IFAD’s engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations
Corporate-level evaluation
Draft approach paper

Note to Executive Board Representatives

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Contents

Executive summary ii

Appendix
IFAD’s engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations
Corporate-level evaluation – Draft approach paper
Executive summary

A. Background
1. IFAD has been involved in post-crisis situations since the early years of its operations. The IFAD Framework for Bridging Post-Crisis Recovery and Long-Term Development approved by the Executive Board in 1998 provided the first guidance for dealing with the stresses resulting from natural and man-made disasters. The Framework was followed in 2006 by the Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery and augmented by a paper outlining IFAD’s role in fragile states prepared for the Consultation on the Eighth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources (IFAD8). These papers provide the policy framework for this evaluation.

2. IFAD’s commitments to fragile states are rising. Of the IFAD9 programme of loans and grants of US$3 billion (2013-2015), Management estimates that US$1.2 billion (40 per cent) will be allocated to fragile states,¹ in comparison to an allocation of approximately US$848 million to fragile states under IFAD8 (2010-2012).²

3. Projects in fragile states have not performed as well as those in non-fragile states. Project performance data show that the overall performance of IFAD’s portfolio improved over the period 2006-2013. The analysis of the portfolio in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations (FCS)³ and non-FCS shows that projects in FCS perform less satisfactorily and their performance has seen no improvement over the last eight years.

4. The weaker performance of projects in fragile states is confirmed by the findings of the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE). The Annual Report on the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI) for 2012 reveals that performance across most evaluation criteria is generally weaker in fragile states than in other country contexts. Similarly, the 2013 ARRI finds that there is a much higher occurrence of poorly performing projects than good projects: fragile states underperform against all key performance indicators, including project effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability and ownership, and overall project achievement.

B. Objectives of the evaluation
5. In line with the decision of the Executive Board in December 2013, IOE will undertake a corporate-level evaluation (CLE) in 2014/2015 on IFAD’s engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations.

6. The objectives of the evaluation are to: (i) assess the performance of IFAD’s engagement in FCS and identify the explanatory factors that lie behind current performance in FCS; and (ii) generate a series of findings, lessons learned and recommendations that will assist IFAD Management and the Executive Board in deciding on the future strategic and operational directions of the Fund in FCS.

7. Though the evaluation will include a review of performance, it will devote a greater share of its attention and resources to understanding the proximate causes (i.e. the "why" factor) of good performance or otherwise in FCS. This will enable the evaluators to generate best practices and lessons learned for IFAD’s future policies, strategies and operations in FCS. As such, this evaluation will have a greater focus on learning, as compared to other CLEs by IOE.

C. Evaluation coverage
8. The evaluation will cover IFAD strategies and operations from 2004 until end-2013, thus covering a 10-year period of engagement in FCS. The choice of time frame for

¹ Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP), 2012-2013.
³ The Programme Management Department’s analysis uses the acronym FS for fragile states. For consistency in this CLE, the acronym FCS (fragile and conflict-affected states and situations) is used throughout the document.
the evaluation had to balance two considerations: the importance of reflecting the institution’s most current practices as found in recent operations and the need to assess the outcomes of projects designed under the relevant policies and guidelines that are close to or have completed implementation.

D. Evaluation methodology, deliverables and timeline

9. **Methodology.** The evaluation will utilize a mixed method approach combining a desk review of documentation, interviews with IFAD Management and staff, and country case studies of a sample of mature projects. In particular, the methodology will include five specific tasks: (i) analysis of the performance of IFAD’s project portfolio; (ii) review of evaluation results and studies/strategies undertaken by IOE, other international financial institutions and development partners; (iii) analysis of IFAD corporate policies and country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs); (iv) review of design of new operations, with the main aim of assessing the extent to which lessons from past IFAD operations have been incorporated therein; and (v) selected country case studies.

10. **Deliverables.** The following deliverables will be prepared in the course of the evaluation: (i) a final evaluation approach paper; (ii) an interim note after the desk analysis of the portfolio, policies, COSOPs and projects; (iii) a PowerPoint presentation on the CLE’s emerging findings, for presentation to the October 2014 session of the IFAD10 Consultation; (iv) at least 10 country case studies; (v) the main evaluation report; (vi) the IFAD Management response to the final evaluation report; and (vii) the CLE Profile and Insight(s), and a press release at the end of the process.

11. **Timeline.** The evaluation will be completed early next year, and will be presented to the Executive Board in April 2015. Before that and in line with the IFAD Evaluation Policy, the final report will also be considered by the Evaluation Committee.

E. Evaluation team

12. Ashwani Muthoo, IOE Deputy Director, is the lead evaluator for the CLE and will also be responsible for supervising and guiding the team of consultants and staff working on the CLE. In this regard, it is useful to recall that IOE will be responsible for the overall evaluation process, contents of the draft final report, and all other deliverables produced during the evaluation as per the Evaluation Policy. Mr Muthoo will be supported by Linda Danielsson, Assistant to the IOE Deputy Director, who will collect and analyse data and documents, as well as provide all administrative support needed for the CLE.

13. IOE will put together a team of consultants to conduct the exercise. The consultants’ team leader will be Derek Poate, who was also the team leader for the Independent External Evaluation of IFAD in 2004/2005 and has conducted a number of country programme evaluations in fragile and conflict-affected states for the Department for International Development, Irish Aid and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. He is an experienced international evaluator and was President of the Evaluation Society of the United Kingdom in 2012. Mr Poate will work with Brigitte D’Offay, Evaluation Research Analyst and Xiaozhe Zhang, Consultant, both from IOE. The other evaluation team members will bring expertise and experience in the areas of engagement with fragile and conflict-affected states and situations, portfolio analysis and practice in agriculture and rural development, and corporate-level evaluations in United Nations, bilateral and multilateral organizations. Detailed terms of reference will be developed for all team members.

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4 Evaluation Profiles are two-page summaries of the main conclusions and recommendations arising from each IFAD evaluation. They provide a sampling of evaluation results and an incentive for readers to delve deeper and follow up on interesting issues in the full report. Evaluation Insights focus on one learning issue emerging from corporate-level, thematic or country programme evaluations. Presenting a hypothesis, Insights will form the basis for debate and discussion among development professionals and policymakers both within IFAD and outside the institution.
# IFAD’s engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations

**Corporate-level evaluation**

**Draft approach paper**

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations and acronyms</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft approach paper</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. <strong>Background and origin of the evaluation</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Global context of working in fragile and conflict affected states and situations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Origin of the evaluation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. <strong>Evolution of IFAD’s approach to fragile and conflict-effected situations</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Conceptual evolution</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. IFAD’s portfolio performance in fragile states</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. IFAD financial commitments and financing instruments</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Results measurement framework for operations in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. <strong>Lessons learnt from other multilateral development banks (MDBs)</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Approach followed by other MDBs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Lessons learnt from evaluations conducted on other MDBs engagement in fragile states and situations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. <strong>Objectives of the evaluation</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. <strong>Evaluation scope, methodology and process</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Time frame</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Scope and coverage</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Evaluation approach and methodology</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Evaluation process</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. <strong>Deliverables of the evaluation</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. <strong>Core learning partnership</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. <strong>Evaluation work schedule and composition of team</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. <strong>Communication and dissemination</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Annexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Selective Framework</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Evaluation framework for fragile states</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Definitions and concepts</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Bibliography</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Qualitative comparative analysis</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB  Asian Development Bank
AfDB  African Development Bank
ARPP  Annual Review of Portfolio Performance
ARRI  Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations
CLE  Corporate-level Evaluation
CLP  Core Learning Partnership
CPIA  Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPM  Country Programme Manager
COSOP  Country Strategic Opportunities Programme
CPE  Country Programme Evaluation
DFID  UK Department for International Development
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCAS  Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations
FCS  Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations
IDA  International Development Association
IFAD8  Eighth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources
IFAD9  Ninth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources
IFI  International Financial Institution
IOE  Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operations and Development
PBAS  Performance-based allocation system
PPA  Project Performance Assessment
PRISMA  President’s Report on the Implementation Status and Management Action
RB-COSOP  Results-based Country strategic opportunities programme
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WDR  World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development

IFAD divisions and departments

APR – Asia and the Pacific Division
CFS – Controller’s and Financial Services Division
ECD – Environment and Climate Division
ESA – East and Southern Africa Division
IOE – Independent Office of Evaluation
LAC – Latin America and the Caribbean Division
NEN – Near East and North Africa Division
OPV – Office of the President and Vice-President
PMD – Programme Management Department
PRM – Office of Partnership and Resource Mobilization
PTA – Policy and Technical Advisory Division
SKD – Strategy and Knowledge Department
WCA – West and Central Africa Division
IFAD’s engagement in fragile and conflict affected states and situations

Corporate-level evaluation

Draft approach paper

I. Background and origin of the evaluation

F. Global context of working in fragile and conflict affected states and situations

14. Although the term “fragile states” has not always been referred to as such by the international community, donors have always directed their aid to those countries, with variable extent, depending on their respective mandates, aid strategies and resources. The initial perception was that fragility was the sole prerogative of low-income countries. However, the reality of global challenges has proved that fragility may also affect countries that were not considered fragile per se. Fragility may arise from different facets, ranging from conflict, post-conflict, to economic, social or political conditions.

15. Updated estimates from the World Bank highlight that about 370 million people live in low-income fragile and conflict-affected states. They have higher poverty rates, lower growth rates, and weaker human development indicators than other low-income countries. Although “fragile and conflict-affected states are predominantly lower income countries, [...] nearly half of all countries classified as fragile states are now classified as middle-income countries”. Linkages between fragility, conflict and poverty have been demonstrated and widely accepted, making fragile and conflict-affected states a priority of the international development agenda.

16. As a demonstration of concerted global effort, in 2000, the Millennium Summit led to the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), where MDG 1 aims at eradicating extreme hunger and poverty. Member states and international organizations committed, inter alia, to halve the proportion of the world’s people suffering from poverty and hunger by 2015. Ten years later, in the 2010 MDG Report, the United Nations reviewed progress, assessed obstacles and gaps in achieving the MDGs by 2015. Despite some overall progress, the Report acknowledged that progress in achieving MDG 1 was particularly slow.

17. In 2011, the World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development (WDR) reported that one-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility or conflict, and at that time, no low-income fragile or conflict affected country had achieved a MDG. The World Bank further indicated that “poverty rates are 20 per cent higher in countries affected by repeated cycles of violence, and every year
of organized violence slows down poverty reduction by nearly one percentage point. By 2015, an estimated 32 percent of the world’s poor will live in fragile and conflict-affected situations.\(^{10}\)

18. The urgent need to better understand the underlying causes of fragility and the implications of fragility on poverty has continuously been under the spotlight of donors since the 2015 deadline is drawing near. Donors have stepped up the way and given more robust focus to their approach to fragile and conflict-affected states and situations (FCS).

19. In 2011, a new international approach to fragile states emerged from both the WDR and the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. The WDR called for a paradigm shift in the development community’s approach to fragile and conflict-affected situations, based on the premise that violence and conflicts cannot be resolved by short-term solutions in the absence of institutions that provide people with security, justice, and jobs. “The central message of the Report is that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence.”\(^{11}\)

20. The New Deal for engagement in fragile states calls for a new vision by international partners engaging in fragile states, where country leadership and ownership is of primary requirement. The New Deal draws its legitimacy from its ‘Southern’ authorship -- by the g7+, a group of self-confessed fragile states. The New Deal focuses on turning OECD, the World Bank and bilateral analysis into a practical action menu. The New Deal endorsed principles for achieving better results: setting Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) according to which politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenues and services are priorities; a FOCUS\(^{12}\) on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment developed by the g7+ with the support of international partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the PSGs to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue; and building mutual TRUST\(^{13}\) by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results. These principles are considered fundamental foundations to enable progress towards the MDGs in fragile and conflict-affected states.

21. More recent analysis into data from the 2013 Global Monitoring Report shows despite enduring political and economic challenges, 20 fragile and conflict-affected states have recently met one or more targets under the MDGs. Eight fragile and conflict-affected states – including Guinea, Nepal, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Timor-Leste – have already met the target to halve extreme poverty – the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day. Nepal and Bosnia Herzegovina stand-out as fragile states with the most success in meeting MDG targets. The signs of progress reflect accelerated development as well as better quality data and monitoring, although lack of data remains a challenge in many countries. The challenges in fragile and conflict-affected countries still loom large with only about 20 percent of fragile and conflict-affected countries now meeting the MDGs poverty target. Signs of success are themselves fragile, progress can be reversed for countries lapsing into conflict.\(^{14}\)


\(^{12}\)Fragility assessment; One vision, one plan; Compact; Use PSGs to monitor; Support political dialogue and leadership.

\(^{13}\)Transparency; Risk sharing; Use and strengthen country systems; Strengthen capacities; Timely and predictable aid.

G. Origin of the evaluation
22. In 2013, IOE developed for the first time a “selectivity framework” (Appendix I) to assist in the construction of its 2014 work programme. The framework includes a list of guiding questions to select topics for corporate level evaluations (CLEs) and evaluation syntheses reports; countries for country programme evaluations (CPEs); and operations that should be covered by project performance assessment (PPAs). The selectivity framework therefore allows IOE to more transparently identify and prioritize evaluations to be conducted in a given year, taking into account their potential in contributing to better IFAD performance and learning.

23. Therefore, building on the priorities of key stakeholders and IOE’s own strategic objectives, IOE proposed to undertake a CLE on IFAD’s engagement in fragile states in 2014. This was supported by the IFAD Management, the Evaluation Committee and endorsed by the Executive Board in December 2013, while approving IOE’s 2014 work programme. This will be the first time a CLE has been undertaken by IOE on IFAD’s work in fragile states.

II. Evolution of IFAD’s approach to fragile and conflict-effected situations
A. Conceptual evolution
24. Bearing in mind that there is no single international definition of fragile states, the orientation depends on each institution’s donor assistance strategy. Organizations often emphasize different aspects of fragility where contrast can be drawn, for example, between fragile countries facing permanent conflict and those which are fragile but without conflict. Countries may be fragile in some respects and not others, and they may also move in and out of that condition. For the purpose of this evaluation, special attention will be devoted to analysing the implications of fragility and conflict on Fund’s target group, who generally live in remote rural areas, have limited access to resources and might therefore be more severely affected in such contexts to ensure food security and better livelihoods.

25. IFAD has been involved in post-crisis situations since the early years of its operations. The first such project dates back to 1981, when IFAD provided a loan to finance a rehabilitation project in Uganda following the civil strife of 1980\textsuperscript{15}. Drawing on lessons learnt over the years, the 1998 IFAD Framework for Bridging Post-Crisis Recovery and Long-Term Development\textsuperscript{16} stresses the emergencies resulting from crises which may arise from (a) natural disasters; and (b) man-made disasters. The Framework is the first IFAD strategy document that brings together principles of intervention. IFAD’s interventions in a post-disaster situation should be designed to assist the affected communities to move from a relief-based existence to restoring subsistence production, rebuilding their capital base and, from there, to longer-term sustainable development. According to the Framework, IFAD has developed a comparative advantage in undertaking micro-level and location-specific projects for rural poverty alleviation. This specificity is particularly useful for area-based rural development interventions immediately following a crisis, which by their very nature are designed to restore productive capacity and promote self-reliance. IFAD’s interventions in post-crisis situations should be based on:

(a) A case-by-case approach. IFAD will involve itself in post-crisis situations on a case-by-case basis. The Fund’s support will be based on the requests of governments to ensure their commitment to the longer-term aspects of development.

\textsuperscript{16} EB 98/64/R.8.
(b) Enabling factor. IFAD’s intervention will be implemented only once the crisis has subsided, and will in no case be undertaken until such time as the minimum requirements for security of project implementing and supervisory staff have been put in place.

(c) Close inter-agency cooperation and coordination. In all cases, close cooperation and coordination with other partners must be considered as a prerequisite for IFAD support. The primary objective here is to ensure that IFAD assistance to a specific post-crisis situation is not undertaken in isolation, and to enhance complementarity and avoid duplication.

26. Building on the lessons learnt since 1998, the Fund introduced in 2006 the Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery17 to address both the problems caused by major natural hazards and those that originate in violent conflicts and in major, protracted civil disturbances. The policy reaffirms the need for the Fund to help its target group increase their resilience to external shocks and their capacity to cope more effectively with crisis situations and to restore the means of livelihood that have been upset by crisis. By reasserting IFAD’s mandate aiming to reducing poverty and food insecurity in the rural areas, the policy underlines that the Fund does not engage in peace-making or peace-enforcing operations, but focuses on institutional development among rural communities and on local governance issues.

27. It is important that IFAD supports governments in their recovery efforts, while ensuring that IFAD interventions remain within the Fund’s mandate. The policy outlines IFAD’s comparative advantage in its ability to address the issues associated with poverty reduction from the perspectives of poor people, with and through their own organizations and institutions. This comparative advantage is likewise applicable to the problems of the rural poor. The specific objectives of this policy are to:

(a) reinforce IFAD’s approach to the prevention of crisis, especially among those people who are the most vulnerable;

(b) clarify the role for IFAD in post-crisis situations;

(c) define the resource allocation process with respect to the financing of post-crisis interventions; and

(d) enhance programme implementation procedures and processes so as to operate more effectively in crisis-prone and crisis-affected countries.

28. The policy addressed resource allocation and programme implementation. As regards resource allocation post-conflict countries, as defined by the International Development Association (IDA), were eligible to receive a normal PBAS-generated allocation and, in addition, a supplementary amount of 30-100 per cent of their normal PBAS allocation. As regards programme implementation, the policy committed IFAD to develop new instruments for analysing (e.g. conflict risk assessment) and strategically assisting (such as through revised COSOP) in crisis-prone and crisis-affected countries18.

29. It is worth noting that this policy is not specific to fragile states as it deals with broader crisis recovery19 situations. Yet, to date, the definition of the fragile states referred to in this policy remains the normative definition in force within the Fund. See Box 1.

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19 Under the Policy, a “crisis” is a change in the circumstances of a country or of a region within a country that significantly upsets the livelihoods of the IFAD target population.
Box 1
IFAD’s definition of fragile states

“Fragile states are characterized by weak policies, weak institutions and weak governance, resulting in meagre economic growth, widespread inequality and poor human development. Fragile states are more exposed to the risk of outbreaks of violence than are non-fragile states. Fragile states may be well endowed with natural resources or be resource poor”.


30. In 2008, during the 8th Replenishment of IFAD resources, IFAD was asked to provide representatives of Member States with a paper outlining its role in fragile states. By undertaking this task, and in order to identify which countries IFAD would consider fragile, the Fund provided further insight to the fragile states definition. “For the purposes of this paper, all countries currently categorized as fragile or weakly performing by any IFI are included in the list. [...] Importantly, the operational definitions adopted by IFIs for defining fragility are based on several criteria and thus do not limit the category of fragile states to conflict-affected countries”. As highlighted in the paper, “while the relevance of IFAD’s programmes in fragile states is not at issue, programme design needs to factor in the specific characteristics of individual countries and avoid an undifferentiated approach.”

31. A key point made in the paper is that in principle, the range of activities that IFAD covers as part of its regular strategy for low-income countries is of direct relevance to fragile states and does not need to be separately “packaged”. Rather than a global strategy for fragile states, the paper argued that what is needed is a flexible and differentiated approach, underpinned by adequate knowledge of how circumstances differ from country to country, and how conditions in a given country also change at different times. IFAD is well placed realize this, given its relative flexibility and emphasis on customizing assistance within a project approach.

32. While reviewing IFAD’s effectiveness in fragile states, the paper notes that IFAD has had some success in its support in fragile states. The overview of project outcomes in these countries range from broadly positive to mixed but positive; and overall less than satisfactory. To better tackle fragility and improve its development effectiveness in these countries, the Fund committed to the following way of working:

(a) A flexible approach to programme and project design, with a strong focus on building the capacity of community and government institutions.
(b) A greater focus on the key issues of vulnerability and resilience, economic empowerment, gender, indigenous peoples, food security, land rights and natural resource management.
(c) Greater simplicity in project objectives and activities, to take account of the limited capacity of many fragile states to manage and implement development projects.
(d) Better analysis to underpin the design and implementation of programmes and projects, through expanded IFAD country presence and direct supervision.
(e) Attention to mitigating and responding to the risks of natural disasters and conflict, particularly local conflicts over access to natural resources.
(f) Greater knowledge sharing, particularly with partners able to address more of the causes of fragility than IFAD alone can address.

20 IFAD’s role in fragile states (REPL.VIII/4/R.5).
(g) Cofinancing through harmonized procedures, where possible, in order to avoid increasing transaction costs to governments.

33. This approach was endorsed by the Consultation on IFAD’s 8th Replenishment and its provisions were taken into consideration in revisions to the Country Strategic Opportunities Programme (COSOP) guidelines, supervision guidelines, project design, Quality enhancement (QE) and quality assurance (QA).  

34. Later on, in 2011, IFAD developed *Guidelines for disaster early recovery*, which were designed to operationalize both the 1998 Framework and the 2006 Policy. The Guidelines contain practical advice to assist IFAD staff and provide principles of engagement that should be followed when the Fund intervenes in a post-disaster context:

(a) Interventions should be timely, flexible and simple.
(b) Responses should be speedy without compromising quality.
(c) The principle of “do no harm” should prevail.
(d) Avoid the restoration of unsustainable livelihoods.
(e) Synergies with other agencies and specialized (relief) organizations should be maximized and duplication of efforts avoided.
(f) National ownership should be supported and participation should be ensured in the development and implementation of early recovery activities.
(g) IFAD should not engage in peace-making or peace-enforcing operations or in humanitarian relief operations.

35. In 2012, the Consultation on IFAD’s 9th Replenishment agreed on a series of operational, institutional and financial key commitments to strengthen the Fund’s contribution to achieving MDG 1- eradicating poverty and hunger. In this regard, the Fund committed to strengthen country ownership and leadership, and more specifically on fragile states, the Fund committed to adopt a flexible approach to programme design and implementation support, with a strong focus on building the capacity of community and government institutions; enhance the quality of programme design and implementation support in fragile states by performing deeper analysis of the causes of fragility; ensure simplicity of objectives and activities of projects in fragile states and strengthen application of risk management in the context of programmes in fragile states.

36. In response to these commitments, IFAD, in cooperation with FAO and regional institutions, has developed a programme for capacity-building in fragile states. The first grant to FAO for this purpose was approved by IFAD’s Executive Board in September 2013. Its primary objective is to strengthen the capacity of project units, civil society and government agencies to achieve better project performance in some 10 countries. FAO is cofinancing the programme. In line with its IFAD9 commitment, IFAD is awaiting the completion of IOE’s evaluation of IFAD’s work in fragile states to begin designing more simplified approaches for its programmes and projects in these countries.

37. IFAD’s approach to fragile states has evolved over the years from a wide crisis-based approach to a specific and fine-tune approach to fragile states. The documents reviewed range from normative and binding, to guiding principles providing practical advice to be followed by operations for project implementation.

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21 Report of the Consultation on the Ninth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources (GC 35/L.4).
23 Report of the Consultation on the Ninth Replenishment of IFAD’s Resources (GC 35/L.4).
But the applicable policy remains the 2006 *Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery*.

38. It is very recently that the Fund has shifted its terminology reference on fragile and conflict-affected situations, aligning itself with development partners’ preoccupation. In this regard, the Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI) 2013 recommended the CLE to cover fragile and conflict-affected situations in both low- and middle-income countries. The Executive Board, at its 110th session, endorsed the recommendation, with respect to the scope of the planned corporate-level evaluation on fragile states. In conformity with the Executive Board, the scope of the present CLE will therefore cover fragile and conflict-affected situations in both low- and middle-income countries.

**B. IFAD’s portfolio performance in fragile states**

39. This approach paper draws IFAD’s performance trend in fragile states from data released by Programme and Management Department (PMD) in its Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP) in 2012-2013. PMD analysed self-assessed performance of completed projects comparatively over two four-year cycles, 2006-2009, and 2010-2013 (101 and 97 projects respectively). Project performance data analysed show that the overall performance of IFAD’s portfolio improved over the period 2006-2013. The analysis of the portfolio in FCS and non-FCS divided in two four-year datasets (2006-2009 and 2010-2013) shows that while this is true also for projects in non-FCS, projects in FCS perform less satisfactorily and their performance has seen no improvement over the last eight years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Comparative analysis of satisfactory performance in FS (2006-2009 and 2010-2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragile satisfactory 2010-2013</td>
<td>71%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fragile satisfactory 2006-2009</td>
<td>79%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-7%</td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Comparative analysis of satisfactory performance in non-FS (2006-2009 and 2010-2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fragile satisfactory 2010-2013</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fragile satisfactory 2006-2009</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARPP 2012-2013.

40. The weaker performance of projects in fragile states is confirmed by IOE’s findings. The ARRI 2012 reveals that performance across most evaluation criteria is generally weaker in fragile states (with the highest proportion of moderately unsatisfactory, as well as fewer moderately satisfactory or better ratings) than in other country contexts. The ARRI 2013 finds that there is a much higher occurrence of poor performing projects than good projects in FCS. Fragile states underperform in all key performance indicators, including project effectiveness,

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25 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations Evaluated in 2012 (EB 2013/110/R.11/Rev.1) and Decisions and deliberations of the 110th session of the Executive Board (EB 2013/110/INF.9).

26 PMD’s analysis uses the acronym FS for fragile states. For consistency in this CLE we use the acronym FCS (Fragile and conflict affected states and situations) throughout the document.
efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability and ownership, and overall project achievement, as indicated in the figure below.27

Figure 1

![Performance differentials between fragile and non-fragile states, 2006-2013](image)

41. The analysis drawn from the above therefore seems to indicate that fragility is a key issue in determining portfolio performance. The marked disparity between performance in fragile and non-fragile states points to a clear need for IFAD to re-examine its support to fragile states. “A key objective for IFAD has to be to increase the proportion of satisfactory projects and to reduce the proportion of moderately unsatisfactory or unsatisfactory projects”28.

C. IFAD financial commitments and financing instruments

42. IFAD’s commitments to fragile states are rising. The IFAD9 (2013-2015) programme of loans and grants is estimated at US$ 3 billion whereas the IFAD8 (2010-2012) programme of loans and grants totalled US$ 2.9 billion29. Management estimates that US$ 1.2 billion under IFAD9 programme of loans and grants will be allocated to fragile states30, in comparison to the approximately US$ 848 million allocated to fragile states under IFAD8 programme of loans and grants31.

43. IFAD’s performance-based allocation system (PBAS) identifies the medium-term envelope (three-year cycle) of lending resources potentially committable to a country. In determining allocations, IFAD takes into account national per capita income, rural population, and the performance of countries. According to the ARPP, fragile states account for about 45 per cent of the PBAS allocations for 2013-2015 (Table 3). Post-conflict countries defined by the IDA as eligible receive a normal PBAS-generated allocation and, on top of that, a variable amount of 30-100 per cent of their normal PBAS allocation.

44. The CLE will further analyse performance in and allocations to fragile states, by breaking them into groups of countries depending, for example, on their country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) index score, geographic size, share of rural population, women and youth share of the population, unemployment rates, GDP/capita, and also categorize by elements of fragility such as security, political

27 IFAD (2014). IFAD at the Midterm of the Ninth Replenishment (IFAD10/1/R.2). Consultation on the Tenth Replenishment of IFAD’s resources- First session. Rome: IFAD.


29 IFAD (2014). IFAD at the Midterm of the Ninth Replenishment (IFAD10/1/R.2). Consultation on the Tenth Replenishment of IFAD’s resources- First session. Rome: IFAD.

30 ARPP 2012-2013.

situation etc. This will help understand better the drivers of performance and generate specific lessons in different sub-categories of countries, taking into account the fact that fragile states cannot be considered a homogenous category - even though they generally share some similar characteristics (e.g., weak institutional and policy environment).

Table 3
Fragile states with PBA during IFAD9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APR</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>ESA</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>LAC</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>WCA</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea DPR</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Congo, Rep.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARPP 2012-2013.

45. Grant financing under the debt sustainability mechanism is provided to eligible Member States in the form of grants or a combination of a grant and a loan on highly concessional terms, in accordance with arrangements for implementation of a debt sustainability framework (DSF) 32. Under the DSF, poor countries with low debt sustainability ("red light" countries) receive assistance on 100 per cent grant terms; poor countries with medium debt sustainability ("yellow light" countries) receive assistance on 50-50 grant/loan terms; poor countries with high debt sustainability ("green light" countries) receive assistance on 100 per cent loan terms. The ratings have been determined using the country debt sustainability analyses of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Table 4
Debt Sustainability Framework classification for 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Red</th>
<th>Yellow</th>
<th>Green</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Gabon (Th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Laos People's Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Tonga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GC.37/L7/Add.1.

32 Article 4 of the Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing.
46. Whereas the DSF prevents the development of a long-lending cycle, IFAD also participates in the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) which addresses existing debt. “The objective of the HIPC debt initiative is to reduce the net present value of the debt of poor countries that carry unsustainable levels of debt to a level that will no longer compromise their on-going economic reform and poverty eradication efforts” 33. For the IFAD9 period, IFAD’s share of debt relief under the HIPC debt initiative is estimated to amount to US$0.58 billion34. Both the DSF and the HIPC debt initiative are considered relevant tools for poor fragile states since high levels of external debt can severely hamper the poverty-fighting efforts of poor countries.

47. Comparative data show that as of 30 June 2008, IFAD’s total portfolio of 225 projects was comprised of 62 projects (28 per cent) in fragile states35. In 2012, out of the 254 ongoing projects, a total of 105, (41 per cent) were being implemented in fragile states. IFAD9 is planning to provide financing to 46 fragile states. Fragile states received a higher proportion of grants for investment projects, including those approved under the DSF. Over time IFAD’s engagement in fragile states has become more significant, in terms of both numbers of projects and resources committed.

D. Results measurement framework for operations in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations

48. In the context of IFAD9 consultation, a Results Measurement Framework (RMF) was adopted as the pillar of IFAD’s performance measurement system in 2013-2015. In order to devote greater attention to special conditions and requirements prevailing in fragile states, specific indicators were introduced in the RMF to better monitor the operational effectiveness of IFAD’s projects and programmes implemented in fragile states (see Table 5 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
<th>Indicators on projects performance in fragile states in the results measurement framework 2013-2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational effectiveness of country programmes and projects (level 4)36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of projects rated 4 or better at entry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall average for projects in fragile states only</td>
<td>QA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage disbursement ratio-for countries in fragile situations37</td>
<td>PPMS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Lessons learnt from other multilateral development banks (MDBs)

A. Approach followed by other MDBs

49. Development institutions have not fully aligned their approaches to FCS. Although some efforts have made been in this respect38, approaches to FCS vary depending

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36 Level 4 indicators in the RMF monitor IFAD’s operational effectiveness, focusing on the quality of country programme and project design, and implementation support.
on each institutions strategy, and on the criteria used to assess fragility. A comparison of definitions in current use is shown in Appendix III.

**Financial commitments and financing mechanisms**

50. Regarding financial commitments, the World Bank provided a total of US$19.7 billion in FY01–12, of which $11.5 billion was in FY07–12. These commitments include IDA credits and grants, but it excludes a small amount of financing from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as well as funds from the HIPC Initiative and grants from the Institutional Development Fund. During the same period, the World Bank provided US$8.5 billion from trust funds administered by the World Bank to FCS.39

51. Participants of the African Development Fund 13th Replenishment agreed on a replenishment amount of US $7.3 billion for the 2014 to 2016 cycle, of which $1 billion will be dedicated to a special facility for fragile states.40 In the ADF-11, ADF-12 and the recently concluded ADF-13 cycles (2008-2016), the AfDB allocated a total of UA 2.078 billion to fragile states.41,42 AfDB expects to allocate approximately US$ 3.1 billion to fragile states between 2008 and 2016.

52. Between FY00-10, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has approved 74 loan and grant operations amounting to US$3.9 billion and 204 technical assistance projects totalling $161.2 million.43

53. Regarding the financing mechanisms and resource allocations, the PBAS mechanism is common to all the above mentioned development banks. What differentiates them is the additional financing used to supplement the PBAS.

54. IDA has provided FCS with additional financing through exceptional allocations (post-conflict allocations, countries re-engaging with IDA after a prolonged period of inactivity). The ADB is following the same approach. In 2008, the World Bank established a multi-country trust fund known as the Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund designed to provide strategic funding to catalytic programs in FCS. This Trust Fund was created to support measures to improve governance, institutional performance, and reconstruction and development in countries emerging from, in, or at risk of sliding into crisis or arrears. The same year, the AfDB instigated the Fragile States Facility (FSF), which is a grant-funded window structured into three pillars: Pillar I provides supplementary support for funding recovery operations, infrastructure development, building state capacity and accountability, and financing regional projects; Pillar II provides arrears clearance for eligible countries; Pillar III provides targeted support resources through the secondment mode of capacity building.

**B. Lessons learnt from evaluations conducted on other MDBs engagement in fragile states and situations**

55. With the growing recognition of the nexus between fragility and poverty, many UN organizations, bilateral donors and the development banks have undertaken evaluations of their assistance and engagement in fragile states, and have been using the evaluation lessons and recommendations to enhance their effectiveness in fragile states. These include the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the

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38 See the World Bank and AfDB harmonized list of fragile and conflict-affected states.
42 One unit of account estimated to be equivalent to about $1.5. AfDB 2011. Information Statement, 10 August 2011.

56. In this regard, the very recent evaluation on the *World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States* reveals that IDA’s portfolio performance in low-income fragile and conflict-affected states has improved since 2001 compared to low-income countries that are not fragile. It is worth noting that this evaluation assesses the effectiveness of World Bank Group strategies and assistance programs to fragile and conflict-affected states among IDA-only countries. Countries not classified as fragile and conflict-affected states but affected by fragile and conflict-affected situations are not covered by this evaluation and will be reviewed by a separate IEG evaluation. In the 2013 evaluation, IEG confirms that progress is evident in several areas but with several constraints that are yet to overcome. IEG main recommendations highlight the need for the World Bank to:

(a) develop a more suitable and accurate mechanism to classify fragile and conflict-affected states.

(b) Classification of countries as fragile and conflict-affected states should be expected to draw attention to the relevance of fragility or conflict drivers to the Bank Group’s strategy and operational work. The classification itself, however, is not based on an analysis of fragility or conflict. It uses the CPIA ratings as a proxy indicator of fragility. The assumption that CPIA works equally well for fragile and conflict-affected states classification has proved to be problematic in recent years with the emergence of new manifestations of fragility and conflict.

(c) tailor country strategies to fragility and conflict contexts.

(d) Country assistance strategies should be tailored better to fragile and conflict-affected states, with clear articulation and monitoring of risks and contingencies for rapid adjustment of strategic objectives, implementation mechanisms and results frameworks if those risks materialize.

(e) support institutional capacity building at national and subnational levels.

(f) enhance the institutional sustainability of community development programs.

(g) develops a more realistic framework for inclusive growth and jobs.

57. The 2011 WDR identified jobs as one of the priority areas to break the cycles of violence in fragile and conflict-affected states; however, Bank group support has not been effective particularly in creating long-term jobs in fragile and conflict-affected states. Employment in agriculture, which absorbs 50–80 per cent of the fragile and conflict-affected states workforce, has received inadequate attention, and the potential for leveraging natural resources management and migration toward job creation remains untapped.

58. The 2012 Evaluation of the Assistance of the African Development Bank to Fragile States acknowledges that the Bank had a more explicit and systematic approach toward fragile states, but practice has shown that this approach does not capture various situations of fragility and provides limited flexibility to respond to rapidly changing circumstances. The Bank’s instruments have globally been able to respond to a range of country needs and capacities. Regarding the FSF, of the three functional pillars, Pillar II for arrears clearance has performed well against the aims set in the Strategy, Pillar I for supplementary support in post-conflict countries has

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performed moderately well, while the performance of Pillar III for capacity building and technical assistance has been disappointing.

59. In 2010, the evaluation on the Asian Development Bank’s support to fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCAS)\(^{47}\) argues that while the approach of identifying FCAS can be more flexible based on country context, the principles used in ADB’s approach to FCAS have been relevant. Lessons from general implementation performance show that implementation adjustments are very likely. Adjustments and major change in scopes, with a few cases of cancellations, have proven to be highly probable during project implementation and efficiency has suffered as a result. Projects may need to incorporate built in mechanisms for flexibility in adjusting outputs and components as long as it is consistent with project outcomes. Moreover, the evaluation finds that exited FCAS countries perform slightly better. Countries that are currently FCAS have more pronounced problems with efficiency and achieving outcomes. According to the evaluation, more important than large resource transfers is the need to understand the country and the counterparts, to produce better, simpler designs, and to commit to work consistently over a medium-term horizon. The recommendations consist of:

(a) Classify FCAS countries at the country partnership strategy preparation stage based not only on the country performance assessment (CPA) rating but also on other fragile and/or conflict characteristics of the country, including those at subnational levels.

(b) Develop a step-by-step plan for capacity development based on country context, CPA assessment, and country diagnostics identified through a needs assessment.

(c) Provide flexibility in the design of FCAS projects to accommodate implementation adjustments and build in longer-term programmatic approaches.

(d) Identify the external resource gaps and internal resource gaps for working in FCAS countries in consultation with donors and other development partners taking into consideration the country classification, capacity development needs, and pragmatic implementation approaches.

60. The MDBs are currently working on strengthening their resource allocation framework. Indeed, ADB is preparing a proposal to strengthen the Asian Development Fund resource allocation framework for FCAS countries and plans to consult with donors in 2014. The World Bank is examining options for strengthening the IDA resource allocation framework for countries facing FCAS, and the AfDB is doing the same for its Fund\(^{48}\).

IV. Objectives of the evaluation

61. The origin of the evaluation has been described in Section I. This will be IOE’s first CLE on **IFAD’s Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations (FCS)**.

62. The objectives of the evaluation are to: (1) assess the performance of IFAD’s engagement in FCS and identify the explanatory factors that lie behind current performance in FCS; and (2) generate a series of findings, lessons learnt and recommendations that will assist the IFAD management and Executive Board in deciding on the future strategic and operations directions of the Fund in FCS.

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\(^{48}\) ADB. 2013. *Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB’s Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*. Manila: ADB.
63. Though the evaluation will include an appreciation of performance, it will devote a greater share of its attention and resources to understanding the proximate causes (i.e., the why factor) of good or less good performance of working in FCS. Special attention will be devoted to identifying operational good practices and lessons, both from IOE evaluations and experiences of other IFIs. This will enable the evaluators to generate good practices and lessons learned for IFAD’s future policies, strategies and operations in FCS. As such, this evaluation will have a greater focus on learning, as compared to other CLEs by IOE.

**Main evaluation questions**

64. In order to fulfil its objectives, the evaluation will focus on a number of key questions (see Table 6). These are set out in more detail in the CLE’s evaluation framework, which may be seen in Appendix II. The questions to be covered by the CLE – as currently contained in table 6 and the evaluation framework in Appendix II - will be further fine-tuned and elaborated during the evaluation’s inception phase in April 2014, before IOE embarks on its analytic work.

### Table 6 Main evaluation questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>How has IFAD’s engagement to FCS changed over time and why? To what extent is the 2006 Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery relevant to FCS? To what extent IFAD’s [RB]-COSOPs, projects, and policy dialogue activities have explicitly sought to respond to the drivers and manifestations of fragility in specific FCS contexts? To what extent have IFAD’s [RB]-COSOPs and projects been relevant and designed to be flexible in response to the constraints in FCS contexts?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Has IFAD’s approach to FCS resulted in better focused country strategies and projects with simpler objectives? How does security affect project implementation and implementation support by IFAD?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>How have IFADs procedures and management been responsive to the contexts in FCS? Is IFAD endowed with institutional capacity and administrative tools to be responsive to FCS specificities? What are the available concrete instruments and measures that IFAD already uses in fragile and conflict-affected states?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>What evidence is there of impacts that tackle core issues in FCS?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Has IFAD’s approach to FSC resulted in more sustainable outcomes for institutions and poor people?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Has IFAD’s approach to country strategy and projects in FCS followed IFAD’s strategy to introduce gender equality and women’s empowerment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation and scaling up</td>
<td>Has IFAD’s approach been innovative in responding to FCS challenges and are interventions likely to be scaled up?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Lesson learning     | What are the lessons from past performance that can guide future support to FCS? Does the security situation have an impact on the average cost of project design, supervision and implementation support?
V. Evaluation scope, methodology and process

A. Time frame

65. The evaluation will cover IFAD strategies and operations from 2004 till end 2013, thus covering a ten year period of engagement in FCS. The choice of time frame for the evaluation has to balance two considerations: reflecting the institution’s most current practices as found in recent operations and assessing the outcomes of projects that were designed under the relevant policies and guidelines and are close to or have completed implementation. Key dates for this evaluation are the 2006 IFAD Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the 2008 Consultation on IFAD's 8th Replenishment for which guidelines on IFAD's role in fragile states were prepared.

66. Data will be drawn from ongoing and completed projects with a focus on those operations that were initiated after the 2006 policy. None of the Project Performance Assessments or the Project Completion Report validations carried out to date by IOE have an Executive Board approval date more recent than 2005. Seven projects approved in or after 2006 have been evaluated as part of a Country Programme Evaluation, as reported in the 2012 and 2013 ARRIIs, respectively. However, selectively, some operations designed in 2004 and 2005 will also be assessed by the CLE, in particular those that were designed and implemented to respond to specific circumstances of relevance to this evaluation. These projects will be assessed mainly based on self-evaluation documents and data, though IOE reports and data will also be used, as and where available.

67. Evaluation of performance will therefore draw mainly on self-assessment data. The evaluation will look at development results through a review of project performance self-assessments prepared as part of the ARPP followed by country case studies of a sample of projects. To review more recent performance, a desk review will look at the design of all COSOPs approved within the past three to four years, and a sample of recent projects approved by the Executive Board. As mentioned, however, IOE evaluation reports, data and lessons will also be used as and where available, to complement IFAD’s self-evaluation data.

B. Scope and coverage

68. In line with the recommendation endorsed by the Executive Board\(^{49}\), the present CLE will cover all IFAD fragile and conflict affected member states as well as those not classified as FCS, but facing fragile and conflict-affected situation. Given that the list of FCS is updated annually based on the classifications used by respective multilateral or bilateral development agencies, there has been movement in and out of the FCS category during the evaluation period. For analytic purpose, the targeted member states will be identified through a purposive approach taking into account of the following criteria:

(a) Persistent fragility: i.e. member states which have had persistent fragility and been on the FCS list during the selected evaluation period from 2004 to 2014.

(b) Volatile fragility: i.e. member states which have had volatility moving out of and back into the FCS list during the selected evaluation period.

(c) Graduation: i.e. member states which have graduated during the evaluation period and are less likely to move back into the FCS list.

(d) Non FCS with regional fragility: i.e. member states have not been considered as FCS during the evaluation period while having regions facing fragile and conflict affected situations.

\(^{49}\) IFAD (2013). Decisions and deliberations of the 110\(^{th}\) session of the Executive Board (EB 2013/110/INF.9). Rome: IFAD.
C. Evaluation approach and methodology

69. One of the main objectives of the CLE is to learn lessons from IFAD’s experience of working in FCS. What approach to use depends to some extent on the nature of the evaluation questions being posed. At their simplest, these might be ‘Did these projects achieve their objectives?’ Such a question is valuable for accountability, but brings little information to the organisation. A more searching question might be, ‘Why or how did these projects achieve their objectives?’ which would explore the country strategy and how the project was designed and implemented in respect of policies and guidelines. But for IFAD, which faces similar challenges in a wide variety of countries and settings, the evaluation question should extend to ‘How did this project achieve its objectives and will it work in other settings and circumstances?’ In this way, lessons from one situation can be applied to policy and practice across IFAD’s portfolio. But it is a more demanding evaluation question as it focuses on the strategic context as well as the intervention and raises the need to address the external validity of what is learned from examining specific interventions. For those concerned with designing new interventions, it is a more relevant question. It attempts to provide credible evidence on whether if something worked at a particular time and in a certain context, is it also likely to deliver the same outcome in the context and circumstances that those designing and implementing a particular future intervention are focused upon.

70. This question assumes an underlying model or approach that IFAD follows in dealing with FCS. Such an approach is variously described as an intervention logic or theory of change. All development interventions have theories, sometime expressed explicitly through summarising tools such as the logical framework, and sometimes taken for granted. Given the central tenet of a project theory, it is common for development evaluation to follow a theory based approach, albeit sometimes incorporating aspects of other approaches such as Utilisation-focused, or participatory evaluation. Theory based approaches sometimes seek to explore performance against underlying theories of social or natural science systems, or more often just the programme logic of an investment.

71. All interventions are embedded in social and (in the case of agriculture and NRM) natural systems. How well an intervention will succeed depends on the way in which the implementation of the intervention interacts with the setting or context in which it operates. Realist evaluation is a theory-based approach that recognises this interplay of factors, summarised in the formulation ‘Context + Mechanism = Outcome’, where mechanism is the project intervention.

72. The evaluation will follow a realist theory-based approach. The 2006 IFAD Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery and the 2008 Consultation on IFAD’s 8th Replenishment both present sufficient guidelines to develop a simple results chain to illustrate the notional intervention logic. A draft version has been developed from the concepts and guidelines set out in recent IFAD publications and described above, drawing also on experience and analysis. This does not extend to a full assessment of context and assumptions, so a detailed theory of change has not been developed. Specification of context and assumptions requires knowledge of a project setting and will be examined as part of the evaluation itself. For FCS, context can be framed in terms of the major constituents of the classification of a fragile or conflict affected state: the quality of governance; the capacity of

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50 Utilization focused evaluation is an approach in which the needs of stakeholders drive the conceptualisation, design, implementation and reporting of the work. Participatory evaluation is where key stakeholders, primarily beneficiaries, work in conjunction with the evaluators to define the scope, methodology, data collection, analysis and reporting. Elements of a utilization focus inform many development evaluations. Participatory approaches are rarely used for the whole design but often inform field work at community level.

institutions; and the level of security. Figure 2 presents the draft results chain with illustrations of some a priori statements about assumptions.

Figure 2

Notional results chain and assumptions for operations in FCS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• COSOP identifies issues of fragility affecting poor and vulnerable populations</td>
<td>• Simplicity in project objectives and activities</td>
<td>• Institutions improve performance &amp; effectively manage stresses</td>
<td>• Trust and legitimacy in state institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flexible project design focused on capacity building</td>
<td>• Focus on key issues: vulnerability; resilience; economic empowerment; gender; food security; land rights; NRM</td>
<td>• Improved accountability of institutions</td>
<td>• Sustainable community institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Attention to mitigating and responding to risks</td>
<td>• Natural disaster and conflict risk mitigation</td>
<td>• Measurable improvements in sustainable livelihoods</td>
<td>• Poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-financing through harmonized procedures</td>
<td>• Effective support through country presence and direct supervision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Guidelines have universal applicability across regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resources are generally available across different country settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional structures enable focus on key issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Staffing and supervisory resources are of a common standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Outcomes were responsive to political and institutional factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transparency in performance assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainability of institutional capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Measurable changes in human welfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73. The results chain and assumptions in Figure 1 provide insights into lines of enquiry that will be explored in order to assess lessons that have application across IFAD’s portfolio.

Methodology

74. The evaluation will utilise a mixed methods approach combining desk review of documentation, interviews with IFAD management and staff, and country case studies of a sample of mature projects. In view of the systematic approach to project performance assessment through the ARPP and ARRI, the evaluation will draw on established ratings and assessment of performance, without further validation. The main focus of the evaluation will be to determine the extent to which country and project analysis identifies the fragile constituents in the FCS setting and makes provision for appropriate arrangements and supervision during implementation. The evaluation framework in Appendix II sets out questions and sources of information, which as mentioned earlier will be further developed during the inception phase of the evaluation.

75. The assignment will consist of five areas of work, illustrated in Table 7. The use of multiple sources will permit results to be synthesized and triangulated to provide answers to the evaluation questions.

52 These aspects of fragility can be manifest in many ways including, for example, degree of partnership with IFAD.
### Table 7

**Areas of work**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Analysis of portfolio performance</td>
<td>Secondary analysis of project ratings for the Annual Portfolio Performance Report in collaboration with PMD to identify distribution of performance characteristics from projects in FCS. As and where appropriate, ARRI data will also be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Review of evaluation results and reports, strategies and relevant studies from IOE and other IFI and development partners</td>
<td>Synthesis of findings to explore trends and hypotheses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) IFAD Policy and COSOP analysis</td>
<td>Review of all new COSOPs approved in the last three to four years in comparison with the previous version to analyse FSC conditions and implications for interventions. Moreover, attention will be devoted to reviewed key corporate policies and strategies, as the overarching documents guiding IFAD’s work in FCS. In this process, the CLE will also review IFAD’s institutional architecture and preparedness to respond to issues in FCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Project analysis</td>
<td>Review of a sample all recent operations (both FSC and non-FSC) approved by the Executive Board in 2012 and 2013 to assess analysis and implications for implementation in FSC. If possible, some slightly older interventions in FCS will also be covered, to gain insights from their implementation based on a review of supervision/implementation support documentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Country case studies</td>
<td>In-depth analysis of a sample of at least 10 country case studies drawn purposively to illustrate examples of strong performance and weak performance. A minimum of eight will be drawn from designated FSC states; a minimum of two from non-FSC states where there are localised fragile or conflict affected situations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76. The tasks are described below in turn.

**a) Analysis of portfolio performance**

77. The 2012-13 ARPP noted that 68 of the 198 projects which were completed in 2006–2013 were implemented in fragile states. Analysis of projects in two cohorts 2006-09 and 2010-13 shows that while projects in non-fragile states performed consistently better, effectiveness in fragile states actually fell between the two periods while performance in non-fragile states improved consistently over the whole eight years. The evaluation will re-examine these data to look more closely at the individual ratings and identify common characteristics in the context of lessons and observations from the experience of other IFIs. This analysis will contribute to the choice of country and project case studies. ARRI data will also be used as and where appropriate in the analysis of the portfolio’s performance.

**b) Review of evaluation results and studies/strategies from IOE and other IFI and development partners.**

78. A core building block for the study will be IOE’s own evaluation data, drawing on findings from the ARRI and looking specifically at CPEs and project evaluations that have been carried out in FCS.

79. A number of studies published in recent years by development partners offer relevant insights into operations in FCS. The review will focus on:


- The CLE team will review a selection of strategies and approaches of other IFIs to their work in FCS. The list of documents to be reviewed will be identified during the CLE’s inception phase in April 2014.

80. Overall, the purpose of the review is to identify trends, good practices, and lessons that might be of relevance to IFAD as well as to identify key hypothesis and questions that deserve to be considered during the further work in the CLE process. This review will also take note of the g7+ group New Deal with its provisions for use of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), FOCUS and TRUST and take these into account when synthesising lessons from IFAD’s experience.

(c) Policy and COSOP analysis

81. All new COSOPs and RB-COSOPs approved by the Executive Board during 2011, 2012 and 2013 will be reviewed. The main aim of the review is to assess the evolving approaches to IFAD’s strategy and operations in FCS. Where possible, the review will compare the most recent COSOP with the previous version and also take note of findings from a desk review of 14 selected countries undertaken as part of a review of COSOP guidelines in 2010. Moreover, the CLE will review major corporate policy and strategy documents (e.g., the Strategic Frameworks, country presence strategy, etc.) to assess their relevance in guiding IFAD’s work in FCS. In this regard, the CLE will also assess IFAD’s institutional architecture and preparedness (e.g., availability of technical skills, supervision process, budget allocations for analytic work, country presence, etc.) to respond to the specific circumstances and requirements of FCS. The main questions to be answered to assess IFAD’s institutional architecture and preparedness will be defined during the CLE’s inception phase following further discussions with IFAD Management.

(d) Recent project analysis

82. A sample of recent projects approved by the Executive Board in 2012 and 2013 will be analysed for their design, fit with context and institutional analysis. This review will also consider the extent to which lessons from past operations have been incorporated into the design of new operations and activities in FCS.

(e) Country case studies

83. The principal original research under this evaluation will be a country case study analysis of a sample of mature projects. Although the purpose is to be able to generalise findings to IFAD’s portfolio as a whole an average, or typical, case is often not the richest source of information. In clarifying implementation experience and causation it is more useful to select subjects that offer an interesting, unusual or particularly revealing set of circumstances. Systematic comparison of evidence from country case studies will permit limited generalization of theory. This is

53 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (g7+) 2012 A new deal for engagement in fragile states.
54 COSOP Source Book Volume 2 - Section XII.
particularly relevant where there are simple working hypotheses about performance in fragile states (the need for good design, high quality project management, and good support from IFAD and government) but there is a need for greater clarity about these factors. For this reason, it is proposed to follow the same strategy as in the 2013 ARRI and select outlier cases (those which are extreme or atypical).

84. Selection will be made in three stages. Firstly, a candidate list of good and poor performing projects will be identified from the self-assessment ratings prepared by PMD. This will include identification of projects in middle income countries but located in fragile or conflict affected situations. A second level of prioritization will follow, drawing on findings from IOE’s CPEs and expert knowledge within PMD. The final selection will reflect the following additional considerations.

- Two countries per IFAD geographical region, making a sample of ten. The CLE will study at least one project in each country to be covered;
- The mix of countries should include those with contrasting governance, institutional capacity and security situations;
- The sample of 10 projects or more should comprise a minimum of eight in FCS and a minimum of two projects operating in fragile or conflict affected situations in middle income countries.
- Projects in operations with significant disbursement, past their mid-term point and with a completed mid-term review or evaluation; and
- Countries that do not have a current or very recent programme of work by IOE or other major corporate review such that it may create fatigue or be felt as an imposition for this evaluation.

85. The country case study enquiry will be undertaken in two stages: firstly a desk review of the current COSOP for that country, the project documentation and interviews with relevant staff in IFAD headquarters; secondly, a field visit to review operations on the ground and interview key informants from government, management, beneficiaries, IFAD and other development organisations. Work at country level will be supported by the recruitment of one national consultant in each country. Consideration will be given to a limited application of beneficiary feedback monitoring to determine perceptions about institutional performance. Review proforma will be developed starting with the standard instruments used by IOE, modified to take account of the questions in the evaluation framework in Appendix II.

86. The team will explore the use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in the analysis of the case studies. QCA is a method used for the systematic comparison (synthesis) of evidence from case studies and was initially developed in the field of political science. It allows 'middle-range' theory generalisations and the examination of causality which means the evaluator can examine how an intervention has worked in what conditions. More details are given in Appendix V.

D. Evaluation process

87. The evaluation will be implemented in a number of stages which reflect the building blocks in Table 7.

88. Stage I, Desk Review. The phase of the work will have the following activities:

- IFAD portfolio review and analysis.
- Review of evaluation findings and conclusions from IOE’s work on relevant CPEs and project evaluations.
- Review of evaluation results, strategies and related studies from other IFI and development partners.
• IFAD policy and COSOP analysis, as well as review of IFAD’s institutional architecture for supporting FCS.
• Analysis of recent operations.
• Interviews with IFAD management and staff.

89. **Stage II, Interim note.** This stage will include drafting of an interim, note and presentation to the IFAD Management and thereafter to the Consultation on the 10th IFAD replenishment in October 2014. This will draw together the emerging evaluation findings from the desk review, and provide an indication of the key hypothesis and questions that merit to be explored during the country visits (see next paragraph).

90. **Stage III, Country visit to prepare country case studies.** The country visits is the stage where the evaluation will undertake field research into a sample of mature projects under implementation. This will enable the team to examine in more detail the issues and hypotheses generated during the desk review phase. Visits will be undertaken to ten countries (two in each geographic region), covering at least ten projects in total. Discussions will be held with national partners, project staff, local authorities, NGOs and others at the local level. The evaluation team will also hold discussions with project beneficiaries and their organizations to gauge performance and results and lessons learnt.

91. **Stage IV, Draft final report.** The draft final report will be prepared following completion of the country visits. The draft final report will internally peer reviewed within IOE, and thereafter shared with the IFAD Management for their review and written comments. IOE will prepare an ‘audit trail’, which will clearly illustrate how and in which sections of the final evaluation report the written comments received from the Management have been included. The audit trail, which will be a separate document not for inclusion in the evaluation report, will be shared for information with the Management. Comments received from IFAD Management will be treated in line with the provisions of the IFAD Evaluation Policy (2011).

92. **Stage V, Stakeholders Learning Workshop.** This workshop will be organized to discuss the draft final report before the same is finalized.

**VI. Deliverables of the evaluation**

93. The expected deliverables of the evaluation will include the following:

• The evaluation Approach Paper
• An interim note and presentation after the portfolio, policy, COSOP and project desk analysis. This note will also include a review of IFAD’s institutional architecture in relation to engagement in FCS.
• Power point presentation on the CLE’s emerging findings, for presentation to the October 2014 session of the consultation on the tenth replenishment of IFAD
• Ten country case studies
• The main evaluation report
• The IFAD Management Response on the final evaluation report
• The CLE Profile, Insight(s)\(^{55}\), and a Press Release at the end of the process

\(^{55}\) Evaluation Profiles are two-page summaries of the main conclusions and recommendations arising from each IFAD evaluation. They provide a sampling of evaluation results and an incentive for readers to delve deeper and follow up on interesting issues in the full report. Evaluation Insights focus on one learning issue emerging from corporate-level, thematic or country programme evaluations. Presenting a hypothesis, Insights will form the basis for debate and discussion amongst development professionals and policymakers both within IFAD and outside the institution.
VII. Core learning partnership

94. The role of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) is to provide guidance to the evaluation process and review key evaluation deliverables. In particular, at the start of the evaluation, CLP members will help flag issues and information sources for the evaluation. IOE will facilitate the CLP discussions. The composition of the CLP is for the time being as follow:

- Mr Kevin Cleaver (and his successor), Associate Vice President, PMD
- Mr Mohamed Béavogui, Director PRM and Special Advisor to the President
- Mr Adolfo Brizzi, Director PTA
- Mr Gary Howe, Officer-in-Charge, SKM
- Mr Kees Tuinenburg, Officer-in-Charge, IOE
- Mr Jeremy Hovland, interim General Counsel
- Ms Khalida Bouzar, Director, NEN
- Ms Hoonae Kim, Director, APR
- Ms Josefina Stubbs, Director, LAC
- Mr Perin Saint Ange, Director, ESA
- Mr Ides de Willebois, Director, WCA
- Ms Ruth Farrant, Director and Controller, CFS
- Mr Elwyn Grainger-Jones, Director, ECD
- Mr Ashwani Muthoo, Deputy Director and lead evaluator of this CLE, IOE
- Mr Brian Baldwin, Senior Operations Management Adviser, PMD
- Mr Shyam Khadka, Senior Portfolio Manager, PMD
- Mr Matteo Marchisio, CPM Afghanistan & Pakistan, APR
- Mr Abdelhamid Abdouli, CPM Syria, NEN
- Ms Esther Kasalu-Coffin, CPM Haiti, LAC
- Ms Nadine Gbossa, CPM Comoros & Kenya, ESA
- Mr Hubert Boirard, CPM Liberia & Sierra Leone, WCA
- Mr Karim Hussein, Strategic Policy Analysis and Knowledge Management Officer, SKD
- Representatives of other development institutions (to be identified)
- Selected resources persons from fragile member states (to be identified)

95. The final composition of CLP will be determined in consultation with the IFAD Management following the discussion of the draft approach paper with the Evaluation Committee on 31 March 2014.

96. The CLP will be responsible for sharing all information and documentation with others in their respective divisions. Members of the CLP will be asked to meet a number of times during the evaluation to discuss the approach paper, the interim note and draft final report. They will also be invited to take part in the learning workshop to be organized at the end of the process.

VIII. Evaluation work schedule and composition of team

97. The schedule is based on having a final report for presentation at the April 2015 meeting of the Executive Board. Before that, and in line with the Evaluation Policy, the final report will also be discussed in a session of the Evaluation Committee of the Board.

98. A team of consultants (the evaluation team) will be put together by IOE to conduct the exercise. The consultants’ team leader - Mr Derek Poate - has designed and led a number of relevant evaluations. He was the team leader for the Independent
External Evaluation of IFAD in 2004/5 and has conducted a number of country programme evaluations in fragile and conflict affected states for DFID, Irish Aid and Norad. He is an experienced international evaluator and was President of the UK Evaluation Society in 2012. Mr Poate will work with Brigitte D’Offay, Evaluation Research Analyst and Xiaozhe Zhang, Consultant, both from the Independent Office of Evaluation. The other evaluation team members will include men and women who will bring expertise and experience in the areas of engagement with fragile and conflict affected states and situations, portfolio analysis and practice in agriculture and rural development and corporate-level evaluations in UN, bilateral and multilateral organizations. Detailed terms of reference will be developed for all team members, which will form the basis of collaboration with each of them.

99. Mr Ashwani Muthoo, IOE Deputy Director is the lead evaluator for the CLE, who will also be responsible for supervising and guiding the team of consultants and staff working on the CLE. In this regard, it is useful to recall that IOE will be responsible for the overall evaluation process, contents of the draft final report, and all other deliverables produced during the evaluation as per the Evaluation Policy. Mr Muthoo will be supported by Ms Linda Danielsson, who will collect and analyse data and documents, as well as provide all administrative support needed for the CLE.

100. Given the above considerations the planned schedule for the evaluation is shown in Table 8. This will be further developed as needed in the inception phase of the evaluation in April 2014. The purpose of the inception phase is to, inter-alia, carefully consider all comments on the approach paper and sharpen the evaluation’s design, methodology, process, instruments for data collection, and timelines.

101. It is to be underlined that this CLE will be undertaken in a shorter time frame, from start to completion, as compared to other CLEs by IOE. The reason for this is to allow for some of the CLE’s emerging findings to be considered by Management and member states in the context of the tenth replenishment of IFAD resources in 2014. Moreover, a shorter time frame will ensure the final evaluation results can be made available as soon as possible, thereby allowing for any required adjustments to IFAD policies and approaches of engagement in FCS in a timely manner.

Table 8
Planned schedule of activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Distribute draft approach paper to IFAD management for comments</td>
<td>10 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Comments from IFAD management</td>
<td>14 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Finalize approach paper and dispatch to SEC and advance copy to Evaluation Committee</td>
<td>17 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Presentation to the Evaluation Committee</td>
<td>31 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Inception phase of evaluation to further develop approach paper and discussion of evaluation design with IFAD management and staff</td>
<td>April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Desk review phase of the evaluation</td>
<td>May to July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Preparation of interim note and presentation to IFAD Management</td>
<td>Late September 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Power point presentation of emerging findings to the third meeting of IFAD10 replenishment consultation</td>
<td>7-8 October 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Country visits to prepare country case studies</td>
<td>August to October 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Main draft final report writing</td>
<td>October-November 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. IOE internal peer review on draft final report December 2014

12. Report shared with IFAD management for comments December 2014

13. Learning workshop and finalization of the evaluation report January 2015


15. Transmit final report to IFAD’s Office of the Secretary for discussion in the Fund’s Evaluation Committee and Executive Board Mid February 2015

16. Discuss the final report evaluation together with IFAD Management Response in the Evaluation Committee March/April 2015

17. Discuss the final evaluation report together with IFAD Management Response in the 114th session of IFAD’s Executive Board April 2015

**IX. Communication and dissemination**

102. During the process of the CLE there will be constant interactions with main stakeholders, to understand their needs and address their concerns. Comments and feedback from the members of the CLP will be sought on the approach paper and the draft CLE report.

103. In addition, in order to enhance the CLE’s impact, its findings and conclusions will be disseminated to a targeted audience. The report will be distributed in electronic form to members of the IFAD Management and staff, Executive Board members, IFIs, United Nations agencies and other development partners. The main report will be around 50 pages long, and hard copies will be made available upon request. As per usual practice, the evaluation profile and the evaluation insights will be produced and distributed more widely both within and outside IFAD. The profile will contain a succinct summary of the evaluation’s findings and recommendations, whereas the insight will focus on one learning theme emerging from the evaluation, with the aim of promoting debate among development practitioners, policy makers and others on the topic.

104. A learning workshop will be organized to discuss the draft final report. Moreover, IOE will prepare a Press Release to announce the finalisation of the evaluation and highlight some of the main results contained therein. Finally, all CLE deliverables will be made available to the public at large through the dedicated section on independent evaluation within IFAD’s corporate website.

**Follow-up on the CLE results**

105. According to the Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure of the Evaluation Committee of the Executive Board, the Committee will discuss revisions to corporate-level policies that have been evaluated by IOE or new policies that have emerged as a follow-up to an IOE CLE. To facilitate the Committee’s work in this regard, IOE would provide its written comments to the Committee on each operation policy document that the Evaluation Committee may decide to examine. This will apply to any eventual production of policy/strategy on fragile states by IFAD management as an outcome of this CLE. Moreover, as per usual practice, the Management will report on the follow-up to the evaluation’s recommendation through the President’s Report on the Implementation Status and Management Action (PRISMA), which is presented to the Executive Board annually.

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## Selective Framework

### Table 1
Guiding questions for selection and prioritization of evaluations for inclusion in IOE's work programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporate-level evaluations/evaluation syntheses</th>
<th>Country programme evaluations</th>
<th>Project performance assessments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Is this an area of interest/priority for IFAD stakeholders?</td>
<td>1. Is this a country of interest/priority to regional division?</td>
<td>1. Are there major information gaps, inconsistencies and analytical weaknesses in PCR found by IOE during validation process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is this in line with IFAD's strategic priorities and replenishment commitments?</td>
<td>2. How does this evaluation fit within geographical balance of IOE evaluation portfolio?</td>
<td>2. Does project have successful innovative approaches that can be scaled up elsewhere?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Will this address a knowledge gap in IFAD?</td>
<td>3. Is there a critical decision point in IFAD that would drive timing of this evaluation?</td>
<td>3. Is there high disconnect between ratings contained in PCR and those generated by IOE during validation process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is evaluation expected to impact?</td>
<td>4. How does this evaluation fit within IOE's objective?</td>
<td>4. How does this evaluation fit within geographical balance of IOE evaluation portfolio?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Is there a critical decision point in IFAD that would drive timing of this evaluation?</td>
<td>5. What other IOE deliverables would this evaluation draw on and/or contribute to?</td>
<td>5. What other IOE deliverables would this evaluation draw on and/or contribute to?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How does this evaluation fit within IOE's objectives?</td>
<td>6. Does IOE have resources (financial and human) to conduct this evaluation?</td>
<td>6. Does IOE have resources (financial and human) to conduct this evaluation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What other IOE deliverables would this evaluation draw on and/or contribute to?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Does IOE have resources (financial and human) to conduct this evaluation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
Application of selectivity framework for CLEs and evaluation syntheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guiding questions for CLEs/evaluation syntheses</th>
<th>CLE on IFAD’s engagement in fragile states</th>
<th>CLE on IFAD’s approach and results in policy dialogue</th>
<th>Evaluation synthesis on IFAD’s engagement in middle-income countries</th>
<th>Evaluation synthesis on pastoral development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Is this an area of interest/priority for IFAD stakeholders?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is this in line with IFAD’s strategic priorities and replenishment commitments?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Will this address a knowledge gap in IFAD?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, to a lesser extent, as 2012 ARRI included a learning theme on policy dialogue</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is evaluation expected to impact?</td>
<td>IFAD’s approach to its engagement in fragile states</td>
<td>IFAD’s approach to policy dialogue</td>
<td>IFAD’s approach to its engagement in middle-income countries</td>
<td>IFAD’s operations related to pastoral development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Is there a critical decision point in IFAD that would drive timing of this evaluation?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How does this evaluation fit within IOE’s objectives?</td>
<td>Contribute to strategic objectives 1 and 2</td>
<td>Contribute to strategic objectives 1 and 2</td>
<td>Contribute to strategic objective 2</td>
<td>Contribute to strategic objective 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What other IOE deliverables would this evaluation draw on and/or contribute to?</td>
<td>Draw on CPEs and project-level evaluations</td>
<td>Draw on CPEs and project-level evaluations, as well as 2012 ARRI learning theme on policy dialogue</td>
<td>Draw on CPEs and project-level evaluations undertaken in middle-income countries. Contribute to future CLE on this topic</td>
<td>Draw on CPEs and project-level evaluations where there are pastoral development activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Does IOE have resources (financial and human) to conduct this evaluation?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Only one new CLE can be carried out in a given year.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In constructing the work programme, each proposed evaluation has been validated against the guiding questions, using a five-point score, where 5 represents the highest score and 1 the lowest.
Evaluation framework for fragile states

Objectives:
(1) identify the explanatory factors that lie behind current performance in fragile states;
(2) generate a series of lessons learnt and recommendations that will assist the Board and IFAD management in deciding on the future strategic and operations directions of the Fund in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations. .. in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main questions</th>
<th>Detailed questions</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How has IFAD’s engagement to FCS changed over time and why?</td>
<td>To what extent is the 2006 Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery relevant to FCS?</td>
<td>Was the design of projects sensitive to available local resources and capacities? Were project designs adjusted on the basis of deepening understandings and changing needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have IFAD’s COSOPs and projects been relevant and designed to be flexible in response to the constraints in FCS contexts?</td>
<td>To what extent IFAD’s [RB]-COSOPs, projects, and policy dialogue activities have explicitly sought to respond to the drivers and manifestations of fragility in specific FCS contexts?</td>
<td>Analysis of new projects Country Case studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Review of findings from other IFI and development organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has IFAD’s approach to FCS resulted in better focused country strategies and projects with simpler objectives?</td>
<td>What are the characteristics of good and poor performance among FCS?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were provisions for direct IFAD oversight and support effective?</td>
<td>Review of findings from other IFI and development organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff</td>
<td>Portfolio analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main questions</td>
<td>Detailed questions</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>• To what extent was capacity building incorporated in project design?</td>
<td>Analysis of new projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Was institution building well targeted and approached with clear expectations of how long IFAD's support would be required for its interventions to 'take'? Was that substantiated by experience?</td>
<td>Country Case studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How does security affect project implementation and implementation support by IFAD?

**Efficiency**

How have IFADs procedures and management been responsive to the contexts in FSC?  
Is IFAD endowed with institutional capacity and administrative tools to be responsive to FCS specificities?  
Is IFAD equipped to intervene in fragile situations in MICS?

What are the available concrete instruments and measures that IFAD already uses in fragile and conflict-affected countries?

• What are the available concrete instruments and measures that IFAD already uses in fragile and conflict-affected countries?  
  Analysis of IFAD instruments and measures

• Was appropriate use made of IFAD’s financing instruments and co-financing opportunities?  
  Analysis of new projects  
  Country Case studies  
  Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff

• What attempts were made to reduce the administrative burden on the government (simpler procedures, use of government systems, efforts to better harmonize with other donors)?  
  Analysis of new projects  
  Country Case studies  
  Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff; government staff

• What steps were taken to accelerate project processing and streamline fiduciary requirements?  
  Analysis of new projects  
  Country Case studies  
  Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff; government staff

• How were setbacks and shortcomings handled in IFAD communications to the government, and within HQ?  
  Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff

• To what extent has monitoring and evaluation contributed to flexible implementation?  
  Analysis of COSOPs  
  Analysis of new projects  
  Country Case studies  
  Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Main questions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Detailed questions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sources of information</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>What evidence is there of impacts that tackle core issues in FSC?</td>
<td>• What impacts can be claimed on food security, rural employment and incomes, land rights and NRM?</td>
<td>Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What impacts can be claimed on community and state institutions and the transparency of governance?</td>
<td>Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• What impact did projects have on relationships between disadvantaged groups, including women, and those with power?</td>
<td>Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What were the consequences of such impacts on the disadvantaged: was their social position enhanced, or did they suffer as a result?</td>
<td>Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Has IFAD’s approach to FSC resulted in more sustainable outcomes for institutions and poor people?</td>
<td>• What type of sustainability was being sought? (Project activities per se? the transfer of knowledge and experience to individuals? The creation of durable community or state-level organizations? Altered power relationships?).</td>
<td>Analysis of new projects; Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What efforts were made (at design, during implementation and after project completion) to analyse the project’s wider lessons, and to disseminate/advocate for their uptake?</td>
<td>Analysis of COSOPs; Analysis of new projects; Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Has IFAD’s approach to country strategy and projects in FCS followed IFAD’s strategy to introduce gender equality and women’s empowerment?</td>
<td>• Have IFAD projects in FCS set monitorable objectives for female and male beneficiaries?</td>
<td>Analysis of COSOPs; Analysis of new projects; Country Case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Does the M&amp;E system implemented in FCS include measurable indicators for progress in gender objectives?</td>
<td>Analysis of COSOPs; Analysis of new projects; Country Case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Have the gender objectives of the projects in FCS been achieved or are likely to be achieved?</td>
<td>Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What are the factors affecting project performance in achieving gender objectives in FCS?</td>
<td>Country Case studies; Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Innovation and scaling up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main questions</th>
<th>Detailed questions</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Has IFAD’s approach been innovative in responding to FCS challenges and are interventions likely to be scaled up?</strong></td>
<td><strong>To what extent have IFAD’s projects been innovative within the FCS context?</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of COSOPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>How did the innovation originate in the fragility context (e.g. through the beneficiaries, government, IFAD, NGOs, etc.) and was it adapted in any particular way during project/programme design?</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of new projects</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Country Case studies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Are there plans for scaling up or has interested been expressed by any development partners?</strong></td>
<td>Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Analysis of COSOPs
- Analysis of new projects
- Country Case studies
- Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
Definitions and concepts

- **Conflict-affected situations**

1. Conflict-affected (conflict or post-conflict, national or subnational) situations are those in which significant social and economic disruptions lead to weak governance, extensive damage to infrastructure, and disruption of service provision.\(^{57}\)

- **Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)**

2. The CPIA is a diagnostic tool initially created by the World Bank to measure the extent to which a country’s policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and consequently how effectively the country is using its development resources. The CPIA consists of 16 criteria grouped into four equally weighted clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. For each of these criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high).\(^{58}\)

- **Fragile Situations**

3. ADB identifies fragile situations as "small and geographically isolated, often with scattered, low-density populations and underdeveloped markets. Opportunities for economies of scale and scope, as well as human and financial resources and infrastructure, are limited and highly dependent on aid flows. Core state political, security, and service delivery functions are weak, unstable, and concentrated around urban areas. Countries in these fragile situations may also be particularly vulnerable to climate change and disasters.”

4. The World Bank defines “fragile situation” have a) a harmonized average CPIA rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years.\(^{59}\)

- **Fragile States**

5. There is no uniformly accepted or internationally agreed definition of the term “fragile states” or “fragility”. The differing mandates and regions/areas of focus have led multilateral and bilateral development agencies to use different terms and definitions, identifying different list of countries. The table below provides the definitions or classifications used by major multilateral development agencies or bilateral donors.

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### Appendix III Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB&lt;sup&gt;61&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>ADB utilizes recent country performance on country performance assessment (CPA) rating as basis for determining fragility. Developing member countries in the 4th or 5th quintiles of the country performance assessments for two of the most recent three years, and those in conflict or post-conflict situations, are considered FCS countries. CPA process uses the World Bank’s CPIA questionnaire, criteria, and clusters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>In conceptual terms, the World Bank defines fragile and conflict-affected states as &quot;countries where policies and institutions—or governance, broadly defined—are so weak that the state’s ability to guarantee security to its citizens and deliver basic public services is severely limited.&quot; In the context of IDA 17, the terms fragile and conflict-affected states refers to countries that: (i) have a harmonized average CPIA rating of 3.2 or less (or no CPIA); or (ii) have or have had a UN and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>The AfDB’s definition of fragile states covers countries scoring below 3.0 on the CPIA and a Country Vulnerability Index (CVI) of less than 0.351.&lt;sup&gt;63&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>A fragile region or state that has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters.&lt;sup&gt;64&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>DFID’s working definition of a fragile states covers countries &quot;where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor&quot;. Core functions are considered to include service entitlements, justice and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>Fragile states are characterized by weak policies, weak institutions and weak governance, resulting in meagre economic growth, widespread inequality and poor human development. Fragile states are more exposed to the risk of outbreaks of violence than are non-fragile states. Fragile states may be well endowed with natural resources or be resource poor.&lt;sup&gt;66&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Fragile contexts include those countries and territories experiencing armed conflicted, emerging from armed conflict, or affected by acute political, social, and conflict, or affected by acute political, social, and economic vulnerability, and susceptible to chronic forms of organized criminal violence.[...] Many fragile contexts feature one or more of these manifestations simultaneously.&lt;sup&gt;67&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>60</sup> Note that the definitions herein are drawn from publicly available documents of respective organizations and may not necessarily reflect the latest definitions being used officially. Further cross-check and updates will be made during the evaluation.


<sup>63</sup> Despite that CPIA is used widely as a criterion to classify FCS, it was critiqued in the evaluation undertaken by ADB’s Operations Evaluation Department in 2012 for its limitations.

<sup>64</sup> OECD (2014). Domestic Revenue Mobilisation in Fragile States. Paris: OECD.

<sup>65</sup> DFID (2005). Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states? Department for International Development. London: DFID.


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IFAD (2014). IFAD at the Midterm of the Ninth Replenishment (IFAD10/1/R.2). Consultation on the Tenth Replenishment of IFAD’s resources - First session. Rome: IFAD.


**IFAD’s evaluation reports**


**External documents**


Qualitative comparative analysis

1. Analysis that relied only on a single case would be subject to external validity threats. In other words, knowing the specific combination of conditions that explain why an outcome is achieved at one place and at one point in time isn’t enough to enable you to say much on whether it will work either elsewhere or else when. The conventional approach to generalisation is through sampling for statistical representation, but this is often not possible. This can be overcome if theory development and testing, based on empirical evidence drawn from cases, is used as the basis for more general theory making.

Appendix V - Box 1
What is QCA

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a method used for the systematic comparison (synthesis) of evidence from case studies and was initially developed in the field of political science. It allows 'middle-range' theory generalisations and the examination of causality (the how focused upon in the ADRs). 'Theories of the middle range' is a concept drawn from sociology. It means theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during the analytical process and development of a single unified theory that will explain everything about the issue being researched. As such, it can't guarantee that you can identify all of the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a particular outcome to be delivered in a certain context, but does enhance the probability that policy makers are aware of a greater number of them.

In classical approaches to causal inference (attribution), causality is established by seeking a strong association between a single cause and a single effect, either by observing a regular combined presence of cause and effect in a number of highly-diverse cases (Hume's regularity and Mill's Method of Agreement) or through the observation of quasi-identical cases whereby only the cause and the effect are different (Mill's Method of Difference, or the philosophical basis for experiments and other methods involving the construction of a counterfactual). The cause is mostly conceived as being both necessary and sufficient for the effect; and not usually able to untangle the complexities of causal relations when causes are interdependent and affect outcomes as ‘causal packages’ rather than independently.

QCA aims to identify the combinations of what are called necessary and sufficient conditions required for a particular outcome, based on the empirical evidence. As such the analysis can lead to identification of several configurations of conditions, rather than the identification of a single set of independent variables identified when using statistical methods, needed to deliver a particular outcome. When we say that one event causes another we do not always imply a necessary and sufficient relation between and effect. Indeed, we may be saying that the first event is any one of the following:

- **Both necessary and sufficient:** The cause always leads to the intended effect and is the only way to get there.
- **Necessary but not sufficient:** The cause is a necessary precondition for intended effects but won’t make them happen without what some call other ‘helping factors’.
- **Sufficient but not necessary:** The identified causes are one way to arrive at the effect but there are other ways.
- **Neither necessary nor sufficient but a contributory cause:** The identified causes are a vital part of a ‘package’ of causal factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect. However on their own, the identified causes are neither sufficient nor always necessary.

2. The main elements of the QCA analytical process to explain the performance of post-2006 FCS project interventions would be as follows:

(i) Develop an explicit theory that identified both the major aspects of IFAD performance. This would include the outcomes (called O conditions) and drawn from the evaluation criteria and the major contextual (called C

---

conditions) and management issues [called mechanisms (M conditions)] that are thought to determine performance at the outcome level for post-2006 FCA project interventions.

(ii) Ensure that clear definitions of the individual C, M and O conditions are in place.

(iii) Identify the cases (project interventions) to be included in the analysis.

(iv) Systematically collect evidence against the individual C, M and O conditions from both existing documentation and the case study work. Note that it is important to collect evidence on all of the conditions to be included in the QCA work for all cases.

(v) Set thresholds for rating performance against each condition.

(vi) Systematically and transparently rate performance against the C, M and O conditions based on the evidence.

(vii) Summarise the ratings against the theory and test/adjust the conditions for consistency against the theory through the development and examination of what are called truth tables.

(viii) Based on analysis of the truth tables and resolution of contradictions in the data revealed in the truth tables, decide whether enough consistency to allow a rigorous examination of causality.

(ix) Carry out the Qualitative Comparative Analysis.