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Enabling poor rural people
to overcome poverty

Republic of Burundi

Rural Recovery and Development Programme

Project Performance Assessment

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For: **Review**

Preface

This project performance assessment was prepared by Anne-Marie Lambert, Senior Evaluation Officer, with contributions by Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Consultant (Agricultural Specialist). Internal peer reviewers from the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD – Ashwani Muthoo, Deputy Director and Fabrizio Felloni, Senior Evaluation Officer – provided guidance and comments on the draft evaluation report. Linda Danielsson, Evaluation Assistant, provided administrative support to the evaluation.

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* Annexes 4 and 5 are available in English.

Currency equivalent, weights and measures

Currency equivalent

1 US\$ = 1,406.00 BIF
 1,000 BIF = 0,753 US\$
 (1 April 2012)

Weights and measures

Metric system

Abbreviations and acronyms


CCDC	communal community development committee
CDC	community development committee
CDF	family development centre
CPD	provincial development committee
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
PAIVA-B	Agricultural Intensification and Value-Enhancing Support Project
PARSE	Livestock Sector Rehabilitation Support Project
PCDC	communal community development plan
PPA	Project Performance Assessment
PRASAB	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project
PRDMR	Rural Recovery and Development Programme
PRODEFI	Value Chain Development Programme
PRODEMA	Agricultural Productivity and Market Development Project
SRDI	Regional Development Company of Imbo
WFP	World Food Programme

Map of the programme area

Republic of Burundi

Rural Recovery and Development Programme (PRDMR)

Programme performance assessment



24-09-2012



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD

Executive summary

1. The Peer Review of IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation and Evaluation Function, conducted in 2010 by the Evaluation Cooperation Group, recommended that the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) modify its approach to project evaluation by moving to validations of project completion reports and a limited number of project performance assessments (PPAs). The Rural Recovery and Development Programme (PRDMR) in Burundi has been selected for a PPA. As is the practice for all PPAs, this assessment covered the evaluation criteria set forth in the IOE Evaluation Manual and included an extensive review of documentation and a mission to the field.
2. The programme successfully achieved its objectives vis-à-vis the main target populations, in particular the most vulnerable households, which had lost their means of production. The PRDMR provides an important reference point for Burundi, for IFAD, and also for the international community active in the sector. At the time of programme start-up, the country's main challenge was to reactivate the economy in the wake of the crisis by restoring the production base and addressing the structural problems affecting production. The programme response was to improve food security and living standards, increase rural incomes and improve land conservation in four of the country's poorest provinces. The programme closed in February 2011.
3. The relevance of PRDMR is deemed satisfactory based on Burundi's economic and social indicators at the time, IFAD's strategy for economic recovery, and the needs of vulnerable poor people living in rural areas. The programme was designed to address a complex set of root causes of poverty and insecurity, and although each of the programme components was relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, the interventions as a whole made the programme complex and difficult to manage. The programme's effectiveness and efficiency are considered satisfactory based on the level of achievement of both objectives and budget despite the delays incurred; the sound choice of partners, particularly NGOs; and the innovative community-driven approach.
4. Rural poverty impact is also rated satisfactory in view of the benefits seen among the target groups in terms of income and assets, food security and agricultural productivity, human and social capital, and empowerment. The assessment notes weaknesses in the conservation of agricultural land and environmental resources but underscores the programme's strong influence on government policies and institutions.
5. Sustainability is rated moderately satisfactory. The programme interventions show good signs of sustainability, specifically the high degree of ownership by local populations and good financial returns on several activities. Nevertheless, challenges remain – particularly in consolidating infrastructure management committees. The programme's greatest success lies in its innovations and their scaling up throughout the country: government organization of communities and the support for livestock development by other partners through the cattle solidarity chain. The assessment rates this aspect as highly satisfactory. Based on the programme's positive impact on women overall, gender equality and women's empowerment are judged satisfactory.
6. Finally, the performance of IFAD and the Government is considered satisfactory. The Government and partners have commended the coordination unit for sound programme management, the technical quality of the team and its flexibility in providing implementation support when needed. The Government committed to PRDMR design and operationalization, and the programme revitalized local administrations, which led to strong support for implementation and monitoring. It is, however, crucial that both IFAD and the Government continue to protect the impressive achievement by PRDMR.

Republic of Burundi

Rural Recovery and Development Programme

Project Performance Assessment

I. Objectives, methodology and process

1. **Objectives.** The Peer Review of IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) and Evaluation Function, conducted in 2010 by the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG), recommended that IOE modify its approach to project evaluation by moving to validations of project completion reports and a limited number of project performance assessments (PPA).
2. Project performance assessments are intended to provide an independent review of overall project results, and generate conclusions and recommendations for the design and implementation of future and ongoing operations. An overview of the methodology for PPAs may be seen in Annex 4.
3. Project performance assessments represent the second stage of validation of the project completion report. The project performance assessment includes field visits to supplement the findings of the project completion report validation and to fill in any gaps in information and knowledge. The project performance assessment applies the evaluation criteria set forth in the IOE Evaluation Manual, as well as the criteria of gender equality and women's empowerment, climate change, and promoting innovation and scaling up¹ (see annex 5 for the definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE).
4. The PRDMR has been selected for performance assessment because the findings of its project completion report validation suggest that a more in-depth review of specific aspects would be of benefit. These include natural resources, environment and climate change, capacity-building, sustainability and the influence of community-based planning methodologies on national policy, including synergies with NGOs and other partners.
5. **Methodology.** Performance on each of the evaluation criteria was assessed using a six-point rating system, where 1 is the lowest score and 6 the highest. The draft evaluation report, like all PPAs, underwent an internal quality control process in the form of a peer review within IOE. The PPA takes into account, to the extent possible, the context (cf. Evaluation Manual, p. 16) of crisis in which the programme was designed and implemented.
6. The assessment is based on the PRDMR project completion report validation, and on the documents consulted in this regard: the appraisal report, midterm review, supervision and implementation reports, and an overall results and impact evaluation of PRDMR conducted in collaboration with the University of Burundi. These reference documents (see list in annex 8) provided the basis for this PPA, supplemented by data gathered during the mission to the field.
7. Primary data were collected during the field mission to provide an independent assessment of the programme performance and results. The methods used to collect data were chiefly participatory techniques and qualitative data. The assessment prioritized techniques and instruments such as semi-structured individual and group interviews, thematic discussions at the offices of ministries in the capital and with staff and beneficiaries in three of the four provinces covered by the programme, and direct observations in the field. Triangulation techniques were applied to verify the findings, based on various information sources. Secondary

¹<http://www.ifad.org/gbdosc/eb/ec/e/65/EC-2010-65-W-P-6.pdf>.

data gathered are based on studies conducted during programme implementation (see annex 4 for bibliography).

8. **Process.** The mission to Burundi took place in February 2012. It was conducted with the support of the authorities from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Planning of Burundi and from the three provinces visited by the assessment mission (see Terms of Reference of the assessment in annex 3). A wrap-up meeting was held at the end of the mission on 27 February with participation by representatives of the Government and other programme partners, the country programme manager (CPM) and other IFAD staff from the field (see annex 7).

II. The programme

A. Programme context

9. **Country context.** Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a human development index of 0.282, placing it 166th of 169 countries for which comparable data exist, and estimated GDP of US\$161 in 2009. The country faces formidable challenges in reducing widespread poverty. More than 10 years of conflict, exacerbated by a regional economic embargo and a freeze on international aid at the end in the 1990s, led to the destruction of productive capital. Lacking natural resources (with the exception of nickel, which has yet to be developed), Burundi's economy is based mainly on agriculture, which contributes close to 35 per cent of GDP and provides 87 per cent of exports. Reforms have been undertaken to stabilize the economy, restructure the public finances and improve governance. Economic growth has resumed and the economy expanded at an estimated 3.5 per cent in 2011. However, the country continues to face unique major structural constraints.
10. Family farming is based on polycropping, in most cases associated with food crops for self-consumption. Serious problems with land tenure exist as a result of extreme subdivision of land handed down by inheritance, the return of refugees and the gap between the law and actual land tenure practice. Farms average 0.5 ha with 5.3 persons per household (without including relatives victims of the crisis).
11. Soil fertility in Burundi is relatively low. More than 36 per cent of soil is acid with aluminum toxicity. Terrain is uneven and characterized by hills with convex slope profiles that expose the soil to a high risk of erosion. The country is increasingly obliged to resort to imports of cereals and food aid. Food and nutrition problems relate mainly to an imbalance of proteins and energy.
12. Traditional income-generating crops are coffee, tea, cotton, oil palm, sugar cane and tobacco. These crops occupy just 10 per cent of cultivated land and are largely under the control of government institutions and subsectors now in the process of privatization. They contribute more than 90 per cent of the country's export revenues. Other than these cash crops, the agrifood industry is virtually nonexistent. Farms operate mainly on a family and artisanal scale and product processing remains rudimentary.
13. **Programme rationale.** The 1993 crisis disrupted the existing agricultural production systems with population movements towards displaced persons centres and refugee camps in neighbouring countries. The PRDMR started up in a period of conflict in which the population – particularly vulnerable households – needed support to weather various temporary and long-term food shortages that threatened their very existence. In 1996, almost all bilateral and multilateral donors shut down their aid programmes in Burundi. In 1998, agricultural production showed signs of recovering as many displaced persons returned to their villages of origin. Although the emergency situation had yet to be overcome by all the population, the major challenge for Burundians at that time was recovery, chiefly by restoring the productive base and addressing structural production problems.

14. **Programme objectives.** The overall objective of the programme was to: (i) improve food security; (ii) raise living standards and increase incomes for rural people; and (iii) improve the conservation of land resources. Specific objectives were to: (i) increase agricultural production; (ii) build capacity in rural planning and management; (iii) strengthen rural support services; and (v) improve the social status of women. The programme was carried out in four provinces (Cibitoke, Gitega, Karusi and Kayanza).
15. **Programme financing.** The programme became effective on 4 August 1999. The programme was initially to last seven years from that date. To enable implementation of the activities under the socio-economic infrastructure component financed by OFID loan 801 P, which did not become available until August 2007, and to consolidate achievements, two extensions were granted by the Government and IFAD (see summary in box 1). The original loan closing date was 30.09.06. It was initially extended to 30.06.2010 and an additional two-month period was granted in order to effectively close down the final activities under the OFID-funded socio-economic infrastructure component, ending on 28 February 2011.

Box 1

Programme data

Country: Republic of Burundi
Programme title: Rural Recovery and Development Programme
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Board Approval date: 28 April 1999 • Effectiveness date: 4 August 1999 • Original closing date: 30 September 2006 • Loan closing date: 28 February 2011 • Total cost: US\$34.2 million • IFAD loan: US\$20 million • Terms of loan: highly concessional • Contribution of Government: US\$3.3 million • Contribution of beneficiaries: US\$1.2 million • Cofinancier (OFID): US\$8.3 million • Cofinancier (WFP): US\$1.2 million • Cooperating institution: United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS); directly supervised by IFAD since 1 January 2009

Source: IFAD President's report and recommendation, 1999.

16. **Programme components.** The programme had six components: community development; on-farm agriculture support; natural resource development and conservation; socio-economic infrastructure development; support to local initiatives; and programme coordination. Cost distribution and percentage by component are shown in table 1.

Table 1
Summary of total programme costs in US\$

Components	Total in millions of US\$	% base cost
Community development	1.74	5
On-farm agriculture support	10.28	32
Natural resource development and conservation	4.32	13
Socio-economic infrastructure development	9.64	30
Support to local initiatives	3.31	10
Programme coordination	3.27	10
Total costs including contingencies	34.22	100

Source: IFAD President's report and recommendation, 1999.

17. **Programme coverage and target group.** The target group comprised disadvantaged rural families and communities affected by the crisis. These included the most vulnerable groups – such as women and children, farmers, rural young people lacking education, and poor and landless rural people. At the time of programme design, the target group estimated on the basis of structural and temporary vulnerability numbered between 766,000 and 1,167,000 people, i.e. between 126,000 and 195,000 rural households, out of a total population of 18 million people.
18. **Institutional arrangements.** A programme coordination unit was to be set up to steer, manage and coordinate the programme activities and interventions entrusted to the various partners. The designated executing agency of the programme was the Ministry of Planning and Community Development and the following steering and coordination structures (which included all the technical ministries engaged in programme implementation) were to be set up: a national steering committee, a technical steering committee, a sector policy steering committee and a provincial committee tasked with coordinating programme interventions at the provincial level.
19. **Monitoring and evaluation (M&E).** The M&E function was to be the direct responsibility of specialists within the programme coordination unit. Semi-annual progress reports were to serve as a basis for discussion with the national steering committee and programming and monitoring workshops organized twice a year. The expert was to prepare an annual report. A project completion report was to be prepared as part of the self-evaluation system.
20. **Changes made during programme implementation.** The programme strategy called for rehabilitating publicly managed transit centres where animals were required to remain in quarantine prior to distribution. However, the Government ruled out this option. It was then decided to source the animals privately and deliver them directly to the farmer beneficiaries.
21. The programme called for the construction of protected wells in the provinces of Bururi and Ruyigi, and sanitation by building public sanitary blocks. Although part of this infrastructure was to be carried out in six provinces, the start-up of the Transitional Programme of Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PTRPC) cofinanced by IFAD enabled the PRDMR to concentrate on infrastructure in the four provinces within its intervention area.
22. The vulnerable groups rehabilitation subcomponent was to be implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) under an agreement with IFAD. For bureaucratic reasons, the agreement was never signed and PRDMR was obliged to abandon the idea of FAO intervention. The programme then

launched a pilot operation that involved providing 10 vulnerable families in each *colline* [smallest administrative unit in Burundi] with a more substantial kit.

23. The appraisal report called for a skeleton contractual staff, specifically staff seconded from the public service. In actual fact, only an engineer and an agronomic technician were seconded and then quickly recruited by NGOs offering more attractive salaries. The supervision missions and midterm review mission recommended that the programme coordination unit gradually flesh out the contractual staff of the PRDMR.

B. Programme implementation

24. Details on physical progress by the PRDMR (cumulative results as of 31 December 2010) are presented in annex 9. The following paragraphs provide a summary and brief discussion of the main activities and results achieved.
25. **Community-driven development** was a key programme component. All targets were met and in many cases exceeded in terms of impact (see paragraph 78 related to impact). The programme called for: (i) increasing community planning; (ii) community organization with development committees at various levels; (iii) capacity-building; and (iv) harmonization and coordination of approach.
26. Accordingly, 33 communal community development plans (CCDPs) were developed (100 per cent of target) based on community consultations with *collines*, as well as four regularly updated summary provincial development plans (PDPs) (100 per cent of target). The above CCDPs were the result of consultative workshops organized in all *collines*, covering the main problems and actions assigned priority by communities. The programme set up and operationalized 782 *colline* development committees (102.7 per cent of target), 33 communal development committees (100 per cent of target) and four provincial development committees (100 per cent of target) by election.
27. Training played an important role, particularly the training of trainers (78.25 per cent of target) and members of community development committees (CDCs) (147.9 per cent of target). This training enabled the CDC members to participate effectively in carrying out certain programme activities, specifically monitoring the livestock community solidarity chain and the ongoing updating of community development plans.
28. The programme organized 45 harmonization workshops for various partners in community development. This approach enabled a bridge to be built between grant-centred emergency activities and loan-centred development activities, bringing more coherence among different partners interventions.
29. **On-farm agriculture support** comprised a series of actions to improve and increase production by rural families and included seven subcomponents: (i) rehabilitation of production capacity of vulnerable groups; (ii) fertilization of agricultural land; (iii) reactivation of the seed production subsector; (iv) reintroduction of livestock; (v) recovery of cash crops; (vi) research and development; and (vii) support for training organizations.
30. Briefly, the Report on the global evaluation of the results and impact of PRDMR prepared by the Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction has shown that 68.7 per cent of beneficiary households have in fact been able to resume agricultural activities: inter alia, through support provided to vulnerable households (103.5 per cent of target) in the form of kits composed of hoes, seed, fertilizer and a small ruminant (300 per cent of target); and an operating fund for fertilizer distribution (121.65 per cent of target) made available to the provincial agriculture and livestock directorates (DPAEs) and the Department of Fertilization and Soil Protection (DFPS).

31. Within the framework of seed production subsector reactivation, training (120.5 per cent of target) has provided capacity-building for 686 people (DPAE plant production unit heads, seed centre heads, communal agronomists, seed multipliers, and plant health inspectors and laboratory assistants) in seed production and conservation techniques; 200 associations (156.25 per cent of target) have received seed production support.
32. The programme of cattle distribution² (59.4 per cent of target) and goat distribution (254 per cent of target), employing credit reimbursable in kind via the community solidarity chain, was still able to largely achieve the target numbers because of the close monitoring by the community. At the end of the programme, 1,223 head of cattle had been reimbursed and their progeny redistributed.
33. One-off support was provided to reactivate cash crop production, through four public companies managing the tea (Office national du thé), coffee (Office du café du Burundi), rice (Société régionale de développement de l'Imbo) and cotton (Compagnie de gérance du coton) subsectors.
34. Actions under the **natural resource development and conservation** component included marshland treatment, forest and agro-forest plant production and distribution, and forage clump division and planting to combat erosion. Except for the development of vertical terraces (on public land as a pilot and on privately owned fields), which had to be abandoned as too costly for beneficiaries, the activities were carried out quite successfully, particularly in quantitative terms.
35. Results included 1,969 ha of marshland treated (98.45 per cent of target) for 19,995 farm households, with the piloting of the intensive rice cultivation system (SRI).
36. Forest plants (175.9 per cent of target) and agro-forest plants (230.8 per cent of target) were produced and distributed. To combat erosion, clump division sets were planted on 18,125.76 km (302.9 per cent of target).
37. **Socio-economic infrastructure development.** This component covers water supply, construction of primary schools and public sanitation blocks and related equipment, and construction of health care centres and related equipment. Although these activities were to commence in 2000, the funds were not released until 2007 owing to delays in the settlement of payment arrears to OFID. In addition to revising the targets to adapt to the changing context, there are significant discrepancies between the targets set in the PRDMR appraisal report in 1999 and the actual achievements in 2007. Inflation eroded the budget for this component and, although plans called for rehabilitating existing infrastructure and making use of specialized government services, PRDMR judiciously opted for new construction using durable materials and contracted out the work to private enterprises.
38. The most important infrastructure built includes a potable water supply system of 155 km (95.9 per cent of target) and the development of 299 water sources. The programme built 34 new primary schools (77.3 per cent) and 35 primary schools were equipped. Four new health care centres with accommodations for medical staff were built (100 per cent of target). The health care centres were built in compliance with the standards adopted by the Ministry of Public Health in February 2007, in terms of both infrastructure and equipment.
39. **Support to local initiatives** targeted women's literacy in particular by setting up infrastructure and training trainers. PRDMR built 95 new literacy houses and opened 294 literacy centres. The programme supported 1,169 groups (233.8 per cent of target), assisted with the recruitment and training of 880 new literacy officers (232.2 per cent of target) and provided literacy training for 62,485 people. Certificates were issued for 29,456 women among 39,889 people receiving training.

² The unit cost was significantly underestimated in the appraisal report.

40. **Programme coordination.** Staff composition evolved significantly compared to initial plans. To address the lack of staff motivation and availability during crisis periods and based on recommendations made by the supervision missions and midterm review mission, 14 key personnel and four field drivers were hired to strengthen the programme coordination unit.

III. Review of results by criteria

A. Programme performance

Relevance

41. Generally speaking, the programme objectives were highly relevant in view of the crisis situation prevailing in Burundi, IFAD's strategy for post-conflict reconstruction and reactivation of socio-economic development, and the needs of the most vulnerable rural poor people, who had been stripped of their means of production with no community organizations to anchor an economic recovery. The programme design was intended as a response to a complex set of root causes of poverty and insecurity, and although each of the programme components was relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, the interventions taken as a whole rendered the programme complex, disperse, and difficult to manage.
42. The programme commenced during a particular set of circumstances – a war that had been ongoing since 1993 and an embargo during the period 1996-1999 by the country's economic partners. This period was marked by the absence of the Government's technical and financial partners and a lack of development planning. Although there were no reference documents on development available at the time when the appraisal report was prepared, the economic and social indicators demonstrate the programme's relevance vis-à-vis the needs of the Government. The situation led to a regression in GDP of about 20 per cent between 1993 and January 1999, when the embargo ended. During the same period, the investment rate fell from 18 per cent to 6 per cent and inflation rose from 4 per cent prior to the crisis to 21 per cent in 1999. Public development aid also declined to a third of its pre-crisis level at less than US\$100 million. At the same time, external debt levels soared (US\$1.12 G in 2000) and interest on the debt absorbed more than 50 per cent of export receipts in the early 2000s. Agriculture, accounting for more than 50 per cent of GDP (US\$800 million in 1999) stagnated, with oversight bodies barely functioning owing to a lack of resources and the destruction of much of the country's socio-economic infrastructure.
43. More than 90 per cent of Burundi's population depended – and continue to depend – upon agriculture for their livelihoods, growing food for self-consumption and living on income generated by cash crops or farm work. Following the crisis and the embargo, however, cash crop yields were halved, particularly in the case of coffee and tea. The main causes for the decline in production were the lack of agricultural inputs (manure, fertilizer, pesticides, quality seed), soil erosion and a lack of support services. The programme as designed was therefore responding to a very real and urgent need of the population. According to the 1998 Human Development Index, the four provinces targeted by the programme were among the country's seven poorest, posting poverty rates of between 83.2 and 91.2 per cent.
44. The programme designed prioritized community-driven and participatory development, and targeted the households considered the poorest. The criteria guiding the selection of direct beneficiaries were as follows: (i) families with numerous members and/or headed by women; (ii) families with small farms; (iii) families with no monetary income; and (iv) families having lived through traumatic events. Beneficiaries were selected by the communities themselves using a methodology developed with the strategic collaboration of an international NGO (ACORD) having expertise in participatory community-based processes. The capacity-building strategy directed at all stakeholders; community involvement in planning, implementing and M&E of programme actions; and the creation of

democratically selected community organizations all played a major role in the identification of beneficiaries and management of activities at the community level. Many accounts provided to the PPA mission confirmed the transparency of the process of beneficiary identification.

45. Although the design of the programme components was highly relevant, the PRDMR as a whole was complex and the programme management approach as initially planned was not in line with the realities of crisis conditions and insecurity. The approach outlined in the appraisal report was to employ mainly public service staff, who were to continue to receive their salaries together with a pay supplement from PRDMR. These staff members were not to report to the PRDMR coordinator hierarchically, as established by the Government. This approach was not workable, as it overestimated the capacity of the public service, and had to be adapted in the course of implementation to ensure sound and transparent programme management (see the section on efficiency). Some unit costs, e.g. for cattle, and the cost of inflation were also underestimated in the appraisal report.
46. In short, the programme was highly relevant in terms of the country context, IFAD's priorities and the needs of beneficiaries. The choice of partners, in particular NGOs, proved to be highly strategic. In addition, community strategy and targeting were very useful, promoting participation and a transparent transfer of responsibility to beneficiaries, including the poorest. The main weaknesses were overly disperse interventions and an initially unrealistic management approach, which was however corrected during implementation. Accordingly, the assessment rated relevance as satisfactory (5).

Effectiveness

47. Specific objectives were not clearly defined at the time of programme design. They were articulated at the beginning of the implementation phase as follows: (i) increase agricultural production; (ii) strengthen rural planning and management capacities; (iii) improve conditions of health and hygiene; and (iv) improve the social status of women. They were validated by the midterm review in 2003. This section analyses the effectiveness of PRDMR on the basis of these objectives.

Specific objective 1: Increase agricultural production

48. Different components and subcomponents complemented one another in promoting an increase in agricultural production. These included: (i) reintroducing livestock; (ii) multiplying improved seed and improving access to agricultural inputs; (iii) treating marshland and introducing the intensive rice cultivation system; and (iv) combating erosion.
49. Among the beneficiary households, 41.88 per cent were able to raise their agricultural production by 30 to 50 per cent, compared to 27.7 per cent among non-beneficiary households.³ Major successes included: (i) cattle beneficiaries with access to manure and anti-erosion measures; and (ii) farmers of treated marshland following improvements in water management, with households easily doubling or tripling production. All of the households having received cattle under the PRDMR reported increases in agricultural production as a result of the organic manure produced by the animals; agricultural production doubled or tripled for crops now being fertilized by these households. The number of beneficiaries having received cattle and the resulting benefits continue to increase at the present time thanks to the solidarity chain and animal reproduction. In 2004, the PRDMR distributed 1,013 head of cattle, and in 2009 the first beneficiaries had already reimbursed 2,236 head of cattle by passing them on to other beneficiaries. The PPA mission observed that the number of head of cattle per beneficiary continued to rise. By way of example, (i) Hakizimana Jean de Buhinyuza of Karusi received one cow in 2004 and

³Report on the global evaluation of the results and impact of PRDMR, Ministry of Planning and Reconstruction, May 2010).

had five cows after having reimbursed one and sold another; (ii) Nteziryayo Firmin de Gatara of Kayanza received one cow in 2005 and had eight at the time of the mission, after having reimbursed one.

50. The swampland treatments had a positive influence on yields per hectare, particularly rice yields, which rose from 1.5 tonne per hectare before the programme to 3 tonnes per hectare afterwards. In several pilot marshes in Gitega and Karusi, and the irrigated perimeters of Murambi-Rugombo in the province of Cibitoke, where 2,310 ha were rehabilitated, yields were raised to 5 or 6 tonnes of rice per hectare. In addition, the treatments enabled users to move to two crops a year rather than the one that was the norm prior to PRDMR.
51. The production of quality seed did not achieve its potential given the organizational constraints⁴ of seed multiplication associations and climate phenomena. Although private seed multipliers offered a more effective alternative to associations, they were too few and too scattered geographically to have any significant impact on agricultural production in the intervention area. With respect to food crops, the number of improved seed users accounted for 6.67 per cent of non-beneficiary households and 27.92 per cent of beneficiary households. Although these data are of interest, they do not provide any information on the extent to which the needs of these users were met.
52. Vulnerable households having benefited from kits, which were composed essentially of agricultural inputs, were able to resume their agricultural activities; 68.7 per cent of them felt that they had done so successfully. A total of 33,099 households received the kits, at an average value of 30,000 Burundian francs per household. The kits provided contained 40,291 goats, 12,780 hoes, 14,000 banana suckers, 2,840 market gardening seed bags and 4,260 fruit plants.

Specific objective 2: Strengthen rural planning and management capacities

53. At the time of PRDMR start-up, an extensive participatory diagnostic process led to the development of communal development plans that highlighted the priorities and needs of the grass-roots communities. This process allowed for the election of *colline* development committees (CDCs) that genuinely represent the people. These committees were highly involved throughout the process of targeting beneficiaries, distributing kits to vulnerable households, and monitoring the community solidarity chain and other programme activities.
54. The PRDMR, in organizing training for grass-roots community organizations, has enabled those trained to raise their awareness of taking charge of their own development. During visits to the field by the evaluation missions, many accounts confirmed that the CDC members play a crucial role in ensuring transparency in the management of development projects at the *colline* level.
55. The creation of community development committees by PRDMR at the *colline*, communal and provincial levels was a great success and has served as a basis for design of the Government's decentralization policy. The CDCs and CCDCs are recognized under the Communal Law (2005), and a specific ordinance was issued on 31 December 2007 by the Ministry of the Interior and Communal Development to clarify the composition, mandates and workings of community development committees at all levels. Every one of the country's communes and provinces now has a development plan. Bottom-up planning from the *colline* level set the stage for preparation of the national practical guide to communal planning published in 2007 that is currently being used in all communes across the country.

⁴Eligibility criteria for financing or reimbursable support from PRDMR (rationale developed by the Government) were very strict. There were more than five criteria, including presenting a transferable and executable guarantee or mortgaging an asset (fields, house, next harvest, etc.).

56. However, bottom-up planning could be improved in several respects, specifically with respect to: (i) the quality of communal community development plans (PCDCs), which too often take the form of inventories rather than presenting strategic choices for interventions over a given period of time; (ii) ownership by administrative staff (iii) the workings of CCDCs and provincial development committees (CPDs);; and (iii) lack of knowledge of legislative and regulatory texts on the part of the authorities and the grass-roots population.
57. The DPAE technical services have resumed operations, chiefly on account of the logistical support provided to re-operationalize them and the training provided. The logistical support in particular was most useful. All DPAEs were virtually at a standstill during the crisis, lacking vehicles, operating funds and computer equipment. Various training courses were given to DPAE officers and technicians to enable them to better monitor activities. Nevertheless, frequent political changes led to high turnover among key DPAE staff (directors and officers). Most of the officers trained under PRDMMR would now benefit from an update.
58. Family development centres (CDFs) were set up by PRDMMR in the four provinces and 33 communes within the programme area, with support in the form of operating resources. These community organizations strongly influenced the Government in expanding the CDFs to all communes and provinces in the country under a social cohesion approach. Currently the salaries of all CDF staff at both the communal and provincial levels are covered by the Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender, although for the moment there is no provision for operating expenses, which slows down their community work. Moreover, there are no legal texts to regulate their creation, which has an impact on their recognition and clarity as to their specific mandate. Thus, the effectiveness of the CDFs is currently highly dependent upon cooperation projects and organizations providing support.
59. Management committees for infrastructure built or rehabilitated under the programme were strengthened by means of awareness-raising and training. The community organizations trained under the PRDMMR currently contribute to monitoring the execution of works and infrastructure maintenance. Owing to the delay in releasing funding for the socio-economic infrastructure component, the health care centre and primary school committees have not had the support they need for proper functioning. However, most of the AUMs are operating relatively well, although they face two major problems. First, the fact that the ownership of the hydro-agricultural infrastructure operated by AUM members is not clearly defined is a handicap in collecting fees and performing maintenance work. Second, the lack of knowledge of land tenure law on the part of both users and the authorities, particularly with respect to marshland, leaves users in a situation of uncertainty as to the long-term sustainability of their rights to farm the marshland.

Specific objective 3: improve health and hygiene conditions

60. Improving health and hygiene conditions was to be done by supporting access to health care services, potable water and public latrines. According to the Report on the global evaluation of the results of PRDMMR, the four health care centres built by PRDMMR provide health care services to a large population, estimated at 62,632 inhabitants. Each centre provides services to an average of 16,155 inhabitants per centre (World Health Organizations standards call for a maximum of 10,000 inhabitants per health care centre). The programme gave 23,639 families access to potable water and gave 24,750 schoolchildren access to latrines and better schooling conditions (by reducing the distance to walk to school, reducing the number of students per class and providing appropriate desks).
61. The management of latrines and rainwater collection cisterns is crucial to maintain good hygiene in primary schools. In Burundi's recent history, primary schools have had little experience in this regard, so much the more so since school principals are

new following major political changes that occurred during the programme implementation phase, leaving PRDMM with insufficient time to provide adequate guidance. However, school health and hygiene infrastructure is relatively well organized by the health care sector in Burundi, through the water points management committees and health care committees that have traditionally existed in the country.

Specific objective 4: Improve the social status of women

62. Within the programme area women are now represented on community organizations, either at the level of CDCs or on *colline* councils, since a number of women have been elected as communal administrators. At the outset of programme implementation, 34.57 per cent of women members were represented overall in CDCs (2001) compared to 27.2 per cent following the elections held in 2005. The decrease is attributable to the fact that in 2001 women were better represented by CDCs because the criteria established by PRDMM in setting up the CDCs required that level of women's representation. Following the elections, based on political competition, women's representation has been merit-based rather than quantitative, and is contributing to greater awareness in terms of both self-esteem and the community.
63. Although women's representation declined as a percentage following the elections in 2005, an important positive change is observable. Following the 2010 elections, 30 per cent of women members of CDCs are represented in the programme area and the proportion of women represented on *colline* councils rose from 15 per cent after the 2005 elections to 25 to 30 per cent after the 2010 elections. The province of Kayanza has set an example, with more than 50 per cent of women leaders having become members of *colline* councils. In 2001, there was not a single woman communal administrator in the programme area. After the 2005 elections, there were eight, and after the 2010 elections, 12.
64. Following the programme activities, particularly through the work done by communal networks of women leaders and CDFs at the provincial and communal levels, women in the PRDMM area have been observed to express themselves more and more freely at meetings and to defend their own interests without hesitation. At the present time women chair and express their opinions at meetings to settle disputes organized by the Bashingantahe (traditional institutions that settle community conflicts) and *colline* council meetings. This was not the case prior to PRDMM. In addition, women peasant leaders mediate at the family level between parties in conflict, in particular with respect to family conflicts and protecting children in difficulty. Women leaders support the CDF officers at the communal level in promoting community awareness around women's and children's rights.
65. In view of the foregoing analysis, the performance of PRDMM is considered satisfactory, with a rating of 5.

Efficiency

66. The IFAD loan agreement for PRDMM became effective on 4 August 1999 after a delay of three months – exemplary compared to the average delay of 11.4 months for the region and 12.2 months for IFAD as a whole. There was a delay in the actual start-up of programme activities as a result of the institutional complexity (six ministries), the novel community development approach that took time to implement systematically, and the late signing (in 2001) of agreements with implementation partners. In 2003 the pace of implementation and disbursements was very slow given the insecurity prevailing in the country. As a result, the PRDMM costs were reviewed and updated by the midterm review mission for the period 2004-2007 and, based on disbursements as of 31 December 2003, the remainder of approximately US\$13.6 million was carried over to the second phase in 2004-2007. This led to a first extension of the programme for 15 months.

67. A second extension moved the closing date forward to 31 December 2010 from 31 March 2007. A budget reallocation took place in 2009 after the OFID funds were released, to support consolidation of activities under the socio-economic infrastructure component. The unit quantities called for in the appraisal report were no longer feasible following the eight-year delay in implementation, given the increase in unit costs.
68. The completion report indicates a physical execution rate of close to 100 per cent for activities financed under the IFAD loan and a financial implantation rate of 99 per cent. Despite the significant delay in releasing the OFID funds and its consequences from a cost point of view, the extended period of political instability, insecurity, drought and poor morale among the oversight bodies, the programme overall (including the OFID funding) managed to properly carry out virtually all activities (97.74 per cent) as initially planned. These results, particularly in such an unfavourable context, provide a very good indicator of efficient resource use.
69. As indicated in the section on relevance, the provision for human resources to manage the programme was greatly underestimated in the programme design, leading to significant budget overruns for the programme coordination component. Based on the requirements duly noted by the various supervision missions and the midterm review, it became necessary to hire contractual staff not initially provided for in the appraisal report, given the need for strong, transparent management and close monitoring of the many activities being implemented in all four provinces, as well as insecurity owing to the crisis. By way of example, an accountant and accounting assistant were hired, as well as a procurement officer justified by the volume of public procurement to be carried out. The M&E officer, who was not provided for in the cost table of the PRDMR appraisal report, was essential to produce regular monitoring reports. The midterm review also recommended hiring a staff person to facilitate building in cross-cutting gender considerations while monitoring work done by CDFs.
70. Moreover, PRDMR needed to revise pay levels upwards on at least two occasions (2004 and 2006), in agreement with government authorities and IFAD and with the non objection of the cooperating institution (UNOPS until end-2008). The related demands, which involved other cooperation projects as well, led to the preparation of a new set of harmonized rules of procedure with a more attractive pay scale, which was signed by the Government and IFAD in 2011 and entered into effect on 1 July 2011 for all IFAD-funded projects. The PRDMR also had staff rules calling for an annual pay raise based on performance evaluations at the end of each year, providing for a 3 per cent increase for a score of very good and 2 per cent for a score of good. This annual performance-based pay increment also contributed to increasing PRDMR pay costs, which had been calculated as remaining steady in the costs table (COSTAB). But these measures did provide stability for staff during implementation and made them more effective. The foregoing explains the cost overruns over and above the pay levels initially provided for in the PRDMR appraisal report. This is clear in the COSTAB for the midterm review and in the two amendments to IFAD loan 500-BI.
71. By hiring a contractual M&E officer, PRDMR was able to update the logical framework and build an M&E framework, together with a review of monitoring and impact indicators. Owing to the programme's complexity and the fact that public institutions did not have the capacity for regular collection of M&E data, the data collection system was decentralized, with support from provincial officers and under a participatory approach in line with the community-driven structure of activity monitoring. The M&E unit organized several studies and thematic surveys with collaboration from, inter alia, specialists from the University of Burundi (overall evaluation of the results and impact of PRDMR in preparation for the PRDMR completion report, livestock reintroduction impact study, environmental impact assessment, etc.). The baseline study did not take place until 2007 and the

methodology had to include a historical procedure to establish the starting situation. Generally speaking, these studies, which were not planned at the outset, contributed important clarifications on the programme results.

72. Programme management showed a high capacity for adapting operations to the recommendations made by supervision missions. The government respondents and other partners interviewed during the evaluation mission were unanimous in attributing the success of the programme in large part to its rigorous, transparent but flexible management. The quarterly accounting and financial reports provided by PRDMR and the 11 positive external audit missions have confirmed these accounts. IFAD's 2010 portfolio review for the region gave Burundi the highest rating overall for project management (4.7).
73. The use of NGOs to provide community guidance – ACORD for coordination and a local NGO for each of the four provinces were recruited by public procurement – contributed to the great success of the bottom-up community planning component, at reasonable cost for superior quality. In addition, the beneficiaries made an important contribution to implementation that has been undervalued in view of their major commitment to activities. For instance, beneficiary participation required under the seed multiplication and livestock reintroduction activities has not been quantified.
74. Considering that the PRDMR implementation period was extended by close to four years at no additional cost⁵ and achieved satisfactory effectiveness and impact on both economic recovery and development, despite the fact that certain costs increased – particularly for programme coordination where they were critical for proper PRDMR implementation in the context of the crisis – programme efficiency is judged satisfactory (5).

B. Rural poverty impact

75. With the exception of the management of natural resources, environment and climate change, which is judged moderately satisfactory (4), the PRDMR is judged satisfactory on impact (5). The programme's influence on government policy warrants highlighting, and is rated highly satisfactory (6). The main areas of impact of PRDMR are presented in the following paragraphs.
76. **Household incomes and assets.** The Report on the global evaluation of the results and impact of the PRDMR shows that 64.2 per cent of beneficiaries saw their incomes rise by at least 30 per cent: (i) from 2000 to 2009, the proportion of households with incomes greater than 180,000 Burundian francs per year increased 13.96 per cent, compared to just 5.43 per cent among non-beneficiaries;⁶ (ii) 49.74 per cent of households having benefited from the programme (compared to 29.15 per cent of non-beneficiary households) report a good standard of living and more than 30 per cent of household say they have made housing upgrades.⁷ The increase in household incomes and assets was confirmed by the PPA mission and is observable particularly among: (i) cattle beneficiaries, most of whom invested in plots of land, built houses and started up other commercial activities; (ii) forest plan beneficiaries, especially in the province of Kayanza, where the evaluation mission found beneficiaries who had clearly graduated from poverty and were considered relatively wealthy by local community standards;⁸ and (iii) beneficiaries

⁵ There was a gradual withdrawal of coordination unit staff, ending with only the minimum staff for the delayed socio-infrastructure component.

⁶ According to the QUIBB survey in 2006, the poverty line in rural Burundi was 191,625 Burundian francs. Unfortunately, the survey did not use this poverty line but rather a bracket of between 180,000 and 240,000 Burundian francs. The evaluation used the poverty line of 180,000 Burundian francs, which seems more realistic.

⁷ For example, the number of beneficiaries living in houses built of sheet metal and tile rose from 69.9 per cent to 85.7 per cent and the number of those living in houses of straw fell from 30 per cent to 14.2 per cent.

⁸ At the time of the mission, one beneficiary who was considered very poor prior to the programme had just sold part of his land, which had been planted with fruit trees with PRDMR support, for 42 million Burundian francs. Another

- of economic infrastructure (cabinetmaking, garment-making workshops, marketing units, etc.).
77. It cannot be said that the increase in household incomes and assets extended to all beneficiaries, or that the return to peace and resumption of cooperation in the programme area was not a positive factor on this impact area. On the other hand, the mission observed multiple knock-on effects, particularly among nursery owners. For these reasons, the mission awarded a score of satisfactory (5).
 78. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** The programme made a major investment in human capital and empowerment of target populations. The most impressive evidence of this is as follows: (i) community organization and capacity-building for CDCs in planning and monitoring the implementation of development plans; (ii) creating and strengthening competencies of CDFs in social cohesion, local governance and the promotion and defense of women's and children's rights; (iii) support for the emergence of women as peasant leaders committed to community development and social cohesion, as well as in the capacity of politically elected women; (iv) capacity-building for staff members of decentralized government services (provincial directorates of agriculture and livestock, land use administration, rural engineering, etc.), - the knowledge and competencies newly acquired by these officers have enabled them to take up new and better paid functions; some have even passed competitive examinations and been hired by other projects financed by IFAD and other donors; (v) literacy, particularly for women, members of CDCs and elected *colline* councilmembers; (vi) promotion and technical support for associations to facilitate access to PRDMR and government services; (vii) creation and training of management committees for socio-economic infrastructure (marshland users). The mission observed that literacy workers and women leaders continue to work on a volunteer basis with no outside support. This active involvement merits being supported to keep it alive.
 79. Based on the foregoing, the mission has assigned rating of satisfactory (5) to the programme on this evaluation criterion.
 80. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The Report on the global evaluation of results and impact of PRDMR reveals that the proportion of households having access to two meals a day increased from 13 per cent in 2000 to 69.6 per cent in 2009. As indicated, this positive development cannot be attributed entirely to the programme and the report does not clearly identify the part that is attributable to it. During the implementation period, the security situation improved in the programme area and cooperation efforts by other donors resumed.
 81. Nevertheless, the mission noted that the programme had genuinely contributed to the increase in agricultural production and improvement in food security, which resulted in better food availability and access for beneficiary households. The increase in agricultural production and food security was seen above all among cattle beneficiaries, since manure production improved the fertility of their land and they were able to apply anti-erosion techniques. In addition, the cattle beneficiaries produce and consume more milk and oil and some of them are now selling milk (51.4 per cent of the milk produced by those receiving cows was sold).
 82. Production increased also among those farming marshland treated under PRDMR. Production levels rose overall but did not achieve their full potential in some marshland areas because of organizational weaknesses among producers and inadequate treatment techniques in some cases. In fact, in some areas, and this is also the case for other projects in the country, watersheds not fully treated led to a decrease in yields from the previous production systems, as noted in the Report on the global evaluation of results and impact of PRDMR.

beneficiary now has a stable of six cows and the profits on livestock sales have enabled her to open a milk distribution and yogurt sales business.

83. The beneficiaries of successful reforestation and economic infrastructure activities derived sufficient income to buy food and improve production on their fields by paying for farm labour and purchasing agricultural inputs. However, they are scattered, reflecting the programme design, and their degree of success varies by province.
84. The support provided to vulnerable people in the form of kits of agricultural inputs did not increase production but did in fact bring about a recovery of production activities that had previously ceased. Although the first two agricultural seasons did not fully meet the needs of these vulnerable people (most of them displaced persons having returned to their villages of origin), the next two seasons benefited from the community-based PRDMR approach and brought adaptations to the needs of beneficiaries to reactivate their production activities more effectively.
85. As mentioned, stocks of fertilizer and seed production neither achieved the desired effects nor supported agricultural productivity over a very significant geographical area, and the mission observed weaknesses in certain activities as explained above. The evaluation has assigned the programme a score of satisfactory (5).
86. **Natural resources and environment (including climate change issues).** The Report on the global evaluation of results and impact of PRDMR notes that between 2000 and 2009 the proportion of farms with improved soil protection rose from 2.48 per cent to 12.85 per cent (an increase of 10.37 per cent) among beneficiary households and from 0.48 per cent to 4.57 per cent (an increase of 4.09 per cent) among non-beneficiaries. The mission observed that the programme had in fact contributed to improving soil protection for farming households although this was not a widespread phenomenon. No activities were planned to combat the effects of climate change.
87. Positive effects were observed as well among beneficiaries of cattle. The programme also contributed to reforestation of the areas targeted, leading to total production of 24,408,431 forest and agro-forest plants. However, the reports do not provide sufficient information on the percentage of plants actually planted or those having grown. The mission observed somewhat different levels of interest in forestation among the population in the three provinces visited. Enthusiasm was greatest in Kayanza, compared to Karusi and Gitega. Known reforested areas are an estimated 977.13 ha, capable of average carbon sequestration of 9,771.3 tonnes per year during the growth phase.
88. Watershed management was regularly undertaken around the marshland treated.⁹ However, it was not fully executed because the area to be treated was underestimated. In fact, the World Food Programme (WFP) provided a contribution in excess of the amount planned at the outset (US\$1.85 million) for this purpose and still did not meet all the needs. The food for work approach employed could be criticized on the basis that it was not designed from the point of view of sustainability and raised expectations among beneficiary populations, which led to a failure to keep the anti-erosion trenches cleared and open in the absence of resources to provide support. The mission therefore noted that some of the trenches had virtually disappeared.
89. In 2003, PRDMR conducted an environmental and social impact study of the irrigated rice growing operation managed by the Regional Development Company of Imbo (SRDI). This was done in response to the requirements of the environmental code adopted in 2000. Such studies were not done systematically for the other work done under PRDMR that warranted them, such as marshland treatment, water supply and construction of social infrastructure (schools and health care centres). Although laws exist, they are not always well known because they have not been

⁹ However, activities relating to water resources management, irrigation and watershed protection compensated for irregularities in rainfall.

disseminated throughout the country, and PRDMM did not make any budget provision for such studies. The fact that environmental and social impact studies were not done systematically may have had a deleterious effect. For example, if PRDMM had had knowledge of requirements under the land tenure law, it might have been able to influence compensation for those households having lost plots of marshland following the installation of hydro-agricultural works.

90. The appraisal report called for environmental protection of vertical terraces on an experimental basis. As indicated, these activities were abandoned on the recommendation of the midterm review as overly costly for beneficiaries. They were included in the budget reallocation following the midterm review.
91. Based on an analysis of strengths and weaknesses in this area, the evaluation has assigned a rating of moderately satisfactory (4) to this criteria.
92. **Institutions and policies.** This is the most successful impact area for PRDMM. The programme initiated the participatory community-driven development approach currently being applied on a national scale. With support from other partners involved in community development, such as the non-profit organization Twitezimbere [Let Us Develop Ourselves] and the Community and Social Development Project, both financed by the World Bank, and the Gutwara Neza [Good Governance] project financed by the European Union, this model has contributed along with other partners to changing the country's regulatory framework, particularly with respect to citizen participation (promulgation of the Communal Law of 20 April 2005, the ministerial ordinance of 2007 establishing the CDCs, CCDCs and CDPs, and the national practical guide to communal planning published in 2007), favouring poverty reduction.
93. The programme influenced local governance – *colline* communities, communal services, elected bodies and officers, and partnerships with NGOs – at the same time as the local elections held in 2005 laid the groundwork for decentralization, adopting this model and extending it to all the provinces. This countered the prevailing welfare mentality (expectations of grants and subsidies) with ownership and community leadership (modifying behaviour by providing support in the form of credit).
94. The PRDMM's creation and support of CDFs in the programme area influenced the Government in expanding the CDFs countrywide and covering the salaries of their members up to the present day.
95. During the crisis period of quasi-paralysis the PRDMM supported public services in all four provinces in resuming the work hitherto suspended for lack of resources and skills.
96. Finally, the bottom-up planning approach promoted by PRDMM inspired the methodology used to develop the strategic frameworks for growth and poverty reduction in 2006 and 2012.
97. In view of this notable influence on legislation, policies and strategies, local governance, attitudes and behaviours, the evaluation has assigned a score of highly satisfactory (6).
98. In short, based on data from the project completion report, the other studies done by PRDMM and the information and observations gathered in the field, the evaluation rates the programme's overall impact on rural poverty as satisfactory (5).

C. Other performance criteria

99. **Sustainability.** A number of exit strategy considerations were developed and agreed upon with the major partners in the course of implementation. These included the generalization of the community-driven approach, the availability of

human resources at provincial and communal administrations for monitoring, capitalization by other IFAD interventions and partnerships with NGOs. They also included infrastructure maintenance by associations and financial support provided in 2010 to communal networks of peasant leaders to consolidate income-generating activities.

100. Some of the PRDMR activities and approaches are demonstrably sustainable as observed in the field several years after completion. This is the case of livestock reintroduction by means of the solidarity chain, which was extremely successful in increasing incomes and agricultural production, as well as social infrastructure such as schools, health care centres and offices for certain government services.
101. However, some of the organizations set up have not yet reached the level of technical maturity needed to achieve true autonomy. For example, the socio-economic infrastructure maintenance committees and income-generating activities by women's networks are not yet sufficiently robust to survive without recourse to institutional support. High turnover among the officers of government services, in the absence of support for their monitoring capacities, risks weakening the monitoring of achievements by PRDMR.
102. Thus, despite the transfer of marshland user committees to other IFAD-funded projects to pass on guidance, the lack of clarity among government agencies responsible for hydro-agricultural works stands in the way of sustainable management. The same is true of achievements in conservation of agricultural land and environmental resources (water points, soil fertility, nurseries, treated marshland, etc.). These are such that they can contribute to the programme's sustainable impact in terms of agricultural production and replication by non-beneficiaries, but only on the condition that they are supported by adequate technical guidance.
103. Taking into account the sustainable nature of certain achievements, the various exit strategies prepared and agreed upon with the partners and the existence of the weaknesses noted in certain components in terms of sustainability, performance is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4). Government and IFAD need to redouble their efforts to protect the impressive achievements by PRDMR. In addition, the 2008 COSOP underscores that the sustainability of IFAD-funded interventions should be improved.
104. **Innovation and scaling up.** The assessment assigns a rating of highly satisfactory to this criteria. The participatory and community-driven approach was innovative for Burundi and is increasingly being adopted by other cooperation programmes. All of the large-scale projects initiated in recent years have been strongly inspired by the PRDMR approach. The development of the new strategic framework for growth and poverty reduction was based on community organization and the NGO ACORD working with local NGOs, and made an important contribution through effective lobbying. As indicated, the Government has already come out in favour of the approach in the form of legal recognition and generalization of development committees across the country at the *colline*, communal and provincial level. New projects financed bilaterally or multilaterally are now adopting this approach spontaneously. Projects funded by IFAD (PTRPC, PARSE, PAIVA-B, PRODEFI), the World Bank (PRASAB, PRODEMA), NGOs such as Caritas, International Red Cross, etc. are basing their interventions on legally recognized community organizations.
105. Bottom-up planning, a strategic approach that involves marginalized groups, is another innovation introduced by PRDMR. This was an inclusive approach in the sense that it facilitated the participation of marginalized groups in development actions and brought together different social groups that could no longer communicate after the crisis. The CDCs are composed of people from different social groups and have greatly contributed to social integration. Women participate

- on an equal basis with men in community development initiatives that were previously reserved exclusively for men. Many partners have collaborated on developing the community planning guide, which has become a national reference manual.
106. Another innovation was the introduction of the first intensive rice cultivation system in Burundi. Pilots took place in the provinces of Gitega, Karusi and, to a lesser extent, Kayanza. As a result of exchange visits to Rwanda for technicians and instructors, representatives of CDCs and marshland user committees, the system started up quickly and results in marshland in all three provinces demonstrated the system's profitability. The exchange visits also contributed to preparations for the start-up of PAIVA-B. Currently yields have increased from 3 tonnes to 5 or 6 tonnes per hectare. The intensive rice cultivation system was also adopted for scaling up by the PAIVA-B, PRODEFI and PTRPC projects.
 107. The CDFs (provincial and communal) set up by PRDMR have been recognized and generalized by the Government and employed by other partners (international development agencies such as the German Cooperation Agency [GIZ], international NGOs such as Handicap International in Gitega, and national NGOs).
 108. The introduction of cattle under community development projects was also a major innovation for Burundi. Prior to PRDMR, the partners (essentially NGOs) defended and promoted goats as a solution to economic problems and the need for organic fertilizer. With the successful introduction of cattle by PRDMR within the framework of the community chain, this innovation has been scaled up and strengthened by other projects funded by IFAD, the World Bank and the European Union.
 109. In conclusion, in the view of this evaluation of PRDMR performance one of the programme's greatest successes lies in its innovations and influence on the Government and other partners having adopted, strengthened and scaled up these innovative initiatives. PRDMR is a "teaching" programme that has influenced the country's development approach. A score of highly satisfactory (6) has therefore been awarded.
 110. **Gender equality and women's empowerment.** The evaluation has considered this criterion under the three objectives of IFAD's 2003 Gender Plan of Action,¹⁰ i.e.: (1) women's access and control over fundamental assets of capital, land, knowledge and technology; (2) strengthening women's decision-making role in community affairs and representation in local institutions; and (3) improving women's well-being and alleviating their workload by facilitating their access to basic services and infrastructure. PRDMR assigned high importance to gender equality and women's empowerment, which translated into a cross-cutting function in all its interventions.
 111. With respect to the first objective of IFAD'S Gender Plan of Action, the programme strengthened women's position specifically in terms of knowledge via literacy and training and support on women's rights. In addition, through the networks of women leaders, PRDMR encouraged solidarity among women in all communes within the programme area to promote women's and children's rights. The result was that women joined their husbands in having stable access and control of family assets, particularly land.
 112. PRDMR made a strong contribution to strengthening women's decision-making role in community affairs and representation in local institutions (see paragraphs 63-65). Particularly following awareness-raising and knowledge acquired, women beneficiaries improved their awareness of self-esteem. This gave them the courage to stand for local election and seek appointment as members of development committees and other local institutions such as *colline* and communal councils, and

¹⁰In 2012 IFAD developed a new gender policy in which the three objectives have been updated.

as directors. In fact, the number of women members of these organizations increased steadily from programme start-up to the 2005 elections and then the elections held in 2010. By way of illustration, in 2001 there were no women communal directors. In 2005 there were eight in the 33 communes targeted under PRDMM (24.4 per cent) and by 2010 there were 12 out of 33 (36.4 per cent). In *colline* councils, women accounted for 15 per cent of members in 2005 and 25 to 30 per cent by 2010. After the elections in 2005, 27.2 per cent of CDC members were women and after the elections held in 2010, 30 per cent were women. In addition, the women's networks have become so effective that they currently sit alongside *Bashingantahe* and *colline* elected officers in meetings to settle community disputes – and women are listened to, which makes this democratic mechanism more transparent. Their success in all four provinces covered by PRDMM is underscored by the situation in the other provinces where less progress has been made.

113. Although the third criteria under IFAD's strategy was not specifically addressed by PRDMM, several of its achievements contributed to women's well-being, specifically on water supply since women are the ones who carry water according to local culture. Shorter distances between water points and greater availability of drinking water provides more benefits for women, as does greater availability of wood for fuel. The same is true of health care centres with birthing services. Finally, several economic activities such as the small-scale fruit marketing centre in Cibitoke have been highly successful. Women have also participated in the community cattle chain.
114. The gender equality and women's empowerment criterion is deemed satisfactory (5) by this assessment. However, both Government and IFAD need to ensure that the benefits continue to be sustained.

D. Performance of partners

115. **Performance of IFAD.** IFAD played a pivotal role during the crisis and post-crisis period by filling the void left by the Government's technical and financial partners. The quality of the appraisal report was high and it reflected the national priorities for poverty reduction in a context of insecurity. The design was participatory and took into account contributions from the technical services of ministries and knowledge of the environment on the part of NGOs.
116. The partners are highly appreciative of the programme's performance, owing in large part to the sound management and technical quality of coordination unit staff and their capacity to adapt operations. Direct supervision by IFAD had a positive influence on programme implementation and the gradual withdrawal of coordination unit staff. Prior to the changeover to direct supervision, the recommendations made by the midterm review and supervision missions were followed up on properly and the previous coordination team underscores IFAD's ongoing support for proper programme implementation.
117. The M&E section of the coordination unit generated data and studies that favoured learning and knowledge management of benefit to IFAD's portfolio of projects in Burundi. Knowledge sharing was also facilitated by the fact that the management units for all IFAD projects moved to a single shared building in 2009 (IFAD programme support unit), facilitating collaboration among projects.
118. Weaknesses in the PRDMM design – dispersion, underestimation of human resources costs and administrative expenses were identified. However, IFAD made every effort to minimize or rectify design flaws and showed flexibility in implementing the programme. This positive role led the assessment to assign a score of satisfactory (5) to IFAD's performance
119. **Performance of the Government.** In the context of instability and the departure of international partners, the Government ventured to borrow resources from IFAD to help reactivate the country's economy. The programme financing was suspended

for only four months of a total 132 months, or 11 years, owing to temporary arrears situations, but since this did not affect the programme's implementation or sound cash flow the major activities continued uninterrupted. Also, the Government provided counterpart funds as planned and on a timely basis.

120. The Government was a stakeholder in the programme's design, through the oversight ministries. The Government also did preparatory work for project operationalization and the oversight ministries regularly joined supervision missions during implementation. The technical steering committee met regularly with the participation of directors general and advisors from the ministries involved and facilitated consultation and consensus-building among the ministries.
121. The OFID loan underwent an eight-year delay as a result of government arrears. However, the Government successfully renegotiated the loan with a new schedule and virtually all of the economic and social infrastructure was maintained, although with significant delays.
122. The local administration benefited from programme support, particularly material and logistical support. The resumption of operations at DPAEs enabled monitoring of activities to take place in all four provinces with analytical support from the M&E section of the coordination unit. As indicated elsewhere in the report, major political changes resulted in weaknesses in staff competencies in various government services such as the DPAEs. Although CDF officers are paid by the Government, they have no operating budget, nor are there legal or regulatory texts in force clarifying their mandate and workings.
123. The evaluation has awarded a score of satisfactory (5) to performance of the Government.

E. Overall programme achievement

124. With an implementation rate of more than 97 per cent despite the difficult context in which it was implemented, the performance of PRDMR is deemed satisfactory overall. Annex 1 presents a summary of assessment ratings by criteria, including a comparison of ratings awarded by PMD and IOE.

IV. Conclusion and recommendations

A. Conclusion

125. The overall objective of PRDMR was to improve food security, raise the standard of living and increase incomes for rural people, and improve land conservation. The evaluation concludes that the programme contributed to restoring the productive base and addressing structural problems affecting production in the wake of the crisis and the economic embargo. Upon programme completion, the targeted households had seen an increase in their incomes and their food security had lessened (paragraph 49-52). The vulnerable households targeted had resumed their production activities. PRDMR made a strong contribution to strengthening rural planning and management capacities by introducing a participatory, inclusive approach and community organization into the planning process – now widespread throughout the country (paragraph 53-59)– and by reactivating the technical services of provincial agriculture and livestock departments in their role of providing guidance and oversight for community development (paragraph 57).
126. The increase in household incomes is attributable mainly to the economic impact of the cattle solidarity chain, forest plants and small-scale economic infrastructure (paragraph 76). The recovery of agricultural activities and the increase in yields have contributed to food availability and access for the targeted households. This is particularly true in the case of those having benefited from cattle and reforestation (paragraphs 86-88). It is also true for those farming treated marshland, although certain technical and organizational weaknesses limited the achievement of their

- full potential, especially with respect to managing natural resources and the environment where the area to be treated was underestimated.
127. The programme contributed to improving health and hygiene conditions by providing health care services to large numbers of people in each of the provinces targeted, as well as access to potable water and primary school by means of socio-economic infrastructure, the construction of health care centres, primary schools and water supply sources and systems (paragraphs 60-61).
 128. The creation of CDCs at the *colline*, communal and provincial levels by PRDMM served as a basis for the Government's decentralization policy. The CDCs and CCDCs are recognized by the Communal Law 2005 and a specific ordinance was issued in 2007 to clarify the composition, mandate and workings of committees at all levels, thus generalizing community organization throughout the country (paragraphs 92-97).
 129. Women are now well represented in community organizations and are elected members of *colline* committees. The communal networks of women leaders and CDFs also contribute to social cohesion and awareness-raising among communities around women's and children's rights (paragraphs 111-112). However, their structures need continued support to remain effective.
 130. Maintenance of the infrastructure built or rehabilitated under the programme is provided by management committees set up during programme implementation. These committees were active during implementation and were strengthened with training. Most of the committees continue to function, although they would benefit from upgrading (paragraphs 101-102). Most of the targets set were met or exceeded despite delays in implementation, particularly for socio-economic infrastructure (paragraph 68). The few concerns expressed here are minor in comparison with the programme's achievements in a difficult political and economic environment. The few lacunae in programme design – inadequate planning and funding of human resources for administrative and financial monitoring and for M&E – were corrected in the course of implementation (paragraphs 69-72), with the exception of the dispersion of activities that was called into question by the midterm review in some cases.
 131. The success of PRDMM can be attributed to a number of factors, the most important of which are outlined below:
 132. **Flexibility in designing interventions.** Flexibility was shown in adapting the programme to the implementation context (paragraph 72). For instance, changes were made in the structure and number of staff in the coordination unit to improve administrative and financial management, and the programme adapted its quantitative objectives to slippage caused by the eight-year delay in construction of economic infrastructure to take into account, inter alia, the effect of inflation on the cost dynamic and evolving national priorities.
 133. **Role of NGOs.** NGOs played a key role in bottom-up community organization and planning by means of an extended period of learning and sustained lobbying, which led to legal recognition and generalization and strongly influenced the government decentralization agenda (paragraph 73).
 134. Another decisive element in the programme's success was **quality of programme management.** The coordination unit team was competent and provided leadership that was highly esteemed by all stakeholders (paragraph 72). Management methods and procedures were effective and motivating, even in a difficult context. Upon programme completion, a high percentage of PRDMM staff occupied key positions in other projects funded by IFAD and other donors or in private enterprises and NGOs.
 135. Finally, in preparation of the PPA, a comprehensive summary of lessons learned, prepared by the coordinator of the programme (see annex 10), raises many

important issues which would benefit IFAD's country programme and IFAD's dialogue with Government and partners.

B. Recommendations

136. This section sets forth a number of general recommendations on issues of importance to IFAD's current and future operations in Burundi. There is a wealth of both positive and negative learning to be drawn from PRDMR, some of which already referred to in the above paragraph. This critical analysis warrants being shared with the stakeholders, particularly with staff working on initiatives under way by IFAD and the Government, and should be addressed at a **knowledge sharing** session organized by the IFAD programme support unit. The recommendations below were identified on the basis of performance evaluation and are considered strategic issues for both IFAD and the Government.
137. **Capacity-building** played an important role in PRDMR. The institutions providing oversight and guidance (DPAE, DGSE, DGVA) were revitalized with logistical support and training, and participated in the implementation and monitoring of programme interventions (paragraph 125). However, multiple changes within the oversight ministry and other local institutions resulted in frequent turnover among staff and the evaluation noted weaknesses in staff competencies, especially at DPAs. Now that PRDMR has been closed, the Government will need to provide adequate support to these structures in the form of training and upgrading on, inter alia, technical matters relating to agriculture and livestock, administrative management and M&E techniques to ensure the long-term sustainability of programme achievements.
138. The interventions supported by IFAD involve community organizations (CDCs, CCDCs, CPDs) set up by PRDMR and generalized throughout the country (paragraph 127). Their planning and monitoring functions should be consolidated with collaboration from NGOs (ACORD and local NGOs) acting as liaison between CDCs and administrative and technical structures. This could include support in the form of specific training and ongoing support for communities and new administrative, political and technical authorities and new members of CDCs, facilitating financing for activities by PCDCs not yet completed, and generally facilitating an understanding of the roles of CDCs and *colline* councils, CCDCs and communal councils.
139. **Policy dialogue.** The assessment also identified major challenges faced by PRDMR that could not be resolved solely by means of a project, some of which are raised in the self-evaluation (paragraph 135) and in the section on effectiveness. IFAD is very well positioned as an experienced partner in Burundi and has the desired credibility to engage in policy dialogue with the Government.¹¹ Some of the issues raised in the context of PRDMR that would benefit from policy dialogue are as follows: (i) continued legalization of CDCs (including financial management of activities) and continued harmonization of intervention approaches and viability of organizations; (ii) CDF operating expenses; (iii) encouraging the generalization of communal and provincial networks of women peasant leaders; (iv) organization of the seed production subsector at the national level together with distribution of good quality seed; (v) support for watershed management at the national level; (v) clarification of the reference authority for hydro-agriculture infrastructure in treated marshland; and (vi) better dissemination of information on legislative matters relating to the environment and land tenure law.

¹¹A thematic group on land tenure was set up in the context of the partner coordination group, the preferred channel for policy dialogue in which IFAD takes an active part.

Tableau comparatif des notes attribuées

<i>Critères d'évaluation</i>	<i>FIDA/DGP Notes d'évaluation</i>	<i>IOE Notes d'évaluation</i>	<i>Ecart</i>
Performance du projet			
Pertinence	6	5	-1
Efficacité	5	5	0
Efficiences	5	5	0
Performance du projet	n.a.	5	n.a.
Impact sur la pauvreté rurale			
Revenus et activités des ménages	6	5	-1
Capital humain et social et autonomisation	5	5	0
Sécurité alimentaire et productivité agricole	6	5	-1
Ressources naturelles, environnement (et changement climatique)	5	4	-1
Institutions et politiques	5	6	+1
Impact sur la pauvreté rurale		5	
Autres critères de performance			
Durabilité	5	4	-1
Innovation, transposition à plus grande échelle	6	6	0
Egalité genre et autonomisation des femmes	5	5	0
Performance des partenaires			
Performance du FIDA	5	5	0
Performance du Gouvernement	5	5	0
Résultats globaux du projet	5	5	0
Moyenne nette des écarts			- 0,307

Note sur la qualité du Rapport d'achèvement	FIDA/DGP Notes d'évaluation	IOE Notes d'évaluation	Ecart
Portée	5	5	0
Qualité (méthodes, données, processus participatif)	5	5	0
Leçons	5	5	0
Franchise	6	5	-1
Note globale du Rapport	n.a.	5	n.a.

Données de base

			Montant approuvé (en millions d'USD)		Montant effectif (en millions d'USD) ^A	
Région	Afrique orientale et austral	Coût total du projet	34.2		35.0	
Pays	Burundi	Montant du prêt du FIDA et % par rapport au coût total	20.0	58.48%	20.0	57.14%
Numéro du prêt	500	Emprunteur	3.54	10/35%	3.54	10.12%
Type de projet (sous-secteur)	Rural	Cofinanceur (OFID)	8.30	24.27%	8.30	23.71%
Type de financement	FIDA prêt + cofinancé	Cofinanceur (PAM)	1.16	3.39%	1.85%	5.29%
Conditions de prêt ^B	Très favorables					
Date d'approbation	28/04/1999					
Date de signature du prêt	06/05/1999	Contribution des bénéficiaires	1.22	3.56%	1.22	3.49%
Date d'entrée en vigueur	04/08/1999					
Modifications du prêt	2	Nombre de bénéficiaires	60,000 bénéficiaires directs			
Prolongation du prêt	2	Institutions coopérantes	UNOPS		UNOPS/FIDA	
Chargés de programme de pays	A. Benhammouche ; C. Reiner ; H. Haidara	Date de clôture du prêt	30 Septembre 2006		30 Juin 2010	
Directeur(s) régional(aux)	I. De Willebois	Examen à mi-parcours			1-19 Octobre 2003	
Évaluateur du RAP	L. Kellens	Décaissement du prêt du FIDA à l'achèvement du projet (%)			99.16	
Membres du panel contrôle qualité du RAP	F. Felloni ; A. Lambert					

Source : FIDA, Rapport et recommandation du Président, 1999.

^A Le FIDA système de gestion de projets et programmes (PPMS) ne fait aucune référence à des changements dans les coûts totaux du projet et de sa composition, tandis que le Rapport d'achèvement de projet indique que la contribution du PAM était plus élevé que commis.

^B Il existe quatre types de prêts: i) des prêts spéciaux à des conditions très favorables, d'une durée de 40 ans, y compris un différé d'amortissement de 10 ans, exempts d'intérêts mais avec une commission de service de trois quarts de point (0,75%) l'an; ii) des prêts à des conditions durcies, d'une durée de 20 ans, y compris un différé d'amortissement de 10 ans, avec une commission de service de trois quarts de point (0,75%) l'an; iii) des prêts à des conditions intermédiaires, d'une durée de 20 ans, y compris un différé d'amortissement de 5 ans, avec un taux d'intérêt annuel équivalant à 50% du taux d'intérêt variable de référence; et iv) des prêts à des conditions ordinaires, d'une durée de 15 à 18 ans, y compris un différé d'amortissement de 3 ans, avec un taux d'intérêt annuel équivalant à 100% du taux d'intérêt variable de référence.

Termes de référence de l'évaluation

Contexte

1. Le programme de relance et de développement du monde rural (PRDMR) appuyé par le FIDA en République du Burundi a été sélectionné pour faire l'objet d'une évaluation de la performance de projet.
2. Les objectifs généraux de l'évaluation de la performance du PRDMR sont de (i) fournir un examen indépendant des résultats et de l'impact du projet visant à mieux rendre compte de la performance et des résultats de développement des opérations appuyées par le FIDA et à améliorer ces dernières, (ii) tirer des enseignements au niveau institutionnel et (iii) renforcer la fiabilité et la qualité des mécanismes d'auto-évaluation du FIDA.
3. Une mission est prévue au Burundi du 23 février au 3 mars 2012 et comprendra un programme de visites de terrain sur les sites du PRDMR, l'interaction avec les autorités gouvernementales, les bénéficiaires et d'autres informateurs clés.

Tâches de la responsable de l'évaluation

4. Madame Anne-Marie Lambert, chargé d'évaluation principal au BIE est responsable du processus et de la rédaction du rapport de l'évaluation. Elle orientera le consultant en appui à l'évaluation, en veillant à ce que les preuves et les informations nécessaires à la préparation du rapport soient rassemblées. Elle assumera le leadership de la préparation du rapport.
5. Avant la mission d'évaluation, Madame Lambert préparera le cadre de l'évaluation, en collaboration étroite avec le consultant. La responsable de l'évaluation dirigera la mission d'évaluation et participera aux réunions avec, entre autres, des représentants du gouvernement, des organismes donateurs, les gestionnaires de projet et les bénéficiaires. Par ailleurs, au début de la mission d'évaluation, la responsable de l'évaluation animera une séance de travail avec le consultant afin de clarifier les objectifs de l'évaluation, la méthodologie, les méthodes de collecte de données, l'organisation de la mission et les résultats attendus de l'évaluation.
6. Durant le travail de terrain, Madame Lambert sera chargée de s'assurer que toutes les preuves nécessaires à la rédaction du rapport d'évaluation sont rassemblées. En particulier elle devra:
 - Évaluer, en collaboration avec le consultant, la pertinence de la conception du projet et la stratégie, y compris le réalisme des objectifs du projet; la cohérence entre les objectifs, les extrants et activités des composantes du projet; et tout changement dans le contexte du projet et changement politique pendant la période de mise en œuvre;
 - Examiner l'efficacité globale du projet et valider, avec le soutien du consultant, l'analyse fournie dans le rapport d'achèvement du PRDMR;
 - Évaluer la performance des partenaires du projet, y compris le FIDA, le Gouvernement et l'UNOPS;
 - En outre, en s'appuyant sur la validation du rapport d'achèvement du programme et autres documents pertinents, la responsable de l'évaluation rédigera la partie du rapport sur les objectifs de l'évaluation, la méthodologie et le processus, ainsi que le contexte du pays, du secteur et du projet.
7. Vers la fin de la mission d'évaluation, la responsable de l'évaluation, en consultation avec le consultant, sera chargée de préparer une présentation PowerPoint, résumant les constats et conclusions préliminaires, à partager lors d'une réunion récapitulative, qui se tiendra avant le départ de l'équipe d'évaluation. La

responsable de l'évaluation présentera les résultats préliminaires de l'évaluation aux partenaires du projet à Bujumbura.

Tâches du consultant

8. Monsieur Emmanuel Nshimirimana, expert en agriculture et développement rural, appuiera le BIE dans la conduite de l'évaluation mentionnée ci-haut, sous la supervision globale de Madame Anne-Marie Lambert, agent d'évaluation senior au BIE et responsable de l'évaluation de la performance du PRDMR.
9. Le consultant se familiarisera avec la méthodologie du BIE (lecture du manuel de l'évaluation, des directives pour la conduite des validations de rapport d'achèvement et des évaluation de la performance de projet, un exemple de rapport final d'évaluation de la performance d'un projet d'un autre pays). Le consultant passera en revue le rapport de validation du rapport d'achèvement du PRDMR et documents disponibles et contribuera à la conception de la mission principale (développement du cadre d'évaluation) ainsi que d'autres travaux préparatoires.
10. Le consultant local se joindra à la mission au Burundi et participera aux réunions avec des représentants du gouvernement, des organismes donateurs, les gestionnaires de projet et les bénéficiaires, ainsi qu'avec d'autres personnes et organisations concernées. Au début de la mission, le consultant participera à une séance de travail avec Madame Anne-Marie Lambert, afin de clarifier les objectifs de l'évaluation, la méthodologie, les méthodes de collecte de données, l'organisation de la mission et les résultats attendus de l'évaluation.
11. Pendant la mission, le consultant devra se concentrer en particulier sur les questions identifiées lors de la validation du rapport d'achèvement, et résumées dans le document d'orientation, soit :
 - l'approche de ciblage,
 - les ressources naturelles et l'environnement,
 - le renforcement des capacités,
 - l'innovation et l'élargissement à plus grande échelle en faveur des pauvres,
 - la durabilité,
 - l'efficacité des activités du projet, de leur impact potentiel, et
 - l'égalité des sexes et l'autonomisation des femmes.
12. Par ailleurs, le consultant appuiera également la responsable de l'évaluation dans l'examen de la pertinence, de l'efficacité et de la performance des partenaires. Ce faisant, une attention particulière sera donnée également à la qualité du système de suivi-évaluation(S&E) du projet des extrants et des résultats.
13. Le consultant passera en revue les données générées par le projet et quand c'est possible, les complètera avec les études existantes et la littérature disponible. Le travail de terrain complètera les sources secondaires avec l'observation directe et l'entrevue avec les individus et les groupes de bénéficiaires et les prestataires de services. Dans ce contexte, il est recommandé d'utiliser des questionnaires courts et simples et des listes de contrôle pour des entrevues. Ceux-ci seront élaborés en consultation avec la responsable de l'évaluation avant la mission.
14. Vers la fin de la mission, le consultant devra fournir des contributions écrites au rapport, selon les accords pris avec la responsable de l'évaluation au début du processus d'évaluation (basé sur la table des matières annotée fournie dans l'annexe 3 du document d'orientation). Par ailleurs, le consultant fournira son appui à la préparation d'une présentation PowerPoint résumant les conclusions de l'évaluation préliminaire qui doit être présentée lors d'une réunion récapitulative avant le départ de l'équipe d'évaluation.

15. Pour cette mission, le Consultant devra produire les résultats suivants :
- i. Avant la mission: s'appropriier la méthodologie utilisée par le FIDA ; fournir des commentaires sur le document d'orientation, contribuer à l'élaboration du cadre d'évaluation et l'établissement du calendrier de la mission; donner un appui logistique à la préparation et au déroulement de la mission ;
 - ii. Lors de la mission: contribuer à la rédaction du rapport selon les accords pris avec la responsable de l'évaluation, la rédaction des conclusions et des recommandations préliminaires ; préparer, en étroite collaboration avec la responsable de l'évaluation la séance récapitulative avec le gouvernement sur les conclusions de la mission et les enjeux stratégiques de l'évaluation;
 - iii. Après la mission: rédiger le projet de rapport final et soutenir la responsable de l'évaluation tout au long du processus d'examen interne et externe.

Echéancier

16. Un total de 25 jours sont alloués pour cette tâche dans la période de mars à avril 2012.

Pendant la phase de rédaction de rapport, la communication permanente sera assurée entre la responsable de l'évaluation et le consultant afin d'échanger sur les progrès réalisés par rapport à la table des matières annotée acceptée. Le projet de rapport final du consultant sera envoyé à la responsable de l'évaluation le 21 mars 2012.

Methodological note on IOE's project performance assessments

Definition of a project performance assessment¹²


A. What is a project performance assessment?

1. The project performance assessment (PPA) entails one mission of 7-10 days¹³ (as opposed to 20-25 for past project evaluations) and two mission members¹⁴ (compared with 3-4). PPAs are conducted on a sample of projects for which project completion reports have been validated by IOE, and take account of the following criteria (not mutually exclusive): (i) synergies with forthcoming or ongoing IOE evaluations (e.g. CPEs or CLEs); (ii) major information gaps in PCRVs; (iii) novel approaches; and (iv) geographic balance.
2. The objectives of the PPA are to: assess the results and impact of the project under consideration; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in the country involved. When the PPA is to be used as an input for a CPE, this should be reflected at the beginning of the report. The PPA is based on the project completion report validation (PCRv) results, further desk review, interviews at IFAD headquarters, and a dedicated mission to the country, to include meetings in the capital city and field visits. The scope of the PPA is set out in the respective terms of reference.

B. Preparing a PPA

3. Based on the results of the PCRv, IOE prepares brief terms of reference (ToR) for the PPA in order to sharpen the focus of the exercise.¹⁵ As in the case of PCRVs, PPAs do not attempt to respond to each and every question contained in the Evaluation Manual. Instead, they concentrate on the most salient facets of the criteria calling for PPA analysis, especially those not adequately explained in the PCRv.
4. When preparing a PPA, the emphasis placed on each evaluation criterion will depend both on the PCRv assessment and on findings that emerge during the PPA process. When a criterion or issue is not identified as problematic or in need of further investigation, and no additional information or evidence emerges during the PPA process, the PPA report will re-elaborate the PCRv findings.

Scope of the PPA



C. Evaluation criteria

5. The PPA is well suited to provide an informed summary assessment of project relevance. This includes assessing the relevance of project objectives and of design.

¹² Extract from the PCRv and PPA Guidelines.

¹³ PPAs are to be conducted within a budget ceiling of US\$25,000.

¹⁴ Typically, a PPA mission would be conducted by an IOE staff member with the support of a consultant (international or national). An additional (national) consultant may be recruited if required and feasible within the evaluation budget.

¹⁵ Rather than an approach paper, IOE prepares terms of reference for PPAs. These terms of reference ensure coverage of information gaps, areas of focus identified through PCRVs and comments by the country programme manager, and will concentrate the PPA on those areas. The terms of reference will be included as an annex to the PPA.

While, at the design stage, project logical frameworks are sometimes succinct and sketchy, they do contain a number of (tacit) assumptions on mechanisms and processes expected to generate the final results. At the post-completion phase, and with the benefit of hindsight, it will be clearer to the evaluators which of these assumptions have proved to be realistic, and which did not hold up during implementation and why.

6. For example, the PPA of a project with a major agricultural marketing component may consider whether the project framework incorporated key information on the value chain. Did it investigate issues relating to input and output markets (distance, information, monopolistic power)? Did it make realistic assumptions on post-harvest conservation and losses? In such cases, staff responsible for the PPA will not be expected to conduct extensive market analyses, but might consider the different steps (e.g. production, processing, transportation, distribution, retail) involved and conduct interviews with selected actors along the value chain.
7. An assessment of effectiveness, the extent to which a project's overall objectives have been achieved, should be preferably made at project completion, when the components are expected to have been executed and all resources fully utilized. The PPA considers the overall objectives¹⁶ set out in the final project design document and as modified during implementation. At the same time, it should be flexible enough to capture good performance or under-performance in areas that were not defined as an objective in the initial design but emerged during the course of implementation.
8. The PPA mission may interview farmers regarding an extension component, the objective of which was to diffuse a certain agricultural practice (say, adoption of a soil nutrient conservation technique). The purpose here would be to understand whether the farmers found it useful, to what extent they applied it and their perception of the results obtained. The PPA may look into reasons for the farmers' interest in new techniques, and into adoption rates. For example, was the extension message delivered through lectures? Did extension agents use audio-visual tools? Did extension agents engage farmers in interactive and participatory modules? These type of questions help illustrate *why* certain initiatives have been conducive (or not conducive) to obtaining the desired results.
9. The Evaluation Manual suggests methods for assessing efficiency, such as calculating the economic internal rate of return (EIRR),¹⁷ estimating unit costs and comparing them with standards (cost-effectiveness approach), or addressing managerial aspects of efficiency (timely delivery of activities, respect of budget provisions). The documentation used in preparing the PCRV should normally provide sufficient evidence of delays and cost overruns and make it possible to explain why they happened.
10. As far as rural poverty impact is concerned, the following domains are contemplated in the Evaluation Manual: (a) household income and assets; (b) human and social capital and empowerment; (c) food security and agricultural productivity; (d) natural resources, the environment and climate change;¹⁸ and

¹⁶ Overall objectives will be considered as a reference for assessing effectiveness. However, these are not always stated clearly or consistent throughout the documentation. The assessment may be made by component if objectives are defined by components; however the evaluation will try to establish a correspondence between the overall objectives and outputs.

¹⁷ Calculating an EIRR may be challenging for a PPA as it is time consuming and the required high quality data are often not available. The PPA may help verify whether some of the crucial assumptions for EIRR calculation are consistent with field observations. The mission may also help shed light on the cost-effectiveness aspects of efficiency, for example whether, in an irrigation project, a simple upgrade of traditional seasonal flood water canalization systems might have been an option, rather than investing on a complex irrigation system, when access to markets is seriously constrained (annex 3.C.3).

¹⁸ Climate change criterion will be addressed if and when pertinent in the context of the project, as most completed projects evaluated did not integrate this issue into the project design.

- (e) institutions and policies. As shown in past evaluations, IFAD-funded projects generally collect very little data on household or community-level impact indicators. Even when impact data are available, both their quality and the methodological rigour of impact assessments are still questionable. For example, although data report significant increases in household assets, these may be due to exogenous factors (e.g. falling prices of certain commodities; a general economic upturn; households receiving remittances), and not to the project.
11. PPAs may help address the “attribution issue” (i.e. establishing to what extent certain results are due to a development intervention rather than to exogenous factors) by:
 - (i) following the logical chain of the project, identifying key hypotheses and reassessing the plausibility chain; and
 - (ii) conducting interviews with non-beneficiaries sharing key characteristics (e.g. socio-economic status, livelihood, farming system), which would give the mission an idea of what would have happened without the project (counterfactual).¹⁹
 12. When sufficient resources are available, simple data collection exercises (mini-surveys) may be conducted by a local consultant prior to the PPA mission.²⁰ Another non-mutually exclusive option is to spot-check typical data ranges or patterns described in the PCR by means of case studies (e.g. do PCR claims regarding increases in average food-secure months fall within the typical ranges recorded in the field?). It is to be noted that, while data collected by a PPA mission may not be representative in a statistical sense, such data often provide useful reference points and insights. It is important to exercise care in selecting sites for interviews in order to avoid blatant cases of non-beneficiaries profiting from the project.). Sites for field visits are selected by IOE in consultation with the government concerned. Government staff may also accompany the PPA mission on these visits.
 13. The typical timing of the PPA (1-2 years after project closure) may be useful for identifying factors that enhance or threaten the sustainability of benefits. By that stage, the project management unit may have been disbanded and some of the support activities (technical, financial, organizational) terminated, unless a second phase is going forward or other funding has become available. Typical factors of sustainability (political support, availability of budgetary resources for maintenance, technical capacity, commitment, ownership by the beneficiaries, environmental resilience) can be better understood at the ex post stage..
 14. The PPA also concentrates on IFAD’s role with regard to the promotion of innovations and scaling up. For example, it might be observed that some innovations are easily scaled up at low cost (e.g. simple but improved cattle-rearing practices that can be disseminated with limited funding). In other cases, scaling up may involve risks: consider the case of a high-yield crop variety for which market demand is static. Broad adoption of the variety may be beneficial in terms of ensuring food security, but may also depress market prices and thereby reduce sale revenues for many households unless there are other, complementary activities for the processing of raw products.
 15. The PPA addresses gender equality and women’s empowerment, a criterion recently introduced into IFAD’s evaluation methodology. This relates to the emphasis placed on gender issues: whether it has been followed up during implementation, including the monitoring of gender-related indicators; and the results achieve.

¹⁹ See also the discussion of attribution issues in the section on PCRVs.

²⁰ If the PPA is conducted in the context of a country programme evaluation, then the PPA can piggy-back on the CPE and dedicate more resources to primary data collection.

16. Information from the PCRV may be often sufficient to assess the performance of partners, namely, IFAD and the government. The PPA mission may provide further insights, such as on IFAD's responsiveness, if relevant, to implementation issues or problems of coordination among the project implementation unit and local and central governments (annex 3, C.8). The PPA does not assess the performance of cooperating institutions, which now has little or no learning value for IFAD.
17. Having completed the analysis, the PPA provides its own ratings in accordance with the evaluation criteria and compares them with PMD's ratings. PPA ratings are final for evaluation reporting purposes. The PPA also rates the quality of the PCR document.

The PPA formulates short conclusions: a storyline of the main findings. Thereafter, a few key recommendations are presented with a view to following up projects, or other interventions with a similar focus or components in different areas of the country.²¹

²¹ Practices differ among MDBs, including recommendations in PPAs. At the World Bank, there are no recommendations but "lessons learned" are presented in a typical PPA. On the other hand, PPAs prepared by AsDB include "issues and lessons" as well as "follow-up actions" although the latter tend to take the form of either generic technical guidelines for a future (hypothetical) intervention in the same sector or for an ongoing follow-up project (at AsDB, PPAs are undertaken at least three years after project closure).

Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition^a</i>
Project performance	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design in achieving its objectives.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
Rural poverty impact^b	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and assets 	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment 	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grassroots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity 	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Natural resources, the environment and climate change 	The focus on natural resources and the environment involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment as well as in mitigating the negative impact of climate change or promoting adaptation measures.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies 	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
Other performance criteria	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustainability 	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Innovation and scaling up 	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender equality and women's empowerment 	The criterion assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
Performance of partners	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. It also assesses the performance of individual partners against their expected role and responsibilities in the project life cycle.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IFAD Government 	

^a These definitions have been taken from the OECD/DAC *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).

^b The IFAD Evaluation Manual also deals with the "lack of intervention", that is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or the mention "not applicable") is assigned.

Liste des personnes clés rencontrées

N°	Nom et prénom	Organisation	Responsabilité
1	Madame Odette Kayitesi	Ministre	Ministère de l'Agriculture et l'Élevage
2	Monsieur Edonias Niyongabo	Directeur Général	Ministère des Finances et de la Planification du Développement Economique
3	Monsieur Joseph Nduwimana	Secrétaire Permanent	Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage
4	Monsieur Dieudonné Nahimana	Directeur Général	ISABU
5	Monsieur Yves Minani	Ex-coordonnateur	Consultant
6	Monsieur Cyprien Banyiyereka	Conseiller	ISABU
7	Madame Yvonne Girukwishaka	Directeur Agronomique	OTB
8	Monsieur Alphonse Nimbona	Cadre	OTB
9	Monsieur Ladislas Kabwa	Cadre	ONG TWITEZIMBERE
10	Monsieur Alexis Ndayizeye	Cadre	ONG PREFED
11	Monsieur Gilbert Hatungumukama	Vice Doyen	Adjoint de la Faculté d'Agronomie, Université du Burundi
12	Monsieur Pierre Claver Seberegé	Ex Coordonnateur	ONG AFRICARE
13	Rurayinga Michel	Commune Bugendana	Alphabétiseur
14	Bazirutwabo Lazzard	Commune Bugendana	Alphabétiseur
15	Ntiyibagiruwayo Emilienne	CDF Gitega	Coordinatrice
16	Nkeshimana Emma	Centre multimédia Gitega	Gérante
17	Sindayigaya Bernard	Giz	Responsable de la Composante Gouvernance locale du projet ADLP
18	Nininahazwe Alexis	Administration provinciale de Gitega	Conseiller Economique et Social
19	Karumbeti Donatien	DPAE Gitega	Responsable du service formation - vulgarisation
20	Nyabenda Daniel	DPAE Gitega	Responsable du service production animale
21	Rivuzimana Agnus	CDF Karusi	Coordinateur
22	Nkuningoma Emmanuel	CDF Karusi	Coordinateur Adjoint
23	Ndayikunda Claudine	CDF Karusi	Animatrice communale de Buhiga
24	Njemurweze Agnès	CDF Karusi	Animatrice communale de Bugenyuzi
25	Bntirampeba Jeanne	Réseau Provincial des Leaders paysannes	Présidente
26	Hakizimana Jean		Bénéficiaire de bovin
27	Kajambere Gustave	DPAE Karusi	Directeur
28	Nimpagaritse Isaac	DPAE Karusi	Responsable du service production végétale

N°	Nom et prénom	Organisation	Responsabilité
29	Gahungu Evariste	DPAE Karusi	Responsable du service administratif et financier
30	Nizigiyimana Philbert	PVV-Bugenyuzi	Président
31	Nahimana Sylvestre	PVV-Bugenyuzi	Membre
32	NizigiyimanaDidace	DPAE Karusi	Vétérinaire communal de Bugenyuzi
33	Nkeshimana Claver	BIA-Bugenyuzi	Président
34	Manirambona Jean Bosco	BIA-Bugenyuzi	Secrétaire
35	NgendakumanaJeudi Saint Pascal	DPAE Karusi	Agronome communal
36	Ntirampeba Clémence	Administration communale de Muhanga	Administratrice
37	Nsengiyumva Rémy	Administration communale de Muhanga	Conseiller chargé du Développement
38	Habimana Ferdinand	Administration communale de Muhanga	Conseiller chargé des affaires sociales et administratives
39	Ngendabanyikwa Vital	Association des pépiniéristes de Muhanga	Président
40	Ngowenubusa Henry	Association des usagers de marais de Nyakagezi/Muhanga	Membre du comité exécutif
41	Kamwenubusa Tite	Ecoleprimaire de Mbogwe	Directeur
42	Sibomana Nestor	Centre d'alphabétisation de Maramvya	Alphabétiseur volontaire
43	Ntamasambiro Netor		Ancien pépiniériste de Mbirizi
44	Ngandakumana François		Ancien pépiniériste de Mbirizi
45	Girukwishaka Fabiola	CDF Kayanza	Animatrice communale de Kayanza
46	Bucumi Marius	DPAE Kayanza	Directeur
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48	Hatungimana Novence	DPAE Kayanza	Responsable du Service Formation - Vulgarisation
49	NdikumanaVianney	Administration provinciale de Gitega	Conseiller principal
50	Ndayikengurukiye Emmanuella		Bénéficiaire de bovin de Gatara
51	Ntezivyayo Firmin		Bénéficiaire de bovin de Gatara
52	Nahimana Siméon	Centre de Santé de Gakenke	Infirmier - Titulaire
53	Nicoyanyimye Thomas		Paysan pilote du Kitchen Garden / commune Bugenyuzi
54	Bwakira Emmanuel	PAIVAB	Chef d'antenne Gitega-Karusi
55	Ndayikengurukiye Jean Pierre	Commune Matongo	Président de la Régie communale de l'eau
56	Nkunguzi Jean Pierre	PAIVAB	Chef d'antenne Kayanza-Ngozi

Liste des participants à la séance de restitution Evaluation de la Performance du PRDMR

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Tableau des performances du programme

(Résultats cumulés au 31 décembre 2010)

Composante	Indicateurs	Unité	Total effectif cumulé Déce mbre 2010	Objectif du RPE	
1. Composante Développement communautaire et participatif					
1.1. Harmonisation des approches d'intervention	Document harmonisé (4 provinces) pour le cahier des charges et de fonctionnement des CDC	nb	1,0	100,0	
	Rapport de diagnostic participatif				
1.2. Planification	Niveau colline	nb	818,0	100,0	
	Outils de planification préparés	nb	5,0	100,0	
	Documents de PDCs actualisés				
	Niveau colline	nb	91,0	100,0	
	Niveau commune	nb	165,0	100,0	
	Niveau province	nb	19,0	32,0	59,4
1.3. Structuration communautaire	Documents de PDCs restitués				
	Niveau colline	nb	71,0	100,0	
	Niveau commune	nb	165,0	231,0	71,4
	Niveau province	nb	21,0	28,0	75,0
	Tables rondes organisées	nb	9,0	10,0	90,0
	CDC organisés/actualisés au niveau provincial	nb	17,0	25,0	68,0
	CDC organisés/actualisés au niveau communal	nb	123,0	189,0	65,1
	CDC organisés/actualisés au niveau zone	nb	297,0	297,0	100,0
	CDC organisés au niveau colline	nb	1 600,0	1 600,0	100,0
	CDC actualisés au niveau colline	nb	72,0	72,0	100,0

Composante	Indicateurs	Unité	Total effectif cumulé Déce mbre 2010	Objectif du RPE	
1.4. Renforcement des capacités	Modules de formation préparés	Nb	13,0	11,0	100,0
	Guide de formation préparé	nb	3,0	2,0	150,0
	Formation des formateurs (partenaires)	h/j	5 157,0	4 655,0	110,8
	Formation des animateurs de proximité	h/j	1 200,0	1 600,0	75,0
	Formation des CDC	h/j	45 584,0	5 506,0	827,9
	Visites/Réunions d'échange organisées au niveau des CDC	nb	5,0	10,0	50,0
	Atelier d'échange et d'harmonisation avec les autres partenaires organisé	nb	49,0	48,0	102,1
	Atelier d'auto évaluation au niveau provinces	nb	10,0	8,0	125,0
	Atelier d'échange et auto évaluation au niveau commune	nb	231,0	231,0	100,0
	Atelier d' évaluation et de recyclage des associations de gestion des infrastructures et AGR	nb	7,0	11,0	63,6
	Atelier d'échange et auto évaluation au niveau zone	hj	and	416,0	
	Rencontres inter groupements organisées	nb	1,0	1,0	100,0
	Journées sportives et socioculturelles organisées	nb	0	15,0	0,0
	Numéros du journal rural produits	nb	11,0	7,0	157,1

2. Composante Appui à la production paysanne					
Composante	Indicateurs	Unité	Cumul Juin 2010	Objectif du RPE	%
2.1. Réhabilitation des capacités de production des familles vulnérables					
Kits pour vulnérables disponibles	Familles vulnérables appuyées	nb	33 099,0	31 980,0	103,5
2.2. Fertilisation des terres agricoles					
Mise à disposition d'engrais et amendements	tonnes d'engrais disponibles en FR	T	1 391,7	1 150,0	121,0
	nb de hangars de stockage construits	nb	21,0	33,0	63,6
	(Qtéengraisstocké/Capacité)	%			
2.3. Relance filière semencière					
Production de semences pré base et souche	Semences de base de tubercules diffusées	t	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Boutures de base de manioc diffusées	nbx10 ³	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Semences Riz	ha	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Boutures de base de patate douce diffusées	nbx10 ⁶	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Semences de base de légumineuses diffusées	t	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Semences de base de céréales diffusées	t	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Semences de pré-base de tubercules produites	t	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Boutures de pré-base de manioc produites	nbx10 ⁶	0,0	0,0	0,0
Boutures de pré-base de patate douce produites	nbx10 ⁶	0,0	0,0	0,0	

2.3. Relance filière semencière						
Production de semences de pré base ISABU	Semences vivrières (pdt, haricot, maïs, blé)	ha	138,5	138,5	100,0	100,0
Production semences souche ISABU	Semences vivrières (pdt, haricot, maïs, soja, blé, arachide etc.)	ha	7,9	7,9	100,0	100,0
	Création boutiques d'intrants	nbre	8,0	8,0	100,0	100,0
	Formations gestionnaires boutiques d'intrants	h/j	93,0	0,0		
	Formations usagers des marais	h/j	1 500,0	dnd		
Production de semences commerciales	Formation multiplicateurs de semences	session	16,0	16,0	100,0	100,0
	Multiplicateurs de semence soutenus et actifs	nb	200,0	128,0	156,3	156,3
	Formation des inspecteurs phytosanitaires	h/j	126,0	250,0	50,4	50,4
	Formation des agronomes communaux	h/j	246,0	1 600,0	15,4	15,4
2.4. Relance des cultures de rente						
Infrastructures caféicoles construites / réhabilitées	CDM réhabilité	nb	0,0	133,0	0,0	0,0
	STL construite	nb	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
	Hangars construits	nb	0,0	26,0	0,0	0,0
	Quantité de ceriseraillées	t				
Infrastructures théicoles construites	Hangars de collecte de feuilles construits	nb	7,0	30,0	23,3	23,3
	Centres de dressage construits/réhabilités	nb	2,0	2,0	100,0	100,0
Infrastructures cotonnières construites	Centre d'encadrement construit à Cibitoke (maison d'hab.)	nb	1,0	1,0	100,0	100,0
	Magasins de stockage construits	nb	1,0	1,0	100,0	100,0
	Hangars pour intrants construits	nb	0,0	4,0	0,0	0,0

2.4. Relance des cultures de rente						
Plants de caféiers produits	Plants de caféiers vigoureux produits des pépinières	x 10 ⁶	4,2	4,2	100,0	
Plants de théiers produits	Plants de théiers vigoureux produits des pépinières	x 10 ⁶	3,0	2,1	142,9	
Périmètre rizicole réhabilité	Longueur réhabilitée du périmètre rizicole	km	195,0	195,0	100,0	
Maîtrise de l'impact de la riziculture sur environnement	Etude conduite sur l'impact de la riziculture sur environnement	nb	1,0	1,0	100,0	
Distribut* de semences de riz	Qtésemences distribuées	t	18,0	18,0	100,0	
Constitution du FR engrais	Engrais achetés au titre de fonds de roulement pour l'OTB	t	299,0	300,0	99,7	
	Engrais achetés au titre de fonds de roulement pour la COGERCO	t	200,0	200,0	100,0	
	Engrais achetés à titre de fonds de roulement pour la SRDI	t	249,0	250,0	99,6	
Maîtrise des maladies du cotonnier	Produits phytosanitaires achetés pour le cotonnier	l	8 000,0	8 000,0	100,0	
Paires de boeufsdressés	Nbre de paires de boeufs dressé	nb	57,0	65,0	87,7	
2.5. Appui à la recherche -développement						
Ateliers de recherche fonctionnels	Ateliers de recherche installés	nb	2,0	2,0	100,0	
	Formations organisées pour chercheurs ISABU	sess*	2,0	14,0	14,3	
	Mise à disposit* de vaches	nb	40,0	40,0	100,0	
	Mise à disposit* de chèvres	nb	0,0	Non prévu		
	Formations organisées pour les artisans	sess.*	1,0	Non prévu		
	Formations organisées pour les techniciens du CNTA	Stages	1,0	3,0	33,3	

2.6. Repeuplement du cheptel								
(Ré) introduction de l'élevage dans les exploitations	Superficie de cultures fourragères mise en place	ha	155,0	160,0	96,9			
	Centres de transit réhabilités	nb	0,0	4,0	0,0			
	Vaches-mères/génisses acquises par achat et distribuées	nb	1 272,0	1 320,0	96,4			
	Chèvres acquises par achat et distribuées	nb	4 167,0	41 67,0	100,0			
	Truies distribuées	nb	145,0	214	68			
	Taureillons/Géniteurs acquis par achat et distribués	nb	109,0	384,0	28,4			
	Boucs distribués		77,0	0,0	-			
	Verrats distribués		7,0	0,0	-			
	Doses d'I Afournies	nb	4 000,0	12 000,0	33,3			
	Ménages ayant bénéficié d'un animal	nb	2 236,0	Non précisé				
	Pharmacies vétérinaires villageoises	nb	23,0	non prévu	-			
	Formation des formateurs	h/j	129,0	1 000,0	12,9			
	Formation des médecins vétérinaires	sess*	1,0	1,0	100,0			
	Formation des techniciens vétérinaires	h/j	193,0	193,0	100,0			
Formation des agriéleveurs	h/j	2 091,0	2 091,0	100,0				
Formation des apiculteurs	h/j	197,0						

2.7. Renforcement des structures agricoles publiques						
Services de vulgarisation revitalisés	Construction bureau à Karusi	m ²	294,0	150,0	196	
	Construction de maison d'habitation à Karusi	m ²	155,0	120,0	129,2	
	Formation de cadres	sess*	2,0	6,0		
		h/j	210,0	210,0	100,0	
	Formation des techniciens / vulgarisateurs	h/j	168,0	13 320,0		
	Formation des agriéleveurs	h/j	561,0	9 600,0	5,8	
3. Composante Aménagement du territoire et protection de l'environnement						
	<i>Indicateurs</i>	<i>Unité</i>	<i>Cumuljuin 2010</i>	<i>RPE</i>		<i>%</i>
3.1. Aménagement des marais	Superficie des marais avec étude	ha	1 559,5	2 000,0	78,0	
	Superficie des marais aménagés	ha	1 978,0	2 000,0	98,9	
	Formation des techniciens	h/j	325,0	225,0	144,4	
3.2. Protection de l'environnement	Plantation herbesfixatrices	km	6 892,8	6 000,0	114,9	
	Plantation plants forestiers et agro forestiers	(x10 ³)	24 408,4	12 000,0	203,4	
	Plantation plants fruitiers	(x10 ³)	200,0	200,0	100,0	
	Terrasses radicales expérimentales	ha	55,4	64,0	86,5	
	Terrasses radicales dans les exploitations	ha	3,6	480,0	0,7	

4. Composante infrastructures socio-économiques ^A						
Indicateurs	Unité	Cumul/Juin 2010	Objectif du RPE	%		
Adduction d'eau potable	Longueur de réseau d'adduction d'eau réhabilitée	km	0,0	530,0	0,0	
	Longueur de réseau d'adduction d'eau construite	km	155,0	155,0	100,0	
Ecoles primaires	Ecoles primaires réhabilitées	Nbre	0,0	55,0	0,0	
	Ecoles primaires construites	Nbre	34,0	34,0	100,0	
	Blocs latrines construits	nb	108,0	108,0	100,0	
	Ecoles équipées en mobilier	nb	78,0	34,0	229,4	
Centres de santé	Centres de santé réhabilités	nb	0	17	0,0	
	Centres de santé construits	nb	4,0	4,0	100,0	
	Centres de santé équipés	nb	4,0	4,0	100,0	
5. Composante Initiatives locales						
Alphabétisation, formation, infrastructures et activités génératrices de revenus, infrastructures construites ou réhabilitées	Nouveaux alphabétiseurs recrutés et formés	nb	880,0	379,0	232,2	
	Alphabétiseurs recyclés	nb	513,0	379,0	135,4	
	Alphabétisants inscrits	nb	62 485,0	43 000,0	145,3	

^A Les réhabilitations d'infrastructures ont été abandonnées au profit de nouvelles constructions essentiellement à cause du décaissement tardif des fonds du prêt OFID. Une nouvelle planification a dû être faite.

Annex 9

5. Composante Initiatives locales

Alphabétisés	nb	50 437,0	38 700,0	130,3
Certifiés	nb	39 889,0	34 400,0	116,0
Leaders paysannes recrutées	nb	977,0	759,0	128,7
Leaders paysannes formées	nb	1 402,0	759,0	184,7
Nouveaux bureaux CDFs construits	nb	4,0	4,0	100,0
Nouveaux bureaux CDFs démarrés	nb	4,0	4,0	100,0
Bureaux CDFs fonctionnels	nb	4,0	4,0	100,0
Degré de réhabilitation du Centre Multifonctionnel de Gitega	%	100,0	100,0	100,0
Nouveaux bureaux d'antennes animatrices démarrés	nb	31,0	16,0	193,8
Nouveaux bureaux d'antennes animatrices construites	nb	30,0	16,0	187,5
Bureaux d'antennes animatrices fonctionnels	nb	30,0	16,0	187,5
Bureaux d'antenne animatrice réhabilités	nb	4,0	0,0	-
Four tunnel réhabilité	nb	0,0	0,0	-
Nouvelles animatrices recrutées	nb	33,0	16,0	206,3
Nouvelles cases d'alphabétisation démarrées	nb	102,0	95,0	107,4
Nouvelles cases d'alphabétisation construites	nb	95,0	95,0	100,0
Cases d'alphabétisation fonctionnelles	nb	95,0	95,0	100,0
Nouveaux centres de lecture fonctionnels	nb	267,0	267,0	100,0
Nouveaux centres d'alphabétisation	nb	294,0	294,0	100,0

5. Composante Initiatives locales (suite)							
Groupements appuyés	nb	1 169,0	500,0	233,8			
Nbre de réunions des groupements	nb	2 302,0	1200,0	191,8			
Nouveaux thèmes développés dans les séances IEC	nb	13,0	7,0	185,7			
Participation aux séances IEC	nb	114 512,0	10 000,0	1145,1			
Rencontres IEC organisées	nb	3 788,0	3 038,0	124,7			
Formation des equps administratives	h/j	332,0	332,0	100,0			
Formation des animatricescommunales	h/j	422,0	422,0	100,0			
Formation des alphabétiseurs	h/j	3 160,0	3 160,0	100,0			
Formation des leaders paysannes	h/j	1 214,0	1 214,0	100,0			
Projets communautariétés	nb	19,0	19,0	100,0			
Sources aménagées	nb	200,0	300,0	66,7			
Fours à tuilesconstruites	nb	2,0	8,0	25,0			
Atelier de menuiserie mis en place	nb	5,0	4,0	125			
Atelier de couture mis en place	nb	9,0	11,0	82			
Atelier de vannerie mis en place	nb	3,0	11,0	27			
Atelier mécanique mis en place	nb	2,0	4,0	50			
Atelier de petit outillage agricole mis en place	nb	0,0	4,0	0			
Moulins mis en place	nb	3,0	8,0	37,5			

5. Composante Initiatives locales (suite)						
		nb				
	Presses à huile		0,0	22,0	0	
	Pharmacies vétérinaires	nb	16,0	8,0	200,0	
	Kiosques de vente construits	nb	4,0	16,0	25,0	
	Projets communaux achevés	nb	6,0	0,0	-	
	Projets communautaires achevés	nb	29,0	0,0	-	

Leçons tirées

NB : Cette note a été élaborée dans le but de contribuer à l'amélioration de la conception des futurs projets et de leur mise en œuvre. C'est pourquoi, elle insiste beaucoup plus sur les insuffisances constatées tout au long de la période qui a suivi le démarrage du Projet et qui ont été progressivement redressées sur la base de l'expérience acquise et du contexte du moment que sur les succès. Les cas de succès du projet notamment dans les domaines du développement communautaire, du repeuplement du cheptel bovin, de l'aménagement des marais et de l'intensification de la riziculture, de la protection de l'environnement par le reboisement, des infrastructures socio-économiques comme les écoles primaires, les adductions d'eau potable et les centres de santé, de l'alphabétisation et des leaders paysannes sont nombreux et ont été développés dans les différentes études thématiques et rapports de supervision et d'évaluation. La présente note ne s'est pas appesantie sur ces cas qui du reste sont connus.

1. Composante Développement Communautaire et Participatif

A/ MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA COMPOSANTE

1) Rôle spécifique de(s) ONG(s) dans le processus

- La première année, le volume des résultats à atteindre par rapport au temps imparti (mise en place des CDC et des PDC en moins d'une année) a été sous-estimé. Il est par conséquent indispensable de mettre en place les ONG dès le démarrage du Projet et de planifier les activités en conséquence.
- La mise en place des ONG à temps permettrait aux interventions des autres composantes techniques de se mettre en harmonie avec l'approche du développement communautaire et participatif qui est une composante transversale à toutes les autres composantes. Il serait très difficile de redresser la situation au cas où certaines activités des composantes techniques seraient mises en œuvre avant le démarrage de cette approche. Les ONG doivent disposer de suffisamment de temps pour mettre en place une organisation optimale des activités et d'intégrer les activités du programme/FIDA dans leur propre planification.
- Les ONG provinciales (ONG p) recrutées appliquaient l'approche participative avant de travailler avec le PRDMR, mais avec des spécificités internes qu'il fallait harmoniser. D'où un besoin d'harmonisation des approches au sein même des ONG avant de chercher l'harmonisation avec les autres composantes et intervenants (séances d'harmonisation, de programmation commune, de capitalisation des expériences et d'accompagnement). Ceci justifiait encore une fois la nécessité d'une ONG centrale dont le rôle a été efficacement joué par ACORD.
- Les ONG ont développé un partenariat caractérisé par un bon climat de travail et de soutien mutuel, ce qui a facilité l'harmonisation des interventions. Ce modèle de concertation, d'harmonisation est à consolider et à valoriser car il a constitué un noyau solide sur lequel on peut bâtir un réseau d'acteurs fort, capable d'influencer la prise d'importantes décisions par le Gouvernement dans le domaine du développement communautaire et participatif.
- Le processus communautaire et participatif a constitué pour ACORD et le PRDMR (et pour les autres partenaires) un bon exercice d'apprentissage. Il a été constamment documenté, amélioré, harmonisé, actualisé et partagé avec les autres acteurs.

2) Une approche qui exige beaucoup de temps et une concertation permanente entre partenaires

L'approche participative et la planification ascendante constituent une rupture par rapport aux approches dirigistes jusqu'alors appliquées par les administratifs et les services techniques du Burundi. Elles supposent, pour les acteurs externes à la communauté, une cession d'une partie du pouvoir et l'acceptation d'un audit par les communautés. Comme tout changement de pratiques, d'attitudes et de comportements il faut un long processus

d'apprentissage mutuel pour amener ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir à en céder une partie aux communautés et à ces dernières d'exercer ce pouvoir leur cédé de façon responsable. C'est ainsi que malgré les nombreuses formations et les ateliers et réunions d'échange, il persiste encore quelques écarts et quelques conflits entre acteurs. On parvient à ancrer le processus en mettant le paquet dans les formations et les ateliers/réunions de concertation spécialement au démarrage de l'approche ; sans quoi il y aurait des risques de repli sur les anciennes approches. Une attention particulière doit être portée sur le renforcement des capacités et le suivi de nouveaux acteurs qui entrent dans le système pour la première fois.

La composante Développement Communautaire et Participatif a été mise en œuvre dans un contexte particulier qui lui a permis de tirer cette leçon. En effet, le long conflit politique qu'a connu le Burundi et les accords de paix et de cessez-le-feu qui ont été plus tard signés ont conduit à de nombreux changements au niveau administratif et technique et il fallait chaque fois reprendre l'apprentissage pour que les nouvelles autorités s'approprient de l'approche.

Par ailleurs, avec l'arrêt des activités de OXFAM GB, qui a fermé ses portes en date du 31/12/2003, une des ONG provinciales de la composante a entraîné une interruption des activités en province de Gitega pendant 5 mois. Pendant cette période, le processus a régressé et CARE a dû redoubler d'efforts pour remettre le processus sur les rails.

3) L'unité de planification/budgétisation est la colline

L'ancrage du processus de développement communautaire et participatif repose sur l'adhésion des communautés de base. Pour cela, il s'est avéré que l'unité de planification la plus proche des communautés est la colline. C'est ainsi que le PRDMR a introduit la planification et budgétisation au niveau de la colline dans une zone pilote par province. L'exécution des activités figurant dans les Plans de Développement Communautaire collinaires rencontre une participation plus forte des communautés. Il importe cependant de noter que le suivi des interventions par les services techniques est difficile. Pour cette raison, un accent doit être mis sur la formation des animateurs communautaires et des relais collinaires. L'approche « zone pilote » a influencé le choix de l'approche de « concentration » des activités sur des communes et collines pilotes adoptée actuellement par le PAIVA-B, le PRODEFI et le PTRPC depuis la revue à mi-parcours de 2010.

4) L'approche participative et communautaire qui s'étend de plus en plus aux autres projets

Les grands projets initiés ces dernières années par le FIDA ou d'autres partenaires techniques et financiers du Burundi se sont beaucoup inspirés de l'approche du PRDMR dans leurs interventions. La mise en œuvre du Cadre Stratégique de Croissance et de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (CSLP) s'est basée également sur la structuration communautaire et le PRDMR à, travers ACORD y a fortement contribué. Le Gouvernement s'est même déjà prononcé en faveur de l'approche et les nouveaux projets financés dans le cadre bilatéral ou multilatéral l'adoptent de façon spontanée.

L'implication des structures communautaires dans le ciblage des groupes vulnérables s'est avérée très transparente, plus juste et plus équitable. Elle a permis à certains intervenants d'avoir plus confiance dans l'approche.

5) La planification ascendante, une voie stratégique impliquant les groupes marginalisés

L'approche participative et inclusive a facilité la participation des groupes marginalisés dans les actions de développement et le rapprochement des différentes catégories sociales qui ne pouvaient se parler que difficilement suite aux séquelles de la guerre fratricide. Les CDC dont les membres proviennent des différentes catégories sociales ont beaucoup contribué à l'intégration sociale et à la réconciliation. Les femmes participent au même titre que les hommes dans les actions de développement communautaire hier uniquement dévolues aux hommes.

6) Rôle capital des autorités administratives au plus haut niveau dans l'harmonisation des approches d'intervention et la viabilité des structures

Les différentes observations ainsi que les évaluations de la composante Développement Communautaire et Participatif ont souligné une variabilité au niveau de l'engagement de l'autorité provinciale (le Gouverneur) et son impact sur le fonctionnement du système.

En effet, dans les provinces où le Gouverneur de province s'est engagé en faveur de l'approche, tous les intervenants passent obligatoirement par les structures communautaires et exécutent les activités définies dans les Plans Communaux de Développement Communautaire (PCDC). L'harmonisation des approches a été ainsi facilement atteinte et la mobilisation des financements pour les projets issus des PCDC est prioritaire. Si actuellement le taux d'exécution des activités des PCDC reste faible même dans les provinces, c'est parce que l'environnement de crise sociopolitique dans lequel a travaillé le PRDMR était caractérisé par une économie du pays mise à mal par plus d'une décennie de guerre et le gel de la coopération.

Sur terrain, l'engagement se manifeste par l'absence de conflits entre CDC et services administratifs et techniques et entre intervenants eux-mêmes. C'est aussi de l'engagement du Gouverneur dont dépend la fonctionnalité du Comité Provincial de Développement (CPD), structure clé dans la pérennisation de l'approche.

Il est donc indispensable d'obtenir l'implication de l'autorité provinciale pour la mise en œuvre harmonieuse de l'approche.

7) Forces et faiblesses du processus de développement communautaire et participatif

a) Les forces

Il convient de citer quelques forces liées au processus à savoir :

- Conduite d'un processus ascendant d'analyse diagnostic et de planification, qui tranche avec les approches TOP Down qui étaient en vogue. Ce fut un tournant dans l'histoire des interventions au niveau communautaire au Burundi.
- Processus inclusif qui a intégré tous les acteurs (ONGs, Administration, services techniques, confessions religieuses, parlementaires, communautés de base ...).
- Méthodologie et approche qui permettent une meilleure adhésion et internalisation au/du processus ainsi qu'un renforcement des capacités /responsabilisation des communautés.
- Un processus qui permet une meilleure construction des relations de partenariat avec les communautés et les autres acteurs.
- Un processus qui constitue un cadre d'expression pour la communauté, d'information pour les autorités, de négociation et de rapprochement entre les différents acteurs et les communautés.
- L'approche globale utilisée a permis d'appréhender beaucoup de problèmes de la vie communautaire. Ne pouvant pas prétendre apporter des solutions à tous ces problèmes, le PRDMR a dû organiser, en collaboration avec les Provinces, des tables rondes au niveau des provinces pour valoriser les Plans de Développement Communautaire et mobiliser des financements pour les projets non pris en charge par le programme. Cependant le PRDMR tire de ces plans des projets (en rapport avec son expertise et ses moyens) qui constituent un contrat entre le gouvernement et les communautés.

b) Les faiblesses et/ou contraintes

- On a assisté à des changements fréquents des partenaires (administratifs, techniques et politiques).
- L'insécurité a ralenti le rythme d'exécution des activités de la composante et du programme en général.
- On a connu une faible réalisation ou un faible financement des PCDC à cause de la période de crise qui fait que les priorités des partenaires soient surtout orientées vers les activités d'urgence ou humanitaires. Le retard dans la

mobilisation des fonds de l'OPEP n'a pas permis aux communautés rurales de disposer d'un temps suffisant d'appropriation des infrastructures construites.

-Le PRDMR est complexe et multisectoriel avec une approche du développement communautaire et participatif, longue et parfois difficile à mettre en œuvre surtout lorsqu'elle fait appel à un changement de mentalité et de comportement de tous les acteurs.

-Long processus de légalité des CDC ; la légalisation des CDC par une ordonnance du Ministre de l'Intérieur n'est intervenue que le 31 décembre 2007 alors que les activités du PRDMR avaient démarré en janvier 2000.

-Coexistence dans la zone d'intervention du PRDMR de plusieurs approches et comités sectoriels divers.

-Besoin permanent d'harmonisation et de coordination des interventions.

-Difficultés d'évaluer régulièrement l'état de mise en œuvre des PCDC (état des lieux des activités réalisées) car les intervenants ne lui donnaient pas des rapports d'activités.

8) Changement de mentalité de l'administration, collaboration des partenaires

Dans un premier temps, les administrateurs communaux et la majorité des cadres des services techniques n'étaient pas convaincus de la pertinence de l'approche mais, à travers la formation et l'exercice de planification ascendante, ils ont vite compris que cette approche est un outil pratique qui facilite leur travail. Ils ont constaté que finalement leurs actions sont plus efficaces et leurs relations avec les communautés plus aisées. Les populations sont plus engagées au suivi des projets qui résultent de la planification participative et à contribuer par un apport en main d'œuvre et en matériel de construction. Ces populations contribuent également à la maintenance des infrastructures.

9) Une série d'initiatives en faveur du renforcement des capacités des CDC

Les comités de développement communautaires ont été renforcés par les formations et les ateliers/réunions, par leur intégration dans les comités communaux et provinciaux existants, leur légitimation, avant leur légalisation, par les décisions des gouverneurs de provinces mettant sur pied ces comités intégrés, les visites d'échanges organisées à leur intention, la mise en place des secrétaires exécutifs des comités provinciaux pour faciliter leur fonctionnement, le journal rural en langue nationale (Kirundi) qui leur permet d'échange des informations en provenance des différentes provinces et communes, les animateurs de zone, l'alphabétisation, etc.

10) Plaidoyer pour la légalisation des CDC

L'implication des CDC dans les actions du programme suppose leur participation à toutes les étapes du programme y compris la gestion (processus de décentralisation). Il y a par conséquent un besoin de plaidoyer pour la poursuite de la légalisation des CDC en vue de pouvoir plus tard leur confier la gestion financière des activités. Il conviendrait à cet effet d'inclure dans la loi communale le contenu amélioré de l'ordonnance ministérielle du 31 décembre 2007 portant création, composition et fonctionnement des comités de développement communautaire.

11) Planification sur une zone pilote

Le fait de planifier les actions au niveau collinaire et de se focaliser sur une zone pilote est une bonne expérience qui évite de disperser les actions (problème de visibilité des actions du programme et de créer des attentes non satisfaites avec risque de démotivation communautaire).

12) Cohérence entre les éléments du processus de structuration/planification

Les différentes phases du processus de développement communautaire (l'établissement de la situation de référence, le diagnostic participatif, la planification, la structuration, le renforcement des capacités, l'harmonisation des

approches, l'accompagnement dans la réalisation des PCDC) sont autant d'éléments qui constituent un tout indivisible pour bien réussir la mission de la composante développement communautaire et participatif.

13) Influence des facteurs internes et externes

En plus des problèmes internes à la communauté, d'autres phénomènes externes et d'ordre systémique liés à la gouvernance et au conflit ont été identifiés. C'est par exemple, l'initiative des administrations provinciale et communale d'actualiser la composition des membres des CDC à différents niveaux sur base de la loi communale de 2005. Il a fallu en débattre et enclencher des actions de plaidoyer afin d'influencer certaines attitudes et pratiques en faveur des transformations positives.

14) Attentes des vulnérables générées par le processus de planification

On a observé des attentes exprimées par la population et générées par le processus de planification participatif et l'établissement de la liste des ménages vulnérables. A ce sujet, le programme devait veiller à ce que des réponses adéquates leur soient apportées à travers un plaidoyer régulier auprès d'autres intervenants.

15) Mise à jour régulière des situations (PDC, CDC, listes des vulnérables, etc.)

Durant l'exécution du programme, il est apparu la nécessité de mettre à jour chaque année les PCDC et de les actualiser progressivement. Le même exercice de mise à jour a été fait pour les CDC et les listes des vulnérables devant bénéficier des appuis du PRDMR ou d'autres intervenants.

16) Capacités et stratégies d'adaptation des ONG

Les 4 ONG provinciales ont fait preuve d'une grande capacité d'adaptation par rapport aux contraintes rencontrées comme les conflits de tout genre, l'insécurité dans les zones d'intervention, la résistance de certains partenaires de terrain par rapport à l'approche, la multitude d'approches de développement, les différentes structures communautaires sectorielles, le changement des responsables administratifs et techniques, etc.

17) Des solutions plus pratiques que stratégiques aux problèmes rencontrés

Les problèmes de la communauté sont presque identiques dans les 4 provinces, la différence résidant seulement au niveau de leur priorisation. Mais l'analyse des problèmes identifiés reste lacunaire car les solutions proposées sont plus pratiques que stratégiques. Il a fallu les approfondir par des recherches thématiques même si un travail important reste encore dans ce domaine.

18) Nécessité d'une véritable coordination des interventions

Il existe plusieurs structures et intervenants dans la communauté et dont la plupart commencent ont adopté la démarche ascendante. Il est par conséquent nécessaire de créer une structure de coordination des interventions en matière de développement communautaire, les CDC jouant leur rôle dans ce domaine. Cela serait d'autant plus facile que le Gouvernement a déjà décidé de généraliser la démarche de développement communautaire impulsée par le PRDMR.

19) Des données nouvelles à valoriser

Le travail de la composante sur terrain a déjà rendu disponible un capital important d'informations et de base de données qu'il faut approfondir et valoriser.

20) Lacune inévitable au niveau de la formulation des activités de micro projet

S'agissant de la formulation des activités de microprojet, la composante n'avait pas encore réalisé l'étude sur la micro finance dont les résultats auraient permis la mobilisation des fonds pour le financement des PCDC.

B/ PERSPECTIVES D'AVENIR

La réflexion sur l'avenir des acquis du programme a permis d'imaginer quelques perspectives d'avenir pour renforcer les CDC et valoriser les PCDC à savoir :

- La poursuite du renforcement du système de planification et structuration communautaire.
- Les services étatiques habilités devraient mettre en place des mécanismes susceptibles de renforcer le système de collaboration entre les différents acteurs du développement.
- Il serait profitable pour la nation entière que le Gouvernement en collaboration avec les partenaires de développement prennent les mesures et les stratégies nécessaires pouvant favoriser la consolidation de l'approche participative par rapport aux nouveaux acteurs présents ou à venir et cela dans toutes les provinces du pays.
- Les services concernés devraient continuer la poursuite du processus de légalisation des CDC notamment en plaidant pour l'intégration du contenu de l'ordonnance ministérielle du 31 décembre 2007 portant création, composition et fonctionnement des comités de développement communautaire.
- Plusieurs projets contenus dans les PCDC n'ont pas pu être réalisés pour des raisons diverses. Pour ne pas décevoir les attentes des populations nécessiteuses et les CDC qui se sont beaucoup investis durant la phase de planification, il est souhaitable de poursuivre le plaidoyer en faveur de la mobilisation des ressources en vue du financement des activités du PCDC non réalisées en organisant des tables rondes à cet effet.
- Il s'avère nécessaire d'assurer la poursuite des formations des nouvelles autorités administratives, politiques et techniques ainsi que des nouveaux membres des CDC à l'approche participative et communautaire, surtout après la mise en place de nouvelles structures issues des élections.
- Un programme qui envisage le changement de mentalité et de comportement et un transfert de capacités exige beaucoup de temps. C'est pourquoi un programme du genre qui réussit devrait se poursuivre sur une longue période pour renforcer les acquis du programme.

CONCLUSIONS ET RECOMMANDATIONS

Malgré la nouveauté de l'approche et dans un contexte conflictuel persistant, les ONG ont pu obtenir les principaux résultats attendus et démontrer leurs capacités d'adaptation opérationnelle. Leur expérience et leur sensibilité aux approches participatives ont été valorisées de manière opportune et leur ont permis d'accéder facilement aux communautés.

Les ONG ont servi d'interfaces entre les CDC et les structures administratives et techniques et ont veillé au respect de l'approche. Leur rôle principal a été de renforcer le système de planification et de structuration et de consolider l'approche en vue de la pérennisation des structures et des actions du programme.

La composante développement communautaire et participatif du PRDMR a accompli son agenda en ce qui concerne la mise en place des structures communautaires et l'appui à l'élaboration et à la mise en œuvre des PCDC. Cependant le système mis en place n'est pas encore totalement ancré dans les pratiques de tous les partenaires. Certaines actions sont donc encore indispensables pour que les mécanismes mis en place s'enracinent définitivement dans la société en général et dans l'espace politique local et national.

Même si les structures de planification participative sont en place, l'exécution et le suivi des PCDC ne sont pas encore tout à fait maîtrisés. Ainsi, dans les provinces, certains intervenants et services techniques pensent que les communautés paysannes n'ont pas encore les connaissances requises pour assurer le suivi de certaines activités. Cette opinion cache une certaine volonté de contourner les mécanismes communautaires de contrôle, souvent jugés trop longs, pour

emprunter les raccourcis préjudiciables à l'approche. Par rapport à ce constat, on recommande deux actions importantes :

Il y a donc encore un besoin, pour les communautés et les cadres administratifs et techniques, de formations spécifiques et d'accompagnement continu surtout par rapport au suivi de l'exécution des projets.

Une fois un système harmonisé de suivi et évaluation mis en place, il y a aussi un besoin d'enregistrer en permanence les informations nécessaires et de les analyser, pour bien capter le progrès qui est fait et pour développer des thèmes de discussion.

Au-delà du renforcement des activités et des impacts de la composante, les besoins ci-après ont été identifiés:

Il est nécessaire d'enraciner l'approche dans les provinces et communes.

L'enracinement plus large dans le pays et dans l'espace politique au niveau national implique l'harmonisation de l'approche participative avec les acteurs dans le domaine du développement communautaire dans les autres provinces, les autres projets d'investissement social et les acteurs de la société civile.

Il s'agit en même temps de contribuer à la croissance d'un environnement politique où l'approche participative peut être enrichie et validée par son intégration à d'autres thèmes d'importance nationale comme l'égalité de genre, les droits humains, la décentralisation, et les mécanismes de règlement pacifique des conflits.

Il s'agit aussi d'examiner différentes options pour la restructuration de l'économie du pays pour qu'elle puisse permettre aux populations rurales d'avoir une certaine marge de manœuvre pour valoriser les initiatives productrices.

Le constat fait sur terrain est que l'information passe bien de bas en haut, c'est-à-dire de la colline à la province, mais que dans l'autre sens il y a une certaine rétention de l'information à un certain niveau. Cela provoque parfois des malentendus qui peuvent fragiliser le système. Un accompagnement des acteurs pour une meilleure compréhension de l'approche qui exige un respect mutuel entre partenaires s'avère par conséquent nécessaire.

Il y a eu beaucoup de séances de restitution, mais les CDC ne restituent pas toujours à leur tour les informations aux communautés qu'ils sont censés représenter.

Le PRDMR, à travers sa composante Développement Communautaire et Participatif, a rendu un grand service à la nation en éduquant les populations à concevoir et à planifier leurs propres projets, à les exécuter et à s'en approprier les résultats. Des efforts restent à consentir mais, un tremplin solide a été mis en place et cette initiative du PRDMR a été généralisée dans tout le pays.

2. Composante Appui à la Production Paysanne.

2.1 Appui aux ménages vulnérables

Même si les appuis apportés aux ménages vulnérables par le PRDMR ont été appréciés, on doit néanmoins regretter qu'ils ont visé un nombre limité de vulnérables (40 ménages par colline soit 32.440 ménages au total) si on se réfère au nombre combien élevé de vulnérables à l'échelle de toutes les collines.

Et s'il est vrai que la conjoncture socio-économique a évolué très positivement dans l'entre-temps, on doit reconnaître qu'il reste encore une grande population de vulnérables qu'il importe d'assister. Ainsi, les consultations faites ont révélé que si des interventions similaires étaient en vue, des balises devraient être prises en vue de faire face aux difficultés rencontrées lors de la mise en œuvre du volet et de capitaliser les leçons tirées. Parmi ces principales difficultés rencontrées, on citera notamment :

a) Difficulté de servir tous les vulnérables recensés au niveau de toutes les collines et différence d'approche d'intervention avec d'autres intervenants en la matière.

Cette situation a failli générer des tensions dans la mesure où même si l'intervention avait été suffisamment annoncée (bénéficiaires et éléments du kit définis), ceux qui n'étaient pas servis croyaient à tort ou à raison à une certaine injustice.

b) Pendant que d'autres intervenants s'adressaient aux plus vulnérables avec des kits d'urgence (couvertures, ustensiles de cuisine, tôles, farine composée pour la bouillie etc...), le PRDMMR visait ceux qui potentiellement pouvaient recouvrer rapidement leur capacité de production agricole. Cette différence d'objectifs, d'approche et partant de kits distribués a suscité beaucoup d'envie, les bénéficiaires du PRDMMR souhaitant également avoir des kits d'urgence répondant aux besoins les plus immédiats.

c) Certains kits ont été particulièrement appréciés. C'est le cas de la carte d'assurance maladie, de la houe et de la chèvre. Il a été néanmoins remarqué que l'usage de la carte d'assurance maladie a été vite limité par la suspension de leur usage au niveau des différents centres de santé. La chèvre a été également très bien perçue au niveau de la communauté.

d) La responsabilisation et l'implication des représentants de la communauté dans toutes les étapes de l'opération ont constitué une expérience concluante qui a permis de limiter les cas de tricherie tant au niveau du ciblage des bénéficiaires que de la distribution des kits.

2.2 Appui à la filière semencière

- L'appui aux associations de multiplicateurs de semences a abouti à des résultats peu encourageants tant au niveau de la production que du remboursement des intrants que le PRDMR leur a avancés. En tout état de cause, les expériences accumulées et les leçons tirées varient d'une province à une autre. Dans l'ensemble cependant, les échecs enregistrés dans la production sont principalement imputables à : des conditions climatiques défavorables, le coût prohibitif des intrants, les faiblesses de l'encadrement et le caractère opportuniste des groupements multiplicateurs de semences. En effet, ces derniers ont été créés dans le but de réconcilier les communautés en les organisant autour des activités de production. D'autres ont été créés fortuitement pour accéder au financement des multiples intervenants d'urgence. Enfin, la différence d'approches d'intervention a démobilisé les producteurs de semences. En effet, on a observé que les groupements appuyés par le PRDMR voyaient que d'autres donateurs des opérations d'urgence distribuaient gratuitement les semences et les intrants.
- Le remboursement des intrants en espèces n'a pas été couronné de succès et a été progressivement remplacé par le remboursement en nature des semences et par leur diffusion latérale au niveau des multiplicateurs de semences.
- La multiplication des semences doit tenir compte des conditions édapho-climatiques et ne pas uniquement se baser sur les demandes des groupements multiplicateurs de semences.
- Les multiplicateurs individuels présentent des avantages indéniables par rapport aux groupements. Ils exploitent leur propre terre et souvent sur des superficies dépassant le seuil de rentabilité, le sens de la propriété de l'ensemble de récolte constitue une motivation qui pousse les agriculteurs à mieux s'investir en terme de travaux d'entretien de la culture, les agriculteurs s'engagent individuellement à rembourser les avances reçues et peuvent facilement offrir des garanties sous forme des propriétés foncières, une culture pérenne (bananeraie, caféiers, parcelles boisées, etc.), le suivi des recouvrements est relativement plus facile par rapport aux groupements, etc. Il est même plus facile de viser un certain niveau de capacités techniques/intellectuelles et financières de l'agriculteur individuel et de professionnaliser les bénéficiaires dans le domaine de la multiplication des semences.
- La réussite de l'opération d'appui à la filière semencière qui n'est pas encore bien organisée au niveau national devrait être plutôt envisagée dans l'appropriation et la diffusion latérale et à grande échelle de la bonne semence ; ce qui a été le cas pour certaines cultures comme la pomme de terre, le manioc et le riz.

2.3 Promotion de la fertilisation des terres

- Essentiellement à cause des procédures des Marchés Publics et de la spéculation de certains soumissionnaires, la constitution du fonds de roulement engrais a pris du retard.
- Les mécanismes prévus pour la bonne gestion du fonds de roulement engrais ont connu des réaménagements de nature à assurer sa pérennité : la cogestion du compte FR engrais par le Coordonnateur du PRDMR aux côtés du Directeur de la Fertilisation et de la Protection des sols et du Directeur Général de l'Agriculture afin d'éviter que les fonds soient utilisés à d'autres fins que celles initialement prévues a été plus tard proposée au MINAGRIE qui l'a approuvée.
- Malgré qu'elle fût fondée, la diversification des engrais mise à la disposition du Département de la Fertilisation et de la Protection des Sols par le PRDMR par la commande du Triple-superphosphate et du sulfate d'ammonium ont connu des difficultés d'écoulement car les agriculteurs sont plutôt habitués à l'utilisation du DAP et de l'urée. Les services de vulgarisation devraient davantage sensibiliser les agriculteurs sur leur usage.

- Afin d'écarter les risques d'effritement de ce fonds de roulement engrais qui, après un audit, a été rétrocedé au PAIVA-B, et de rendre disponibles les engrais demandés par la population à temps, et en quantité et en qualité, il est recommandé sur base de l'expérience du PRDMR de :
 - a. *redéfinir les responsabilités des intervenants en la matière à savoir* : a) l'établissement de la synthèse des besoins en engrais exprimés par la communauté via leurs représentants et les DPAE, ii) la commande d'engrais à temps par le Projet, iii) la gestion du stock d'engrais par chacune des DPAE concernées, iv) la commercialisation des engrais dans la zone de ressort de la DPAE par les uniques commerçants connus qui y exercent.
 - b. *veiller aux dispositions de sécurité ci-après* : a) l'élaboration des listes détaillées des acheteurs de ces engrais par les commerçants, ii) la publication et la diffusion élargie des prix planchers de ces engrais, iii) la cogestion des comptes FR engrais par deux responsables de la DPAE et un représentant (sur place) du projet, iv) le placement à des taux rémunérateurs du fonds de roulement en attendant l'aboutissement des procédures d'acquisition des engrais destinés à renouveler le stock d'engrais, v) l'évaluation et l'audit interne réguliers de ce fonds de roulement qui seraient complétés par l'audit d'un bureau spécialisé vi) un inventaire des stocks et un relevé des soldes des comptes fonds de roulement engrais à une périodicité régulière.

2.4 Reconstitution et repeuplement du cheptel

- La méconnaissance du patrimoine génétique du bétail importé compromet à terme tout programme d'amélioration génétique dans la zone d'action du projet. Pour l'avenir, l'expérience du PRDMR inspire que l'importation d'animaux en général et des bovins en particulier se fasse à partir des fermes d'élevage bien connues connaissant le pedigree de chaque animal.
- L'importation d'un grand effectif de taureaux permet d'éviter les cas de stérilité des animaux due à la couverture insuffisante du programme d'insémination artificielle et aux difficultés de détection des chaleurs qu'éprouvent les bénéficiaires.
- L'absence des encadreurs d'élevage au niveau des collines (infirmiers vétérinaires) n'a pas du tout facilité le suivi des animaux. C'est pour cette raison que le PRDMR a encouragé la constitution et la formation des pharmacies vétérinaires villageoises qui ont quand même rendu pas mal de services aux éleveurs. Aujourd'hui, les Agents Communautaires en Santé Animale (ACSA) mis en place par le PARSE appuient les éleveurs.
- L'appui à l'apiculture a suscité beaucoup d'engouement de la part des communautés et le PRDMR aura impulsé un mouvement associatif des apiculteurs qui est actuellement encadré par le PARSE.
- Afin de s'assurer de la diffusion latérale des animaux ou de la continuité de la chaîne de solidarité communautaire surtout bovine, tous les partenaires doivent se mobiliser et suivre de près cette opération. La sensibilisation des structures communautaires et de l'administration locale pour qu'elles veillent au suivi de la chaîne de solidarité communautaire a porté ses fruits.

2.5 Appui aux structures d'encadrement

- Les structures d'appui à l'encadrement (DPAE, DGSE, DGVA) ont bénéficié d'un appui institutionnel consistant. Cet appui multiforme leur a permis d'améliorer leur capacité d'intervention. Les appuis logistiques (moyens de déplacement) leur ont permis de suivre les activités sur terrain et de garder les contacts avec les différents partenaires. Les nombreuses sessions de formations sur des thèmes variés ont contribué au renforcement des capacités des nombreux partenaires administratifs et techniques parmi lesquels figurent les cadres et agents de différents services ainsi que les bénéficiaires.

- Après l'achèvement des Projets comme le PRDMM, ces structures devraient normalement recevoir du Gouvernement tous les appuis nécessaires pour faire le suivi des acquis du Projet en vue de leur pérennisation.

3 Composante Aménagement du territoire et protection de l'environnement

- Au départ, la qualité des ouvrages hydrauliques a souffert de la mauvaise conception du Projet qui préconisait la mise en place d'ouvrages (partiteurs, chutes) en matériaux locaux. Cela a entraîné la dégradation rapide de ces ouvrages. Le PRDMM a dû revoir cette conception en proposant la mise en place d'ouvrages maçonnés et la réhabilitation progressive des ouvrages en matériaux locaux.
- Le rythme de réalisation du programme d'aménagement des marais par le Département du Génie Rural et de la Protection du Patrimoine Foncier (travaux en régie) qui ne disposait pas toujours d'un personnel techniquement compétent pour ce genre de travaux a été relativement lent étant donné que ce personnel a dû être formé. La qualité des travaux pouvait également en souffrir au début. A l'avenir, ces travaux devraient être confiés à des entreprises. Les formations organisées à l'intention des cadres du Département du Génie Rural ont tellement renforcé leurs capacités dans les travaux d'aménagement des marais que la plupart d'entre eux ont pu être recrutés par différents projets.
- L'aménagement des terrasses radicales requiert une grande technicité et mobilise beaucoup de main d'œuvre. Il est par conséquent très cher. Leur mise en valeur efficace est conditionnée à la disponibilité en quantité suffisante des amendements calcaires et des fertilisants (minéraux et organiques) ; or les prix de ces derniers sont habituellement hors de portée des agriculteurs. Ces problèmes ont handicapé l'extension du programme d'aménagement des terrasses radicales surtout au niveau des exploitations individuelles.
- La production des plants forestiers, agroforestiers et fruitiers a monétarisé la zone d'action du programme. Cependant, le manque d'harmonisation des approches d'intervention dans ce domaine en général et la différence des prix payés par plant a provoqué certaines frustrations au niveau de certains groupements de pépiniéristes appuyés par le PRDMM. En effet, le PRDMM ne rachetait le plant qu'à 8,5 FBU alors que d'autres intervenants payaient entre 20 et 30 FBU le plant.
- Malgré les dix ans d'appui à la production et à la mise en place des plants, la demande en plants reste de loin supérieure à la quantité produite. Des initiatives d'appui à la production des plants forestiers, agroforestiers et fruitiers devraient être prises et intensifiées par les projets.

4 Composante infrastructures socio-economiques

- Le retard enregistré dans la mobilisation des Fonds de l'OPEP et dans la disponibilité des vivres contre travail du PAM a été préjudiciable à la mise en œuvre harmonieuse du PRDMM qui a dû solliciter des extensions. Il faudrait à l'avenir éviter tout déphasage dans la mobilisation des fonds des différents bailleurs/ donateurs.
- Le PRDMM a dû également revoir la conception initiale qui préconisait notamment que les travaux d'aménagement des réseaux d'adduction d'eau potable d'une longueur inférieure ou égale à 7km devaient être confiés à des ONG locales et à des entreprises quand la longueur du réseau était égale ou supérieure à 7 Km. En effet, les marchés publics demandent que les marchés soient attribués sur base d'une compétition.

5 Composante initiatives locales

- L'alphabétisation fonctionnelle des adultes a suscité beaucoup d'engouement de la part des populations et le PRDMM ne pouvait pas honorer toutes les demandes d'alphabétisation enregistrées. Il faudrait que le Gouvernement planifie les activités d'alphabétisation dans tout le pays car les besoins sont nombreux.

- Les séances IEC ont également attiré beaucoup de foule qui s'est montrée intéressée par les thèmes développés : le code des personnes et de la famille, la lutte contre le VIH/SIDA, la résolution pacifique des conflits etc. La poursuite de ces séances d'animation devrait être assurée par le Gouvernement par l'intermédiaire des Centres de Développement Familial.
- La constitution des réseaux communaux et provinciaux de leaders paysannes initiée par le PRDMM devrait être encouragée sur toute l'étendue du pays étant donné le rôle de plus en plus déterminant que ces leaders jouent dans le règlement pacifique des conflits et dans le renforcement de la cohésion sociale.

6 Composante coordination

- Pour plus d'efficacité, chaque projet doit gérer un personnel contractuel sur lequel la coordination peut avoir une mainmise et qui dépend hiérarchiquement d'elle. Le personnel détaché de la Fonction Publique qui dépend hiérarchiquement des Ministères d'origine est difficile à gérer surtout qu'elle ne reçoit qu'une indemnité de la part du Projet.
- La fixation des salaires du personnel des projets financés par le FIDA n'avait pas tenu compte des conditions salariales du personnel des autres projets financés par les partenaires techniques et financiers comme la Banque Mondiale, la BAD, l'Union Européenne. Cette situation a été progressivement corrigée mais elle était à la base de la démotivation et même de la démission de certains cadres du PRDMM. La rigueur dans la gestion administrative et financière a permis au PRDMM de disposer en permanence d'une bonne trésorerie et de ne laisser aucun litige au niveau des nombreux prestataires de service et partenaires d'exécution. L'extension de la durée du Programme sur près de 4 ans a été finalement possible grâce à une bonne gestion. Elle a permis de faire profiter à son groupe cible des infrastructures socio-économiques financées par l'OFID avec un montant de près de 8 millions de dollars et de renforcer ses acquis dans l'objectif de pérennisation.
- Le PRDMM a également donné de multiples appuis aux équipes de formulation de nouveaux projets et aux équipes de nouveaux projets en mettant à leur disposition pendant au moins l'année de démarrage leur expertise, leurs équipements (véhicules et ordinateurs) et leurs documents.
- Le PRDMM a également contribué à la création et au fonctionnement de l'Unité de Facilitation des Projets FIDA (FIDA) devenue plus tard la Cellule d'Appui au Programme FIDA (CAP-FIDA) et a ainsi renforcé l'approche programme prônée par le FIDA.

Note préparée par l'ex-coordonnateur du PRDMM, février 2012.

