, innovation/scaling-up, and gender.



None of the seven evaluation criteria are considered satisfactory or highly satisfactory.

309. It is however interesting to note that the IFAD Management also provided the same rating (4, moderately satisfactory) to *overall programme achievement*, which illustrates an overall convergence between IFAD's independent and self-evaluation functions at least as far as the broader results achieved by the JCTDP.
310. Having said that, the impact evaluation has provided lower ratings to several individual evaluation criteria as compared to the IFAD Management, which underlines there that are opportunities for further strengthening the candour and objectivity in the Fund's self-evaluation processes. In fact, the average disconnect between IOE and ratings by IFAD's Programme Management Department (PMD) across all the evaluation criteria is minus 0.69. The comparison of the evaluation ratings provided by IOE and the ratings by the IFAD Management may be seen in annex VIII.

## X. Conclusions and recommendations

### A. Conclusions

311. **Storyline.** Notwithstanding the impressive growth and development, the country still has the largest number of poor people in the world, at around 300 million, who live on less than US\$1.25 a day on purchasing power parity. This represents around 25 per cent of its total population and implies that one in every four Indian still struggles to make ends meet. Inequality remains widespread and is therefore a major concern to development workers and policy makers.
312. Against this backdrop, the IFAD Executive Board decided to fund the JCTDP in 1999, focusing on the development of tribal people and scheduled castes, who remain amongst the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population. They manifest low social and economic indicators, including poor literacy, limited tenure rights, inadequate access to health, sanitation and water, and low incomes. Their livelihoods are under constant threat also by large public and private investors, who see the pristine forests and remote rural areas where they live offering opportunities for extraction of lucrative minerals and industrial development. Moreover, they are widely exposed to climate change and their coping mechanisms to internal and external shocks is extremely weak.
313. Therefore, the decision by IFAD to finance the JCTDP was appropriate, timely and consistent with the Fund's mandate, especially taking into account that the two states have high proportions of tribal people and scheduled castes. This decision is further supported by the fact that IFAD has developed a well-recognized comparative advantage, specialization and track record in supporting tribal development in the country, as illustrated by three relatively successful predecessor projects with a similar focus (two in Andhra Pradesh and one in Orissa), financed before the JCTDP and several others after it.
314. The programme met some of its objectives by adopting an integrated watershed management approach. Also, its attention to women's empowerment, enhancements in paddy production and productivity, and grass-roots institution-building have been good. However, the programme had a complex design covering two states and numerous sub-sector activities and did not have the expected impact on incomes, promoting linkages to markets, and convergence with major national programmes and policies, which are essential to foster inclusive and sustainable rural transformation in the wider sense. Similar findings are also documented in the recent project performance evaluation by IOE of the IFAD-financed Livelihoods Improvement Project in the Himalayas in India.
315. In sum, on the whole, the JCTDP could have achieved more. Limited results are also partly attributable to the challenges faced by two newly established states, which were and remain affected by fragility due to on-going left-wing (Naxalite)

insurgency movements. IFAD on its part could have also stepped in more energetically, especially at the outset of programme, to ensure timely flow of funds required for adequate implementation. However, the Fund financed a successor programme in 2012 in Jharkhand, which offers a renewed possibility to consolidate and build on some of the initial achievements of the JCTDP, at least in one of the two states covered by the programme.

316. **The programme objectives were well aligned to Government and IFAD policy and strategy, but design was complex constraining outcomes** (see paragraphs 74-100 and 155). The programme's objectives were closely aligned with relevant Government and IFAD policies and strategies and the needs of the poor, such as India's five-year national development plans and IFAD's country strategies. However, programme design had some inherent weaknesses that constrained its final results. For instance, covering two separate states under one loan implied that JCTDP was in fact two projects. This created challenges in implementation, constraining final outcomes.
317. Furthermore, the programme components were overly complex including many sub-components in diverse sub-sectors, suggesting also that insufficient attention was devoted to designing a programme commensurate with the prevailing institutional capacities in the two states. This created complications for implementation, coordination, monitoring, supervision and evaluation. Limited synergies across the range of activities promoted by JCTDP was another factor limiting final results. Moreover, programme design did not adequately factor in the conflict dimension prevailing in the states and its implications for implementation. For example, one of the reasons for the programme's limited success was the high turnover of project directors and other key staff, who found it challenging to work in remote rural areas affected by violence - also taking into account the unattractive compensation packages they were provided.
318. **There were some successes in meeting programme objectives, but more attention to diversification and a sharper targeting would have generated enhanced results** (see paragraphs 88 and 101-137). With regard to effectiveness, the programme had positive results in terms of community mobilization and empowerment and microfinance development. It managed to establish land and water structures, mobilize self-help groups, arrange on-farm activities and organize various types of technical and awareness trainings. It also reached more beneficiaries than envisaged at design. At the same time, however, it did not succeed in fully achieving its objectives, also because it was not successful in promoting diversification of crops and the economic base of the rural poor, and because its targeting approach did not adequately distinguish between the different types of scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in the programme areas.
319. **Programme efficiency was weak, with a rather late start to implementation and high management costs** (see paragraphs 138-159). The programme's cost per beneficiary and cost per self-help group were low, which is a positive factor. However, JCTDP's efficiency was weak on the whole, largely due long lapse between approval and first disbursement, high proportion of costs absorbed by project managements, delays in implementation, and untimely flow of funds. The latter also resulted in the cancellation of a portion of IFAD's loan in the end. All in all, the impact evaluation concludes that JCTDP relevance and effectiveness were moderately satisfactory, whereas its efficiency was moderately unsatisfactory.
320. **Some impacts are visible in the treatment group, but the improvements are generally relatively small** (see paragraphs 164-220). The evaluation concludes that the project had positive impact on the target groups, although the magnitude of impacts was rather limited. By the end of the project, less people within the target group were living under the poverty line (US\$1.25), as compared to those the project did not support. Similarly, members of the target group have

higher monthly incomes, and as mentioned earlier, their paddy production and productivity also increased. Based on a standard of living index, which is an aggregated score of 33 household assets and housing characteristics, the evaluation found that ownership of assets at household level is slightly better in the treatment group.

321. On the other hand, the programme did not achieve much in creating linkages in support of tribal rights and awareness of key government schemes and relevant entitlements. It did also not address their land tenure rights. Using an aggregate estimate to capture dietary diversity and frequency of consumption, only marginal results are visible in the treatment areas. Nutritional assessment of children under the age of 5 does not show much variation between treatment and comparison areas. And, in spite of some achievements in grass roots institution building, self-help groups and other common interest groups were not effectively and sustainably linked to the local governance framework. The JCTDP did not also open up opportunities for value addition of produce or ensure greater access to input or output markets. Taking into account the above and the fact that the improvements in the various impact domains is only marginal in the treatment areas as compared to the non-treatments areas, the evaluation concludes that the programme was only moderately satisfactory in terms of rural poverty impact.
322. **Sustainability is a challenge though prospects are better in Jharkhand than in Chhattisgarh** (see paragraphs 221-234). First and foremost, the JCTDP did not develop an exit strategy, which would have helped clarify the roles and responsibilities of different institutions and actors in ensuring the beneficiaries would receive the necessary inputs and services after programme completion. Operation and maintenance of the important rural infrastructure, land and assets developed by the programme is not assured. Many of the village committees established under the JCTDP are no longer fully active. While the evaluation found that tribal people and others have been empowered at an individual level, insufficient attention was devoted to developing collective social capital that would enable them to voice their priorities effectively in future decision-making and resource allocation processes for development interventions. Limited convergence with major national agriculture and rural development programmes operational in the two states was also not pursued. The new IFAD-funded programme in Jharkhand approved in 2012 provides an opportunity to consolidate some of the achievements of the JCTDP and contribute to better sustainability. However, all in all, the evaluation concludes that the sustainability of benefit of the JCTDP is moderately unsatisfactory.
323. **Programme design included some interesting innovations. Notwithstanding the new IFAD-financed programme in Jharkhand, the evaluation did not find evidence that IFAD took a proactive approach to scaling up** (see paragraphs 235-242). The JCTDP promoted some innovations, both in the technical and institutional arena. The creation of tribal development societies, an autonomous body linked to relevant government departments in both states, was entrusted with responsibilities for programme management. While this was an interesting idea with the aim of ensuring speedy implementation, these societies faced several challenges, including inadequate knowledge and understanding of IFAD policies and processes, and lack of continuity in staffing. The two societies established at the state level and the district level societies also made little effort to learn from each other and exchange experiences. The programme promoted some technical innovations, for instance, Chhattisgarh introduced a process to extract carbon credit under a Clean Development Mechanism, and other initiatives included the use of solar energy and promotion of biogas, but both of them had a very limited outreach. In terms of scaling up, IFAD has now funded a further similar programme in Jharkhand, but on the whole, the evaluation did not find evidence that IFAD took a proactive approach to identifying pathways for scaling up some of the positive features of the programme. The impact evaluation

concludes that moderately satisfactory results have been achieved in the promotion of innovation and scaling up.

324. **Women's empowerment activities achieved positive results, in spite of the lack of a coherent gender strategy** (see paragraphs 243-267). The programme made useful contributions to promoting gender equality and women's empowerment. The evaluation used a women's empowerment score based on three interrelated indicators namely: (i) autonomy and authority in decision-making with respect to the financial and intra-household decision-making process; (ii) group membership in village-level institutions and leadership; and (iii) comfort in raising voice against social and domestic issues. The women empowerment scores are better in both states in the treatment areas, as compared to the groups that did not receive the programme. Other indicators used in the evaluation also show some positive achievements, such as in terms of better incomes among women-headed households in treatment areas.
325. At the same time, the programme did not have a gender strategy and insufficient attention was paid to training men to sensitize them towards broader issues of relationships between men and women, and the transformational role women can plan in broader social and economic development activities. More attention could have been devoted to easing women's workloads by providing water for domestic use and reduction in the use of fuel wood for cooking. And, despite the enhancement of personal savings and income level due to diversification of income-generating activities, women remain among the poorest and disadvantaged in the community. In conclusion, impact in this area has been moderately satisfactory.
326. **IFAD and the Government showed continued commitment to tribal development, but could have more energetically addressed some bottlenecks emerging during programme implementation** (see paragraphs 268-291). IFAD's supervision and implementation support and the mid-term review were generally of good quality, though it could have more proactively intervened at critical times during implementation to address bottlenecks, such as with the flow of funds which was hampering implementation. It could have also taken more decisive steps to make the necessary adjustments to design, once it was clear the DfID grant would not materialize. IFAD could also have made more efforts to develop linkages with concerned technical ministries at the central level and ensured enhanced attention to policy dialogue and promoting greater convergence of the programme. The IFAD country office in New Delhi has committed staff, but they are few and stretched to provide timely support to the many operations as well as engage in other processes (e.g., policy dialogue, advocacy, partnership building, etc.). IFAD organized useful training for programme staff on a number of subjects including knowledge management, and organized study tours and exposure visits.
327. The Ministry of Finance took active interest in the JCTDP and stepped in a key moments, in line with its overall remit. The state Governments played an essential role through the establishment of the Tribal Development Societies. However, the programme suffered from loss of time and leadership during the formation of the new state governments. Furthermore, the irregular fund flow from Chhattisgarh and inadequate fund flow from Jharkhand to the programme was an area of concern which affected the pace of implementation. Both IFAD and the Government performance is assessed as moderately satisfactory.
328. **Weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation** (see paragraphs 10-13, 37-38, 108-111, 156, 272-283, 299-300). The programme faced several challenges in this area. Though baseline surveys were done, their quality was weak. The JCTDP's logical framework was poor and it was not used by programme management as a tool to monitor or manage for results. Efforts were made mostly to monitor outputs, and less attention was paid to assessing outcomes, and RIMS data was also not properly captured or analysed. The competencies and experience of M&E

personnel also contributed to limited performance. And, finally, though the programme undertook some studies during implementation, the evaluation component of the M&E system was not sufficiently used for learning and continuous improvement.


## **B. Recommendations**

329. The impact evaluation makes four main recommendations, which would serve to inform the implementation of the new programme in Jharkhand, as well as other IFAD-financed programmes and projects in the country. Many of the below recommendations have wider implications for the India country programme and beyond.
330. **Design for context** (see paragraphs 316-317)<sup>54</sup>. All project designs should include a thorough poverty and institutional analysis, to ensure that objectives and design are commensurate with state-level capacities, systems and processes to ensure timely delivery and better impact. This will also assist in determining adequate targeting approaches which carefully differentiate among diverse poor social groups. For projects designed in fragile situations, a fragility analysis should also be standard practice of design. Moreover, projects should be exposed to continuous adjustments in design taking into account changing context or introduction of any pertinent new operational corporate policy in IFAD to ensure their continued relevance. This should especially be done for projects that have not yet crossed their mid-point in implementation duration. Finally, projects covering two states under one loan should no longer be financed, unless there is a clear strategy for their integration and cross-fertilisation of lessons and enhanced budgets are allocated for supervision and implementation support.
331. **Convergence with government programmes** (see paragraphs 321 and 322). It is recommended that all projects clarify how they are aligned with key national and state-level programmes in the agriculture and rural sectors. This is essential to ensure sustainability and can provide an opportunity for scaling up after the completion of IFAD-financed operations. The quest for better convergence, sustainability and scaling up will also require that projects implemented at the state level ensure that concerned technical ministries at the central level participate in their design and are involved in an appropriate manner throughout implementation.
332. **Sustainability strategy** (see paragraphs 322). All IFAD-financed projects should be designed in such a way to ensure sustainability of benefits. In this regard, all projects in India and elsewhere should include in their financing agreement that an exit/sustainability strategy would be developed well before project closure, which would be agreed by IFAD and the Government. Such a strategy should clarify the roles and responsibilities of national and state governments, IFAD, communities, and other relevant partners. The strategy would also clarify how any needed recurrent costs would be met, to ensure that operations and maintenance especially of public good created during the investment phase are ensured.
333. **Monitoring and evaluation** (see paragraphs 328). It is important that all IFAD-supported projects are designed based on a theory of change to ensure better outcomes and facilitate monitoring and evaluation activities. Project should undertake baselines surveys as early as possible, and such surveys should include a properly selected control/comparison group to facilitate impact evaluations in the future. The Strategic Planning and Impact Assessment Division should be involved in the design of such surveys, for instance, by having a chance to comment on their terms of reference. The terms of reference of a member of supervision missions should explicitly include a comprehensive review of M&E systems and activities and provide recommendations to improve them, as needed. The project

<sup>54</sup> Paragraph numbers refer to key paragraphs in the conclusions that form the basis of each recommendation.

completion report (PCRs) should be prepared in line with IFAD guidelines and the quality of the report and ratings of evaluation criteria covered should be exposed to a systematic peer review within PMD to ensure their objectivity and consistency with the narrative in the PCRs. A representative of the front office of PMD should be included in such peer review process. The logical framework should be used more proactively as a basis for ongoing monitoring of achievements, and for introducing any adjustments for better effectiveness.

# Theory of Change of the Programme



## Impact evaluation indicator matrix

<i>Impact domains</i>	<i>Indicator matrix</i>
<i>Household income and assets</i>	Standard of living index* based on house type, separate room for cooking, ownership of house, toilet facility, source of lighting, main fuel for cooking, source of drinking water and other households assets
	Number of people above and below US\$1.25/day
	Percentage of households reporting savings (in SHG and other sources)
	Percentage of households reporting engagement in income-generating activities through SHG/CIG or at individual level
	Percentage of households reporting engagement in primary livelihoods activity (intensification of livelihoods portfolio)
	Percentage of household reporting involvement in various sources of income (diversification of livelihood portfolio)
<i>Human and social capital and empowerment</i>	Percentage of households reporting access to financial services
	Percentage of women delivered in the last one year reporting institutional deliveries
	Percentage of children of 6-14 years (especially girls) enrolled in schools
	Percentage of households with access to safe source of drinking water (from an hand pump)
	Percentage of respondents having knowledge of key provisions of Atrocities act, Forest Rights Act (2006), MNREGA
	Percentage of respondents reporting participation in gram sabhas in the last one year
	Percentage of women of reporting participation in gram sabhas in last one year
Percentage of women reporting participation in household decision-making	
<i>Food security and agricultural productivity</i>	Percentage of 0-5 years children malnourished and severely malnourished
	Percentage of households reporting year round availability of food
	Yield of major crops (paddy, tomato, cauliflower, okra, brinjal and potato)
<i>Natural resources, the environment and climate change</i>	Annual patterns of household collection, consumptions and sale of non-timber forest produce
	Percentage of rural households in the various cropping seasons
	Number of environment protective initiatives
<i>Institutions and policies</i>	Number of institutions developed by the programme
	Percentage of household membership of the institutions developed by the programme
	Number of existing institutions strengthened by the programme
	Qualitative assessment of institutional health
	Qualitative assessment of pro-poor and pro-tribal changes made in existing policies in conjunction with the programme directions

\* Standard index used as part of the National Family Health Survey; (<http://www.rchiips.org/nfhs>).



# Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme impact evaluation framework

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Data/Information sources</i>
<b>I. IMPACT</b>		
Rural poverty impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What difference has the project made to beneficiaries?</li> <li>• How many people have been affected?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Impact survey</li> </ul>
<u>Household income and assets</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the composition and level of household incomes change (more income sources, more diversification, higher income)?</li> <li>• Has JCTDP increased vulnerable groups' (in particular women) income-generating capacity in targeted areas with respect to non-targeted areas?</li> <li>• What has been the programme contribution to the creation of alternative sources of income?</li> <li>• What changes are apparent in intra-household incomes and assets?</li> <li>• Did farm households' physical assets change (farmland, water, livestock, trees, equipment, etc.)? Did other household assets change (houses, bicycles, radios, television sets, telephones, etc.)?</li> <li>• Did households' financial assets change (savings, debt, borrowing, insurance)?</li> <li>• Were the rural poor able to access financial markets more easily?</li> <li>• Did the rural poor have better access to input and output markets?</li> <li>• Do the better health and education promoted by the programme allow the rural poor to obtain higher incomes and more assets?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus group interviews with programme beneficiaries and state authorities</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Secondary data</li> </ul>
<u>Human and social capital and empowerment</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did rural people's organizations and grass-roots institutions change?</li> <li>• Are changes in the social cohesion and local self-help capacities of rural communities visible?</li> <li>• To what extent did the project empower the rural poor vis-à-vis development actors and local and national public authorities?</li> <li>• Do they play more effective roles in decision-making?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus group interviews with programme beneficiaries and state authorities</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Secondary data</li> </ul>

Criteria	Evaluation questions	Data/Information sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the rural poor empowered to gain better access to the information needed for their livelihoods?</li> <li>• Did the rural poor gain access to better health and education facilities?</li> <li>• To what extent the programme contributed to strengthening the role of community-based organizations, <i>inter alia</i>, in planning and executing development activities?</li> <li>• Has JCTDP improved knowledge on watershed and crop / livestock / aquaculture management?</li> <li>• Has JCTDP improved knowledge on tribal rights by vulnerable groups?</li> </ul>	
<u>Food security and agricultural productivity</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What have been the changes in food security and productivity? In particular: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ What have been the changes in the average agricultural/livestock productivity of the programme's area with respect to another area not involved in the programme?</li> <li>✓ Has JCTDP increased the average value of production as well as average yields per hectare of the beneficiaries with respect to non-beneficiaries?</li> <li>✓ Has JCTDP increased on average the percentage of commercialized production of the beneficiaries with respect to non-beneficiaries?</li> <li>✓ What have been the changes in nutrition and health conditions?</li> <li>✓ Did children's nutritional status change (e.g. stunting, wasting, underweight)?</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Has JCTDP contributed to long-term technological change? Did cropping intensity change? Was there an improvement in land productivity and, if so, to what extent? Did the returns to labour change?</li> <li>• To what extent did the rural poor improve their access to input and output markets that could help them enhance their productivity and access to food?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus group interviews with programme beneficiaries and state authorities</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Secondary data</li> </ul>
<u>Natural resources and environment</u>	<p>What has been the impact on natural resources and environment? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ To what extent the programme contributed to sustainable land, water and forest management and conservation?</li> <li>✓ Did the status of the natural resources base change (land, water, forest, pasture, fish stocks, etc.)?</li> <li>✓ Did local communities' access to natural resources change (in general and specifically for the poor)?</li> <li>✓ Has the degree of environmental vulnerability changed (e.g. exposure to pollutants, climate change effects, volatility in resources, potential natural disasters)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus group interviews with programme beneficiaries and state authorities</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Secondary data</li> </ul>

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Data/Information sources</i>
<u>Institutions and policies</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What has been the programme's contribution to the behavioural changes in local authorities and grass roots organizations?</li> <li>• Were there any changes in rural financial institutions (e.g. in facilitating access for the rural poor)?</li> <li>• How did public institutions and service delivery for the rural poor change?</li> <li>• What improvements were discernible in local governance, including the capacity and role of government departments, NGOs, the private sector, and elected bodies and officials?</li> <li>• Were there any changes in national/sectoral policies affecting the rural poor?</li> <li>• Did market structures and other institutional factors affecting poor producers' access to markets change?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus group interviews with programme beneficiaries and state authorities</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Secondary data</li> </ul>
<b>II. PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</b>		

<b>A. Relevance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the JCTDP objectives realistic and aligned to national agriculture and rural development strategies and policies, the COSOP and relevant IFAD sector and subsector policies, as well as the needs of the rural poor? Are they still valid? To what extent did the project respond to the development needs of the rural poor in the two states?</li> <li>• How was the internal coherence of the project in terms of synergies and complementarity between objectives, components, activities and inputs as described in the project design document and subsequent changes?</li> <li>• Was the project design participatory in the sense that it took into consideration the inputs and needs of key stakeholders, including the government, executing agencies, co-financiers and the expected beneficiaries and their grass roots organizations?</li> <li>• Was the project design and implementation approach appropriate for achieving the project's objectives, given the context in which the project was implemented? This refers, <i>inter alia</i>, to the following dimensions: (i) targeting approach; (ii) working through grass roots organizations; (iii) set-up of Tribal Development Societies, PMU and DPUs (District Programme Units); and (iv) engagement with service providers (e.g. NGOs) and use of traditional knowledge</li> <li>• Is the community development approach based on grass roots organizations appropriate and relevant for rural poverty reduction in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh?</li> <li>• Did the project benefit from available knowledge (for example, the experience of other similar projects in the area or in the country) during its design and implementation?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appraisal Report</li> <li>• Supervision, MTR, PCR</li> <li>• Self-assessment reports</li> <li>• Interviews with IFAD country office (ICO), ex TDSs staff, government staff at federal, state and district level</li> <li>• Group discussion and interviews with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Interviews with IFAD CPM/ICO staff</li> <li>• Interviews with development actors in project area</li> <li>• Interviews with grass-roots organizations</li> </ul>
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<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Data/Information sources</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the project objectives remain relevant over the period of time required for implementation? In the event of significant changes in the project context or in IFAD policies, has design been retrofitted?</li> <li>• What are the main factors that contributed to a positive or less positive assessment of relevance?</li> <li>• How coherent was the project in terms of how it fit in with the policies, programmes and projects undertaken by the government and other development partners?</li> </ul>	
B. Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent have the objectives of the project and its components been attained both in quantitative and in qualitative terms?</li> <li>• Was the project design appropriate for achieving the project's core objectives?</li> <li>• To what extent have project objectives been attained? To what extent has the project succeeded in its objectives of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Strengthening existing community organizations and establishing new grass roots organizations towards benefitting IFAD's target group;</li> <li>✓ Establishing the basis for successful devolution process;</li> <li>✓ Improving natural resource management;</li> <li>✓ Improving access to social and economic infrastructure by the target group;</li> <li>✓ Improving access to financial services by the target group.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• What were the facilitating or impeding factors for achievements or under-achievements?</li> <li>• What factors in project design and implementation account for the estimated results in terms of effectiveness?</li> <li>• In particular, what changes in the overall context (e.g. policy framework, political situation, institutional set-up, economic shocks, civil unrest, etc.) have affected or are likely to affect project implementation and overall results?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appraisal report</li> <li>• Supervision, MTR, PCR</li> <li>• Self-assessment reports</li> <li>• Interviews with ex TDS staff, national and state authorities</li> <li>• Group discussion with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Interviews with IFAD CPM/ICO staff</li> <li>• Interviews with development actors in project area</li> <li>• Interviews with grass roots organizations</li> </ul>
C. Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How much time did it take for the loan to be effective, and how does it compare with other loans in the same country and region?</li> <li>• By how much was the original closing date extended, and what were the additional administrative costs that were incurred during the extension period?</li> <li>• Where the objectives achieved on time? What factors helped or impeded the efficiency in implementation progress</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appraisal report</li> <li>• Supervision reports, MTR, PCR</li> <li>• Self-assessment reports</li> <li>• Interviews with ex TDS staff, national and state authorities</li> </ul>

Criteria	Evaluation questions	Data/Information sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the costs of investments for different types of CDF sub-projects compared to national standards (if available)? How is the JCTDP cost of delivering services and results (including cost per beneficiary) compared to local, national or regional benchmarks?</li> <li>• What were the administrative costs per beneficiary and how do they compare to other projects?</li> <li>• Is it possible to get an indication on plausible economic rate of return compared to the projection at the appraisal stage, based on existing data?</li> <li>• What factors help account for project efficiency performance?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group discussion with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Interviews with IFAD CPM/ICO staff</li> <li>• Analysis of comparators</li> <li>• Interviews with grass roots organizations and implementing partners</li> <li>• IFAD database on disbursements and programme costs</li> </ul>
<p><b>III. OTHER PERFORMANCE CRITERIA</b></p>		
<p>A. Sustainability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was a specific exit strategy or approach prepared and agreed upon by key partners to ensure post-project sustainability? Has this been effective?</li> <li>• What are the chances that benefits generated by the project will continue after project closure, and what factors militate in favour of or against maintaining benefits?</li> <li>• What are the current state of operations and maintenance (O&amp;M) of the community-level infrastructure supported under the JCTDP? Did the project lay the ground for sustainable O&amp;M for community-level infrastructure after the project closure?</li> <li>• Is there a clear indication of government commitment after the project for continuing community mobilization and participatory development processes? What are the resources, and instruments provided, if any?</li> <li>• What are the current roles of activities of the TDS vis-à-vis improving sustainability of benefits generated by the project, as well as scaling up the project experience and lessons? How are they financed and what is the prospect for the organizational sustainability?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appraisal report</li> <li>• Supervision reports, MTR, PCR</li> <li>• Self-assessment reports</li> <li>• Interviews and group discussion with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Interviews with TDS staff</li> <li>• Interviews with government staff</li> <li>• Interviews with grass roots organizations</li> <li>• Interviews with IFAD CPM/ICO staff</li> </ul>
<p>B. Innovation and scaling up</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the initiative being evaluated specifically address innovation and scaling up?</li> <li>• Did it articulate an explicit strategy and define pathways for scaling up, and was an ultimate scale target included?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supervision reports, MTR, PCR</li> <li>• Self-assessment reports</li> </ul>

Criteria	Evaluation questions	Data/Information sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were successfully promoted innovations documented and shared? Were other specific activities (e.g. workshops, exchange visits, etc.) undertaken to disseminate the innovative experiences? Were efforts related to scaling up assessed and reported upon in the MTR and periodic supervision processes?</li> <li>• Did the project design build on prior successful experiences and lessons with scaling up? How did the innovation originate (e.g. through the beneficiaries, government, IFAD, NGOs, research institution, etc.) and was it adapted in any particular way during project/programme design?</li> <li>• Did the project design documents address what are the potential drivers and constraints that will affect the scale-up potential of the project?</li> <li>• Did project implementation support the development of relevant drivers (e.g. in terms of resources allocation for knowledge management) that are essential for scaling up?</li> <li>• Were proactive efforts made to identify and develop strategic partnerships with organizations which could potentially be involved in scaling up of successfully piloted innovations?</li> <li>• Did the project's M&amp;E system help capture successful innovative activities that have potential for scaling up?</li> <li>• Are the actions in question truly innovative or are they well-established elsewhere but new to the country or project area?</li> <li>• Have these innovations been scaled up and, if so, by whom (TDS, Government of India or other partners)? If not, what are the realistic prospects that they can and will be scaled up by the government, other donors and/or the private sector?</li> <li>• Has there been any additional funding/intervention from the government during and/or after the project? Has there been any regular annual budgetary allocation to support development activities after the project? If there has been, what is the mechanism for approval and flow of funds?</li> <li>• Has there been any additional funding/interventions from other development partners to support TDS and grass-roots organizations (existing and new)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews and group discussion with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Interviews with ex TDS staff</li> <li>• Interviews with government staff</li> <li>• Interviews with TDS, national and states authorities</li> <li>• Interviews with IFAD CPM/ICO staff</li> </ul>
C. Gender equality and women's empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the initiative contain specific activities for gender equality and women's empowerment, and what was their effect on the rural poor?</li> <li>• What has been the impact on gender equality and women's empowerment? in particular:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appraisal report</li> <li>• Supervision reports, MTR, PCR</li> </ul>

Criteria	Evaluation questions	Data/Information sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ has JCTDP facilitated: (i) changes in gender roles and women's access to income from productive activities; (ii) changes in men's and women's access to local grass roots organizations and to services from public institutions (e.g. health and education); (iii) changes in men's and women's roles in household food security and nutrition; and (iv) men's and women's access to basic infrastructure.</li> <li>✓ has JCTDP facilitated access to land by vulnerable groups?</li> <li>• What is the relevance of design in terms of gender equality and women's empowerment? This will include assessing the results-framework of COSOPs and projects to assess whether IFAD's corporate objectives on gender are adequately integrated therein.</li> <li>• To what extent did the project succeed in promoting gender equality and women's empowerment, given the social and cultural context?</li> <li>• What were the project activities and approaches that effectively contributed to empowering women, if any?</li> <li>• Were gender dimensions adequately included in the project's annual work plans and budgets?</li> <li>• What percentage of total project resources was invested for gender equality and women's empowerment activities?</li> <li>• What was the impact of the project in terms of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment? Among other issues, this would include assessing whether: there are changes to household members including women's workload, women's health, skills, income and nutritional levels; women have greater influence in decision-making; women have been empowered to gain better access to resources and assets; there are changes in gender relations within the households and communities in the project area; etc.</li> <li>• To what extent is the gender-related impact likely to be sustainable after the completion of the IFAD-funded project period?</li> <li>• To what extent did the project: (i) monitor gender-disaggregated outputs to ensure gender equality and women's empowerment objectives were being met; (ii) adapt project implementation as required to better meet gender equality and women's empowerment objectives; (iii) supervision and implementation support address and report on gender issues; (iv) engage in policy dialogue to promote changes to government and other partner systems and processes that would improve gender equality and women's empowerment; and (iv) systematically analyse, document and disseminate lessons on gender equality and women's empowerment?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Self-assessment reports</li> <li>• Interviews and group discussion with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Interviews with TDS staff</li> <li>• Interviews with government staff</li> <li>• Interviews with grass-roots organizations</li> <li>• Interviews with IFAD CPM/ICO staff</li> </ul>

Criteria	Evaluation questions	Data/Information sources
D. Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What were the strengths and weaknesses of the contributions of IFAD and the government, respectively, in promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment?</li> <li>• Did the initiative contain specific adaptation and mitigation activities and what was their effect on the livelihoods of the rural poor?</li> <li>• Were the approaches presented in the IFAD climate change strategy adequately reflected in the initiative being evaluated?</li> <li>• For projects/COSOPs, were climate change issues treated as an integral dimension in the risk analysis that informed the design?</li> <li>• Did the adaptation and mitigation activities ensure the sustainability of rural livelihoods within changing climate conditions? If yes, what were the results achieved? Did the budget include all costs associated with these activities?</li> <li>• Did the initiative help the rural poor to restore the natural resources and environment base that (may) have been affected by climate change?</li> <li>• Were adequate funds allocated to measures aiming at mitigating the climate change-related risks identified in the risk analysis?</li> <li>• Did the initiative contain activities and resources to capture and disseminate across the organization and externally experiences, lessons and innovations on climate change?</li> <li>• Provide an analysis of any disaster preparedness measures, for example, in terms of agro-meteorological warning systems, drought contingency plans, response to flooding, weather-indexed risk insurance, etc.?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project documents</li> <li>• Focus group discussions</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Interviews with TDS</li> </ul>
IV. PERFORMANCE OF PARTNERS		

A. Performance of IFAD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has IFAD exercised its developmental, project management, and fiduciary responsibilities?</li> <li>• Did IFAD mobilize adequate resources (funding, time, technical expertise)?</li> <li>• Were specific efforts made to incorporate the lessons and recommendations from previous independent evaluations in project design and implementation?</li> <li>• Has IFAD made proactive efforts to be engaged in policy dialogue activities at different levels in order to ensure, inter alia, the scaling up of pro-poor innovations?</li> <li>• Was the design process participatory (with national and local agencies, grass-roots organizations) and did it promote ownership by the borrower?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project documents</li> <li>• Focus group discussions</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Interviews with TDS</li> </ul>
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Criteria	Evaluation questions	Data/Information sources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did IFAD adequately integrate comments made by its quality enhancement and quality assurance processes?</li> <li>• Did IFAD (and the government) take the initiative to suitably modify project design (if required) during implementation in response to any major changes in the context, especially during the MTR?</li> <li>• Was prompt action taken to ensure the timely implementation of recommendations stemming from the supervision and implementation support missions, including the MTR?</li> <li>• Did IFAD undertake the necessary follow-up to resolve any implementation bottlenecks?</li> <li>• Where applicable, what is the role and performance of IFAD's country presence team (including proxy country presence arrangements)? Did IFAD headquarters provide the necessary support to its country presence team, for example, in terms of resources, follow-up and guidance, adequate delegation of authority, and so on?</li> <li>• Has IFAD been active in creating an effective partnership and maintaining coordination among key partners to ensure the achievement of project objectives, including the scaling up of pro-poor innovations?</li> </ul> <p>Has IFAD, together with the government, contributed to planning an exit strategy?</p>	
B. Performance of government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the government assumed ownership and responsibility for the project? Judging by its actions and policies, has the government been fully supportive of project goals?</li> <li>• Has adequate staffing and project management been assured? Have appropriate levels of counterpart funding been provided on time?</li> <li>• Has project management discharged its functions adequately, and has the government provided policy guidance to project management staff when required?</li> <li>• Did the government ensure suitable coordination of the various departments involved in execution?</li> <li>• Has auditing been undertaken in a timely manner and have reports been submitted as required?</li> <li>• Did the government (and IFAD) take the initiative to suitably modify the project design (if required) during implementation in response to any major changes in the context?</li> <li>• Was prompt action taken to ensure the timely implementation of recommendations from supervision and implementation support missions, including the MTR?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project documents</li> <li>• Focus group discussions</li> <li>• Impact survey</li> <li>• Interviews with TDS</li> </ul>

- Has an effective M&E system been put in place and does it generate information on performance and impact which is useful for project managers when they are called upon to take critical decisions?
- Has the government (and IFAD) contributed to planning an exit strategy and/or making arrangements for continued funding of certain activities?
- Have loan covenants and the spirit of the loan agreement been observed?
- Has the government facilitated the participation of NGOs and civil society where appropriate?
- Have the flow of funds and procurement procedures been suitable for ensuring timely implementation?

## Programme logical framework

Narrative summary	Key performance indicators	Means of verification	Critical assumptions
<b>Objective</b>			
Sustainable improvement in food and livelihood security and general quality of life of several million poor people in Southern Bihar and north-eastern MP.	1.1 At least 70% of the beneficiaries report HFS ensured and at least 50% report livelihood systems improved by 2010. 1.2 People outside the programme area report confidence and ability to access resources from outside agencies. 1.3 At least about half of the NGOs/CBOs report improved access to development funds and services by 2010. 1.4 IFAD and other donors have promoted similar initiatives in India and outside by 2010.	Ex-post impact assessment of programmes by the Government and external donors.  Analyses and comparison of data on similar rainfed areas.	Not applicable.
<b>Purpose</b>			
Sustainable and equitable approach to ensure household food security and to improve the livelihood systems and overall quality of life of 356 000 poor people in tribal areas in the programme area of Bihar and MP. Developed, implemented and ready for replication.	1.1 HFS ensured for at least 70% of the programme area HHs and livelihood systems improved for at least 50 % of population in programme villages on sustainable basis by EOP. 1.2 At least 70% of the people report confidence and ability to access resources from outside agencies. 1.3 At least two partner organizations have developed and resourced replication plans. 1.4 Over 80% of the poorest HHs report improvement in their HFS situation and improved livelihood systems. 1.5 Over 50% of women report practical benefits and enhanced role in HFS and livelihood decision making by EOP.	Output to purpose review in PY 3 and at the end of the programme, based on external impact assessment studies using baseline (before and after) and comparative (with/without) data.  Cumulative findings of regular impact assessment studies and internal monitoring systems.	Technologies and approaches of the programme effectively adopted by GOs, NGOs, and other donors.  Wider context of agricultural policies and service provision become more appropriate for complex, risk-prone and diverse rain fed
<b>Outputs</b>			
1. Empowerment of the tribal population, especially women and other marginal groups, through awareness-raising on tribals' and women's rights.	1.1 At least 70 % of the overall tribal population and 80% of the women population understand and begin asserting their rights. 1.2 At least 20% of grouped court cases concerning legal rights of individuals/communities successfully completed by PY5.	Findings of the PRA-based surveys.	The Government of MP and the Government of Bihar eager to comply with the spirit of the <i>Panchayats</i> Act and willing to put it into practice.

Narrative summary	Key performance indicators	Means of verification	Critical assumptions
<p>2. Participatory community institutions established, operational and meeting the needs of poor households.</p>	<p>2.1 At least one SHG established and operational in all NVs by PY 1 and at least two by PY 2.            2.2 75 % of SHGs have functioning savings and credit scheme within one year of establishment.            2.2 At least 50% of gram sabhas and GSPECs formed and recognized by PY 1 and 95% by PY 2.            2.3 All NVs have at least one trained animators in key programme areas (at least 50% women) within one year of joining programme and two by the end of PY 2.            2.4 At least 50% of all Executive Committees' members and 60% of Users' Groups and SHGs consist of women, marginal and landless farmers and PTGs.            2.5 At least six strong users' groups, with at least 60% membership of women/landless/marginal farmers, work in MWS continuously for a minimum of two years after four years of village phasing.            2.6 At least 25% of SHG avail themselves of formal financial services after four years' of entry.            2.7 Dependence of target group on informal lending sector reduced by 20% after two years and by 40% in the next two years.            2.8 At least 15% of concerned gram sabha Executive Committees and 20% of beneficiary groups have established independent linkages with government schemes.</p>	<p>Records kept by the groups. Regular documents/reports available for verification at PMUs, DPIUs, NGOs, WSAs, gram sabhas. Donors consultants missions, the Government, state governments visit reports/ documents. Meeting registers and records at various levels in the programme. Studies and assessment reports within and outside the programme. Accounts and audit reports.</p>	<p>Serious droughts and/or other natural disasters do not severely disrupt or change local farming, food security and livelihood systems.             Market trends and fluctuations do not adversely affect economic viability of on and off-farm activities.             Recruit, train and retain staff for sufficiently long period.</p>
<p>3. Participatory planning system for natural resource management evolved and implemented.</p>	<p>3.1 Participatory planning manual in place and stakeholders trained by the end of PM 6.            3.2 Micro plans for 25% of the natural villages completed by PM 12 and 95% of natural villages (NVs) by the end of PM 24.</p>	<p>GSPEC records. Regular reports available for verification at PMUs, DPIUs, NGOs, WSAs, gram sabhas.</p>	
<p>4. Appropriate farming system technologies identified, developed and adapted, tested with poor farmers, and made widely available.</p>	<p>4.1 Over 30% of treatable areas of watershed treated for L&amp;WM and the same amount of cultivable area with improved moisture status in <i>Kharif</i> season and 10% in <i>Rabi</i> season within three years of village entry.            4.2 Over 20% of the gross cropped area of programme villages under improved cropping systems within four years of entry.            4.3 Over 55% of programme villages have functional CFM Executive Committees successfully implementing a micro plan after two and a half years from establishment of the Committee.            4.4 Over 30% of households report improved productivity of livestock and fish rearing within three years of village entry.            4.5 Over 30% of CFM villages and 45% of PTG villages have other non-timber forest produce (NTFP) related income-generating activities.            4.6 All programme staff and staff of facilitating NGOs have received appropriate technical training within one year of programme entry and all technical manuals and guidelines are completed during by PY 1.            4.7 Specific indicators for specific farming system activities developed in all NVs by the end of Year One of village entry.</p>	<p>Regular progress report; Interim impact assessment reports; and Supervision reports, etc.</p>	

Narrative summary	Key performance indicators	Means of verification	Critical assumptions
5. Tribal rights on natural resources such as land, forest, water, minor minerals, recognized and promoted.	5.1 Tribals report increase in actual ownership and management of their land. 5.2 Improved access to natural resources including NTFPs by the end of the programme period.	PRA-based findings. Interim impact assessment reports.	
6. Complementary income-generating, expenditure saving and viable microenterprise, benefiting especially the “losers”, PTGs and women, in forest, farm and off-farm sectors, promoted and implemented in programme villages.	6.1 At least half of the “loser” households in programme villages establish MEs with assistance from the programme by PY3. 6.2 At least 60 % of the new entrepreneurs are women or from PTGs. 6.3 Overall employment opportunities increased by 20% by Year Three and 30% by Year Five. 6.4 Conspicuous consumption reduced by at least 20% by Year Three and 40% by Year Five.	Regular progress reports with separate aggregation by gender, PTGs, and target group (such as losers). Interim impact assessment reports.	Government policies and legal environment continue to remain supportive. Outside stakeholders such as banks, GOs and NGOs willing and able to work with the programme.
7. Improved access to drinking water, health care and nutrition education services ensured.	7.1 Provision of rural water supply through repair of existing systems and/or construction of new facilities in about 30% of programme villages and establishment of O&M committee. 7.2 60% of concerned villages served by mobile health care facilities three years after block entry. 7.3 Improvement of about 60 km of access tracks and 110 causeways.	Regular progress reports. Interim impact assessment reports.	Working relationships among SHGs, gram sabhas, WSAs, NGOs, DPIUs, PMUs/TDS.
8. Programme learning system developed and operational.	8.1. M & E and learning systems documented and established. 8.2 Meaningful lessons learned disseminated to at least 50% of the communities. 8.3 Learning incorporated in programme strategies and activities.	Regular reports available for verification at various levels of programme management.	
9. Effective programme management system established and operational	9.1 Organograms, manuals, and delegation of authority, financial powers and policies and procedures prepared and implemented. 9.2 Annual reviews of above (e.g., recruitment, pay and service conditions, training, etc.) take place regularly, and necessary changes incorporated. 9.3 Quarterly progress of activities and processes reviewed at various levels.	Regular documents/reports available for verification at various levels of programme management.	
<b>Activities</b>			
1.1 Study on the tribal and gender rights completed and packaged into appropriate communication materials. 1.2 Legal awareness programme conducted in all villages. 1.3 Legal defence fund established and made use of for defending the rights of tribal population. 2.1 Review PPs of other projects through field visits and workshops. 2.2 Design and test system for microplanning based on PRA and other techniques; implement, evaluate and revise, as necessary. 2.3 Train villagers, staff and other stakeholders in use of PPs. 2.4 Implement system in all project villages. 2.5 Review system and revise as necessary.			

Narrative summary	Key performance indicators	Means of verification	Critical assumptions
<p>3.1 Training and exposure visits for NGOs in participatory community development planned and implemented.</p> <p>3.2 Criteria for selection of NVs agreed and NVs selected.</p> <p>3.3 Rapport with communities established by NGO field workers and entry point activities, including savings negotiated and implemented.</p> <p>3.4 Women and men animators identified, selected and trained.</p> <p>3.5 Frequent meetings with communities held, including men and women separately, SHGs formed, training needs of the villagers identified and training programmes on group management implemented.</p> <p>3.6 Awareness-building programme in NVs implemented and resulting in gram sabhas formed and recognized and large cluster associations for WS management formed and operational.</p> <p>3.7 Complex WS schemes planned and implemented through gram sabha associations.</p> <p>3.8 Support to community institutions in training and capacity-building including finance and audit continued.</p> <p>3.9 Community institutions are encouraged; identify and cope with development constraints without outside assistance.</p> <p>3.10 Linked to external institutions, including banks, facilitated.</p> <p>3.11 Strategies for sustainability of community institutions evolved and implemented.</p>			
	<p>4.1 Issue-focused PRAs on overall relevant aspects of farming systems (crops, livestock, fish, forests, watershed development, irrigation) conducted.</p> <p>4.2 Appropriate technologies identified, procured, tested and evaluated with poor farmers.</p> <p>4.3 Farmer-preferred technologies promoted widely.</p> <p>4.4 Exposure visits and training on key technologies provided for selected farmers.</p>		
	<p>5.1 Develop an understanding of current tribal practices and interpretation of customary laws and document them with tribal participation with support of an anthropologist.</p> <p>5.2 Develop understanding of national and state level legal situation with regard to tribal rights over natural resources.</p> <p>5.3 Develop an appropriate strategy for tribal communities to assert and realise their rights over natural resources.</p>		
	<p>6.1 Participative review of opportunities and constraints of existing situation in the area (e.g., village markets).</p> <p>6.2 Identify, recognize and prioritize microenterprises by the villagers, especially for the landless and women.</p> <p>6.3 Provide training, exposure visits, consultancy, financial services and market and other linkages.</p>		

## Glossary

**Panchayat Raj** – a decentralized rural governance system, composed of various statutory Panchayat raj institutions, formed under the Panchayat raj act and the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) of the Indian Constitution.

**Gram panchayat** – Grass-roots level institution of rural self-government, responsible for managing village affairs with statutory powers.

**Gram Sabha** – Village decision-making assembly composed of every adult member to help assert themselves in the statutory Panchayat. To be provided with statutory recognition. Also central assembly for planning, coordination and monitoring of programme activities at village level and approving of village plans.

**Gram Sabha Project Executive Committee (GSPEC)** – elected by the Gram Sabha in each village. They play an important role in the execution of project activities, by preparing and consolidating village wide plans and financial plans, among which the Gram Sabha Natural Resource Management and Livelihood Plan (GSRMP). Receives funds from DPIU for the various committees holding funds.

**Tribal Development Society (TDS)** – has overall responsibility for implementation of the project. The TDS of Jharkhand operates within the overall framework of the Welfare Department of the state, while the TDS of Chhattisgarh operates within the overall framework of the Tribal Development Department. The TDS receives policy guidance from a state programme coordination committee. The board of the TDSs comprises representatives of both governments and representatives of beneficiaries and facilitating NGOs.

**Project management unit (PMU)** – located within the TDS and headed by a State Programme Director. Responsible for monitoring performance of project activities and their progress towards targets. Receives guidance from district programme coordination committees that will be established in each district, composed of representatives from DPIU, NGOs, banks and line departments.

**District project implementation unit (DPIU)** – implements the project in selected blocks by undertaking and supervising project activities of all partners; committees at the Gram Sabha level, resource and facilitating NGOs, SHGs as well as contracted village animators, health workers.

**Community Forestry Management Committee (CFMC)** – responsible for micro-planning and implementation of forest related activities, expenditures of FFS and community forest management fund.

**Village Credit Committee** – manages the community-based financial services mechanism (village credit fund) to support productive activities (SHGs, livestock/fisheries activities and other IGA). Has representation of the different SHGs

**Watershed Committee** – responsible for overseeing implementation of activities under the land and water development sub-component and corresponding land & water management fund.

**Self-help group (SHG)** – are key micro-finance institutions at village level, formed by 10-20 informally self-selected members, who stay together because they are linked by some form of affinity (e.g. village, tribal ties, similar livelihoods, etc.) ensuring sustainability and trust.

## Turnover of programme directors

Chhattisgarh <i>Name</i>	Jharkhand <i>Name</i>
Shri B.M.S. Rathore (IFS)	Shri V. kispota
Shri S.L. Yadav (SRS)	Shri M. Sinha
Shri Anil Kumar Rai (IFS)	Sri P. Oraon
Shri S.K. Behar (IAS)	Shri D. Singh
Ms. Shahla Nigar (IAS)	Sri H.S. Gupta
Shri P.C. Pandey (IFS)	
Shri Manoj Kumar Pingua (IAS)	
Shri S.K. Singh (IFS)	
Shri L.K.Gupta (SRS)	
Shri B.S.Anant (IAS)	



## Tables from the impact survey

### PSM tables-using Kernel matching

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ATET	T-stat
<b>Households aware about Forest Rights Act (2006) (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.41	0.39	.02	2.27**	0.44	0.43	0	.0003
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.38	0.36	.02	2.02**	0.44	0.43	.01	.02
Overall (matched)	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.38</b>	.02	1.91**	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.43</b>	.02	.05
Overall (unmatched)	<b>0.38</b>	<b>0.35</b>	.03	2.18**	<b>0.44</b>	<b>0.44</b>	0	.01
<b>Households aware about scheduled caste/scheduled tribe Act (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.38	0.37	.02	1.62*	0.34	0.37	-.03	-2.62***
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.34	0.31	.04	1.82**	0.33	0.38	-.05	-2.95***
Overall (matched)	0.37	0.36	.01	1.09	0.35	0.38	-.03	-2.53***
Overall (unmatched)	0.34	0.32	.02	1.73**	0.35	0.38	-.04	-2.61**
<b>Households aware about MNREGA (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.75	0.74	.01	0.081	0.81	0.80	.01	.105
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.73	0.70	.03	.177	0.80	0.78	.02	.662
Overall (matched)	0.76	0.76	0	.002	0.80	0.79	.01	.801
Overall (unmatched)	0.73	0.71	.02	.183	0.79	0.79	0	.395

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) – Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ATET	T-stat
<b>Women having their own savings (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.55	0.50	.05	1.78**	0.56	0.56	0	.066
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.56	0.50	.06	1.80**	0.58	0.57	.01	.042
Overall (matched)	0.56	0.51	.05	1.71**	0.58	0.58	0	.005
Overall (unmatched)	0.56	0.51	.05	1.76**	0.58	0.58	0	.007

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) – Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

	Jharkhand				Chhattisgarh			
	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ATET	T-stat	Treatment mean	Comparison mean	Difference/ATET	T-stat
<b>Women using their savings independently (Yes=1, No=0)</b>								
Scheduled tribe (matched)	0.44	0.41	.03	1.1	0.45	0.47	-.02	1.04
Scheduled tribe (unmatched)	0.44	0.40	.04	1.28*	0.46	0.48	-.02	0.98
Overall (matched)	0.44	0.40	.04	1.29*	0.46	0.48	-.02	1.09
Overall (unmatched)	0.44	0.40	.04	1.32*	0.46	0.48	-.02	1.02

ATET – Average treatment effect on the treated (for matched data) – Kernel matching.

Note: level of significance \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## Rating comparison<sup>a</sup>

Criteria	IFAD-PMD rating	Evaluation rating	Rating disconnect
<b>Project performance</b>			
Relevance	5	4	-1
Effectiveness	4	4	0
Efficiency	4	3	-1
<b>Project performance<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
<b>Rural poverty impact</b>			
Household income and assets	4	5	+1
Human and social capital and empowerment	5	4	-1
Food security and agricultural productivity	4	3	-1
Natural resources, environment and climate change	5	3	-2
Institutions and policies	4	3	-1
<b>Rural poverty impact<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Other performance criteria</b>			
Sustainability	4	3	-1
Innovation and scaling up	4	4	0
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	4	-1
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>d</sup></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Performance of partners<sup>e</sup></b>			
IFAD	5	4	-1
Government	4	4	0
<b>Average net disconnect</b>			<b>-0.69</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory.

<sup>b</sup> Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

<sup>c</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual impact domains.

<sup>d</sup> This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability, innovation and scaling up, and gender.

<sup>e</sup> The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.

## Ratings of the project completion report document

<i>Ratings of the PCR document quality</i>	<i>PMD ratings</i>	<i>IOE ratings</i>	<i>Disconnect</i>
Scope	6	4	-2
Quality	5	4	-1
Lessons	5	4	-1
Candour	5	5	0

## Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition<sup>a</sup></i>
<b>Project performance</b>	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design in achieving its objectives.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
<b>Rural poverty impact<sup>b</sup></b>	
	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
Household income and assets	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
Human and social capital and empowerment	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
Food security and agricultural productivity	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
Natural resources, the environment and climate change	The focus on natural resources and the environment involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment as well as in mitigating the negative impact of climate change or promoting adaptation measures.
Institutions and policies	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
<b>Other performance criteria</b>	
Sustainability	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The criterion assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	
	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
<b>Performance of partners</b>	
IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. It also assesses the performance of individual partners against their expected role and responsibilities in the project life cycle.
Government	

<sup>a</sup> These definitions have been taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).

<sup>b</sup> The IFAD Evaluation Manual also deals with the 'lack of intervention', that is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or the mention 'not applicable') is assigned.

## List of key persons met

- Mr S.K. Samantaray, Under Secretary at the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance.
- Mr Adarsh Kishore, former Additional Secretary at the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance.
- Mr Ashok Chawla, former Additional Secretary at the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance.
- Mr Venu Rajamony, former Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance.
- Mr Bhaskar Dasgupta, Director (Multilateral Institutions) at the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance.
- Ms Kavita Prasad, former Director (Multilateral Institutions) at the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance.
- Mr B.M.S. Rathore, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests.
- Dr N. Hangloo, Additional Private Secretary to Minister of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Tribal Affairs.
- Dr S. Karuna Raju, Additional Private Secretary to Minister of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Tribal Affairs.
- Mr Gautam Buddha Mukherji, Secretary, Ministry of Tribal Affairs.
- Mr Ashok Pai, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Tribal Affairs.
- Mr Manoj Kumar Pingua, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Tribal Affairs.
- Mr G.B. Murkejee, former Secretary, Ministry of Tribal Affairs.
- Mr Harish Kumar Varma, Senior Project Officer (Natural Resources and Agriculture) at the Indian Resident Mission of the Asian Development Bank.
- Mr Raghavendra Naduvinamani, Associate Project Analyst at the Indian Resident Mission of the Asian Development Bank.
- Mr Arnab Bandyopadhyay, Programme Officer at the World Bank.
- Mr Alam, Managing Director, The Agricultural Finance Corporation of India, Mumbai.
- Mr Shyam Khadka, former IFAD Country Programme Manager.
- Mr Mattia Prayer Galletti, former IFAD Country Programme Manager. Ms Meera Misha, IFAD Country Coordinator at the International Country Office in India.
- Mr Vincent Darlong, IFAD Country Programme Officer at the International Country Office in India.
- Mr Sriram Sankara Subramaniam, Assistant Programme Officer at the International Country Office in India.

Mr D.K. Srivastava, Principal Chief Conservator (PCC) of Forests within the Forest and Environment Department in Ranchi, Jharkhand.

Mr Rajeev L. Bakshi, Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) within the Forest and Environment Department in Ranchi, Jharkhand.

Dr Hari Shanker Gupta, Current Programme Director at the Jharkhand Tribal Development Society (JTDS).

Mr Manoj Sinha, Additional Programme Director at the Jharkhand Tribal Development Society (JTDS).

Mr Vinod Kisphota, former State Programme Director at the Jharkhand Tribal Development Society (JTDS).

Mr Prakash Oraon, former State Programme Director at the Jharkhand Tribal Development Society (JTDS).

Mr Dipak Singh, Chief Conservator of Forest (and former Special Secretary at the Tribal Welfare Department and former Programme Director at JTDS).

Mr Debajyoti Kundu, Convergence Manager at the Jharkhand Tribal Development Society (JTDS).

Mr Atonu Sen, District Project Manager at the Jharkhand Tribal Development Society (JTDS).

Ms Sanchita Mukhopadhyay, Planning and Monitoring Officer at the Jharkhand Tribal Development Society (JTDS).

Mr D.N. Tewari, former Head of the Chhattisgarh Planning Board.

Mr. Anupam Trivedi, Deputy State Programme Director, Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Society (CTDS).

Mr. K. Murugan, Secretary, Scheduled Tribe/Scheduled Caste Development Department, Chhattisgarh.

Mr. P.C.Pandey, IFS, Former State Programme Director, Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Society (CTDS).

Mr. Maihram Mahto, Director, Mahila Jagriti Samiti (MJS).

Mr. Pranay Kumar, Nodal Officer, The Consultant for Rural Area Development Linked Economy (CRADLE).

Mr. Subhash Kumar, Nodal Officer, Sramik Vidyapeeth (SVP).

Mr. S. Bhushan, Nodal Officer, Jan Jagran Kendra (JJK).

Mr Surendra, Mahila Jagriti Samiti, NGO

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