



Investir dans les populations rurales

Comité de l'évaluation

Cent dix-neuvième session

Rome, 18 octobre 2022

Évaluation infrarégionale des pays en situation de fragilité en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre

Cote du document: EC 2022/119/W.P.4

Point de l'ordre du jour: 5

Date: 20 septembre 2022

Distribution: Publique

Original: Anglais

POUR: EXAMEN

Mesures à prendre: Le Comité de l'évaluation est invité à examiner l'évaluation infrarégionale des pays en situation de fragilité en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre.

Questions techniques:

Indran A. Naidoo

Directeur

Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA

courriel: i.naidoo@ifad.org

Kouessi Maximin Kodjo

Responsable supérieur de l'évaluation

Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA

courriel: k.kodjo@ifad.org

Table des matières

Remerciements	ii
Résumé	iii
Annexe	
Réponse de la direction	xiii
Appendice	
Main report – Sub-Regional Evaluation of countries with fragile situations in IFAD-WCA	1

Remerciements

La présente évaluation, première évaluation infrarégionale menée par le Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA (IOE), a été dirigée par Kouessi Maximin Kodjo, responsable supérieur de l'évaluation à IOE, avec la contribution des consultants principaux suivants: Anne Floquet, James Gasana et Paul Balogun. D'autres personnes ont participé à l'évaluation, notamment Antonio Cesare, Fatou Dieng, Denis Liselele et Ramoudane Orou Sannou, analystes chargés de l'évaluation; Adiza Lamien Ouando (Burkina Faso), Siaka Ouedraogo et Fatoumata D. Traore (Mali), Isselmou Boye (Mauritanie), Chaïbou Dadi (Niger), Zubairu Maiwada (Nigéria) et Ezechiel Dingamadji (Tchad), consultants nationaux.

Daniela Asprella et Margherita Iovino, adjointes à l'évaluation d'IOE, ont également fourni un appui administratif précieux. L'évaluation a bénéficié d'un examen interne par les pairs, conduit par IOE.

IOE remercie de leur collaboration le Département de la gestion des programmes – en particulier le Vice-Président adjoint Donal Brown; la Division Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre; et les équipes du FIDA dans les six pays sélectionnés (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Nigéria et Tchad).

Nous remercions également les représentants des autorités publiques des six États concernés et les principaux partenaires nationaux et régionaux de leur appui et de leur coopération pendant l'évaluation.

Évaluation infrarégionale des pays en situation de fragilité en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre

Résumé

A. Contexte

1. **Introduction.** En 2021, le Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA (IOE) a réalisé une évaluation infrarégionale, pour la période allant de 2010 à 2021, de l'intervention du FIDA dans les pays en situation de fragilité et relevant de la Division Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre du FIDA. Ce type d'évaluation, mis en place en 2021, entend concourir à l'apprentissage fondé sur des données probantes. Il s'agit d'évaluer les problèmes intrarégionaux ou les défis de développement communs à toute une zone géographique donnée afin d'en dégager des leçons stratégiques et programmatiques d'ensemble.
2. **Pays sélectionnés.** L'évaluation infrarégionale porte sur les pays du G5 Sahel – Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger et Tchad – et sur les opérations du FIDA dans le nord du Nigéria. Les pays de l'échantillon, ci-après dénommés « G5+1 », ont été choisis parce qu'ils présentent, du point de vue de la fragilité, un profil analogue qui menace la réalisation des objectifs de développement durable. L'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) (2020) classe les pays du G5 Sahel et le Nigéria parmi les pays qui étaient en 2020 en situation de fragilité (le Tchad étant extrêmement fragile). Selon la Banque mondiale (2020), le Burkina Faso, le Mali, le Niger et le Nigéria se trouvent dans une situation de fragilité liée à un conflit, et le Tchad dans une situation de fragilité sociale et institutionnelle.
3. **Raison d'être.** Le Programme spécial du FIDA pour les pays comportant des situations de fragilité (2019)¹ indique que « la fragilité représente une menace sérieuse pour la mise en œuvre du Programme de développement durable à l'horizon 2030 ». Le soutien apporté par le FIDA a ainsi débouché sur le Programme conjoint Sahel en réponse aux défis COVID-19, conflits et changements climatiques (SD3C). Le programme a été approuvé par le Conseil d'administration en décembre 2020 et mis en œuvre en partenariat avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) et le Secrétariat du G5 Sahel. Ce programme conjoint infrarégional, le premier de ce type, a suscité un vif intérêt au sein du FIDA pour l'utilisation de l'évaluation sous-régionale comme source d'apprentissage fondé sur des données probantes et efficacement applicable.

B. Conception et méthode de l'évaluation

4. **Objectifs et périmètre.** L'objectif de l'évaluation infrarégionale était d'évaluer les opérations du FIDA entre 2010 et 2021 sous l'angle de la fragilité, afin d'en tirer des enseignements utiles. Le périmètre de l'évaluation était le suivant: i) vérifier dans quelle mesure les objectifs opérationnels et les résultats du FIDA ont contribué à lutter contre les facteurs de fragilité et ses causes profondes dans la sous-région; ii) vérifier si les outils et les approches utilisés étaient adéquats compte tenu des circonstances volatiles suscitées par les facteurs économiques, naturels et d'insécurité.
5. **Théorie du changement.** L'évaluation infrarégionale, construite sur une forte assise théorique, a été menée conformément aux lignes directrices d'IOE en matière d'évaluation. Il s'agissait de voir comment et pourquoi la performance était efficace ou non en situation de fragilité. L'équipe d'évaluation infrarégionale a

¹ EB 2019/126/R.20/Rev.2.

élaboré une théorie du changement basée sur le cadre de résultats du SD3C et sur les résultats des échanges avec les principales parties prenantes (au siège et sur le terrain).

6. **Cadre analytique.** L'évaluation infrarégionale repose sur un cadre analytique insistant sur la nécessaire amélioration de la résilience. Le cadre comprend cinq groupes de facteurs de fragilité liés aux éléments suivants: i) les problèmes socioéconomiques; ii) les perturbations sociales; iii) les défis liés à l'environnement et aux changements climatiques; iv) les faiblesses institutionnelles et la faiblesse du contrat social; v) les problèmes d'insécurité et de conflit. L'objectif du FIDA est de contribuer à l'amélioration de la résilience rurale par le développement des capacités d'absorption, d'adaptation et de transformation au niveau local.
7. **Méthode.** L'évaluation infrarégionale repose sur une approche mixte, combinant d'une part la collecte de données qualitatives et quantitatives par des études documentaires et des entretiens avec les parties prenantes (en groupes et avec des informateurs clés) et, d'autre part, la collecte de données primaires sur le terrain. Des entretiens virtuels ont également été menés avec diverses catégories de parties prenantes au siège du FIDA, ainsi qu'aux niveaux infrarégional et national. En raison des restrictions liées à la COVID-19, des consultants nationaux ont effectué des missions sur le terrain dans les six pays. Dans l'ensemble, les conclusions découlent du recoupement des données de plusieurs sources.

C. Principales constatations

Pertinence

8. **Les programmes d'options stratégiques pour les pays (COSOP) ont permis de soutenir le renforcement de la résilience rurale, objectif critique en situation de fragilité.** Les COSOP, qui encadrent les interventions du FIDA en faveur d'une transformation rurale inclusive et durable, fixent clairement l'objectif de renforcement de la résilience dans le contexte sahélien. L'évaluation n'a fait ressortir aucune souplesse ou adaptation dans l'application des COSOP en cas de fragilité et d'imprévisibilité. Ces documents sont muets aussi quant aux enjeux stratégiques de fragilité transfrontalière, tels que le commerce transfrontalier et la transhumance.
9. Les stratégies et les opérations examinées comprenaient des analyses contextuelles, largement axées sur trois facteurs de fragilité au sujet desquels le FIDA apporte une contribution directe. Ces analyses se cantonnaient au contexte économique/à la pauvreté, à la gestion des ressources naturelles/l'adaptation aux changements climatiques et aux inégalités sociales. L'analyse approfondie des deux autres facteurs (faiblesse des institutions publiques et insécurité/conflit grave) faisait largement défaut.
10. **L'intérêt d'une analyse de fragilité holistique, et la méthode à suivre, n'est pas clairement assimilé, notamment au regard des analyses déjà réalisées au stade de la conception.** L'examen a révélé un manque d'analyse du jeu des catégories de facteurs, prises individuellement ou dans leur ensemble. Les enseignements tirés ont étayé la conception des programmes, mais ne concernent pas expressément la manière de traiter les facteurs de fragilité de manière holistique. En effet, les analyses holistiques de la fragilité faisaient défaut et les exemples de conception de projets simples, essentiels dans ces situations, se comptaient sur les doigts de la main.

Cohérence

11. **La cohérence de chaque projet, et d'un projet à l'autre, a été respectée dans le portefeuille de prêts du FIDA, mais rien n'est expressément prévu pour combattre la fragilité de manière globale.** La cohérence interne ne fait aucun doute dans les activités de prêt du FIDA, et tout indique qu'il existe un effort

en ce sens dans les opérations de prêt consécutives menées dans une même zone géographique. Il ressort des données que, sauf au Nigéria, les activités de gestion des savoirs et de participation à l'élaboration des politiques n'ont pas contribué à l'efficacité globale des travaux menés en situation de fragilité, faute d'avoir mis l'accent sur les enseignements tirés ou sur les mesures à prendre pour mieux intervenir dans de tels contextes, notamment auprès des gouvernements.

12. Il existe une large complémentarité entre les opérations du FIDA et les priorités des programmes d'autres institutions financières internationales (à savoir la Banque africaine de développement et la Banque mondiale) dans les pays G5+1. Cependant, les données sont insuffisantes pour déterminer dans quelle mesure cette complémentarité s'est traduite soit par des mécanismes formels visant à renforcer les avantages comparatifs respectifs, soit par des synergies sur le terrain. Des possibilités de partenariat ont été recensées parmi les organismes ayant leur siège à Rome, mais rien ne permet d'affirmer qu'elles aient été mises à profit. Selon l'évaluation infrarégionale, le SD3C est une bonne occasion de renforcer la collaboration et les partenariats entre les organismes ayant leur siège à Rome.

L'efficacité au service de résultats concrets en situation de fragilité

13. La présente section décrit la mesure dans laquelle les interventions ayant bénéficié d'un soutien ont contribué à la lutte contre les facteurs de fragilité, étaient en phase avec le cadre analytique, ont permis de faire face aux conséquences de la COVID-19 et ont généré des enseignements.

Facteurs de fragilité socioéconomique

14. **La promotion d'activités génératrices de revenus a contribué à renforcer les capacités d'absorption et d'adaptation des bénéficiaires en situation de fragilité.** L'amélioration des pratiques agricoles a permis d'augmenter les rendements, de réduire leur variabilité, de promouvoir de nouvelles cultures et techniques d'élevage et d'adopter des stratégies de développement des actifs. Parmi ces stratégies figurent: i) le recours à la politique de subventions publiques dans certains pays; ii) le crédit en nature, de sorte que les plus vulnérables puissent accumuler des actifs primaires; iii) l'épargne en nature (semis et intrants). Ces stratégies ont contribué à renforcer la capacité des producteurs à résister aux chocs.
15. **Le renforcement des capacités et le soutien non financier ont été essentiels pour développer le capital humain et social voulu, au plan individuel et collectif, pour faire face aux situations de fragilité.** La plupart des projets comprenaient des mesures complètes à l'appui de microprojets et d'entreprises rurales. Ces mesures se répartissent en trois grandes catégories: la formation; le soutien à chaque point de la chaîne de valeur, y compris l'accès au marché; la promotion de services financiers ruraux inclusifs.
16. **Le soutien aux groupes traditionnels de crédit et d'épargne a été déterminant dans la mise en place des stratégies de résilience des petits exploitants.** En l'absence de systèmes de financement formels, le soutien aux mécanismes locaux facilite l'expansion des actifs productifs des petits exploitants pauvres (par exemple, les intrants agricoles et le matériel de transformation au Tchad, les pompes d'irrigation et les clôtures pour les oasis en Mauritanie). Il favorise également les investissements rentables et renforce les capacités d'absorption et d'adaptation des producteurs.
17. Les banques de céréales ont contribué à améliorer les capacités d'absorption en mettant des denrées alimentaires à la disposition des petits exploitants pauvres, en réduisant la faim pendant la période de soudure et en servant de tampon contre les variations des prix alimentaires. Le soutien du FIDA consistait essentiellement à doter les membres du comité de gestion des banques de céréales qui géraient la collecte, l'entreposage et la redistribution des céréales déposées par les agriculteurs

de compétences techniques, de gestion et de gouvernance. Ces mesures sont particulièrement importantes au Niger et au Tchad, où les phénomènes climatiques imprévisibles se conjuguent à l'insécurité.

Facteurs de fragilité liés à l'environnement et aux changements climatiques

18. **La promotion des pratiques de conservation des sols et de l'eau dans les contextes arides et semi-arides du Sahel est essentielle pour améliorer la résilience des petits exploitants.** Les projets soutenus par le FIDA ont permis d'accumuler un stock important de connaissances sur ce qui fonctionne en matière de conservation des sols et de l'eau, de restauration du couvert végétal et de systèmes d'irrigation à petite échelle (au Burkina Faso, au Mali, en Mauritanie, au Niger et au Tchad). Ces interventions ont été associées à des méthodes d'intensification agricole durable dans un souci de productivité et d'adaptation aux changements climatiques. De fait, la plupart des interventions comprenant une composante relative à la conservation des sols et de l'eau ont été jugées conformes aux pratiques agricoles climato-compatibles.
19. Il s'est avéré déterminant, pour renforcer la résilience, d'aider les bénéficiaires et les décideurs à privilégier des pratiques de gestion des ressources naturelles efficaces et durables. À titre d'exemple, on peut citer l'internalisation de la conservation des sols et de l'eau et la mise à l'échelle de la régénération naturelle assistée au Niger par un programme national soutenu par l'État et d'autres partenaires.
20. **Le soutien financé par le Fonds pour l'environnement mondial (FEM) et le Programme d'adaptation de l'agriculture paysanne (ASAP) a été essentiel pour promouvoir des stratégies efficaces d'adaptation des petits exploitants aux changements climatiques.** Les financements du FEM ont favorisé la diversification des moyens d'existence des petits exploitants (sources de revenus non agricoles), ce qui a contribué à une adaptation efficace (projet Neer-Tamba au Burkina Faso et Projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement de la région de Maradi [PASADEM] au Niger). Le soutien financé par l'ASAP a permis de promouvoir efficacement la planification communale participative, qui a contribué aux stratégies d'adaptation aux changements climatiques et a encouragé les actions soucieuses des enjeux climatiques (Projet visant à améliorer la productivité agricole [PAPAM] au Mali et Projet d'amélioration de la résilience des systèmes agricoles au Tchad [PARSAT]).
21. **La gestion des ressources naturelles, dans le contexte sahélien, ne peut se faire efficacement sans mener un dialogue complet avec toutes les parties pour arbitrer entre les intérêts des populations pour ce qui est de l'eau et des pâturages.** La disponibilité de l'eau et l'accès à celle-ci sont essentiels pour améliorer la gestion des pâturages naturels dans les conditions arides du Sahel, comme le montre le Projet d'hydraulique pastorale en zone sahélienne (PROHYPA) au Tchad. En Mauritanie, le soutien apporté par la composante FEM a permis de créer trois couloirs de pâturage dotés de puits pastoraux pour la transhumance. Dans l'ensemble, l'évaluation infrarégionale a fait ressortir un soutien aux éleveurs modeste car limité au développement de couloirs de transhumance à petite échelle.

Fragilité institutionnelle: rôle des organisations paysannes

22. **Le fait de donner aux organisations de producteurs et aux organisations paysannes les moyens de fournir des services efficaces et durables a contribué à renforcer les capacités d'absorption et d'adaptation, et peut conduire au développement de capacités de transformation.** La collaboration avec les organisations paysannes et les organisations de producteurs est un avantage comparatif pour le FIDA dans la sous-région. Elle consiste essentiellement à renforcer leur capacité à fournir des services pour améliorer l'approvisionnement

en intrants et la commercialisation des produits; à associer renforcement institutionnel et capacités de plaider au développement local; et à les aider à se fédérer en organisations faïtières. Des résultats concluants ont été obtenus au niveau national dans tous les pays évalués et au niveau régional avec l'organisation faïtière régionale: le Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (ROPPA).

23. Le soutien apporté par le FIDA aux chambres d'agriculture a permis d'améliorer la gouvernance des processus de développement local et de renforcer le capital social. Les projets menés au Burkina Faso et au Niger ont beaucoup joué pour encourager la participation des chambres régionales d'agriculture à la mise en œuvre des projets et la participation des organisations faïtières de producteurs à la concertation sur les politiques, soutenir les interventions en matière de sécurité alimentaire et la prestation de services par les gouvernements et produire des diagnostics marché participatifs. Externalité positive, bon nombre de ces travaux ont renforcé la confiance entre les bénéficiaires et l'État.
24. **Des résultats mitigés ont été obtenus en ce qui concerne la fonctionnalité des petits systèmes d'irrigation gérés par des associations d'usagers de l'eau, où les comités de gestion locaux ont été amenés à jouer un rôle important malgré les grands efforts des projets** (au Burkina Faso, au Mali, au Niger et au Tchad). Cela s'explique notamment par les divergences d'intérêts internes, la mauvaise répartition des droits, l'inaptitude des associations à fournir des services d'entretien pour que les investissements restent fonctionnels, le manque de temps pour mettre en place des comités de gestion fonctionnels, les faibles frais d'entretien des systèmes d'irrigation et le manque de soutien aux associations faïtières d'usagers.
25. L'expérience a montré l'efficacité du développement de conventions locales² en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles, propres à garantir la cohésion sociale et la confiance au sein des populations et entre elles. Plusieurs projets de ce type soutenus par le FIDA (au Burkina Faso, au Mali et en Mauritanie) ont été concluants, la démarche s'avérant intéressante et utile à la gestion consensuelle des ressources naturelles.
26. **Le soutien apporté par le FIDA a permis de créer des conditions favorables à la participation des organisations paysannes aux concertations pertinentes.** L'évaluation infrarégionale a recensé des cas où les organisations paysannes ont influencé les décisions relatives à la politique de sécurité alimentaire, ce qui a contribué de manière positive au renforcement de la résilience. On peut notamment citer le PASADEM au Niger, où des cadres de consultation ont été mis en place pour favoriser les liens commerciaux entre différents groupes d'intérêts économiques.

Fragilités liées à l'inégalité sociale

27. **Le manque de sécurité foncière dissuade les petits exploitants d'investir dans la réhabilitation à long terme de leurs terres.** Les données disponibles dans la zone G5+1 révèlent un certain travail sur cette question, principalement au moyen d'investissements dans les infrastructures de gestion des ressources naturelles, mais sans que la réglementation prenne toujours le relais. Une exception a été constatée au Mali, où la récente loi foncière encourage le recours aux commissions foncières locales et nationales existantes et où les représentants des producteurs ont été formés à se servir de ces cadres pour prévenir les conflits.

² Les conventions locales sont des ensembles de règles élaborés localement par les parties prenantes utilisant les ressources naturelles et se disputant ces ressources, afin de réglementer leur utilisation et de régler pacifiquement ou de prévenir les conflits.

28. Dans la zone G5+1, les femmes et les jeunes, dont les droits fonciers sont restreints, ont en moyenne un accès plus précaire à la terre. Certains projets soutenus par le FIDA concernaient en partie l'inégalité d'accès à la terre. Le sujet mérite toutefois un soutien et une implication à long terme de divers acteurs (du niveau local au niveau national).
29. **Le pastoralisme est une question essentielle dans le contexte sahélien. Cependant, elle n'a pas fait l'objet d'une attention suffisante dans les opérations soutenues par le FIDA au cours de la période à l'examen.** Les éleveurs pastoraux ne disposent pas de droits d'accès garantis aux terres agricoles et aux pâturages situés à proximité de leur lieu d'habitation, ni aux autres pâturages en période de transhumance. L'accès aux ressources en eau ou aux zones protégées peut aussi être source de conflits. Très peu de projets du FIDA ont abordé la transhumance et ses aspects transfrontaliers, alors que les changements climatiques en font un enjeu de plus en plus conflictuel dans la sous-région. Il apparaît, à la lumière des données disponibles, qu'il peut être efficace de soutenir des commissions de gestion conjointe réunissant des utilisateurs concurrents pour prévenir les conflits locaux liés aux pâturages.
30. **Il est nécessaire de considérer la gestion des ressources naturelles sous l'angle des droits des utilisateurs, en particulier dans les régions sujettes aux conflits sociaux, où les conflits liés à l'accès et à l'utilisation des terres peuvent facilement dégénérer.** Le SD3C tient compte de ce besoin et entend y répondre en épaulant les efforts des groupes de producteurs cherchant à gérer durablement les ressources naturelles et à faire face aux risques climatiques par des pratiques plus adaptées et de meilleures infrastructures productives concernant la terre et l'eau, ce qui permettra de renforcer la résilience des moyens d'existence ruraux.

Conflits violents et insécurité

31. **Une approche reliant pauvreté et conflits faisait défaut dans les opérations soutenues par le FIDA dans les pays G5+1.** Les projets soutenus par le FIDA ont été affectés par diverses formes de conflit au Mali, au Niger et au Nigéria, mais les conflits sont traités comme des risques à maîtriser plutôt que comme des problèmes que le FIDA peut directement aider à résoudre ou à prévenir. Par exemple, rien n'est dit dans les cadres de résultats des projets du FIDA au Nigéria sur le rapport entre les résultats escomptés et le lien entre pauvreté et conflit. Il est donc difficile d'évaluer dans quelle mesure les interventions étaient destinées à remédier aux facteurs de conflit.

Chocs liés à la pandémie de COVID-19

32. Les mesures mises en œuvre dans le cadre de la pandémie de COVID-19 illustrent la capacité du FIDA à agir dans des situations d'urgence. À plusieurs reprises, le FIDA a fait preuve de souplesse dans sa contribution aux efforts déployés par les États pour faire face aux effets de la pandémie. Ainsi du plan d'urgence pour la prévention et l'atténuation des effets de la COVID-19 au Niger, du Mécanisme de relance en faveur des populations rurales pauvres et d'autres initiatives à court terme mises en œuvre au niveau national au Mali, au Nigéria et au Tchad. Les leçons de ces initiatives n'ont pas encore été tirées, mais elles illustrent néanmoins la capacité du FIDA à s'adapter à l'évolution des circonstances.

Garantir des interventions inclusives

33. **Les données disponibles indiquent un fort accent sur l'égalité des genres dans les opérations soutenues par le FIDA, sans toutefois que cela suffise à remédier aux causes profondes de la vulnérabilité supérieure des femmes en situation de fragilité.** Les femmes sont plus sensibles aux facteurs de fragilité dans les milieux ruraux sahéliens, et la pandémie de COVID-19 a exacerbé leur vulnérabilité. Les projets reposent sur des approches de ciblage

positif qui ont permis aux femmes et aux filles de bénéficier des interventions. Cependant, les impacts liés au genre, pourtant déterminants en situation de fragilité, n'apparaissent pas expressément ou clairement dans les théories du changement qui encadrent les interventions contre les causes profondes, principalement d'ordre socioculturel, de la vulnérabilité. En outre, certains documents de conception de projets ne comportaient aucune stratégie spécifique en matière de genre.

34. Le soutien du FIDA a contribué à l'autonomisation des femmes rurales et à l'amélioration de leur accès aux actifs productifs, deux éléments essentiels au renforcement des capacités d'absorption et d'adaptation. Tous les projets visaient à autonomiser les femmes sur le plan économique, et certains portaient sur des questions liées à la charge de travail (Mali, Mauritanie et Tchad). Les données disponibles révèlent également: i) une amélioration progressive mais lente du renforcement de la position des femmes au niveau local, en particulier dans les organes de direction des organisations paysannes et, dans une moindre mesure, au sein des ménages; ii) des progrès en matière de droits d'accès des femmes à la terre au Burkina Faso, et d'accès aux intrants nécessaires à des activités économiques diversifiées au Niger et au Tchad. Néanmoins, l'évaluation infrarégionale n'a fait ressortir aucune participation des femmes aux processus liés aux mécanismes locaux de gestion des ressources naturelles, ni aucun rôle dans le renforcement des contrats sociaux et le maintien de la paix.
35. **Les approches visant à promouvoir l'inclusion des jeunes, au cœur de plusieurs projets récents, étaient généralement axées sur des activités génératrices de revenus et des formations destinées à renforcer les capacités d'absorption et d'adaptation de cette catégorie de population.** Dans les situations de fragilité, les modalités d'accès aux fonds (par exemple, le crédit) sont plus souples et adaptées (comme au Mali et au Niger). Les données disponibles (par exemple au Burkina Faso et au Nigéria) indiquent que l'intégration des femmes et des jeunes dans les activités de développement des chaînes de valeur en amont et en aval est une stratégie efficace qui contribue à diversifier leurs perspectives économiques et à atténuer les effets des facteurs de fragilité tels que l'extrême pauvreté et les changements climatiques.
36. Les jeunes ont contribué efficacement au renforcement de la résilience des populations rurales lorsqu'ils ont été correctement ciblés et associés à des activités clés, comme cela a été le cas en Mauritanie et au Niger. Les interventions efficaces sont celles qui visent à la fois à améliorer les capacités techniques et à accroître l'accès aux actifs productifs et aux marchés rentables. Dans l'ensemble, le soutien apporté par le FIDA aux jeunes gagnerait en efficacité et en adaptation aux objectifs d'entrepreneuriat et de création d'emplois durables pour eux si leurs principaux facteurs de fragilité étaient analysés plus avant au stade de la conception.

Efficiences, durabilité et reproduction à plus grande échelle

37. Il apparaît que l'obtention de gains d'efficacité dans des situations de fragilité est difficile, mais possible. Le FIDA a intensifié ses activités de supervision et ses missions techniques dans le cadre des projets menés dans les pays G5+1 et a également travaillé avec des prestataires de services non gouvernementaux, ce qui a permis de lever certains obstacles à l'obtention de gains d'efficacité. Cette approche a permis de lutter contre les retards dans le lancement des projets, la lenteur des décaissements et les problèmes de coordination des projets. Cependant, les coûts de gestion étaient généralement plus élevés dans les situations de fragilité en raison de problèmes imprévus.
38. **L'évaluation infrarégionale a mis en évidence les failles du modèle d'activité du FIDA lorsqu'il s'agit de soutenir une opération en situation de fragilité.** Le financement par prêts souverains n'est pas assez souple pour

permettre des ajustements rapides en cas de phénomènes critiques (par exemple, une grave sécheresse, une crise économique, une perturbation politique); la souplesse des dons (pour le décaissement et la gestion) en fait un outil plus adapté et adaptable. Or leur volume est faible. Le respect des accords de cofinancement ne va pas sans peine pour les gouvernements des pays G5+1. Point positif, la disponibilité de fonds provenant d'autres cofinanciers internationaux (par exemple, le FEM et le Fonds vert pour le climat) a été utile pour soutenir les interventions de renforcement de la résilience. Au cours de la période à l'examen, la plupart des directeurs de pays (cinq sur six) ne résidaient pas dans les pays cibles, ce qui a limité la capacité du FIDA à travailler avec des partenaires clés et à réagir rapidement à l'évolution des circonstances.

39. **Les données disponibles suggèrent que les résultats peuvent être pérennisés dans les situations de fragilité en renforçant la capacité des organisations locales à obtenir des résultats dans le cadre des projets soutenus par le FIDA et à en assurer le suivi, ainsi qu'à renforcer la cohésion sociale à l'échelle locale.** Les exemples observés au Niger et au Tchad confirment que le renforcement de l'efficacité des associations d'usagers des ressources et des comités de gestion desdites ressources augmente la probabilité d'obtenir des résultats durables. Au Niger et au Nigéria, les données montrent qu'aider les organisations locales à élargir et approfondir la cohésion sociale et à renforcer le contrat social a contribué à pérenniser les résultats obtenus en situation de fragilité. Ainsi des efforts d'« ingénierie sociale » (ou de mobilisation sociale) visant à renforcer la mobilisation, le regroupement et la cohésion du capital social (notamment au Burkina Faso, au Mali et en Mauritanie).
40. En ce qui concerne la transposition à plus grande échelle, l'évaluation infrarégionale a montré qu'il est essentiel d'aider les gouvernements à définir et à mettre en œuvre une stratégie en la matière. Des exemples de transposition des résultats à plus grande échelle par les gouvernements ont été constatés au Mali et au Niger, tandis que d'autres cas de transposition par d'autres partenaires de développement ont été observés au Tchad. L'ancrage des interventions dans les programmes nationaux est un facteur primordial pour obtenir une transposition efficace des résultats à plus grande échelle.

D. Conclusions et recommandations

41. **Conclusions.** Les cinq catégories de facteurs de fragilité, telles que recensées dans le cadre analytique de l'évaluation, apparaissent dans les pays G5+1, même si la situation varie d'un pays à l'autre et dans chaque pays. Le renforcement de la résilience (la solution clé à la fragilité) y est donc essentiel. L'évaluation a révélé que les stratégies, programmes et projets nationaux du FIDA à l'examen visaient de plus en plus la priorité au renforcement de la résilience, bien que l'on manque d'une analyse complète de la fragilité.
42. Le soutien du FIDA a contribué à changer en mieux les perspectives économiques, la gestion des ressources naturelles et l'adaptation aux changements climatiques, d'où une meilleure résilience des bénéficiaires, qui ont vu leurs capacités d'absorption, d'adaptation et de transformation renforcées. Il apparaît que les femmes et les jeunes (acteurs essentiels dans les situations de fragilité) ont bénéficié d'un soutien sous forme d'activités de développement de filières inclusives, mais que ce soutien n'a eu qu'un effet mitigé sur les facteurs contextuels qui les rendent plus vulnérables. En outre, le renforcement de la cohésion sociale par le truchement des organisations locales (dont des organisations paysannes) et l'utilisation des mécanismes endogènes existants sont essentiels pour atteindre et pérenniser les résultats obtenus.
43. L'évaluation infrarégionale a fait ressortir trois défis majeurs. Premièrement, l'intervention du FIDA n'a pas suffisamment tenu compte des spécificités de l'action en situation de fragilité dans les pays G5+1 (par exemple, la simplicité de la

conception, l'élaboration préalable d'analyses holistiques pour comprendre les causes profondes de la fragilité, les questions transfrontalières). Deuxièmement, le modèle d'activité du FIDA (en termes d'instruments financiers et de présence dans les pays) est mieux adapté à la fourniture de services dans des situations non fragiles que dans la zone G5+1. Troisièmement, les activités autres que les prêts n'ont pas pu aider les opérations de prêt à traiter les facteurs de fragilité de manière holistique.

44. Ce constat amène à formuler les recommandations suivantes.
45. **Recommandation 1. Élaborer un cadre global de résilience pour la sous-région ou la région afin d'orienter les évaluations et la conception et la mise en œuvre des opérations (sur le terrain et au niveau national et régional).** Le cadre, qui devrait s'appuyer sur les documents d'orientation existants et sur l'expérience du FIDA, doit présider à des analyses holistiques propres à: i) comprendre les différents facteurs de fragilité et ses causes profondes; ii) élaborer une théorie du changement solide qui aide à recenser les moyens de s'attaquer aux facteurs de fragilité identifiés, y compris ceux qui sont de nature transfrontalière; iii) concevoir des interventions simples mais efficaces tenant compte du lien entre résilience et transformation rurale; iv) identifier les partenariats stratégiques et opérationnels utiles aux interventions. Compte tenu de la nature transfrontalière de nombre de ces questions, le FIDA devrait envisager de mettre à l'essai des cadres de partenariat à cheval sur plusieurs pays et de tirer parti de l'expérience du projet pilote en cours relatif aux opérations régionales. Les sources de financement (disponibles et potentielles) doivent être présentées de manière analytique afin d'obtenir le bon bouquet d'instruments financiers pour soutenir les interventions de renforcement de la résilience en situation de fragilité.
46. **Recommandation 2. Profiter de la décentralisation 2.0 du FIDA pour améliorer les capacités, les interactions et la souplesse des équipes de pays, de sorte qu'elles soient plus efficaces dans les contextes de fragilité des pays G5+1.** Cela suppose de renforcer les capacités techniques des membres des équipes de pays (renforcement des capacités) afin d'épauler comme il faut les opérations en situation de fragilité, d'identifier les acteurs clés avec lesquels établir des partenariats contre telle ou telle source de fragilité, d'accroître les interactions préalables à la planification et la mise en œuvre d'actions conjointes, en tenant compte de l'avantage comparatif de chaque organisation, et de concevoir les projets de manière efficace mais simple.
47. **Recommandation 3. Revoir la manière d'aborder le soutien au développement des filières dans la sous-région, qui doit être plus inclusif et s'appuyer sur les approches locales dans les zones extrêmement fragiles.** Pour ce faire, il convient de mieux cibler les femmes et les jeunes et de développer des formules de soutien appropriées (concernant notamment les solutions numériques, l'accès aux marchés et l'agriculture climato-compatible) qui tiennent compte de leurs situations spécifiques et répondent à leurs attentes et de veiller à l'ancrage local, en associant les groupes marginalisés à l'amélioration de la gestion des ressources naturelles (y compris les terrains de parcours), à l'adaptation aux changements climatiques et à la prévention des conflits liés aux ressources naturelles. Il faut s'attacher à comprendre les questions liées à l'élevage pastoral afin de trouver des moyens de promouvoir des synergies positives entre les systèmes de production agricole et pastorale.
48. **Recommandation 4. Continuer de promouvoir la résilience des populations rurales en aidant les organisations de producteurs, les organisations paysannes et les organisations locales à intervenir efficacement et en les rendant mieux à même de participer à la concertation sur les questions qui les concernent.** Il faut ainsi capitaliser sur les collaborations fructueuses avec les organisations de producteurs, les organisations paysannes et leurs organes faïtiers

– y compris les organisations pastorales – dans le cadre d'un engagement à long terme pour qu'ils contribuent efficacement à renforcer la résilience de leurs membres, en particulier dans les zones les plus fragiles. Le soutien aux organisations de femmes doit être accru et adapté à chaque contexte afin de remédier progressivement aux causes profondes de ce type spécifique de fragilité et d'améliorer durablement leur rôle de leader, leur influence et leur statut socioéconomique.

49. **Recommandation 5. Organiser le renforcement du soutien apporté aux équipes de pays afin d'accroître l'efficacité des opérations hors prêts en situation de fragilité.** Pour ce faire, il faut renforcer l'assistance technique (sous forme de missions, d'activités de formation, d'études et de consultations sur les politiques) en vue de mieux collaborer avec les partenaires gouvernementaux sur des questions de résilience spécifiques (par exemple, l'exclusion, le contrat social, le pastoralisme et la transhumance) en partenariat avec des acteurs nationaux et internationaux.

Réponse de la direction du FIDA à l'évaluation infrarégionale des pays en situation de fragilité en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre

1. La direction se félicite de la première évaluation infrarégionale du FIDA, axée sur les pays en situation de fragilité dans la région de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre. Les évaluations infrarégionales sont un nouveau type d'évaluation proposé dans la stratégie d'évaluation pluriannuelle d'IOE, publiée en 2021. Elles portent sur les points de convergence, du point de vue des enjeux de développement, des initiatives de programmes et des perspectives, dans un ensemble de pays partageant les mêmes problèmes de développement rural, et dépassent donc le périmètre strictement national. Ainsi, les évaluations infrarégionales permettront à la direction de tirer des enseignements utiles pour élaborer des stratégies infrarégionales ou améliorer les opérations en cours aux niveaux national et régional. Elles seront également utiles pour acquérir des connaissances dans les pays qui n'entrent pas dans le champ des évaluations des stratégies et programmes de pays.
2. **Cette évaluation infrarégionale est particulièrement pertinente à la lumière de la mesure contrôlable n° 14 des engagements pris au titre de la Douzième reconstitution des ressources du FIDA (FIDA12)**, qui dispose que le FIDA élaborera des initiatives destinées spécifiquement à renforcer son action au Sahel et dans la Corne de l'Afrique. En particulier, les constatations issues de l'évaluation infrarégionale étayeront le cadre de résultats des organismes ayant leur siège à Rome aux fins du programme conjoint SD3C Sahel, qui sera présenté au Conseil d'administration en 2022. Elles éclaireront également la mise en œuvre de l'Initiative pour la finance verte inclusive (IGREENFIN), qui démarrera en 2022 et 2023 avec la signature de divers projets.
3. Pour ce qui est du processus, la direction salue l'approche participative adoptée par IOE dans cette évaluation infrarégionale et la bonne interaction obtenue à chaque étape du processus malgré les défis suscités par la pandémie de COVID-19 et le manque de données. Les évaluations infrarégionales étant une nouveauté, IOE peut aider la direction à faire connaître ce type d'évaluation en interne. IOE a fait preuve de souplesse tout au long du processus d'évaluation; il importera de maintenir cette souplesse et de permettre au personnel du FIDA de mettre en place des processus d'examen interne et de retour d'information sur ce nouveau produit.
4. **La version finale de l'évaluation infrarégionale tient compte des retours d'information fournis par la direction lors des étapes précédentes de la consultation.** La direction souhaite mettre l'accent sur les points clés suivants:
 - i) **L'analyse du « contrat social ».** L'évaluation au niveau de l'institution de l'engagement du FIDA dans les États et contextes fragiles et touchés par un conflit, qu'IOE a réalisée en 2015, ne fait pas explicitement référence au concept de contrat social, pas plus que le Cadre stratégique du FIDA 2016-2025 et le document relatif au Programme spécial pour les pays comportant des situations de fragilité. La direction sait que l'évaluation infrarégionale ne recommande pas explicitement l'adoption du concept de contrat social, mais le document montre bien l'intérêt du concept, de plus en plus utilisé, par exemple dans le COSOP 2020 pour le Mali.
 - ii) **Complexité de la conception.** La question de la complexité, bien connue du FIDA, apparaît en bonne place dans plusieurs bilans de portefeuilles et dans le Rapport annuel 2021 d'IOE sur les résultats et l'impact des opérations du FIDA. La complexité des projets s'explique par l'évolution du FIDA au cours des dix dernières années, à savoir la mise en correspondance des engagements pris au titre de la reconstitution des ressources et des éléments

prévus au stade de la conception des projets. Les nouvelles directives pour la conception des projets – qui seront publiées en 2022 – offriront des outils concrets pour mieux agencer la théorie du changement d'un projet et établir un cadre logique cohérent à des fins de suivi. Cependant, la direction estime que la question mérite une conversation plus poussée dans le contexte de la Consultation sur FIDA13.

5. **La direction approuve les principales constatations de l'évaluation infrarégionale et reconnaît que l'objectif de renforcement de la résilience est le fer de lance des opérations du FIDA dans les pays G5+1.** La direction souscrit également aux enjeux décrits en conclusion, mais tient à souligner ce qui suit:

- i) **Concernant l'absence d'approche spécifique du FIDA face aux contextes de fragilité:** Les directives actualisées relatives à la conception des COSOP et des projets, qui seront publiées en 2022, comprennent des orientations plus précises sur l'évaluation et la prise en compte de la fragilité. En outre, dans le cadre des engagements pris au titre de FIDA12, le Fonds soumettra au Conseil d'administration une stratégie révisée sur l'intervention du FIDA dans les situations de fragilité et de conflit, qui remplacera celle de 2016. La stratégie révisée s'appuiera sur les recommandations issues du Groupe de travail du FIDA sur la fragilité de 2021, et sur les enseignements tirés du Programme spécial de 2019 pour les pays comportant des situations de fragilité. La stratégie révisée précisera la définition de la fragilité, et contiendra des conseils sur l'ajustement de l'approche en fonction du niveau de fragilité. Le FIDA entend par ailleurs donner des lignes directrices spécifiques pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie et fournir aux équipes d'exécution des projets de meilleurs conseils sur ce qu'il convient concrètement de faire en situation de fragilité et de conflit.
- ii) **Concernant le décalage entre la présence du FIDA dans les pays et ses instruments financiers, et la réalité des opérations dans les pays G5+1:** La question de la présence dans les pays est abordée dans la recommandation n° 3. En ce qui concerne la flexibilité des instruments financiers, la Politique du FIDA de 2018 relative à la restructuration des projets encourage la proactivité et les mesures incitant les gouvernements à adapter leurs projets à l'évolution de l'environnement en fonction de l'évolution des besoins et des priorités.
- iii) **Concernant la capacité inégale des opérations hors prêts à soutenir les opérations de prêt:** Conformément aux engagements pris au titre de FIDA12, le Fonds élabore des outils complémentaires aux directives existantes en matière de contribution à l'élaboration des politiques nationales, et produit du matériel de formation dans le cadre du programme de perfectionnement de l'Académie des opérations du FIDA. Au titre des nouvelles directives relatives aux COSOP, qui mettent également l'accent sur la gestion des connaissances, tout COSOP doit prévoir un cadre fondamental de génération et d'application des connaissances, et de création d'un environnement porteur. Ces ajustements seront particulièrement pertinents dans les contextes de fragilité.

Recommandations

6. **La direction souscrit aux cinq recommandations formulées dans l'évaluation infrarégionale.** Les paragraphes ci-après présentent le point de vue de la direction et l'action proposée pour chaque recommandation.
7. **Recommandation 1.** « Élaborer un cadre global de résilience pour la sous-région ou la région afin d'orienter les évaluations et la conception et la mise en œuvre des opérations (sur le terrain et au niveau national et régional). [...] le FIDA devrait

envisager de mettre à l'essai des cadres de partenariat à cheval sur plusieurs pays et de tirer parti de l'expérience du projet pilote en cours relatif aux opérations régionales. »

8. **Approuvée.** Le FIDA s'est engagé à rendre opérationnelle la Stratégie intégrée des Nations Unies pour le Sahel (UNISS)³. Le paragraphe 9 du document relatif au SD3C⁴ relie le programme et l'objectif stratégique plus large prévu dans l'UNISS, à savoir le renforcement de la résilience. L'appendice X du document indique aussi explicitement que le SD3C s'inscrit dans l'UNISS. Cette dernière constitue un cadre d'intervention solide dans la région.
9. Compte tenu de la complexité et de la nature spécifique des défis de développement auxquels doivent faire face les États membres du FIDA au Sahel, la direction convient que l'élaboration d'un cadre de résilience commun et complet pour le Sahel permettra de mieux orienter les interventions actuelles et futures. Sous réserve que les organes directeurs du FIDA acceptent d'allouer suffisamment de temps et de ressources à cette entreprise, la direction accepte la recommandation tendant à élaborer un tel cadre de résilience, en s'appuyant sur les enseignements tirés de son engagement au Sahel, sur les priorités de développement nationales et régionales et sur les partenariats en cours et potentiels avec un certain nombre d'initiatives et d'acteurs clés, notamment: les organismes ayant leur siège à Rome, le Comité permanent inter-États de lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel, le G5 Sahel, la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, le Club du Sahel de l'OCDE, les banques régionales de développement et les institutions d'intégration, les organisations professionnelles d'agriculteurs et d'éleveurs (par exemple, le ROPPA, le Réseau Billital Maroobé et l'Association pour la promotion de l'élevage au Sahel et dans les savanes), entre autres. La direction s'abstiendra toutefois d'utiliser le cadre comme condition préalable à l'approbation de nouvelles opérations au Sahel pour éviter d'ajouter un niveau supplémentaire de mise en conformité et d'accroître ainsi la complexité de la conception.
10. **Recommandation 2.** « Profiter de la décentralisation 2.0 du FIDA pour améliorer les capacités, les interactions et la souplesse des équipes de pays, de sorte qu'elles soient plus efficaces dans les contextes de fragilité des pays G5+1. [...] identifier les acteurs clés avec lesquels établir des partenariats contre telle ou telle source de fragilité, [...] accroître les interactions préalables à la planification et la mise en œuvre d'actions conjointes, en tenant compte de l'avantage comparatif de chaque organisation, et [...] concevoir les projets de manière efficace mais simple. »
11. **Approuvée.** Dans le cadre de la décentralisation 2.0, le FIDA étend considérablement sa présence dans les pays du Sahel. En plus du bureau régional d'Abidjan, du bureau multipays de Dakar et du bureau de pays du FIDA dirigé par le directeur de pays au Niger, les bureaux du Burkina Faso et du Mali seront transformés en bureaux de pays dirigés par le directeur de pays. En outre, le FIDA ouvrira un nouveau bureau de pays au Tchad. D'ici à la fin de 2022, le FIDA disposera d'un bureau de pays dans chaque pays du Sahel, à l'exception de la Mauritanie.
12. Le FIDA renforcera les capacités de chaque bureau de pays par la formation (Académie des opérations), avec l'appui de Rome, d'Abidjan et de Dakar. Il prévoit également de recruter des experts thématiques et techniques supplémentaires, notamment des spécialistes chargés de soutenir la mise en œuvre des opérations régionales de financement de l'action climatique.

³ https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sites/www.un.org.africarenewal/files/French%20Summary%20Report_0.pdf.

⁴ EB 2020/131(R)/R.8/Rev.1.

13. **Recommandation 3.** « Revoir la manière d'aborder le soutien au développement des filières dans la sous-région, qui doit être plus inclusif et s'appuyer sur les approches locales dans les zones extrêmement fragiles. Pour ce faire, il convient de mieux cibler les femmes et les jeunes et de développer des formules de soutien appropriées [...] et de veiller à l'ancrage local, en associant les groupes marginalisés à l'amélioration de la gestion des ressources naturelles (y compris les terrains de parcours), à l'adaptation aux changements climatiques et à la prévention des conflits liés aux ressources naturelles. Il faut s'attacher à comprendre les questions liées à l'élevage pastoral afin de trouver des moyens de promouvoir des synergies positives entre les systèmes de production agricole et pastorale. »
14. **Approuvée.** Le FIDA possède une expérience considérable dans la promotion des approches locales, les bénéficiaires ciblés et leurs communautés jouant un rôle clé dans la conception et la mise en œuvre de projets et de politiques qui répondent à leurs besoins. La synthèse d'évaluations portant sur le développement à l'initiative des communautés dans les projets soutenus par le FIDA (2020) a conclu que les projets menés à l'initiative des communautés sont plus performants que ceux qui ne le sont pas dans les pays en situation de fragilité. Selon l'évaluation, le FIDA doit « se réapproprier le développement à l'initiative des communautés en lui donnant une visibilité dans l'ensemble de ses stratégies et de ses fonctions institutionnelles ».
15. Dans cette optique, les projets du FIDA continueront à mettre l'accent sur le ciblage et la qualité des services adaptés fournis aux groupes vulnérables, en particulier aux femmes et aux jeunes, conformément aux engagements pris au titre de FIDA12. Par exemple, la direction continuera de soutenir les investissements et les services favorisant l'esprit d'entreprise et le développement des compétences chez les jeunes, notamment par l'intensification des interventions innovantes dans le domaine des technologies de l'information et des communications au service du développement. Elle encouragera en outre les investissements dans l'élevage pastoral grâce à la gestion des ressources naturelles et aux interventions participatives menées par les communautés, sur la base des enseignements tirés de la mise en œuvre du PROHYPA au Tchad et du don en cours financé par le Mécanisme de relance en faveur des populations rurales pauvres et mis en œuvre par le Réseau Billital Maroobé (une organisation régionale d'éleveurs pastoraux).
16. **Recommandation 4.** « Continuer de promouvoir la résilience des populations rurales en aidant les organisations de producteurs, les organisations paysannes et les organisations locales à intervenir efficacement et en les rendant mieux à même de participer à la concertation sur les questions qui les concernent. »
17. **Approuvée.** Le FIDA collabore depuis longtemps avec les organisations de producteurs, les organisations paysannes et les organisations locales au Sahel. La récente décentralisation du Forum paysan du FIDA apparaît également comme un mécanisme pertinent pour favoriser des partenariats plus solides au niveau local, comme en témoigne le succès de la réunion régionale de Nouakchott en 2018. La structure du SD3C favorise un modus operandi innovant pour collaborer avec les organisations de producteurs en tant que partenaires stratégiques, tant au niveau régional que national; cette démarche devra faire l'objet d'un suivi attentif afin de tirer des enseignements utiles.
18. La direction continuera également de promouvoir les investissements dans le renforcement des capacités des organisations de producteurs, des organisations paysannes et des organisations locales, afin de soutenir leur participation à l'élaboration des politiques aux niveaux local, national et régional, mais également pour que lesdites organisations améliorent les services professionnels proposés à leurs membres. Par exemple, le Programme d'appui aux organisations paysannes africaines et le programme Organisations paysannes dans les pays d'Afrique, des

Caraïbes et du Pacifique, cofinancés par la Commission européenne et le FIDA, permettent de renforcer les capacités des organisations paysannes depuis plusieurs années. En outre, de nombreux projets financés par le FIDA établissent des mémorandums d'accord ou des accords de services directs avec les organisations paysannes, ce qui contribue à renforcer les capacités techniques et institutionnelles de ces dernières. Le SD3C comprend également des investissements dans le renforcement des capacités des organisations paysannes.

19. **Recommandation 5.** « Organiser le renforcement du soutien apporté aux équipes de pays afin d'accroître l'efficacité des opérations hors prêts en situation de fragilité. »
20. **Approuvée.** La direction prend note de la possibilité d'améliorer la performance des opérations hors prêts en situation de fragilité. Les actions clés que la direction doit prendre sont les suivantes: i) le renforcement des capacités des équipes de pays et des unités de gestion de projet en matière de participation à l'élaboration des politiques, de création de partenariats et de coopération Sud-Sud et triangulaire; ii) la réalisation d'études analytiques axées sur les contextes de fragilité; iii) l'identification des domaines prioritaires pour les opérations hors prêts au cours du processus de conception du cadre régional de résilience; iv) le développement de partenariats avec des institutions crédibles pour améliorer les performances des opérations hors prêts.

Sub-Regional Evaluation of countries with fragile situations in IFAD-WCA. Learning from experiences of IFAD's Engagement in the G5 Sahel Countries and Northern Nigeria

Contents

Abbreviations and acronyms	3
I. Background	6
A. Introduction	6
B. Fragility related concepts and approaches	8
C. Evaluation methodology	12
II. Fragility drivers, overview of IFAD operations and lessons from partners' experiences	18
A. Contextual fragility issues of the sub-region	18
B. Overview of IFAD engagement in the six countries	23
C. Overview of lessons learned from partners' experiences	25
III. Relevance and coherence	28
A. Relevance	28
B. Coherence	36
IV. From effectiveness to impacts in fragile contexts	43
A. Poverty and economic fragility aspects	43
B. Environment and climate change related fragility	47
C. Institutional fragility: role of farmers' organisations	51
D. Social inequalities in access to productive resources	54
E. Violent conflicts and insecurity	57
F. Shocks due to the COVID-19 pandemic	58
G. Resilience building overall	58
V. Ensuring inclusiveness of interventions	62
A. Gender equality and women empowerment	62
B. Youth promotion	66
C. Other marginalized groups	70
VI. Efficiency, Sustainability and Scaling up	72
A. Efficiency	72
B. Sustainability	76
C. Scaling up	79
VII. Conclusions and recommendations	83
A. Conclusions	83
B. Recommendations	85
Annexes	
I. Evaluation criteria and definition	88
II. SRE Evaluation framework	89
III. List of projects reviewed	91
IV. List of grants reviewed	93
V. Complementary background and information overview	96
VI. Additional analytical information to chapters 3 to 6	105
VII. List of key persons met	110
VIII. Bibliography	121

Appendices

The appendices are available upon request from the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (evaluation@ifad.org).

Abbreviations and acronyms

AEDD	Environment and Sustainable Development Agency
AFD	French Development Agency
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANR	Assisted Natural Regeneration
ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
CASP	Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt
CBARDP	Community Based Agriculture and Rural Development Programme
CBOs	Community-Based Organizations
CC	Climate Change
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CD	Country Director
CDA	Community Development Associations
CDD	Community Driven Development
CGIAR	Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
CIF	Community Investment Funds
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for drought control in the Sahel
CLE	Corporate-Level Evaluation
COGES	Cereal Bank Community Committees
COSOP	Country Strategic Opportunities Programme
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease 2019
CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPM	Country Programme Manager
CPO	Country Programme Officer
CSN	Country Strategy Note
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSPE	Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation
DSF	Debt Sustainability Framework
EB	Executive Board
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations
FFS	Farmer Field School
FIER	Rural Youth Vocational Training, Employment and Entrepreneurship Support Project
FIPS	Faster Implementation of Project Start-up
FOs	Farmers Organizations
GALS	Gender Action Learning System
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
HDI	Human Development Index
ICO	IFAD Country Office
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IFA	Integrated Farm Assurance
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGA	Income Generating Activities
ILO	International Labour Organization

INCLUSIF	Inclusive Finance in Agricultural Value Chain Project
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
IPRM	Integrated Project Risk Management
KM	Knowledge Management
LGAs	Local Government Areas
LIFE-ND	Livelihood Improvement Family Enterprises Project in the Niger Delta of Nigeria
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MERIT	Multi-Energy for Resilience and Integrated Territorial Management Project
MTR	Mid-Term Review
Neer-Tamba Project	Participatory Natural Resource Management and Rural Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NTFP	Non-Timber Forest Products
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PADER-G	Rural Development Support Programme in Guéra
PAFA-4R	Agricultural Value Chains Support Project in the Southwest, Hauts-Bassins, Cascades and Boucle du Mouhoun Regions
PAI-SA	Programme of Integrated Approaches to Food Security
PAPAM	Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project
PAPFA	Agricultural Value Chains Promotion Project
PARSAT	Project to Improve the Resilience of Agricultural Systems in Chad
PASADEM	Food Security and Development Support Project in the Maradi Region
PASK II	Poverty Reduction Project in Aftout South and Karakoro - Phase II
PASPRU	Rural Business Development Services Programme
PBAS	Performance-Based Allocation System
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCRV	Project Completion Report Validation
PDR	Project Design Report
PFF	Pre-Financing Facility
PMD	Programme Management Department
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PO	Producers' Organization
PoLG	Program of Loans and Grants
PPE	Project Performance Evaluation
PRECIS	Project to Strengthen Resilience of Rural Communities to Food and Nutrition Insecurity
ProDAF	Family Farming Development Programme in Maradi, Tahoua and Zinder Regions
ProDAF-Diffa	Family Farming Development Programme in the Diffa Region
PRODEFI	Inclusive Value Chain Development Project
PROGRES	Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, Communal Equipment and the Organization of Rural Producers Project
PROHYPA	Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas
ProLPRAF	Programme de Lutte contre la Pauvreté Rurale par l'Appui aux Filières
PTA	Policy and Technical Advisory
PUSADER	Emergency Food Security and Rural Development Programme
RBAs	Rome-Based Agencies
RePER	Strengthening Productivity and Resilience of Agropastoral family Farms Project
RIA	Research and Impact Assessment
ROPPA	Network of Farmers'and Producers' Organizations in West Africa
RPSF	Rural Poor Stimulus Facility
RUAs	Resources Users Associations

RUWANMU	Ruwanmu Small-Scale Irrigation Project
SD3C	Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SECAP	Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SRE	Sub-Regional Evaluation
SWC	Soils and Water Conservation
TAPS	Technical Assistance for Project Start-up Facility
ToC	Theory of Change
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAC	Violence Against Children
VCD	Value Chain Development
VCDP	Value Chain Development Programme
WASH	Water Hygiene and Sanitation
WB	World Bank
WCA	Western and Central Africa
WFP	World Food Programme

Main report

Sub-Regional Evaluation of countries with fragile situations in IFAD-WCA. Learning from experiences of IFAD's Engagement in the G5 Sahel Countries and Northern Nigeria

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. In 2021, the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) conducted a sub-regional evaluation (SRE)⁵ of IFAD's support to countries in fragile situations within the West and Central Africa division of IFAD (WCA). The SRE is a new product of IOE that seeks to evaluate intra-regional issues or common development challenges within a geographical zone. It identifies intra-regional strategic and programmatic lessons that cannot be easily addressed by simply looking at countries individually. SREs explicitly aim at evidence-based learning aligned with the evaluation manual of IFAD.⁶
2. **Fragility as the central theme of the SRE and its importance.** Following IOE standard practice when scoping an evaluation, upstream consultations were organized between IOE and Programme Management Department (PMD) (including WCA). These consultations led to a consensus on the need to focus on fragility, as this was seen as a critical contextual issue across the sub-region. On that basis, it was also agreed that the evaluation should cover the G5 Sahel countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger – and IFAD operations in the Northern region of Nigeria. As stated in the IFAD (2019) Special Programme for Countries with fragile situations, "Fragility represents a serious threat to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The consequences of fragility are alarming and represent a serious challenge to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. It is estimated that more than 80 per cent of the world's poorest people will be living in fragile situations by 2030. Moreover, fragility is not confined to specific countries and/or regions – it has severe global impact on issues such as migration, economic and social disruption and insecurity."⁷ The African Development Bank (AfDB) views contextual challenges such as poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, high migration, climate change and poor management of natural resources as sources of pressure that make African countries more vulnerable.⁸ Ending poverty and extreme poverty requires greater efforts in accelerating economic gains, especially where poverty has been most intractable in fragile and conflict situations.⁹
3. **Rationale of choosing the G5 Sahel countries + Nigeria (G5+1).** Created in 2014, the G5 Sahel aims at supporting its members to respond adequately to the security challenges they face.¹⁰ Important human and financial resources have

⁵ A new product introduced by IOE, after the peer review of 2019, which is included in the IOE evaluation manual revised in 2021.

⁶ IFAD evaluation manual was under development in 2021. The draft version states that SRE can have one or more of the following objectives. (i) Assess commonality of development challenges, programmatic initiatives and opportunities beyond the scope of a single country. (ii) Assess the strategy, common intervention approaches supported by IFAD, and IFAD organizational set up in a set of countries that share salient characteristics. (iii) Provide learning that can be used by IFAD as an input to prepare a sub-regional strategy, or to improve on-going operations at country and regional levels. (iv) Build knowledge of countries with a small portfolio that are less likely to have a CSPE conducted.

⁷ IFAD. 2019. *Special Programme for Countries with fragile situations: Operationalizing IFAD's Fragility Strategy*. IFAD, April 2019.

⁸ AfDB Group Strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience in Africa; 2014-2019.

⁹ Corral Paul, Alexander Irwin, Nandini Krishnan, Daniel Gerszon Mahler, & Tara Vishwanath. 2020. *Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight against Poverty*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

¹⁰ Over the past ten years, serious security crises evolved within the sub-region due to armed conflicts primarily in border areas (from Lake Chad to the Niger Delta), and attacks from extremist groups. The G5 military force was then established to protect these countries and their populations, restore government services and promote peace for development.

been allocated by the five member governments for military responses, albeit to the detriment of investments in socio-economic development. In this context, IFAD's support has culminated in the sub-regional "Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict, and Climate Change" (SD3C),¹¹ approved by IFAD EB in December 2020 and implemented in partnership with the other two Rome-based Agencies (FAO and WFP) and the G5 Sahel Secretariat.¹²

4. **The Joint Programme for the G5 Sahel countries (SD3C)¹³ was designed as a response to a sub-regional context characterised by significant fragility challenges.** Sub-regional fragility challenges identified in the programme design include political and economic disruptions, constraints related to smallholder farming development due to degradation of natural resources, climate change, food security and nutrition constraints, as well as security concerns. The programme is the first of this kind financed by IFAD, with a clear intended purpose of addressing fragility challenges, in particular at sub-regional level, by assisting smallholders, mainly women and young smallholders living in border areas, to consolidate their livelihoods.¹⁴ As the first sub-regional joint programme of this type, there is significant interest within IFAD around learning and drawing lessons on how to effectively operationalise similar programmes considering current IFAD business systems and practices. The SD3C evaluability was almost nil at inception stage during the SRE conduct;¹⁵ therefore, it has not been evaluated. However, its design was referred to to ensure it could benefit the SRE findings.
5. **The SRE's purpose was to assess IFAD's operations since 2010,¹⁶ using fragility lenses, to identify lessons learned that are relevant and useful for current and future interventions.** The SRE covers a geographically continuous area in which the fragility drivers are assumed similar and transboundary. The inclusion of the Northern area of Nigeria is justified by its geographical continuity with the Sahelian region and its influence on interactions with neighbouring countries and the similarity of fragility concerns.¹⁷ As further presented in chapter II, the SRE identified main fragility issues for the sub-region in terms of: Economic, Social, Natural, Institutional, and Conflict related drivers. The SRE did not assess how IFAD's operations directly tackled fragility, but it rather ascertained: (i) the extent to which objectives of IFAD's operations and achieved results contributed towards addressing fragility drivers within the sub-region; and (ii) whether IFAD used adequate instruments and approaches considering the reality of operating in areas where circumstances are volatile due to insecurity and violence. The evaluation also paid attention to non-lending activities and other specific initiatives with a transboundary and/or sub-regional perspective. The scope of the evaluation

¹¹ The SD3C includes country loans (highly concessional terms) and grants, to support those countries that are facing serious fragility challenges due to several reasons, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic.

¹² See, <https://www.g5sahel.org/investir-davantage-dans-le-sahel-pour-stimuler-le-developpement-et-la-resilience-des-populations-rurales-le-g5-sahel-et-le-fida-signent-des-accords-de-financements/> (accessed in December 2021).

¹³ The programme title is: Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change. It also includes Senegal (in addition to the G5 Sahel), which is not included in the present SRE scope, as it is not classified as a country in fragile situation over the reviewed period.

¹⁴ The programme, which will last six years (2021-2026), is expected to contribute to poverty reduction (approximately by 10 per cent) in the programme area and boost socioeconomic (including trading) activities, by reducing constraints (to agricultural production and trade) exacerbated by conflicts, the anthropogenic impacts on natural resources, as well as difficulties in gaining access to productive resources. Elements of the programme are presented in Table A7, Annex V.

¹⁵ Launched in March 2021, while the SRE inception started in April 2021.

¹⁶ Corresponding to the first year of the Eighth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (IFAD8). Under IFAD8, IFAD committed for a differentiated approach between different regions and different country situations, including income and institutional development. One of the typologies identified is "Fragile states", where IFAD recognized the need for more institution-building; basic agriculture and rural services. The report of the Consultation on the Eighth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (REPL.VIII/4/R.2. 2008) acknowledges that almost one quarter of IFAD resources are spent in fragile states.

¹⁷ The formula of IFAD performance- based allocation system (PBAS) includes a variable entitled "IFAD Vulnerability Index", which captures the multidimensionality of rural poverty in each country. An index of 12 equally weighted indicators measures rural vulnerability in terms of exposure, sensitivity, and lack of adaptive capacity to endogenous and exogenous causes and/or events. The IVA scores range between 1 and 2, a score toward 2 entails a high vulnerability. For IFAD11 (2019-2021) the score were: Burkina 1.57, Chad 1.7, Mali 1.58, Mauritania 1.58, Niger 1.67, and Nigeria 1.46.

therefore differs from that of corporate level evaluations (CLEs), which rather evaluate corporate strategies and processes. Judging whether the latter effectively contributed to addressing fragility will not be a priority.

6. **Structure of the report.** The current chapter includes further sections, which present the fragility related concepts and approaches, as well as the evaluation methodology. Chapter II discusses the sub-region's main fragility drivers, the overview of IFAD operations, and key lessons from other partners' experiences. Chapters III to VI include assessments in relation to evaluation criteria in terms of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and impact (analysed as short- to long-term results), efficiency, inclusiveness (gender and youths), sustainability, and scaling up. The conclusions and recommendations complete the report.

B. Fragility related concepts and approaches

7. The term 'fragility' rose to prominence in the development discourse in the 1990s. Key concerns associated with fragile situations include: i) the threats they impose to national, regional, and global security; and ii) the fact that fragility commonly causes higher levels of poverty and slows down progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), compared to non-fragile situations.
8. **Definitions of fragility tend to be organisation specific,¹⁸ but all definitions reflect an assumption that the causes of fragility are multidimensional and weak institutions are commonly flagged across all definitions.** The definition of fragility varies from one organisation to another, depending on the orientation it takes. In general, definitions vary mostly in the degree of emphasis they place on the following drivers of fragility and their interaction: weak institutions, economic decline, poverty, climate change, environmental degradation, social exclusion, insecurity, and violent conflicts (chapter II presents these drivers in detail for the G5+1 countries).¹⁹
9. **The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) characterizes fragility as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacities of the State and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks.** Fragility can be both a result and a cause of negative outcomes including violence, poverty, inequality, displacement, and environmental and political degradation.²⁰ The OECD periodically releases a report on "States of Fragility" which presents an analysis of fragility based on a multidimensional fragility framework. The review of the last decade reports shows a consistent systems-based conceptualization of fragility, albeit with significant evolution in the framework used over time. The current framework is based on five dimensions of fragility: economic, environmental, political, security, and societal.²¹ State level capacities are also measured together with formal and informal mechanisms that societies can draw upon to cope with negative events and shocks.²² The 2020 report classifies countries into three categories (extremely fragile, fragile, and not fragile) based on a spectrum of intensity across the five dimensions. According to the OECD 2020 classification, all the G5 Sahel countries

¹⁸ This entails that the listing of countries in fragile situation can differ (sometime significantly) from one organization to another.

¹⁹ Main organizations that classify countries in the situations of fragility are the World Bank and the OECD. IFAD also developed its own list at a certain time (in its 2016 strategy), but from 2019 it went back to using the WB list, which consolidates scores or other IFIs. Violent conflicts are more and more considered among fragility drivers: see World Bank.


²⁰ Definition first published in the 2016 State of Fragility report and used in the following reports. Before, a fragile state was defined in terms of weak capacity of a State to carry out its basic functions needed to reduce poverty, improve nation's development, and safeguard human rights of its citizens (OECD 2008).

²¹ OECD introduced its multidimensional fragility framework in States of Fragility 2016. This framework captures the diversity of those contexts affected by fragility, measuring it on a spectrum of intensity across five dimensions: economic, environmental, political, security and societal. States of Fragility 2020 marks the third iteration of this multidimensional framework. There are 44 indicators across 5 dimensions of fragility. The choice of indicators has been driven by selection criteria in line with the OECD's fragility concept of high risk and low coping capacity.

²² The choice of these dimensions, and the decision to take a society approach to fragility, is based on expert judgement. It is one of the key outcomes of the consultation process underlying the new OECD fragility framework.

and Nigeria were considered to be in fragile situations in 2020, with Chad being extremely fragile (Figure 1).²³

Figure 1
Fragility situation of G5 +1 countries according to OECD criteria, over the period 2010-2021



Sources: OECD States of Fragility 2020

10. **The World Bank (WB) defines fragility in relation to countries with deep governance issues, and state institutional weakness, which are identified through policy-based and governance indicators.** The WB key definitions are presented in Box 1.²⁴ The WB currently identifies three issues that are significant in fragile contexts: (i) deep governance issues and institutional weakness; (ii) situations of active conflict; and (iii) high levels of interpersonal and/or gang violence. As with the OECD, there has been evolution in the WB's approach to analysing fragility and classifying countries as fragile.

Box 1

World Bank definitions of fragility terms

Fragility: Countries with deep governance issues and state institutional weakness are identified through policy-based and governance indicators. Fragile situations tend to be characterized by deep grievances and/or high levels of exclusion, lack of capacity, and limited provision of basic services to the population. Fragile situations tend also to be characterized by the inability or unwillingness of the state to manage or mitigate risks, including those linked to social, economic, political, security, or environmental and climatic factors.

Conflict: Countries in active conflict are identified based on a threshold rate of conflict-related deaths. Violent conflicts occur when organized groups or institutions, sometimes including the state, use violence to settle grievances or assert power.

Violence: Countries with high levels of interpersonal and gang violence, with major destabilizing impact, are identified based on the per capita level of intentional homicides. Gender-based violence (GBV) and violence against children (VAC) are also integrated into this definition.

Source: The World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025. p.6

11. The WB annually releases a list of fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS), differentiating between two categories.²⁵ The first category includes countries with high levels of institutional and social fragility, identified through publicly available indicators and its own Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) indicators, which measure the quality of policy and institutions, and manifestations of fragility.²⁶ The second category embraces countries affected by violent conflict, identified based on a threshold number of conflict-related deaths relative to the population.²⁷ The WB (2020) considered Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria as in

²³ Box A1, Annex V presents the evolution of OECD criteria since 2010, showing main change

²⁴ World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025


²⁵ The list is consolidated taking into account other IFIs (ADB, AfDB, IAD) assessment and scoring. The classification changed in 2020 to include the differentiation of conflict-affected countries from those that faced deep social and institutional fragility.

²⁶ The WB uses the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) that includes a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions.

²⁷ This category includes two sub-categories based on the intensity of violence: countries in high-intensity conflict and countries in medium-intensity conflict

situation of conflict affected (medium intensity) fragility; while Chad was in the situation of social and institutional fragility (see Figure 2).

Figure 2
Fragility situation of G5 +1 countries according to WB criteria over the period 2010-2020



Source: World Bank Data

12. **The first IFAD formal response to addressing fragility was the Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery, approved in 2006.**²⁸ Prioritisation of adapting support by the Fund to countries in situations of fragility and/or conflict increased with IFAD8 (2010-2012). Since then, IFAD has committed to implementing a differentiated approach tailored to specific fragile contexts, including situations of greater vulnerability and institutional weakness. In 2011, IFAD developed the Disaster Early Recovery Guidelines to support its staff in implementing timely and effective interventions in a post-disaster context. The guidelines emphasized the need for IFAD's involvement in early recovery to support the rehabilitation of rural livelihoods and to ensure the swift transition from relief to long-term sustainable development.²⁹
13. In 2014, the first corporate-level evaluation (CLE) on IFAD's engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) was conducted. Among the CLE's overarching messages, most important were:³⁰ **(i) the need for IFAD to further adapt and sharpen its approaches to achieve better outcomes in FCS; and linked to that, (ii) the need to customize its operating model to respond to the specific requirements of working in those situations.**
14. Following the CLE, **IFAD's Strategy for engagement in countries with fragile situations was approved in 2016 and outlined the guiding principles for IFAD's engagement in such countries**, and proposed organizational and operational approaches to enhance the resilience and effectiveness of IFAD operations in those situations (including options for mobilizing and allocating resources).³¹ The 2016 IFAD Strategy for engagement in countries with fragile situations, includes IFAD's current definition of fragility presented in Box 2. The IFAD 2016 definition is broad in scope – it relates to vulnerability, weak governance, weak capabilities, and conflict – but aligned with those of the OECD and the WB. It includes key aspects highlighted in both OECD and WB definitions, and therefore has been used in the context of this evaluation.

²⁸ The policy defines Fragile states as "characterized by weak policies, weak institutions and weak governance, resulting in meagre economic growth, widespread inequality and poor human development. Fragile states are more exposed to the risk of outbreaks of violence than are non-fragile states. Fragile states may be well endowed with natural resources or be resource-poor."

²⁹ IFAD. 2011. *IFAD Guidelines for Disaster Early Recovery*. EB 2011/102/R.29

³⁰ The CLE recommendations are provided in Table A1, Annex V.

³¹ Guiding principles were introduced, encompassing: risk management and resilience; addressing root causes; gender mainstreaming and targeting; building institutions, trust and social cohesion; flexible and responsive resourcing, instruments and approaches; strategic and complementary partnerships; achieving, measuring, and learning from results.

Box 2

IFAD's definition of fragility

Fragility is "a condition of high vulnerability to natural and man-made shocks, often associated with an elevated risk of violence and conflict"; this entails consequences of weak governance structures along with low-capacity institutions.

Fragility negatively affects rural development and food security objectives, because it weakens institutional capacity, disrupt rural livelihoods, and increases volatility in food prices and food security

Source: IFAD 2016 Strategy on countries in fragile situation

15. **In 2019, the Special Programme for countries with fragile situations was approved, providing an operational framework for the 2016 strategy.**³² The Special programme is intended to consolidate institutional thinking on the ways in which fragility affects IFAD's work. It focuses on fragility consequences and suggests how to adjust IFAD's activities in such operating environments.³³ The 2019 Special Programme identifies four main entry points to maximize IFAD's impact in fragile contexts and for building resilience. This latter aspect is critical when working in such contexts.³⁴ See Box 3.

Box 3

IFAD suggested entry points and approach in fragile situations

Four entry points, based on IFAD's comparative advantage, when working in fragile contexts are: (i) gender empowerment; (ii) institution building; (iii) food security; and (iv) natural resource management (NRM).

A differentiated approach is also suggested that takes into account four fragility stages relevant to IFAD's work: (i) high vulnerability to shocks, (ii) crisis, (iii) post crisis and recovery and (iv) transition to resilience.

Source: IFAD 2019 Special programme on countries in fragile situation

16. **The need to deliver greater resilience, as emphasised by the 2019 Special Programme, means seeking to minimize or suppress vulnerability to shocks by improving actors' ability to effectively manage and mitigate various fragility drivers and stressors.**³⁵ Resilience is the ability to manage fragility strains through effective institutions, processes, and capacities that build legitimacy and societal cohesion.³⁶ Resilience has two key aspects: (i) the resilience to what and (ii), the resilience of what. The "resilience to what" covers both man-made and natural shocks³⁷ and the ability of a system to sustainably respond, manage, and resist such shocks. The "resilience of what / whom" relates to the system elements that are subject to the shocks. This includes the human actors (individuals, households, groups of actors, communities, nations), the physical environment, and the institutional settings (from grassroots to central level).³⁸

³² There has not been time for its usage before the current evaluation.

³³ It is too early to expect it to have significantly affected IFAD support in the G5+1 contexts, given that its major influence would be expected in from 2020 designs and onwards.

³⁴ With the 2019 Special Programme, IFAD moved to use the WB's harmonised list of States in fragile situations to identify fragile states, to align with other multilateral development banks. Before that, IFAD used to establish its own list of States in fragility, mainly based on rural development indicators. For instance, according to the 2014 CLE, 48 IFAD Member States were classified as fragile, which is approximately 50 per cent of the total recipient countries included in the Ninth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (2013-2015) performance-based allocation system (PBAS) cycle.

³⁵ OECD. 2012;

³⁶ The RBA (2015) used the following United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) in their common approach to strengthening resilience for food security and nutrition.

"The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions",

³⁷ See IFAD definition of fragility.

³⁸ IFAD12 (Twelfth Replenishment cycle [2022-2024]. Recovery – Rebuilding – Resilience) has put a strong focus on resilience, especially due to possible implications of the Covid-19 pandemic. Among key points mentioned: (a) Combining lending programme with new means of engagement such as through PS, grant financing in countries most vulnerable to fragility among other characteristics; (b) Enhanced focus on tailoring its offer in countries with fragile

Achieving resilience means promoting and supporting the development of absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities by beneficiaries.³⁹

17. **Another important concept (used in this SRE) is “social contract”, which is increasingly found in literature on fragility and is a response to the growing focus on conflict as a driver of fragility.⁴⁰** According to UNDP (2016), “a social contract refers to processes by which everyone in a political community, either explicitly or tacitly, consents to state authority, thereby limiting some of her or his freedoms, in exchange for the state’s protection of their universal human rights and security and for the adequate provision of public goods and services”.⁴¹ Simply defined, social contract entails the implicit, mutual bargaining over what citizens expect from the state, and what the state can legitimately ask from citizens in return, as well as trades-off between the two.⁴²

C. Evaluation methodology

Overarching and key evaluation questions

18. Aligned with the SRE’s objectives presented earlier, **the overarching evaluation question is: to what extent did past experiences of IFAD engagement in the G5+1 countries respond to the main contextual fragility challenges; and what lessons could be drawn from these?** The key evaluation questions, grouped by result level, are presented in Table 1,⁴³ while the evaluation framework is presented in Annex II. For each key question, what were done and achieved considering working in fragile contexts were explored in order to identify the main lessons.

Table 1

Key evaluation questions

Processes

- *To what extent have the design of country strategies, programmes and projects been relevant, taking into account fragility drivers and the principles of working in fragile situations?*
- *How adequate and adaptive have intervention approaches and elements been, for a delivery in the sub-regional contexts featured by economic, natural, social, institutional and security constraints?*
- *How has IFAD’s engagement (strategies and operations) assumed internal coherence, and had similar or complementary developmental purposes, to contribute mitigating fragility constraints?*
- *How efficient has IFAD’s support been in those challenging fragile contexts, considering financial instruments and procedures, managerial approaches (including field presence), tools and processes?*

Results and outcomes

- *How effective was IFAD’s past support (at national and sub-regional levels) in achieving results that contribute addressing key fragility drivers?*
- *Based on evidence, to what extent have past supports contributed to build resilience and fostering rural transformation in these fragile situations?*
- *What are the lessons learned from IFAD supported interventions in terms of contribution to change in fragile situations?*

Sustainability and up scaling results achieved

- *To what extent have achievements and/or results been sustained and up scaled in these fragile contexts, and which lessons are relevant to IFAD’s future engagement in this sub-region?*

SRE team elaboration

Overall evaluation design

19. **The focus of the SRE on exploring how and why performance was achieved (or not) meant that the overall evaluation design was theory-based.** A key assumption of the evaluation design was that while considering the evolution of underlying fragility drivers in the sub-region over the past decade, lessons could be

situations and leverage existing and new instruments and initiatives – including technology and digitalization – for transformative engagement in these countries.

³⁹ See details in Table A2, Annex V.

⁴⁰ As mentioned earlier one main feature of FCS relates to institutional weakness (state related in particular).

⁴¹ UNDP. 2016. *Engaged Societies, Responsive States: The Social Contract in Situations of Conflict and Fragility* P.9


⁴² World Bank. 2019. *Social Contracts and World Bank Country Engagements: Lessons from Emerging Practices*. IEG Meso Evaluation. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.

⁴³ IOE was preparing its third Edition of IFAD’s Evaluation Manual in 2021 and therefore, the new criterion of coherence has been introduced, aligned with the revised OECD-DAC evaluation criteria.

drawn from the experience, which would be relevant for current and future programmes. This required exploring both how and why performance was achieved (or not), how was this affected by fragility at that point in time, and how the same fragility context applies now. This required the use of a ToC that would allow systematic exploration of how and why performance was delivered.

- Neither the 2016 IFAD Strategy nor the 2019 Special Programme include a ToC related to IFAD’s supports in fragile situations. Therefore, using the SD3C programme as a basis, the SRE team developed the ToC (Figure 3), with inputs from stakeholders of relevant WCA country teams. Through an iterative process, the ToC was finalised considering data gathered. Hence, the ToC below is beyond the SD3C scope because it incorporates key fragility features of the sub-region.

Figure 3
Theory of change



Source: SRE team elaboration


- The ToC reflects results of a rural development programme that contributes to rural transformation in the interventions areas, aligned with IFAD’s mandate and achieving the SDG2.** As reflected at the bottom of the ToC, the contexts entail major fragility issues. Four long-term outcomes are foreseen, of which two are typical rural development objectives: improved livelihoods and resilience of smallholders, and enhanced role of grassroots organisations in processes for rural transformation.⁴⁴ The two other objectives (sustained social contract and regional economic integration) are more related to fragility issues of the sub-region. These long-term outcomes suggest different impact pathways of rural transformation. The theory of change is based on three important assumptions: i) partnerships with various actors who have experience in operating in fragile situations, (ii) targeting of internal system actors and institutions that are critical for achieving resilience, and (iii) implementing actions that contribute to develop and strengthen the resilience of beneficiaries, through

⁴⁴ Typical objectives of IFAD supported programmes and projects in all situations (normal and fragile).

absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities building, which are assumed concurrent and not sequential.

22. **Strategic partnership is strongly emphasised to achieve intended results.** Effective partnership amongst main organisations – IFAD, WFP, FAO, other co-financiers, and Governments – and the G5 Sahel Secretariat is assumed essential for the SD3C programme’s success. IFAD’s role was key by providing initial resources and mobilization of resources for implementation processes. The contribution of other RBAs is assumed essential for the success of planned actions, due to their proven experience in working in such fragile contexts. The strategy envisages targeting rural households (severely affected by poverty), especially youths and women, within geographical areas exposed more to fragile situations.
23. **While the ToC is useful for identifying pathways and assumptions on how results are achieved in the G5+1 contexts, the relationship between the fragility drivers and performance is not reflected.** Therefore, the evaluation team developed a fragility analytical framework (specifically for the SRE), as presented in Figure 4, taking into account main aspects highlighted in the literature. This analytical framework reflects the need to foster greater resilience, highlighted in the 2019 IFAD Special Programme, by minimizing or suppressing the vulnerability to shocks, and/or improving actors’ ability to effectively manage and mitigate various fragility drivers and stressors. To develop this analytical framework, the SRE built on the five dimensions considered in the OECD’s current fragility framework in terms of economic, environmental, political, societal, and security drivers.

Figure 4

Fragility analytical framework

Source: SRE team

24. **The SRE fragility analytical framework consists of five fragility drivers** presented below (Box 4), which guided analyses throughout this report. The bottom frames reflect the need to move from fragility drivers and situations to building resilience. Bundles of shocks and stress factors affect individuals, groups, and communities, combined, or aligned with fragility drivers, leading to fragility situations.⁴⁵ IFAD operations may either contribute (directly or indirectly) reducing the vulnerability to fragility drivers, and/or exposure to these, as well as improving the coping ability or contributing to mitigate fragility burdens. Ultimately, this contributes to enhance rural resilience through the development of absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities at beneficiaries’ level.

⁴⁵ COVID-19 is per se one such shock.

Box 4

SRE fragility analytical points

- 1) **Socioeconomic issues:** enhanced poverty (especially in rural areas) sustained by poor economic governance and rapid demographic growth, high level of unemployment; food insecurity (as a consequence and driver), etc.
- 2) **Social disruption** related drivers: weak social cohesion, inequality (notably in terms of access to productive resources), social exclusion, etc.
- 3) **Natural and environmental and CC** related challenges: entailing the degradation of natural resources, ecosystems, and the high vulnerability to climate change.
- 4) **Institutional** related fragility drivers: high institutional weaknesses and weak social contracts, leading to a lack of accountability, weak regulatory frameworks, as well as poor quality in the provision of services by public institutions.
- 5) **Insecurity and conflict** issues: including banditry, violent and armed conflicts due to extremism.

SRE team elaboration

Evaluation methodology

25. **The SRE applied a mixed-methods approach**, combining desk reviews, interviews of stakeholders, and in-depth review of specific field (project) cases. The methodological building blocks are presented in Table 2.⁴⁶

Table 2

SRE methodology building blocks

<i>Building blocks</i>	<i>Outlines</i>
Review of country strategies	Desk review of COSOPs and CSNs documents, as well as their review reports
Review of the programme of loans and grants	Desk review of project design documents, completion and independent evaluation reports, as well as baseline, end-survey and impact reports Mapping of interventions according to the fragility issues and ToC pathways, and according to the possibilities for comparative assessments at a regional level Preliminary trends of findings and identification of aspects / points that deserve further in-depth review/analysis
Review of experiences of partners (WB, AfDB, FAO and WFP)	Desk review of partners' operations completion and evaluation reports
Interviews of stakeholders and key informants (various level) see the list of persons interviewed in the Annex VII.	Virtual interviews with categories of stakeholders Continuous interactions with the SRE contact groups established Validation of in-depth case studies selected as reflecting significant challenges (fragility and transboundary; IFAD internal)
Self-assessment review	Self-assessment seminar with the participation of IFAD country teams
Questionnaire survey	A questionnaire was sent via email to WFP and FAO representatives within the six countries, to collect their written elaboration on selected aspects. The response rate was 45 per cent
Field (primary) data collection	Field visits and interviews within the six countries (in relation with the case studies) by national consultants in compliance with national regulations related the pandemic. In-depth review and analysis of cases identified, according to the issues and contexts
Data analysis and synthesis	Qualitative and quantitative analyses; triangulation of information and evidence from the sources above. Seminar to discuss and discuss preliminary findings
Reporting	Preparing and sharing the draft report for comments (internal and external) Finalisation

Source: Evaluation team elaboration. More details are presented in Box A2 in Annex V.

26. **Analyses.** Analyses carried out by the SRE team are mainly qualitative in terms of content extraction, comparison, categorization, mapping, and cross-tabulation. Because the SRE aims at generating lessons, generalization appears as a point of consideration, but this was not sought. In fact, there was no approach followed to allow this, as the SRE did carry analyses on the 27 projects identified across the six countries, to identify lessons found in several instances, but likewise in specific

⁴⁶ Not always carried out sequentially as presented in the table.

cases, as far as those lessons are relevant and useful in terms of improving IFAD's engagement in those fragile situations. In addition, in a situation of absence of regional lending operations (except of the very recent SD3C), lessons stemmed mostly from country experiences analysed.

27. **Engagement with stakeholders.** The SRE team engaged with WCA and PMD relevant stakeholders from the beginning till the end of the evaluation process (see Table A3 in Annex V). At inception stage, several discussions held with main actors (including the regional director and AVP-PMD) were useful for scoping the evaluation. A focal group was therefore established comprising the six country directors (CDs) and program officers, with whom interactions happened throughout the SRE conduct. A virtual seminar to discuss preliminary findings was organised on 29 October with the focal group. Before sharing the draft report, additional two key engagement discussions were organised, the first with CDs and the second (on 20 December 2021) with the participation of strategic actors (including IOE Director, IOE Deputy Director, and the AVP-PMD) to discuss implications of the SRE findings and recommendations.

Limitations

28. **The COVID-19 pandemic** posed challenges for the implementation of the in-country missions, as international team members could not travel to any of the six countries. Instead, national team members were recruited to gather field data, under the remote supervision of international team members.⁴⁷
29. **Data availability.** IFAD documentation, including baseline surveys, end-surveys or studies, impact assessments, midterm reviews and project completion reports, and IOE evaluations report were used to the extent possible. The SRE team found sufficient robust evidence on how program results were documented with completion reports, validated by IOE. However, gaps were found in terms of deep explanations for why some results were (or could not be achieved), the extent to which this affected change, and how portfolio activities and non-lending activities took into account contextual fragility challenges to enable higher performance in operations. Gaps in the evidence drawn from desk review could not always be filled through key informant interviews due to the turnover of IFAD staff.
30. **Mitigation measures.** To overcome the data availability limitation, the SRE team used data and information from different sources to the extent possible. The team also utilised available quantitative and qualitative secondary data, interviews and discussions with stakeholders, direct observations, specific surveys, etc. These allowed appropriate triangulation.
31. Virtual interviews were conducted with a wide range of stakeholders to gather opinions and explanations aligned with the evaluation questions. The SRE team also used questionnaires (sent by email to partners) as well as analyses carried out by other development partners working in the sub-region, given that they faced the same challenges as IFAD.

⁴⁷ IOE had experience in applying this approach since 2020, which showed effectiveness when implemented adequately with a clarity on what is expected from the national consultants.

Key points

- Fragility is the central theme of the SRE, whose overarching question is to understand the extent to which experiences of IFAD engagement in the G5+1 countries (over the period 2010-2020) responded to contextual fragility challenges, and what are the main lessons learned from these experiences.
- Definitions of fragility tend to be organisation specific, but all definitions reflect an assumption that the causes of fragility are multidimensional, with weak institutions being a driver commonly flagged across all definitions. The SRE adopted the definition of the 2016 IFAD's Strategy because it includes key aspects flagged in the WB and OECD definitions.
- The SRE design was constructed by developing a ToC using the SD3C as a basis and capturing key sub-regional fragility features. A fragility analytical framework also informed the SRE design, with an emphasis on resilience, aligned with the IFAD 2019 Special Programme on fragile situations.
- Achieving resilience means seeking to minimize or suppress vulnerability to shocks by improving actors' ability to effectively manage and mitigate various fragility drivers and stressors, by promoting the development of absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities.
- The SRE applied a mixed-methods approach and used various sources to collect data and information, allowing a good level of triangulation, even with the COVID-19 limitations.

II. Fragility drivers, overview of IFAD operations and lessons from partners' experiences

32. This chapter reviews the five categories of fragility drivers of the sub-region, aligned with the SRE fragility analytical framework presented previously. The review treats each category of drivers at national level and above. Care needs to be taken for two reasons. First, the individual fragility drivers can be different at sub-national level. For example, the insecurity and conflict driver can vary significantly in different parts of the same country. Second, fragility emerges through the interaction of several drivers with external shocks.⁴⁸ The chapter also provides an overview of IFAD's engagement in the G5+1 over the past decade and finishes with key lessons learned (based on literature review) of the experiences of other development partners working in the sub-region.
33. **Overall, the agricultural sector remains prominent in the economies of the G5+1.** It constitutes the largest source of employment (26 per cent to 75 per cent of the active population) and contributes between 20 to 40 per cent of GDP value added (see Table A4, Annex V). Therefore, agriculture plays a pivotal role in sustainable livelihoods, in terms of social, economic, and environmental resilience, as well as building peace and security in the sub-region.

A. Contextual fragility issues of the sub-region

Poverty and Economic fragility drivers

34. **Rapid demographic growth and youth unemployment are among major socioeconomic challenges.** Indicators in Table 3 show that between 40 and 50 per cent of the populations for the G5+1 countries are under 15 years of age and the annual population growth is between 3 and 5 per cent. The latter raises challenges of: (i) significant agricultural production increases to meet agri-food demands, and (ii) subsequent economic growth to address both current youth unemployment and raise the job creation rate to match the rate of increase in labour force supply. Rapid demographic growth and youth unemployment are among the multiple overlapping factors that drive migration through the Sahel.

Table 3
Demographic indicators

Country	Total population (2019)	Rural population (% of total population) 2019	Annual population growth % (2009-2019)	Population ages 0-14 (% of total population) 2019	Share of youth not in education, employment or training, total (% of youth population)
Burkina Faso	20 321 378	70	3.4	44.6	41 (2018)
Chad	15 946 876	76.7	3.8	46.8	37.04 (2018)
Mali	19 658 031	56.8	3.5	47.3	26.7 (2018)
Mauritania	4 525 696	45.4	3.3	39.8	35.5 (2017)
Niger	23 310 715	83.4	4.7	49.8	68.5 (2017)
Nigeria	200 963 599	48.8	3.0	43.6	31.3 (2019)

Sources: World Bank indicators and UNDP

35. **Debt distress and macroeconomic imbalances limit governments' fiscal space to address drivers.** The World Bank Group observed that building sufficient fiscal space and managing monetary policy are preconditions for effective government service delivery, private sector development, and ensuring resilience to shocks.⁴⁹ It showed that macro-economic stability is key to strengthening resilience and managing fragility, conflict, and violence risks. Additionally, it is

⁴⁸ In situations where fragility is persistent, such as in Chad, the combination of key fragility drivers may remain stable over time. In other countries, it is possible that regions may be fragile for limited periods of time due to sporadic shocks.

⁴⁹ World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025.

<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/844591582815510521/pdf/World-Bank-Group-Strategy-for-Fragility-Conflict-and-Violence-2020-2025.pdf>.

impacted by conflict and crisis, often resulting in a rapid accumulation of public debt, capital flight, high and rising inflation, exchange rate volatility, and other dislocations. It further noted that macroeconomic shocks tend to weaken the factors of resilience for entire economies and societies.

36. **Poverty remains predominant in rural areas, compared to urban areas**, as shown in Table 4. Rural poverty in the sub-region is manifested in terms of a greater vulnerability of household assets to shocks and stressors, and low level of investment and adaptation capacities. Specific features of rural poverty include the decrease in farm productivity, the high and erratic variability of agricultural prices and the insecurity of agricultural transactions.⁵⁰ These negatively affect the level of household food security, especially smallholder farmers. Persistent food insecurity exacerbates the vulnerability of households to shocks and stressors, enhancing the vicious cycle of falling in and out of poverty.⁵¹

Table 4

Socioeconomic indicators

Country	GDP per capita (current US\$) 2019	Poverty headcount ratio (% of population) 2018	Rural poverty %	HDI/Rank (189) 2019	Global Food security index/ Rank (113), 2019	Gini coefficient 2019	Gender inequality Index/Rank (189), 2019
Burkina Faso	786.89	41.4	47.5 (2014)	0.452/182	50.1/87	35.3	0.59/147
Chad	709.54	42.3	52.5 (2011)	0.398/187	36.9/109	43.3	0.71/160
Mali	879	43.8	53.6 (2016)	0.434/184	54.4/80	33	0.67/158
Mauritania	1679.44	n.a.	44.4 (2014)	0.546/157	n.a.	32.6	0.63/151
Niger	553.89	40.8	55.2 (2011)	0.394/189	49.6/89	34.3	0.64/154
Nigeria	2229.85	40.1	52.1 (2018)	0.539/161	48.4/94	43	n.a.

Sources: World Bank indicators, UNDP database, Perspectives économiques au Burkina Faso, Enquête modulaire et permanente auprès des ménages Mali, Office National de la Statistique Mauritania, 2019 Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria

Social disruption related fragility

37. **Social fragilities reflect inequalities and exclusion, which undermine social cohesion.** Gender inequalities remain persistent across the sub-region. For instance, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger rank in the bottom five countries of the global Human Development Index (HDI), Mali in the bottom 10 per cent and Mauritania in the bottom 20 per cent. Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger are in bottom 10 (of 52) African countries in the Africa Gender Equality Index, with only Burkina Faso and Nigeria ranking in the top 50 per cent. FRIDE (2015) notes that in many Sahel countries, women are particularly disadvantaged by several intertwined factors such as the region's extreme poverty, weak state institutions, lack of basic services, unstable, unaccountable, corrupt politics, and highly patriarchal social structures.⁵² At a global level, it further notes that out of 152 countries on the UN Gender Inequality Index, Niger ranks 151, Chad 150, and Mali 148.⁵³ Women are under-represented in the formal sector and in socio-professional categories that require a certain level of training and qualification. In the agricultural sector, they suffer from persistent bias and discrimination, notably in

⁵⁰ Low banking rate, also an issue within the sub-region, has led to the multiplication of inclusive financial systems, especially in rural areas. In some of these countries, access to formal and informal micro financing has increased significantly, but unfortunately, the collapse of many savings and credit unions has caused financial losses and loss of confidence for many savers.

⁵¹ Global food security index data reveal unfavourable situation for Chad, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, see Table A5, Annex V.

⁵² FRIDE. 2015. *Gender inequality and state fragility in the Sahel*.

<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191893/Gender%20inequality%20and%20state%20fragility%20in%20the%20Sahel.pdf>.

⁵³ FRIDE. 2015. *ibid.*

terms of access to productive resources (land access and tenure security) and to services (agricultural inputs, extension, and financial services).

38. **Marginalisation and exclusion of social groups in terms of access rights to natural resources (land and water) are also key issues in the sub-region leading to conflicts over these resources.** Customary rules and mechanisms formerly used to resolve these issues are showing limitations. Nowadays, there are many situations where the efficacy of former arrangements to resolve disputes and/or facilitate agreements between social groups (e.g., between sedentary farmers and nomad pastoralists, autochthones and allochthones, or landlords and land users) is less successful, leading to frustration and violence. Moreover, the situation of insecurity within the sub-region has forced the displacement of persons, exacerbating the pressure and conflicts over natural resources, thus increasing food insecurity, deprivation, and poverty.
39. **Youths are highly vulnerable, being victims of social exclusion, although they are a potential asset to reduce fragility.** Youth vulnerability is a critical structural issue in the G5+1 countries.⁵⁴ The youth bulge is both a cause and a consequence of fragility. The Sahel has the youngest population in the world, with 64.5 per cent of its population being under 25 (United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel, 2018).⁵⁵ Alliance Sahel (2019) notes that there are about 50 million people under the age of 30 living in the Sahel region today, representing approximately 65% of the combined population of the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger).⁵⁶ Prospects for their future are limited due to poor overall levels of education from school systems clogged by rapid population growth, restricted freedom of movement because of insecurity, sluggish job markets, and increasing poverty.⁵⁷ Unemployment and unfavourable rules for access to productive resources are important factors that enhance their vulnerability. In conflict situations, youths are at greater risk due to the fact they constitute a prime source for recruitment for criminal and terrorist groups, given the absence of viable prospects for them, and as they are highly vulnerable. However, when they are provided with adequate opportunities, youths can play important roles in promoting agricultural innovations, for increased agricultural productivity and production, and thus contributing ultimately to rural transformation.

NRM and climate change (CC) related fragility

40. **All G5+1 countries are confronted with significant environmental challenges and are highly vulnerable to climate change.** In these countries, agro-pastoral activities are practiced in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) with short and variable rainfall and limited potential for crop production, where water scarcity is a key driver of vulnerability and access to water is a top priority for rural development. In specific areas of these ASALs, remoteness is a factor that exacerbates environmental fragility. Ecosystems in the sub-region are already affected by the effect of climate change and future adverse impacts are expected to be substantial, particularly in the agricultural and forestry sector, as well as on land use (IFAD 2021).⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Regarding youth definition, IFAD (2019) recalls that the official United Nations definition of “youth” is people between 15 and 24 years of age, adding that countries often adopt different definitions. It gives an example of African governments’ national youth policies which normally adopt the definition provided by the African Union, which is from 18 to 35. (See: IFAD 2019: IFAD’s Rural Youth Action Plan 2019-2021. https://www.ifad.org/documents/38711624/41190839/Action_Youth_web.pdf/f09a8d5c-36eb-f915-8b36-b521b1414b08?t=1560521494000).

⁵⁵ According to The State of the World Population 2018, published by the United Nations Population Fund, 52 per cent of the population (53 million people) in the countries of the Sahel is between 10 and 24 years of age, and that number is set to increase further over the next two decades.

⁵⁶ Alliance Sahel. 2019. *A Demographic, Threat? Youth, Peace and Security Challenges in the Sahel*. https://www.alliance-sahel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/AS_digital_EN.pdf.

⁵⁷ Alliance Sahel. 2019. Ibid.

⁵⁸ IFAD. 2021. *Africa Integrated Climate Risk Management Programme - Environmental & Social Management Framework (ESMF)*. IFAD, January 2012

41. During the last two decades, the frequency and extent of extreme weather events (such as droughts, floods, bushfires, high winds) have increased, with the intensification of climate change burdens. Burkina Faso faced four severe droughts between 2000 and 2017, while between 1983 and 2017, Chad, Mali and Niger faced ten, fourteen, and seven severe droughts, respectively (ARC 2020). These droughts led to decreases in crop productivity of between 10 and 25 per cent. An example relates to Lake Chad, the largest lake in the Sahel, which has shrunk by 95 per cent since the 1960s, with estimates attributing 50 per cent of the decrease to increased water use (e.g., from population growth and unsustainable irrigation projects) and 50 per cent to rainfall change and increasing temperatures.⁵⁹ See Box 5.

Box 5

Vulnerability to climate change in the Sahel

According to the WB (2017), the Sahel is particularly vulnerable to climate-related and other shocks, which have long-lasting negative consequences. Climate change is likely to cause more frequent and severe droughts and floods in the Sahel, affecting pastoral and agro-pastoral areas in particular. With more frequent natural disasters and intensified environmental degradation, people's lives and livelihoods are increasingly at risk.

Extreme events and other shocks have negative and long-lasting consequences for human development and poverty reduction in the Sahel that especially affect the poorest and most vulnerable. Consequences include eroding human capital and forcing families to rely on a range of largely informal activities; suboptimal coping mechanisms such as high interest borrowing; reduced consumption; sale of household and productive assets; and withdrawal of children from school.

Source: WB 2017. Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Programme

42. **Environmental degradation has led to resource depletion and ecological marginalization of the rural poor, amplified by the increased competition over natural resources.**⁶⁰ Natural resource degradation causes social disruption. Land degradation exacerbates water insecurity by reducing soil water retention capacity, increasing runoff, and provoking destructive flooding downstream and compounds water insecurity as a conflict trigger. It is a corollary to high population growth rates, combining increased cultivation of marginal areas, inappropriate agricultural practices, and overgrazing, leading to degradation of rangeland and deforestation.⁶¹ Hence, a decline in the agricultural productivity in some areas, especially those dependent on rainfed agriculture, and an increase in food insecurity.⁶² The World Bank Group (2021) notes that land degradation acted as a multiplier in the conflicts in Northern Mali and showed the link to existing ethnic and political tensions. By eroding natural resource-based livelihoods and income, water insecurity and land degradation generate unemployment, poverty, and resentment, particularly among young, disempowered people who are the most recruitable by groups.⁶³

Institutional weakness related fragility

43. **The lack of good governance as well as state weaknesses and collapses are significant and increasing institutional issues across the countries.**⁶⁴ Institutional fragility indicates that rules, regulations, and services are not

⁵⁹ IFAD. 2021. Ibid.

⁶⁰ Namely: water, arable and pastoral land and forests

⁶¹ Climate Change Profile West African Sahel, USAID, 2018

⁶² According to Thomas Homer Dixon (1999), natural resource scarcities in the Sahel are of three types based on the categories: supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity, and structural scarcity. Supply-induced scarcity is related to the shrinking of the resource due to land degradation and loss of vegetation cover. Demand-induced scarcity is due to population increase, and structural scarcity is due to the unequal geographic distribution of forest resources and unequal sharing of those resources within regions.

⁶³ World Bank Group. 2021. *Strengthening Regional Water Security for Greater Resilience in the G5 Sahel*.

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35994/Strengthening-Regional-Water-Security-for-Greater-Resilience-in-the-G5-Sahel.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

⁶⁴ According to Ncube and Jones 2013,

operating properly. This is commonly combined with weak capacity for policymaking, policy oversight, the inability to have a longer-term perspective, and the presence of weak social contracts within the society (including within rural communities). The prominence of this driver in all definitions is because it leads to poor financial management, slow procurement procedures, weak regulatory frameworks, unreliable judicial systems, lack of qualified human resources, and poor or lack of public quality services (especially in rural areas).⁶⁵ All of these directly have a negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of delivery of development partners' support.

44. The documentation suggests that institutional reforms in most of the G5+1 countries have not yet brought significant improvements either in service delivery, especially in marginalized and high-risk areas,⁶⁶ or in governance within the public and semi-public sub-sectors. Limited Government investments and access to basic public goods and services, which profoundly affect the population in remote rural areas of the Sahel, are frequently key issues mentioned for those countries. For example, the World Bank Group (2020-2025 Strategy.) notes that lack of investments, weak institutional capacity, lack of maintenance, and inequal water distribution, all hinder the actual use of this resource for both consumptive and productive uses and in turn, hamper socio-economic development of the G5+1 countries region.

Security challenges and fragility

45. **Insecurity and violent conflicts are more and more critical within the sub-region, resulting in increased number of deaths, displaced persons as well the lose of state control over resources and territories.** The region has been plagued by armed conflicts, from Lake Chad to the Niger Delta. Armed groups⁶⁷ manage to control large territories and to threaten others through sporadic attacks and raids, hampering efforts to promote economic development (including rural transformation) and social justice. Systems used by conflict entrepreneurs to extend or multiply the zones and communities they influence lead to complex landscapes of fragility. In response, greater attention and resources are being channelled to security matters.⁶⁸ According to the World Bank, across the G5+1 countries, significant medium intensity conflict has increased recently in Burkina Faso and Niger and has been chronic in Chad, Mali and Nigeria over the past decade.⁶⁹ The assumption is that this leads to physical threats to persons and communities and misappropriation and destruction of assets, which in turn exacerbates food insecurity and cycling back into poverty.
46. **Cross border aspects of conflict.** Fragility dynamics in the G5 +1 countries are cross-border in nature. For example, the Boko-Haram violent conflict has spillover effects that extend beyond Nigeria. Furthermore, fragility, conflict and violence situations may be interconnected within the sub-region or connected to other regions of the world. Populations in the G5+1 countries and their livelihoods are increasingly exposed to conflicts and violent extremism that cause food insecurity, aggravate poverty, and maintained the affected regions in situations of fragility, thus reducing the likelihood of sustainability of development impacts. According to UNHCR,⁷⁰ the conflict situation led to the increase of internal displacement in the central Sahel, tenfold since 2013, from 217,000 to a staggering 2.1 million by late

⁶⁵ In fact the WB used social contract framing to diagnose and explain complex development challenges such as entrenched inequalities, poor service delivery, weak institutions, and why decades of policy and institutional reforms promoted by external development actors could not fundamentally alter countries' development paths. World Bank. 2019. Social Contracts and World Bank Country Engagements: Lessons from Emerging Practices. IEG Meso Evaluation. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.

⁶⁶ According to country diagnostics of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger by the WB and AfDB

⁶⁷ Extremist groups belonging to Al-Qaida and Da'esh in the north of the Sahel, and Boko Haram in the east and south.

⁶⁸ In this context, the G5 Sahel governments have sought external military forces (French forces) to counteract the attacks of the extremists.

⁶⁹ https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_situationsofconflict.pdf.

⁷⁰ See <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/1/61e137ac4/decade-sahel-conflict-leaves-25-million-people-displaced.html#:~:text=Internal%20displacement%20has%20increased%20tenfold,Niger%2C%20now%20stands%20at%20410%2C000>. (consulted on 24/03/2022).

2021. The number of refugees in the Central Sahel countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, now stands at 410,000. The majority of the region's refugees fled violence in Mali where the conflict began in January 2012. A surge in violent attacks across the region in 2021 displaced nearly 500,000 people, with figures for December still pending. This has acute consequences on food security.

47. **COVID-19 challenge within the sub-region.** The sub-region has also been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, adding more sources of shocks to the already challenging situations. Restrictions introduced by the governments to manage the health crisis have had an adverse impact on the living conditions of farmers, pastoralists, and agro-pastoral communities and on animal husbandry. The situation will most probably lead to the rise of number of persons living in extreme poverty.

B. Overview of IFAD engagement in the six countries

48. IFAD's financial support is delivered through the program of loans and grants (PoLG). Loans are provided to individual governments, with amounts reflecting the IFAD's performance-based allocation system (PBAS), while grants (small or large) are allocated to a more diverse range of partners (governmental, non-governmental and multilateral). This section gives an overview of IFAD's support in the six countries, covering: IFAD country strategic documents, loan portfolio, grant financing and IFAD country presence.

Country strategies and PBAS allocation

49. **Country strategies.** IFAD engagement in countries happens within the framework of the country strategies and opportunities programme (COSOPs) documents or Country Strategy Notes (CSN). Table 5 shows what was approved for each country either as a COSOP or a CSN during the period under review. As the table shows, the preparation of CSNs in four out of the six countries happened in 2017 and there has been significant periods when there was neither a COSOP nor a CSN in several countries.

Table 5

Overview of COSOPs/CSNs


Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Burkina Faso		COSOP 2007-2012								CSN 2017-2018		COSOP 2019-2024
Chad					COSOP 2010-2015					CSN 2017-2019		
Mali		COSOP 2007-2012								CSN 2017-2018		
Mauritania		COSOP 2007-2012								CSN 2017-2018		COSOP 2018-2024
Niger	COSOP 2006-2011								COSOP 2013-2018			
Nigeria					COSOP 2010-2015						COSOP 2016-2021	

Source: SRE team elaboration

50. **PBAS allocations.** The G5+1 countries absorb a significant proportion of the PBAS allocation of WCA: 40 to 55 per cent between IFAD-8 (2010-2012) and IFAD-11 (2019-2021). This is mainly due to Nigeria, which absorbed an average of 18 per cent of the WCA allocation over the four replenishment periods followed by Niger (11 per cent) and Burkina Faso (8 per cent). Mali, Chad and Mauritania absorb 7, 6 and 4 per cent respectively.⁷¹ (see Figure 5 and further details in Annex V),

⁷¹ These figures supports the choice made to have the SRE focusing on those countries.

Figure 5
PBAS allocated to the G5+1 countries (% of the WCA total amount)




Source: IFAD Oracle BI

IFAD program of loans and grants, and presence in the sub-region

51. **IFAD portfolio financing and sub-sector focus.** In terms of portfolio financing for the six countries, twenty-seven investments projects were approved between 2009 and 2020 (fifteen are still ongoing), with an estimated total investment cost of US\$2.1 billion (See Annex III). Out of this total cost, a large portion (US\$1.2 USD billion, *i.e.*, 56 per cent) was financed by IFAD, followed by international co-financing (24 per cent),⁷² and then governments and beneficiaries (18 per cent).⁷³ The total IFAD financing corresponds (approximately) to 102 per cent of the PBAS allocation for the six countries, over the four replenishment periods (IFAD8 to IFAD11).
52. The consolidated portfolio areas show a clear focus on agricultural development (43 per cent), followed by rural development (17 per cent), credit and financial services (16 per cent), irrigation as well as marketing/storage/processing (11 per cent) and livestock (2 per cent). See figure 6.

Figure 6
Portfolio sector overview



Source: IFAD Oracle BI

53. **Programme of grants for the six countries.** The desk review identified 38 grants approved between 2009 and 2020 for a total of US\$73.8 million (Annex IV), of which 60 per cent was IFAD financing. Thirty-six of these grants are regional/global and only two were country-specific (Mali and Nigeria). A wide range of topics were covered by these grants, which can be grouped into the following main domains of interventions: knowledge-sharing, capacity strengthening for national and civil society organizations (farmers' organizations in particular), policy dialogue, inclusive financing, and promoting climate smart agriculture (a very recent theme). Most grants were large (twenty-seven against eleven small ones) by the IFA standards, possibly reflecting that most were covering regions or were global in terms of coverage. Grants were delivered by a range of partners with the CGIAR centres and international NGOs absorbing more than half of the grant

⁷² World Bank, African Development Bank and OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) were the main co-financing among international institutions and represented respectively 16 per cent, 12 per cent and 12 per cent

⁷³ A smaller share (2 per cent) still must be determined for projects that were just approved.

financing (35 and 16 per cent respectively), mostly through regional/global grants. UN organisations (FAO, UN Habitat) also absorbed a significant share of the grant financing (9 per cent).

54. **IFAD country presence within the sub-region.** In line with the IFAD decentralized model that was launched in 2019, three different hubs (West Africa, Coastal Africa and Central Africa) were established respectively in Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) and Yaoundé (Cameroon), covering the six evaluated countries until the end of 2021. The Country Directors (CDs) for Mali and Mauritania were based in Dakar, while those for Burkina Faso and Niger were in Abidjan. The CD of Nigeria was based in Abuja, while the CD of Chad based in Yaoundé. In 2022, the WCA regional office has been transferred from Rome to Abidjan, and the hub model replaced by the multi country offices, with one in Dakar, and country director-led offices in Nigeria and Niger.⁷⁴
55. During the reviewed period (2010-2020), country managers have changed at least two times for most of the countries.⁷⁵ Apart from Chad and Mauritania, all countries have an IFAD Country Office (ICO) with a Country Programme Officer (CPO). However, with the IFAD Decentralisation 2.0 being underway, this map will change completely from 2022 with the opening of multi country offices and a regional office in Abidjan.

C. Overview of lessons learned from partners' experiences

56. This section provides main lessons learned from the review of partners' interventions in the G5 Sahel countries and Northern Nigeria, over the evaluated period. Partners reviewed were international financial institutions (WB and AfDB), RBAs (FAO and WFP) and UNDP. Partners' experiences revealed some considerations to consider when designing interventions for fragile situations, as well aspects or approaches to apply during implementation. The main relevant lessons in the context of this SRE are presented as follows.
57. **The review confirms the necessity to conduct prior in-depth contextual analyses and to focus on fewer objectives in line with priorities identified, when designing actions for fragile situations.** There is consistency that in-depth analyses of fragility drivers are essential to understand the specificities of fragility in the geographical area that an intervention works in (FAO, WFP, and WB). This helps the design of sound interventions to address fragility (at least to some extent). Complex and/or ambitious projects, with multiple objectives and/or components, deliver limited achievements and results in situations of fragility (according to the WB).⁷⁶ Early and preventive interventions that are well focused on identified fragility pockets and drivers ultimately make it possible to be more effective and optimise the utilisation of resources.
58. **Designing interventions in fragile contexts should include encouraging leadership by government institutions, coupled with building their capacity as well as empowerment of communities through farmers' organizations (FOs) for implementing and managing various activities.** The WB highlights the necessity to help in building the state's legitimacy, capacity, and inclusive institutions. According to UNDP,⁷⁷ this contributes to strengthening resilient social contracts between citizens and the State.. Regarding FOs, WFP notes the need to build on existing community-based mechanisms to deliver programme activities, as well as job creation initiatives for young people, as this helps in reducing tensions in fragile situations. Partnering with local / grassroots organizations allows deepening knowledge of local circumstances and develops implementation capacity to enhance effectiveness in such contexts.

⁷⁴ One additional country director-led office is planned to be open in Burkina Faso.

⁷⁵ According to IFAD Oracle Bi, change in CPMs/CDs over the reviewed period is as follow: two for Chad and Mali, three for Burkina Faso, four for Mauritania and Niger, and five for Nigeria.

⁷⁶ WB experience (2013-2016)

⁷⁷ UNDP. 2018. Forging Resilient Social Contracts: A Pathway to Preventing Violent Conflict and Sustaining Peace.

59. **Flexibility is critical for working in fragile situations, enabling adaptation to changing circumstances and ensuring continued and effective programme implementation.** For the WB, differentiated approaches have been used, as well differentiated financing tools when working in such fragile contexts, to scale up and tailor support. In evolving environments of fragility, programmes that can respond rapidly to crises perform better while also retaining a focus on the key goals of reducing the vulnerability to shocks over the medium-term. In a fragile environment, the Bank's flexibility has been critical to ensuring continued and effective programme implementation, but this requires operational policies that are more agile and risk management practices that promote responsiveness and adaptation in low capacity and high-risk environments.
60. **The need to partner with other development actors when working in fragile situation is very important.** Such partnerships require: (i) effective consultation between partners; ii) complementarity areas of expertise with clearly different comparative advantages for each agency; and iii) developing joint responses and/or joint interventions from the initial planning.⁷⁸ Based on FAO and WFP work in Mali, joint interventions enabled blending of their differing expertise and higher overall effectiveness when carrying out activities on the same site. This was through creating important synergies to improve the resilience capacities of populations. WFP supported the recovery of populations affected by shocks through asset creation activities that mobilized communities around labour-intensive interventions, while FAO was responsible for the supply of inputs and equipment for the development of assets created or rehabilitated. FAO was also responsible for the technical design of infrastructure.
61. **Appropriate targeting and effective capacity building are enabling factors for achieving results in fragile contexts.** WFP experience showed that an overambitious geographical coverage, weak targeting and/or insufficient understanding of factors of vulnerability negatively affected the achievement of programme results (outputs and outcomes).⁷⁹ UNDP experience in Mali (2020) corroborates WFP experience.⁸⁰ The WB experience in Mauritania, based on effective targeting, showed substantial progress in improving access to vocational training, better safety net programmes and improving financial management at decentralized / local government level.
62. **Community driven development (CDD) has shown its relevance and usefulness for achieving results in fragile situations.** Regarding CDD, the WB in Mauritania reported good progress in improving the living conditions of rural communities through the implementation of CDD programmes and in facilitating access to basic services in urban areas. Communities were keen to invest in local economic and social services. Good progress was also found in improving the living conditions of rural communities through implementation of CDD programmes in Niger (2008-2011). Similar results were observed for WB supported CDD projects in Nigeria (2014). The latter showed that interventions to transform land related assets require a socially and culturally sensitive design, which provides inclusive development opportunities for all affected parties.
63. **Nexus approaches, entailing combining short-term (economic and/or humanitarian) needs with longer-term development objectives, enhance effectiveness when working in emergency contexts.** For instance, in Mali (2013-2017), WFP stepped up to meet refugees' and internally displaced persons' needs as required, while it played an increasing role in building the resilience of communities by supporting food security actions. In Mauritania (2018), WFP supported the establishment of the Adaptive Social Protection System, which includes not only the dimension of response to shocks but also a broader approach

⁷⁸ The three stages entail increasing involvement levels, a joint response being the most engaging.

⁷⁹ In 11 operations out of 19, according to the regional synthesis (2013-2017)

⁸⁰ However, UNDP recognizes that for interventions to be more effective, they must address fundamental structural issues that have a large impact on results, such as land tenure issues, social relations, and the natural tendency for assistance to be captured by dominant groups.

to food insecurity and malnutrition, in particular the support for the resilience of populations.

64. **Addressing gender equality issues, both strategically and operationally, is pivotal for reducing inequality linked to fragility.** FAO realized that the lack of a context specific gender strategy,⁸¹ contributed to the lower effectiveness of activities targeted at women, who are amongst the most vulnerable in the sub-region. Additionally in Mali, improving the empowerment of women by strengthening their economic power, strengthening their social status and enabling their decision-making contributed to improving their livelihoods. The WB noted that neglecting human dimensions could reinforce income inequality and exacerbate societal tension. Gender being a key factor, women migrants who reside in hamlets are the most disadvantaged, in terms of access to the productive factors. Thus, addressing their inequality in accessing those factors has been important in such contexts.⁸² Moreover, in conflict-affected situations, gender-based violence can be a serious issue and therefore, it is essential to address this challenge and learn from its complexity and manifestation. Considering all this, support to women is critical to enable them to be entrepreneurs, change makers, and peacebuilders.⁸³
65. **Empowerment of youths has been pivotal to mitigate issues that contribute to fragility.** FAO in Mali (2018/2019) contributed to the empowerment of young people and their remaining in their home areas. The opinion of beneficiaries and local authorities was that there were fewer young people departing from the intervention areas, while robberies carried out by groups of young people had decreased due to alternative sources of income.

Key points

- Five sets of fragility drivers are manifested in the sub-region: Socioeconomic; Social; Natural and environmental; Institutional; and Insecurity and conflict. All five sets of drivers are significant, although their importance has varied both over time and by specific geographic location.
- Over the evaluated period (2010-2020), IFAD has been engaged in the six countries using the COSOPs or CSNs and the PBAS allocation. The later for the six evaluated countries has varied according to IFAD replenishment cycle and represented on average, 54% of WCA PBAS allocation over the decade.
- The largest share (60%) of the portfolio funding (of an estimated total cost of US\$ 2.1 billion) for the six countries was on agriculture and rural development, followed by credit and financial services. Grant financing was slightly important (73.8 million) of which 60% was funded by IFAD to support topics related to KM, inclusive financing, policy dialogue and grassroots' organisations.
- At the time of the evaluation, while IFAD is well present within the sub-region through three hubs, the in-country residence of CDs is weak (only one out of six) and country offices are operational in four countries.
- Main lessons learned identified from the review of partners' interventions in the G5+1 fragile contexts covered points such as: flexibility, need for partnering based on comparative advantages, applying nexus approach, addressing gender inequality and empowerment of youths, and working directly with local and grassroots organizations.

⁸¹ for a project in Mali (2019)

⁸² In Niger (2013-2016) the WB needed to double-up efforts to mainstream gender dimension across the portfolio.

⁸³ Sound analytics need to be done so WBG can learn from the challenges and complexity of addressing GBV and how, beyond the focus on GBV, women should be supported as entrepreneurs, change makers and peacebuilders. WB recommended that support for transformation or commercialization activities should be underpinned by market and value chain analysis that is poverty- and gender-sensitive.

III. Relevance and coherence

A. Relevance

66. Relevance assesses the extent to which: (i) the objectives of the intervention/ strategy are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities, and partner and donor policies ; (ii) the design of the interventions / strategy and the targeting strategies adopted are consistent with the objectives; and (iii) the intervention / strategy has been (re-) adapted to address changes in the context.⁸⁴ In the context of the SRE, the provision of answers to the following two key evaluations questions helped to identify lessons learned, considering IFAD experience within the sub-region so far.
- To what extent have the design of country strategies, programmes and projects been relevant, taking into account fragility drivers and principles of working in fragile situations?
 - How adequate and adaptive have intervention approaches and elements been, for a delivery in the sub-regional contexts featured by economic, natural, social, institutional, and security constraints?

Relevance of country strategies and programmes

67. **COSOPs are, in principle, flexible instruments that should be revised and adapted when major contextual change occurs; but evidence is limited on their flexible use in the G5+1 contexts.** COSOPs provide a framework for IFAD's engagement for inclusive and sustainable rural transformation at the country level and are jointly developed by IFAD and the respective government. The preparation of CSNs, rather than new COSOPs or updating the current COSOP, in four out of the six countries in 2017 appears to have been the main response to IFAD operating in an unpredictable context during much of the past decade in the G5+1. Notwithstanding use of CSNs, the lack of an active COSOP or a CSN for several years raises questions over their usefulness as a tool to manage the unpredictable context. Even when COSOPs/CSNs were in place there is little evidence that they have been revisited on a regular basis, to respond to the unpredictable context, as suggested in IFAD's 2018 Revised Guidelines and Procedures for Results-based Country Strategic Opportunities Programmes. Therefore, there is little experience across the G5+1 of using COSOPs/CSNs as a flexible strategic tool for on-going engagement between IFAD and the governments.⁸⁵ The implied gap in terms of usefulness of COSOPs/CSNs was identified in the recently completed CSPE for Niger, which recommended drafting a COSOP implementation action plan to guide investment and non-lending activities.
68. **The 2018 COSOP guidance requires carrying out a fragility analysis in countries classified as fragile. Experience suggests a non comprehensive approach for that and a lack of clarity on how this adds value.** Before 2018, there was no requirement that COSOPs/CSNs in countries classified as fragile by IFAD should include a fragility analysis. Three COSOPs have been agreed post 2018 – for Mali, Niger, and Mauritania – and one is currently under preparation for Nigeria. Neither Niger nor Mauritania were classified as fragile by IFAD when their post-2018 COSOPs were produced and so, as would be expected do not include fragility analysis. Only the COSOP for Mali, classified as a fragile country when the COSOP was produced, includes a fragility analysis. This Mali focused analysis *de facto* discusses four of the five drivers (see Box 6), namely: (i) conflict and violence; (ii) political instability and governance ineffectiveness; (iii) vulnerability to shocks (climate and price related); and (iv) the low Human Development Index. It does not analyse the interaction between the drivers, which is actually what leads to fragility, and then link these challenges with resilience. Furthermore, it is difficult to see the benefit of the fragility analysis performed, given that the

⁸⁴ It relates to the question: Is the intervention doing the right things?

⁸⁵ NEN division actors interviewed, also facing serious fragility issues due to conflict, mention their preference of using CSNs in their contexts.

recommendations made are generic and mainly repeat points of the IFAD2016 Strategy for engagement in countries with fragile situations (see Box 6).

Box 6

Actions proposed in the COSOP (2020) of Mali

Develop and strengthen partnerships with other development agencies with complementary mandates on humanitarian interventions and proven experiences in building rural communities post conflicts resilience, social cohesion and conflict prevention and mediation;

Design and implement operations that focuses on the most vulnerable groups such as women and young people while promoting climate smart and resilient economic activities. Such operations should be responsive to structural (climate change, conflicts, poverty) and shocks (like the COVID19 pandemic) through adapted and flexible approaches that allow the provisions of short-term emergency supports and mitigate the reverse effects on projects' beneficiaries and their livelihood in the long-term;

Improve quality and capacities in projects' implementation support and follow up through operational partnerships on the ground involving farmer organizations, local and international NGOs, and other socio-economic stakeholders (organised civil society organizations); and

Strengthen institutional support (with the technical, logistical, and financial means) to empower government agencies and local authorities with skills and capacities needed to effectively coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the ongoing projects/programmes.

Source: COSOP Mali 2020

69. **Nevertheless, while COSOPs and CSNs are not supported by formal fragility analyses, and the language of drivers is not used, some aspects of the fragility drivers have been captured in the contextual analyses included in COSOPs/CSNs.** While fragility emerges from the interaction between drivers, a fragility analysis starts with analysis within the individual drivers. Review of the COSOPs' strategic objectives (see Table B1 of Annex VI) highlights three main areas of focus, which are well aligned with key fragility drivers (analysed earlier) related to socioeconomic, institutional, and environmental issues.
- Economic resilience of smallholder farmers and food security, combined with inclusive value chain development (in all six countries).
 - Rural institutions strengthening to enabling sustained and inclusive access (by women, youths, and poor groups) to diversified services (all countries overall, but especially in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria).
 - Environmental sustainability and resilience to climate change (all countries overall, but especially in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger).
70. Guidance for analyses related to most of the drivers already exists within IFAD as presented in Table 6. This explains why analysis pertained to the drivers is found in the COSOPs, but also design documents for loan operations.

Table 6
Examples of guiding documents that address fragility drivers

<i>Name of the document</i>	<i>Stated purpose</i>	<i>Fragility drivers covered</i>
Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies (2019)	The guidelines define the procedures that: (i) highlight the basic principles of country strategies; (ii) define the roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities; (iii) explain the COSOP review and evaluation processes; and (iv) offer an overview of the financial resources needed to implement the country strategy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High poverty and related economic situation • Social inequality and weak social cohesion • Degradation of natural resources and climate change burdens • Erosion of trust in public institutions and weak social contracts • Greater insecurity and violent conflicts due to extremist groups
Project Design Guidelines, Programme Delivery Risks and IPRMs	The IPRM was elaborated for all new and ongoing projects to help identify, assess, mitigate, manage, monitor, and update risks to programme delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High poverty and related economic situation
SECAP assessment	SECAP sets out IFAD's commitments to social, environmental and climate sustainability. All projects supported or co-financed by IFAD are required to comply with SECAP.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social inequality and weak social cohesion • Degradation of natural resources and climate change burdens • Erosion of trust in public institutions and weak social contracts
Revised Operational Guidelines on Targeting	The Revised Operational Guidelines on Targeting operationalize the 2006 targeting policy that calls for a greater commitment of IFAD in engaging more fully in national policy processes in order to tailor country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs) and projects to the specific conditions and priorities of partner countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social inequality and weak social cohesion

Compiled by the SRE team. See detailed Table B2 in Annex VI

71. **Reviewed contextual analyses focus extensively on the drivers where IFAD makes a direct contribution – economic/poverty, natural resources/climate change and social inequality. Deep analysis related to issues in the other two drivers - weak public institutions and insecurity/serious conflict – is absent.** This reflects that issues related to these drivers are to be treated as risks to be managed rather than problems where IFAD is expected to make a direct contribution to their solution. The review of objectives at both the COSOP and loan-operation designs shows outcomes directly addressing problems under the economic / poverty, natural resources / climate change and social inequality drivers, but not in relation to weak public institutions and insecurity/conflict (in rural settings). Social and economic issues are rarely identified among key risks to manage, while public institutions and insecurity are commonly treated as risks to the overall programme.
72. **Analysis of 'social contracts' was not found within the analyses carried out in any of the G5+1 COSOPs, albeit marginally addressed in the fragility analysis for the Mali COSOP.**⁸⁶ The assessment of existing social contracts helps understanding of the political economy in rural settings and the factors causing socio-political instability (see Box-7).

Box 7

What is a social contract analysis?

Social contract analysis (or diagnostic) is an approach that is increasingly used by a number of development organisations, including the World Bank, USAID and UNDP, to help explain disparate and seemingly intractable development challenges within a single analytical framework. It is important to note that its use is not confined to analysis in fragile contexts but has been applied across multiple contexts. As such, it would not be an analytical approach that would be promoted only in IFAD's approach to working in fragile contexts.

⁸⁶ It is probable that IFAD programme staff are unaware of social contract diagnostic tools, such as those developed by the World Bank and UNDP.

Experience of its use in the World Bank would also suggest that the analytical approach is distinct from that found in other analytical approaches to examining government failure and inequality.

According to the World Bank (2019), social contract diagnostics can help explain development challenges and the persistence of distortionary economic policies because of unequal bargaining power among citizens, the state, and nonstate players, including the private sector. As such its main practical use is in identifying risk mitigation strategies for political and governance related risks. Social contract diagnostic approaches differ from those commonly used in IFAD in that they rely on the use of perception-based data to better explain feelings of inequality and discontent rather than relying on traditional measures of inequality such as income and resource distribution.

Source: World Bank 2019⁸⁷

73. In fragile settings, multiple, interacting factors can undermine the social contract, which usually emerge from the interaction between: (i) the expectations of the rural poor and (ii) the state's capacity to provide services, including security. Rural conditions become particularly fragile when rural people living within such contexts are disconnected from state institutions and services. The COSOPs/CSNs for the G5+1 (for the entire reviewed period) did not explicitly touch this point. The exception is the Mali 2020 COSOP. The political economy analysis in its annexed ("Fragility assessment note") can be seen as touching on the issue of social contracts (see Box 8), but it is important to note that social contract analysis is different from a generic political economy analysis. Examples of social contract diagnostic tools include those of the World Bank and UNDP, but it is also true that these diagnostic tools have not been widely promoted by either organisation.

Box 8

Excerpts of fragility assessment in the Mali 2020 COSOP

The military coup in 2012 interrupted this democratic dynamic and shattered the national consensus and the social contract well established through decentralization and promoted under the 1991-2012 presidencies. Meanwhile with conflicts and violence rising in the entire northern part of the country, the growing threats to the country's security diverted public resources and the new elected government could not cope with the high and increasing social expectations emerging from the multidimensional crisis. Although the pursuit of the decentralization agenda is one of the key elements of the 2015 Peace Agreement, it has fallen short of its promise to reduce poverty and build national cohesion. Administrative structures put in place to support decentralization have not been supported by adequate financial resources. Local governments continue to face significant challenges to delivering basic services to the rural communities.

Furthermore, poor governance and weak control of corruption was ubiquitous during the post crisis period and exacerbated the gap in the social distrust toward the central government. Mali has shown poor performance on the World Bank governance indicators recorded over the last decade as the country ranks below the 40 percentile for most of them. As seen in the chart below, the Political Stability and Government Effectiveness indicators show consistent downwards trends. Control of corruption has remained unstable; improvements are not permanent and popular perception on the weakness of this indicator is strong. Many Malians have lost confidence in their elites and their capacity to improve their living standards. Recurrent protests to claim improvement in public services including education, health, and governance demonstrate the general dissatisfaction on the management of public affairs. Adding to that, recurrent changes in the Government affect the development and implementation of policies and programmes. Between 2016 and 2019, the Prime Minister has changed four times. The last national election held in 2018 was marked by low turnout. The legislative election held in 2020 also had low turnout and the results were widely contested leading to protests and escalating social tensions and unrest.

Source: Mali COSOP 2020

74. **Guidance on what to cover in a fragility analysis is available, but built on a simplistic assumption of weak or non-existent interlinkages among the**

⁸⁷ World Bank. 2019. Social Contracts and World Bank Country Engagements : Lessons from Emerging Practices. IEG Meso Evaluation. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32621>

drivers. The current Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies suggests that the fragility analysis seeks to answer the four questions shown in Box 9 but provides no guidance on how to go about answering these questions and highlighting interlinkages within and among drivers. In fact, fragility emerges from the interaction between select drivers and fragility analysis needs to focus on this interaction and not just within the separate drivers. Analysing those linkages are critical to understand the scope of the fragility and therefore, to design appropriate interventions.

Box 9

Suggested questions for fragility analysis in country strategies

1. Why does IFAD consider this country fragile (e.g. conflict or post-conflict, prone to natural disasters, low institutional capacity and governance framework as reflected by bottom rural sector performance quintile)?
2. How does this fragility affect the agricultural/rural sector? What are the drivers of fragility (e.g. riparian water issues, land tenure, pastoralist grazing patterns)?
3. What is the risk posed to IFAD's programme? What are the various measures IFAD would introduce in the new COSOP and future interventions (both lending and non-lending) to prevent, mitigate or help cope with this fragility? What impact does this fragility have on IFAD's current portfolio, if any?
4. How would IFAD operate differently in such situations to reduce risks to beneficiaries, staff/consultants and implementing agencies (e.g. not operate in certain areas, introduce more flexibility in supervision arrangements, ensure additional security arrangements)?

Source: Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies

75. **The assumption that IFAD can easily draw on fragility analyses carried out by other development partners can be questioned.** The operational guidance also suggests that the fragility assessment note draws elements as much as possible on fragility assessments prepared by the Government and its partners, or by other partner institutions (e.g., IFIs or UN agencies). The assumption that this is feasible can be questioned. The fragility analyses carried out by the IFIs (the Risk and Resilience Assessments) are not published. The UN rarely carries out explicit fragility analyses that are in the public domain, albeit such analyses are produced by some UN organisations but for internal use.⁸⁸
76. **Transboundary issues are rarely considered in COSOPs, as IFAD lacks a framework within which such issues can easily be accommodated.** COSOPs are not a tool for coordination and agreement across neighbouring countries, although the current Operational Guidelines for Developing COSOPs note that *'In a limited number of countries, IFAD will pilot: (a) regional lending operations to support country programmes in addressing cross-border development challenges'*. There are at least three challenges to using COSOPs to strategically address transboundary issues. First, COSOPs across the six countries are developed in different years and for different periods, reflecting within country needs aligned with the country development priorities and national plans. Second, COSOPs are joint products of both IFAD and Governments and if transboundary issues are not considered in governments' priorities, so it will be difficult for IFAD to incorporate it in COSOPs.
77. **Positively, few programmes are being used to address transboundary issues.** Investments in addressing transboundary issues are found in the Niger country programme, such as in the ProDAF project, with its systems for monitoring cross-border flows of agro-pastoral products along the Kano-Katsina-Maradi, Tahoua-Sokoto-Kebbi and Zinder-Daura-Kano transport corridors. The more

⁸⁸ The World Bank, Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs) have been developed to assess patterns and drivers of conflict, violence and fragility. RRAs are not published, but on occasion are developed in partnership with other development partners. In 2018, the African Development Bank introduced the Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment (CRFA) tool. This tool provides a systematic and objective assessment of fragility risks and sources of resilience, on the basis of seven dimensions of fragility.

ambitious SD3C programme with its focus on transboundary issues can be seen as the first initiative using such approaches across the entire sub-region.

Relevance of programmes and projects

78. **The objectives of country programmes were well aligned with national and IFAD priorities of achieving resilience and relevant to primary beneficiaries' priorities.** IFAD loan operations are in general designed to meet needs identified in national priorities and of primary beneficiaries, while supporting building resilience in rural areas. There is no evidence suggesting that loan operations are not aligned with Governments' priorities as illustrated in the findings from the CPSEs (Nigeria, 2016; Burkina Faso, 2019; and Niger, 2021) and according to views of key informants. Analysis of field data gathered in the six countries (see Table 7) reveals that the perception of fragility drivers varies slightly according to each category of actor. For instance, beneficiaries of IFAD support mentioned unemployment and lack of economic opportunities as the most important fragility issues, while direct implementers of projects and their local partners mentioned climate and weather disturbance as the top challenges. All those issues expressed have been addressed by IFAD's supported projects and programmes. However, beneficiary groups reported not having been involved in identifying projects' priorities, raising a question on their involvement mechanism.⁸⁹ The generally lower priority given to conflict in Table 7 by all three stakeholder groups is assumed to reflect the fact that IFAD projects have been located in areas where conflict is less problematic than elsewhere (in some countries) or the fact that field data gathering did not take place in medium intensity conflict-affected areas

Table 7
Perception of fragility drivers by category of stakeholder

<i>Fragility driver</i>	<i>Direct project implementers</i>	<i>Beneficiaries of IFAD support</i>	<i>Local projects' partners</i>	<i>Average Total</i>
Poverty leading to asset depletion	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.3
Unemployment and lack of incomes	3.8	4.3	3.8	4.0
Food insecurity and malnutrition	4.2	3.9	3.4	3.8
Social inequality and exclusion	2.8	2.3	2.9	2.7
Environmental /natural resources degradation	3.8	3.9	3.9	4.0
Climate/weather disturbance	4.3	4.0	4.1	4.1
Poor availability of services linked to production	3.9	4.1	3.8	3.9
Insecurity and violation of human right	3.1	2.3	3.6	3.0
Violence and civil unrest	2.5	1.3	2.7	2.0

Source SRE field data (see details by country in Table B3, Annex VI)

Methodological note: The assessment was purely qualitative. After an explanation of the evaluation theme, interviewees were asked during a discussion (in groups or individuals) to provide their opinion by appreciating the importance of each fragility driver aspect in their specific context. The average ratings were calculated for types of actors by country. As already mentioned interviewees were not sampled in order to make a generalization. The results reflect the variability in the perception of fragility by individuals or types of actors. Appreciation varies from (0) almost inexistent to (5) very high. Interviewees were groups met during the field visits. Number of persons met by category are presented in Annex V.

79. **Cross border trade being important in the sub-region, and the increasing priority given by IFAD to investment in value chains, requires sound and comprehensive analysis of the opportunities and risks involved in investing in such areas. Evidence suggests that such analysis has generally not been done.** Available information on cross border trade is produced

⁸⁹ Triangulation of this information confirms the superficiality of consultations with beneficiary groups in most cases.

by regional organisations such as WFP and CILSS. The IFAD FARMTRAC grant also funded the collection of information on cross border trade of food and animal products.⁹⁰ However, the risks of cross border trade are illustrated in the border regions between Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali where trade has been disrupted because of insecurity, thus requiring new arrangements for transporting goods by secured convoy. IFAD supported projects funded initiatives in Niger to mitigate the risks to trade between Niger and Nigeria and to promote dialogue to maintain trading of essential and perishable commodities. However, the review of design documents for relevant loan operations, in general, reveals no use of cross border trade information or analysis of the vulnerability of value chains stakeholders to trade risks. A case in point is the recently designed PAFPA project in Burkina Faso, where design mainly assessed risks in the production segment, due to climate and environmental hazards. The same observation also applies for PRODAF-Diffa.⁹¹ Yet trade risks appear significant in the light of recent events such as conflicts and COVID-19 shocks, leading to border closure or trade hindrance, difficulties to transport and market, insecurity of trade activities, risks of robberies and racketing, etc. Changes of routes due to border closure or insecurity increases the transportation hurdles and costs.

Adequacy of designs and approaches

80. **Programs and projects identified lessons have informed designs of new operations, but not in terms of how interventions can address holistically drivers of fragility.** Examples of lessons being carried through into new projects can be found in Burkina Faso and Niger. For instance, the Burkina Faso COSOP 2019 includes lessons learned from earlier projects that were useful to design new ones, even if not systematically. Some lessons pertained to improved traditional techniques for SWC techniques by establishing a relationship between these techniques and land security, which has changed over time,⁹² and landowners are now requiring to apply these techniques systematically. Another lesson was that access to nonfinancial services is a prerequisite for successful access to financial services. Non-financial services, in particular business development services and technical skills training, should be supported in the context of decentralized financial services and be addressed in a systemic manner. Similar lessons were also identified in Chad and in Mali.⁹³ Those examples show that lessons were more focused on delivery of particular interventions, but not on how interventions can better contribute mitigating drivers of fragility (environmental and economic related in the given examples). This is possibly because: (i) explicit consideration of addressing root causes of fragility contextual challenges has not been a common practice in the programmes; and ii) some key drivers are treated as risks which incidence shall be mitigated, rather than an important contextual challenge that support can directly contribute in addressing.
81. **Maintaining investments in the same geographic area makes learning and implementing lessons easier. Some lessons directly relate to working in**

⁹⁰ FARM TRAC 2019 (CILSS, IFPRI, Association Ouest Africaine du Commerce Transfrontalier des produits Alimentaires, Agro-sylvo-pastoraux et Halieutiques (AOCTAH) / West African Association for Cross-Border Trade, in Agro-forestry-pastoral and Fisheries Products (WACTAF)) is expected to provide quantitative information on trade in agricultural and food commodities and on trade barriers; design an electronic platform for the monitoring of agricultural inter-state trade in Sahel and West Africa and of cross border flows of agro-pastoral products along trade corridors; conduct an economic analysis of the main bottlenecks in rural households' access to agricultural and food products by country

⁹¹ It included a detailed risk assessment at design, including economic risks that might affect market governance, but did not include trade risks.

⁹² more than 20 years of investment on this aspects

⁹³ Based on experience from previous projects, PROHYPA in Chad (2009) highlighted in its design document that priority must be given to establishing diversified institutions to resolve conflicts related to natural resources. The approach should be to capitalise on local institutions' capacities and only engage with the departmental administration for the most delicate arbitrations. In Mali, the PAPAM (2010) drew on lessons related to demand-driven and private delivery of advisory services in rural areas. The Mali COSOP 2020 considered integrating some lessons learned from IFAD funded projects in its design. These lessons include the importance of promoting entrepreneurship for young people and women, and improving household food security by rehabilitating degraded lands.

fragile contexts. This seems to be the case in the G5 (only) countries, where practice has generally been to locate successive project phases (in successive loan design documents) in the same geographical area. By doing so, lessons have been drawn from previous operations, some are in relation with working in fragile situations, and reflected in the design of latter operations. The example of Chad in Box 10 is illustrative.⁹⁴

Box 10

Lessons from Chad, PARSAT (2014-2022)

Complexity of interventions. The experience of IFAD and other Technical and Financial partners (TFPs) has shown the importance - to ensure the rapid achievement of tangible impacts - of limiting the areas of intervention to simple actions easy to implement, given the difficulties in finding quality goods and services in rural areas. The participatory approach must be favoured, as done in the framework of PSANG-II and PRODER-K, whose priority interventions have been based, as far as possible, on those identified and prioritized by the communities in their local or village development plan (LDL or VDP). However, the experience of PSANG-II also demonstrates the fact that the complexity of the projects derives from the desire to respond to all the requests expressed. This can lead to (i) a great dispersion and disconnection of the activities undertaken; (ii) difficulties in technical control and monitoring of these activities and; (iii) to a dilution of the impacts.

Institutional set-up. Chad is classified as a "fragile state", although efforts are being made by the Government to gradually move out of this categorization. Institutional capacities are weak, at the central level and even more in the regions, and the public finance management system suffers from serious shortcomings. The management of development projects / programs is therefore still mainly delegated to specific management units, entities recruited competitively for the duration of the projects / programs, but under the supervision of the Ministries concerned by the interventions. This arrangement remains necessary as long as government and ministerial measures are not defined for a more transparent and sustainable management of bilateral and multilateral cooperation projects/programs (this is one of the conclusions of the PSANG-II and PRODER-K completion reports, and which was also taken into account in the design of PADER-G).

Source: PARSAT Design document

82. **Loan operation designs have not included much consideration on how they can effectively address shocks, except of those related to climate change.** The review of experience shows that shocks are flagged on occasion, but not consistently and systemically in the program designs. Beyond the climatic aspects for which the Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP) are applied,⁹⁵ shocks occurring across the other categories of drivers are not explicitly assessed, in terms of their occurrence, their magnitude or how these might interact with the other drivers.
83. **All relevant guidance on working in fragile contexts emphasises the need to design simple interventions, but there is limited evidence that this approach has been implemented. Programmes have instead prioritised developing capacity of non-government stakeholders in delivery.** In fragile contexts, interventions should fit with the institutional capacity to implement them and in general be simple to implement. Only the Chad project design documents for PADER-G 2010-2016 and PARSAT 2014-2022 explicitly discuss the need for a simple design. Elsewhere, looking across the G5+1, in the instance in Mali, the PAPAM PCR2018 highlighted that the complex design (institutional set-up, complexity of actions and number of public institutions involved) created significant risks for the project implementation. The 2013 CSPE of Mali also highlighted issues with institutional set-ups leading to delays, and changes in the institutional arrangements. In fact, slow initial implementation was highlighted in sixteen out of eighteen initial supervision reports and low institutional capacity signalled as a

⁹⁴ In Nigeria, there has been a significant change in geographic focus over the evaluation period and so a more limited opportunity to pursue such an approach.

⁹⁵ Mandatory since 2015, as an important mechanism to mainstream climate change in IFAD operations. But the starting year was 2009, according to the report of the Thematic Evaluation of IFAD's Support for Smallholder Farmers' Adaptation to Climate Change. IOE, 2021.

significant reason for this. The self-assessment by IFAD country teams also identified low institutional capacity as a continuing challenge across the countries. The main response to low institutional capacity has been to invest in developing capacity of non-government stakeholders which is discussed in more detail in the efficiency section.

84. **Major adjustments in projects were made during the MTRs to respond to critical issues, e.g. a deterioration in the security situation or failures in meeting result targets or in co-financing.** Out of the ten loan operations where MTRs have been carried out during the evaluation period, in three of them⁹⁶ medium intensity conflict led to a scaling back of activities, whilst non-availability of planned co-financing triggered significant redesign of planned results in five loan operations [PASPRU (Burkina Faso), the Rural Microfinance Programme and PAPAM (Mali), PASK II (Mauritania), and PASADEM (Niger)]. Examples of responses to medium intensity conflict for Nigeria and Mali are shown in Box 11.

Box 11

Responses to medium intensity conflict

Nigeria

Given the scale of IFAD's engagement, its programmes have been vulnerable to various forms of conflict, insurgency, or unrest, whether in the Northeast from Boko Haram, from pastoralist-farmer conflicts in the middle belt or violence and unrest in the Delta region. Most programmes do not include any conflict analysis or risk assessment of how changes introduced by IFAD would affect conflict or insecurity in either a positive or negative way, or mitigation measures. Where a mitigation strategy is put forward at design, it is largely to avoid working in known conflict zones by selecting LGAs or villages outside of known areas of disturbance, and by bringing staff and beneficiaries located in conflict zones to attend capacity-building or other sessions in safer programme locations.

Mali

Two projects (PIDRN and PIDRK) operated in the northern regions. Efforts were made to adapt their components to these zones, but the risks linked to conflicts were underestimated. The situation in the north of Mali in recent years has been particularly serious and IFAD supported projects moved from the North to the South. Nevertheless, a more thorough analysis would have helped to plan mitigation measures from the start.

Compiled by the SRE team

Summary on relevance

85. **Lessons from IFAD's engagement in the sub-region (G5+1 countries) confirm that IFAD country strategies, programmes and operations were overall well relevant for objectives linked to rural transformation, in line with IFAD's mandate; but the relevance was less in addressing key fragility challenges of the sub-region.** This is because only three (related to economic poverty, NRM and social exclusion) of the five types of fragility drivers are explicitly covered in designing strategies and operations. Another fact was the insufficient reflection of fragility features in designing strategies and operations as suggested by the 2016 Strategy and its 2019 Special Programme. The SRE found country strategies not suitable to address trans-boundary fragility challenges within the sub-region. Aligned with partners' experiences (chapter II), key lessons learned are relate to: conducting context specific analysis (to explore fragility root causes and identify right actions needed); applying flexible approaches (to adjust when necessary) and simple designs (to be able to work at all levels and with grassroots stakeholders); and extending the duration of support (to better tackle fragility drivers).

B. Coherence

86. Coherence relates to the compatibility of an intervention with other interventions (do they support or undermine each other?) in a country, sector, or institution. It

⁹⁶ PADER-G (Chad), the Rural Microfinance Programme and PAPAM (Mali)

includes internal and external coherences. Internal coherence is the synergy of IFAD-supported interventions with each other and with non-lending support. External coherence is the consistency of the intervention/strategy with other actors' interventions in the same context. The SRE key question was as follows: How has IFAD's engagement (strategies and operations) assumed internal coherence and had similar or complementary developmental purposes, in order to contribute mitigating fragility constraints?⁹⁷

Internal coherence

Loans and grants portfolio

87. **Between IFAD loan-supported operations, a coherence has been observed, although they did not intend to explicitly address fragility drivers or fragility in general.** Internal coherence was evident across IFAD lending operations with good evidence of planning for this between consecutive loan operations in the same geographic areas in four of the six countries, as shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Internal coherence at loan operation level by country

Country	Examples of IFAD loan operations	Anticipated benefit
Burkina Faso	PAPFA (2017-2024) and PAFA-4R (2019-2026)	At the request of the Government, the Support Project for the Promotion of Agricultural Sectors - Extension (PAFA-4R) complements the Support Project for the Promotion of Agricultural Sectors (PAPFA). It will complement the PAPFA through a geographical extension in the South-West region and the addition of additional sectors
Chad	PADER-G (2010-2017) and PARSAT (2013-2020) and REPER (2018-2025)	At the operational level, PARSAT interventions are complementary with PADER-G and PROHYPA given its focus on the development and resilience of agricultural systems. In addition, PARSAT collaborated in the development of the REPER Annual Work Programme and Budget. In addition, the REPER has extended the PARSAT intervention areas by covering additional departments in the regions of Chari Baguirmi (Department of Baguirmi), Batha (Batha West and Batha East) and Salamat (Department of Aboudéia).
Mali	PAPAM (2010-2018), Rural Microfinance Programme (2010-2018) FIER (2013-2022) MERIT (2019-2026)	The complementarity of activities has occurred at the level of intervention areas and thematic focus. Indeed, the INCLUSIF project has confirmed the regions of Ségou, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Kayes and Mopti covered by the previous projects (PMR and FIER) and will rely on the faire-faire mechanisms already established by PMR and FIER for the implementation of rural financial inclusion activities for the rural poor.
Mauritania	PRODEFI (2016-2025) PROGRES (2020-)	PROGRES will be implemented in the six wilayas (regions) covered by the ongoing PRODEFI project, with which it will create strategic and operational synergy and complementarity.

Compiled by the SRE team

88. Two countries, Nigeria and Niger, were exceptions. In Nigeria, the geographical targeting approach was initially too dispersed across the country, which limited the opportunity to pursue an approach to internal coherence from one operation to another covering the same geographic area. In Niger, internal coherence was also observed, but it was delivered through a different approach that reflected the decision of the Government and IFAD to transition towards a programme approach. The main features of the programme approach were as follows: (i) merging several projects within a single initiative (e.g. integrating PASADEM and PPI Ruwanmu into ProDAF); (ii) setting up a single team to manage all the activities funded by several IFAD loans (CENRAT); and (iii) endeavouring to support investments with non-lending activities with the contribution of CENRAT.⁹⁸ The 2021 Niger CPSE found that project components and subcomponents were well linked among themselves, even if the programmatic approach has not been fully implemented.

⁹⁷ This criteria has been introduced from 2021 and therefore, explicit analytical review evidence was missing

⁹⁸ Established in and under the supervision of the Ministry in charge of. Agriculture and Livestock

89. **Small grants⁹⁹ sought for coherence in supporting the loan operations, but this often did not happen.** Out of the 11 small grants operating in the six countries that were reviewed by the SRE team, only one clearly shows an intent for internal coherence also flagged in either a loan operation design document (the PASPRU loan operation and the small grant Participatory Microfinance for Africa (PAMIGA) in Burkina Faso). The 2016 Nigeria CPE found that while small grants for research and development potentially may have created some impact at national level, their use within IFAD's own loan operations was not evident. On the other hand, in Niger, the 2021 CSPE found a more mixed story. While some small grants clearly shared little synergy with the loan operations, others contributed by introducing technical solutions. In all cases, the main challenge remains to ensure a better connection of standalone grants to loan portfolio activities and results.

Knowledge management (KM) and policy engagement

90. **KM and policy engagement activities generally did not focus on identifying and implementing lessons for an enhanced engagement aligned with the fragility situations, including with the governments.** The four CSPEs rated non-lending activities (NLAs) performance as moderately satisfactory, at best. For example, the CSPE of Mali (2013) highlighted weaknesses regarding KM and policy engagement. It found that KM activities were weak, as there were no activities on this before the opening of the country office in 2012; policy dialogue was constrained by limited strategic guidance, the multiplicity of interventions and project management structures, straining the capacity of the ministries concerned.¹⁰⁰ Similar results were noted in the cases of Burkina Faso and Niger CSPEs, 2019 and 2021 respectively (Box 12). The lack of adequate or sufficient capacity to deliver in these areas, aligned with operating in fragile contexts, is an explanatory factor of this shortfall. Another explanatory factor is the weak M&E systems for tracking results and impacts in those contexts, as these are critical to ensure a solid knowledge management function, that can effectively feed in policy engagement activities. Unfortunately, M&E systems of the concerned country programmes were assessed generally weak over the evaluated period.¹⁰¹

Box 12

The challenge of adequately prioritising KM and policy dialogue

CSPE Burkina Faso, 2019. In the country office, portfolio monitoring absorbed too much of the time of the undersized team, which was unable to really engage in policy dialogue and provide leadership in discussions among donors and in knowledge management. The grants were relevant and yielded useful results, the majority having direct links with the project portfolio.

CSPE Niger, 2021. Despite the progress made, knowledge capitalization was confined to technical aspects and not treated comprehensively. Learning efforts were not oriented to transcend the specificities of activities so that capitalized knowledge could be shared by a large number of projects and with other donors, which would have enabled a contribution to sector policy dialogue. In order to offset the small size of the country office, IFAD de facto tasked the ProDAF project management team with public policy dialogue, setting up of a national representation and technical assistance unit (CENRAT) embedded within the Ministry of Agriculture. IFAD's policy dialogue through project formulation missions and implementation support missions remains largely informal and lacks visibility".

Compiled by the SRE team

91. **Bearing in mind that the performance in KM and policy dialogue was modest, only in Nigeria is there some evidence that the KM and policy**

⁹⁹ Different from the in-loan grants such as those related to the debt sustainability framework (DSF) or other grants described in the effectiveness section.

¹⁰⁰ It was noted e.g. Little information from the field has been properly capitalised upon in order to provide solid input to this dialogue rather than simple information. Surprisingly, KM aspects were not addressed in the CSN (2016) and COSOP (2020).

¹⁰¹ The CPE (2016) of Nigeria concluded that effective KM was hampered by poorly performing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. The CSPE (2019) of Burkina Faso stated clearly that M&E systems focused more on monitoring the progress of activities than on measuring changes and impact, as well as related explanatory factors. The latter similar finding was mentioned in the CSPE (2021) of Niger.

engagement approaches have responded to working in a fragile context. In the Nigeria (CPE 2016), it was noted that given the size of the country and the complexities of the federal system, the level of capacity seemed inadequate to cover multiple roles of programme implementation support, policy dialogue and partnership building. As for KM, CDD experience was a priority for knowledge sharing, contributing to dialogues on participatory approaches and encouraging local governments to work with communities. Learning tools were trialled with local communities to allow them to develop appropriate CDD procedures and these also helped informing subsequent programmes such as CBNRMP and VCDP. Nevertheless, the CPE noted that considering the length of IFAD's experience in implementing CDD approaches in the country, the available documentary evidence on this approach was limited.

External coherence

92. **The thematic focus of IFAD's operations– i.e. agricultural and rural development in terms of improving food security and sustainable livelihoods – have been complementary with priorities addressed by other partners working in the sub-region.** Partners' priorities highlighted in Table 9 shows the broad complementarity of IFAD's programmes with AfDB and WB programmatic priorities. However, there is little evidence that this then translates into either formal mechanisms to assess relative comparative advantages or deliver synergy at the field level. With RBAs, there are overlapping themes.¹⁰² On the other hand, RBA actors interviewed noted that the complementarity of their actions at field level is achieved in terms of areas of interventions and with the comparative advantage of each organisation: emergency actions for WFP, policy development and support to governments for FAO and grassroots linkages and support to producers for IFAD. These comparative advantages of RBAs can be very complementary in fragile situations, as being demonstrated through the SD3C programme.

Table 9
Programmatic priorities of IFAD partners in the G5+1

Partner	Programmatic priority or themes
African Development Bank (AfDB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infrastructure development • Regional economic integration • Private sector development • Governance and institutional strengthening • Technology development
World Bank (WB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic reforms, including institutional strengthening • Agricultural transformation • Infrastructure development and access to social services (energy, education and health).
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural policy development • Food security and nutrition • Resilience and rural livelihoods improvement • Early warning systems
World Food Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency responses to vulnerable people directly or indirectly affected by crisis, disease, Including COVID-19, etc. • Nutrition Response- prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition activities. • Resilience building

Source: compiled by the SRE team

93. **Opportunities for partnerships are identified in COSOPs/CSNs and to a lesser degree in loan operation design documents. However, there is very**

¹⁰² According to the 2021 Evaluation of RBAs collaboration, there are significant differences between the three organisations. FAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations, combining normative and operational functions in food and agriculture, food security and nutrition across the humanitarian–development continuum. Its funding combines assessed contributions by each Member State with voluntary contributions of extrabudgetary resources. IFAD is an international financial institution, funded through periodic Member State replenishments, providing finance for combating rural poverty and hunger mainly through loans. WFP delivers emergency food assistance and uses food assistance to support economic and social development. It is financed entirely by voluntary contributions.

limited evidence that country teams have already used partnership as an approach to effectively working in the G5+1 fragile contexts. According to the 2016 IFAD Fragility Strategy, partnership is core to manage risks in fragile situations.¹⁰³ Potential partnerships are identified in COSOPs/CSNs although review of risk management sections within both COSOPs/CSNs and in loan design documents does not identify instances in which partnerships are a key part of risk management. Details of how the partnerships will be managed is always lacking.¹⁰⁴ Most examples of partnerships mentioned in the self-assessment by IFAD country teams, as presented in Box 13, are still yet to be implemented.

Box 13

Examples of partnerships being sought

- IFAD has actively sought support of other organisations - WFP, FAO for the SD3C, as well as the partnership with AfDB for the PAVAL project.
- Currently, in Burkina Faso, support is being sought for a partnership with the WB on the implementation of the digital solutions aspect of the RPSF
- In Nigeria, a design of a major project is ongoing and the country team relied on UNDP expertise to develop the section on Fragility and Conflict.
- In Chad, the Project to Strengthen Innovation in Youth and Women Agro-pastoral Entrepreneurship in Chad (RENFORT), under design, is developing synergies with AfDB supporting a livestock project
- Harnessing of partners reports and knowledge products as well: the case of PRODEX in Niger for example.

Source: SRE data collected

94. **Some examples of partnerships with the RBA are found but evidence of how they were operationalised is not available.** Two examples were identified by IFAD partners in Niger as examples of good partnership projects: (i) the RBA Resilience Initiative (WFP/FAO/IFAD), 2017-2021; and (ii) Communes de convergence. Collaboration between IFAD, FAO and WFP since 2017 with the development of an operational framework for the countries of the Lake Chad Basin (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad) is also an example. Although this framework addresses both humanitarian and development needs, the evaluative evidence from these examples was not available and the evaluation was unable to collect it.
95. **There are challenges for a closer partnership between the RBAs, but these do not relate to fragile contexts specifically.** The case studies carried out in Burkina Faso and Niger, as part of the 2021 joint evaluation on RBAs collaboration reveal a number of enablers and barriers to better partnerships, but there is no evidence that the increasingly fragile context is, in itself, either a significant enabler or barrier to greater collaboration. The broader evaluation also does not identify fragility as a constraint to greater collaboration, as illustrated by excerpts in Box 14.

Box 14

The challenge of delivering partnership across the RBA

The 2021 Joint evaluation of collaboration among the RBAs concluded as follows. Collaboration between the RBAs has significant potential, but the rationale for it is not stated

¹⁰³ The specific importance of partnership in fragile situations warrants its inclusion as a guiding principle. Partnerships help IFAD to manage risks and enable it to stay engaged in more challenging contexts because they provide the means to address root causes of fragility that lie outside IFAD's areas of comparative advantage but pose a threat to IFAD's country programmes.

¹⁰⁴ The 2019 OIE Review of the Partnership Framework identified a number of key concerns across IFAD: (i) Insufficient clarity on how partnerships enable IFAD to achieve results in its projects, programmes, grants and policies, and inadequate linking of partnerships with the underlying theories of change of projects or programmes; (ii) Lack of prioritization and selectivity of partnerships at all levels, leading to inadequate attention to critical partnerships; (iii) Limited or absent monitoring and reporting of the achievements of specific partnerships, and no corporate-level reporting on the overall contribution of partnerships to IFAD's achievements; and (iv) Limited use and awareness of good partnering practices and tools, and variable staff capacity to support effective partnership-building.

in an appropriately realistic way. At present, efforts to promote RBA collaboration are not fully grounded in an accurate understanding of the conditions in which it is most effectively pursued. The formal statements of corporate commitment to collaboration reflect this. In fact, any idea for collaboration must be tested against its practicability, its likely effectiveness, and the level of transaction costs that it will impose. In many cases, these tests yield a negative result. Alternative arrangements, such as separate but complementary activities or collaboration with other partners, may prove more advantageous. Realism and pragmatism are the keys to meaningful and effective RBAC.”

Source: 2021 Joint evaluation of collaboration among the United Nations Rome-Based Agencies¹⁰⁵

96. **The SD3C project between the three RBAs can be seen as a response by the RBAs for a stronger collaboration.** The project requires joint programming between the three agencies at field level, thus delaying the national launching in the countries.¹⁰⁶ IFAD has no previous experience in the G5+1 on implementing such joint programming approaches. Experience in the UN system is that joint programming is challenging and generates significant transaction costs, but IFAD lacks human and financial resources at country level.¹⁰⁷ IFAD is engaged in developing coordination mechanisms to include the development of the Partnership Framework for Sustainable Development 2018–2022 in Mauritania and the most recent UNDAF process in Burkina Faso, which brought together humanitarian, development, and peace actors to undertake joint analysis, planning, and programming.¹⁰⁸

Summary on coherence

97. **In sum, IFAD’s supported operations in the G5+1 contexts have shown good internal coherence within the loan portfolio than between the lending and non-lending operations. In terms of external coherence, there was little evidence on achieving this.** Grants, KM, and policy engagement activities poorly contributed to better operate in such fragile situations. Moreover, whilst partnerships were prioritised in design documents, little evidence was found on the operationalisation of these. The SRE identified lessons learned pertaining to coherence, namely: the importance of learning to enable better tackling fragility drivers, need for complementarity and partnership for greater effectiveness in those contexts. These are aligned with lessons identified from the review of IFAD’s partners experiences.

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714182/44355601/Report+joint+evaluation+RBAs.pdf/974292c1-abac-a880-2f75-8d9d1a1ec891?t=1638354215029>

¹⁰⁶ According to country teams interviewed, while IFAD has put in place resources required on its side, other partners involved have not fulfilled their commitments and this has delayed the national launching. Finally, the launching workshop of the SD3C in the six countries happened on 16-18 November 2021 in Nouakchott (Mauritania). See <https://fr.wfp.org/communiqués-de-presse/lancement-du-programme-regional-conjoint-sahel-en-reponse-aux-defis-covid-19>

¹⁰⁷ One person (at P4 or P5 level) managing multiple countries, and one CPO, whereby other partners (WB, AfDB, FAO and WFP) has a significantly greater presence.

¹⁰⁸ However, even if functioning coordination mechanisms are developing, the question is whether IFAD country teams can participate. Evidence is lacking, but the Niger CSPE 2021 observed that ‘IFAD did not participate sufficiently in coordination with other United Nations agencies operating in Niger, and was absent from the process of developing the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). As a result, IFAD was unable to fully leverage its experience with rural development in Niger by contributing to the common reflection on resilience, as did FAO and WFP’.

Key points**Relevance**

- COSOPs are, in principle, flexible instruments that can be adapted and revised, but their flexible use was not observed in the G5+1 contexts. They are inadequate for addressing transboundary issues.
- Comprehensive fragility are not implemented, but contextual analyses are done covering three fragility drivers (related to economic poverty, NRM and gender inequality). It not clear how analytical results are used to design interventions that address fragility.
- Supported programmes and projects were aligned with national and IFAD priorities in terms of achieving resilience in rural settings.
- Lessons learned have informed designs of programmes, but not explicitly how to address drivers of fragility. Limited evidence of simplicity of designs were found, although very important in fragile situations.

Coherence

- Country strategic documents do not explicitly explain how internal coherence will be achieved within the programme, which is critical in fragile contexts.
- KM and policy engagement activities could not contribute to better working in those fragile contexts, except in Nigeria.
- Opportunities for partnerships are identified, but there is no solid evidence that country teams have used this approach to deliver better in those fragile situations.
- Challenges remain for a closer partnership between the RBAs, but these do not relate to the fragility situations. To that effect, the SD3C project appears as a very good opportunity for stronger collaboration.

IV. From effectiveness to impacts in fragile contexts

98. This chapter assesses short and medium terms results in terms of effectiveness and their contribution to change (longer-term results or impacts) as identified in the evaluation ToC (see Table 10). Intervention outcomes of IFAD supported projects under review are briefly described and then assessed for their contribution to resilience, defined as a combination of the adaptive, absorptive, and transformative capacities of beneficiaries. The focus of analysis is to explore the extent to which supported interventions contributed to tackle fragility drivers, aligned with the ToC outcomes as shown in the Table 10. The assessment is performed by category of fragility drivers, in line with the analytical framework, and findings formulated in terms of lessons.¹⁰⁹

Table 10

Medium term outcome statements in the ToC

<i>Medium term outcome statements in the ToC</i>	<i>Related fragility drivers</i>
Stakeholders in inclusive value chain organised to adjust after shocks and to secure transactions, including cross border	Poverty and food security; Inclusiveness
Nutrition practices and situation improved in household	Poverty and food security
Agricultural investments sustainably managed by farmers and grassroots organisations, which include women and youths	Poverty and food security; Social inequality; Institutions
Natural resources restored, protected and effectively used, also by women and youths	NRM and ACC; Social inequality
Agreements and regulations for natural resources usage claimed by users, including cross-countries resources	NRM and ACC; Social inequality
Institutional framework and arrangements improved for peace and development locally and in cross-border	Institutions and Security

Source: SRE team elaboration

99. Key evaluation questions addressed in this chapter are:
- How effective was IFAD's support (at national and sub-regional levels) in achieving results that contribute addressing key fragility drivers?
 - Based on evidence, to what extent has IFAD support contributed to build resilience and foster rural transformation in these fragile situations?
 - What are the lessons learned from IFAD supported interventions in terms of contribution to change in fragile situations?

A. Poverty and economic fragility aspects

100. A poor economic environment is characterised by low incomes, low levels of socio-economic assets and few opportunities inducing a state of poverty and risks to food security; poverty is a consequence as well as a fragility driver. Overall, **IFAD's interventions did contribute to addressing economic fragility drivers** through promoting diversified income generating activities and development of value chains linked to secure national and cross-border regional markets.

Socioeconomic drivers and income generation

101. **Evidence suggests that the promotion of income generating activities using IFAD's support is conducive to strengthening absorptive and adaptive capacities of beneficiaries in fragile situations.** Promotion of economic activities for rural beneficiaries is an area of comparative advantage for IFAD. The way it has been supported has evolved over time, aligned with changes in the economic context, mainly due to the growth of entrepreneurship in rural settings and to incorporation into the market economy. Different entry points to

¹⁰⁹ As mentioned in the methodology section, generalization was not sought in the evaluation but rather to identify lessons (from single or several experiences) that are relevant and useful for improving IFAD's engagement in those fragile situations.

promote profitable farm income generating activities have been chosen in different countries, but in all cases, promotion of improved farming practices led to increased yields, reductions in yield variability, and promotion of new crops and animal husbandry techniques. Such improvements have been linked with asset building strategies. Strategies have included (i) reliance on public subsidy policy in some countries (input supply in Niger and Nigeria); or (ii) in-kind credit to support the most vulnerable to accumulate primary assets (goat-kits for vulnerable women groups in Niger to be repaid in kind); or (iii) internal in-kind savings (for seeds and inputs in Niger). These strategies have contributed to building the capacities of producers to cope with shocks. In most projects, subsidised investments in land management (see below) to improve productivity have increased opportunities for new crops and thus beneficiaries' adaptive capacities through diversification.

102. **In areas where fragilities were multiple over a long period, including economic, social, and security challenges, a pathway entailing progressive stages has been effective in promoting economic activities and gradually linking them to pro-poor value chains.** In such regions where economic opportunities and market access were initially lacking, the concept of entrepreneurship or economic interest groups was at first not even understood. Returns obtained by the promoted economic interest groups were low (lower than assessed at design). Therefore, most projects developed comprehensive packages for supporting microprojects and rural enterprises around three main categories of actions: training, support along the VC segments including promotion of market access, and enabling inclusive rural finance services. A stronger market orientation of the promoted microenterprises was required, and approaches – such as the business support-service centres and project financing enabling an access to microfinance institutions – have been developed accordingly. Examples include the Agricultural Value Chains Promotion Project (PAPFA) in Burkina Faso and PRoDAF in Niger.
103. **When promoting economic activities, evidence suggests that capacity building and non-financial support are critical in developing the necessary human and social capital of individuals and rural communities.** In the contexts of economic and climatic fragility, smallholders and microenterprises are particularly prone to being negatively affected by poor technical and entrepreneurial capabilities and choices; and poor access to quality inputs and markets, combined with climatic shocks, and environmental constraints. Here-in lies the relevance of non-financial support services and their contribution to the promotion of rural micro enterprises and other initiatives along the value chain. Resource centres promoted in Burkina Faso for providing services to microenterprises are a good example.¹¹⁰ These types of support have been critical for the development of resilience strategies in target communities.
104. **Grants did contribute to making value chains more resilient and able to respond quickly to trade risks.** Trade risks appear to be increasing triggered by increasing medium intensity conflict or COVID-19 related border closures and increased trade barriers. For instance, around Lake Chad, a trade ban has been imposed for some commodities. Border closures or insecurity have led to markets shifting and the need to transport goods in convoy. The IFAD FARMTRAC grant (implemented by IFPRI and CILSS) has contributed to such adjustments by producing publicly available data on intraregional trade in agricultural and food products along trade corridors,¹¹¹ as well as on food losses during transportation and road harassment along trade corridors in the region. Results have been used in

¹¹⁰ IFAD in Burkina Faso has been promoting rural microenterprises (MER) within selected value chains and it has been a major target since 2000 with a focus on business development services. Microenterprises supported showed a willingness to pay for quality support services provided by local business development support centres created. PASPRU developed an ambitious and multidimensional training and information component and a major achievement was to set up 56 CREERs as resource centres for the MERs, which concluded 6116 contracts with MERs on a demand and pay for service basis (partly covered by a subvention); 7440 business development services could be delivered for market access, training in management and access to finance.

¹¹¹ within an extended geographic coverage to the Western and Eastern Basin of West Africa

the design of the SD3C where mediation activities (i.e., with men in uniform) are foreseen to reduce harassment in cross border trade.

Inclusive financial services

105. **Inclusive financial services are essential for enabling the effective promotion of rural economic activities and microenterprises. They can contribute to expanding productive assets and strengthen the absorptive capacities of producers, as well as supporting profitable investments to enhance adaptive capacity.** IFAD supported programmes and projects have focused for most of the evaluation period on building credible, viable and sustainable rural financial services that are accessible to diverse groups (vulnerable and poor in particular). The field mission confirmed that credit and saving groups were considered instrumental for financing farm inputs and processing equipment (Chad), as well as irrigation pumps and fences in gardens and oasis (Mauritania). In addition, support for linking rural microfinance institutions to formal banks has been provided to enhance sustainability and assist these institutions to face shocks. This may not have been always effective (Box 15).
106. **Customary self-help groups contribute to improving the resilience of their members but their development into viable and resilient financial institutions able to deliver local services and respond to credit demands (to some extent), is very challenging. Yet there is no alternative, where public and private service providers are absent, as found in many project areas.** In Chad for instance, successive projects in the Guera region supported the credit and saving groups and their organisation into cooperatives and federation into an apex organisation (*Union des caisses d'épargne et de crédit du Guéra* (UCEC-G)). However, the networks of credit and saving groups and small banks remain fragile and subject to collapse caused by both internal issues and external shocks, and they require long term support.

Box 15

Credit and saving networks fostered over decades can still be bankrupted by shocks

In Chad, credit and saving groups were strengthened (PSANG II, 2001-2010), 41 village banks established (18000 borrowers) and a network linking the two created. This network was expected to be an alternative to moneylenders and as such, contribute to reinforcing the absorptive capacities of beneficiaries facing seasonal shocks and protecting their assets against liquidation. By 2010, after nine years, the credit and saving network was judged very fragile and not yet ready for integration according to the national microfinance strategy. PADER-G (2010-17) supported federation of the savings and credit cooperatives into a union (the UCEC-G) and helped the network mobilise local savings, develop a range of viable products adapted to the needs of rural households and producers, and also to improve access to credit for women, who were not members of the cooperatives, by training them in financial management. These new products increased the coverage and financial viability of the banks.¹¹² However, the union suffered significant internal management weaknesses. Increasing insecurity and an economic crisis also adversely affected the credit portfolio of UCEC-G and new support measures needed to be taken.¹¹³

In Mali, the Rural microfinance programme (PMR) ran between 2011 and 2019. It was specifically designed to strengthen decentralized microfinance institutions (MFIs) and to

¹¹² A NGO was in charge to support the network which also underwent a restructuring. The project also developed a fund for producers' organizations in need of credit for the development of income generating activities (39 microprojects funded). In all 5 384 farms benefited from credit. The network was granted the agreement of Commission Bancaire des Etats d'Afrique Centrale in October 2014 and developed partnership with many institutions in the region. It also benefited from a refinancing line. In all, the projects set the basis for the sound development of this network.

¹¹³ The REPER PDR in 2018 evaluates the operational autonomy of UPEC-G at 58 per cent and identifies the breakdown of the union as a risk. REPER planned to extend financial services to 20 000 HH and 450 POs. In continuity with the intervention of PARSAT, REPER intends to strengthen the credit and saving cooperatives by facilitating a refinancing line from commercial banks; both parties should use an increasing part of their own funds to finance this line. Beneficiaries get access to a three parties funding mechanism: the new entrepreneur has to bring its own contribution and be eligible by its credit cooperative or another DFS to obtain a project subvention. The COSOP 2009 had anticipated that the consolidation of microfinance systems in rural area would be a lengthy process (12 years). The increasing fragility factors also contributed to shake these systems.

implement the national microfinance strategy. As a win-win strategy, poor people in rural areas could become clients and their savings were mobilised. Their mobilization was combined with group building and training for a safer credit management. These MFIs could also benefit from a refinancing line from the banks. Fifteen MFIs were supported, which opened new branches, and some succeeded in partly complying with the legal requirements of the microfinance sector. Despite these achievements, MFIs suffered from the 2011 crisis¹¹⁴ and the contribution of the banks to their refinancing was halved; it fell to 25 per cent of the credit delivered (the agricultural national bank reduced its refinancing from FCFA 30 million to 3 million). An IFAD refinancing facility was set up by the PMR project and its management delegated to a trustee. The MFIs partly recovered, and 3514 POs borrowed from an MFI after having successfully defended their business proposals.

Source: compiled by the SRE team

Food and nutrition insecurity

107. Food insecurity is one of the drivers within the broader poverty and economy drivers. Food insecure smallholders are those that cannot cope with the hunger gap in the lean season, either structurally every year or after a climatic shock, by relying on their production and cash savings. They have to liquidate their productive assets to buy food, work as labourers or emigrate, borrow from moneylenders at a high cost and reduce the number of daily meals over a significant period and food quality even more. This in turn directly affects their working capacity and health, as well as the health of their dependents. Repeated cycles of such food insecurity can lead a household into complete impoverishment, and the household leaving their community with few assets to support themselves.
108. **Community grain-storage facilities supported by IFAD contributed to improving absorptive capacity, preventing food insecure households from forced liquidation of assets while also strengthening social capital at local level. This was particularly important in fragile contexts when erratic climatic events are combined with insecurity.** Food security storages were designed to improve food availability at all times for local producers, reduce the hunger gap in the lean season and buffer food price variations.¹¹⁵ IFAD support has focused on providing technical, managerial and governance skills for committee members selected to manage these facilities. In Chad, successive projects in the Guera region (central Sahel) contributed to a solid network of cereal banks. These were then seen as an entry point to develop other services to producers. In Niger, women were specifically put in charge of the management of security granaries to keep their focus on food security. In our field mission in Niger, beneficiaries and civil servants insisted on the importance of keeping transactions from and back into granaries strictly in kind, to reduce the risks of poor repayment among very vulnerable households, which are higher when scarce cash is involved.
109. **Increasing access to markets for smallholders with the support of private traders, managing stocks and marketing networks, offers a resilient opportunity to address food insecurity, and reduces risks for involved producer organisations (POs).** Trade is also a way to counteract erratic local production and the resulting food insecurity.¹¹⁶ When more and more producers enter the market-based economy, the focus can switch to private traders managing stocks and marketing networks, rather than on producers' organisations only. This decreases the risk born by the producer organisations. Box 16 provides an example of storage facilities managed by farmer organisations.

¹¹⁴ External review (WB, 2015) reveal that the sector has been experiencing a major crisis where some MKI were bankrupt and depositors lost their savings, which explains the following loss of confidence in the sector. A new legal framework was effective since 2010 with several institutions for monitoring and control of the DSF.

¹¹⁵ In remote places, food security granaries (greniers de sécurité alimentaire GSA) and community cereal banks improve accessibility to food at all times and reduce food price variations, which both contribute to the vicious circle of hunger and impoverishment. In remote places, poor households rely on local production and exchanges to secure their food, rather than on inexistant market exchanges.

¹¹⁶ The new 2019 designed REPER keeps a focus on security storage (40 cereals banks) with a target on the improvement of the management of banks. Banks are now managed by producers' organisations according to business plans.

Box 16

Storage facilities managed by FOs and/or by private specialized operators facilitate access to credit but also risky businesses in fragile contexts

In Burkina Faso, for instance with PICOFA support, community-based warehouse receipt systems have a long history where PO stores are used as a guarantee for credits from the MFIs controlling them with the Apex PO negotiating credit with the MFIs on behalf of their members. This credit can then be used without selling the stocks at a low price. Usually, producers cover their costs after deduction of credit interests, storage fees and losses. However, as food prices variations cannot be forecasted with accuracy, there are significant risks to the FOs. Private storage companies increasingly operate as a third specialised party, as they can better manage risks of food price fluctuations and partner with the financial sector. These companies also store products in other segments of the value chains (traders and exporters) and are able to enter contractual arrangements with large quantities.

Source: Compiled by the SRE team

110. **Improvements in food security do not automatically lead to improved nutritional status.** Food insecurity has the greatest impact on children, especially those under five, contributes to poor nutrition and health, and consequential stunting that ultimately contributes to lower learning abilities. This cycle is also inter-generational, as stunted mothers are at higher risk of bearing stunted children. The problem is that while investment may be necessary in increasing food security, this is not always sufficient to address poor nutrition, especially if chronic in children, and the issue remains unacknowledged. In response, some projects in the G5+1 have included nutrition related interventions, e.g., PARSAT and PADER-G in Chad, and ProDaF in Niger. They usually focus on nutritional education on water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) aspects, with little evidence of results.¹¹⁷ Addressing malnutrition is of paramount importance (especially chronic malnutrition),¹¹⁸ but requires long term and coherent interventions in production, consumption, health, WASH, and education. IFAD's perceived comparative advantage in this complex system which has to mobilise many partners has not been very clear nor operationalised for country teams. There was little quality data on food security and nutritional status available, and hence no lesson could be learnt.
111. **IFAD has some experience of supporting development of nutrition-sensitive value chains as a complementary pathway. However, it has not partnered with organisations with comparative advantages in addressing chronic malnutrition.** In Nigeria, new cassava varieties with a higher vitamin A content have been disseminated. In PAFA 4R in Burkina Faso, the promotion of non-timber forest products (moringa, baobab, shea, honey, etc.) and aquaculture is expected to positively affect nutritional status of rural households. Many projects have supported gardens and more diversified food crops and animal husbandry, which all can contribute to improved diets. However, evidence on effectiveness is lacking. Overall, in fragile situations, IFAD has to ensure that nutrition issues can be addressed, as far as possible through partnerships with organisations that have comparative advantages in this domain, but so far evidence has been missing.

B. Environment and climate change related fragility

112. Climatic variability and natural resource degradation are major sources of shocks and stress factors threatening smallholders' resilience, especially in the Sahelian context.¹¹⁹ Vulnerable populations rely on natural assets to make a living and as

¹¹⁷ PADER-G impact assessment in Tchad in 2017 reveals significant improvements in food security, diet diversity, household asset accumulation and resilience to violence and civil unrest

¹¹⁸ In Niger for instance, such a strategy would be of paramount importance: IOE CSPE (2021) noted that with a stunting prevalence rate of 47.8 per cent in 2018, which first declined between 2005 and 2010 but has increased since. Niger is one of the countries with the highest prevalence of chronic malnutrition in the Sahel region and the world. The southern part of the country is the most affected (Maradi, Zinder, and Diffa). The rate of wasting (or acute malnutrition) is 15 per cent. The prevalence rate of anaemia in women of reproductive age (15-49) is almost 50 per cent (2018).

¹¹⁹ Fragility aspects related to CC have been subject to a specific thematic evaluation conducted by IOE in 2020, with two case studies implemented in Chad (PARSAT), Mali (PAPAM) and Niger (ProDAF-Diffa). See <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/ioe/evaluations>

savings to monetize when coping with urgent cash needs. Repeated shocks may lead to very negative outcomes: beyond thresholds of depletion, restoration of natural assets (soil fertility, vegetation, water, etc.) becomes impossible (systemic breakdown) or very costly. Climate change also reduces the range of possible profitable activities if not counteracted by vigorous and speedy adaptation measures. Moreover, in the sub-region, access to natural resource and climate stress factors trigger conflicts; these aspects are treated under social conflicts below.

113. **Over decades, addressing fragility related to natural resource management (NRM) has been an entry point in many IFAD projects in the sub-region.** Significant knowledge has been accumulated on effective interventions for soil and water conservation (SWC), restoration of vegetation cover, and small-scale irrigation. These interventions have been bundled with agricultural intensification methods to improve overall productivity. Conflicts over resources have been considered even if not systematically (see below). Issues related to climate change only recently started to be considered systematically in project designs. However, many lessons remain relevant to adaptation to climate change.¹²⁰

Soil and water conservation (SWC) and sustainable NRM

114. **Supporting SWC practices in arid and semi-arid contexts are instrumental in improving the resilience of beneficiaries but need to be taken to scale.** Overall, absorptive capacities of beneficiaries are strengthened by cash for work performed by groups of vulnerable young people, and adaptive capacities by reversing trends towards resource depletion, yield decrease and land scarcity. SWC investments are also combined with microprojects. SWC management committees are then expected to manage better access to inputs and markets, equipment, and group marketing, veterinary and maintenance services. Supporting beneficiaries and decision-makers to prioritise effective NRM practices and preventive measures over ex post restoration of depleted or destroyed natural assets can lead to transformative capabilities toward resilience. Among the most prominent examples are the internalisation of SWC and of Natural Assisted Regeneration in Niger, which is being up scaled in a national programme supported by the government and other partners (WB, etc.). However, other drivers, especially medium intensity conflict, are an increasing risk to such approaches as they both raise new uncertainties and sometimes destroy the SWC investments or displace the population managing them. Interventions to recover degraded lands and greening however remain effective, provided that the annual area being restored is larger than the area being degraded.
115. **In insecure contexts where formal service providers (both public and private) may not be active or knowledgeable, local stakeholders can effectively support smallholders' groups in their SWC or small-scale irrigation schemes.** When pursuing such strategies, training local committees is key and care needs to be taken to ensure investments are simple and aligned with the level of capacity (see analytical evidence below in rural institutions sections).

Pastoral grazing resources

116. **Experience suggests that the restoration of fragile grazing land, their sustainable management, the management of transhumance and conflict resolution are possible in arid and semi-arid areas, when relevant stakeholders are fully engaged.** Effective NRM results in the Sahelian contexts require adequate management of the differing interests over water and adjacent grazing lands across communities involving agriculturalists, agro-pastoralists, and pastoralists. Availability and access to water is key to improved management of

¹²⁰ In fact, the 2021 thematic evaluation of IFAD on climate change stated explicitly that "IFAD's experience in working with marginalized communities in the rural agricultural sector, often facing adverse climatic and environmental conditions, has positioned it well to address the accelerating risks from climate change and to place climate change adaptation as a strategic institutional priority" (TE 2021).

natural grazing land under the arid conditions of the Sahel. In Chad, the Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas (PROHYPA 2010-2015) has targeted agro-pastoralists as well as pastoralists. Despite good results (see Box 17), These were not replicated by IFAD, but by other partners (e.g., World Bank, AFD).¹²¹

Box 17

The Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas in Chad

In Chad, the Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas (PROHYPA 2010-2015) targeted agro-pastoralists as well as pastoralists. Interventions addressed a major issue of pastoral systems: due to insufficient access to water, pastoral resources were overused in some areas and underused in others. The project improved access to water and pastoral resources for both pastoralists and agropastoralists.¹²² This was based on supporting development of "*commissions mixtes*" for both groups to decide upon the locations of the wells to be installed, and in training management committees which could collect fees for the maintenance of wells and ponds. In the "*commissions mixtes*", local chiefs and religious leaders met, delimited transhumance corridors for livestock mobility and helped settle conflicts. Wells and ponds built or rehabilitated covered 19 per cent of the livestock needs and opened access to new pastures that met 31 per cent of fodder needs). This contributed to a reduction in the increasing pressure on pasture and water resources in the target area.¹²³

Source: compiled by the SRE team

117. **However, IFAD support to pastoralists has been modest as mainly restricted to the development of transhumance corridors and at a reduced scale.** The 2016 Nigeria CSPE states clearly that insufficient attention has been given to pastoralism-related conflictual issues. In Niger, IFAD did not apply its innovative social mobilization approach (of social engineering presented below) in pastoralist contexts to assist pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities to introduce sustainable rangeland management practices that allow them to face climate change burdens effectively.¹²⁴ In Mauritania, the PASK II (completed in 2020), through its GEF component, developed three grazing corridors with 9 pastoral wells for the transhumance. Additional services are offered near the pastoral wells (animal health for camels and livestock).¹²⁵ The number of transhumance corridors considered for grazing corridors has increased so that cross-border transhumance and trade flows towards Senegal and Mali can be managed and improved through pastoral service provision.

Adaptation to climate change (ACC)

118. **Most interventions that include a SWC component can be seen as supporting climate-smart farming practices;** in many cases, they include species and varieties able to cope with erratic rain patterns and make better use of the scarce water, hence contributing to improved absorptive capacity. Details of IFAD experience in SWC is discussed above.
119. **Projects designed after 2014 demonstrate a stronger orientation towards climate change.**¹²⁶ The thematic evaluation of IFAD's support to smallholder

¹²¹ In 2015, the World Bank approved the US\$248 million "Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project" to support two million pastoralists in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. During that same period in Chad, technical partners such as AFD implemented major interventions targeting pastoralists.

¹²² 231 wells and ponds were either built or rehabilitated (125 per cent effectiveness) and improved the availability of grazing resources. 190 corridors were also delineated (100 per cent effectiveness) but their materialization had not been completed at project completion time.

¹²³ Small enterprises were also successfully promoted (239 vet assistants, 586 women trained in animal product processing, 473 in infant food processing etc.).

¹²⁴ For instance, the recent project PRODAF-Diffa intends to build 17 pastoral wells and 1500 ha pastoral corridors in response to insufficiently delineated transhumance corridors in a region where flows are intense.

¹²⁵ PROGRES pursues these activities and extends them to adjacent regions, proposes to regenerate degraded ecosystems through the restoration of abandoned farming areas and pastoral areas, and to promote climate resilient agriculture.

¹²⁶ In 2004, IFAD became an accredited implementation partner to GEF with financing approved for climate adaptation. Climate adaptation became an explicit objective of IFAD. Climate adaptation is an explicit priority within its Eighth

farmers' adaptation to climate change (2021) explicitly stated that IFAD has demonstrated capabilities to improve economic, climate and environmental resilience of smallholders through appropriate interventions. Evidence gathered by the SRE confirms the validity of this statement in the context of IFAD's support in the G5+1 countries. For example, in Burkina-Faso, where water resources are still underused, the PAFA-4R project (2020-26)¹²⁷ defined objectives to improve access to secured land and hydro-agricultural investment, where climate-smart agricultural practices should be implemented – such as afforestation and anti-erosive devices as a protection of irrigation perimeters and small dams coupled with water saving irrigation devices and solar pumps. In Nigeria, the Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt of Nigeria (CASP 2015-2021) intended to mainstream climate change adaptation measures through a landscape rehabilitation approach focused on sustainable land management, which encompasses soil erosion control, water harvesting techniques and soil and water conservation.

120. **Evidence confirms that successful strategies for poor smallholders facing climate change do not only relate to changes in cropping or husbandry practices, but also to diversification of livelihoods, especially off-farm activities,¹²⁸ which contributes to effective adaptation.** GEF additional funding supporting microprojects contributed to improving smallholders' incomes and their diversification. They are expected to yield overall environmental positive effects. With the Neer Tamba project in Burkina for example, 215 business plans have been designed for SMEs in the agroforestry baobab, shea, and locust bean value chains (out of 900 targeted) which should create incentives for the sustainable management of these tree species. In Niger, according to the impact assessment of PASADEM, the most climate-resilient households are those that can diversify their livelihoods by balancing crop production and pastoral activities. For instance, incidence of support for households raising small ruminants are significant due to resilience interventions, which helped reconstitute the stocks, improved breeding conditions and food security (especially during the lean season). However, expansion of microenterprises is very slow (with modest results), in remote areas lacking effective access to markets.
121. **Support through Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) grants effectively promoted participatory communal planning that contributed to climate change adaptation strategies and fostered climate sensitive enterprises.** In Mali PAPAM - ASAP component, a community-based large landscape approach was developed to design agricultural projects in the Sikasso Region. PAPAM initially started with climate change adaptation activities in small-scale irrigation systems (especially SWC and monitoring) before moving onto testing two types of biogas small units coupled with photovoltaic devices. It also contributed to policy formulation as reflected in Box 18. ASAP grants also contributed to the formulation of the National Strategy of Sustainable Development, and to align the NRM and CC adaptation measures promoted with the National strategy against climate change (PARSAT in Chad) as shown in the Box 18.

Replenishment 2010-2012 (IFAD8). In 2010, a climate change strategy was adopted and the flagship Adaptation for Smallholder Agricultural Programme (ASAP I) launched in 2012 to support smallholder investment in climate resilience. The Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP), mandatory since 2015, was an important mechanism to mainstream climate change. Strengthening environmental sustainability and climate resilience constituted one of the three strategic objectives in the 2016-2025 Strategic Framework. In 2018, the Strategy and Action Plan on Environment and Climate Change 2019-2025 fused climate and environment strategies and committed to reduce exposure and vulnerability to climate change for 24 million rural smallholder farmers by 2025." IOE report

¹²⁷ in the regions du "Sud-Ouest, des Hauts-Bassins, des Cascades et de la Boucle du Mouhoun"

¹²⁸ Measures helping smallholders to cope with climate-related shocks and stresses when their assets and livelihoods are threatened are also contributing.

Box 18

Contribution of ASAP grants to CC policy or strategy formulation

Mali, PAPAM (2010–2018). The ASAP component, added later during the project implementation, facilitated a partnership with the Agence de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable (AEDD) and directly contributed to the formulation of the National Strategy of Sustainable Development. The project also successfully advocated for the integration of the Communal Climate Change Adaptation Planning (PCA), a community-based large landscape approach, in the design and implementation of agricultural projects in the Sikasso Region.

Chad, PARSAT. The ASAP component of the project contributed to agricultural sectorial priorities but also to crosscutting priorities such as reinforcing the capacities of the stakeholders towards CCA and fostering resilience. The project financially participated in the National Strategy against CC (2017). In addition, it also contributed to policy dialogue and formulation.

Source: Thematic Evaluation of IFAD's Support for Smallholder Farmers' Adaptation to Climate Change

C. Institutional fragility: role of farmers' organisations

122. **Promoting rural institutions that encourage inclusiveness and social cohesion as well as deliver collective services essential to the livelihoods is an important dimension for building smallholders' absorptive and adaptive capacities.** When embedded in a social contract and backed up by regulations and policies, this can also contribute to social transformation. Solid institutions are even more essential in situations of high social and institutional fragility, including a range of contexts of politico-institutional crises. The reduced presence of public institutions in rural settings in time of conflicts and violence may further fuel the feelings of being marginalized or neglected and provoke a lack of trust in state authorities at decentralized and central levels. The political and economic crises faced by the G5+1 countries can further exacerbate existing social disruption and inequalities, thus perpetuating localized fragility, which in turn weakens social cohesion. Therefore, it is important to assess how IFAD support to the target communities contributed to strengthening their absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities to withstand socio-institutional shocks (usually man made) linked to situations of fragility, and to break the vicious circle of fragile institutions, leading to enhanced sensitivity to fragilities.¹²⁹
123. **Approaches adopted by projects to support organised beneficiaries have increasingly contributed to foster capacities, bonding and bridging social capital at local level, which is useful in a context of fragility; and the provision of services by grassroots organizations has been important.** Such approaches take time, as sufficient grassroots capacity needs to be developed at first.¹³⁰ Many IFAD supported projects in the sub-region have promoted local organisations to deliver and manage infrastructure. They usually rely on the beneficiaries for investments in irrigation or SWC to contribute in-kind labour as a group (in cash for work schemes) to develop the infrastructure and then help them to get organised to share the maintenance costs and benefits. POs/FOs and their apex organisations also play a major role in supporting their members for effective resilience strategies,¹³¹ by providing key services. Examples include training, seed

¹²⁹ The SC3D intends to address these issues in reinforcing smallholders' organisations in their abilities for advocacy, for conflict or crisis prevention, for mediation between farmers and pastoralists and local stakeholders and security forces. Their advocacy should result in better regulations, strategies and laws which, coupled with their capacities, will yield an improved local management of peace and development initiatives and contribute to regional integration.

¹³⁰ Early projects such as the Special Programme Soil and Water Conservation and Agro-forestry in the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso evaluated after 15 years could align impressive results in term of vast areas restored under SWC and NAR, improved with SSI, etc. but had not materialized the expected impact in terms of social capital and local and collective capacities in proportion to the investment made (IOE 2004. Special Programme Soil and Water Conservation and Agro-forestry in the Central Plateau)

¹³¹ Organisations when they grow to networks can have an apex able to deliver services to the member organisations, which every organization could not provide, and which may not be provided as well by the public or the private sectors. Smallholders' organisations may therefore play pivotal functions in directly increasing their members' resilience to shocks of all kinds, maintaining essential socioeconomic support functions for their members' activities during crisis,

production and supply, input transportation and marketing, distribution, and access to markets and to credit. Illustration examples are given below with the roles of resources users associations and management committees.

Socio-economic aspects of promoting POs

124. **Empowering POs/FOs to deliver effectively and sustainably has been instrumental to building absorptive and adaptive capacities, and ultimately transformative capacity.** Working with POs has been an area of comparative advantage of IFAD within the sub-region. An assessment of possible PO functions was done in 2013 for WCA countries as the basis for a set of guidance and a toolbox that could be used by the country teams.¹³² Key steps have been to enhance their capacities to deliver services for improved input supply and product marketing to their members; link institutional strengthening and lobbying capacities with economic promotion; and help them to federate into apex organisations¹³³ and to take part in sectoral and territorial planning. PO leaders' capacities in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and regional apex (such as ROPPA) have been strengthened and they participated in processes such as COSOP and program designs as well as concertation on policy issues at both national and regional levels.¹³⁴ In Chad, during the design of REPER project, the national FO apex advocated for more active role in the project implementation and more support to strengthening its branches, for better monitoring by FOs in the field. Additional examples are given from the CBARDP in the sustainability section below.
125. **IFAD's support to chambers of agriculture in countries where the government policy allows such farmers' representatives to deliver services, also improves the governance in local development processes and builds social capital.** For instance, in Burkina Faso, the Neer Tamba project had a significant role in fostering the involvement of regional chambers of agriculture in both implementing projects activities and in the participation of apex producers' organizations in policy dialogue. In Niger, Regional Chambers of Agriculture (RCAs) were supported in IFAD-funded interventions aimed to increase food security and government led service delivery. For instance, the RCA of Diffa performed a participatory marketing diagnosis and was involved in a process to oversee private management contractors.¹³⁵ A positive externality was building trust between beneficiaries and government.

Resources Users Associations (RUAs) and management committees

126. **Experience has been mixed on the effectiveness and sustainability of RUAs in fragile situations.** There is significant experience of establishing water users'

preparing them to adapt to long term stress factors such as climate change, scarcity and degradation of natural resources, and preventing as well as managing community and inter community conflicts. Federations and interprofessions may also be able to give visibility to fragility drivers affecting their constituents and negotiate at a higher level with public decision makers at different levels.

¹³² FIDA 2013. *Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre. Pour un partenariat efficace avec les organisations paysannes et de producteurs ruraux*

¹³³ Multidonor continental grant "Support to Farmers Organizations in Africa Programme" (SFOAP)¹³³ has been working since 2009 with regional apex and country POs to build their competencies (ie ROPPA Peasant University) and in providing services to their members for incorporation into VCs. Technical staff in these POs allowed them to offer peer to peer training, test several business models, POs business plans and contracts with other VC segments. ROPPA trained its national members in initiating economic activities and regional B2B meetings. Assessment at completion revealed that sound services to members would require different sets of capabilities than usually available in a PO.

¹³⁴ See : Completion report of Support to Farmers Organizations in Africa Programme (SFOAP) - Main Phase 2013-2018, <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/knowledge/-/publication/support-to-farmers-organizations-in-africa-programme-sfoap-completion-report>.

¹³⁵ Chambre Régionale d'Agriculture de Diffa. 2020. *Note de capitalisation des activités d'ingénierie sociale conduites par la CRA autour du Marché à bétail de N'guelkolo réhabilité avec l'appui financier du PECEA*. https://reca-niger.org/IMG/pdf/note_capitalisation_marche_betail-nguelkolo_juin_2020.pdf. In this market, a number of 13 categories of actors were identified according to the activities carried out: the breeders, the "Dillali" or intermediaries, the "kap-kap," the "varandama" or (resellers), wholesalers, "djoaés" or (carriers on foot), rope sellers, restaurateurs, transporters/conveyors, dockers, straw sellers, butchers, and vendors of water. These different categories of actors are in a business relationship or linked by affinity with each other. The N'guelkolo cattle market has a system for managing conflicts between the different market players. This system comprises a single person called a "charama" chosen from among the players, who plays a vital role in the market. In N'guelkolo, there are two "charama," one for large ruminants and the other for small ruminants.

associations for irrigation schemes, especially small-scale irrigation (SSI) ones, where public support services are lacking. Such associations are expected to allocate water and sometimes plots, collect fees, and fund the maintenance of the investments. Despite intensive efforts, their functionality is mixed (see Box 19 for examples).

Box 19

Experience with resource user associations

In Chad, resource management committees were established under both the PROHYPA and PARSAT projects. A key lesson was that sufficient time, possibly several years, is needed after construction of the physical infrastructure to ensure management committees can function properly.

In Mali, under PAPAM, management committees for irrigation and transport investments were promoted, but the assumption that they would receive longer-term support from government could be questioned.

In Burkina Faso, the Neer-Tamba (2013-2021) project supported management committees for common resources as well as village associations with a focus on sub-watershed natural resource management. It innovated by supporting their efforts to federate into unions and design plans and actions at a higher spatial level (76 unions designed development plans and 91 investments were funded).

In Niger, institutions created and supported by PPI Ruwanmu (water user groups and focus groups), have contributed to building social capital through the establishment and implementation of joint plans and the vegetation monitoring sub-committees. These institutions have had an additional benefit by raising local awareness of the value of micro-watershed management and other sustainable management practices.

Source: compiled by the SRE team

127. **A common problem was the insufficient time to establish functional management committees.** Reviewed projects usually pay a lot of attention to the formation and training of the management committees, albeit the approach taken was developed based on trial and error. In most cases, management committees started to function toward the end of projects and were too weak to address issues; their weakness was usually exacerbated by the fragility context, which results in recurrent difficulties to collect fees.
128. **The low functionality of water user associations generally observed is due either to internal divergence of interests and unequitable allocation of rights, or to the low capacity of such associations to deliver maintenance services required to keep the investments functional.** The IFAD grant funded recent review of experiences across Africa, identifies that maintenance is a key problem, which is also found in IFAD investments in the G5+1 countries,¹³⁶ and lays out a number of ways to address this risk. In principle, promoting federations of RUAs (in this case, of water usage) may contribute to the effective participation of users in the delivery of required services (including maintenance) by their own or in partnership with state institutions. This contributes to strengthening the social capital bonds for effective local development, as federations can help in planning at higher spatial levels such as watersheds and have a voice in addressing issues of competing stakeholders.
129. **Experience suggests that nurturing local conventions for natural resource management to ensure social cohesion and confidence within and between**

¹³⁶ IFAD grant on "Water User Associations: A Review of Approaches and Alternative Management Options for Sub-Saharan Africa" states that investors expect WUAs to deliver on user participation, full cost recovery and reliable service provision. But for this to happen, support to WUA policies, bylaws, contracts, trainings, and M&E has not been convincing. User participation is crucial for smallholder irrigation development but does not mean that WUAs can or should be solely responsible for all the functions. Indeed the study identified 7 management options, including enlarging the scope of services delivered by the WUAs, partnering with private providers or with public agencies. Aarnoudse, E.; Closas, A.; Lefore, N. 2018. Water user associations: a review of approaches and alternative management options for Sub-Saharan Africa. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 77p. (IWMI Working Paper 180). doi: 10.5337/2018.210

communities of competing users has been effective.¹³⁷ Alinon and Kalinganire 2008 noted that there is a need to recognize local conventions, which offer an opportunity for decentralization to be more rooted in local situations.¹³⁸ Local conventions are community bylaws, which are adopted in a social settlement process to enable communities to consensually manage natural resources and thus promote equitable access to and use of communal resources. These have demonstrated their relevance and ability as tools for consensual natural resource management.¹³⁹ Several examples found in the G5+1 contexts demonstrate their effectiveness (see Box 20).

Box 20

Local conventions in IFAD projects

In Mauritania, PACDM was effective in supporting settlement between landowners and the "landless" formalized by signing a Land Agreement (French: "Entente foncière"). The aim of the process was to provide landless families with the long-term right to use flood recession cropping land. The negotiations took place in three phases and lasted two years. The first phase was to create village committees to develop a land agreement between owners and users of the land. All members of the community endorsed this agreement, after debate. Then, a land appraisal was carried out in order to identify the most vulnerable groups. During the third phase, the land agreements concluded during the first phase were codified as part of a participatory negotiation and official endorsement process.¹⁴⁰

In Burkina Faso, land tenure commissions were also expected to develop consensus on land issues with the support of the Neer Tamba project.¹⁴¹ When NRM investments open up to opportunities for expanding the resource base, these created a positive context for re-negotiating the access rights for all categories, who had been disadvantaged or marginalised, as well as for developing good practices of sustainable usage, with oversight of local land commissions.

In Mali, PAPAM has assisted the set-up of land commissions at communal and village levels (31 communes) and the on-going MERIT will assist 600 village level commissions so that they can deliver land certificates, especially to women and youth. The project intends to promote a mechanism for conflict resolution.

Source: compiled by the SRE team

FOs and social contract

130. **Strengthening the social contract between the state and beneficiaries has not been an explicit focus of IFAD supported operations in the sub-region. However, interventions have enabled conditions for FOs to participate in policy decisions about them; this is particularly critical in fragility situations.** IFAD in the G5+1 did not conduct any diagnostic analysis of social contracts between the state and the rural population. Nevertheless, through work on resilience building, there are instances where POs have influenced decisions on food security policy or strategy. For instance, PASADEM in Niger, promoted consultation frameworks (*Hadin Gwiwa*) to foster trade linkages. These brought together stakeholders around common strategic visions of economic development and clarifying implications for the roles of economic interest groups responsible for managing semi-wholesale markets built by IFAD projects.

D. Social inequalities in access to productive resources

131. This section assesses issues pertaining to rights for the access to productive resources and conflicts that can arise from the competition in the usage of common natural resources. Aspects of inclusiveness are treated in the next chapter.

¹³⁷ Local conventions are sets of rules developed locally by stakeholders concerned by natural resources and competing over these resources to regulate their uses and peacefully settle or prevent conflicts.

¹³⁸ Alinon, K., Kalinganire, A. 2008. *Effectiveness of bylaws in the management of natural resources: The West African experience*. CAPRI Working Paper No. 93. International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, DC. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/CAPRIWP93>.

¹³⁹ Also confirmed by findings of the IOE 2020 Evaluation Synthesis on community-driven development (ESR-2020).

¹⁴⁰ IOE. 2011. *Validation du Rapport d'Achèvement - Projet d'Amélioration des cultures de décrue à Maghama II*. République Islamique de Mauritanie.

¹⁴¹ Targets of 150 commissions and 500 consensus. But the overall achievement was lower at the end.

Land tenure rights

132. **Investments in land rehabilitation or improvement will only be funded by individuals or families if they are sure to benefit from the returns, which means medium term stability of land tenure.** Rehabilitation may only bring significant benefits after several years. Lack of security in land access therefore discourages smallholders from investing, especially in NRM and other long-term investments. Land tenure insecurity and exclusion from land rights are also usually sources of conflicts that can exacerbate social tension, a driver of fragility. Reviewed past experience of IFAD support within the G5+1 countries reveals that this issue has been addressed to some extent around investments for NRM infrastructure, but not always translated into policies. An exception is in Mali, where the recent land law foresees using existing land commissions from the local to the national levels. Producer representatives were trained under IFAD projects to use these commissions as arena to clarify land rights and prevent conflicts.
133. **There are groups and categories of stakeholders, including women and youths in the G5+1 countries, that have limited land rights and are more subject to insecure land access.** IFAD supported projects have addressed inequality in land access but rarely based on extensive analysis.¹⁴² Land access rights are not favourable for specific groups, as illustrated in Box 21. Effective approaches implemented to managing exclusion from land access have been to decrease the pressure on scarce resources by opening access to new resources (usually communal) to landless groups, and to deliberately condition access to funding around assured access rights for disadvantaged categories (women especially).

Box 21

Main land rights issues in the G5+1 contexts

Women are in most social contexts excluded and must enter groups to negotiate access rights as an organization. These rights may still be contested. Youth are also excluded over a period of their domestic cycle or their access to land and water resources is conditioned to their supply of labour to the right holders. Allochthonous groups, especially if they have only recently settled in an area may have unsecure user rights. Pastoralists settling down as agro-pastoralists often belong to this category. Pastoralists have temporary access rights based on traditional contracts and are in many case not consulted when these rights are de facto revised.

Source: Elaboration by the SRE team

Pastoral land use rights as conflictual issues

134. **Pastoralism is recognized within IFAD as a challenging and important issue, which is a source of social conflicts, but not subject of sufficient focus by IFAD in the G5+1 context.** The desk review shows that analyses of farmers and pastoralists conflict¹⁴³ over rangeland and water resources have not been prioritised in the G5+1 COSOPs and loan-operations documents.¹⁴⁴ The TE on smallholders adaption to CC (2021) found that in the cases of reviewed projects in Chad, Mali and Niger, while the design documents noted the existence of transhumant pastoralism in the intervention areas, clear mechanisms were not established to address their competing interests concerning access to water and land resources.

¹⁴² Worth to mention that inequalities in land and water access is poorly analysed in design documents and processes of land concentration among a small group of better off farmers in areas with better opportunities, individual appropriation of grazing rights by large livestock herd owners are not systematically assessed nor addressed.

¹⁴³ Pastoralist conflicts are competitions over land and land-based resources between pastoralists or between them and crop farmers. See: "Dennis Amego Korbla Penu, D.A.K. 2021. *Institutions and Pastoralist Conflicts in Africa: A Conceptual Framework*". <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1542316621995733>.

¹⁴⁴ It appears that IFAD had projects in pastoralist areas in the 1990s and early 2000s, then it moved out of those areas because of conflicts.

135. For pastoralists, access to most natural resources is subject to both negotiation and potential conflict. Despite the trend for pastoralists to partly settle as agro-pastoralists, nearly all livestock keepers still depend on transhumance, which is increasingly conflictual in the G5+1 context.

According to key informants interviewed, pastoralist transhumance is both a mode of production and a lifestyle for livelihood (see Box 22), but these issues have not been seriously taken into account in national priorities by governments, making difficult for IFAD¹⁴⁵ to put a strong focus on them. The inclusion of an output in the SD3C program related to support dialogue and mediation between farmers and pastoralist is of great importance in the G5+1 contexts. According to the recent Réseau Billital Maroobé (RBM) study¹⁴⁶ most livestock keepers in the Sahel and West Africa are affected by the crisis of pastoralism, which fuels a sense of injustice and mistrust vis-à-vis institutions. Pastoralists may not massively join or support jihadist groups, but most also do not trust the national militaries and self-defence groups. Pastoralists (still mobile or late settlers) are the group with the most insecure access to both farm- and grazing land near their settlement and other grazing land during transhumance. They are also subject to conflicts over access to water resources or areas under protection (natural parks, protected forests). Cross border transhumance brings challenges of animal health regulations that are little known by pastoralists, thus exposing them to both legal and illicit pressures. Finally, they are either grazing their animals in regions of low population density and high insecurity hosting violent and illicit groups, or of high population density where animals encroach over farmland.

Box 22

Pastoralist concerns in West Africa

Pastoralism is becoming associated with problems, with some people talking about the death of mobile and transhumant farming. The reasons for hope come from their capacity and readiness to adapt, notably towards a more intensive, sometimes even sedentary, mode of livestock farming. However, many herders say they are firmly attached to mobility and are not considering another mode of production. Semi-transhumant livestock farming is an option for many farmers, when agro-ecological, political and security conditions allow it. Leaving livestock farming particularly appeals to young people seeking to migrate to urban areas and interested in trade or gold panning. However, this departure is often not definitive and does not necessarily result in an 'inter-generational divide'. Young people become socially and economically emancipated - sometimes even by taking up arms - creating tensions within families, but the children do not systematically break with their families or home territories.

Source: Excerpts from Réseau Billital Maroobé (RBM) and Partners 2021. *Listening to Herders in West Africa and the Sahel: What is The Future for Pastoralism in a Context of Rising Insecurity?* Synthesis Report, p.4.

136. Supporting effective management joint committees of competing users is essential and effective to prevent pastoral related local conflicts. For instance, in Chad the Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas (PROHYPA 2010-2015) targeted both agro-pastoralists as well as pastoralists; however, in the absence of relevant and effective pastoral land rights system, the use of pastures and water points generated numerous and sometimes devastating conflicts. Therefore, the project's investment in pastoral hydraulics required special attention to the management of conflicts that these new structures would generate and sensitivity to conflicts around existing water points. The project supported creation of "commissions mixtes" including both pastoralists and agropastoralists to decide upon the locations of the wells to be installed, delimitate transhumance corridors for livestock mobility and help in conflict settlement. Management committees were trained and were supposed to collect fees for the maintenance of wells and ponds. At project completion, despite training, nearly half of the 231 committees were assessed as only being at the infant stage.

¹⁴⁵ As IFAD supports governments

¹⁴⁶ Réseau Billital Maroobé et partenaires, 2021. *Entendre la voix des éleveurs au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest : quel avenir pour le pastoralisme face à l'insécurité et ses impacts ?* Résumé exécutif, p.1

137. **Very few IFAD projects have tackled transhumance and its transboundary aspects, yet climate change is making this more conflictual.** Due to climate change, the timing of transhumance movement has changed and increasingly overlaps with harvest times in regions to the south (in the sudanian agro-ecological zone).¹⁴⁷ Customary regulations and tacit contracts linking farming and grazing communities are therefore becoming increasingly obsolete as communal planning does not consider the required adaptations in grazing paths and pastoral areas. It seems that changing realities, reinforced by structural causes of conflict have overtaken the existing governance frameworks of transhumance and “emerging forms of pastoralism (neo-pastoralism) and the privatization of land rights leads to growing inequality between different communities, eroding complementarity of agricultural and pastoral activities”.¹⁴⁸ Finally, COVID-19 movement limitations and increasing insecurity have changed transhumance routes leading to more frequent conflicts with agricultural hosting communities.
138. **IFAD successfully facilitated collaboration between Niger and Nigeria in removing barriers to cross-border trade in agro-silvo-pastoral products.** In Niger, PASADEM, PPI Ruwanmu, and more generally PRoDAF, in addition to structuring investments in infrastructure, have helped set up systems for monitoring flows and harassments, as well as local consultation frameworks on the fluidification of trade. PRoDAF and PRoDAF-Diffa being located at the border to Nigeria, corridor management is coupled with the monitoring of cross-border livestock flows on three corridors Kano-Katsina-Maradi, Tahoua-Sokoto-Kebbi and Zinder-Daura-Kano. A mixed commission has been put in place to facilitate cross border trade. Illicit trade barriers and racketeering are to be monitored and reduced. CILSS has been instrumental in the monitoring and facilitation.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, there was no similar initiative on the other side of the border.
139. **Including a user rights dimension in NRM remains a necessity, especially in social conflict prone areas, where land access and use conflicts easily escalate.** The SD3C recognised the user rights dimension as it aims at supporting producers’ groups in their efforts to manage NRM sustainably and tackle climate risks by adopting more suitable practices and improving productive land and water infrastructures. It also intends to secure user rights by regulations as well as mediation spaces between competing user groups. This should not only result in improved production and productivity, less sensitivity towards climate vagaries and more resilient livelihoods, but also in less risks of social conflicts.

E. Violent conflicts and insecurity

140. **A nexus approach addressing poverty and conflict is missing in IFAD supported operations in the G5+1 countries.** The design of IFAD supported interventions in the G5+1 did not consider the nexus between poverty and conflict. This makes it challenging to assess the extent to which interventions were intended to directly address conflict related drivers.
141. **Supports did not seek to address drivers related to medium intensity conflicts. Such conflicts are treated as risks to be managed rather than problems IFAD can directly contribute to solving or preventing.** In Nigeria many parts of the 2016 COSOP demonstrates sensitivity to conflicts although the Results Management Framework does not provide a basis for the analysis of transformative effects on the farmers/pastoralists’ conflicts at the target communities’ level. IFAD’s projects have been vulnerable to various forms of conflict, insurgency, or unrest, whether Boko Haram in the Northeast, pastoralist-farmer conflicts in the middle belt, or violence and unrest in the Delta region. IFAD

¹⁴⁷ Due to demographic increase, general trends observed are to resettle southwards, to mechanize and increase farm size and occupy farmland all year round with tuber cultivation and other crops.

¹⁴⁸ Joined-up analysis on farmer herder dynamics in West and Central Africa commissioned by the UNOCA, UNOWAS and the Office of the Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel, September 2021. Unedited report.

¹⁴⁹ In Mauritania, there is an on-going process between Senegal and Mauritania to develop an agreement regulating transhumance, but cross border institutional linkages seem to be missing between Mali and Mauritania.

projects in Nigeria do not consider in their results framework how project outcomes fit within the poverty-conflict nexus; instead, conflict is managed as a risk. In Niger PRODAF-Diffa, affected by flows of displaced people, no action has been planned either to explicitly address root causes of violent conflicts¹⁵⁰

F. Shocks due to the COVID-19 pandemic

142. **Recent actions implemented, in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, illustrate how IFAD's can react in case in emergency contexts.** In Niger, both ProDAF and PRODAF-Diffa have shown flexibility in contributing to the Government's efforts in the context of the response to COVID-19. This was through emergency plans to finance strengthened household food security in their respective intervention areas. The Government and IFAD have also developed a Contingency Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of COVID-19 in Maradi, Tahoua, Zinder, and Diffa, through ProDAF. This plan includes support in terms of hygiene and sanitation.¹⁵¹ It is too early to assess the effectiveness of such responses.¹⁵²
143. IFAD's response to the COVID-19 crisis was done, among others,¹⁵³ by establishing the Rural Poor Stimulus Facility (RPSF). Short-term country-level initiatives were then financed and implemented in Chad, Mali, and Nigeria. The significant-to-fragility initiative with a transboundary scope was financed in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger (2021) through a stand-alone project (implemented by Réseau Billital Maroobé, which focused on cross-border areas to support pastoralists organizations and agropastoralists (to ultra-poor). It also strengthens the data collection mechanism that feeds in the existing digital platform managed the RBM to monitor the situation of pastoralists and the impact of COVID-19 on them and help to inform policymaking and promote inclusion of this group in new legislation.¹⁵⁴ While lessons from these initiatives are yet to be generated, they however illustrate IFAD's strength to adapt to change in circumstances. As analysed below (efficiency section) the problem may be in terms of swiftness for making change.

G. Resilience building overall

144. **Interventions with a focus on bonding and bridging social capital of target groups and on their resilience capacities have succeeded in engaging communities in collaborative activities that have allowed them to enhance their resilience.**¹⁵⁵ Supporting communities to strengthen their bonding and bridging social capital helped them to improve their absorptive capacity. The appropriate interventions for this have been those that support target groups or communities to work closely with each other to prevent, cope with, and respond to shocks, and focus on the ability of households, communities, and systems to manage shocks in the short-term. Examples were found in Burkina Faso Niger and Nigeria, as presented earlier. The development of apex FOs and the inclusion of FOs in value chains have contributed to bridging and linking social capital.

¹⁵⁰ PRODAF-Diffa design document mentions: "Since 2014, the Diffa region has been facing security challenges related to the attacks of the Boko Haram terrorist group in the Lake Chad Basin area causing massive displacement of populations in the interior of the region. In this context, under the Facility for Refugees, Migrants, Forced Displacement and Rural Stability (hereinafter referred to as "FARMS"), IFAD has received a grant from the Norwegian Development Cooperation Agency of an amount of NOK 32 million (about US \$ 3.8 million), to co-finance IFAD's investments in supporting the development activities of host communities and displaced persons in the Diffa region." Interventions comprehend supporting the resilience of refugees and their hosting communities as well as the promoting cross-border trades. However, there was no action planned to contribute explicitly addressing root causes of violent conflict.

¹⁵¹ IOE CSPE 2021.

¹⁵² IFAD has expertise from post recovery interventions in West Africa. on how to rebuild rural economies after civil conflicts or pandemics (Ebola), which may help in developing approaches to restore the absorptive capacities of impacted populations in fragile contexts. For instance, IFAD launched a Rural Poor Stimulus Facility (RPSF) as a multi-donor fund in April 2020 after the onset of the COVID 19 pandemics as an immediate response that aligns with IFAD long-term development objectives. The Facility should ensure that farmers in the most vulnerable countries have timely access to inputs, information, markets, and liquidity.

¹⁵³ There has been also the repurposing project funds and provision of policy and analytical support.

¹⁵⁴ <https://www.maroobe.com/index.php/chantiers/initiatives>

¹⁵⁵ This collaboration strengthens social values of positive solidarity and social cohesion, which are essential for fragility mitigation.

145. **By fostering approaches of natural resource management on communal land that promote collaborative relations between user groups and strengthen customary institutions that traditionally manage conflicts over natural resources, IFAD-funded programmes have supported the conditions of social cohesion, and thus contributed to fragility mitigation.** IFAD supported interventions are in line with these analyses to achieve food security by fostering equitable and inclusive management of natural resources. Examples were found in Mali, Niger, and Nigeria on how to build community absorptive and adaptive capacities for resilience through the restoration and sustainable management of the natural capital, thus contributing to addressing some of the root causes of fragility. In Niger, assisted natural regeneration (ANR) proved to be an enabling approach for transformative change, demonstrating that **a momentum and consensus for change can occur in a short run among communities and between them and government institutions, as far as an obvious common interest emerges.**¹⁵⁶
146. **There are emerging indications in some countries that transformative capacities are being developed.** In Niger, through the adoption of a range of interventions layering complementary resilience capacity building activities, by adopting a spatial concentration approach, and by sequencing projects, IFAD interventions helped to break the cycle of food crises affecting different poor and vulnerable households and communities. Among the key elements with the potential for developing absorptive capacities of the target groups, there was attention to the marketing of produce; the creation of linkages between producers, their associations, and agricultural sectors; and strengthening networks of farmers' associations. In Mali, certain favourable factors that supported developing transformative capacity, made this sustainability possible. Generally, most of the achievements were based on establishing infrastructure management committees and the involvement of women in management.¹⁵⁷ By contrast, in Chad while incremental benefits for target community groups and locations are seen, the interventions lacked clear approaches to empowering communities to strengthen their resilience capacities in a continuum and manage their risks more effectively by building increased local adaptive capacity.

Summary, from effectiveness to impact

147. **Supported operations in the G5+1 countries have achieved numerous but variable rural resilience results, which contributed to mitigating some fragility drivers. Achievements were mixed in contributing to address fragility drivers linked to transboundary issues, weak social contracts and tackling root causes of medium intensity conflicts.** Strong contribution results were found in terms of: food security and rural income creation and diversification through pro-poor VC development; improved farming practices in soil and water conservation for sustainable resources management; and strengthening grassroots and community-based organisations, which play critical roles for their members (e.g. for delivery of services) in those fragile situations. Achievements were modest in relation to: the management of communal resources and infrastructures, social conflicts linked to pastoralism (especially transhumance) and land tenure rights. All

¹⁵⁶ Key government institutions and their partners mobilized to integrate ANR in their rural development strategies. Early signals of systemic change at the community level indicate that the quality, depth, and intensity of transformation are very likely to sustainably reduce conflicts over access to and use of natural resources. ANR increases agricultural productivity and thus improves the income of poor rural families, reduces the time it takes to collect wood and non-wood products, the diversification of the farming systems, regeneration of the rangelands, and the protection of the ecosystems. It also has an advantage in strengthening social cohesion, which is essential for the mitigation of fragility. It allows mitigation of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists, ensures respect for local social conventions, educates, and involves young people in protecting the environment.

¹⁵⁷ In Mauritania, the examples of sustainable achievements observed by the field visit mission concern, in terms of infrastructure, all the structures of soil and water conservation/restoration of degraded land such as gabion sills or stone bunds. These achievements are sustainable and have a real and verifiable impact on all the territories concerned in terms of soil restoration. The field visit also observed that all the capacity building activities of community associations showed a certain sustainability in the contribution to resilience; the most spectacular example being the AGPOs which have benefited from the support of IFAD to become essential interlocutors of the oasis communities (until obtaining recognition of Law 98/016) and thus continue to attract funding and work with new donors (Fades).

these favoured building absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities, and hence, to develop and strengthen the resilience of beneficiaries (individuals, groups, and communities). For transboundary and weak state institution fragility aspects, contributions were little. The findings highlight several lessons very specific to IFAD interventions. These comprehend conditions for enabling resilience by promoting or supporting: economic activities along VC segments, food security through storage facilities, sustainable management of natural production resources, successful strategies for adaptation to CC by smallholders, effective community-based organisations (FOs, RUAs) and their apex. Forging social contracts between producers and the state, and managing social conflicts linked to access to resources, both in the realm of the IFAD mandate, could be systematically enhanced in fragile situations.

Key points

Poverty and economic fragility aspects

- Support to multiple farm and non-farm income generating activities is conducive to strengthening absorptive and adaptive capacities of beneficiaries.
- Capacity building and non-financial support have been critical in developing the necessary human and social capital of individuals and rural communities.
- Inclusive financial services have contributed to expanding productive assets and strengthen the absorptive capacities of producers.
- Community grain-storage facilities contributed to improving absorptive capacity and benefited private actors in addition to POs.
- Interventions in nutritional issues are scanty and inconclusive. Yet the issue of child malnutrition must be considered in partnership with other more specialised agencies which is yet to be implemented.

Environment and climate change related fragility

- Supporting SWC practices in arid and semi-arid contexts are instrumental in improving the resilience of beneficiaries but need to be taken to scale.
- Restoration of fragile grazing land, their sustainable management and the management of transhumance is possible in arid and semi-arid areas, when relevant stakeholders are fully involved, and their rights secured.
- Successful strategies for poor smallholders facing climate change do not only relate to changes in cropping or husbandry practices, but also to diversification of livelihoods, especially off-farm activities, which contribute to effective adaptation.

Rural institutions: Role FOs, POs and CBOs and public institutions

- POs/FOs and their apex organisations have played a major role in supporting their members for effective resilience strategies, and by providing key services.
- IFAD's support to FOs for service delivery in rural communities did help improve governance in local development processes and build social capital.
- A common issue has been the insufficient time to establish functional management committees.
- Strengthening the social contract between the state and beneficiaries has not been the focus of IFAD supported operations in the sub-region.

Social inequalities and disruption

- Some categories of rural players, including women and youths, have limited land rights and are more subject to insecure land access in those contexts.
- Access to most natural resources by pastoralists has been a source of conflicts within the sub-region.
- Supporting effective management committees might be relevant to preventing transhumance related local conflicts.
- Very few IFAD projects have tackled of transhumance and its transboundary aspects, yet climate change is making this more conflictual.

Violent conflicts and insecurity

- A nexus approach addressing poverty and conflict is missing in IFAD supported operations in the G5+1 countries.
- IFAD's support does not explicitly seek to address drivers related to medium intensity conflicts. Such conflicts are treated as risks. The type of conflicts IFAD should address and how is not clear.

Resilience building overall

- Interventions that focus on the bonding and bridging social capitals of target groups, and on their resilience capacities have succeeded in engaging communities in collaborative activities that have allowed them to enhance their resilience.
- IFAD-funded operations have supported the conditions of social cohesion by fostering approaches of natural resource management on communal land.
- Transformative capacities are being strengthened in some of G5+1 countries.

V. Ensuring inclusiveness of interventions

148. This chapter separately analyses inclusiveness, seen within the social fragility driver and consistently flagged as key to working effectively in fragile contexts. It is complementary to analyses reported in the previous chapter related to social disruption and inequality.¹⁵⁸ Most projects in the G5+1 during the evaluation period implemented approaches (e.g., quota mechanism) for inclusion of women and youth.

A. Gender equality and women empowerment

149. **The status and situation of rural women are not favourable in the G5+1 countries making them more sensitive to fragility drivers.**¹⁵⁹ As presented earlier (in Table 4), the gender inequality indicators of the G5+1 countries are at the very lower side. Food and nutrition insecurity, poverty and climate change burdens in the sub-region contribute to exacerbating existing disparities and inequalities, as women have limited access to productive resources (especially land), opportunities of education and training, and to decision-making processes at household, community, and higher levels. Armed conflicts in the G5 + 1 countries in recent years have negatively affected women and girls (in the forms of verbal, mental, physical, and sexual violence, trauma, stigmatization, and rejection, etc.). The COVID-19 pandemic has also caused major constraints for rural women, particularly with the closure of borders (complicating the marketing of agricultural products and meeting the food needs of rural households). Drawbacks in women empowerment are observed in many regions of the Sahel affected by violent conflicts and religious and political tensions. Gender inequalities, accentuated by socio-cultural norms / values, contribute to worsening the women status in those contexts, reduce their resilience and in a vicious circle increase their vulnerability and pauperisation.

150. **Evidence confirms that IFAD supported programs have put a clear focus on gender equality in the G5+1, albeit not yet sufficient to address root causes underpinning the high vulnerability of women in such fragile contexts.** The 2019 IFAD Special Programme for Countries with Fragile Situations enhances “the role of women in sustaining peace and building resilient communities, by promoting their economic empowerment, their right to access and use resources and services, and their decision-making power in NRM and community development” as one entry point (among four) for interventions in fragile situations.¹⁶⁰ Constraints to gender equality and women empowerment mentioned in COSOPs (and project documents) refer to the three pillars of economic empowerment (secure access to productive resources and activities), voice (in household up to producers’ organization and beyond) and reduced drudgeries, but this does not always translate into a gender strategy for higher resilience in fragile contexts. Targeting women is consistently used as an entry point by the country programmes (see Box 23). However, gender-related impacts, critical in fragile situations, are not depicted (explicitly or clearly) in the ToC pathways to orient interventions to address roots causes of women vulnerability. Moreover, some projects had no specific gender strategy in their design documents: out of 28 projects design documents, 07 did not include a gender strategy right from the design stage, even if they included sub-sections on gender in the context analysis.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Inequalities and marginalization generate frustration, weaken the social patterns and slow the institutional adjustment processes required to cope with fragility overall.

¹⁵⁹ Improving women’s capacities and well-being is strongly correlated with poverty reduction and other gains, such as lower child mortality and malnutrition.

¹⁶⁰ but it has not clarified approaches to achieve this.

¹⁶¹ They were: PROHYPA in Chad, INCLUSIF and MERIT in Mali, PUSADER, PASADEM, PRoDAF, and PRoDAF Diffa in Niger.

Box 23

Examples of women targeting results

Most projects have a strategy for inclusion of women and young people based on a quota planning approach. In Niger, PRECIS targets 30% of women and 30% of young people - 50% of young women. In Burkina Faso, there has been a progression over time and the recent PAFPA targets 50% of women, as well as an allocation of 30% of the irrigated land improved by the project to women.

In some cases, access to funding to POs is conditioned by the participation of women in the microprojects submitted or by the allocation of restored land to women; in other cases, there is a self-selection based on the type of activities promoted. In Nigeria, CBNRMP PCRV (2017) reported that out of 291,435 households who benefited from it, 41 percent of individuals reached by the program were females, 53 percent of people participating in marketing groups were women as well as 50 percent of people trained in income-generating activities and 45 percent of voluntary savers. Female beneficiaries benefitted more from linkages with non-governmental organizations, market outlets and enterprise management activities.

The targeted results are achieved in most projects (they could be better documented by a gender disaggregated reporting) but it is difficult to obtain evidence on the appropriation after project completion of the positive discrimination principles promoted, especially within FOs.

Compiled by the SRE team

151. **Evidence reveals that, with a specific and strong women targeting, IFAD supported projects contributed to empowering rural women and girls and improved their capacity to cope with shocks and stress factors.** Reviewed experiences show that IFAD supported interventions have been sensitive to the participation of women, included them in the decision-making bodies and considered their priorities from project design up to implementation.¹⁶² Interventions sought in first instance to favor the economic empowerment of women, followed by strengthening their position in both households and communities, and easing their workload (Table 11).¹⁶³ All projects have sought to empower women economically,¹⁶⁴ some interventions addressed the work overload due to water harvesting for irrigation and to firewood gathering. Evidence also demonstrates a gradual but slow improvement in strengthening the position of women within communities, especially in governing bodies of FOs and to a lesser extent within households, with self-assessments based on the GALS methodology. A stepwise approach could be observed over successive projects, starting with literacy training, and financial training up to leadership training. For instance, in RUFIN (Niger), the PCRV (2018) reported that in around 70 percent of the groups, women are in leadership positions, more than doubling the appraisal target.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the CBNRMP PCRV (2017) found that sustainable inclusion and empowerment of women is harder to ascertain due to limited evidence to show how women have used the opportunities provided by the programmes to improve their economic and social status.

¹⁶² IFAD's gender policy has been factored in all projects and thus, women actively participated in all stages of the project cycle (preparation, design and implementation) and the choice of activities was guided by their needs. Specific measures were applied in favor of women. Intra-community targeting is carried out by the communities with the most vulnerable through self-targeting methods and instruments (land agreements, labor-based works).

¹⁶³ Women's economic empowerment is restricted by the limited possibility to go and sell their products on the markets (almost systematic intermediation of the husband). Several projects note an overload of work for women, and activities aimed at reducing hard work were not carried out as planned.

¹⁶⁴ by promoting specific value chains and some of their segments where women are active or even dominant (poultry, goat kits, vegetable gardens with increasingly sophisticated irrigation systems, dry grains, sesame, rice or cowpea where women are active in cultivation and processing), as well as cereal banks / women's lean granaries, through micro-project funding mechanisms and training in income-generating activities

¹⁶⁵ Women were trained in entrepreneurship, financial management, book-keeping, group dynamics, and governance aspects. These have enabled them to improve their financial, business, leadership, and management skills and have also assisted in promoting a common vision and understanding of gender equality and women empowerment among the Village Saving and Credit Groups. It has improved their access to income.

Table 11
Examples of IFAD-supported interventions that provided opportunities for women's empowerment over the reviewed period (2010-2020)

Country	Economic empowerment	Social status and voice	Workload reduction
Mauritania	Specific value chains where women are dominant (poultry, vegetables, NTFP)	Women in FOs	Labour saving water systems; gas cooker
Mali		Financial training	Biogas cooking
Burkina Faso	Specific value chains and segments where women are present/dominant Shares of land restored allocated to women	Literacy training Gender Action Learning System (GALS)	Improved drop irrigation
Niger	Women based food security storage	Nutritional education Household Interactive Gender Learning System ¹⁶⁶ Training on women leadership and women in leadership positions in FOs	
Chad	Women based food security storage Vegetable gardens Sesame cultivation and improved poultry		Solar pump and oil crushers

Source: Compiled by the SRE team

152. **Evidence suggests positive results in improving women's access to productive assets, which is critical for building absorptive and adaptive capabilities.** For instance, in Burkina Faso, PDRD has had some success in obtaining the right of use of the managed land plots for women: out of 26,573 farmers that installed in the market gardening areas and rice-growing lowlands, 52.61 per cent are women, who thus benefit from a right of use on the developed plots. Access to this resource is essential for the empowerment of women, particularly in the Burkinabé context. The Neer-Tamba project has also recorded successes in this area. Its support has improved women's access to land in the lowlands and market garden areas by 48 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. In Chad (PADER-G), the diversification of rural activities, especially those that are favourable for women (e.g., improved poultry, sesame farming and cattle raising) contributed to enhancing absorptive and adaptive capacities of women. A similar result was achieved in Niger (with PUSADER and PASADEM) where women were supported to access plots in rehabilitated irrigation perimeters and to improved techniques and inputs.
153. **IFAD supported operations contributed to positive impact on women and ultimately to strengthen their resilience.** In Nigeria, the 2016 CPE noted that overall, the programme increasingly succeeded in mobilizing women to participate. For example, the CBNRMP PCRV (2017) reported that out of 291,435 households which directly benefited, 41 per cent of individuals reached by the programme were females, 53 per cent of people participating in marketing groups were women, 50 per cent of people trained in income-generating activities were women, and 45 per cent of voluntary savers were also women. Female beneficiaries benefitted more from linkages with non-governmental organizations, market outlets, and enterprise management activities. The number of women in leadership positions was below the target, suggesting that actions fostering social change for women had less impact than envisioned.¹⁶⁷
154. **The contribution of women in processes related to the management of natural resources is critical, especially when natural fragility drivers are at**

¹⁶⁶ The most recent PRECIS foresees the implementation of transformative actions such as the use of the Interactive Gender Learning System, and training on women's leadership in farmers' organizations and other rural institutions, without, however, providing a substantial budget for transformative actions.

¹⁶⁷ The 2021 CSPE Niger reported that the Country Program's contribution to gender equality and women's empowerment has been quite satisfactory. However, in most cases, it was hard to substantiate such a positive incidence with evidence.

stake. It appears that the control of women over community natural resources is usually weak or absent. Projects made good effort to include them in NRM committees. However, cultural barriers inhibit their effective participation in those committees. For instance, water is a critical resource for both production and household consumption in the Sahelian sub-region. Women are in charge of seeking for it when the needs are for household purposes, yet their participation can be marginal in NRM committees. In terms of participation of women in NRM committees, ProlPRAF Mauritania provides an example of better participation of women in rural organizations, with the introduction of the dewatering and irrigation systems, including the establishment of quotas for this participation.¹⁶⁸

155. **Ensuring women’s participation in management committees is a prerequisite to enhancing their capacity to play a key role in decision-making, but this is not sufficient.** CBNRMP PCRV 2017 noted that while IFAD’s programmes have increased women's participation in community development activities, the impact on decision-making empowerment and social change was not as great. In Mauritania, the local management structures are required to integrate women. However, the field visit revealed that, despite the presence of women in the management bodies (AGLC, CCC, AGPO), when it came to allocating funds from the Community Investment Funds (CIF) or the Municipal Investment Fund (FIEC), women are in small number according to several accounts which is not favorable of strengthening social cohesion.
156. **Those positive achievements related to women empowerment in the G5+1 contexts may be restricted in terms of importance and sustainability, to counteracting fragility drivers, due to socio-cultural constraints.** Field information gathered (presented in Table 12) show that field actors in four of the six countries perceived social inequality and exclusion fragility drivers as having a lower importance, compared to other drivers. This situation reflects the prominence of sociocultural aspects linked to gender inequality, a key element of social related fragility drivers, in the G5+1 countries. While context-specific gender assessments guided interventions, they were hardly precise enough to capture sociocultural factors and constraints that lead to women’s vulnerability and exacerbate it. Most assessments conducted were short and unspecific. They do not describe the social organization, sociocultural values and norms regulating households and communities (for all kinds of interactions and activities), nor the room left for women to rely upon. The latter varies according to regions, socio ethnic groups and political contexts and along trends, which may oscillate between openness to new norms and empowerment versus stiffening back to patriarchal traditions and rigors. Changes in norms affecting women status are therefore difficult to foster and trace.¹⁶⁹

Table 12

Appreciation of fragility drivers of social inequality and exclusion by field stakeholders

<i>Driver</i>	<i>Burkina Faso</i>	<i>Chad</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Mauritania</i>	<i>Niger</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Sub-region</i>
Social inequality and exclusion	3.8	2.5	2.0	2.5	1.0	4.1	2.7
All fragility drivers average	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.0	2.8	3.8	3.4

Source: field data gathered¹⁷⁰

157. **Evidence is lacking on what might be effective ways to support the role of women in strengthening social contracts, which is key for both reliance**

¹⁶⁸ In Chad, where concerted efforts were made to build social cohesion in securing access to water in pastoral systems and in establishing stakeholders’ consultation, the involvement, and the role of women at each stage of the process has not been highlighted. In Mali, PAPAM mentioned the role of women in the management and use of rehabilitated lowlands.

¹⁶⁹ An example of women situation analysis can be found for example in: WFP. 2017. *Gender, Markets and Women’s Empowerment in the Sahel Region: A Comparative Analysis of Mali, Niger, and Chad*. VAM Gender and Markets Study #4 2016-2017

¹⁷⁰ Please see methodological note mentioned for Table 9.

and sustainability. Previous analyses (in chapter IV) reveal significant experience in the field of social cohesion and contracts in Niger and Nigeria. Unfortunately, little or no evidence is available on how women's roles were determinant in such processes. The same appears in Chad, where concerted efforts to build social cohesion in securing access to water in pastoral systems and establish a consultation framework of stakeholders were made. However, the involvement of women and the role they played at each stage of the process has not been examined. Only in Mali, PAPAM mentioned the role of managing rehabilitated lowlands and exploiting them. This does not strengthen social cohesion.

158. **Women in the Sahel are expected to contribute to prevention, mediation, and peacekeeping in conflict situations, which will require much stronger collective and broader actions.** For now, increasing insecurity in the Sahel region and the northern area of Nigeria victimizes women and their children, as they are unable to exercise their economic activities. They are cut from their rightful access to basic social services and are at high risk of being victims of violence, coercion, and racketeering. The review found no evidence of collective actions, albeit there are some associations and unions where women are well organized for socioeconomic purposes.¹⁷¹ To that effect, the SD3C, as a pilot program specifically addressing fragility, can be useful to test innovative options.

B. Youth promotion

159. Youths have restricted access to productive resources, they lack voice at household and community levels, they suffer from a low access to quality education, and therefore are often underemployed or unemployed, and they tend to cope with these constraints by looking for alternative employment opportunities, often in illicit and high-risk activities. Consequently, they remain highly sensitive to fragility drivers and unable to contribute to their reduction.
160. **Prioritisation of youth as a target group has only been recent in IFAD but is reflected in the country programmes of the G5+1.** All COSOPs over the evaluation period recognised the contextually fragile socio-economic situation of young people, which is characterized by underemployment and unemployment, illiteracy, lack of skills, heavy dependence on the household production system, and lack of access to the means of production (land, inputs, and equipment). Greater attention to youth issues, and how they are addressed, can be seen in recent COSOPs compared to older ones. For instance, the 2007 – 2012 Mali COSOP simply called for IFAD programmes to support the participation of poor rural youth in the development of community development plans, environmental action plans. By contrast, the Mauritania COSOP 2018-2024 emphasized the need to encourage the inclusion of youth in local organizations that represent the rural poor and can defend their interests. Among the 26 projects under review, 22 have a sub section on youth in the context analysis of their design document but six only had added a detailed assessment at that stage; 15 developed a youth strategy at design but two of the most recent projects did not. Most projects implemented have included interventions aimed at supporting youth with targeting approaches to include them, in addition to women, and based on a quota approach. Recent projects have been specifically designed for youth (FIER in Mali) or have a whole component dedicated to youth (PRECIS in Niger, REPER in Chad).
161. **Reporting on intervention results achieved pertaining to youth inclusion has been weak in the G5+1 contexts, hence few lessons could be identified.** Many completed projects that were reviewed often mentioned youth inclusion objectives in conjunction with women's inclusion. Although the inclusion of young people seemed systematic, the results are only reported in terms of the number of women supported with little reference to young beneficiaries. Reporting

¹⁷¹ COVID-19 has a strong impact on women, with the closing borders that inhibits the marketing of products, area where women may be active. Due to the lack of specific evidence, gender-sensitive COVID-19 assessment would be needed to design adequate actions to support them during the post-Covid period.

on youth participation has been poor in early projects and in more recent ones, beyond reporting on youth targeting number and process level results,¹⁷² evidence of outcomes on youth are rare or absent. Reports are not always disaggregating results and how youth will be capacitated is not always reflected in a theory of change and in outcome level indicators. Therefore, the evaluation team could only learn little on the employment and entrepreneurship development achieved, and even less on social empowerment and contribution to peace, which could have informed policy decisions.

162. **Approaches to promote youths generally focused on income generation activities and training, to build their absorptive and adaptive capacities.** Access to funds and other resources is critical for entrepreneurship development and therefore, in fragile situations modalities of supporting youths to that effect should be very flexible. In some cases, cash for work and assets has been an entry point, in other cases, vocational training (reaching mainly young men), and in many cases, support to rural microenterprises. New types of microenterprises have been recently supported to foster youth engagement in mechanised service provision (REPER in Tchad) but experiences are too recent to be assessed. Digital agriculture and trade are hardly mentioned. Examples are provided in Table 13.

Table 13
Examples of interventions targeting youth

<i>Projects</i>	<i>Example of interventions targeting youths</i>
Neer-Tamba (Burkina Faso) MTR 2012-2022	Investments in SWC and NRM with a low participation of young people at MTR (gold mining as an alternative)
PAPFA (Burkina Faso) 2017-2024	4 value chains promotion with quota-based targeting of youth RMEs (specialized in service provision to other stakeholders in the value chains), conditional selection of groups requesting funds to improve their access to markets, and specific vegetable garden investments targeting women and youth.
PROHYPA PCR (Chad) 2009-2015	Capacity building of young beneficiaries to deal with climate change and the degradation of natural resources and to develop skills in processing and off farm activities (cooking stoves; fodder harvesting and conservation)
FIER (Mali) MTR 2013-2022	Entirely dedicated to Rural Youth Entrepreneurship with a vocational training component and an Income Generating Activity/Rural Micro Enterprise component funded based on requests after a facilitation-training-linking with DSFs sequence
PUSADER (Niger) PCR 2010-2014	Creation of local employment to reduce the exodus of young people through labor-intensive activities, small-scale irrigation and Cash for Work to recover degraded land; specific financing services.
PPI Ruwanmu PCR (Niger) 2012-2018	Cash for work and assets in irrigated and SWC perimeters; extension and literacy training
VCDP MTR (Nigeria) 2012-2022	Builds on the development of market linkages with stakeholders downstream in cassava and rice value chains with processing creating jobs and identifies viable business opportunities for youth and women. Youth active in all FOs also in the production segments (40% participation at MTR)
CASP MTR (Nigeria) 2013-2021	Enterprise development in specific value chains targeting women and youth (training, starter packs, linkages with banks)

Source: compiled by the SRE team

163. **In fragile situations, modalities for accessing funds (e.g., credit) must be more flexible and tailored.** In Niger, the Country Programme portfolio integrates support for rural microenterprises promoted by young men and women. Indeed, the 2021 CSPE noted that youth economic integration is affected by the same problems of supporting businesses in general, which are: (i) unclear guidance for financial support to businesses; (ii) credit terms not well suited to small producers; and (iii) unclear strategy and priorities of microenterprise development. Recent programmes target youth and draw on partnerships with other IFAD programs to ensure a proper linkage with financial institutions (FIER and INCLUSIV in Mali). They rely on the combination of sound business planning and training, starter kits

¹⁷² The percentages of youth inclusion are reported rather superficially and without precision on the denominator which sometimes is related to the total number of beneficiaries and other times related to the total number of youth beneficiaries foreseen. In some cases, although the projects have intervened to increase the productive capacity of rural populations, the results on youth are not reported.

in kind or cash and subvention delivered by a financial institution able to provide credit (especially for operations) to the young entrepreneurs. Another alternative remains a project fund mobilized to finance eligible microprojects; the solution is convenient as easily tailored to the specific needs of the beneficiaries but may be less sustainable. Alternatives cannot be compared due to lack of evidence, and their robustness when facing new fragility drivers such as a pandemic or a conflict, cannot be assessed.

164. **In VCD projects, integration of women and youths in upstream and downstream activities contributes to diversifying economic opportunities of beneficiaries, as well as to mitigate the effects of fragility drivers such as extreme poverty, climate change and natural resource degradation.** The Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP) in Nigeria adopted a holistic and demand-driven approach to addressing constraints along the cassava and rice value chains. The programme focused its interventions on Agricultural Market Development and Smallholder Productivity Enhancement. VCDP has a sound strategy for inclusiveness. The implementation strategy is led by Rural Institutions and Gender / Youth Advisor at national level, supplemented by officers at state level. VCDP mainstreams women and youths into project implementation (the M&E system adequately disaggregates performance indicator data enabling gender sensitive progress analysis). As at MTR, 61 per cent of the beneficiary farmers' organizations were youth, of which 28 per cent were young women and 72 per cent young men. Through their interventions on productivity enhancement and enterprise development for women and youth, VCDP (as well as CASP) have contributed to diversifying the economic activities of young beneficiaries in intervention areas, allowing them to mitigate the effects of fragility drivers such as extreme poverty, climate change and natural resource degradation. Additional examples are provided by the projects in Burkina Faso and Niger.¹⁷³
165. **When youth are effectively targeted and pro-actively involved in actions aiming at mitigating conflicts, e.g., over resources in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, they can effectively contribute to enhancing the resilience of their communities.** For instance, in Niger, actions carried out by PASADEM on natural resource management have produced numerous effects that have made it possible to strengthen the capacities of 8,133 young people on NRM while reducing the quantity of firewood and crop residues used as fuel in households. Together with the COGES, these interventions to support the involvement of young people in the management of natural resources have had a significant effect on reducing conflicts between farmers and herders. PASK II in Mauritania has developed a gender and youth targeting strategy based on a policy of positive discrimination in favour of women and youth. As such, young people are systematically considered in the preparatory steps of the activities of all components. The project also has a Gender, and Youth Officer who ensures that women and youth are included into the project's activities. The project has supported young people for the restoration of soils, the mobilization and management of surface water, the development of agricultural systems of livestock and support to production systems vulnerable to climate change. In this sense, the project has made it possible to increase the production and agricultural productivity of young beneficiaries and, in turn, to fight against the fragility driver of poverty.
166. **Evidence (though limited) suggests that curbing youth out migration and strengthening their resilience can occur in fragile contexts when interventions simultaneously include goals of improving their technical capabilities, sustainably increasing their access to productive assets, and access to profitable markets.** In Niger for instance, in addition to the youth quota strategy and the process of developing and validating targeting criteria at the community level, PPI Ruwanmu has developed an "Equitable Development and

¹⁷³ PAFA-4R (Burkina Faso) has strengthened the resilience of young smallholder farmers through climate-smart agriculture by PAFA-4R. PUSADER (Niger) has engaged youth towards reducing land resource degradation and to create economic value.

Empowerment of Women and Youth” strategy document that has created the conditions for equitable access to the opportunities and benefits of the project. The project has contributed to reducing the vulnerability of beneficiaries through watershed rehabilitation by granting temporary works to beneficiaries over an average period of 4 months/beneficiary. The approach used is the distribution of cash for assets, avoiding the massive departure of able-bodied youth towards uncertain horizons in a context of regional insecurity. Consequently, 47% of the young people surveyed at the end of the project were no longer willing to leave. The project has thus introduced a direct provision of financing services contributing to poverty reduction and a better economic framework. An additional example in PUSADER reveals that the project played a key role in creating local employment and greatly reduced the exodus of young people through labor-intensive activities and small-scale irrigation. This has allowed them to ensure the vital needs of their households and to reduce the drain on their agricultural production or on their herds, which are already severely affected by recurrent periods of drought.

167. **Targeting youth of diverse social and educational status, living in very different contexts as well as facing diverse opportunities require a deep assessment of their situations; but this has hardly been implemented.** This point was partially addressed by designing baskets of interventions and approaches, so that young farmers could draw an advantage from cash for work while rural youth with initial resources for entrepreneurship would provide services or develop off-farm activities. Expected outcomes were not always met due to unspecific contextual assessments. For instance, in Nigeria CASP actions have been directed towards individual and collective enterprise development around value chains, relying on the N-Agripreneur approach to attracting youth to agribusiness, including young women. It raised interest among youth and at mid-term,¹⁷⁴ it was reported that a total of 6,931 young farmers (4,159 men and 2,772 women) were reached out of a target of 10,500 (66% achievement rate) but the project was plagued by weak enforcement of loan repayment. In addition, the methodologies and tools tested were not applicable to young people with low literacy levels.¹⁷⁵
168. **Interventions that were effective in youth targeting and promotion were backed up by strong political commitment.** For example, in Nigeria, under CBARDP the initiative ‘Youth in Agriculture’ was a deliberate strategy to address the problem of crime and unemployment amongst younger people in the Delta. The 2016 CPE reported that in CBNRMP, the focus on youth empowerment had a significant achievement. Through increased incomes, youth groups grew their confidence and for some the impact was life changing. It added that important social benefits included reduction in youth migration, crime and vandalism as employment opportunities rose. Youth were specifically asked to participate in collective decision processes.¹⁷⁶
169. Overall, regarding gender equality and women empowerment, **the effectiveness of IFAD’s engagement to support youths, aligned with the outcome of sustainable youth’s entrepreneurships and job creation, require a deeper analysis at design stage of major drivers that affect the fragility of young**

¹⁷⁴ A government initiative to attract youth to agribusiness

¹⁷⁵ In PPI Ruwanmu (Niger) irrigation and watershed management did not attract youth as planned because their access to the restored land could not be secured. All successive projects in Niger reduced the massive departure of able-bodied youth towards uncertain horizons in a context of regional insecurity but the planned 30% youth targets were usually not achieved due to restricted land rights. Therefore, there is a need for more holistic approaches to the inclusion of youth from diverse social and educational backgrounds.

¹⁷⁶ For instance, the 2007 – 2012 COSOP in Mali called for IFAD programs to support the participation of poor rural youth in the development of community development and environmental action plans; while Mauritania’s COSOP 2018-2024 emphasizes the need to encourage the inclusion of youth in local organizations that represent the rural poor and can defend their interests.

people. By doing so, interventions can contribute to improving the resilience of rural youths with a potential of rural transformative in fragility settings.¹⁷⁷

C. Other marginalized groups

170. **Marginalization can be very significant in fragile situations.** In the G5+1 fragility settings, the marginalization of the rural poor may be a consequence of neglect or a reduced focus on the development of livelihood zones that have limited or no rainfed or irrigated agriculture potential.¹⁷⁸
171. **Interventions addressing the needs of the marginalized groups for reinforcing social cohesion between and within communities do not focus on the multiple interconnected processes of marginalization, and thus it is difficult to conclude on their effectiveness in terms of transformative results.** For instance, regarding refugees and displaced populations, which is a key issue in the sub-region plagued by protracted insecurity and conflict,¹⁷⁹ IFAD-funded interventions still lack a development approach in addressing related challenges. Yet, how to understand displaced people's specific needs and develop appropriate responses, especially in partnership with other UN agencies, is not clear. There is a lack of interventions to address environmental impacts associated with the refugee pressure on natural resources and undertake positive remedial actions to offset those impacts in a way that addresses the needs of both the refugee and host populations. For instance, in August 2020, in the Diffa region, the Sayam Forage refugee camp, which accommodates refugees, Nigerien returnees, and asylum seekers of various nationalities, had 4,121 households of 19,315 registered people.¹⁸⁰ The environmental assessment indicates that the impact of the settling refugee camps is distress in this region, which is already affected by desertification, land degradation, and climate change. Bare soils are in the full progression, and regression is noted on the shrub vegetation cover and the gallery forest areas.¹⁸¹ For IFAD operations in those areas, integrating the needs of refugees in intervention strategies will be more and more necessary to impact social cohesion and adequately contribute to the nexus emergency and resilience. This can be done in partnership with other RBAs.
172. **In the sub-region, safeguarding land tenure rights is generally an issue for marginalized groups, including foreigners (allochtones), temporary users such as pastoralists, and other sociologically marginalised groups.** As mentioned earlier, structural elements such as demography and land rights contribute to exacerbate the fragility situation of environmental and natural resource degradation. Lack of inclusiveness is a source of major frustration, resulting in violent conflicts between and within communities, and a cause of environmental degradation. The review could not find projects with elements of strategies to address these issues.

Summary on inclusiveness

173. **Findings show that IFAD's supports moderately contributed to tackle social fragility drivers related to gender inequality, due to sociocultural barriers that are critical in the G5+1 contexts. Youth promotion results have also been modest due to a great variability in their conditions,**

¹⁷⁷ These aspects are currently missing in strategic and programmatic documents. It would therefore be necessary to conduct systematic surveys on their aspirations, and how they cope with the discrepancies between the realities of their environment and their aspirations for a better future.

¹⁷⁸ The interface between those zones and those with a rainfed/irrigated agriculture potential may turn into geographies of tensions between farmers and pastoralists who share at the margin of the national political, economic, and social life.

¹⁷⁹ UNHCR and the Government have registered 35,439 refugees (9,708 households) in the Maradi region as of 31st January 2020. Of those registered, 23% were women, 10% were men, and 67% were children. UNHCR (2020). UNHCR Niger - Factsheet Maradi Situation - February 2020. <https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/details/73999>.

¹⁸⁰ UNHCR. 2020. *Camp de Refugiés de Sayam Forage (Commune de Chetimari, Région de Diffa au Niger)*. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/79516>.

¹⁸¹ Mansour, R.H., Mahamane ; Issiaka, M.M., Issiaka, I.M., Ali, I.M., and Mahamane M.A. (2019). *Impact de L'installation des Camps des Réfugiés, Retournés et Déplacés sur L'exploitation des Ressources Ligneuses dans la Région de Diffa Impact of the Installation of Refugee Camps, Returned and Displaced on the Exploitation of Wood Resources in the Region of Diffa*. DOI: 10.19044/esj.2019.v15n36p118.

leading to variable vulnerability level. Specific approaches to target women have been effective to launch economic insertion processes, leading to their economic empowerment, which in turn led to a gradual social improvement of their status. Insertion of youths as entrepreneurs and/or in value chains segments led to mixed results in responding to their diverse needs in those fragile contexts but contributed to mitigate their vulnerability. The positive results achieved appear low in view of important women and youths related challenges in the G5+1 fragile situations. Therefore, a more differentiated approach linked to specific assessments (tailored to contextual constraints and challenges) is required for a better effectiveness of IFAD supported interventions to that effect. Findings confirmed lessons from partners related to the critical role of women and youths in fragile situations, as both groups are affected and are key contributors to solve fragility issues.

Key points

Gender equality and women empowerment (GEWE)

- Applying specific and strong targeting of women and relevant supports contributed to empowering rural women and girls and to strengthening their resilience.
- The effective participation of women in processes related to the management of natural resources is critical, especially when natural fragility drivers are concerned, but still timid as social norms are usually not conducive.
- Ensuring participation in terms of quotas is a necessary step to enhancing women's capacity to play a role in decision making but not sufficient.
- Context-specific gender assessments will be increasingly needed, due sociocultural issues, and as fragility drivers are worsening; so that women can turn from victims to organised proactive actors capable of addressing drivers of their higher vulnerability.

Youth promotion

- Stepping youth out-migration and strengthening their resilience can occur in fragile contexts when interventions simultaneously include goals of improving their technical capabilities, increasing their sustained access to productive assets, and access to profitable markets.
- When youth are effectively targeted and pro-actively involved in actions aiming at mitigating conflicts, e.g., over resources in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, they can effectively contribute to enhancing the resilience of their communities.
- Enhancing the effectiveness of IFAD's engagement to support youths, aligned with the outcome of sustainable youths' entrepreneurship and job creation, require a deeper analysis at design stage of major drivers that affect their fragility and take into account the diversity of their situations.

Other marginalized groups

- Interventions addressing the needs of the marginalized groups for reinforcing social cohesion between and within communities do not focus on the multiple interconnected processes of marginalization, and thus it is difficult to conclude on their effectiveness in terms of transformative results.

VI. Efficiency, Sustainability and Scaling up

174. This chapter assesses results achieved in terms of three evaluation criteria: efficiency, sustainability and scaling up. The definition of the criteria is presented in Annex I. Each section starts by presenting the related key evaluation question that triggers analytical and exploratory answers, leading to identification of lessons learned.

A. Efficiency

175. This section addresses lessons on the delivery of IFAD supported operations in those fragile contexts.¹⁸² First, performance of the loan operations is benchmarked against that of the overall IFAD loan operation portfolio. Then, several enablers and barriers to efficiency are discussed,¹⁸³ and instances where the fragile context in the G5+1 may also be a contributory barrier are identified. The main evaluation question is: How efficient has IFAD's support been in those challenging fragile contexts, considering financial instruments and procedures, managerial approaches (including field presence), tools and processes?

Efficiency against performance across the entire IFAD portfolio

176. **Reported ARRI ratings of efficiency during the evaluation period indicate that efficiency in the G5+1 loan operations was actually higher than for the loan operations in WCA as a whole, and comparable to those across the entire IFAD loan portfolio.**¹⁸⁴ The ARRI efficiency rating for the period under review gives an average rating of 3.53 for the six reviewed countries. This is higher than for WCA as a whole (3.19) and slightly lower than the overall IFAD loan portfolio (3.59). The disaggregated ratings by country (Table 14) furthermore does not suggest that fragility was a significant barrier to efficiency, since the three countries classified as fragile during most of the period - Chad, Mali, and Niger - had the higher ratings.¹⁸⁵

Table 14
Disaggregated ratings by country

	<i>Burkina Faso</i>	<i>Chad</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Mauritania</i>	<i>Niger</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>G5+1 average</i>	<i>WCA average</i>
Efficiency ratings	3.0	3.60	3.50	3.33	4.40	3.33	3.53	3.19
Elapsed months, approval and first disbursement	16.04	7.90	18.52	15.97	8.45	47.41	19.05	12.8

Source: Compiled by the SRE team based on ARRI and OBI data

177. **This finding is *prima facie* surprising since fragility analyses tend to highlight weak institutional capacity and challenges to achieve efficiency gains in such contexts.** On the one hand, as acknowledged by field stakeholders interviewed, taking into account the low institutional capacity in those countries, IFAD has intensified the supervision and technical missions for the projects in the sub-region, as well the recourse to external service providers. On the other hand, the ratings may have taken into account contextual challenges of intervention areas and so, the judgment of efficiency have reflected this.

178. **In the G5+1 countries the period between loan approval and the first disbursement has been longer than observed across the broader WCA**

¹⁸² The efficiency with which non-lending support is delivered is touched upon but, reflecting the relative lack of evidence, to a lesser extent.

¹⁸³ As identified in the IFAD ARRI 2019

¹⁸⁴ In fact, similar results were observed for other evaluation criteria, namely: effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

¹⁸⁵ In fact, the 2021 Niger CSPE stated that there were good financial performance and execution of loan operations by the country programme, with indicators such as a lower than average time for loan effectiveness and the good profitability of main loan operation activities. But the level of efficiency of most of the loan operations was affected by: i) the partial realization of structuring investments (for reasons of increased unit costs and the low execution capacities of operators); and ii) the significant reduction in the achievements of micro-loan operations and income-generating activities (for reasons of inadequacy of the implementation procedures with the capacities of the target populations)

portfolio of loan operations, but with exceptions. Table 15 includes the numbers of elapsed months between approval and first disbursement. Delays in launching loan operations have been higher in four countries out of the six, with an average of 19 months, compared to 12.8 months across WCA.

179. **Exceptions were observed in Chad and Niger** (shorter timeframes of 3.60 and 4.40 months respectively), where both had the highest efficiency ratings. Nigeria is an outlier with the longest timeframe and a low efficiency rating (3.33). Common reasons cited for delayed launching in the G5+1 countries include very slow procurement procedures, the necessity to conduct preliminary studies and to set up steering mechanisms, and time needed to decide on the allocation of grants and loans to the beneficiaries' specific micro loan operations. In Nigeria, the several levels of approvals required, from national to local authorities, has been a significant reason for delays.
180. **Two approaches hold the prospect of addressing barriers that lead to launch delays.** First, experience has shown that using operating and procedure manuals prepared for previous loan operations cuts the time to first disbursement by addressing the very slow procurement procedures.¹⁸⁶ Second, IFAD developed specific new instruments that should positively affect the timely launching of loan operations. An example is the Faster Implementation of Loan operation Start-up (FIPS) instrument,¹⁸⁷ which is not a grant, but an up-front short-term loan that is reimbursed when the IFAD loan is disbursed, helps speeding up the implementation of required prior technical studies for risky operations. Because this facility was approved only recently, yet only Burkina Faso and Niger took advantage of it in the preparation of PAFA 4R and PRECIS, leading to a reduction in the timeframes (before the first disbursement) to 1.1 and 4 months respectively.¹⁸⁸ Other causes of delays (for example the setting up of steering mechanisms and time needed to decide on the allocation of funding to beneficiaries' of micro projects), still required appropriate actions to speed up the launching of loan operations.¹⁸⁹
181. **Coordination units of IFAD supported projects in the sub-region have learnt how to address problems with slow disbursement that were observed in earlier periods.** Completed loan operations disbursed an average of 87 per cent (G5 countries only), with a distorted pattern over the implementation period. In the very early loan operations, there were significant issues of cash flow. Out of the 16 loan operations reviewed, seven explicitly mentioned slow and complex financial procedures as a cause of delays and the need to focus on addressing such issues (especially for procurement) in the design of the following loan operations. For instance, in the cases of PPI Ruwanmu and PASADEM in Niger, IFAD negotiated differentiated procurement rules with the Ministry of Finance and obtained increased thresholds, when applying different rules. In Chad, with PADER-G, the establishment of a local commission in charge of implementing the procurement plan, along with the support provided by IFAD, contributed to significantly reducing the average duration of procurement process from 211 to 86

¹⁸⁶ Operating and procedure manuals prepared before loan operation start as well as preliminary feasibility studies prior investments enable a swift start of operations and previous loan operations may help following ones to perform such preliminary operations. Follow up loan operations can take advantage from their predecessor and be better prepared by having completed administrative procedures and preliminary studies. In was not always the case (PASPRU did not take advantage from PROFIL in Burkina Faso), but recent loan operations tend to build on one another or to pool resources (PASADEM informed PRODAF in Niger and PAPAM informed FIER in Mali). In a few cases, governments also funded preliminary studies before the start of a loan operation, in order to reduce the delays.

¹⁸⁷ Faster Implementation of Loan operation Start-up (FIPS) Instruments comprehend (IFAD 2018, EB-2018-124-R-34):

- The Loan operation pre-Financing Facility (PFF) is a revolving fund that would provide liquidity early on in the loan operation cycle so that activities can be initiated and financed prior to entry into force of the financing agreement (as part of loan operation design).

- The non-reimbursable Technical Assistance for Loan operation Start-up Facility (TAPS) would finance specific activities to support loan operation implementation capacities at start-up.

¹⁸⁸ PAFA-4R) which also contributes to the GR5 Sahel Priority Investment Programme 2019-21 took advantage of pre financing facility to recruit the team of a new antenna, launch feasibility studies and prepare the working and procurement plans. PRECIS also used the facility to complete characterisation studies of the economic development poles in the regions. PAFA 4R did succeed in reducing drastically delays between approval and first disbursement.

¹⁸⁹ As for SD3C, there are the added complication to coordinate with both WFP and FAO partners.

days. The fact that issues with slow disbursement due to cumbersome rules are not identified in the most recent completion reports may suggest that country teams have learned lessons on how to effectively address those issues.

Other aspects of efficiency performance in fragile situations

182. **The appropriateness of IFAD financial instruments is variable to support the resilience building in the G5+1 fragile contexts.** Highly concessional loans (sovereign lending), DSF grants (tied to sovereign loans) and grants (of national and regional windows) have been deployed by IFAD over the evaluated period to finance operations in the G5+1 countries.¹⁹⁰ Evidence gathered suggests that sovereign loan financing is not flexible enough to allow swift adjustments in cases of critical events (e.g. severe drought, economic crisis, political disruption) that exacerbate the fragility situations.¹⁹¹ Non-lending supports (with grant windows) are quite appropriate and adaptive to such contexts due to their flexibility (for disbursement and management), but they are limited in their amounts and their linkage with the lending portfolio is usually weak to ensure a greater effectiveness of the overall country programme.¹⁹²
183. **Long-term co-funding arrangements with other international donors are critical to address effectively and sustainably the fragility drivers in the G5+1 countries.** Evidence confirms failures in delivery of co-financing agreements. This issue seems to be increasing and is one major reason for reprogramming at the midterm review stage. In the eleven completed loan operations, at design IFAD should have contributed to 48.5 per cent of the costs, governments to 13.5 per cent, beneficiaries to 3.3 per cent and other sources to 34.7 per cent. At the end, while commitments were met, IFAD financing was greater (57.2 per cent of costs) than planned (as presented in Table 15). The decrease in the mobilisation of co-financing by the governments appears as a key challenge, which is understood in the fragility situation of the G5+1 countries that have to devote significant resources for security purposes.¹⁹³

Table 15

Source of financing for completed projects

Source of financing	% at Design	% at Completion
IFAD	48.5%	57.2%
Government	13.5%	7.6%
Co-financers	34.7%	34.4%
Beneficiaries	3.3%	0.9%

Source: Projects' Design and Completion reports

184. Considering the overall external resources mobilised for WCA PoLG over replenishment periods, Table 16 shows that the contribution percentage from co-financers has declined between IFAD-9 and IFAD10, but this trend is being reversed considering the co-financing plans for IFAD11.¹⁹⁴ Most reliable co-financers are GCF and GEF.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁰ Specific funding opportunity also exist, such as the ASAP related support, as presented in the effectiveness section.

¹⁹¹ In terms of procedures for approval, clearance, disbursement and revisiting the loan agreement. The decision to revise and adjust can be taken only at midterm review, which can be late in the case of shocks and/or stressors (climate, security, health and economic related), which are more and more frequent in the region.

¹⁹² For instance, highlighted in the CSPE reports of Nigeria (2016) and Burkina Faso (2019)

¹⁹³ There is a significant variation in experience across the six countries, with at one extreme Burkina Faso where co-financer commitments were often not met and Niger at the other where co-financers actually topped up their commitments.

¹⁹⁴ This is still a plan. The effective mobilisation will be assessed in about 4-6 years.

¹⁹⁵ For the 16 on-going loan operations, the size of the loan operations is twice as high on average than for closed operations (USD 72.48 million against USD 39.16 million) attesting the trend to go "bigger" in the sub-region, but this has not been matched by a comparable increase in international co-financing commitments.

Table 16
PBAS allocation and co-financing over the evaluation period

Country	IFAD 8 (2010-2012)	IFAD 9 (2013-2015)	IFAD 10 (2016-2018)	IFAD 11 (2019-2021)
IFAD PBAS (planned)	223 390 562	213 664 175	348 964 591	383 034 293
PBAS (used)	245 283 194	180 608 770	348 761 591	345 546 708
G5 Sahel+1 co-finance planned	150 126 005	56 722 928	128 199 656	232 432 100
List of co-financiers	European Union, GEF, IDA, Spanish, Swedish Comp	Canada/CIDA, OFID, OFID, Fund, WFP	GEF, ABC, Denmark/DANIDA, GCF, GEF, NORAD, OFID	AFDB, Canada/CIDA, GCF, GEF, NORAD, OFID

Source: Oracle BI and Projects' Design reports

185. **Governments' capacity to ensure that PMUs fulfil adequately their role affects efficiency in the fragile contexts.** For example, in Mali, the PAPAM national director was also in charge of a major division within the government and did not have sufficient time to maintain the required oversight of a large and complex multi-donors loan operation. Other experience was of project management units that were both overstaffed but with underpaid staff without the required skills-sets (ProLRAF in Mauritania), or that experienced a rapid turnover of government staff (common in Burkina Faso operations). By contrast, well-staffed and dedicated national project teams in Niger have contributed to the better performance in the Niger PASADEM and PRODAF loan operations.¹⁹⁶
186. **The cost-effectiveness of using non-governmental service providers is contingent on their readiness to deliver.** Reliance on local stakeholders has to be considered in fragile contexts, especially in areas where the State cannot fully control. NGOs are often funded for social mobilisation, but this may initially appear as a source of inefficiency if their capacity needs first to be enhanced, usually by a learning by doing process.¹⁹⁷ At the same time, they fill in critical capacity gaps, and reduce the management overhead costs. Five out of 16 loan operations (completed) reviewed explicitly mentioned recourse to non-state organisations to implement their activities and only one was satisfied (PASPRU in Burkina Faso).
187. **Management costs have often been higher than initially foreseen. Reasons include issues that could have been recognised during design and led to extensions in loan operation, but also the need to adjust to crises and security concerns.** At design, management costs of between 10 per cent and 15 per cent were commonly cited for loan operations in the G5+1. At completion, actual management costs ranged from 18 per cent to 37 per cent. Examples of loan operations where poor design was the main reason for high management costs include: (i) PASK II (Mauritania) where there were too many field workers and costs needed to be reduced by revising the non-essential activities at MTR; and (ii) delays in the establishment of the PROHYPA Project Management Unit (PMU) in a remote area in Chad and the consequent slow implementation of loan operation activities, resulting in one-year extension of the loan implementation period. Crises are, by definition, unpredictable but loan operations implemented in times of crisis also have to revise their plans. Examples include PAPAM and PIDRK (Mali) and

¹⁹⁶ According to WCA country team actors, IFAD loan operations are designed in a manner that relies on Government systems as it helps to strengthen national systems and national ownership. Then ring-fenced PMUs are set up to administer and manage IFAD financing. However, these PMUs are overseen by the relevant Government ministries, which subject them to many of the shortcomings for which the PMUs were set up in the first place. The recruitment of key loan operation (PMU) staff from the Government civil service has often enabled a carryover into IFAD loan operations, of some of the inefficiencies and poor financial and administrative management at country level highlighted by fiduciary agents such as Transparency International and the World Bank.

¹⁹⁷ For instance, in Chad, PADER-G delegated the implementation of 2 components to a local NGO in order to be more efficient, but the organisation could not do the job. CASP in Nigeria deplored the low quality of the contracted service providers also in Farmer Field Schools. PASADEM in Niger assessed its service providers as unprofessional and in PRODAF few entrepreneurs could do the job.

Neer-Tamba (Burkina Faso).¹⁹⁸ Looking forward, the example of increased security costs in Nigeria, where security measures are mandatory, suggests that management costs will be higher than planned in several of the G5+1 countries.

188. **Evidence suggests that the previous decentralised sub-regional hub approach is less favourable in the G5+1 contexts.** As mentioned earlier, between 2019 and 2021, three hubs hosted the CDs of the G5 countries, plus Nigeria where the CD resides.¹⁹⁹ Whilst the six countries have moved in and out of being designated fragile during the evaluation period, it is undoubted that they are becoming increasingly challenging contexts and certainly more challenging than the countries usually hosting the IFAD sub-regional hubs. Stakeholders interviewed have consistently highlighted the need to frequently take *ad hoc* decisions, which, in the absence of a resident CPM is a source of delays.
189. **The non-residence of CDs appears in this context to be constraining IFAD's ability to both work with key partners and respond quickly to the changing context.** Whilst new IFAD instruments (e.g., FIPS, RPFS) have been created that allow a more rapid response than the usual 12-24 months required to launch operations under the standard business model, their use also requires human resources to draft the proposals. The design and implementation of the SD3C assumes a learning by doing endeavour with intra RBA cooperation. It seems clear that the non-residence of CPMs/CDs in the countries constitutes a major limitation on their ability to quickly respond to challenges, as well as for opportunities of joint planning and actions, which is critical for the operationalisation of loan operations such as SD3C. What is unknown is whether the change that started in 2022 to replace the hubs by the multi country offices and to have more CD-led offices will completely solve these challenges; but surely this may significantly contribute to improving IFAD's agility in the G5+1 contexts.²⁰⁰

Summary on efficiency

190. **In line with other partners' experience in this context, the findings show that achieving efficiency gains in fragile situation is very challenging, but possible.** In an operationally challenging context, IFAD has been applying the same financing rules and procedures (in terms of flexibility) as in non-fragile contexts. Despite this, IFAD country teams' have learned lessons on how to work better to address challenges of delayed launching and slow disbursement. On the other hand, the most significant challenge remains the ability to respond efficiently (and effectively) to new shocks and stressors, especially given the deteriorating fragility situations across the G5+1, to sustain co-financing and to work effectively with other partners.

B. Sustainability

191. This section assesses the extent to which sustained results in addressing fragility drivers, were achieved and explanatory factors associated with these. It answers the following key evaluation question: to what extent have achievements and/or results been sustained in these fragile contexts, and which lessons are relevant for IFAD future engagement to address fragility in the sub-region?
192. **The 2016 Strategy assumes implicitly that a main entry point to ensuring sustainability in fragile contexts is through strengthening the social**

¹⁹⁸ According to ARRI 2020, "within the 2019 ARRI loan operation sample, 34 per cent were implemented in WCA and, among these, 71 per cent in fragile situations. Some of the main causes for high loan operation management costs in WCA were mainly related to high staff turnover (Burkina Faso, Gambia and Ghana), low performance of key loan operation staff requiring external service providers (Burkina Faso, Gambia and Ghana), vast and dispersed loan operation areas (Congo), and a lack of rigour in the planning of activities (Congo)".

¹⁹⁹ Advantages mentioned by actors interviewed for the hub model encompass: more proximity to clients, beneficiaries (although processes remain still centralized); increased visibility of IFAD in the field; opportunities for networking and work with sub-regional Sahelian institutions (ECOWAS, CILSS).

²⁰⁰ Within the scope of Decentralization 2.0, IFAD has defined the optimal scenario for its enhanced field presence, which will comprise 50 field offices including four regional offices by 2024. Aligned with the documentation received from IFAD management, in the G5+1 sub-region, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali will be hosting their country directors from 2022 onward, making to four the number of countries having their CDs resident.

contract between the state and the populations whose livelihoods depend on rural production. The 2016 IFAD Strategy for engagement in fragile situation does not provide guidance on how to maintain sustainable results in fragile settings where institutional support is particularly weak. Nevertheless, it does identify some aspects that should be covered in project design and that should increase the likelihood of sustainability and scaling up. These include: strengthening institutional capacity, building the resilience of target groups, and using implementation models that are robust. All these points trigger actions in terms of social contract strengthening. The following analyses corroborate this.

193. **Approaches to sustainability applied by loan projects have varied, while prospects for sustainable results are generally good with ASAP or GEF funding.** Contrasting examples are the Neer-Tamba project in Burkina Faso and PAPAM in Mali. For Neer-Tamba, the objective was to improve the living conditions and income of the most disadvantaged rural populations in the northern region. Additional funding from the GEF under the Pilot Programme of Integrated Approaches to Food Security (PAI-SA) was used to strengthen the sustainability of the project's investments in the North region. An exit strategy document was drawn up and validated by stakeholders covering the period 2018-2022.²⁰¹ By contrast, the PAPAM project in Mali included additional ASAP grant funding to complement the activities in climate change adaptation and to improve the resilience of family farms. The design of the project did not formulate an explicit exit strategy but included a commitment to working on how the planned activities could be made sustainable.
194. **Processes supporting inclusiveness in the management of natural resources as well as strengthening the effectiveness of RUAs increase the likelihood of sustainability of results.** In Niger, IFAD-funded interventions achieved good and sustained results through support for assisted natural regeneration (ANR). The projects supported the setting up of management committees around the restored sites. The approaches promoted were effective because the techniques used were both simple and fully owned by the producers. To strengthen equitable use of the regenerated resources, the government adopted a decree regulating the practice of assisted natural regeneration. In Chad, the field mission observed that good experience and achievement through supporting lean season banks and the Savings and Credit Banks under the PSANG and PADER-G loan operations are continuing and are being leveraged in the on-going RePER loan operation.
195. **Positive examples of broadening and deepening social cohesion and thus the resilience of target communities are found where IFAD has also supported more inclusive political settlements and institutions.**²⁰² The case of Niger illustrates this. Until recently, the country has managed to avoid internal instability and open conflict. Several factors helped to facilitate the institutional arrangements needed for various groups to coexist and manage violence. The government has also increasingly built effective and inclusive institutions. With the strong international support, including IFAD's, the government successfully developed a core political platform around the Initiative "Nigériens Feed Nigériens" (I3N), which seeks to build resilience through local community projects, and as shown above, can be considered as a social contract with the rural producers. IFAD's projects have collaborated with deconcentrated government technical services at the departmental and regional levels and with local NGOs, communes, and, more recently, regional chambers of agriculture and their national network to implement its projects with I3N priorities. In this social contract context, the high quality of partnerships established by IFAD with government structures at national and regional levels and with farmers' organizations and CSOs for implementation

²⁰¹ Supervision Report, November 2018.

²⁰² Previously presented in the concept section.

has been a significant sustainability factor. An additional example is provided with CBRADP project in Nigeria in Box 24.

Box 24

Example of broadening and deepening social cohesion in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the Government turned the Community Development Associations (CDAs) into a “fourth tier” (below Federal, State, and local government) of governance to link and institutionalize their inter-relationships with the local governments. Okwakpam (2010)²⁰³ defined CDA “as the coming together of people living within a given locality or community with the sole aim of identifying their felt needs and agreeing on the ways, means, and moves towards the realization of such identified needs.” In general, by establishing the CDAs as a link of the state with grassroots communities in the form of a fourth governance tier, the government innovated a form of strengthening of the social contract with them. IFAD-funded CBRADP used the CDAs to allow gains for the target communities to be sustained. With this support, the CDAs demonstrated reasonable confidence in their relations with local government officials and in managing programme assets and showed leadership in planning and implementing local development.²⁰⁴

Source: compiled by the SRE team

196. **Differing opportunities to enhance management of community level conflicts are found in the different countries.** In Nigeria, CDAs and value chain investments may also hold potential for increasing grassroots’ ability to manage community level conflicts. Although reportedly not a wide-spread phenomenon, in a VCDP-targeted community visited by the evaluation team (in Nigeria), the formation of a conflict resolution committee within the existing farmer organization combined with using the CDA as a platform was reported to have reduced instances of farmer-herder conflict. Working in synergy with the private sector involved in economic activities in selected value chains, was also reported to have led to a decline in tensions between herders and farmers. In Niger, the entry point of projects was different, but still built on community-steered mechanisms such the Water User Groups or the COGES. However, these may not guarantee that investments will be maintained; some COGES become inactive or had very limited budget for maintenance. Decentralization has given producers and their organizations a position of responsibility and improved their access to advisory services from government structures.²⁰⁵ This has allowed recent IFAD projects more effectively to address pastoralists’ needs in the Pastoral Law and the SDS.
197. **Experiences suggest that ‘social engineering’ approach contributes to increasing the likelihood of sustainability of projects’ achievements. This is through strengthening the engagement of rural producers and building bonding, bridging, and linking social capitals.** Nigeria has a decentralized federal system of government comprising a federal capital territory, 36 states and 774 local government areas (LGAs). LGAs are unable to generate sufficient revenue to enable them to discharge their responsibilities. In many instances, this creates a gap of service delivery at grassroots level. To fill this gap, as already mentioned, IFAD-funded CBRADP established community development associations (CDAs) as a “fourth tier” of government through a process of systematic sensitization and group formation across 207 selected village areas. As shown above, the CDAs fill a

²⁰³ Okwakpam N. 2010. Analysis of the Activities of Community Development Associations in Rural Transformation in Emohua Town, Nigeria. *International Journal of Rural Studies (IJRS)* 17(1). <http://www.vri-online.org.uk/ijrs/April2010/community-development-associations.pdf>.

²⁰⁴ IOE. 2016. *Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme. Project Performance Assessment*. <https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714182/39731335/Nigeria%20CBARDP%20PPA%20-%20full%20report%20for%20web.pdf/b2c60d57-eb63-4b46-8889-6ed3ac1ed133>.

²⁰⁵ The examples can be found in IOE’s 2021 CSPE which reports that IFAD has introduced development approaches into the Niger country programme with the potential to ensure the sustainability of results, such as the economic development poles approach and the social engineering approach. The economic development poles approach, first used by PASADEM, was the basis for the formulation of PRoDAF. The interventions are carried out in synergy and proceed from social engineering (participation, organization, and involvement of local actors from planning to the management and sustainable use of infrastructure) and civil engineering (studies, control, and construction of infrastructure).

gap in certain aspects of the social contract between the state and the citizens in the targeted areas.²⁰⁶

198. **However, social engineering approaches cannot guarantee a full success for the investments' sustainability.** For instance, in Mauritania, the oasis project promoted local participatory organizations at oasis level, which still exist today and are able to put claims towards the State and many donors for their development. On the other hand, the evaluation field visit observed first-hand that many investments were no longer operational due to inability to solve minor maintenance issues.
199. **Insecurity appears as being a main threat to the sustainability of IFAD supported projects results in terms of infrastructure and consultation frameworks to facilitate cross-border trade of agricultural and agro-pastoral products.** For example, Niger has been affected by the violent extremism from Boko Haram, affecting cross-border trade of agro-pastoral products. Particularly threatened is the sustainability of the results of ProDAF and ProDAF Diffa in supporting cross-border trade in agro-pastoral products. With ProDAF Diffa, local consultation frameworks have been established to increase the value and volume of cross-border trade of agro-pastoral products, by reducing barriers and strengthening the capacities of actors between Niger and Nigeria.²⁰⁷ The implementation of those activities has been facing challenges such as the borders closure by Nigeria, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the prevailing insecurity in interventions areas. Since 2017, the insecurity situation has spread to Tillabéri and Tahoua regions, which have borders with Mali, then the south of the region of Tillabéri with the deterioration of the situation in Burkina Faso since 2018. Since the beginning of 2019, the situation is also deteriorating in the Maradi region, bordering Nigeria.

Summary on sustainability

200. **Albeit the little evidence found, findings confirm that sustainable results can be achieved in the G5+1 fragile situations, by strengthening social contracts through CBOs, by enhancing their capabilities to deliver and follow-up achievements of IFAD supported projects, as well as to ensure a greater social cohesion within communities.** Enabling to strengthen the social contract between the state and the rural producers can increase the likelihood of socio-political sustainability of benefits, as far as fragility drivers related to public institutions and provision of services are concerned. This outlines once more the pivotal role of CBOs in such contexts, as also highlighted by lessons learned by other development partners. Other lessons learned pertaining to successful conditions relate to the inclusiveness in the management of natural resources and deepening the social cohesion.

C. Scaling up

201. Scaling up is when results achieved through IFAD's support are either adopted or taken to scale by other partners (bi- or multi laterals), the private sector or incorporated into a government's national policy framework (from practice to a policy). Review of design documents reveals that scaling up is not reflected in the theories of change of programmes and projects. Here, the SER is answering the key question related to the extent to which achievements and/or results have been up scaled in these fragile contexts, and lessons learned that are relevant to IFAD's future engagement in this sub-region.
202. **Evidence confirms that scaling up of results has been very limited with governments.**²⁰⁸ Good examples being found in Nigeria and Niger. From the four

²⁰⁶ CASP also followed the same approach in its target areas. By filling the gap in service provision at grassroots levels, the CDAs enhanced the likelihood of sustainability.

²⁰⁷ in the Diffa-Zinder-Jigawa / Daura-Kano and Diffa-Borno-Yobé corridor areas. An agreement was signed with the Mixed Nigerian-Nigerian Cooperation Commission.

²⁰⁸ The TE. 2021. Assessed IFAD scaling up results limited; due to difficulty in securing sufficient resources and/or mainstreaming the work within national budgets.

CSPE's and key informant interviews, the clearest example of scaling up has occurred in Nigeria, but of limited extent. In Nigeria, the 2016 CPE shows scaling up of the CDD approach, with State legislation and funding for replication in Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina States. IFAD's follow-up programme, CASP, to CBARDP, is intended to replicate the CDD approach to formulate and implement their plans effectively towards achieving the goals of providing services to respective local communities. The field visit also found that the state government has used the IFAD VCDP model and adopted a value chain approach to three major crops, while in Katsina State the mission observed that a university had adapted the energy-saving stove introduced by IFAD-CASP with the support of the State's environment ministry, because it reduced wood consumption and was demanded by the community. The 2016 CBARDP PPE stated that Kebbi state government has adopted the pioneering CBARDP approach to rural development and expanded interventions to more than five local governments – 100 per cent government-funded. One more example is given in Box 25 below.

Box 25

Example of a scaling up case in Niger

Through its field results, PASADEM has supported national rural development strategies to improve food and nutritional security. It envisaged coordination with other sectors and partners working in the field of nutrition. This was reinforced with the 2012 COSOP, which saw the increased effort of the Government of Niger and IFAD to initiate a transition towards a "program approach", which promotes scaling up, in particular through greater alignment on the I3N. PASADEM envisaged notably coordination with other sectors and partners working in the field of nutrition. With regard to the Niger Government I3N's, the 2020 CSPE questioned whether scaling up of the agricultural intensification through farmer field schools (FFS), and the sale points of agricultural inputs and improved seeds was really taking place. It found instead that IFAD was called upon to provide funding to enlarge the size of interventions. PASADEM also inspired the I3N for its 2nd five-year action plan (2016-2020) concerning the integration of development sectors and the reduction of vulnerability to food and nutritional insecurity as its focus areas, while ProDAF is considered fully aligned with the Initiative.

Source: compiled by the SRE team

203. **Experience suggests that supporting the governments to define and implement strategies for scaling up is essential in the G5+1.** The case of Niger provides a good example of IFAD's support to a government for scaling up, from practices to policy.²⁰⁹ In Mali, PAPAM (2011-2018) was designed for policy engagement and scaling up, both horizontally and vertically. Its coordination unit was embedded in the Ministry of Agriculture, and it pursued a sector-wide approach. The idea was that each funding partner (EU, IFAD, WB) would care for those activities they respectively supported but learning from each other. However, this did not fully work out because of the following barriers: i) the political crisis that started during the implementation of the project; ii) the lack of experience of the government-led central coordination unit; iii) the withdrawal of a large part of the EU funds as a result of these challenges, and iv) the poor communication and coordination between the funding partners.²¹⁰
204. **There is more evidence of scaling-up through other development partners, but IFAD's monitoring systems rarely picked these up.** The evaluation field missions observed several examples of scaling up in Chad, presented in the Box

²⁰⁹ The 2021 CSPE reported that PASADEM supported national strategies to improve nutritional security and called for coordination with other sectors and partners working in the area of nutrition. PRECIS calls for consultations with the Government, development partners and other stakeholders on rural finance policies and support for youth agropastoral entrepreneurship.

²¹⁰ IOE. 2012. A detailed account of this is provided in "IOE. 2012. *Mali Case Study- Mali - Evaluation of IFAD Support to Smallholders' Adaptation to Climate Change*". By design, PAPAM was set up for both policy engagement and scaling up. However, this did not fully play out as planned due to these obstacles described here. With this new situation, IFAD made several modifications to the Project including the reduction of the intervention areas, focussing on the South and lowering the targets.

26, largely due to the uptake of IFAD-supported projects experiences with government programmes supported by other development partners.

Box 26

Examples of a scaling up implemented in Chad with partners

- The “make do” and “do with” approach for the implementation of projects and programmes that largely involves partners' services, the mobilization of water resources for the mobility of pastoralists, and the consultation by local actors around natural resources that subsequently replicated by WB, AfDB, IDB, AFD, the EU, and Swiss Cooperation;
- Innovative techniques for agricultural production (soil bunds, spreading threshold, market gardening sites with boreholes equipped with a solar system), the construction of tracks by users, lean season cereal banks and cereal storage stores that are now recommended by the EU SAN programme in the Guera area for the implementation of the food and nutritional security component;
- the production of improved seeds by OXFAM, AURA CARITAS;
- Market gardening sites with boreholes and solar equipment, FFS, and the making of boards for vegetable production are replicated by AURA France and the Jean Paul II Foundation to support beneficiaries in the areas of Dababa, Abtouyour, and Barh Signaka;
- UCEC-G funds solicited by PROMOFIT under BID financing for Islamic loans (MOURABA or Buy-Sell); and the auxiliary women approach for animal health, and breeding centres is replicated by OXFAM with funding from BMZ and AURA France, etc.

Source: SRE field data collected

205. **The limitation of scaling-up results is linked to IFAD supported KM and/or policy engagement activities in the G5+1, which were mixed.** As indicated above, examples of scaling-up were identified in field visits that were not identified in IFAD’s own documentation or previous evaluations. In Burkina Faso, the 2019 CSPE report flags that project completion reports generally provide little or no information on efforts to scale up innovations, whether internal or external to the projects. The CSPE also observed that usually replication occurs from one IFAD project to another, mentioning as an illustration that PDRD took into account the CES/DRS practices developed within the framework of other programmes to replicate them. The Niger 2021 CSPE mentions the fact that innovations were introduced, but not always formalized and well capitalized to enable them to be shared and to influence public policies, so their potential remains underutilised.

Summary on scaling up results

206. **As for sustainability, findings on scaling up results are mixed in the G5+1 contexts.** While more examples of scaling up results were found with development partners (in general), with governments, success cases were limited, and this can be justified by the weakness of state institutions in those fragile contexts. It appears essential to support governments to define and implement a strategy for up scaling successful experiences in such situations.

Key points

Efficiency

- Efficiency ratings during the evaluation period indicate that efficiency in loan operations in the G5+1 contexts was actually higher than for WCA as a whole, which is surprising due to preconception on efficiency gains in fragile situations.
- However, some efficiency indicators have not been better, in relation to first disbursement and rates, delays in implementation and management costs.
- Sustaining co-financing is critical for IFAD supported operations in the G5+1 countries, but there has been a decreasing trend over the evaluated period, which is being reversed from IFAD-11. The most reliable co-financers are GEF and GCF.
- Variation between the capacities of governmental institutions to ensure an adequate fulfilment of PMU role affects efficiency in those contexts.

- Close follow up by IFAD country teams and strong support to loan operation teams are required in those fragile situations.
- The hub model is not favourable for the agility in responding to new challenges.
- Adjustments during supervision missions and at mid-term contribute improving the effectiveness and efficiency overall, however adjustments should be enabled at all times in the fragile situation of the G5+1.

Sustainability

- The 2016 IFAD Strategy on fragile situation implicitly mentions the strengthening of social contracts as essential for achieving sustainability in such contexts.
- Processes supporting both equity and inclusiveness in the management of natural resources as well as strengthening the effectiveness of resource-user associations increase the likelihood of sustainability of results.
- Experiences corroborate that social engineering (“ingénierie sociale”) contributes to increasing the likelihood of sustainability of projects’ achievements.
- Sustainability of results in terms of cross-border trade of agricultural and agro-pastoral products has been threatened by the security situation, which has deteriorated for several years.

Scaling up

- Scaling up results with governments have been very limited, with few good examples found in Nigeria and Niger.
- There is evidence of scaling-up through other development partners, but IFAD’s monitoring systems rarely seem to pick these up.
- Supporting the governments to define and implement strategy for scaling up is essential in the G5+1
- Mixed scaling-up results achieved in the G5+1 contexts reflect weaknesses in terms of KM and policy engagement activities.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

D. Conclusions

207. **Contexts in the Sahel sub-region are becoming more and more fragile.** All the G5+1 countries were classified as fragile at some point, by OECD and/or WB, over the reviewed period 2010-2020; and the evolution in the metrics for classification has been a significant reason for countries getting in and out of the list of countries in fragile situations. The five categories of fragility drivers, identified in the evaluation analytical framework, were well present in those contexts, but with variability between and within countries. These include: (i) high poverty levels (including youth unemployment, food and nutrition insecurity), (ii) social inequality and exclusion, (iii) degradation of natural resources and high vulnerability to climate change (CC), (iv) institutional weaknesses and poor governance, and (v) insecurity due to violent conflicts. The COVID-19 pandemic also appeared since 2020 to exacerbate the situations. Several of these problems are on a worsening trend, and in particular the level of conflict, as clearly described by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.²¹¹ In such situations, it will be increasingly difficult for IFAD operations to avoid conflict-affected areas in the G5+1 sub-region.
208. Building resilience, which ultimately is the solution to fragility, is critical in the G5+1 contexts. Reviewed IFAD country strategies, programmes and projects have all increasingly prioritised resilience in their design. All COSOPs and portfolio projects included the explicit intention of working to address rural poverty and its root causes (within IFAD's mandate), and enabling rural transformation in intervention areas. IFAD's engagement within the sub-region has been relevant in addressing national agricultural priorities identified by governments. Programmes and projects developed after 2015 have explicitly put a core focus on building resilience, aligned with the 2016 IFAD Strategy for engagement in countries with fragile situations. They have responded adequately to rural development challenges identified in the intervention areas, achieved positive short to long terms results, which contributed to address some fragility drivers mainly pertaining to economic / poverty, natural resources / CC and social exclusion (especially gender inequality). Drivers of fragility in relation to weak state institutions (including weak governance and social contracts) and violent conflict have been managed as risks to be mitigated, rather than issues that operations can directly contribute to addressing.
209. IFAD's support contributed to change in rural settings in terms of economic opportunities, NRM and adaptation to CC. This was instrumental in enhancing the resilience of beneficiaries (individuals, groups, and communities) by building their absorptive, adaptive and on-going transformative capacities. The SRE identified key lessons. In relation to food security, effective community food storage systems have contributed to building absorptive capacities of farmers when the delivery is ensured by FOs, which benefit from public and private actors' support, and promoted along the emergency and development nexus. In terms of adaptation to CC, strategies were successful when effective changes in cropping and/or husbandry practices were coupled with support for diversification of livelihoods (especially with off-farm activities). This entailed integration of ecological and socio-economic perspectives, enabling to strengthen absorptive and adaptive capacities. Regarding NRM, pivotal investments in the restoration and protection of environmental assets were effective when combined with 'cash-for-asset' schemes, implemented in partnership with WFP for instance, which provided incentives for labor-intensive activities to restore land and vegetation. Findings show that in areas subject to repeated shocks and stresses, IFAD's engagement needs to be long-term and based on building local capacity, with simple actions that can progressively become complex, only when local capacity grows. In addition, sustainable management of fragile grazing land is possible in arid and semi-arid areas, when key actors are fully engaged. Nevertheless, IFAD's

²¹¹ <https://acleddata.com/2021/06/17/sahel-2021-communal-wars-broken-ceasefires-and-shifting-frontlines/>

- support to pastoralists has been modest, limited to developing transhumance corridors in most cases.
210. Women and youths, who are critical actors in fragile situations, have been supported through inclusive VCD activities; but achievements were moderate in terms of tackling context-specific factors underpinning their greater vulnerability. Findings confirm that VCD interventions adequately targeted women and youths through the choice of products and by setting quotas of inclusion. They were beneficial in improving human and social capital as well as providing economic opportunities. These contributed to strengthen absorptive and adaptive capacities of women and youths. However, those benefits were moderate in terms of amplitude and stability because context specific issues leading to their greater vulnerability and fragility could not be properly identified and addressed. In fact, in such contexts where sociocultural aspects are prominent, women still lack a collective voice, which is key to prevent drawbacks in times of insecurity, conflicts and norms questioning their autonomy. Regarding youth, their prioritisation as a target group for IFAD is relatively recent and given the complexity of contexts and the limited availability of analytical results, it is too early to draw lessons on what works and under which specific contexts.
 211. Strengthening social cohesion using existing endogenous mechanisms was effective for NRM; additionally, promoting strong rural institutions (FOs and CBOs) is critical to build resilience and sustain achievements in such contexts. Several lessons were identified. Nurturing local consultation mechanisms for NRM as well as local approaches for inclusive land rights have shown to be effective in ensuring social cohesion and confidence within and between communities (in building bonding and bridging capital), especially when regulations or laws backed them up. Promoting strong FOs and CBOs (including resource users' associations) and their apex organizations is pivotal for effective resilience building strategies in rural communities, as they can ensure the provision of essential social and economic support and services, in particular in terms of VCD activities, and strengthening the social contract. CBOs can also contribute to inclusiveness in the management of natural resources and play a crucial role for the sustainability of investments in fragile contexts. Nevertheless, to reach this performance level in such situations, FOs and CBOs require a long period of support (through gradual and successive stages), before becoming effectively functional and viable.
 212. **These positive lessons on FOs and CBOs have not been used to address pastoralist-related issues.** A gap identified by the SRE has been, not to build on CBOs, which include pastoralist groups/organizations, to improve endogenous mechanisms in order to manage at scale pastoral related issues (e.g. transhumance) that trigger increasingly social conflicts across the sub-region. The SRE also found no indication that governments are taking actions to scale up pilot results demonstrated by few IFAD projects (e.g., in Chad and Mauritania).
 213. In its operations in the G5+1 fragile contexts, IFAD's engagement has not adequately reflected specificities of working in such contexts. Simplicity is a key feature that is consistently highlighted while working in fragile situation (e.g., by the IFAD 2016 Strategy and its operational programme). The SRE found limited evidence (only in Chad) of this being applied explicitly in the design of projects and their delivery; on the contrary, complexity of implementation arrangements was flagged in some cases (Burkina Faso and Mali). The SRE also found that experience was very limited in conducting comprehensive fragility analysis, required in such contexts to understand the root causes of fragility (as mentioned in the 2018 COSOP guidance and emphasized in lessons learned from other development partners). This raises three issues. First, how to perform such a holistic analysis, when operational COSOP guidelines suggest a very simple approach, neither including the concept of fragility drivers nor the fact that fragility emerges from the interaction between drivers as well as the linkage between fragility and resilience. Second, the use of fragility analysis results to develop appropriate responses that effectively contribute addressing fragility root cause, as evidence has shown a lack of clarity on how existing contextual analyses (in the design documents) contributed to identify fragility-tackling

- actions. Third, the availability of adequate resources (fund and expertise) to perform such analyses; the insufficiency of skills within IFAD country teams having been mentioned consistently by stakeholders (internal and external).²¹²
214. Finally, due to the absence of a regional strategy, findings confirm the limitation of COSOPs as a tool for addressing fragility aspects with a regional dimension, as observed in the sub-region (e.g., insecurity, transboundary trades, transhumance, insecurity, etc.).
215. **Notwithstanding performance achieved, the IFAD's business model is better suited for delivering in non-fragile situations than in the G5+1 contexts featured by increasing fragility issues and medium intensity conflicts.** IFAD's financing model (in terms of instruments and implementation procedures) did allow country programmes to respond effectively to rural development challenges (rural economic poverty, food insecurity, social inequality, degradation of natural resources and CC burdens). Findings confirm that IFAD loan-financing procedures were suitable to respond (in the past) to these issues in the sub-region when the contexts were of low fragility level. IFAD grants (national and regional windows) have demonstrated some adaptability and flexibility but have been relatively small in size and rarely well-linked with the loan portfolio. ASAP grants and international co-funding (especially from GCF and GEF) have been instrumental in the G5+1 contexts and need to be sustained.
216. Regarding loan-financed supports, procedures take a relatively long time to make change, when this is needed if circumstances change, in terms of acute shocks due to weather or environmental conditions, economic crisis or conflict. On the other hand, IFAD showed adaptive capacity with new instruments such as RPSF and FIPS. However, the non-residence of most IFAD's CDs (5/6) over the reviewed period has contributed to circumscribe the agility and swiftness of IFAD responses.
217. **Learning was reflected across the programmes, but mainly for designing and managing operations within the lending portfolio. A gap has been not using non-lending activities to improve IFAD's engagement in such fragile situations.** Evidence confirms that portfolio projects were able to identify lessons, while operations were deployed successively in the same geographical area for a long period (projects with successive phases); and this was helpful to better address challenges under some fragility drivers. Country teams also learnt how to address delays for launching projects and slow disbursement rates. More broadly, the SRE identified a gap in linking lending and non-lending operations for improving IFAD engagement in the G5+1 contexts. Indeed, regarding KM, there was no learning documentation on how IFAD supported interventions contributed addressing holistically key fragility drivers and to building resilience. With policy engagement, no evidence of policy brief or paper and policy action on the fragility theme was found by the SRE. Among explanatory factors of these gaps, there are the M&E systems, which were found weak in measuring outcome and impact results, as well as generating lessons. Moreover, while strategic and operational partnerships are critical in those situations, the SRE found little evidence of such partnerships; the main explanation of this being the limited or non-presence of IFAD senior programme staff in several countries, limiting coordination (joint planning and implementation) with others.
218. **Overall, the SRE found the SD3C programme relevant to filling several gaps identified, as well as consolidating positive lessons identified,** for a greater performance of IFAD's support in the G5+1 fragile contexts.

E. Recommendations

219. The recommendations below relate to main conclusions presented above, with the purpose of improving IFAD-WCA engagement in the fragile Sahelian context. Some

²¹² Such analyses also needs to focus on sub-national levels where there is increasing availability of GIS data. See <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/knowledge/-/geospatial-tools-and-applications-for-climate-investments>

findings / lessons call for change at IFAD corporate level, but the SRE made recommendations for which actions can be undertaken at WCA regional level.²¹³

220. **Recommendation 1. Develop a comprehensive resilience framework for the sub-region or region to guide assessments, designs and implementation of operations (at field, national and regional levels).** The framework should build on existing guiding documents and on past IFAD experiences to guide holistic analyses in order to: (i) understand the various drivers of fragility and root causes; (ii) develop sound ToC that help identifying pathways to tackling the fragility drivers identified, including those of trans-boundary nature; (iii) design interventions that are simple but effective along the nexus resilience and rural transformation; and (iv) identify strategic and operational partnerships for engagement. Given the trans-boundary nature of many of these issues, IFAD should consider piloting partnership frameworks that extend across national borders and build on experience from the on-going pilot for regional operations. Sources of funding (available and potential) should be analytically presented to ensure a proper mix of financial instruments to support resilience building interventions in those contexts.
221. **Recommendation 2. Use the opportunity of IFAD decentralisation 2.0 to improve the capabilities of country teams, interactions, and agility for effective delivery in the G5+1 fragile contexts.** This entails strengthening the technical capacities of country teams' members (capacity building) to adequately support operations in those situations, to identify key players to partner with for specific fragility aspects, also to increase interactions for planning and implementation of joint actions, taking into account the comparative advantage of each organisations, and to define appropriate but simple designs.
222. **Recommendation 3. Revisit approaches for VCD support within the sub-region to further improve the inclusiveness, and to build on community-driven approaches in highly fragile areas.** This requires, on one hand, to improve the targeting of women and youths and develop appropriate support packages (including: digital solutions, access to market, climate-smart agriculture) that take into account their specific conditions and respond to their expectations. On the other hand, to apply community-driven approaches that involve marginalised groups for better management of natural resources (including rangelands), adaptation to CC and to prevent conflicts on natural resources. A specific focus should be to understand pastoralism issues in order to find ways to promote positive interactions between agricultural and pastoral production systems.
223. **Recommendation 4. Further promote the resilience of rural communities through supports to POs/FOs and CBOs to effectively deliver services and strengthen their capacity to engage in policy dialogue on topics related to them.** This entails to capitalize on past IFAD's achievements with POs/FOs and their apex bodies, which should include pastoralist organisations, through long-term engagement for their effective contribution to building resilience of their members, especially in most fragile areas. Supports to women organisations should be increased and tailored to each context to address progressively their specific fragility root causes, to raise sustainably their leadership profile, voice social and economic status.
224. **Recommendation 5. Organise greater support to country teams for a greater effectiveness of non-lending operations in those contexts.** This entails increasing the provision of technical backstopping (in terms of missions, learning events, studies and policy consultations) for better engagement with

²¹³ IFAD established in 2021 a Cross-Departmental Working Group on IFAD's interventions in Conflict-Affected Situations, to review how IFAD current business system (of strategic, policy and operational frameworks) is adequate and adaptable to remain engaged in conflict-affected situations. Main issues addressed are also valid for fragile situations. Comprehensive recommendations were made in the final report that provide IFAD Management with practical, prioritized and costed options to improve its institutional approach (including global engagement, financing, delivery modalities and supervision, human resources and field security) and impact in those contexts.

government partners on specific resilience issues (e.g., exclusion, social contract, pastoralism and transhumance), in partnerships with other actors both national and international.

Evaluation criteria and definition

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition **</i>
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.
Coherence***	The compatibility of the country strategy and programme with corporate policies as well as interventions by other actors. Internal coherence refers to synergies and interlinkages between key elements of the country strategy and programme. External coherence refers to consistency of the country strategy and programme with other development partners, including complementarity, harmonisation and co-ordination with others.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
Other performance criteria	
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.

* As IOE is piloting a new CSPE structure in 2021, this information is subject to change.

** With the exception of "Coherence", these definitions build on the OECD-DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

*** Current working definition of "Coherence" in IOE based on the OECD-DAC Revised Evaluation Criteria, December 2019

SRE Evaluation framework

<i>Evaluation key questions</i>	<i>Sub-questions</i>	<i>Source of data / information</i>	<i>Type of analysis</i>
<p>Relevance:</p> <p>- To what extent have the design of country strategies, programmes and projects been relevant, taking into account fragility drivers and the principles of working in fragile situations?</p> <p>- How adequate and adaptive have intervention approaches and elements been, for a delivery in the sub-regional contexts featured by economic, natural, social, institutional and security constraints?</p>	<p>1) To what extent did COSOPs, programmes and projects incorporate a sound analysis of fragility drivers, for improving the population resilience and reduce risks of conflicts?</p> <p>2) How were COSOPs relevant in light of fragility issues and risks for improving the population resilience?</p> <p>3) To what extent did IFAD's Interventions meet the needs of the target communities despite the fragility constraints?</p> <p>4) How were the designs of projects and programmes (including grants and other initiatives) relevant and adaptive in light of fragility drivers?</p> <p>6) How adequate are the IFAD's tools, and approaches in delivering programme activities given the fragile contexts, including transboundary issues?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COSOP documents • Programme design documents. • Key Informant Interviews with Country teams; hub teams (present and past); • Interviews with governments actors • Interviews with RBAs players, regional networks of stakeholder organisations; local institutions; direct individual beneficiaries. • IOE reports • Surveys (by SRE team) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content analysis • Mapping • Frequency tables • Categorisation • Success stories
<p>Coherence:</p> <p>- How has IFAD's engagement (strategies and operations) assumed internal coherence, and had similar or complementary developmental purposes, in order to contribute mitigating fragility constraints?</p>	<p>1) To what extent was IFAD's country programme support internally coherent and did this enhance the ability to address the challenges of fragile situations?</p> <p>2) To what extent was IFAD's country programme support coherent with other international partners' interventions and did this enhance the ability to address the challenges of fragile situations?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme and project design reports • IOE reports • Key Informant Interviews with Country teams; hub teams (present and past); • Interviews with governments actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content analysis • Framework matrices: summarising and analysing qualitative data in a two-by-two matrix table.
<p>Efficiency:</p> <p>- How efficient has IFAD's support been in those challenging fragile contexts, considering financial instruments and procedures, managerial approaches (including field presence), tools and processes?</p>	<p>1) Based on available evidence to what extent did approaches and tools applied contribute to efficiency in those fragile contexts? And why?</p> <p>2) What are explanatory factors of positive or negative efficiency performance in those contexts?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programmes and projects documentation • IOE reports • Key Informant Interviews; • Partners programmes & projects documents (within the sub-region) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cross tabulations: using contingency tables of two or more dimensions to indicate the relationship between variables. • Frequency tables
<p>Effectiveness:</p> <p>- How effective was IFAD's past support (at national and sub-regional levels) in achieving results that contribute addressing key fragility drivers?</p>	<p>1) Which results (adaptive to transformative capacities) have been achieved considering those fragile contexts? How and why?</p> <p>2) What are the contributing and constraining factors for achieving results and what are the barriers at national and sub-regional levels?</p> <p>3) Which approaches have been applied to address them?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Monitoring reports, including supervision and completion • Key Informant Interviews with various stakeholders • RIA Impact assessment reports • IOE reports • Surveys (by SRE team) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content analysis • Mapping and Framework matrices • Frequency tables • Cross tabulations: using contingency tables of two or more dimensions

<i>Evaluation key questions</i>	<i>Sub-questions</i>	<i>Source of data / information</i>	<i>Type of analysis</i>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partners programmes & projects documents (within the sub-region) 	
<p><u>Impact:</u></p> <p>- Based on evidence, to what extent have past supports contributed to build resilience and fostering rural transformation in these fragile situations?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) What transformative results can be reported amongst the target communities? And why? 2) How have programmes outcomes contributed to these changes, especially those related? 3) To what extent were outcomes inclusive (e.g. gender equality, youth promotion and pro poor groups)? 4) How did programmes contribute to manage risks of harmful events and their negative outcomes (displacement of population; plunder and destruction)? 5) What are explanatory factors of contribution to impacts in those contexts? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme reports (completion) Impact assessment report Key Informant Interviews IOE reports Partners programmes & projects documents (within the sub-region) Beneficiaries success stories In-depth analysis of cases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Content extraction Mapping Exploratory Techniques Cross tabulations
<p><u>Sustainability and scaling up:</u></p> <p>- To what extent have achievements and/or results been sustained and up scaled in these fragile contexts, and which lessons are relevant to IFAD's future engagement in this sub-region?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) How has the continuum of absorptive, adaptive and transformative capabilities been sustained with IFAD's support within the sub-region? 2) To what extent are successful interventions (at all levels) scaled up, in those fragile situations? 4) What are explanatory factors of sustained achievements in those contexts considering both IFAD and partners' experiences? 4) What are explanatory factors of scaling up results in those contexts? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme reports Beneficiaries success stories Key Informant Interviews with various stakeholders IOE reports In-depth analysis of cases Partners' documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Content analysis Exploratory techniques

List of projects for the evaluation period

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Total project cost US\$ million</i>	<i>IFAD approved financing US\$ million</i>	<i>Cofinancing US\$ million</i>	<i>Counterpart US\$ million</i>	<i>Beneficiary contribution US\$ million</i>	<i>Executive Board approval</i>	<i>Loan effectiveness</i>	<i>Project completion date</i>	<i>Cooperating institution</i>	<i>Project status</i>
1. PASPRU	Burkina Faso	25 213 000	16 150 000	5 100 000	3 867 000	96 000	30/04/2009	08/12/2010	31/12/2016	IFAD	Completed
2. Neer-Tamba Project	Burkina Faso	117 452 000	80 140 000	7 269 000	24 134 000	5 909 000	13/12/2012	30/08/2013	30/09/2022	IFAD	Ongoing
3. PAPFA	Burkina Faso	71 700 000	38 000 000	20 000 000	6 400 000	7 300 000	11/12/2017	15/03/2018	31/03/2024	IFAD	Ongoing
4. PAFA-4R	Burkina Faso	72 052 000	52 290 000		12 000 000	7 762 000	12/09/2019	13/03/2020	30/06/2026	IFAD	Ongoing
5. PROHYPA	Chad	22 590 000	19 500 000		2 510 000	580 000	15/09/2009	26/01/2010	31/03/2015	IFAD	Completed
6. PADER-G	Chad	20 119 000	17 401 000		2 529 000	189 000	15/12/2010	18/10/2011	31/12/2016	IFAD	Completed
7. PARSAT	Chad	36 234 000	17 200 000	12 308 000	6 107 000	619 000	01/12/2014	17/02/2015	31/03/2022	IFAD	Ongoing
8. RePER	Chad	72 804 000	60 896 000		8 882 000	3 026 000	13/09/2018	28/02/2019	31/03/2025	IFAD	Ongoing
9. Rural Microfinance Programme	Mali	38 564 000	25 045 000	9 259 000	3 666 000	594 000	30/04/2009	21/07/2010	30/09/2018	IFAD	Completed
10. PAPAM	Mali	171 075 000	41 935 000	97 600 000	23 700 000	7 840 000	16/09/2010	13/10/2011	31/07/2018	IFAD	Completed
11. FIER	Mali	49 006 000	30 095 000	10 884 000	4 070 000	3 957 000	11/12/2013	20/08/2014	30/09/2022	IFAD	Ongoing
12. INCLUSIF	Mali	103 507 200	43 707 200	53 300 000	4 600 000	1 900 000	17/04/2018	09/11/2018	31/12/2024	IFAD	Ongoing
13. MERIT	Mali	50 611 000	29 821 000	11 390 000	4 873 000	4 527 000	16/10/2019	09/12/2020	31/12/2026	IFAD	Ongoing
14. Oasis Sustainable Dev.	Mauritania	17 562 510	11 407 600		4 894 910	1 260 000	18/12/2003	18/11/2004	30/04/2014	IFAD	Completed
15. ProLPRAF	Mauritania	16 308 000	12 008 000	2 000 000	2 300 000		15/09/2009	19/02/2010	31/03/2016	IFAD	Completed
16. PASK II	Mauritania	38 400 000	27 400 000	3 500 000	5 200 000	2 300 000	15/09/2011	12/06/2012	30/06/2019	IFAD	Completed
17. PRODEFI	Mauritania	45 300 000	15 000 000	23 100 000	5 000 000	2 200 000	03/12/2016	12/01/2017	31/03/2025	IFAD	Ongoing
18. PROGRES	Mauritania	44 000 000	23 700 000	14 000 000	5 300 000	1 000 000	02/06/2020	13/10/2020	31/10/2026	IFAD	Ongoing

19.	PUSADER	Niger	19 360 000	13 000 000	6 360 000		15/12/2010	07/02/2011	31/03/2014	IFAD	Completed	
20.	PASADEM	Niger	35 906 204	22 200 381	6 900 400	5 554 000	1 251 423	13/12/2011	12/03/2012	31/03/2018	IFAD	Completed
21.	RUWANMU	Niger	25 652 400	2 781 100	18 757 400	4 113 900		21/09/2012	19/02/2013	30/06/2018	IFAD	Completed
22.	ProDAF	Niger	27 016 987	18 996 170	4 398 756	2 722 128	899 933	22/04/2015	21/09/2015	30/09/2023	IFAD	Ongoing
23.	ProDAF-Diffa	Niger	25 482 800	12 500 000	10 365 900	2 473 900	143 000	29/09/2018	21/03/2019	31/03/2025	IFAD	Ongoing
24.	PRECIS	Niger	170 905 200	83 380 400	52 002 200	29 930 800	5 591 800	12/09/2019	05/08/2020	30/09/2026	IFAD	Ongoing
25.	VCDP	Nigeria	104 400 000	74 900 000	2 800 000	24 600 000	2 100 000	03/04/2012	14/10/2013	31/12/2024	IFAD	Ongoing
26.	CASP	Nigeria	80 569 029	58 445 338	14 949 000	5 774 691	1 400 000	11/12/2013	25/03/2015	30/09/2021	IFAD	Completed
27.	LIFE-ND	Nigeria	97 934 000	60 000 000	30 000 000	7 934 000		11/12/2017	21/02/2019	31/03/2025	IFAD	Ongoing

List of grants reviewed

<i>Project/grant name</i>	<i>Grant number</i>	<i>Grant amount US\$</i>	<i>Grant recipient</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>Effective date</i>	<i>Completion date</i>	<i>Focus countries</i>
Smallholder Poultry Development	1000003362	800 000	FAO	30/04/2009	03/09/2009	30/09/2012	Burkina Faso, Mauritania
Enabling Sustainable Land Management, Resilient Pastoral Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction in Africa	1000003612	1 511 000	IUCN	17/12/2009	24/03/2010	31/08/2014	Chad
Parkland Trees and Livelihoods: Adapting to Climate Change in the West African Sahel	1000003831	1 500 000	ICRAF	07/10/2010	06/12/2010	31/12/2013	Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger
Strengthening capacities of Farmers' Organisations in relation with IFAD country programs	1000003914	1 550 000	Agricord	05/12/2010	17/02/2011	30/09/2014	Mali, Niger
Building Farmer's income and safety nets while securing local energy supply in West Africa	1000004148	4 300 000	MBSA	13/12/2011	13/01/2012	31/08/2016	Mali
Technical and Capacity Strengthening Support for Country Level Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support Systems (SAKSS) in Selected African Countries	1000004221	9 828 000	IFPRI	07/04/2012	05/06/2012	31/12/2016	Mali
Participatory Microfinance for Africa (PAMIGA)	1000004303	4 400 000	PAMIGA	12/08/2012	01/11/2012	31/12/2015	Mali
Rainwater Harvesting for Food Security; Setting an enabling institutional and policy environment for rainwater harvesting	1000004304	3 613 644	RAIN	12/08/2012	11/10/2012	31/12/2015	Burkina Faso
More Effective and Sustainable Investments in Water for Poverty Reduction	2000000119	2 000 000	IWMI	09/12/2013	14/04/2014	30/06/2018	Mali, Niger
Capacity building in WCA	2000000239	1 896 500	2iE-BurkinaFaso	09/12/2013	21/05/2014	30/09/2018	Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania
Humid Tropics	2000000175	2 500 000	IITA	09/12/2013	13/03/2014	31/03/2017	Nigeria
Youth Agribusiness	2000000216	402 500	IITA	17/01/2014	14/03/2014	31/03/2016	Nigeria

Cassava Flour in Bread	2000000289	458 745	IITA	17/01/2014	11/03/2014	30/06/2016	Nigeria
Agribusiness IITA NG KE DRC	2000001099	498 346	IITA	24/08/2015	22/09/2015	30/09/2017	Nigeria
Climate change Large Grant	2000000474	1 510 000	FAO	13/09/2014	22/01/2015	31/03/2019	Mali, Niger
Rural finance support	2000000477	950 000	DID	13/09/2014	08/01/2015	30/09/2018	Mali, Nigeria
ASAP Learning Alliance	2000000517	3 100 000	CIAT	01/12/2014	30/01/2015	31/03/2018	Mali, Niger, Nigeria
Direct Support to FO-Agricord	2000001137	250 000	Agricord	23/11/2015	03/02/2016	31/03/2019	Burkina Faso
Capitalizing on experiences for greater impact rural development	2000001091	1 500 000	CTA	04/12/2015	21/03/2016	31/03/2019	Niger
Improving the articulation between social protection and rural development interventions in developing countries: Lessons from Latin America and Africa	2000001102	1 820 000	Uni_Andes_COL	12/12/2015	01/07/2016	31/12/2020	Mali
Beyond IYFF 2014: Support to National Committees for Family Farming	2000001045	1 650 000	WRF	30/12/2015	31/03/2016	31/03/2020	Burkina Faso, Chad
Strengthening capacity for assessing the impact of tenure security measures on IFAD supported and other projects within the SDG framework	2000001310	220 000	UN Habitat	12/08/2016	20/01/2017	31/12/2019	Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger
Rural Youth & Malian Diaspora	2000001291	509 850	ABC	22/09/2016	15/11/2016	15/10/2020	Mali
Pastoralists driven data_CS0	2000001308	450 000	FAO	26/09/2016	03/01/2017	30/09/2019	Chad
Tools for Youth Large Grant	2000001320	2 400 000	PROCASUR	23/12/2017	23/02/2018	30/06/2022	Mali, Nigeria
Leveraging SSTC	2000002380	1 099 750	AGRA	29/11/2018	22/01/2019	31/03/2022	Burkina Faso, Mali
NEPAD	2000002054	1 238 000	NEPAD	22/12/2018	09/10/2019	17/06/2022	Mali
TAF for the ABC Fund	2000001991	3 500 000	Agriterra	30/12/2018	05/07/2019	05/07/2022	Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger
Nutritious Water Productivity	2000002864	2 400 000	FAO	29/11/2019	06/02/2020	06/02/2023	Niger
Farm Trac	2000002817	4 499 800	CILSS	18/12/2019	27/04/2020	30/06/2023	Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger
ASAP Learning Alliance	2000003388	7 428	CIAT	04/05/2020	04/05/2020	30/06/2020	Mali

Promoting sustainability and resilience of smallholder irrigation impacts in sub-Saharan Africa	2000002828	1 490 000	UNL_DWFI	24/07/2020	18/12/2020	30/04/2024	Niger
Women's land rights initiative	2000003133	2 360 000	CIFOR	28/10/2020			Niger
Rural youth employment Nigeria	2000002860	3 135 000	IITA	11/12/2019	15/06/2020	30/06/2024	Nigeria

Complementary background and information overview

Box A1

Evolution of OECD criteria

- The 2007 list was assembled by identifying states in the bottom two quintiles of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ranking as fragile; it also included non-ranked states such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as several states that clustered just above the fourth quintile cut-off.
- From 2008-10, the list was compiled using the bottom two CPIA quintiles, data from the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Rice and Patrick, 2008 and the Carleton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy [CIFP] Index, 2007). Since 2010, the fragile states list has been produced by combining the Harmonized List of Fragile Situations produced by multilateral development banks including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank, with countries scoring 90 or above on the Fragile Country States Index produced by The Fund for Peace.
- The 2015 States of Fragility presented present five dimensions of fragility that relate directly to post-2015 objectives at the national level: 1. Violence: reduction of violence 2. Justice: access to justice for all 3. Institutions: effective, accountable and inclusive institutions 4. Economic foundations: economic foundations, inclusion and stability 5. Resilience: capacity to prevent and adapt to shocks and disasters. The main goals of this approach are to identify groups of countries – both fragile and non-fragile – that will face similar challenges in making progress on the emerging post-2015 development agenda; to highlight countries facing stress factors that are likely to affect their ability to deliver sustainable development in the coming decades; and to illustrate differences in the geography and context of fragility, as compared to the traditional list of fragile states and economies. The specific approach taken is to disaggregate fragility, by presenting five discrete indices and sets of country rankings. These include peaceful societies, justice for all, and effective and accountable institutions.
- OECD introduced its multidimensional fragility framework in States of Fragility 2016. This framework captures the diversity of those contexts affected by fragility, measuring it on a spectrum of intensity across five dimensions: economic, environmental, political, security and societal. States of Fragility 2020 marks the third iteration of this multidimensional framework. There are 44 indicators across 5 dimensions of fragility. The choice of indicators has been driven by selection criteria in line with the OECD's fragility concept of high risk and low coping capacity.

Table A1

Recommendations of 2015 Corporate Level Evaluation of IFAD's Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected States and Situations

Area	Detailed recommendation
Policy and strategy	<p>Reconsider the current classification of fragile states. The way forward needs more careful planning than trying to reconcile a coherent corporate strategy with recognition that development effectiveness will require bespoke programming in most countries. A particular problem is in trying to predict where the majority of the poor will live in the future. The MICS synthesis evaluation pointed out contrasting scenarios as to whether most absolute poverty will be in low-income and African states or, as today, mostly in middle-income states. That will depend to a large extent on the levels of growth achieved in those countries. Whilst IFAD's primary focus will continue to be rural poverty, the close interaction between conflict, fragility and poverty means that even if the locus of poverty shifts away from MICs, IFAD is likely to still be working in remote, hard to access locations where pockets of poverty persist. Instead of the current all-encompassing approach take the opposite stance and differentiate clearly among countries. A starting point is those states with weak national-level policy and institutional capacity, as reflected in the low CPIA score, which we have seen is correlated with weak project performance. But the IFI lists exclude middle-income countries and this is where more use could be made of the rural sector performance assessments that IFAD already employs, possibly with some modification, to classify such countries. All other settings would then reflect context specific factors and should draw on data from United Nations and independent sources to discriminate among conflict prone, conflict, post conflict, and transition settings and also include countries at risk from natural disasters. In view of the speed with which context can change, such assessment needs to be more frequent than current COSOP practice.</p> <p>Draft a statement that defines a set of principles to guide how IFAD plans to engage with fragile and conflict-affected states and sub-national situations. This is long overdue. It should distinguish clearly between natural and man-made disasters and it should put forward a working definition of fragility that identifies the major drivers of conflict and provide clear distinctions about how to deal with various</p>

fragility dimensions and whether they are connected with proneness to conflict. The principles should also include discussion of how IFAD will respond to specific country needs when fragility and conflict are contained in subnational situations. They should take account of distinct vulnerabilities to climate change and natural disasters. They should also assess the resilience associated with disaster preparedness and institutional capacities geared to coping abilities. This should link to the 2011 Guidelines for Disaster Early Recovery.

Change the approach to analysis in the COSOP. Situational or context analysis is essential and the COSOP is widely considered to be the right instrument. IFAD needs to provide adequate resources, draw more explicitly on analysis done by partner IFIs and United Nations agencies and find a means to update the information more frequently than the current period between COSOPs. One solution would be to prepare a transitional COSOP after three years in all fragile and conflict-affected states and situations. A simpler approach could be to commission a separate working paper from time to time, dealing more specifically with drivers of fragility and conflict. Instead of listing full synopses of pipeline projects in the COSOP, a short menu of possible interventions would bring more flexibility and choice that could be followed up depending on country performance. In many countries, the present poverty focused analysis will be enough and IFAD should therefore focus on enhancing the quality and comprehensiveness of the analysis and strengthening the link between analysis and what it and partners decide it should do. At the other extreme are countries where conflict looms or major conflict has recently been resolved by a peace agreement. In such cases, fragility analyses are often available and other security and development institutions are involved and the challenge for IFAD will be to draw on their analyses and identify its niche as part of multi-donor coalitions. In between is the large number of countries in which aspects of fragility will be found at either national or sub-national level. In these cases, IFAD needs to assess the risks, share them with other partners and manage them while concentrating on its comparative advantage.

Project and programme implementation

Expand implementation support in quantity and technical content. Opportunities exist to strengthen implementation support in several ways. (a) More resources for implementation support: Regional spending on implementation support should be made more transparent and allocated according to country needs so that relative effort can be monitored and managed across the whole portfolio. PTA already plans to increase technical involvement and this is to be welcomed. (b) IFAD country offices and outposting: Explicitly prioritize the establishment of new IFAD country offices and outposting of CPMs in countries affected by fragility and conflict. (c) Strategic partnerships: In fragile states where statebuilding is an objective IFAD could take a more radical approach and expand partnership with IFIs and multilateral agencies that can provide a higher level and broader basis of implementation support. IFAD's policy on supervision still provides for contracted arrangements and these could be used selectively to expand IFAD's reach in countries where IFAD has a small presence but partner IFI's have large country teams. Such an approach is directly compatible with IFAD's core policy of innovative designs leading to scaling up, for which close partnership working is desirable.

Empowerment of staff

Efforts should be made to introduce specific incentives for staff working in fragile states and conflict-affected situations, including those based in headquarters discharging similar functions. Working in fragile situations should be included as a main criterion for professional development and diversification as well as career advancement within the broader framework of IFAD's performance evaluation system. Greater attention to capacity-building and training needs of staff should also be explicitly promoted, and platforms for exchanging knowledge, good practices and experiences of working in fragile states (across regional divisions) should be introduced.

Results measurement

Plan and resource project M&E more selectively. The persistent problem of weak M&E needs to be reversed. It might help to develop a core competency within PTA. But greater attention needs to be paid to planning for monitoring and evaluation during project design. At present, the approach is one size fits all. But some project interventions are well proven and arguably need little or no evaluation. Others may be innovative and require a counterfactual evaluation design to test their effectiveness. Most projects will fall somewhere between these extremes. All projects should be required to defend their design with proven evidence from earlier phases or other locations that the intervention will work in the planned context. That process leads logically to a decision on the necessary effort for evaluation. Where evidence is lacking, or contexts are very different, or where a project is an acknowledged innovation or pilot, evaluation will need more resources. More selective evaluation designs, supported by grants or partnerships with other donors, would enable resources to be concentrated where they are most necessary for learning.

Revise IFAD's results measurement framework to include indicators of outcomes related to fragility. The major gaps are in measurement of women's empowerment and institutional performance. Indicators and means of measurement need to be established in both areas.

Table A2

RBA conceptual framework for resilience: absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities

Absorptive capacity	Adaptive capacity	Transformative capacity
The capacity to withstand threats and minimize exposure to shocks and stressors through preventative measures and appropriate coping strategies to avoid permanent, negative impacts.	The capacity to adapt to new options in the face of crisis by making proactive and informed choices about alternative livelihood strategies based on an understanding of changing conditions.	The capacity to transform the set of livelihood choices available through empowerment and growth, including governance mechanisms, policies/regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and formal and informal social protection mechanisms that constitute an enabling environment for systemic change.

Source: FAO, IFAD and WFP (2015). Strengthening resilience for food security and nutrition.

Box A2

Detailed SRE methodology

- The SRE applied a mixed-methods approach, combining desk review, interviews of stakeholders, in-depth review of specific field (project) cases. The methodological steps are presented as below. They are not always sequential.
- Desk review of documentation. This was the main source of information. It will be undertaken throughout all the SRE stages, with a high intensity until halfway (at least). It will cover documents related to IFAD country strategies, loan portfolio and grants programmes, IOE evaluations and databases, relevant studies, national strategies, other partners' reports (WFP, FAO, WB and AfDB). Both quantitative and qualitative data will be extracted. Documentation on IFAD non-lending activities (i.e. knowledge management, partnerships, policy influence) and on other special initiatives will also be reviewed. The review will enable generating preliminary trends in attempting to respond to the evaluation questions. Moreover, it will help completing the stakeholders mapping, as well as the identification of key informants at regional, national or field levels. At the end of this stage, the SRE team will prepare internal working papers highlighting preliminary trends and information gaps, as well as suggest field cases to be subject to in-depth review and assessment. The team will therefore define how to fill evidence/information gaps identified.
- Interviews of stakeholders. The SRE team conducted semi-structured interviews with the categories of stakeholders mentioned in Table A3 below. Modalities of engagement previously defined will be applied throughout the evaluation stages, using virtually meetings and/or in-person (when applicable). Responses were cross-checked within respondents and with other sources of information.
- Self-assessment. In parallel to stakeholders' interviews, and aligned with IOE practices, a self-assessment review was organised, in form of a seminar (online), with the participation of relevant IFAD country teams and RBA partners. The aim is to gather perspectives and opinions on some aspects, for instance the transboundary and regional dimensions of IFAD's support in those contexts.
- Electric questionnaire. In addition to the previous data sources, a survey has been carried out online, to capture opinions and views of IFAD partners. The survey results were used to confirm/infirm findings and conclusions.
- Field data gathering. Team members within the countries implemented field visits for data gathering. Direct beneficiaries and representatives of implementing and local institutions working with them were visited and interviewed, in compliance with national rules related to the Covid 19 crisis. The aim was to validate preliminary trends identified through the desk review, as well as to fill information and evidence gaps (to the extent possible).
- Data analysis. Analysis was based on triangulation of evidence and findings from the various sources to develop lessons learned from various experiences analysed, around key assumptions on what, how and why results are likely to be delivered, under contextual constraints. The IFAD learning frame was complemented by lessons from experiences of other partners – IFIs (WB, AfDB) and RBAs (FAO and WFP) – within the sub-region and over the same period (as much as possible).

- Report preparation. Following the field data gathering, the evaluation report was drafted by the SRE team. A workshop was organised with the focal groups of SD3C, to present and discuss emerging findings, as well as areas of recommendations, before sharing the draft report.
- The final report was issued after comments are received from IFAD Management and other SD3C players. The last SRE stage will be the organisation of a learning event. The form, timeframe and modality of this event will be specified toward the end of the SRE.

Table A3
Categories of SRE stakeholders, their potential interest and engagement

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Interest</i>	<i>Engagement modality</i>
IFAD Management (PMD) Relevant IFAD Country Directors and WCA Staff members	Primary intended users of the SRE findings. Better understanding of explanatory factors of performance in fragile situations. Learning from the evaluation findings. Processing of knowledge for improving current and future operations within the sub-region, especially at a regional scale.	Regular consultations throughout the evaluation process to (1) validate trends and preliminary findings (2) conduct an internal or self-assessment. A learning group, with relevant country directors and others will be established for continuous interactions.
(National or State level) Central government resource persons	Expressing views on Government strategies to strengthen resilience, support rash recovery in post conflict situations in the fragility contexts as well as align cross border interventions, and the contribution of IFAD's support Ability to learn from interventions, replicate them and upscale from practice to policies	Individual interviews for data collection
Managers of IFAD supported projects in the countries (project teams)	Learning from past experiences (on the above); usage of lessons to improve further projects or programmes Expressing views on IFAD's supports and operational procedures to implement them in fragile contexts	Engagement in individual and collective discussions Contribution for purposely selection of cases for in-depth analysis; Feedback on findings Interviews during the SRE process
Beneficiaries (organisations and individuals) – ie regional farmers organisations and networks; cross border traders and transporters, etc.	Expressing views on processes and mechanisms enabling resilience strengthening in their fragile contexts; then on the contribution of IFAD's operations	Interviews for primary data collection Field visits for in-depth analysis of cases where beneficiaries underwent relevant experiences (specific types of fragility and conflicts; successful and unsuccessful)
Intermediate institutions operating in close interactions with beneficiaries (including local government and service providers; NGOs; IFIs; civil society representatives; etc.)	Expressing views on processes and mechanisms enabling resilience strengthening in their fragile contexts; then on the contribution of IFAD's operations Contribution to understand factors for (in)effectiveness and (un)sustainability	Interviews for primary data collection, coupled with beneficiary level investigations.
Other SD3C partners: FAO, WFP, G5 Sahel Secretariat	Secondary intended users of the SRE findings. Learning from past experiences and usage of lessons to improve the programme Expressing views on processes leading to fragility and conflicts and on mechanisms enabling to strengthen resilience in such contexts, based on their own experience (in their organisation) Expressing views on IFAD's supports and the suitability of approaches	Consultative group established at inception and used during the SRE process Feedback and validating findings and lessons to be learnt at regional level
Other partners within the sub-region (e.g. WBs, AfDB UNDP,) and their teams	Expressing views on IFAD's interventions, taking into account context specificities	Interviews as deemed necessary; Contact with relevant staff or resources persons of these organisations

Source: Evaluation team elaboration

Table A4
Importance of the agriculture sector for the six countries

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2019</i>
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP)	Burkina Faso	23.2	22.6	20.1
	Chad	46.5	50.3	42.5
	Mali	31.7	37.7	37.3
	Mauritania	19.1	20.6	18.6
	Niger	34.7	32.4	37.8
	Nigeria	26.7	20.6	21.9
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (ILO estimate)	Burkina Faso	52.7	29.7	26.2
	Chad	77.8	75.3	75.0
	Mali	68.9	62.2	62.4
	Mauritania	36.4	32.9	30.8
	Niger	75.4	73.7	72.5
	Nigeria	42.1	36.9	34.9

Sources: World Bank indicators

Table A5
Food security situations in the G5+1


<i>Country</i>	<i>2020 Global Food security index score</i>	<i>2020 Global Food security index rank (Rank/113)</i>	<i>Overall situation of food security over the period 2012 – 2020</i>
Burkina Faso	47.4	88	The value increased from 40.6 to 47.4, well below the average value 60.4 of the 113 countries. Significant difference compared to average value were recorded with respect to Affordability (-20.5) and Quality and Safety (-21.7) components.
Chad	39.4	103	The country experienced a rise passing from a score of 32.4 to 39.4. This improvement was mainly to the significant increase of the "Availability" component that rose from 23.1 in 2012 to 32.2 in 2020.
Mali	52.7	79	The improvement was slight, with the score that went from 49.7 to 52.7. It has to be mentioned the "Availability" component remained around the average for the period.
Mauritania	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Niger	47.6	87	The index increased from 43.2 to 47.6, the increased derived from the "Availability" component that jumped from 35.2 to 48.8.
Nigeria	40.1	100	A decrease from 40.9 to 40.1 was recorded. The , Affordability (-33.0) and Quality and Safety (-26.1) components account for the main gap discrepancy with the average score.

Source: <https://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/> , The Economist Intelligence Unit

Table A6
Detailed PBAS allocation

Country	PBAS 2010-2012	PBAS 2013 - 2015	PBAS 2016 - 2018	PBAS 2019 - 2021	PBAS total
Burkina Faso	39 575 310	28 495 294	37 999 891	68 155 269	174 225 764
Chad	17 913 423	21 138 603	32 500 000	61 683 313	133 235 339
Mali	31 838 547	28 421 542	46 154 146	53 645 308	160 059 543
Mauritania	17 459 795	14 817 769	22 086 014	23 696 976	78 060 554
Niger	33 399 790	48 560 040	61 024 540	88 387 501	231 371 871
Nigeria	83 203 697	72 230 927	149 200 000	87 465 926	392 100 550
Total	223 390 562	213 664 175	348 964 591	383 034 293	1 169 053 621
WCA total	544 812 425	538 604 761	630 103 454	827 004 994	2 163 881 479

Graph A1
Evolution of the G5+1 Countries' PBAS allocation



Source: IFAD Oracle BI

Table A7
SD3C main elements

Element	Details
SD3C components	<p>The SD3C financing includes loans (of highly concessional terms) and grants (under Debt Sustainability Framework, DSF) to countries individually, in the framework of their respective PBAS allocation. A regional large grant, to be implemented by the G5 Sahel Secretariat, is also included in the financing. There is an important co-financing of the Green Climate Fund, aligned with climate change challenges faced by those countries.</p> <p>The first component, related to productivity and production increase, aims at boosting production and productivity in the agricultural sector (crop farming, forestry, livestock and fishery) by climate-resilient practices and technologies in combination with the sustainable management of natural resources. It will strengthen productive assets (increased approximately by 30 per cent at the end) and resilience, as well as human capacity building and peacebuilding. It is complementary to the regional programme submitted by IFAD to the Green Climate Fund (GCF).</p> <p>The second component addresses regional economic integration issues, by contributing to expand (by 10 per cent at the end) the domestic and regional trade. Interventions in this component are intended to strengthen cross-border markets and make border transactions more secure. Activities under the first and second components are implemented at national level.</p> <p>The third component relates to policy dialogue, coordination and management. It uses a regional approach to enable greater institutional support for the programme's implementation.</p>

<i>Element</i>	<i>Details</i>
SD3C Regional Grant	The grant component of the SD3C aims at supporting regional coordination, policy dialogue and knowledge generation, as well as strengthening regional dialogue on issues related to COVID-19, conflict and climate change (3Cs) in the Sahel region. Its objectives are to: (i) promote inclusive policy and social dialogue related to the 3Cs in support of peace and security, and regional integration with the active involvement of producers' organizations; and (ii) support regional planning, management, KM/M&E to ensure harmonization and coherence of the approaches, tools and products adopted by the SD3C. Thus, the grant will play a significant role in view of fragility challenges identified. The recipient is the G5 Sahel Secretariat, which will be reinforced to broaden its influence on policy dialogue on rural and agricultural development.

Source: Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change President's report, 2020

Table A8
SD3C financing per country (in euros)

	<i>IFAD Loan</i>	<i>IFAD DSF</i>	<i>IFAD</i>	<i>Regional grant</i>	<i>Co-financing (GCF)</i>	<i>Financing gap</i>	<i>total</i>
Burkina	1 085 000	-	-	-	-	11 188 000	12 273 000
Chad	875 000	3 505 000	-	-	-	7 011 000	11 391 000
Mali	15 155 000	5 605 000	-	-	-	7 287 000	28 047 000
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	10 517 000	10 517 000
Niger	3 200 000	1 185 000	-	-	-	13 146 000	17 531 000
Senegal	5 700 000	-	-	-	-	8 326 000	14 026 000
G5 Sahel Secretariat	-	-	1 710 000	62 600 000	-	-	64 310 000
Total	26 015 000	10 295 000	1 710 000	62 600 000	57 475 000	158 095 000	

Source: Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change President's report, 2020

Table A9
Number of persons interviewed by category of stakeholders

<i>Country</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Non-governmental organizations and associations</i>	<i>Private sector</i>	<i>Beneficiaries</i>
Burkina Faso	22	2	-	23
Chad	21	2	1	88
Mali	8	3	2	70
Mauritania	20	-	2	14
Niger	13	-	3	85
Nigeria	38	4	6	11
Total	122	11	14	291

Table A10

List of areas visited by country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Visited areas</i>
Burkina Faso	Dedougou, Gourcy, Kaya, Nouna, Ouahigouya, Tougan,
Chad	Abtouyour, Barth-Signaka, Dababa, Fitri, Guéra
Mali	Ségou , Mopti , Bougouni, Kolondjèba, Sikasso, Kangaba
Mauritania	Adrar, Assaba, Brakna, Gorgol, Guidimakha, Tagant
Niger	Badaguichiri, Diffa, Guidan Roumdji, Madarounfa, Maradi, Ngourti
Nigeria	Niger, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa

Additional analytical information to chapters 3 to 6

Table B1
Review of the COSOPs strategic objectives

Country	Main focus areas and/or themes
Burkina Faso	The 2017 CSN called for the development of agricultural value chains as key-entry points to sustainably increase income and employment opportunities as well as resilience to climate change for rural populations. The actions were confirmed by the 2019 COSOP by adding the focus on the development of rural microenterprises.
Chad	The 2010 COSOP poverty and vulnerability analysis helped to identify the regions to deepen IFAD's intervention based on the number of vulnerable people and agricultural potential. Interventions were aimed at strengthening local people's capacity to sustainably manage soil and water. The 2010 COSOP review and the 2017 CSN confirmed the relevance of those actions, as well as the development of resilient family farming, to ensure food and nutritional security for rural populations. No explicit discussion of whether political/military instability that leading to severe conflict influenced decisions on geographical location of projects.
Mauritania	The 2007 COSOP outlined as the most vulnerable poor person in Mauritania is rural, lives in the southern regions and practices rainfed cultivation. She is vulnerable to drought, insect plagues and desertification. The goal of the IFAD COSOP and was to build inclusive and sustainable institutional systems that are supported through pro-poor investments and policies and relevant innovation and learning engagements. This is to be achieved through the following three strategic objectives: (a) strengthen the institutions of the rural poor using community-driven development approaches; (b) promote sustainable rural financial services; and (c) achieve sustainable agricultural development and food security. The 2018 COSOP confirmed the relevance of these interventions as the specific development objective is the empowerment of poor rural populations and their organizations in relation to the following aspects: i) sustainable access to natural resources and communal amenities; and ii) inclusive value chains. Geographically, priority was given to rural areas in the south of the country, which are the poorest, the most populated and whose agricultural potential is the most promising.
Mali	The 2007 COSOP targeted small agropastoralists, farmers and breeders in the Sahelian belt and the northern regions. These three groups have in common: (i) weak diversification of productive activities making them vulnerable to climatic fluctuations, which are particularly severe in the Sahelian belt and in the north; (ii) localization in isolated areas that have weak economic potential and degraded natural resources; (iii) limited access to basic social services; and (iv) weak levels of organization, which limits their economic outreach. The 2016 CSN aimed at supporting agricultural production resilient to CCs, in response to the increase need of food and nutritional security of poor rural households while taking climate change into account. IFAD's interventions focused on increasing productivity and production through small-scale local irrigation and adaptation to climate change such as agro ecology. With respect to 2020 COSOP, its lines of interventions reflected IFAD's five-change-drivers for the Sahel, namely: creation of jobs, tackling climate change, cross-border operations, addressing conflict and coleadership. Moreover, some specific activities to counter the effects of the fragility were foreseen: (i) Develop and strengthen partnerships with other development agencies with complementary mandates on humanitarian interventions, (ii) Design and implement operations that focuses on the most vulnerable groups such as women and young people while promoting climate smart and resilient economic activities, and (iii) Strengthen Institutional support (with the technical, logistical and financial means) to empower government agencies and local authorities with skills and capacities needed to effectively coordinate, monitor and evaluate the ongoing projects/programmes.
Niger	For the 2006 COSOP, IFAD strategy was articulated around 3 main axes: (i) reduction of vulnerability and strengthening of food security for rural households, (ii) improvement of income and access to markets for target groups and (iii) better access to basic social services for the most vulnerable populations. The actions responded to two of the four key priorities of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: (a) development of productive sectors and job creation, (b) access of the poor to essential social services. After focusing on Maradi region, IFAD entered a phase of expansion in Tahoua and Zinder with the 2013 COSOP. Strategic objectives were formulated as follows: i) intensification and diversification of small-scale production systems; ii) the adaptation of these systems to the effects of climate change (rehabilitation of degraded lands, development of watersheds, etc.); (iii) strengthening of the socio-economic tissue of the community and of rural entities; and iv) participatory targeting.
Nigeria	COSOP 2016 acknowledged that in some states, low counterpart contributions hampered project implementation while in other states, counterpart contributions have been regular. Thus, States/area of intervention were selected by the following key criteria: poverty; tangible commitment and political will to support a joint programme; clear focus on community development and smallholder agriculture; strong track record of public accountability and financial management; and willingness to work with the private sector. Within states, targeting was based on reliable poverty data. Fewer but better-performing states would have been selected to benefit from focused IFAD support.

Table B2
Available guidance to orient the analysis of fragility drivers

Driver	Existing relevant guidance related to development of:	
	COSOPs	Loan operations
High poverty and related economic situation	<p>SECAP background study – Part 1: Situational analysis and main challenges (socio-economic situation and underlying causes).</p> <p>Reference documents: Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies (May 2019) IFAD Strategic Framework 2016-2025 Policy on Improving Access to Land and Tenure Security (2008) Rural Finance Policy (2021)</p>	<p>As part of the Integrated Project Risk Matrix of the PDR Project Design Guidelines (2019); Rural Finance Policy (2021)</p>
Social inequality and weak social cohesion	<p>SECAP background study – Part 1: Situational analysis and main challenges (socio-economic situation and underlying causes).</p> <p>Reference documents: Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies (May 2019) Mainstreaming Gender Transformative Approach at IFAD Action Plan (2019-2025) Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy (2012) Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples (2009) Policy on Improving Access to Land and Tenure Security (2008) Framework for Operational Feedback from Stakeholders (2019) IFAD Rural Youth Action Plan 2019-2021 IFAD Strategy and Action Plan on Environment and Climate Change 2019-2025 Mainstreaming Nutrition in IFAD – Action Plan 2019-2025 Revised Operational Guidelines on Targeting (2020)</p>	<p>As part of the SECAP analysis at the project design stage</p> <p>Reference documents: IFAD's Social Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures(SECAP) (2021) Operational Guidelines on Targeting (2019) Policy on Improving Access to Land and Tenure Security (2008); Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples (2009) IFAD Policy on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (2012) Environment and Natural Resource Management Policy (2012) Framework for Operational Feedback from Stakeholders (2019) IFAD Rural Youth Action Plan 2019-2021 Mainstreaming Gender-transformative Approaches at IFAD – Action Plan 2019-2025, IFAD Strategy and Action Plan on Environment and Climate Change 2019-2025 Mainstreaming Nutrition in IFAD – Action Plan 2019-2025 Revised Operational Guidelines on Targeting (2020); How-to-do Note on Free, Prior and Informed Consent</p>
Degradation of natural resources and climate change burdens	<p>SECAP background study.</p> <p>Reference documents: Page 16-19, Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies (May 2019) IFAD Strategy and Action Plan on Environment and Climate Change 2019-2025 Environment and NRM Policy (2012) Policy on Improving Access to Land and Tenure Security (2008) Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples (2009)</p>	<p>As part of the SECAP analysis at the project design stage Reference document: IFAD's Social Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures(SECAP) (2021) Policy on Improving Access to Land and Tenure Security (2008) Policy on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples (2009) IFAD Strategy and Action Plan on Environment and Climate Change 2019-2025</p>
Erosion of trust in public institutions and weak social contracts	<p>Fragility assessment note. Reference document: Appendix V, Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies (May 2019)</p>	<p>As part of the SECAP analysis at the project design stage Reference document: IFAD's Social Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures(SECAP) (2021) How-to-do Note on Free, Prior and Informed Consent</p>
Greater insecurity and violent conflicts due to extremist groups	<p>Fragility assessment note. Reference document: Appendix V, Operational Procedures and Guidelines for Country Strategies (May 2019)</p>	

Table B3
Relevance of fragility drivers by country, according to field stakeholders

Driver	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Sub-region
Poverty leading to asset depletion	3.2	2.8	3.5	3.0	3.0	4.2	3.3
Unemployment and lack of incomes	4.3	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.3	4.1	4.0
Food insecurity and malnutrition	4.2	4.3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.9	3.8
Social inequality and exclusion	3.8	2.5	2.0	2.5	1.0	4.1	2.7
Environmental /natural resources degradation	4.3	4.4	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.7	4.0
Climate/weather disturbance	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.0	3.5	3.7	4.1
Poor availability of services linked to production	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.3	4.0	4.2	3.9
Insecurity and violation of human right	4.3	2.8	3.8	1.5	2.3	3.0	3.0
Violence and civil unrest	1.7		2.8	1.5	0.8	2.9	2.0
All fragility drivers average	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.0	2.8	3.8	3.4

Appreciation level varies from (0) inexistent to (5) very high

Table B4
Reference to internal coherence in COSOPs

Country	Period COSOPs/CSNs	Statements with linkage to internal coherence
Burkina Faso	CSN 2017-2018	The CSN focuses on consolidating and scaling up the achievements of PAMER, PROFIL and PASPRU and will extend these achievements with new targets, especially young people and women.
	COSOP 2019	The loan portfolio to support government investments consists currently of two ongoing projects, Neer-tamba (2013-2022) and PAPFA (2018–2024). Two new projects will be designed, namely a geographic extension of PAPFA (PAPFA-Extension) in 2019 and a youth and entrepreneurship project.
Chad	CSN 2017-2019	<p>The 2017 CSN called for the adoption of a country program approach for effective management of IFAD's portfolio. This approach would make it possible to invest in the long term both on a thematic and territorial level and to build synergies in the implementation with other technical and financial partners (TFP) in order to harmonize the interventions and maximize the positive impacts. No evidence in documents reviewed on what this meant in practice.</p> <p>The actions of PARSAT, by emphasizing the development and resilience of agricultural systems were complementary to those of PADER-G (development of socio-community infrastructures, the structuring and support producer organizations and the development of microfinance instruments in the Guéra region) and PROHYPA (development of communities and pastoral systems in the regions) where PARSAT would intervene.</p>
Mali	CSN 2017-2018	Mali internal coherence is achieved as most of projects are built upon the achievements of the previous ones, enabling both area of support and intervention area coherence.
Mauritania	COSOP 2018-2024	<p>The 2016 CSN described the establishment of the country program management team to support the creation of a program approach. In this context, a joint PASK II / PRODEFI support unit bringing together permanent expertise and ad hoc technical assistance in terms of monitoring and evaluation, knowledge management, procurement, internal audit, communication, etc. will be incorporated. The country program will facilitate policy dialogue with the government, particularly on themes relating to: i) inclusive value chains; ii) promotion of local products; and iii) support for inter-professional organizations.</p> <p>In order not to disperse portfolio interventions, after almost 25 years of support in the oases and the government's decision to create an Oasis Development Agency, priority will be given to rural areas located in the south of the country, which correspond to both in the most populated areas, the poorest and with the best agricultural potential</p>

Niger	COSOP 2013-2018	The Maradi Region has been the depository of a significant capital of experience in agricultural and rural development, and IFAD investments in Niger for more than 30 years, which has enabled a long-term contribution to strengthening the resilience of populations. An example is the RUWAMNU which operates on complementarities in terms of productive sector, geographical area, and intervention logic with: (i) other projects financed by IFAD: for the strengthening of municipalities as master structure (IRDAR / PAC2), the targeted productions (PASADEM), market infrastructures (PASADEM but also IRDAR / PAC2 for the tracks) as well as the PPILDA and the PUSADER in the completion phase;
Nigeria	COSOP 2016-2021	IFAD will continue working in rural and peri-urban areas most affected by conflict and fragile ecology. Projects will focus on a smaller number of states where commitment to IFAD projects is high. Projects will continue to include strategies for gender equality and women's empowerment to support women's participation at all levels and in all spheres – public, private and community – and will scale up the GALS methodology and successes from VSCGs Three successful approaches will be scaled up: (i) CDD for planning at the local level; (ii) the enterprise incubator model; and (iii) rural financial inclusion. The pathway towards scaling up will integrate projects, KM and policy engagement

Table B5
Average values of efficiency indicators

	<i>Burkina Faso</i>	<i>Chad</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Mauritania</i>	<i>Niger</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>
Appraisal costs (USD millions)	71 604 250	37 936 750	82 552 640	32 314 102	50 720 599	94 301 010
Actual costs (USD millions)		20 603 772	71 923 445	17 909 247	24 245 775	
IFAD funding approved (USD millions)	46 645 000	28 749 250	38 278 640	16 003 120	23 280 132	69 431 446
IFAD Disbursement rate (%)	56.9%	93.9%	98.2%	90.2%	97.0%	
Overall Disbursement rate (%)	39.2%	97.0%	79.9%	80.1%	89.8%	
Approval/ Entry into force lag (number of months)	9.4	5.7	11.4	6.2	5.3	16.3
Approval/ First disbursement lag (number of months)	16.0	7.9	18.5	16.0	8.5	47.4
Entry into force/ First disbursement lag (number of months)	6.7	2.2	7.7	9.7	3.2	31.1
Appraisal Programme Management costs (%)	9.88%	16.43%	15.42%	14.98%	14.15%	13.23%
Actual Programme Management costs (%)	37.0%	19.6%	17.75%	28.17%	22.10%	
Estimated number of beneficiaries	231 000	366 833	458 062	134 000	579 626	336 660
Actual number of beneficiaries		222 776	464 919	110 279	344 730	
Estimated cost per beneficiary (USD)	138.8458	127.8	468.7	262.9	54.8	1 400
Actual cost per beneficiary (USD)	651.0	92.9	532.9	184.5	74.9	

	<i>Burkina Faso</i>	<i>Chad</i>	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Mauritania</i>	<i>Niger</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>
Estimated Internal Rate of Return (%)	18.23%	16.30%	17.30%	14.75%	17.28%	11.87%
Actual Internal Rate of Return (%)	9,78%	15.75%	20.65%	15.97%	21.01%	

Box B1

Example of social contract diagnostic as part of the World Bank's Systematic Country Diagnostic for Mauritania

The World Bank carried out a systematic country diagnostic (SCD) in 2017 for Mauritania to identify key constraints and priority interventions needed for the country to achieve the twin goals of the World Bank Group: i) ending extreme poverty and ii) improving shared prosperity among the poorest forty percent of the population (the bottom 40). The Bank used the findings and conclusions of the SCD to stimulate dialogue with the national authorities and relevant stakeholders.

One of the areas covered by the SCD is fragility. It was found that the underlying fragility stresses associated with Mauritania's delicate and complex social fabric and the environmental challenges of an encroaching coastline and an expanding desert risk undermining the development gains made to the time it was conducted. On environmental fragility, the SCD noted that in a nation that depends so heavily on its natural resource endowments, the impact of environmental degradation and climate change on economic development and on the livelihoods of the poor could be catastrophic, as Mauritania is caught between an expanding desert and an eroding coastline.

On social fragility, the SCD noted that social cohesion in Mauritania is precarious and risks derailing economic and social progress. The difficulties involved in cultivating a strong shared national identity are deeply rooted in ethno-racial divisions, sociopolitical tensions, historical grievances over discriminatory state practices, and the slow pace of integration of marginalized groups excluded from social and economic opportunity. The government addressed these challenges by undertaking concerted efforts to harness the richness of the country's ethnic and cultural diversity and breaking away from the historical legacy of slavery and ethnic stratification.

The SCD further noted that Mauritania has been a bulwark against regional instability, as it shares a long border with Algeria and Mali and suffered numerous attacks from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2005–2011, shutting down a small, but promising desert tourism industry. The continued rebellion in Mali has had many negative spillovers, including large numbers of refugees, trade disruptions, and illegal trafficking.

Based on these and other analyses, and the Government's own recognition of the importance of reinforcing national identity as a basis for building a stronger state-society relationship, the SCD concluded that the weak social contract represents a priority cross-cutting sustainability constraint to development in Mauritania. To strengthen the social contract the SCD presented solutions in the areas of national identity, protecting the vulnerable, and enhancing political inclusion. On protecting the vulnerable, it listed the following solutions

- Explore options for positive discrimination in employment, and geographic targeting of public investment, and access to credit
- Improve the targeting and consolidation of the Social Protection System
- Strengthen the skills and youth agenda: develop a steady job creation plan for young workers; reinforce out of school programs; youth training programs
- Improve access to justice amongst the most vulnerable including protection for women, slaves and former slaves and the landless.

Source: "World Bank Group. 2017. Islamic Republic of Mauritania : Turning Challenges into Opportunities for Ending Poverty and Promoting Shared Prosperity. Systematic Country Diagnostic. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27997> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO."

List of key persons met

Government

Directorate of Nutrition and Food Technology (DNFTA) of Chad
Abdelhakh Ahmat Saleh, Nutrition Focal Point in Guera

Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation of Chad
Batedjim Noudjalmabeye, Technical advisor of MoA Ministry
Moussa Saleh, Direction M&E of Agricultural projects

Ministry of Agriculture of Mali
Yacouba Koné, Technical Advisor to the Rural Development Department

Ministry of Rural Development of Mauritania
Abdallahi Ould Babe, Director of Strategies, Cooperation and Monitoring and Evaluation
Coulibaly Kodore, Head of the Rural Development Department at the Regional Delegation in Gorgol
Harouna Sall, Head of the Rural Development Department at the Regional Delegation in Guidimakha

Ministry of Economy and Industry of Mauritania
Mohamed Salem Ould Nany, Director General for Finance, Public Investment and Economic Cooperation

Ministry of Social Affairs for Children and the Family of Mauritania
Gaitana Mint Mohamed, Regional Representative

Burkina Faso

Beclou Nagalo, OAC/ Head of Mission
Chantal Sienou, Head of Agricultural Economy Unit
Drissa Traore, Secretary General CRA Center Nord
Hamidou Sawadogo, Land Commission
Harouna Baya, OAC/ Head of Mission Assistant
Hawa Ily, CRA-NORD / ARD
Issa Kindo, Head of Planning Unit
Joseph Ouedraogo, Land Commission
Kouedregma Zongo, Neer-Tamba Project Coordinator
Louba Dakio, CM/OAC/ NORD
Moussa Ouedraogo, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
Mrius Tamine, CM/OAC/ NORD
Nonyeza Bonzi, CRA-BMH President
Noufou Ouedraogo, Land Commission
Orokia Sie, Rural Actors Reinforcement Officer
Oumarou Kindo, CRA-NORD / SG
Philippe Yonli, CRA-EST President
Rasmane Ouedraogo, Land Commission
Sié Salif Stephan Kambou, PAFPA Coordinator
Simon Kabore, Environmental Monitoring Manager
Théophile Hien, Dédougou Head of Antenna
Tidiane Ongoiba, DPAAHM/UAT/BOGOYA

Chad

Abakar Hamit Mouctar, Chief of branch for PARSAT/RePER
Abdoulaye Mahamoud Labit, Coordinator of PADER-G, PARSAT and RePER
Adoum Defallah, TGR du PARSAT/RePER à Dababa
Ali Gamane Kaffine, Chief of branch for PARSAT/RePER
Allamine Ahmat Gamane, Supervisor for PARSAT
Allassira Dieu Benit, Manager of water collection infrastructures

Beultoingar Lina, Manager of gender and targeting for PARSAT
 Brahim Taha, Coordinator for PROHYPA
 Datoloum Kilareaou, Manager of chain and agrobusiness for RePER
 Djedion Mbaihakambe Roland, Manager of agropastoral production systems for RePER
 Foulnou Solkissam, Manager of climate change and environment for PARSAT
 Gabpode Souapede Aristide, Manager of capacity building of FOs for PARSAT
 Gnebe Djiri Daniel, TGR du PARSAT/RePER
 Hamid Kiram, Manager in charge of production for PARSAT
 Khamis Youssouf, Manager of M&E for PARSAT
 Kodanbe Wadjonre, Weather station Observer
 Mahamat Saker Abderamane, Chief of branch for PARSAT/RePER
 Mahamoud Abdoulaye, Coordinator of PARSAT
 Masrabaye Bertrand, ASE of PARSAT/RePER
 Ouagah Djimet, ASE of PARSAT/RePER
 Sarhane Haroun Oppi, Business Advisor for PARSAT

Mali

Daouda Diallo, Former Coordinator of ASAP
 Draman Sidibé, Coordinator for INCLUSIF
 Ismail Dandara, Supervisor of M&E for INCLUSIF
 Issa Guindo, General Coordinator of INCLUSIF
 Lamine Diassana, Coordinator of FIER
 Mamadou Tamboura, Finance specialist of INCLUSIF
 Mamadou Traoré, Knowledge Management and Communication Expert of PMR
 Moussa Camara, Former Coordinator of PAPAM

Mauritania

Abdallahi Salem, Veterinarian and Head of the PRODEFI branch in Kaédi
 Abdelkader Ould Mohamed Saleck, Coordinator of PRODEFI
 Abdelkader Saleck, Coordinator for PRODEFI
 Abdelwehab Ould Sidine, Local Development Officer
 Ahmed ould Amar, Coordinator for PROGRES
 Ahmed Ould Amar, Coordinator of PROGRES and Former Coordinator PASK 2
 Ahmedou Ould Tlamid, PEPDO Coordinator in Tijigja and Former PDDO Collaborator
 Bamanthia Tandia, Head of the Prodefi Assaba and Hodhs branch
 Dah Ould Arouata, M&E officer and Representative of the PRODEFI regional office
 Ella Ould Abdeljelil, President of an AGPO in Tidjikja (Tagant)
 Mariam Diarra, Acting Regional Agricultural Delegate for Assaba
 Mister Gandega, Mayor of Diadjbeni in the Gorgol
 Mohamed Mbeirick, President of the management committee of the Boudami pastoral area
 Mohamed Ould Abdallahi, Technical Advisor and Former Coordinator of ProIPRAF
 Mohamed Ould Teyah, Regional Councillor in Tagant and Former Mayor of Tichitt (Tagant)
 Mohamed Yahya Ould Moussa, Agricultural engineer for FADES and pepdo
 Mohamedou Ould Mohamed Laghdaf, Coordinator of PEPDO and Former Coordinator of PDDO
 Mouhamed Ould Oumar, Secretary General of the UGAGPO of Assaba
 Oumar Niasse, Coordinator of the Ecodev NGO in Kaédi (Gorgol)
 Sidi Mohamed Ely Tayeb, Agricultural engineer, PRODEFI technical assistant and market garden sector Expert

Niger

Abdoulaye Soumaila, Regional Coordinator for ProDAF-MTZ-PRECIS
 Abdourahamane Mahamadou, Assistant in structural and productive planning of ProDAF
 Bodé Marou, Regional Coordinator for ProDAF-MTZ-PRECIS

Boubacar Altine, Coordinator for CENRAT and ProDAF
 Coulidiati Zara Inoussa, ALF/SNURGP PRODAF
 Harouna Traoré, Regional Coordinator of PASADEM
 Hassane Issa, Regional Coordinator for PRECIS
 Kimé Moustaphe, Coordinator for ProDAF
 Mahamadou Harouna Traoré, Regional Coordinator for ProDAF-MTZ-PRECIS
 Marou Bodo, Coordinator of PRODAF
 Mohamed Assadeck, Coordinator of PUSADER
 Sidikou, M&E of PRODAF
 Soumaila Abdoulaye, Regional Coordinator of ProDAF

Nigeria

Abdulhamid Musa Assistant Agricultural Productivity Officer
 Abubakar Garba, State M&E Officer
 Ahmed Rufai, Local Government Support Officer
 Aminu Ahmed, Institutional Development Officer
 Ayuba Yusuf CDA representative
 Bala M., State Programme Officer
 Binta Sulaiman, Gender Agent
 Bright Wategire, Director of FMARD's Projects Coordinating Unit
 Dikko Sirajaddeen, State Agricultural Development Officer
 Mathew Ahmed, State Coordinator
 Emeka Nwachuku, National Rural Infrastructure Engineer
 Emmanuel Bonde Sustainable Agricultural Development Officer
 Faruk Garba Illo, Climate Change officer
 Garba Bala, National Programme Coordinator
 Garba Salihu, State Community Infrastructure Officer
 Hassan Ado, Local Government Support Officer
 Hassatu Saidu, Gender and Youth Agent
 Ibrahim M. Kanko Commodity Alliances Forum Representative
 Ibrahim Musa, Climate Change Agent
 Ibrahim Yusuf El-Ladan, M&E Coordinator
 Isiah Gana, State M&E Officer
 Lubabatu A-Halim (State Gender & Youth Officer)
 Modu Aji Shugaba, Agricultural Development Coordinator
 Muhammad Shafii CDA Representative.
 Musa Hassan, State Programme Officer
 Nasiru Abubakar Agriculture and Climate Change Agent
 Nasiru Ibrahim, State Financial Service Assistant
 Nasiru Usman, State M&E Officer
 Nura Danbaba, State M&E Officer
 Nuraddeen Lawal, Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator
 Othman Yahaya, National Programme Coordinator
 Sale Abbas, State Financial Service officer
 Seriki Musa, Rural Finance Officer
 Thomas Yisa, Knowledge and Communication Manager
 Umar Abubakar, State Programme Officer
 Unamma Chyka Agricultural Productivity Advisor
 Yahaya Buba, State Agricultural Development Officer
 Yakubu Labaran, Financial Service Assistant
 Zakari Nasiru, Local Government Support Officer

International and donor institutions

IFAD

Adriane Del Torto, Mauritania Country Programme Officer
 Amath Pathe Sane, Regional Climate and Environment Specialist
 Ann Turinayo, Burkina Faso Country Director

Antonio Rota, Lead Global Technical Specialist, Livestock
 Benoit Thierry, Head of Dakar Hub
 Dimitra Stamatopoulos, Policy and Results Specialist
 Dina Saleh, Near East, North Africa and Europe Regional Director
 Donal Brown, Associate Vice-President
 Fanny Grandval, Senior Regional Technical Specialist, Rural Institutions
 Gabriel Neyra, Programme analyst
 Gianluca Capaldo, Mauritania Country Director
 Hermann Sèlidji Tossou, Program analyst WCA
 Ibrahima Tonton Cisse, Programme analyst
 Koularambaye Koundja Julien, Focal point of IFAD in Chad
 Lawan Cherif, Niger Country Programme Officer
 Ludovic Conditamde, Burkina Faso Country Programme Officer
 Manda Sissoko, Mali Country Programme Officer
 Marcelin Norvilus, Chad Country Programme Officer
 Mariatu Kamara, Nigeria Country Programme Officer
 Mohamed Abdelgadir, Country Director for Iraq, Oman and Yemen
 Nadia Cappiello, Programme Liaison Associate
 Nadine Gbossa, former West and Central Africa Director
 Nigel, Brett, OPR Director
 Norman Messer, Chad & Mali Country Director
 Omar Njie, Egypt Country Director
 Pascal Kabore, Mali Former Country Director
 Patrick Habamenshi, Nigeria Acting Country Director
 Sana Jatta, ad interim West and Central Africa Director
 Sara Aya Kouakou, Senior Portfolio Advisor NEN Division
 Tarek Ahmed, Portfolio advisor
 Thomas Eriksonn, former OPR Director
 Xiaozhe Zhang, Policy and Results Specialist
 Yacouba Koné, Focal point of IFAD in Mali
 Yumi Sakata, Junior Programme Officer

FAO

Abakar Abdelkader, Technical assistant to Resilience Programme
 Mahamat Sorto, Chad Country Director
 Mansour Ndiaye, Mali Country representative

WFP

Alhassan Cisse, Nigeria Policy Officer
 Amos Chinyama, Nigeria M&E Specialist
 Caroline Schaefer, Mali Representative and Country Director
 Claude Jibidar, Chad Representative and Country Director
 Damien Vaquier, Mauritania Programme Officer
 Eric Perdison, Chad Deputy Country Director
 Kinday Samba, Mauritania Country Director
 Raoul Balletto, Chad Deputy Country Director
 Salisu Mohammed, Nigeria M&E Specialist

Non-governmental organizations and associations

RBM Réseau Billital Marrobé
 Blama Jallo, Coordinator

Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse (CILSS)
 Brahima Cissé, Expert in intra-regional trade in agroforestry and fisheries products

Burkina Faso

Clémentine Dabire, President of the YIYE Association
 Aminata Sow, YIYE Association representative in Tougan

Chad

Djibrine Ramadane, Supervisor for FBCG NGO in Guera
 Ramadan Madani, Director General of the Chadian Association for the Development of Agricultural Technologies in Dababa

Mali

Ibrahim Boré, Coordinator of AMAPROS
 Madani Ballo, Branch Chief in Kolondièba of the NGO ADAAC
 Mamadou Konaté, Team Chief of the NGO ADAAC

Nigeria

James Nanfa, NGO-DEC Representative
 Kabir M. Ali, Financial Service Association Representative
 Sarah Job, from Development Exchange Center
 Usman S. Umar, Financial Service Association Representative

Private sector

Chad

Ibrahim Seid Djimet, Executive Director of the Union des caisses d'épargnes et de crédit du Guéra (UCEC-G)

Mali

Oumar Diarra, President of REFOR
 Massaoly Traoré, Coordinator of REFOR

Mauritania

Ahmedou Ould Hmeity, 4P Investor and President of Société Moringa & Cultures Fourragères
 Oumar Niasse, Provider of technical operators for PRODEFI in the field of market gardening

Niger

Tijani Mahamane Sani, Partners Trade Directorate
 Amadou Bakoye, Partners Trade Directorate
 Ibrahim Abdoulaye Mohamed, Partners MECAT BAGRI MI

Nigeria

Ado Nasiru, Private Service Provider
 Dauda Gambo, Private Service Provider
 I. Bobby, Financial Services Provider
 Iyare Israel, Financial Services Provider
 Jibril Ahmed, Marketer
 Sule Ayuba, Private Service Provider

Research and training institutions

International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF)
 Gaiwa Daakreo, Research Assistant in Guera

Beneficiaries

Burkina Faso

Abdine Koeta, Member of « Association des jeunes leaders entrepreneurs » of Kossi
 Nouna
 Abdoul Nourou Ouedraogo Lamine, Youth group
 Abdoulaye Diallo, Youth group
 Alassane Ganame, Youth group
 Alidou Tiembre, Youth group
 Alimata Traore, Benkadi Nouna group
 Amadou Ouaba, Poultry farmer
 Ami Belem, Women group

Amnatou Kindo, Women group
 Bakari Boro, Member of « Association des jeunes leaders entrepreneurs » of Kossi
 Nouna Mamadou Sissoko, Member of « Association des jeunes leaders entrepreneurs
 » of Kossi Nouna
 Bintou Karambiri, President of « Société Coopérative Kadi Jeunesse »
 Boukaré Zabre, AGRODIA
 Boukary Bamogo, AVAD President
 Boukary Sana, Youth group
 Drissa Traore, Member of « Association des jeunes leaders entrepreneurs » of Kossi
 Nouna
 Kadiatou Drabo, President of « Société Coopérative Kadi Jeunesse »
 Ouandegma Tankoano, President of Union Bwayala
 Pakoundi Simboro, Member of « Association des jeunes leaders entrepreneurs » of
 Kossi Nouna
 Rasmata Basbila Kone, Member of Union Bwayala
 Salmata Ganame, Women group

Chad

Abakar Adoum, Secretary General of CEP agriculture
 Abakar Mahamat, Secretary General of COGEA
 Abdelaziz Bechir, Auditor of COGEM
 Abdelkerim Mosso, Mobile cashier at the Caisse Urbaine
 Abdoulaye Baine, Director General of Moustagbal NGO
 Abdoulaye Mahamat, Auditor of the cereal bank
 Ache Aboulaye Hassan, Learner
 Ache Mahamat Abdramane, « Maman lumière »
 Achta Ahmat, Auxiliary
 Adoum Bebe, Instructor
 Adoum Mahamat, Secretary General of the cereal bank
 Ahmat Borkou, COGEM Advisor
 Ambineye Moussa, Member of the Banque de soudure
 Arisala Ourdi, President of the Union of Women's Groups
 Assi Moussa, President of the Rural Caisse
 Bani Garboyo, COGEA Advisor
 Bani Kodo, Member of COGEA
 Baye Idriss, President of the cereal bank
 Beindjere Gamane, Nursery gardener
 Brahim Kadre Kaïdallah, Member of the seed group Al Nadja Wadjat
 Daoud Boïkina Tinga, Mobile cashier at the Caisse Urbaine
 Djamila Adoum, Auxiliary
 Djaya Baye, Member of the Environment Club
 Djibrine Adjalou, President of Groups Union
 Djibrine Mahamat Adoum, Member of the seed group Al Nadja Wadjat
 Fanne Modou, Member of Transformation Cooperative
 Fatime Abakar, Member of the Banque de soudure
 Fatime Adoum, Member of the Amkachayé cooperative
 Fatime Djimet, President of CEP élevage
 Fatime Mahamat Hassan, Member of CEP élevage
 Fatime Zara, Member of the Oil Cooperative
 Gabi Banatine, Secretary General of the Momdomo Market Gardening Association
 Gabreke Tassi, President of the Momdomo Market Gardening Association
 Gasi Tchere, Member of COGEA
 Godi Rass, Nursery gardener
 Goni Mahamat, Secretary General of the seed group Al Nadja Wadjat
 Goudja Adoum, Member of COGEA
 Goudja Garboubou, CEP Agriculture Advisor
 Hadje Hawa Mahamat, Nutritional Facilitator

Halime Alhad, President of the Oil Cooperative
 Halime Mahamat, Member of the Oil Cooperative
 Hamat Saleh, Member of CEP agriculture
 Hamit Mahamat, Vice-president at the NGO Amtine
 Hassan Adaoum, Instructor at the Literacy Centre
 Hassan Djibrine, Member of the Environment Club
 Hassan Djidrine Adoum, President of the seed group Al Nadja Wadjat
 Hassan Mahamat, Secretary General of COGEM
 Hassan Tosdom, Member of the Momdomo Market Gardening Association
 Hassane Awada, Member of the NGO Amtine
 Hassane Mahamat Abakar, Supervisor at the NGO Amtine
 Hawa Abakar Abdramane, Member du CEP élevage
 Hawa Ahmat, Learner at the Literacy Centre
 Hawa Haroun, President of the Amkachayé cooperative
 Hawa Issa, Member of the Amkachayé cooperative
 Ibrahim Adoum, Storekeeper of the cereal bank
 Issa Tamour, Agriculture technician of Moustagbal NGO
 Kaltouma Adoum, Member of the Amkachayé cooperative
 Kevin Moity, Technical assistant of Moustagbal NGO
 Khadidja Abdramane, Learner
 Khamis Adef, Secretary General at the NGO Amtine
 Kherallah Soumaine, Educational supervisor at FAPLN
 Koubra Abdraman, Learner at the Literacy Centre
 Mabrouka Youssouf, Auditor at Transformation Cooperative
 Mahamat Harouin, Deputy Secretary General of COGEM
 Mahamat Oumar, Instructor at the Literacy Centre
 Mahamat Tchere, Member CEP Agriculture
 Mahamt Idriss, Member of the Momdomo Market Gardening Association
 Maïtara Djimet, Member of the Rural Caisse
 Mankaga Daboubou, Officer for materials of CEP Agriculture
 Manserke Gamane
 Mariam Ibrahim DOUNGOU, « Maman lumière »
 Mariam Mahamat, Deputy Secretary General of Transformation Cooperative
 Michel Kerim, Administrator at FAPLN
 Moumine Alkhali, IPAENF of the Education Delegation
 Nafissa Youssouf, Sales Manager at Transformation Cooperative
 Oumar Dieudonne, President of the Banque de soudure
 Ousmane Saleh, Nursery gardener
 Sadia Abdallah Choroma, Nutritional Facilitator
 Saleh Ali, Member of the Momdomo Market Gardening Association
 Seid Manecga, Member of CEP agriculture
 Tassi Kondgargue, Secretary General of COGEA
 Tchere Gaba, President of COGEA
 Tollo Offi, Member of CEP Agriculture
 Yaya Djegougta, Member of the Momdomo Market Gardening Association
 Yobo Hassan Abakar, Member du CEP élevage
 Yoboide Totro, President of CEP agriculture
 Zarga Abakar Hissein, « Maman lumière »
 Zenaba Djaba, Member of FAPLN

Mali

Adairatou Koné, Treasurer of the youth association Kotognogotala
 Adiaratou Sinayogo, President of the youth association Kotognogotala
 Afoussatou Coulibaly, Administrative secretary of women association Benkadi
 Aguechatou Maïga, President of the association of women market gardeners
 Aïchatou Koné, President of the youth association Kènèyatou
 Ali Bagayogo, Supervisor of REFOR

Alima Koné, Treasurer of the human powered pump management committee
 Amidou Coulibaly, President of youth association Benkadi
 Aminata Bakayoko, Treasurer of the communal union of cooperative societies of the cereal sector
 Aminata Dicko, Member of the association Fafadoboyé
 Aminata Traoré, Member of women association Moussala
 Arouna Karabenta, Member of the youth association Kaboundé
 Assetou Haïdara, Member of women association Moussala
 Awa Cissé, Member of women association Moussala
 Awa Tamboura, Member of the association Fafadoboyé
 Babani Koné, External relations Officer of the youth association Kènèyaton
 Bakaye Coulibaly, Président of the communal union of cooperative societies of the cereal sector
 Baye Konta, Organisation secretary of the youth association Nyèta
 Bekaye Coulibaly, Administrative secretary of the communal union of cooperative societies of the cereal sector
 Bintou Dicko, Member of women association
 Bintou Koné, Treasurer of women association Yiriwa
 Bintou Togola, Treasurer of women association Kalandé
 Bouacar Niènta, Member of the youth association Nyèta
 Broulaye Koné, Beneficiary of FIER
 Chata Koné, Vice-president of Flammation Benkady Cooperative
 Cheick Oumar Coulibaly, Supervisor of REFOR
 Daouda Koné, Beneficiary of FIER
 Daouda Mariko, Committee member of the management committee of the bridge in the commune of Zantiebougou
 Fanta Sangaré, Information secretary of the management committee of a market garden in Ouré
 Fatoumata Doumbia, Administrative secretary of women association Yiriwa
 Fatoumata Maïga, Member of the association Fafadoboyé
 Fatoumata Sangaré, Member of women association
 Fatoumata Traoré, Member of the youth association
 Issa Traoré, External relations Secretary of the youth association
 Kadia Coulibaly, President of women association Benkadi
 Kadiatou Doumbia, President of the management committee of a market garden in Ouré
 Kandia Kamissoko, Information secretary of the youth association Landaya
 Kandia Sinayoko, Administrative secretary of women association Moussala
 Karia Doumbia, Administrative secretary of the youth association
 Kariata Fofana, Administrative secretary of the youth association Landaya
 Konza Koné, Administrative secretary Flammation Benkady Cooperative
 Madou Mariko, Village chief and committee member of the management committee of the bridge in the commune of Zantiebougou
 Mady Bagayogo, Coordinator of Action Mopti
 Maïmouna Coulibaly, Administrative secretary of women association Kotoyogotala
 Mamadou Mariko, FIER beneficiary
 Mamane Maïga, Administrative secretary of the youth association Nyèta
 Mariam Guindo, Member of women association
 Mariam Mariko, Beneficiary of FIER
 Mariam Sidibé, Beneficiary of FIER
 Mariam Traoré, Assistant treasurer of women association Kalandé
 Mariétou Fané, Information and Organisation Secretary of Flammation Benkady Cooperative
 Massaran Konaté, Information secretary of women association Moussala
 Mineta Doumbia, Beneficiary of FIER
 Morou Salamanta, Member of the youth association Kaboundé
 Moussa Sylla, Member of the youth association Landaya

Nakamissa Coulibaly, President of the youth association Landaya
 Nouhoum Koné, External relations Officer of the youth association Kotognogotala
 Salamanta Issa, President of the youth association Kaboundé
 Salif Tangara, External relations secretary of the youth association Landaya
 Saran Maguassouba, Member of the youth association Landaya
 Sata Coulibaly, President of women association Yiriwa
 Sata Koné, Information secretary of women association Yiriwa
 Satan Traoré, Member of supervisory committee of women association Kotoyogotala
 Selin Traoré, President of women association Kalandé
 Siré Koné, Member of women association
 Sitan Coulibaly, Cashier of the women association Kotoyogotala
 Souleymane Coulibaly, Administrative secretary of the youth association Benkadi
 Soyi Keita, Beneficiary of FIER
 Tiefolo Tamboura, President of women association
 Zoumana Mariko, Committee member of the management committee of the bridge
 in the commune of Zantiebougou

Mauritania

Abdollahi Ould Mohamed Ould Yergene, President of the Koub ehl Jaavar gas deposit
 cooperative
 Abderrahmane alassane Ly, LY Family Cooperative
 Amadou Sow, Diawbe Dindi Cooperative
 Beyye Ould Sidi, President of the youth association "Espoir Gueveire"
 Cheikh Ould Sidi, President of the Gueveire AGLC
 Fatimetou Mint Mohameden, El Kheyra Cooperative
 Khadiatou abdoulaye Ly, Hamadi Diom Cooperative
 Khouerate mint barkke, Butchery Helle
 Mariem Mint Messoud, Al Wehde Cooperative in Thiouth
 Mohamed Ould Abderrahman, Chairman of the Lekleybiya Dam AGLC
 Mohamed Ould nagi Ould Sidahmed, Veterinary Assistant
 Rakya Alassane Thiam, Santianary Cooperative
 Sidi Ould Mewlout, President of the Association of Milk and Meat Producers (APLV)
 Yahyalne Ould, President of the General Union of AGPO of Tagant

Niger

Abdoukadro Saidu, Organization CRA Diffa
 Abdoumoumouni Moussa, Group ACAP
 Abdourahmane Goumar, Group COGES TA Toubout
 Abouzeidi, Group COGES TA Toubout
 Adam Mamadi, Women group in N'Gourty
 Ahmad Goumar, Group COGES TA Toubout
 Ahmat Albakari, Group AUE TA Sabara
 Ali Neino, UNION GACAP MI
 Almahadi Ahmad, Group AUE TA Sabara
 Aminatou Moussa, Women group
 Atchilé Ounfana, Women group
 Bouda Boubé, Group AUE TA Sabara
 Dan Ladi Arzika, Group AUE TA Sabara
 Daouda Oumarou Habibou, Coordinator of ONG-VEDDN
 Dawi Allassane, Group COGES TA Toubout
 Diya Amansar, Women group
 Djibo Issoufou, UNION GACAP MI
 Djoute Abela, Women group in N'Gourty
 Elh Idi Abdoulaye, Group GIE TA Badaguichiri
 Elh Moumouni Mahamadou, Group GIE TA Badaguichiri

Falmata Barkaye, Women group in N’Gourty
Fatchima Irzakko, Women group
Gousmane Souhounoune, Group AUE TA Sabara
Habsou Hassane, Women group
Hachimou Djibo, Group AUE TA Sabara
Hadijatou Chafiou, Women group
Hadin Gwiwa, Economic interest group
Hadiza Issa, Women group
Hadjia Souley, Group COGES TA Toubout
Hadjara Yahaya, Women group
Haladou Oumarou, Group ACAP
Halima Adam, Women group in N’Gourty
Halima Ibrahim, Women group
Halima Mohamed, Women group
Hamissou ELH Issoufou, Group GIE MI Guidan Roumdji
Harouna Aboubacar, Group COGES TA Toubout
Harouna Alhadji, Group AUE TA Sabara
Harouna Chipkaou, Organization MI AUE MADAROUFA
Hassane Issa, Women group in N’Gourty
Hassane Ousmane, Organization UNION SEMENCIERS
Hassia Yacouba, Women group
Ibrahim Habibou, Group COGES RNA MI EL kolta
Idrissa Mahamadou, Group COGES TA Toubout
Ismaguel ALio, Group AUE TA Sabara
Issa Adam, Resource person groups DA N’Gourty
Issoufou Oumarou, Mi Safo Cooperative
Karima Mamane, Women group
Lamine Boukar, Organization CRA Diffa
Mahamadal Mansour, Supervisor CES/DRS ONG/VEDDN
Mainassara Balla, Group GIE MI Guidan Roumdji
Mairi Adamou, Women group
Malla Gaddo, Women group
Mamane Amadou, Organization UNION SEMENCIERS
Mamane Gadi Mahamat, Women group in N’Gourty
Manirou Mamane, Group ACAP
Maria Soumaila, Women group
Mariama Ibrahim, Women group
Massaouda Ali, Women group
Mohamed Souleymane, Supervisor CRA/Tahoua
Moumouni Moussa, Group GIE MI Guidan Roumdji
Moussa Abdallah, Women group in N’Gourty
Moussa Dodo Abdoul Kader, Management specialist of ONG/VEDDN
Moussa Mahamane, Group COGES TA Toubout
Moussa Mahamat, Resource person groups DA N’Gourty
Moustapha Issoufou, Supervisor of GIE/TELWA
Moustapha Madadou Adji, Organization CRA Diffa
Nana Fatouma Sanoussi, Women group
Nassara Salami, Women group
Noura Oumarou, Groupe MER PI MI

Oubeida Ousmane, Women group
Oumarou Ibrahim, Group COGES RNA MI EL kolta
Ousmane Karré, Resource person groups DA N’Gourty
Ousseini ELH Yacouba, Group GIE MI Guidan Roundji
Rahida Chaibou, Women group
Rawa Samaila, Group COGES TA Toubout
Saadou Idrissa, Group GIE TA Badaguichiri
Sahiyo Yahaya, Group GIE TA Badaguichiri
Salissou Laouali, Groupe MER PI MI
Salissou Na Inna, Mi Safo Cooperative
Sallah Ibrahim, Group AUE TA Sabara
Sani Moussa, Organization MI AUE MADAROUFA
Tiemogo Aboubacar, SP/CRA
Tsahirou Mahamane, Group COGES RNA MI EL kolta
Yaché Bouda, Women group
Yahouza Idi, Group GIE MI Guidan Roundji
Zali Saidou, Women group
Zayanou Halilou, Groupe MER PI MI

Nigeria

Gamande Salisu, Women Representative
Hamza Abdullahi, Youth Representative
Inuwa Ismaila Reza, Seed Farmer
Laure Abubakar, Women Leader Representative
Mamuda Adamu, Producer Representative
Muhammad Lukman, Farmer
Muhammad Musa, Farmer
Rabi Madugu, Women Representative
Salisu Ibrahim, Youth Representative
Sanin Salihu, Youth Representative
Shehu Abdullahin, Apex Chairman

Bibliography

IFAD's documents

Strategic documents

- IFAD. 2005. *République du Niger : Exposé des options et stratégies d'intervention pour le pays*. EB 2005/85/R.17.
- ___ . 2007. *Burkina Faso : Options stratégiques pour le programme-pays*. EB 2007/91/R.9.
- ___ . 2007. *Islamic Republic of Mauritania Country Strategic Opportunities Programme*. EB 2007/91/R.11.
- ___ . 2007. *Republic of Mali Country Strategic Opportunities Programme*. EB 2007/92/R.12.
- ___ . 2009. *République du Tchad : Programme d'options stratégiques pour le pays*. EB 2009/97/R.10.
- ___ . 2010. *Federal Republic of Nigeria: Country Strategic Opportunities Programme*. EB 2010/99/R.11.
- ___ . 2010. *Options stratégiques pour le programme – pays basée sur les résultats RB-COSOP 2010-2015*. Première revue annuelle.
- ___ . 2010. *République du Mali : Options stratégiques pour le programme – pays*. Revue mi-parcours.
- ___ . 2011. *République du Mali : Options stratégiques pour le Programme – pays COSOP 2007 – 2011*. Mission de revue annuelle.
- ___ . 2012. *Burkina Faso : Revue finale du COSOP FIDA*.
- ___ . 2012. *Rapport de la seconde revue annuelle du COSOP Tchad*. Atelier du 29 Mai 2012. Ndjamenas : IFAD.
- ___ . 2012. *République du Niger : Programme d'options stratégiques pour le pays*. EB 2012/107/R.12.
- ___ . 2013. *Federal Republic of Nigeria: 2013 COSOP Mid-term review*. 3554-NG.
- ___ . 2014. *Rapport de la troisième revue annuelle du programme d'option stratégiques pour le pays (COSOP Tchad)*. Ndjamenas: IFAD.
- ___ . 2015. *Federal Republic of Nigeria: 2015 Annual Results Based COSOP Review*.
- ___ . 2016. *Federal Republic of Nigeria Country strategic opportunities programme*. EB 2016/119/R.17.
- ___ . 2016. *République du Mali Note de stratégie de pays*. 4174-ML.
- ___ . 2016. *République du Niger : Examen des résultats du COSOP*.
- ___ . 2016. *République islamique de Mauritanie Note de stratégie de pays*. Rapport no. : 4208.
- ___ . 2017. *Burkina Faso : Note de Stratégie de Pays*.
- ___ . 2017. *République du Tchad : Note de stratégie de pays*. Rapport no. : 4550-TD.
- ___ . 2018. *République islamique de Mauritanie Programme d'options stratégiques pour le pays (2018-2024)*. EB 2018/123/R.6.

___ . 2019. *Burkina Faso Country Strategic Opportunities Programme 2019 – 2024*. EB 2019/126/R.17.

___ . 2020. *Republic of Mali Country Strategic Opportunities Programme 2020-2024*. EB 2020/131(R)/R.17.

Project documents

IFAD. 2008. *Burkina Faso Rapport de conception du Programme d'appui et de promotion du secteur privé en milieu rural (PASPRU)*.

___ . 2008. *Grant summary of Smallholder poultry development*.

___ . 2008. *Mauritanie Rapport de conception du Programme de lutte contre la pauvreté rurale par l'appui aux filières (ProLPRAF)*.

___ . 2009. *Fiche de projet du Protection participative de l'environnement et réduction de la pauvreté dans les oasis de la Mauritanie*.

___ . 2009. *Grant design report of Mainstreaming EX-Ante GHG accounting into investments in agriculture and their EFAs*.

___ . 2009. *Programme document of Support to Farmers' Organizations in Africa Programme (SFOAP)*.

___ . 2009. *Tchad Rapport de conception du Projet d'hydraulique pastorale en zone sahélienne (PROHYPA)*.

___ . 2010. *Emergency paper on a proposed grant financed by the food crisis response trust fund under the global food crisis response program in the amount of US\$15.0 million to the Republic of Niger for a proposed second emergency food security support project*.

___ . 2010. *Mali Rapport de pré-évaluation du Programme de microfinance (PMR). Document de conception de projet*.

___ . 2010. *President's report on proposed grants under the global/regional grants window to CGIAR-supported international centres*.

___ . 2010. *Programme d'urgence pour l'atténuation de la crise alimentaire dans la région de Maradi. Don n°. G-I-DSF-8062-NE*.

___ . 2010. *Tchad Rapport de conception du Programme d'appui au développement rural dans le Guéra (PADER-G)*.

___ . 2010. *Tchad Rapport de conception du Programme d'amélioration des conditions d'existence dans le Guéra (PADER-G)*.

___ . 2011. *Mauritanie Rapport de conception du Projet de Lutte contre la Pauvreté dans l'Aftout Sud et le Karakoro II (PASK II)*.

___ . 2011. *Rapport d'Evaluation finale Dons du FIDA accordés pour la consolidation des caisses d'épargne et de crédit autogérées (CECA) au Nord Guera et mis en œuvre avec l'appui technique du CIDR*.

___ . 2011. *Rapport de mission du Programme de facilité alimentaire : Composante A du programme "Disponibilité et Accessibilité aux Semences de Qualité des Principales Cultures de la Région Ouest Africaine"*.

___ . 2011. *Summary Programme document of Farmers' Organizations for Africa, Caribbean and Pacific - FO4ACP*.

- ___ 2012. *Burkina Faso Rapport de conception du Projet de gestion participative des ressources naturelles et de développement rural au Nord, Centre-Nord et Est, dit Projet « Neer-Tamba »*. 3454-BF.
- ___ 2012. *Grant completion report of PAMIGA Responsible and Sustainable Growth for Rural Microfinance*.
- ___ 2012. *Large grant design report Rainwater Harvesting for Food Security; Setting an enabling institutional and policy environment for rainwater harvesting*.
- ___ 2012. *Niger Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Projet d'urgence pour l'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement rural (PUSADER)*.
- ___ 2012. *Niger Rapport de conception du Projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement dans la région de Maradi (PASADEM)*.
- ___ 2012. *Niger Rapport de conception du Projet de petite irrigation RUWANMU*.
- ___ 2012. *Nigeria Design Report of Value Chain Development Programme (VCDP)*.
- ___ 2012. *Tchad Aide-mémoire de revue à mi-parcours du Projet d'hydraulique pastorale en zone sahélienne (PROHYPA)*.
- ___ 2013. *Final report of Support to Farmers' Organizations in Africa Programme (SFOAP) Pilot phase 2009-2012 - Contribution Agreement EC-IFAD N°148-722*.
- ___ 2013. *Mali Rapport de conception du Projet de Formation professionnelle, insertion et appui l'entrepreneuriat des jeunes ruraux*.
- ___ 2013. *Nigeria Final Programme Report of Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme (CASP) in the Savannah Belt of Nigeria*.
- ___ 2013. *Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Projet de protection participative de l'environnement et réduction de la pauvreté dans les oasis de Mauritanie*.
- ___ 2014. *Accord de don de l'Introduction du warrantage dans le Walode Maghama Don n°. COFIN-IT-68-AMDE*.
- ___ 2014. *Accord de don du Projet d'appui à la production agricole et la diversification des revenus dans les zones rurales de l'Aftout à travers la promotion des systèmes photovoltaïques*.
- ___ 2014. *Grant agreement of Adapting small-scale irrigation to climate change in West and Central Africa (GRANT NO. 2000000474- FAO)*.
- ___ 2014. *Grant completion report of Parkland Trees and Livelihoods: Adapting to Climate Change in the West African Sahel ICRAF TAG 1225*.
- ___ 2014. *Mali Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Programme de Microfinance Rurale (PMR)*.
- ___ 2014. *Mauritanie Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Programme de lutte contre la Pauvreté par l'Appui aux Filières (ProLPRAF)*.
- ___ 2014. *President's report on a proposed grant under the global/regional grants window to a CGIAR-supported international centre*.
- ___ 2014. *Rapport de conception du Projet d'amélioration de la résilience des systèmes agricoles au Tchad (PARSAT)*.
- ___ 2014. *Small grant design report of Understanding changing land issues for poor rural people in sub-Saharan Africa*.

- ___ 2014. *Tchad Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Programme d'appui au développement rural dans le Guéra (PADER-G).*
- ___ 2015. *Large grant agreement of Increasing access to sustainable rural financial services in Western and Central Africa.*
- ___ 2015. *Mali Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Projet d'accroissement de la productivité agricole (PAPAM).*
- ___ 2015. *Mauritanie Rapport d'achèvement du Programme de Développement Durable des Oasis (PDDO).*
- ___ 2015. *Mauritanie Rapport d'activité du Projet Introduction du Warrantage dans Le Walo de Maghama PROWAM.*
- ___ 2015. *Niger Programme de Développement de l'Agriculture Familiale (ProDAF) dans les régions de Maradi, Tahoua et Zinder.*
- ___ 2015. *Niger Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Projet d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire et au Développement de la Région de Maradi (PASADEM).*
- ___ 2015. *Niger Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Projet de Petite Irrigation (PPI Ruwanmu).*
- ___ 2015. *President's report on a proposed grant under the global/regional grants window to the World Rural Forum for Beyond IYFF 2014: Support to National Committees for Family Farming.*
- ___ 2015. *President's report on a proposed grant under the global/regional grants windows to the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) for Capitalizing on Experiences for Greater Impact in Rural Development.*
- ___ 2015. *Project progress report of Adapting small-scale irrigation to climate change in West and Central Africa (WCA) (Grant No.: 2000000474-FAO).*
- ___ 2015. *Summary sheet of Responsible and Sustainable Growth for Rural Microfinance Programme. Grant Proposal.*
- ___ 2015. *Tchad Rapport d'achèvement du Projet d'Hydraulique Pastorale en Zone Sahélienne (PROHYPA).*
- ___ 2016. *Final report of Building Farmer's income and safety nets while securing local energy supply in West Africa / GIR 1335 MBSA.*
- ___ 2016. *Grant design report of Improving the articulation between social protection and rural development interventions in developing countries: lessons from Latin America and Africa.*
- ___ 2016. *Mali GAFSP MMI Mali Concept Note Proposal - Proposal submitted for funding under the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP).*
- ___ 2016. *Mauritanie Rapport d'achèvement du Programme de Lutte contre la Pauvreté Rurale par l'Appui aux Filières (ProLPRAF).*
- ___ 2016. *Mauritanie Rapport de conception du Projet de Développement de Filières Inclusives (PRODEFI).*
- ___ 2016. *Project progress report Adapting small-scale irrigation to climate change in West and Central Africa (WCA) (Grant No.: 2000000474-FAO).*
- ___ 2016. *Small grant agreement Strengthening the involvement of Farmers' Organisations in Public Programmes (Grant no. 2000001137).*

- ___ . 2016. *Small grant design report Financing Rural Youth from Malian Diaspora - 2000001291.*
- ___ . 2017. *1st Progress report of Beyond the International Year of Family Farming (IYFF) 2014: Support to National Committees for Family Farming (Grant Number: 2000001045).*
- ___ . 2017. *Burkina Faso Rapport d'achèvement du Programme d'appui et de promotion du secteur privé en milieu rural (PASPRU).*
- ___ . 2017. *Burkina Faso Rapport de conception du Projet d'appui à la promotion des filières agricoles (PAPFA).*
- ___ . 2017. *Don FIDA/DID – Améliorer l'accès à des services financiers ruraux durables en Afrique de l'Ouest et Centrale - Rapport de la mission de coaching des agents de crédit dans le montage des dossiers de financement des OPA appuyées par le PROPACOM-Ouest.*
- ___ . 2017. *Don FIDA/DID – Améliorer l'accès à des services financiers ruraux durables en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre - Appui au recentrage et à la restructuration de l'Union des Caisses d'Épargne et de Crédit du Guéra au Tchad. Rapport de mission.*
- ___ . 2017. *Don FIDA/DID – Améliorer l'accès à des services financiers ruraux durables en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre - Projet pilote de banque à distance du PROPACOM-Ouest.*
- ___ . 2017. *Grant status report of Capitalizing on experiences for greater impact rural development (Grant No.2000001091).*
- ___ . 2017. *Grant status report of Understanding changing land issues for poor rural people in sub-Saharan Africa (Grant No. 200000016700).*
- ___ . 2017. *Nigeria Design report of Livelihood Improvement Family Enterprises Project in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (LIFE-ND).*
- ___ . 2017. *Progress report no. 3. IFAD/DID GRANT – Increasing access to sustainable rural financial services in West and Central Africa.*
- ___ . 2017. *Small grant agreement of Project Title: Strengthening capacity for assessing the impact of tenure security measures on IFAD supported and other projects within the SDG framework.*
- ___ . 2017. *Small grant design report Pastoralists-driven data management system (GRIPS no.: 2000001308).*
- ___ . 2017. *Tchad Rapport d'achèvement du Programme d'appui au développement rural dans le Guéra.*
- ___ . 2018. *2nd Progress report of Beyond the International Year of Family Farming (IYFF) 2014: Support to National Committees for Family Farming (Grant Number: 2000001045).*
- ___ . 2018. *Burkina Faso Mid-term review of Participatory Natural Resource Management and Rural Development Project in the North, Centre-North and East Regions. 4791-BF.*
- ___ . 2018. *Grant design report of Stichting Agriterra: Management of the Technical Assistance Facility for the Agri-Business Capital Fund (ABC Fund).*
- ___ . 2018. *Grant status report of Capitalizing on experiences for greater impact rural development (Grant No.2000001091).*

- ___ 2018. *Large grant agreement of Project Title: Development of Tools to Engage Youth in Agriculture and Agribusiness (Grant Number: 2000001320).*
- ___ 2018. *Mali Rapport d'achèvement du Projet d'accroissement de la productivité agricole au Mali (PAPAM).*
- ___ 2018. *Niger Rapport d'achèvement du Projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement dans la région de Maradi (PASADEM).*
- ___ 2018. *Niger Rapport de conception du ProDAF Diffa -PDR avant QE.*
- ___ 2018. *Nigeria Mid-term review of Value Chain Development Programme.*
- ___ 2018. *Project completion report of The CGIAR Research Program on Water Land and Ecosystems: Project implemented by the Food and Agricultural Organization and the International Water Management Institute (Grant no. 200000119).*
- ___ 2018. *Project progress report of Adapting small-scale irrigation to climate change in West and Central Africa (WCA) (Grant No.: 2000000474-FAO).*
- ___ 2018. *République du Tchad Rapport de conception du Projet de Renforcement de la Productivité des Exploitations Agropastorales Familiales et Résilience (RePER).*
- ___ 2019. *Burkina Faso Project design report of Agricultural Value Chains Support Project in the Sud-Ouest, Hauts-Bassins, Cascades and Boucle du Mouhoun Regions.*
- ___ 2019. *Family Farming, Regional Markets and Cross border Trade corridors (FARM-TRAC) in the Sahel (GRIPS ID: 200000281).*
- ___ 2019. *Grant agreement of Strengthening opportunities of rural youth employment and entrepreneurship in Africa (Grant no.: 20000002054).*
- ___ 2019. *Grant completion report of Support to Farmers Organizations in Africa Programme (SFOAP) – Main Phase 2013-2018.*
- ___ 2019. *Grant design report Creating Employment Opportunities for Rural Youth in Africa: alSupport to integrated agribusiness hubs.*
- ___ 2019. *Grant design report of Leveraging South-South and Triangular Cooperation to share rural development solutions for private sector engagement.*
- ___ 2019. *Grant status report of Pastoralists-driven data management system.*
- ___ 2019. *Mali Rapport d'achèvement du Rural Microfinance Programme.*
- ___ 2019. *Mali Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Rural Youth Vocational Training, Employment and Entrepreneurship Support Project.*
- ___ 2019. *Mauritanie Rapport de conception du Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, Communal Equipment, and the Organization of Rural Producers Project.*
- ___ 2019. *Memo of Leveraging SSTC to share rural development solutions for private sector engagement.*
- ___ 2019. *Niger Rapport de conception du Program to strengthen resilience of rural communities to food and nutrition insecurity.*
- ___ 2019. *Niger Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Family Farming Development Programme in Maradi, Tahoua and Zinder Regions.*
- ___ 2019. *Niger Rapport d'achèvement du Projet de petite irrigation dans les régions de Maradi, Tahoua et Zinder (PPI Ruwanmu).*
- ___ 2019. *Project progress report of Pastoralist-driven data management system.*

- ___ 2020. *Developing tools to engage youth in agriculture and agribusiness IFAD Grant Number: 2000001320. Third Annual Work Plan and Budget.*
- ___ 2020. *Grant design report Daugherty Water for Food Global Institute (DWFI) - Promoting sustainability and resilience of smallholder ABCs in sub-Saharan Africa.*
- ___ 2020. *Grant design report of Increasing water productivity for sustainable 'nutritive sensitive' agriculture production and improved food sensitivity.*
- ___ 2020. *Grant design report of Strengthening Opportunities for Rural Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship in Africa.*
- ___ 2020. *Mauritanie Rapport d'achèvement du Poverty Reduction Project in Aftout South and Karakoro – Phase II.*
- ___ 2020. *Mauritanie Rapport d'appui à l'exécution de l'Inclusive Value Chain Development Project.*
- ___ 2020. *Nigeria Mid-term review of Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt.*
- ___ 2020. *President's report Proposed loans and grants under the Debt Sustainability Framework Countries of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Republic of Senegal Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change. EB 2020/131(R)/R.8/Add.1.*
- ___ 2020. *President's report: Proposed loans and grants under the Debt Sustainability Framework Countries of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Republic of Senegal Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change. EB 2020/131(R)/R.8/Rev.1.*
- ___ 2020. *Progress report of Youth-Tools: Developing tools to engage youth in agriculture and agribusiness (GRIPs ID: 2000001320).*
- ___ 2020. *Rapport de revue à mi-parcours du Project to Improve the Resilience of Agricultural Systems in Chad.*
- ___ 2021. *Grant agreement of Project Title: Global initiative to secure women's land rights through gender transformative approaches. IFAD. 2021. Mauritanie Rapport d'appui à l'exécution de l'Inclusive Value Chain Development Project.*
- ___ *PowerPoint Presentation of Joint Programme for the Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change (SD3C).*

IOE evaluations

IFAD/IOE. 2009. *Nigeria: Country Programme Evaluation*. Rome : IFAD.

- ___ 2010. *Burkina Faso : Projet d'appui aux micro-entreprises rurales*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2010. *Chad: KANEM Rural Development Project (PRODER-K)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2010. *Food security project in the northern Guéra Region – Phase II*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2011. *Mauritanie : Projet d'Amélioration des cultures de décrue à Maghama II*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2012. *Chad: Batha Rural Development Project (PRODER-B)*. Project Completion Report Validation.

- ___ 2013. *Burkina Faso: Community Investment Programme for Agricultural Fertility (PICOFA)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2013. *Mali : Evaluation du programme de pays*. 3011-ML. Rome: IFAD.
- ___ 2014. *Niger: Projet de Promotion de l` Initiative Locale pour le Développement à Aguiè (PPILDA)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2015. *Burkina Faso : Programme de Développement Rural Durable (PDRD)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2015. *Niger : Initiative de Réhabilitation et de Développent Agricole et Rurale- Renforcement des Capacités Institutionnelles (IRDAR-RCI)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2016. *Burkina Faso: Small-scale irrigation and water management project (PIGEPE)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2016. *Mali: Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2016. *Mali: Northern Regions Investment and Rural Development Programme*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2016. *Niger: Emergency food security and rural development programme (PUSADER)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2016. *Nigeria: Country Programme Evaluation*. Report No. 4145-NG. Rome: IFAD.
- ___ 2017. *Mauritania: Value Chains Development Programme for Poverty Reduction (ProLPRAF)*. Project Completion report Validation.
- ___ 2017. *Nigeria: Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme -Niger Delta Region (CBNRMP-ND)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2018. *Burkina Faso: Agricultural Commodity Chain Support Project (PROFIL)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2018. *Burkina Faso: Rural Business Development Services Programme (PASPRU)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2018. *Nigeria: Rural Finance Institutions-Building Programme*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2019. *Burkina Faso : Évaluation de la stratégie et du programme de pays*. 5018-BF. Rome : IFAD.
- ___ 2019. *Mali : Projet d'accroissement de la productivité agricole (PAPAM)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2019. *Niger : Projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement dans la région de Maradi*. Évaluation d'impact du projet.
- ___ 2019. *Niger : Ruwanmu Small-Scale Irrigation Project - Project de Petite Irrigation Ruwanmu (PPI Ruwanmu)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2019. *Tchad : Programme d'appui au développement rural dans le Guéra (PADER-G)*. Project Completion Report Validation.
- ___ 2019. *Tchad : Projet d'hydraulique pastorale en zone sahélienne*. Évaluation de la performance du projet. 4853-TD. Rome : IFAD.
- ___ 2020. *Mali : Projet de Micro Finance Rurale (PMR)*. Project Completion Report Validation.

- ___ . 2021. *Mauritania: Poverty Reduction Project in Aftout South and Karakoro Phase II - Projet de Lutte contre la Pauvreté dans l'Aftout Sud et le Karaboro II (PASK II). Project Completion Report Validation.*
- ___ . 2021. *Niger : Évaluation de la stratégie et du programme de pays.*

Government documents

- Cissé, A., Tchoua, P. 2012. *Programme d'appui au développement rural dans le Guéra (PADER-G) : Résultats de l'enquête de référence SYCRI.* Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Irrigation de la République du Tchad.
- Federal Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development of Nigeria. 2016. *VCDP Baseline survey report.*
- Haidara, A. C. 2012. *Programme d'appui et de promotion du secteur privé en milieu rural (PASPRU) & Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles (PROFIL) : Résultats de l'enquête sygri de référence.* Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Aménagements Hydrauliques du Burkina Faso.
- ___ . 2011. *Projet d'hydraulique pastorale en zone sahélienne – Système de gestion des résultats et de l'impact du PROHYPA : Enquête de référence.* Ministère de l'Élevage et de l'Hydraulique de la République du Tchad.
- ___ . 2011. *République du Mali : Rapport de l'enquête SYGRI de référence - Système de Gestion des résultats et de l'impact.* Ministère de l'Agriculture de la République du Mali.
- ___ . 2011. *République du Niger : projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement dans la région de Maradi (PASADEM) – Enquête SYGRI de référence.*
- ___ . 2012. *République du Niger : Projet de petite irrigation RUWANMU – Enquête de référence.* Rapport général. Ministère de l'Agriculture de la République du Niger.
- ___ . 2014. *PASK II : enquête SYGRI de référence.* Rapport général. Ministère de l'Agriculture de la République Islamique de Mauritanie.
- Mbaye, S. 2018. *Rapport de la situation de référence du Projet d'amélioration de la résilience des systèmes agricoles au Tchad.*
- Ministère de l'Agriculture de la République du Niger. 2014. *Evaluation des effets / impacts des actions du PUSADER sur la sécurité alimentaire des populations bénéficiaires dans les régions de Maradi et Tahoua.*
- Ministère de l'agriculture et des aménagements hydrauliques du Burkina Faso. 2016. *Programme d'appui et de promotion du secteur privé en milieu rural (PASPRU) : Rapport général de l'enquête sygri.* Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Aménagements Hydrauliques du Burkina Faso.
- Ministère de l'Emploi, de la Formation Professionnelle, de la Jeunesse et de la Construction Citoyenne de la République du Mali. 2015. *Rapport final : enquête multidimensionnelle d'évaluation de la pauvreté dans les zones d'intervention du projet de formation professionnelle, insertion et appui à l'entrepreneuriat des jeunes ruraux.*
- Ministère du Développement Rural de la République Islamique de Mauritanie. 2011. *Programme de lutte contre la pauvreté rurale par l'appui aux filières (ProLPRAF) : Rapport de l'enquête SYGRI.*

- ___ . 2016. *Programme de lutte contre la pauvreté rurale par l'appui aux filières (ProLPRAF) : Rapport de l'enquête SYGRI.*
- Tchoua, P. 2014. *Rapport de l'enquête du système de gestion des résultats et de l'impact du PROHYPA.* Rapport final. Ministère de l'Élevage et de l'Hydraulique de la République du Tchad.
- Vognan, G., Koanda, W. M., Haidara, A. C. 2015. *Projet Neer-Tamba : étude socio-économique de référence.* Version finale. Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Aménagements Hydrauliques du Burkina Faso.

Other documents

- ABC Microfinance. 2017. *Financement des jeunes ruraux par la diaspora malienne. Rapport d'activité année 1.*
- ___ . 2018. *Financement des jeunes ruraux par la diaspora malienne. Rapport d'activité année 2.*
- ___ . 2019. *Financement des jeunes ruraux par la diaspora malienne. Rapport d'activité année 3.*
- AfDB. 2009. *Chad Completion Report: Economic Management Support Project (PAGE).*
- ___ . 2009. *Chad Completion report: Governance Reform Support Programme (PARG).*
- ___ . 2009. *Chad Completion Report: Poverty Reduction and Action for Women Project (P-TD-IE0-001).*
- ___ . 2009. *Republic of Chad: Country Strategy Paper 2010-2014.*
- ___ . 2010. *Mauritania: Results-based Country Strategy Paper (RBCSP) 2011-2015.*
- ___ . 2010. *Multinational Pilot Research/Development Support Project on Integrated Pest Management for Subsistence Farming in The Lake Chad Basin.* Project performance Evaluation Report (PPER).
- ___ . 2011. *Central Africa: Regional integration strategy paper (RISP) 2011-2015.*
- ___ . 2011. *Chad Completion Report: Governance Reform Support Programme (PARG I) - Institutional Support Component Country.*
- ___ . 2011. *Regional integration strategy paper for West Africa 2011-2015.*
- ___ . 2012. *Burkina Faso : Document de stratégie pays 2012-2016.*
- ___ . 2012. *Evaluation of the Assistance of the African Development Bank to Fragile States.* Tunis: AfDB.
- ___ . 2013. *Federal Republic of Nigeria Country Strategy Paper 2013-2017.*
- ___ . 2013. *Niger Combined 2013-2017 Country Strategy Paper and Portfolio Review.*
- ___ . 2014. *Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa 2014 – 2019.*
- ___ . 2014. *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa and for the Transition Support Facility.*
- ___ . 2015. *Republic of Chad: Country Strategy Paper 2015-2020.*
- ___ . 2016. *From Fragility to Resilience: Managing Natural Resources in Fragile Situations in Africa.* Abidjan: AfDB.
- ___ . 2016. *Islamic Republic of Mauritania Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2016-2020.*
- ___ . 2017. *Burkina Faso: Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2017-2021.*

- ___ . 2018. *Niger Country Strategy Paper 2018-2022*.
- ___ . 2018. *Nigeria: Evaluation of the Bank's Country Strategy and Program 2004-2016*. Summary Report. Abidjan: AfDB.
- ___ . 2019. *Central Africa regional integration strategy paper 2019-2025*.
- ___ . 2019. *Completion Report of Multinational (Cameroon and Chad) Central Africa Biodiversity Conservation Programme – Protecting Central Africa's Elephants (PCBAC-SEAC)*.
- ___ . 2019. *Mali: 2015-2019 Country strategy paper mid-term review and 2018 Country portfolio performance review*.
- ___ . 2019. *Synthesis Report on the Validation of the 2017 Project Completion Reports*. Abidjan: AfDB.
- ___ . 2019. *West Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper*. Completion Report Validation Note.
- ___ . 2020. *Evaluation of the AfDB's Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa (2014-2019)*. Summary Report. Abidjan: AfDB.
- ___ . 2020. *Mali: Evaluation of the AfDB's Country Strategy and Program (2005-2019)*. Summary report. Abidjan: AfDB.
- ___ . 2020. *Mali: Evaluation of the AfDB's Country Strategy and Program (2005-2019)*. Summary Report. Abidjan: AfDB. Abidjan: AfDB.
- ___ . 2020. *Nigeria Country Strategy Paper 2020-2024*.
- ___ . 2020. *Synthesis Report on the Validation of 2018. Project Completion Reports*. Abidjan: AfDB.
- AgriCord. 2015. *Completion report of Strengthening capacities of Farmers' Organisations in relation with IFAD country programs*.
- Cavatassi, R., Mabiso, A., Abouaziza, and M. Djimeu, E. 2018. *Chad - Impact Assessment of the Cereal Banks: Intervention in the Programme d'Appui au Développement Rural dans le Guéra (PADER-G)*. Impact Assessment Report. Rome: IFAD.
- CIAT. 2020. *Project completion report of Learning Alliance for Adaptation in Smallholder Agriculture*.
- CNOP. 2017. *Manuel d'opération projet : « Insertion économique des jeunes ruraux dans les chaînes de valeur avicole et piscicole au Mali »*.
- Desjardin Développement International. 2016. *Compte rendu de la mission de diagnostic au Tchad : Amélioration de l'accès à des services financiers ruraux en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre (Don PTA1WCAIDID)*.
- DFID. 2005. *Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states*. London: DFID.
- Economic Commission for Africa. 2012. *Fragile States and Development in West Africa*.
- FAO. 2009. *Evaluation Finale Indépendante Programmes Spéciaux de Sécurité Alimentaire au Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Tchad et Soudan*.
- ___ . 2012. *Terminal report of Smallholder poultry development – Project findings and recommendations*.
- ___ . 2013. *Cadre de Programmation Pays 2013 – 2017 du Mali*.
- ___ . 2013. *Cadre de Programmation Pays 2013-2015 du Burkina Faso*.

- ___ . 2013. *Cadre de Programmation Pays CPP Niger 2013-2016.*
 - ___ . 2013. *Country Programming Framework of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2013-2017.*
 - ___ . 2013. *Représentation de la FAO au Tchad Cadre de Programmation Pays.*
 - ___ . 2015. *Evaluation of FAO's contributions in Burkina Faso 2010-2014.* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2016. *FAO response to the crisis in northeast Nigeria.* Rome : FAO.
 - ___ . 2016. *Évaluation du programme de pays de la FAO au Niger.* Rome : FAO.
 - ___ . 2016. *Évaluation du programme de pays de la FAO au Niger.* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2017. *Project progress report of Pastoralist-driven data management system.*
 - ___ . 2018. *Évaluation finale du projet « Appui à la mise en place d'un Système d'Information durable sur la sécurité alimentaire et d'alerte précoce ».* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2018. *Final Evaluation of the Project "Integrating Climate Resilience into Agricultural Production for Food Security in Rural Areas of Mali".* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2018. *Final Evaluation of the Project "Integrating Climate Resilience into Agricultural Production for Food Security in Rural Areas of Mali".* Rome : FAO.
 - ___ . 2019. *Évaluation conjointe FAO/PAM du projet « Appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables au nord du Mali ».* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2019. *Terminal report of Adapting small-scale irrigation to climate change in West Africa and Central Africa (WCA).* Rome : FAO.
 - ___ . 2020. *Évaluation finale du projet « Intensifier la résilience aux changements climatiques à travers une gestion agricole et pastorale intégrée dans la zone sahélienne dans le cadre de l'approche de gestion durable des terres au Mali ».* Rome : FAO.
 - ___ . 2020. *Évaluation finale du projet « Réduire la vulnérabilité des moyens d'existence agricoles à travers l'approche "Caisses de résilience" au Sahel ».* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2020. *Final evaluation of the project "Strengthening resilience to climate change through integrated agricultural and pastoral management in the Sahelian zone in the framework of Mali's sustainable land management approach".* Rome : FAO
 - ___ . 2020. *Mali Réponse conjointe 2020 : Soutenir les activités agricoles et pastorales des ménages touchés par la crise dans les régions de Kayes et de Mopti.*
 - ___ . 2020. *Niger Plan de réponse mai - décembre 2020 : Atténuer l'impact de la maladie à coronavirus 2019 (covid-19) sur la sécurité alimentaire.* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2020. *Terminal report of Pastoralist-driven data management system.*
 - ___ . 2021. *Country Programming Framework for Nigeria 2018–2022.* Abuja: FAO.
 - ___ . 2021. *Évaluation de la réponse de la FAO à la crise dans le bassin du lac Tchad 2015-2018.* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2021. *Evaluation of the FAO response to the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin 2015–2018.* Rome: FAO.
 - ___ . 2021. *Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan 2019–2021.*
- Funds for peace. 2011. *A new deal for engagement in fragile states.*
- ___ . 2014. *Fragile States Index 2014.* Washington, D.C.: The Funds for peace.

- ___ . 2015. *Fragile States Index 2015*. Washington, D.C.: The Funds for peace.
- ___ . 2016. *Fragile States Index 2016*. Washington, D.C.: The Funds for peace.
- ___ . 2017. *Fragile States Index 2017*. Washington, D.C.: The Funds for peace.
- ___ . 2018. *Fragile States Index 2018*. Washington, D.C.: The Funds for peace.
- ___ . 2019. *Fragile States Index 2019*. Washington, D.C.: The Funds for peace.
- GIZ. 2014. *How Does State Fragility Affect Rural Development? Evidence from Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen, Nepal, and Bolivia*. Berlin & Bonn: GIZ.
- IFPRI. 2017. *Final progress report of Technical and Capacity Strengthening Support for Country - Level Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support Systems (SAKSS) in Selected African Countries*.
- IITA. 2015. *Project report of Improving quality, nutrition and health impacts of inclusion of Cassava flour in bread formulation in West Africa (Nigeria & Ghana)*.
- ___ . 2017. *Project completion report Enhancing the competitiveness of High Quality Cassava Flour Value Chain in West and Central Africa*.
- IMF. 2018. *The IMF and Fragile States*. Evaluation report. Washington, DC.: IMF.
- Institute for Security Studies. *Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 'more fragile' countries*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. 2016. *Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World*.
- ITTA. 2015. *Final project progress report of Youth Agribusiness Development Initiative (YADI): A Private-Public Partnership to Advance Participation of the Youth in Agriculture*.
- IUCN. 2015. *Grant completion report of Project: Enabling land management, resilient pastoral livelihoods and poverty reduction in Africa*.
- Ncube, M., Jones, B. 2013. "Drivers and Dynamics of Fragility in Africa". African Economic Brief, Volume 4, Issue 5, 2013.
- OECD. 2007. *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations*.
- ___ . 2008. *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: from Fragility to Resilience*. Journal on Development 2008 Volume 9, No. 3.
- ___ . 2010. *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities and Challenges: A synthesis of findings from seven multi-stakeholder consultations*.
- ___ . 2012. *Fragile States 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world*.
- ___ . 2015. *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions*. Paris: OECD.
- ___ . 2020. *States of Fragility 2020*. Paris: OECD.
- PROCASUR Corporation. 2017. *Developing tools to engage youth in agriculture and agribusiness - Grant Proposal (2000001320)*.
- UNDP. 2011. *Descriptif de programme de pays pour la Mauritanie (2012-2016)*. DP/DCP/MRT/2.
- ___ . 2013. *Descriptif de programme de pays pour le Nigéria*. DP/DCP/NGA/2.
- ___ . 2013. *Descriptif de programme pour le Niger (2014-2018)*. DP/DCP/NER/2.

- ___ 2013. *Niger : Évaluation des résultats des activités de développement*. New York : UNDP.
- ___ 2016. *Descriptif de programme de pays pour le Tchad (2017-2021)*. DP/DCP/TCD/3.
- ___ 2016. *Mauritanie : Évaluation des résultats des activités de développement*. New York : UNDP.
- ___ 2017. *Descriptif de programme de pays pour la Mauritanie (2018-2022)*. DP/DCP/MRT/3.
- ___ 2017. *Descriptif de programme de pays pour le Burkina Faso (2018-2022)*. DP/DCP/BFA/3.
- ___ 2017. *Mali Rapport final de l'Évaluation à mi-parcours du programme pays cycle 2015-2019*. Bamako : UNDP.
- ___ 2017. *Mali Rapport final de l'évaluation du projet : « Renforcer la capacité d'adaptation et la résilience des communes de Sandare, Massantola, Cinzana et M'Pessoba face aux changements climatiques dans le secteur agricole au Mali »*.
- ___ 2017. *Projet de descriptif de programme de pays pour le Nigéria (2018-2022)*. DP/DCP/NGA/3.
- ___ 2017. *Rapport final de l'Évaluation des effets « Développement Durable » du CPAP PNUD/TCHAD 2012-2016*.
- ___ 2017. *Tchad Rapport final de l'Évaluation du Programme Pays du PNUD (CPD/CPAP 2012 – 2015)*.
- ___ 2018. *Burkina Faso Rapport provisoire de l'Évaluation finale du Sous-programme Centre-Ouest du Programme National de Partenariat pour la Gestion Durable des Terres (CPP-CO)*.
- ___ 2018. *Descriptif de programme de pays pour le Niger (2019-2021)*. DP/DCP/NER/3.
- ___ 2018. *Tchad Rapport final de l'Évaluation finale du Projet « Sécurité humaine : 'Établir la cohésion sociale entre les personnes déplacées et leurs Communautés d'accueil dans la région de Sila - Autoriser et Reconstruire les Communautés avec des Initiatives Multisectorielles dans le post-Conflit Tchad pour un changement Durable' »*.
- ___ 2019. *Descriptif de programme de pays pour le Mali (2020-2024)*. DP/DCP/MLI/4.
- ___ 2019. *Évaluation Indépendante de Programme de Pays : Burkina Faso*.
- ___ 2020. *Independent Country Programme Evaluation: Mali*. New York: UNDP.
- ___ 2020. *Mali Rapport final de l'Évaluation finale du projet financé par le LDCF « Renforcement de la résilience des groupements de femmes productrices et des communautés vulnérables aux changements climatiques au Mali » ou « Projet Mali-Femmes »*. Régions de Koulikoro, Kayes et Sikasso.
- ___ 2020. *Mali Rapport final de l'Évaluation à mi-parcours du projet « Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale d'adaptation aux changements climatiques (ASNACC) »*.
- ___ 2020. *Mali Rapport final de l'Évaluation finale du Programme d'Appui aux Changements Climatiques dans les Communes les plus Vulnérables des Régions de Mopti et de Tombouctou (PACV-MT)*.
- ___ 2020. *Mali Rapport final de l'Évaluation finale du projet « Appui à l'Amélioration de la Productivité Agricole, Animale, Piscicole pour la réduction de la vulnérabilité aux*

changements climatiques des Petites Exploitations Agricoles familiales dans le Cercle de Kita – Bamako, Mali ».

- ___ 2020. *Mali Rapport provisoire de l'Évaluation finale du Projet d'appui à la sécurité humaine au Nord du Mali à travers le renforcement de la résilience des jeunes et des femmes.*
- ___ 2020. *Mali Terminal evaluation of the project "Generating global benefits for the environment through improved environmental information, planning and decision-making systems (PGAGE)".*
- United Nations. 2015. *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.* Geneva: United Nations.
- Uzoehina, O. 2018. *"State Fragility" and the Challenges of Development in West Africa: Moving from Reaction to Prevention*". African Leadership Centre Research Report No. 3.
- Warner strategy and fundraising. 2015. *How to mould rivers into moulded rivers? External Evaluation of the Rain4Food Program.*
- WFP. 2010. *Food Systems in Fragile Settings: Identifying gaps and opportunities to support access to improved diets.* Rome: WFP.
- ___ 2011. *Budget increases to development activities – Mali Country Programme 105830 (2008 – 2012).* WFP/EB.A/2011/10-A.
- ___ 2011. *Country Programme Burkina Faso 200163 (2011-2015).* WFP/EB.1/2011/8/1.
- ___ 2011. *Country Programme Mauritania 200251 (2012 – 2016).* WFP/EB.2/2011/8/7.
- ___ 2014. *Rapport Evaluations d'opérations Programme de pays 200163 « Burkina Faso 2011 – 2015 ».*
- ___ 2016. *Mauritanie Rapport d'Évaluation du portefeuille du PAM (2011-2015).*
- ___ 2016. *Rapport d'Évaluations d'opérations Tchad. Interventions prolongées de secours et de redressement (IPSR) 200713, Renforcer la résilience, protéger les moyens d'existence et réduire la malnutrition parmi les réfugiés, les rapatriés et les autres personnes vulnérables : Une évaluation à mi-parcours d'opération du PAM (janvier 2015 – mars 2016).*
- ___ 2017. *Operation Evaluation of West and Central Africa Region. Regional Synthesis 2013-2017.* OEV/2017/009.
- ___ 2018. *Burkina Faso country strategic plan (2019–2023).* WFP/EB.2/2018/8-A/1.
- ___ 2018. *Chad country strategic plan (2019–2023).* WFP/EB.2/2018/8-A/2.
- ___ 2018. *Impact evaluation synthesis of Four Evaluations of the Impact of WFP Programmes on Nutrition in Humanitarian Contexts in the Sahel.*
- ___ 2018. *Mali Rapport d'Évaluation du portefeuille du PAM (2013-2017).*
- ___ 2018. *Mauritania country strategic plan (2019–2022).* WFP/EB.2/2018/8-A/6.
- ___ 2019. *Evaluation du projet "IRF 217 peers for peace building social cohesion in Mopti and Segou regions".*
- ___ 2019. *Evaluation report of WFP's Corporate Emergency Response in Northeast Nigeria (2016–2018) Corporate emergency response evaluation.*
- ___ 2019. *Mali country strategic plan (2020–2024).* WFP/EB.2/2019/7-A/5/Rev.1.
- ___ 2019. *Niger country strategic plan (2020–2024).* WFP/EB.2/2019/7-A/6.

- ___ . 2019. *Nigeria country strategic plan (2019–2022)*. WFP/EB.1/2019/8-A/8.
- ___ . 2021. *Evaluation décentralisée de la Contribution du Programme Alimentaire Mondial au Système de Protection Sociale Adaptative (SPSA) en Mauritanie depuis 2018*.
- Word Bank. 2019. *Special Theme: Fragility, conflict & violence*.
- ___ . 2010. *Rapport de conception du Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project (PAPAM)*.
- ___ . 2011. *Conflict, Security, and Development. World Development Report*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- ___ . 2013. *IDA’s Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States*.
- ___ . 2013. *Mauritania: Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report Review (CASCR)*.
- ___ . 2013. *Niger: Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report Review (CASCR)*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- ___ . 2014. *Nigeria: Second National FADAMA Development Project IDA-38380*.
- ___ . 2015. *Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Chad for the period FY16-20*. 95277-TD.
- ___ . 2015. *Country Partnership Framework for the republic of Mali for the period FY19-19*. 94005-ML.
- ___ . 2015. *Mali: Completion and Learning Review (CLR)*.
- ___ . 2015. *The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- ___ . 2016. *World Bank Group Engagement in Situations of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- ___ . 2017. *Mali: Rural Community Development Project*. Washington DC: World bank.
- ___ . 2017. *Report from the Executive Directors of the International Development Association to the Board of Governors*.
- ___ . 2018. *Burkina Faso: Completion and Learning Review (CLR)*.
- ___ . 2018. *Country Partnership Framework for Burkina Faso for the Period FY18-FY23*. 123712 – BF.
- ___ . 2018. *Country Partnership Framework for the Islamic republic of Mauritania for the period FY18-FY23*. 125012-MR.
- ___ . 2018. *Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Niger for the period of FY18-FY22*. 123736-NE.
- ___ . 2018. *IDA18 Mid-Term Review Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV)*.
- ___ . 2018. *Mali: Project to Support Grassroots Initiatives to Fight Hunger and Poverty*. Washington DC: World bank.
- ___ . 2018. *Mauritania: Completion and Learning Review (CLR)*.
- ___ . 2018. *Niger: Completion and Learning Review (CLR)*.
- ___ . 2018. *Nigeria: Country Partnership Strategy Completion Report Review (CPSCR)*.
- ___ . 2019. *The role of the World Bank in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Lessons for IDA19 and the FCV Strategy*.
- ___ . 2020. *Approach paper of Chad Country Program Evaluation*.

- ___ . 2020. *Federal Republic of Nigeria. Country Partnership Framework for The Federal Republic of Nigeria for the period FY21-FY25.* 153873-NG.
- ___ . 2020. *FY20 List of Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations.*
- ___ . 2020. *Historical Overview: The World Bank Group's Classification of Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations.*
- ___ . 2020. *Niger: Community action program (CAP-1) and Community-based integrated ecosystem management project (IDA-H3460, IDA-H0250, TF-52053) and Community action program (CAP-2) and community-based integrated ecosystem management project (APL PHASE II) (IDA-H4230, TF-92411).* Washington DC: World bank.
- ___ . 2020. *Nigeria: Completion and Learning Review (CLR).*
- ___ . 2020. *Summary of World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020 –2025.*
- ___ . 2020. *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020 –2025.*
- ___ . 2021. *Sustainable Land Management in the Sahel. Lesson from the Sahel and West Africa Program in Support of the Great Green Wall (SAWAP).*