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Invertir en la población rural

Informe de síntesis de evaluación sobre el fortalecimiento de las asociaciones en pro de una mayor eficacia de las actividades de desarrollo: examen de las experiencias y resultados a nivel de los países

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Para examen

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Acrónimos y siglas

Asociaciones 4P	asociaciones entre el sector público, el sector privado y los productores
BMD	bancos multilaterales de desarrollo
COSOP	programas sobre oportunidades estratégicas nacionales
EEPP	evaluaciones de las estrategias y los programas en los países
FIDA11	Undécima Reposición de los Recursos del FIDA
GPP	gerente del programa en el país
IOE	Oficina de Evaluación Independiente del FIDA
OSR	organismos con sede en Roma
PBI	países de bajos ingresos
PIM	países de ingresos medianos

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Resumen

I. Antecedentes

1. En la Política de Evaluación del FIDA se prevé que la Oficina de Evaluación Independiente (IOE) elabore cada año informes de síntesis de evaluación sobre diversos temas. Esta síntesis brinda al FIDA una oportunidad de aprendizaje sobre el tema de las asociaciones. En ella se definen y reflejan los conocimientos derivados de evaluaciones y de otros datos fiables sobre cómo se puede aumentar la eficacia de las actividades de desarrollo del FIDA mediante la creación de asociaciones, con el objeto de extraer enseñanzas pertinentes a los distintos tipos de asociación. Las conclusiones y enseñanzas extraídas del presente informe podrán usarse para entender mejor las asociaciones y la función que cumplen en el logro de resultados de desarrollo, así como para orientar la evaluación de la Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA en 2018 y la elaboración de criterios aplicables en las evaluaciones de la IOE.
2. Los objetivos específicos de esta síntesis de evaluación son:
 - a) estudiar los tipos de asociación que han permitido al FIDA cumplir su mandato de reducir la pobreza rural a nivel de los países, tomando como base datos extraídos de las evaluaciones del FIDA;
 - b) considerar las ventajas e inconvenientes que comparativamente tienen los distintos tipos de asociados a la hora de permitir al FIDA lograr sus objetivos en materia de asociaciones a nivel de los países, esto es: ampliar su radio de acción y aumentar su impacto, con recursos limitados, en la reducción de la pobreza rural;
 - c) determinar los factores que han favorecido o impedido el desarrollo (o no) de asociaciones en determinadas condiciones y cómo estas podrían mejorarse, y
 - d) extraer enseñanzas sobre la función que cumplen las oficinas del FIDA en los países a la hora de establecer asociaciones que favorecen una mayor eficacia de las actividades de desarrollo.
3. Si bien las asociaciones funcionan a nivel mundial, regional y de los países, la presente síntesis se centra en las asociaciones a nivel de los países, dado que es en este nivel donde las asociaciones tienen mayor relevancia y donde se espera que generen resultados concretos en materia de reducción de la pobreza. Los datos usados en la evaluación proceden principalmente de las evaluaciones de las estrategias y los programas en los países (EPPP), de algunos informes de síntesis de evaluación de la IOE y de evaluaciones a nivel institucional centradas sobre todo en operaciones ejecutadas y resultados obtenidos a nivel de los países.
4. El equipo encargado de la evaluación ha examinado sistemáticamente las EPPP finalizadas entre 2006 y 2016. La muestra estaba compuesta por 36 EPPP de un total de 40, 22 de ellas en países de ingresos medianos (PIM) y 14 en países de bajos ingresos (PBI). También se estudiaron minuciosamente (mediante un examen exhaustivo de la documentación de los programas, entrevistas con los gerentes de los programas en los países (GPP) y grupos de discusión formados por economistas regionales y asesores de carteras) los factores subyacentes que llevaron al éxito o al fracaso de las asociaciones.
5. La pregunta fundamental que se ha investigado en esta síntesis es la siguiente: ¿Qué tipos de relaciones, instrumentos y modalidades de asociación, y combinados de qué forma, han sido más pertinentes y eficaces para el FIDA a la hora de lograr su objetivo en materia de asociaciones, que consiste en ampliar el radio de acción y la contribución a la reducción de la pobreza rural, tal como se recoge en la Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA de 2012?

6. Gracias a que la síntesis aborda expresamente las asociaciones en su concepto más amplio, sirve también de complemento a evaluaciones previas de la IOE, como las evaluaciones a nivel institucional sobre el sector privado (2011), las donaciones (2014) y la descentralización (2016), y los informes de síntesis de evaluación de la IOE sobre cooperación Sur-Sur y cooperación triangular (2016), los pueblos indígenas (2015), la actuación normativa (2017) y la ampliación de escala (2017).

II. Principales constataciones

7. El Grupo de Alto Nivel sobre la Agenda para el Desarrollo después de 2015 (2013) hizo un llamamiento para forjar una nueva alianza mundial. El establecimiento de alianzas diversas e inclusivas es una necesidad en la que se hace mucho hincapié en la Agenda 2030, la cual contempla un objetivo de desarrollo sostenible concreto relativo a las alianzas entre múltiples partes interesadas y compromisos voluntarios (el Objetivo de Desarrollo Sostenible 17). En el Marco Estratégico del FIDA (2016-2025) se pone de relieve la importancia que tienen las asociaciones para el Fondo a fin de forjar sinergias entre sus propias fuentes y otras fuentes externas de financiación y de conocimientos generales y especializados, y de crear entornos más propicios para que las personas pobres de las zonas rurales puedan forjar sus propias vías de salida de la pobreza. Para poder realizar las actividades de transformación rural, el FIDA tendrá que trabajar con una gama más amplia de asociados y ajustar su modelo operacional mediante una mejor movilización, asignación y utilización de los recursos de diversas fuentes. En el marco de la Undécima Reposición de los Recursos del FIDA (FIDA11), el Fondo se ha comprometido a consolidar la colaboración con un abanico más amplio de asociados, en particular con el sector privado, y a poner más énfasis en las asociaciones a nivel de los países.
8. La conclusión general de esta síntesis es que el abanico de instrumentos de asociación del FIDA es limitado y no se ha mantenido a la altura de un contexto que cambia rápidamente. Además, los instrumentos de asociación existentes no se suelen usar lo suficiente ni estratégicamente para obtener resultados en materia de asociaciones, en especial a nivel de los países. Los principales instrumentos de asociación del FIDA son los préstamos y las donaciones. Por otra parte, en el momento en que se realizó el examen el FIDA no contaba con instrumentos específicos para establecer asociaciones con el sector privado¹.
9. **Las asociaciones a nivel mundial tienen mucha visibilidad y reciben una gran atención a nivel institucional.** La Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA (2012) se centra especialmente en las iniciativas orientadas a establecer asociaciones a nivel mundial. Sin embargo, según se señala en una evaluación de este tipo de asociaciones recientemente realizada por el Banco Mundial, promoverlas en toda la cartera puede dar lugar a una proliferación de asociaciones descoordinadas que no son objeto de un seguimiento sistemático ni están vinculadas a programas en los países. En evaluaciones anteriores de la IOE ya se había señalado la falta de vínculos entre las asociaciones a nivel mundial y los programas del FIDA en los países, por ejemplo, en el caso de las donaciones a nivel mundial y regional (evaluación a nivel institucional sobre la financiación mediante donaciones), de las asociaciones a nivel mundial con los pueblos indígenas (informe de síntesis de evaluación de la IOE sobre la actuación del FIDA en relación con los pueblos indígenas) y de la cooperación Sur-Sur y la cooperación triangular (informe de síntesis de evaluación de la IOE sobre la cooperación Sur-Sur y la cooperación triangular).
10. Según se desprende del examen de las EEPP realizado para esta síntesis, las constataciones son las mismas, poniendo de relieve por ejemplo la falta de vínculos entre las donaciones a nivel regional y los programas nacionales en el Ecuador,

¹ En diciembre de 2017 se aprobó un nuevo instrumento, el Fondo de Inversiones para las Pymes.

Nigeria y Tanzania. La cooperación con los otros organismos de las Naciones Unidas con sede en Roma es otra asociación a nivel mundial importante; sin embargo, las EEPP solo daban cuenta de unos pocos casos donde se habían forjado vínculos con los programas del FIDA y los resultados (p. ej. el Brasil). En la Estrategia de Asociación no se hace referencia explícita a los vínculos entre las iniciativas de asociación a nivel mundial, regional y de los países. Por este motivo es posible que los efectos derivados de las iniciativas de asociación a nivel mundial no se perciban con claridad y no se registren como tal a nivel de los países. Por consiguiente, al examinar estas cuestiones se obtendrán unas ideas limitadas de la eficacia de las iniciativas de asociación mundial a nivel de los países.

11. En el examen se observó que **la actual Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA no es suficiente para orientar las asociaciones a nivel de los países**. No es lo bastante específica en lo que respecta al modo de fomentar asociaciones de manera estratégica en el contexto de un país. Algunos de los factores contextuales más importantes que pueden afectar al estado de las asociaciones en un país determinado son el crecimiento económico, la diversificación del sector rural y la coordinación de los donantes. En el caso de los PBI, los PIM (tanto los de ingresos medianos altos como los de ingresos medianos bajos) y los Estados afectados por conflictos y situaciones de fragilidad, los objetivos de las asociaciones, así como los requisitos y preferencias en ese ámbito, son muy diferentes.
12. **En general, las asociaciones han dado mejores resultados en los PBI**, en particular en África Subsahariana, donde existen estructuras bien establecidas que facilitan la coordinación y la cooperación entre los asociados para el desarrollo. En el momento en que se realizó la EEPP, una característica importante en muchos de estos países había sido el significativo monto de la cofinanciación internacional. En los PBI, las asociaciones con organizaciones de la sociedad civil son útiles ya que suelen complementar a las escasas capacidades de los gobiernos. Según se desprende de la muestra de EEPP examinadas, en los PBI existe un gran número de asociaciones con el sector privado pero, en el momento en que se realizaron las evaluaciones, muy pocas se habían transformado en asociaciones entre el sector público, el sector privado y los productores (asociaciones 4P).
13. **Las asociaciones en los PIM no han dado buenos resultados y las deficiencias deberán abordarse de un modo estratégico**. En el examen se observó que las asociaciones con los gobiernos centrales no solían ser lo suficientemente sólidas para que se tradujeran en buenos resultados, en particular en los PIM de mayor tamaño como la India y Nigeria. En muchos PIM, no se aprovechan los recursos nacionales como fuentes de cofinanciación mediante el establecimiento de asociaciones más sólidas tanto con los gobiernos como con el sector privado. Se observó asimismo que en varios PIM las asociaciones con la sociedad civil no eran suficientes. En general, la combinación de asociaciones en los PIM se puede calificar de insatisfactoria.
14. En el informe se distinguen **tres categorías de asociación**. Las asociaciones con fines de financiación (o cofinanciación) combinan los recursos financieros de los asociados. Las asociaciones para el aprendizaje y los conocimientos son alianzas y redes que suelen estar respaldadas por donaciones a nivel regional o de los países. Las asociaciones con fines de coordinación y cooperación son relaciones de importancia estratégica pero suelen tener un carácter informal y, por ende, no se registran ni someten a un seguimiento sistemático. **Estos tres tipos de asociación son igual de importantes y desempeñan funciones complementarias para mejorar la eficacia de las actividades de desarrollo del FIDA a nivel mundial, regional y de los países**. Los programas en los países del FIDA han dado buenos resultados en los casos en que las tres categorías de asociación estaban presentes.

15. Las **asociaciones con fines de financiación** son necesarias pero no suficientes para alcanzar objetivos asociativos fundamentales. La cofinanciación permite establecer complementariedades y propicia la actuación normativa. Además, los proyectos cofinanciados suelen dar mejores resultados a pesar de que, en contrapartida, los desembolsos son más lentos. La cofinanciación ha sido menos efectiva a la hora de movilizar recursos adicionales. La tasa de cofinanciación, que es un indicador del volumen de fondos movilizados por el FIDA, aumentó en el caso de los PIM (tanto los de ingresos medianos altos como los de ingresos medianos bajos), pasando de 1,29 y 2,51 en la FIDA8 a 2,20 y 2,83 en la FIDA9). Sin embargo, la tasa se redujo en el caso de los PBI (pasando de 1,37 en la FIDA8 a 1,03 en la FIDA9). Esto significa que el objetivo del FIDA de movilizar fondos adicionales en el sector de la agricultura mediante cofinanciación necesita estrategias de asociación mejor definidas para movilizar fondos de cofinanciación en los PIM y los PBI.
16. **Las asociaciones para el aprendizaje y los conocimientos** suelen complementar a las asociaciones establecidas entre el FIDA y los gobiernos, por ejemplo, en el ámbito del apoyo a tecnologías o enfoques innovadores. Sin embargo, las donaciones concedidas a organizaciones de investigación internacionales generalmente no propiciaron la adopción de innovaciones en el país y no estaban lo suficientemente vinculadas a las operaciones de préstamo del FIDA, tal como se señala en las EEPP de la India y Nigeria. Además, los resultados de las asociaciones para el aprendizaje y los conocimientos no se suelen conocer, documentar ni vincular lo suficiente. Se han dado ciertas excepciones en el caso de Bangladesh y Filipinas, donde la Feria de Conocimientos y Aprendizaje, fundada mediante una donación para el Proyecto de Contabilidad del Medio Ambiente y de los Recursos Naturales (ENRAP, por sus siglas en inglés), ha ayudado a reproducir las buenas prácticas en los diferentes proyectos.
17. Las asociaciones con fines de **coordinación y cooperación** a nivel de los países incluían las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, las asociaciones de agricultores y las organizaciones de pueblos indígenas, y generalmente fueron eficaces en lo que respecta a ejercer influencia en la esfera de las políticas. La labor que realiza el FIDA con las organizaciones de agricultores es particularmente intensa en América Latina y partes de Asia. Cabe citar algunos ejemplos positivos de África, como Madagascar, Malí y el Níger, donde el FIDA ha facilitado la participación de las organizaciones de agricultores en los procesos de formulación de políticas. Este tipo de asociaciones requieren mantener contactos y comunicaciones frecuentes en cuanto a las prioridades temáticas y del país, los puntos en común y las complementariedades.
18. El FIDA ha estado promoviendo **modalidades de asociación específicas para fortalecer la cooperación y las sinergias con ciertos asociados a nivel mundial, regional y de los países**, entre otras, la colaboración entre los organismos de las Naciones Unidas con sede en Roma, la cooperación Sur-Sur y la cooperación triangular, y las asociaciones con el sector privado. Hasta el momento, la eficacia de esas asociaciones ha sido variada y se han documentado muy pocos resultados en las EEPP objeto de examen.
19. **La colaboración entre los organismos con sede en Roma todavía no ha generado resultados tangibles.** El FIDA se ha tomado esta colaboración como una prioridad institucional desde 2009, año en que se establecieron las directrices de colaboración entre los organismos con sede en Roma (OSR). No obstante, a pesar de que los GPP consideran que esos organismos son los segundos asociados más importantes, en las EEPP objeto de examen apenas se encuentran pruebas de que las asociaciones entre los OSR hayan dado resultados. La colaboración entre estos organismos ha sido más fructífera a nivel sectorial en países con mecanismos de coordinación establecidos entre los asociados para el desarrollo y, en concreto, las Naciones Unidas. En Brasil, las asociaciones entre los OSR surgidas de grupos

de coordinación de las Naciones Unidas han desempeñado un papel fundamental en la actuación normativa y la cooperación Sur-Sur y la cooperación triangular. A nivel de los proyectos, sin embargo, la cooperación entre los OSR se ha dado solo excepcionalmente.

20. **Últimamente, la cooperación Sur-Sur y la cooperación triangular han sido objeto de un gran interés.** En el examen se observó que estos tipos de cooperación solo habían dado buenos resultados en pocos países, como el Brasil. Las actividades de cooperación Sur-Sur y cooperación triangular se han ejecutado generalmente sobre una base *ad hoc*. Han resultado menos eficaces debido a que no existían vínculos con los programas en los países, a que había poca claridad sobre las contribuciones de los asociados y las vías de impacto y a que no se aprovecharon las oportunidades para vincular estos tipos de cooperación con los proyectos cofinanciados en los PIM. En algunos casos se ha observado la falta de un enfoque estratégico, por ejemplo en China y Turquía. Se espera que la nueva estrategia del FIDA sobre cooperación Sur-Sur y cooperación triangular (2016) aporte un mejor enfoque y mejores sinergias con los programas en los países
21. **La cooperación con el sector privado ha adquirido aún más importancia a raíz de los enfoques sobre las cadenas de valor promovidos por el FIDA.** En Madagascar, la República de Moldova y Mozambique se han podido constatar algunas actividades innovadoras en materia de asociaciones 4P. No obstante, las asociaciones con el sector privado siguen todavía sin poder superar algunos obstáculos fundamentales. No hay claridad respecto de cuál o cuáles deberían ser los principales grupos del sector privado que se beneficien del apoyo del FIDA. Además, debido a la diversidad de asociados y a los retos y riesgos concretos relacionados con las asociaciones 4P, es necesario implantar mecanismos de apoyo específicos, si bien la gama de instrumentos disponibles para establecer asociaciones 4P es bastante limitada, en particular para respaldar a las pymes y los mecanismos de distribución del riesgo. El nuevo Fondo de Inversiones para las Pymes podría aportar algo de flexibilidad en la colaboración con los asociados del sector privado.
22. Dada la mayor atención que se presta al establecimiento de asociaciones, debe tenerse en cuenta que las asociaciones son un medio para lograr un fin, es decir, se trata de una relación de colaboración para alcanzar objetivos mutuamente acordados, que entraña una responsabilidad compartida en cuanto a los resultados previstos. Este énfasis en los resultados de las asociaciones también se refleja en la definición de asociación formulada por el FIDA. Sin embargo, a la hora de proporcionar información sobre asociaciones en los programas sobre oportunidades estratégicas nacionales (COSOP) y las EEP, la labor se suele centrar en las intenciones y los procesos; los resultados de las asociaciones no se describen correctamente ni son objeto de un debido seguimiento. Por lo tanto, este examen se centra específicamente en los resultados de las asociaciones, tanto conceptuales como prácticos, en la medida en que se hayan hecho constatar en las evaluaciones de la IOE.
23. La mayoría de los resultados observados se relacionaban con la influencia en las políticas, los conocimientos y el aprendizaje y la movilización de recursos. Todos ellos son tipos de resultados a los que el FIDA ha prestado mucha atención y que se han promovido activamente mediante el diálogo, la participación en grupos de trabajo y el apoyo al desarrollo de nuevas estrategias, así como mediante donaciones para investigaciones y el fomento de la capacidad de asociados en organizaciones de agricultores y de la sociedad civil. En el informe de síntesis se hizo constar que las asociaciones con bancos multilaterales de desarrollo (BMD), con los OSR y con las organizaciones de la sociedad civil han resultado ser muy eficaces a la hora de movilizar influencia en la esfera de las políticas, siempre que tuviesen que ver con experiencias de proyectos de inversión y con los conocimientos y el aprendizaje. También se han registrado casos en los que se ha

logrado ejercer influencia sobre las políticas mediante la cooperación Sur-Sur y la cooperación triangular (p. ej. en la Argentina y el Brasil). Las instituciones financieras internacionales fueron asociados importantes del FIDA a efectos de lograr sinergias y complementariedades, en particular en la movilización de recursos, conocimientos, influencias y sinergias.

24. Los resultados de las asociaciones muestran desde 2012 una tendencia a la disminución del interés por el tema de la concordancia y la armonización en las asociaciones establecidas a nivel de los países, en comparación con los años posteriores a la Declaración de París de 2005 y el Programa de Acción de Accra de 2008. A partir de 2012, en las EEPP también se constatan pocos resultados en la movilización de recursos y fondos de cofinanciación. La sostenibilidad y la implicación nacional, fomentadas mediante asociaciones a largo plazo y el fortalecimiento de la capacidad de los gobiernos y otros asociados nacionales (organizaciones de la sociedad civil, sector privado, etc.), también han tenido un papel menos prominente a nivel de los países. En cambio, la ampliación de escala ha ido ganando importancia desde 2012, a pesar de que los resultados documentados en la muestra de EEPP todavía sean bastante dispersos. La ampliación de escala requiere contar con una gama más amplia de asociados además de los gobiernos. Aunque las organizaciones de la sociedad civil han desempeñado en muchos casos un papel fundamental en la ampliación de escala, las asociaciones establecidas con ellas han sido escasas o ineficaces.
25. Lograr establecer asociaciones eficaces y que estas den buenos resultados depende de una serie de factores pero, según el examen, la presencia del FIDA en los países y la capacidad de los gobiernos son los principales pilares. En todos los países donde el FIDA tiene presencia, se ha mejorado la frecuencia y la calidad de los contactos con las contrapartes de los gobiernos nacionales y se ha propiciado la participación del FIDA en grupos sectoriales de coordinación con otros donantes y asociados. En 22 de las 36 EEPP se ha observado que la presencia de una oficina del FIDA en el país dotada del personal adecuado ha resultado fundamental; en 14 EEPP se ha subrayado la importancia de que el personal de las oficinas del FIDA en los países contaba con buenos conocimientos técnicos específicos y aptitudes de comunicación. Aunque las capacidades e intereses de los gobiernos son factores importantes que influyen en la labor del FIDA de establecimiento de asociaciones, el informe de síntesis de evaluación también subraya su naturaleza ambivalente, lo que puede facilitar o dificultar las asociaciones con una gama más amplia de asociados, en particular con la sociedad civil. La voluntad de los gobiernos de colaborar con los asociados preferentes del FIDA no siempre se da por hecha.
26. **Las asociaciones ofrecen importantes oportunidades y beneficios, pero también acarrear una serie de costos y riesgos, cuestiones que no se pueden pasar por alto**, sobre todo el tiempo que se necesita para organizarlas y gestionarlas y los diversos costos que implica hacer un seguimiento de las mismas y velar por que se cumplan sus acuerdos. Por ejemplo, coordinar a los donantes es una labor que requiere mucho tiempo. El riesgo de impago por parte de un asociado puede aumentar cuando estos tienen problemas para movilizar los fondos u otros recursos de manera oportuna. En las asociaciones, el FIDA también corre el riesgo de perder de vista sus valores institucionales fundamentales, una cuestión sobre la que se hizo hincapié especialmente en el caso de las asociaciones con el sector privado. Parte de los costos de transacción y de los riesgos para la reputación se pueden reducir mediante el establecimiento de relaciones a más largo plazo y la creación de un clima de confianza, y podría hacerse más al respecto.
27. El escalonamiento de las asociaciones según su grado de colaboración que se presenta en el presente informe muestra que la mayoría de las asociaciones del FIDA se centran en la ejecución y el intercambio de información. Los principios

clave de reciprocidad y complementariedad de las asociaciones, que se reflejan en la realización de acciones comunes y la toma conjunta de decisiones, se observan en un número reducido de asociaciones. Con demasiada frecuencia, las asociaciones solo funcionaban con el impulso del FIDA y se centraban en cuestiones urgentes relacionadas con la ejecución.

III. Conclusiones

28. El presente informe de síntesis de evaluación no se centra únicamente en las asociaciones, sino también en los resultados concretos de las mismas (sus efectos directos), y en determinar la mejor manera de obtenerlos mediante diferentes tipos de asociación, con los mejores asociados, de la manera más eficaz y eficiente posible y de un modo adecuado al contexto regional y del país.
29. **La calidad de las asociaciones es importante pero, para obtener resultados, también es importante cómo se combinan los distintos tipos de asociación.** Es importante lograr una buena combinación de las tres categorías de asociaciones (para la obtención de cofinanciación, para el aprendizaje y los conocimientos y para la coordinación y la cooperación) a fin de aumentar el alcance y la complementariedad de los resultados, por ejemplo, para su ampliación de escala y la creación de sinergias.
30. **Falta de atención a los resultados.** Las asociaciones constituyen una de las prioridades institucionales básicas del FIDA junto con la ampliación de escala, la generación de conocimientos y aprendizaje, y la actuación normativa e influencia en las políticas. Sin embargo, todavía no existe un marco coherente que refleje los resultados generales de las asociaciones. Se ha sobrestimado la eficacia de los COSOP para orientar el establecimiento de asociaciones. En los COSOP se suelen plasmar intenciones programáticas que normalmente tienen más que ver con consideraciones políticas que con oportunidades reales y recursos disponibles sobre el terreno. Las asociaciones se suelen establecer sobre una base *ad hoc* y sin un marco de recursos adecuado; los resultados no son objeto de seguimiento. No se refleja la naturaleza a largo plazo de las asociaciones, ni su contribución al logro de una gama más amplia de efectos directos.
31. **La Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA no ofrece orientación suficiente sobre cómo obtener resultados de las asociaciones a nivel de los países.** En la Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA (2012) apenas se refleja la importancia de las asociaciones a nivel de los países. Además, el FIDA tiene que ajustar su estrategia de cofinanciación para que no solo se aplique a nivel mundial sino también más firmemente a nivel de los países a fin de utilizarla para movilizar recursos y fondos de cofinanciación, lo cual incluye prestar el apoyo pertinente a los equipos en los países. Si bien una de las cuatro categorías de asociaciones definidas en la Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA de 2012 tiene por objetivo la mayor movilización de recursos, este se refiere sobre todo a la movilización a nivel mundial de fondos suplementarios para el FIDA en lugar de los típicos fondos de cofinanciación para proyectos. Y aunque en el Informe de la FIDA11 (2017) se destaca la importancia de movilizar recursos nacionales, es necesario elaborar una estrategia y orientaciones específicas.
32. **La limitada gama de instrumentos de asociación disponible y su escasa versatilidad reducen el potencial de lograr mejores resultados en términos de desarrollo.** En la categoría de actividades no crediticias del FIDA se engloban actualmente la actuación normativa, los conocimientos y el establecimiento de asociaciones, pero no se reflejan resultados fundamentales como la ampliación de escala, el sentido de apropiación y la sostenibilidad o beneficios que son inherentes a esos proyectos o generarse a partir de ellos. Por ejemplo, las donaciones se usan principalmente para generar conocimientos y con fines de aprendizaje, pero las asociaciones también pueden generar efectos más amplios o a un nivel superior, como puede ser la ampliación de escala o la influencia en las políticas, si se realiza

de forma más estratégica. De igual modo, la cofinanciación no consiste solo en movilizar recursos, sino que también ofrece otros beneficios, como las sinergias y las complementariedades.

33. **Resulta importante que los equipos en los países reciban apoyo institucional y respuestas a sus necesidades y que el establecimiento de asociaciones se planifique a nivel de los países.** Es necesario que la labor de establecimiento de asociaciones a nivel de los países, así como los resultados que produzcan, tengan un reconocimiento institucional y se integren adecuadamente en toda la programación del FIDA en los países. Actualmente, los incentivos institucionales oficiales y oficiosos no son suficientes para que las oficinas del FIDA en los países se animen a emprender actividades relacionadas con las asociaciones, como la actuación normativa. Quizás se necesite apoyo institucional para ayudar a los equipos en los países a determinar cuáles son las mejores maneras de planificar las asociaciones en función de las oportunidades y recursos de cada país, y de hacer un seguimiento de estas. Ello implica brindar ayuda a los equipos en los países para movilizar los recursos necesarios.
34. **Por último, en el ámbito de las asociaciones hay muchas buenas prácticas que se pueden compartir.** Cabe destacar entre las buenas prácticas el diseño de las asociaciones siguiendo un enfoque programático, con unos objetivos claros, y orientándolas a los resultados y al cumplimiento de plazos concretos. También es importante dotar a las asociaciones de los recursos suficientes o que se prevean vías claras y factibles de movilización de recursos. Asimismo, es importante que las normas que rigen las relaciones de asociación sean lo suficientemente duraderas y flexibles para que los vínculos con los asociados se vayan consolidando. Por último, es importante poner el énfasis en sacar partido de las sinergias creadas por las asociaciones, aprovechando las ventajas comparativas y evitando la superposición de actividades.

Recomendaciones

35. **El entorno que rodea a las asociaciones y las expectativas que se plantean respecto de estas están cambiando rápidamente,** acompañados de cambios rápidos en la esfera de la ayuda externa, una importancia creciente de los PIM y una mayor atención en las actividades no crediticias y la búsqueda de nuevos donantes en el sector agrícola. La evaluación de la Estrategia de Asociación del FIDA prevista para 2018 brinda la oportunidad de examinar de forma crítica la pertinencia y eficacia de las asociaciones del FIDA. Los compromisos adoptados para la FIDA¹¹ propician y respaldan las recomendaciones derivadas del presente examen.
36. En esta síntesis de evaluación se recomiendan tres ámbitos de acción que podrían mejorar los resultados de las asociaciones en los países: a) formulación de estrategias de asociación adaptadas a las condiciones y necesidades específicas de los PIM y los PBI; b) uso más estratégico de modalidades e instrumentos de asociación, y c) mejora de la rendición de cuentas de los resultados de las asociaciones.
37. **Recomendación 1. Formular una estrategia de asociación institucional revisada que se centre claramente en los resultados de las asociaciones a nivel de los países.** Las asociaciones a nivel mundial son importantes para que el FIDA pueda cumplir su mandato. No obstante, en consonancia con el nuevo modelo operacional del FIDA, el apoyo al establecimiento de asociaciones debe pasar de la escala mundial a las escalas regional y de los países. En la estrategia de asociación revisada se deberá definir una visión clara y orientaciones específicas sobre los enfoques y resultados concretos de las asociaciones a nivel de los países que podrían motivar al personal encargado de los programas en los países y facilitar mayores sinergias entre las distintas partes de las organizaciones. En la estrategia revisada se deberá reconocer la importancia de las asociaciones a nivel

de los países y especificarse qué tipo de apoyo institucional, fomento de la capacidad e incentivos permitirán a las oficinas del FIDA en los países establecer asociaciones orientadas a los resultados concretos dentro y fuera del ámbito de los proyectos. De este modo habría más claridad acerca de los tipos específicos de relaciones, instrumentos y resultados previstos en los diferentes contextos. Además, se recomienda que la estrategia revisada

- a) incluya un marco de gestión basado en los resultados que se sirva de un conjunto más amplio de instrumentos, además de los préstamos y las donaciones, para facilitar las asociaciones con una gama más amplia de asociados, en particular con el sector privado;
- b) brinde orientación sobre el modo de combinar esos instrumentos para lograr los objetivos fundamentales del FIDA que son la influencia en las políticas, la ampliación de escala de las innovaciones, los conocimientos y el aprendizaje, las sinergias y la sostenibilidad, y el aprovechamiento de los recursos;
- c) proporcione estrategias de asociación específicas para las distintas categorías de países (PBI, PIM (tanto los de ingresos medianos altos como los de ingresos medianos bajos) y países con las situaciones de mayor fragilidad);
- d) especifique el enfoque previsto para formular estrategias de asociación como parte del proceso de elaboración de los COSOP, oriente el desarrollo de las asociaciones para que este sea más selectivo, por ejemplo, mediante un análisis más riguroso de la relación costo-beneficio, defina los principales resultados (efectos directos) que se deben alcanzar con la asociación y los medios para alcanzarlos, y determine cuáles son los puntos de entrada para entablar compromisos con los gobiernos en el marco más amplio de las asociaciones.

38. Recomendación 2. Simplificar la aplicación de los instrumentos y modalidades de asociación con miras a obtener resultados.

- a) En lo que respecta a los préstamos como instrumentos de asociación, es necesario que el FIDA encuentre una gama más amplia de opciones específicas de cofinanciación a nivel mundial y de los países². Es preciso evitar caer en la confusión que existe actualmente entre la cofinanciación (usada sobre todo para mejorar los resultados de las asociaciones y sumar fondos destinados a la agricultura) y la movilización de recursos (usada para expandir la cartera de préstamos y donaciones del FIDA, incluidos los fondos suplementarios). El FIDA haría bien en adoptar estrategias específicas de movilización de fondos de cofinanciación para los PIM y los PBI. Por otro lado, además de los indicadores de préstamos de mayor cuantía y costos de transacción más bajos, el FIDA deberá también hacer un seguimiento y documentar sistemáticamente los resultados de las asociaciones con fines de cofinanciación en lo que concierne a los resultados concretos obtenidos por las asociaciones en cada país, en particular la esfera de la influencia en políticas y la ampliación de escala.
- b) Por lo que respecta a las donaciones como instrumentos fundamentales de asociación, es necesario mejorar los mecanismos internos del FIDA para armonizar las donaciones regionales y por países, en particular la cooperación Sur-Sur y la cooperación triangular, y para que posibiliten operaciones de préstamo que se refuerzan entre sí y garanticen que los resultados (efectos directos) de las asociaciones a nivel de los países estén contemplados en los COSOP. En este sentido, el compromiso 3.4 adoptado para la FIDA11 relativo a fortalecer las sinergias entre las actividades crediticias y no crediticias es importante y alentador. De igual modo, se recomienda destinar

² También podrían aplicarse unos principios de cofinanciación similares a cierto tipo de donaciones del FIDA que podrían beneficiarse de la cofinanciación.

más fondos en forma de donaciones para establecer asociaciones a largo plazo con las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, las organizaciones de agricultores, los grupos indígenas y el sector privado a través de pymes a fin de fortalecer sus capacidades, en particular en los países cuyos gobiernos estén menos dispuestos a destinar préstamos a estas actividades. Por último, al prestar apoyo a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil se deberá adoptar una perspectiva a largo plazo sobre la eficacia y sostenibilidad institucionales más allá del ámbito de los proyectos, por ejemplo mediante el apoyo a organizaciones centrales o coordinadoras de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil.

- c) En cuanto a las asociaciones 4P, es necesario que el FIDA reconozca los retos que plantean este tipo de asociaciones y diseñe mecanismos eficaces para abordarlos directamente. Ello implica ser consciente de los riesgos de las asociaciones 4P y diseñar las estrategias para mitigarlos. La actualización de la estrategia de actuación del FIDA en relación con el sector privado y la mejora de los instrumentos de colaboración con el sector privado y fundaciones (sexta medida del compromiso 1.2 para la FIDA11) serán un paso importante. Además, el FIDA deberá seguir usando plataformas regionales y subnacionales para las asociaciones 4P a fin de apoyar el establecimiento de redes y el aprendizaje recíproco.

39. Recomendación 3. Reforzar la labor institucional de rendición de cuentas por los resultados de las asociaciones mediante un enfoque coherente del seguimiento y la evaluación de las asociaciones.

- a) Los compromisos asumidos para la FIDA11 comprenden una serie de medidas objeto de seguimiento que son pertinentes en este sentido: por un lado, mejorar el seguimiento de la cofinanciación y presentar la información por fuente y categoría de país, así como medir mejor la capacidad del FIDA de atraer inversiones privadas (quinta medida del compromiso 1.2), y, por otro lado, formular y aplicar un marco de planificación y seguimiento estratégicos de las actividades de asociación del FIDA a nivel institucional, de los países, regional y mundial (vigésimoséptima medida del compromiso 3.5).
- b) Además, el FIDA deberá emplear unos criterios e indicadores coherentes para valorar la calidad y la eficacia del establecimiento de las asociaciones en las autoevaluaciones y evaluaciones independientes del FIDA y mejorar el sistema de seguimiento, presentación de información y evaluación de los efectos directos fundamentales de las asociaciones a nivel de los países y a nivel institucional del FIDA, en particular la medición *ex post* de los logros en materia de cofinanciación, además de la medición *ex ante* que proporciona el Sistema de Proyectos de Inversión y Donaciones (GRIPS, por sus siglas en inglés). En ello se deberá incluir al menos algunos indicadores y metas específicos de los países (COSOP) —basados en los que son generales de todo el FIDA— para someterlos a examen y modificación según convenga en los exámenes anuales de los COSOP.
- c) Se deberá también mejorar la base de datos institucionales sobre asociaciones financiadas mediante donaciones para que incluya los principales resultados previstos en materia de asociaciones.
- d) Por último, deberán evaluarse las asociaciones a nivel mundial que tengan importancia estratégica para el FIDA a fin de determinar cómo se podrían mejorar. En este sentido, la IOE debería plantearse llevar a cabo una evaluación de las asociación con los OSR.

Main report

Building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness – a review of country-level experiences and results

Evaluation synthesis

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
APR	Asia and the Pacific Division of IFAD
CBO	community based organization
CLEs	corporate level evaluations
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CPM	country programme managers
CSO	civil society organization
CSPE	country strategy and programme evaluations
ESA	East and Southern Africa Division of IFAD
ESR	evaluation synthesis report
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FO	Farmers' organizations
MFS	Most Fragile Situations
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GRIPS	Grants and Investment Project System
ICO	IFAD country office
IFIs	international financial institutions
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
K&L	knowledge and learning
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean Division of IFAD
LIC	lower-income country
MDB	multilateral development bank
MICs	middle-income countries
NEN	Near East, North Africa and Europe Division of IFAD
NGOs	non-government organizations
PCRv	project completion report validation
PPE	project performance evaluation
PPPP	public-private-producer partnerships
PRM	Partnership and Resources Mobilization Office
RBAs	Rome-based agencies
SSTC	South-South and Triangular Cooperation
ToC	theory of change
WB	World Bank
WCA	West and Central Africa Division of IFAD
WFP	World Food Programme

Building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness – a review of country-level experiences and results

Evaluation synthesis

I. Introduction, evaluation objectives and methodology

A. Background

Introduction

1. The IFAD Evaluation Policy states that each year the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) will produce evaluation syntheses on selected topics. This synthesis provides a learning opportunity for IFAD. It identifies and captures accumulated knowledge from existing evaluative and other credible evidence on how partnership building can enhance IFAD's development effectiveness. The aim is to identify lessons relevant to different forms of partnership. The findings and lessons from this report may contribute to a better understanding of partnerships and their role in achieving development results, and they may inform the assessment of IFAD's partnership strategy as well as the elaboration of applicable criteria in IOE evaluations.
2. This synthesis report on partnership practices and results responds directly to an expectation identified in the mid-term review of the 10th Replenishment, where it states that '*A working group on partnerships coordinated implementation of the [partnership] strategy during IFAD9 and recently completed a progress review and developed a workplan for IFAD10. The next detailed assessment will take place in 2018, after the planned IOE evaluation synthesis report on partnerships (2017)*'.

IFAD's mandate and strategic focus

3. IFAD is the only international financial institution with a specific mandate to reduce rural poverty through investments in agriculture and rural development. It was established as a specialized UN agency and an international financial institution in 1977 to mobilize resources to invest in development opportunities for poor rural people. The fund works in close collaboration with borrowing country governments and local communities to design, supervise and assess country-led programmes and projects that support smallholders and poor rural producers.
4. The Agreement Establishing IFAD requires IFAD (article 8) to "cooperate closely" with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the other organizations of the United Nations system, as well as with international financial institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and governmental and intergovernmental agencies concerned with agricultural development.

B. Synthesis objectives and scope

Objectives

5. The purpose of this synthesis is to inform the assessment of IFAD's Partnership Strategy by management in 2018. The specific objectives are:
 - a. Based on evidence from IFAD evaluations, explore the types of partnerships that have enabled IFAD to deliver on its mandate, to reduce rural poverty, *at country level*.
 - b. Explore the comparative strengths and weakness of different types of partners in enabling IFAD to achieve its country partnership objectives, to increase outreach and expand impact on rural poverty reduction with limited resources.

- c. Identify the enabling or disabling factors to explain why partnerships have developed (or not) under certain conditions and how they could be improved.
- d. Identify lessons on the role of ICOs in building effective partnerships for greater development effectiveness.

Scope and approach

6. While partnerships operate at global, regional and the country level, this synthesis has focussed on the operation of partnerships at the **country level**, because this where most of IOE's evaluations of partnerships have focussed. The evaluative evidence has been primarily derived from country strategy and programme evaluations (CSPEs),³ selected evaluation synthesis reports and relevant corporate level evaluations (CLEs), which focus mainly on the operations and the results at the country level.
7. At country level a broad range of partnerships has been studied. Both the Strategy and IOE's Evaluation Manuel broadly identify the same **range of partners** at country level: member governments; civil society organizations, particularly those of smallholder farmers and other groups of rural people; other United Nations agencies; bilateral and multilateral development agencies; international agricultural research centres; CSOs and foundations; policy research institutes and universities; regional organizations; and private-sector players.
8. **Government** is the most important partner in IFAD. Currently, IFAD has 176 Member States and is working in partnership with governments in almost 100 countries. Government is the main partner implementing IFAD-supported programmes and projects. This synthesis has looked at Government as "facilitating partner" rather than "implementing partner", meaning that it will review the role that Government plays as point of entry and core partner within countries in facilitating partnerships for greater development effectiveness.
9. While the focus of the analysis is on the **country level**, it is understood that partnership agreements are often the result of engagement processes at **global level** that will involve IFAD headquarter. Thus, priorities for certain partnerships, e.g. cofinancing agreement with EU or ADB, have to be seen in the context of the existing corporate-level frameworks, policies and agreements.
10. **Timeframe**. The period covered by this synthesis starts in 2006, when the first CSPE that rated partnership performance was completed. For the period 2006-2016, the synthesis reviewed 36 of 40 CPSEs for substantive evidence on the contribution of partnerships to country outcomes in IFAD operations (annex VII.3). For analysis, this period was broken down into two phases of 2006 to 2011 (with 15 CSPEs) and 2012 to 16 (with 21 CSPEs), with the second period starting in the year when the new Partnership Strategy was approved.

C. Conceptual framework

Evaluation questions

11. Based on above objectives, a preliminary review of documents and in-house consultations the following evaluation questions were formulated:
 - a. How important and relevant are different partnership categories (cofinancing, knowledge and learning and coordination and cooperation) and specific engagement modalities for IFAD?
 - b. How do partnerships perform and what are their main outcomes at country level?
 - c. What configurations of partnerships are most effective for different outcomes within given country contexts?

³ For the purpose of this ESR the more recent term CSPE is also used for the former CPEs

- d. What are the most important enabling and limiting factors for country-oriented partnerships?
 - e. What are the lessons and emerging good practices and how to build better partnerships at IFAD over the next five years?
12. The evaluation team developed an evaluation framework for this synthesis that includes the main evaluation questions, hypotheses and forms of partnership engagement (for details see annex I).

Theory of change


13. Underpinning IFAD's partnership approach are a number of theories for how partnerships would lead to more effective partnership outcomes and hence to greater levels of results from IFAD investments. Therefore, the synthesis is focused on examining whether evaluative evidence confirms the theories that underpin IFAD's strategies and the main interventions identified.
14. **Partnerships are a means to an end** – a collaborative relationship toward mutually agreed objectives and involving shared responsibility for outcomes (Picciotto 2004⁴). This focus on partnership outcomes is also reflected in the IFAD partnership definition (from the 2012 partnership strategy) (see Chapter II B). In order to reach its corporate goal – reducing rural poverty – IFAD relies on a broad range of partnerships. Government, as the borrower and main enabler of its loans, is the key partner for IFAD. Civil society is traditionally a core partner for reaching out to beneficiaries and for advocating changes in the policy and institutional framework. Farmers' organizations and indigenous peoples' organizations are civil society organizations that are close to IFAD's target groups and thus well positioned to present their interests. The private sector has been recognised as a key player in agricultural development and is thus becoming part of IFAD's partnership strategies in many countries. And finally, multilateral and bilateral organizations are important partners for leveraging influence and outreach on poverty reduction, through cofinancing, policy engagement and knowledge generation. The different types of partnerships are all important for IFAD to achieve its objectives within any country, although their roles and constellations may within a given context (see annex X for a description of typical IFAD partnerships).
15. The **theory of change** (ToC) used in this synthesis defines the pathways for achieving critical partnership outcomes at country level and for exploring the causal relations and contributing factors enabling or hindering those outcomes.⁵ The core elements of this ToC (figure 1) include IFAD's main *partners, partnership categories and modalities*. The key question to be explored in this synthesis is what **forms of partnership engagement, instruments and partnership modalities, and in what combinations, have been most relevant and effective for IFAD to achieve its partnership goal**, which is to improve outreach and contribution to rural poverty reduction (as formulated in the 2012 Partnership Strategy).
16. As immediate results towards the partnership goal, six main *outcomes* were identified for country partnerships: Leveraging resources, influence on policies and strategies, scaling-up and mainstreaming of good practices, knowledge and learning including innovations, exploitation of complementarities and synergies, and ultimately ownership and sustainability.
17. IFAD could achieve these outcomes through various *outputs* such as making good partnership use in its loan projects, in particular cofinanced ones; its country level grant results; building partner capacities; establishing knowledge platforms;

⁴ Picciotto, 2004

⁵ This theory of change was developed through a review of IFAD partnership documents and literature and in consultation with PRM and other key informants within IFAD during a workshop in June 2017.

- vertical cooperation across geographical levels; and through engaging in policy engagement, national working groups and various events.
18. Three main *partnership categories* were identified, those of cofinancing partnerships, knowledge and learning partnerships, and coordination and cooperation partnerships that will be explained in more detail in Ch. III A.
 19. The ToC also considers the most important *enabling factors* as well as potential *costs and risks* associated with partnerships. These factors include IFAD institutional support and conducive governments, as well as awareness of partnership transaction costs and risks.
 20. This theory of change served as the reference for analyzing partnership results and the most important enabling and distracting factors for partnerships in this evaluation synthesis.

Figure 1
IFAD Partnerships in countries – a theory of change



Source: Evaluation Synthesis team, based on IFAD document review and consultations

D. Evidence base

21. The synthesis has derived information on partnerships from the following IOE evaluation products.
22. **Country strategy and programme evaluations (CSPEs)** assess the extent to which partnership building has efficiently and effectively contributed to the achievement of IFAD's goals and objectives within the country.⁶ Forty CSPEs have been published since 2006 based on a consistent methodology to assess partnerships. Partnership building, i.e. with partners beyond government counterparts, is systematically assessed under non-lending activities, for example

⁶ According to the Harmonisation Agreement (EC 2017/96/W.P.4)

the extent to which partnerships had been built in line with the stated intentions of the applicable country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP), in addition to indicators such as the number of partnerships enhanced through the implementation of the country programme and resources leveraged through partnerships. Information became even more detailed after the approval of IFAD's first partnership strategy in 2011/12, and with Management drawing more attention to scaling-up and policy engagement since then.

23. The amount of information provided on country relevant partnerships in the reviewed CSPEs is often extensive, with information on specific partnerships, but mainly focussed on activities and certain outputs, much less on outcomes. Most commonly, partnership information focuses on cofinancing amounts and partners; regional and country-level knowledge work, particularly through IFAD grants; and work with CSOs and private sector. Often there are specific references to Rome-based Agencies although only rarely the results are reported. The CSPE do not provide explanations of why certain partnerships worked or failed.
24. **Partnership ratings.** The ESR reviewed IOE partnership ratings to discern trends over time and regional patterns and to identify outliers for a more detailed review. CSPEs review partnership building as one of three aspects of IFAD's non-lending performance, the other two being knowledge and policy engagement. Ratings of partnership building are usually based on both quantitative and qualitative aspects of partnership building; and there are frequent references to plans in COSOPs. Often, but not always, the rationale for ratings is provided. Important criteria are scope of cofinancing and type of partners, the extent of partnering with CSOs and private sector, and the linkage of knowledge partnerships and IFAD's investment projects.
25. **CLEs and ESRs.** In addition to CSPEs this synthesis also relied on several CLEs and ESRs conducted by IOE since 2011. These documents usually offer extensive background analyses of their respective topics with high relevance for country partnerships and intended partnership outcomes. They provide success stories and analyze constraints from their respective angles and viewpoints. They frequently comment on typical partnership constraints. The important IFAD corporate evaluations reviewed were those on IFAD's decentralization experience (2017), grant financing (2014), and private-sector development and partnership strategy (2011). IFAD synthesis evaluations on policy engagement financing (2017), scaling up of results (2017), engagement with indigenous peoples (2015), South-South and triangular cooperation (2016) and middle-income countries (2014) were particularly informative.
26. **PPEs and PCRVs.** The ESR reviewed project performance evaluation (PPE) and project completion report validation (PCRv) ratings for a detailed analysis of the performance of cofinanced projects over the ESR period (2006 – 2016). The analysis is included in annex VII.1 and VII.2 (also see Chapter III F for a summary of the analysis).
27. **GRIPS database.** The IFAD Grants and Investment Project System (GRIPS) is the corporate vehicle for the collection and dissemination of information related to IFAD grant and loan financed projects. For the purpose of this synthesis, GRIPS was used to extract information on cofinancing and supplementary funding.
28. **Country Opportunity and Strategy Papers (COSOPs),** in principle, provide operationalisation of the partnership strategy at country level. They indicate opportunities for potential partnerships in support of their strategic objectives, taking into account the area of focus and priority sectors of each. These partnerships could be for the purpose of project implementation, policy engagement, innovation or knowledge management and may involve cofinancing, sector-wide approaches, joint policy work and sharing of experience. Usually

COSOPs include a short assessment of what has been achieved in terms of partnership building and a SWOT analysis of different partners.

29. **Surveys.** The approach paper for this synthesis anticipated a survey to be conducted to collate feedback on recent partnerships from PMD staff and in particular from CPS. However, the survey was cancelled to avoid duplication with a PRM survey targeting the same audience and conducted at the same time. Instead the synthesis used some results of the PRM survey (see annex III).
30. **Focus group discussions.** The ESR process involved two focus group discussions with CPMs, economists and portfolio advisors at IFAD. The first meeting in June was to further elaborate the theory of change on the basis of selected case studies. The second meeting in September was to discuss emerging findings and to further explore some key issues raised by this synthesis.

E. CSPE review methodology

31. **CSPE sample.** The evaluation team systematically reviewed the CSPEs completed between 2006 and 2016. The sample included 36 CSPEs out of a total of 40 CSPEs. Twenty-two MICs and 14 LICs were covered (see Table 1 in Annex VIII.1). For three countries where there had been repeat CSPEs, the first CSPE was not reviewed separately (Ethiopia, Nigeria and Mozambique). For India, the first CSPE was reviewed but findings were merged with the second CSPE as its information was not extensive.
32. **Hypotheses.** The theory of change led to the formulation of a number of hypotheses that were used in the review and analysis of CSPEs, CLEs and other documents in this evaluation synthesis report (ESR) (see annex I.2). The hypothesis relate to the enabling factors and transaction costs and risks as identified in the ToC, among others the relevance of a clear corporate partnership vision and strategic approach, decentralized country teams for partnerships, country priorities and various resources and capacities. The initial ESR hypotheses were tested and further refined during the scoping phase, based on the review of relevant sections in the CSPEs and focus group discussions.
33. **Review matrices.** The occurrence of certain modalities of engagement, partners and outcomes and outputs was recorded for each country.⁷ The extent to which different types of partners and partnership outcomes occurred in the CSPE was recorded in three different partnership matrices: the first one cross-tabulates different engagement modalities with different partners; the second one notes key outcomes/outputs for each partner.
34. **Partnership ladder.** The third matrix established a 'partnership ladder' that notes the quality of partnerships.⁸ For this purpose six categories were chosen: (i) partners were mainly involved in implementation/execution; (ii) there was substantial exchange of information during the partnership; (iii) partners decided together, with mutual understanding; (iv) partners acted together; (v) own initiatives by partners were supported; (vi) partners were entrusted with handing over or scaling up projects and initiatives.
35. **Force-field analysis.** The review documented the different factors found at country level that enable or hinder partnerships. These were aggregated and visualised in a force-field diagram, based on the number of occurrences in the documents.

⁷ Partners included: Government, regional economic communities, international development partners, IFIs, local financial institutions, national development banks, research institutions and universities, CSOs and indigenous organizations, farmers' organizations and the private sector. Engagement modalities included: loans, grants, supplementary grants, brokering, networking, dialogue, SSTC, partnering with Rome-based Agencies, and PPPP. Outcomes/outputs included: influencing policy, scaling-up, leveraging resources, complementarities and synergies, partner capacities, alignment and harmonization, knowledge and communication and ownership.

⁸ Note: The matrices only report occurrence rather than frequency.

36. **Data aggregation.** During the following in-depth review of the CSPEs, different types of partnership engagement and related outcomes and outputs were assessed for the countries with CSPEs. In this phase, qualitative data was extracted and the prevalence and intensity of partnerships recorded according to the following criteria: 1. no reported partnership engagement (-); 2. some engagement, but under-exploited (+); substantial engagement, visible, strategic (++); and very strong and visible engagement, demonstrated and well-noted results; in terms of quantities but also quality of partnership engagement (+++). These data provided the basis for many of the country examples and comparative tables and graphics included in the report (see annex V.1 for the related assessment matrix).
37. **Outlier analysis.** The review of the CSPEs generated further questions, in particular about the “why”, i.e. why partnerships have developed the way they did. The synthesis separately looked at the “outliers” in terms of partnership ratings to better understand why in some countries performance on partnerships has been very good and why not in others. The outlier analysis was undertaken early in the process to inform the hypothesis tested during the main review phase.
38. **Country case studies.** The causal factors explaining success or failure in partnerships were explored in further depth through focused review of programme documentation (e.g. PPEs, portfolio reviews or COSOP documentation), interviews with CPMs and focus group discussions economists and portfolio advisers. The country case studies thus contain additional evidence to explain why partnerships were effective in a certain context and under certain conditions (see annex X).
39. **Review of partnership findings at other IFIs.** The ESR also selectively reviewed independent evaluations by other IFIs for findings, lessons and methodological conclusions related to partnerships, with focus on the World Bank Group, regional development banks and the GEF.

F. Limitations

40. Theory-based synthesis is dependent upon the quality of evidence available in the evaluations used. The most important limitation therefore is the limited depth of the analysis included in IOE evaluations on how and why change happens. The synthesis has carefully reviewed the quality of the available evidence, in particular with regard to the depth of analysis of partnership results as well as seeking to explain why it happened. Variance in the quality and depth of the evidence inevitably put a limitation to this synthesis.
41. A second limitation is that IFAD's business processes have evolved significantly over the past decade, and some of these changes would be expected to have significant effects upon its partnership approach and how and why things occur. For instance, the IOE CLE on decentralisation (2016) found that having presence in-country has had a significant effect on partnerships created and maintained. However the synthesis confirmed that the basic principles of partnerships and why they succeed or fail remained more or less unchanged, and therefore the findings and lessons extracted from IOE evaluation of “older” IFAD projects are still relevant.
42. The main limitations to the CSPE review were their timing and way of reporting. The CSPEs were all conducted at different times. The assessment refers to information from CSPEs at the time of the evaluation, but performance may be different to date. Furthermore CSPEs may not have well captured all ongoing activities in the respective category. For instance, this sometimes required review of additional evidence and discussions with PMD staff for the in-depth case studies.
43. A major limitation in the CSPEs was that often partnership-relevant sections are descriptive and activity-oriented, describing the main partners and analysing factors for overall success and deficiencies. Yet reports rarely elaborate on intended or achieved specific outputs and outcomes from these partnerships,

beyond general comments on performance, partly due to the lack of outcome specification or of ready availability of such information at country level or in IFAD's corporate information systems, as for outcomes from knowledge grants. Most CSPEs, particularly in recent years, contain specific conclusions and recommendations on how to enhance partnerships and measure their performance.

44. A final limitation was the broad nature of IFAD partnerships and the challenges this posed for any evaluation and in particular for a synthesis which is primarily desk based. For this reason, focus group discussions to validate case studies and emerging findings have been built into the process of preparing this ESR.

G. Lessons on partnerships from other IFIs

45. Several other international finance institutions (IFIs) have addressed partnership performance in their evaluations in recent years. But only the ADB carried out a full-fledged partnership evaluation (2016), focusing on its corporate and global partnerships and their effectiveness in cofinancing, knowledge management, and coordination. Many of the findings and lessons learnt in these evaluations refer to management and effectiveness of trust funds and global partnership programs – that are of relevance for IFAD's grants programmes. There are also important lessons with high relevance for IFAD on other institutions' experience and lessons with partnerships in cofinancing, knowledge management, PPPs and CSOs. Specific lessons in fragile states and for small states were found in WB evaluations. Several evaluations included some general best practices for partnerships and limitations. (These lessons are presented in further detail in annex IX).
46. **Global partnerships** are highly visible and receive a lot of attention. However, the recent World Bank evaluation of Global Partnerships⁹ highlights some important limitations. First, there is a risk of proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives with inappropriate earmarking, and parallel budgeting and approval processes. Furthermore, many global and regional activities are neither tracked in any portfolio data base nor expected to produce results. And finally, many of these Global partnership programmes miss clear goals and indicators and independent evaluations.
47. The importance of **cofinancing** for better coordination, project results and policy influence is underlined in two regional Bank evaluations. The ADB partnership evaluation positively pointed out that cofinancing facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results. But it also found that a lot of collaborative cofinancing does not mobilize additional resources. A similar conclusion came out of the AfDB comprehensive evaluation of development results which concluded that AfDB cofinancing is not sufficiently oriented towards mobilizing additional resources for the Bank and projects, although positive practices were encountered in some cases.
48. Effective **knowledge partnership** in ADB consisted of collaboration on specific initiatives that led to more systematic and joint project preparation and implementation, engagement of high-level persons in conferences and policy dialogue, completion of a series of publications or events, sometimes with joint funding (WWF). What worked in ADB was to avoid vagueness and to link up knowledge partnerships with ADB technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement. In contrast, the introduction of knowledge hubs proved mostly unsuccessful due to poor design and focus, under-funding, and lack of linkages with ADB technical staff.
49. In terms of **coordination and cooperation partnerships** the ADB evaluation emphasized flexible engagement rules that may enable strengthening ties with

⁹ IEG (2015). *Opportunities and Challenges from Working in Partnership: Findings from IEG's Work on Partnership Programs and Trust Funds*. A learning focused note of World Bank findings on global and regional partnership programs over the last 10 years. World Bank. Washington, DC.

partners over time. Secondly, the ADB evaluation found that its formal partnerships are more often effective than non-formal ones. Third, where partnerships allow players to capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps positive results could be expected. Gains from aligning interests and tapping into partner strengths allow for a stronger voice with the government in promoting reforms, for example.

Key lessons from other IFIs

- The proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives in Global Partnership programmes can be reduced by linking those initiatives with country programmes and establishing effective oversight, setting goals and tracking results.
- Cofinancing does not necessarily mobilize additional resources but it facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results.
- Effective knowledge partnerships avoid vagueness and build strong links with the organization's technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement.
- Flexible engagement over time may enable strengthening ties with partners.
- Formal partnerships are more often effective than non-formal ones.
- Where partnerships allow players to capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps positive results could be expected.

Key points from Chapter 1

- **Partnerships are a means to an end** – a collaborative relationship toward mutually agreed objectives and involving shared responsibility for outcomes.
- Civil society organizations are seen as core partners for achieving IFAD mandate and strategic objectives. Among them, Farmers' Organizations (FOs) are very important strategic partners for IFAD as institutions that deliver services to their members, speak on their behalf and are becoming key actors in social and policy dialogue at the local, national and international levels.
- The Indigenous Peoples Policy (2009) encourages IFAD to promote systematic dialogue with representatives of national and subnational indigenous peoples' organizations to share information, consult with them on COSOPs, and promote their participation in institutional outreach and learning events.
- The Private-Sector Strategy (2011) states that working with private companies can bring additional financial resources, technology and access to markets for IFAD target groups.
- The key question to be explored in this synthesis is **what forms of partnership engagement, instruments and partnership modalities, and in what combinations, have been most relevant and effective for IFAD to achieve its partnership goal.**
- The main source of evidence for this synthesis is derived from a sample of 36 CSPEs conducted between 2006 and 2016. Additional evidence came from CLEs and ESRs prepared by IOE as well as from evaluations conducted by other IFIs.

II. Partnerships for development effectiveness

A. Partnerships –the changing context and IFAD response

50. **From Paris to Busan.** Partnership principles have been central in the **aid effectiveness agenda**, starting with the First High Level Forum in Rome (2002) which called for stronger partnerships and cooperation at country level. The Second High Level Forum in Paris (2005) concluded with a commitment to five partnership principles for improved aid effectiveness, including country ownership, donor harmonisation and alignment, and greater focus on and mutual accountability for development results. These principles were followed up during the Third High Level Forum in Accra (2008) through a broad-based alliance of development partners. The Fourth High Level Forum in Busan (2011) marked a shift in focus from aid effectiveness to the broader concept of **development effectiveness**, which provided a new inclusive framework beyond traditional donors and governments. It emphasised the important role of a wider range of development stakeholders such as the private sector, civil society organizations (CSOs), parliamentarians, and local authorities for effective results on the ground.
51. The inclusive framework on partnerships was further elaborated by the **High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda** (2013) which called for a New Global Partnership: "...A new partnership should be based on a common understanding of our shared humanity, underpinning mutual respect and mutual benefit in a shrinking world. This partnership should involve governments *but also include others: people living in poverty, those with disabilities, women, civil society and indigenous and local communities, traditionally marginalized groups, multilateral institutions, local and national government, the business community, academia and private philanthropy*".¹⁰ The need for diverse and inclusive partnerships was reiterated in the **Agenda 2030** which includes a dedicated goal: SDG 17 on multi-stakeholder partnerships and voluntary commitments.
52. **IFAD's Strategic Framework 2016 – 2025** recognises the changing context, which provides new challenges for agriculture and rural development and a new development architecture and financing architecture. The strategic framework highlights the importance of partnerships for IFAD to promote synergies among its own and other sources of finance, knowledge and expertise and create more enabling environments for poor people in rural areas to build their pathways out of poverty (p. 20).
53. The **partnership paper prepared for the consultations on IFAD11**¹¹ addresses more specifically the changing external context that will require stronger partnerships for IFAD. First, the Agenda 2030 involves a **broader rural transformation agenda** which will require IFAD to work with governments and other partners to leverage financing and knowledge, and advocate globally on issues of food security and nutrition, climate change mitigation, youth employment and empowerment of smallholder farmers.¹² Second, IFAD will have to continue adjusting its operational model by **improving resource mobilisation, allocation and utilisation** from diverse sources.

B. IFAD Strategic Framework and Partnership Strategy

IFAD policies on partnership

54. Whilst partnerships have always been part of IFAD's business model, as part of the consultations for the Eighth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources, the organization

¹⁰ The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, UN) 2013

¹¹ IFAD11 – Leveraging partnerships for country-level impact and global engagement. October 2017

¹² In a similar vein, the 2016 IFAD Rural Development Report refers to expanded possibilities for partnering on knowledge (p.24).

confirmed that it needed to take a more systematic and strategic approach to partnerships and defined a number of priority areas for action.

55. The **Strategic Framework 2011-2015** therefore highlighted the need for the organization “to strengthen its capacity to lead or contribute to national and international initiatives around small-scale agriculture, food security and rural poverty reduction...”. To this end, the Framework included “effective partnerships and resource mobilization” as one of eight principles of engagement. Under this principle, the Fund would “seek partnership opportunities and enhance its capacity to operate effectively with partners...in all thematic areas and at all levels.” Concurrently, IFAD committed itself to reporting back to the Executive Board in September 2011 on the success of its efforts to develop a more selective approach to partnerships and the progress achieved in the priority areas for action. This it did, through an Information Note on progress in developing a more strategic approach to partnership and collaboration, which further committed IFAD to preparing a partnership strategy.
56. The resulting **2012 Partnership Strategy** recognized that IFAD was already working with a wide array of partners in all aspect of its work. The need was to ensure that partnerships supported the achievement of IFADs strategic objectives (its corporate management results) and the strategy identified four broad partnership priorities: better country programmes and projects, better inputs into global policy engagement, increased mobilization of resources, and improved organizational efficiency.

Box 1

IFAD definition of partnerships

In the 2012 Partnership Strategy, partnerships are defined as ‘*Collaborative relationships between institutional actors that combine their complementary strengths and resources and work together in a transparent, equitable and mutually beneficial way to achieve a common goal or undertake specific tasks. Partners share the risks, responsibilities, resources and benefits of that collaboration and learn from it through regular monitoring and review*’.¹³ Embedded in the definition are the three principles of equity, transparency and mutual benefits.

57. While the Partnership Strategy identifies a number of priorities, it does not relate them to different forms of partnership engagement. The Partnership Strategy is oriented toward corporate-level outcomes, but does not propose strategies and objectives to include different partnership instruments, modalities and forms to achieve these outcomes. In particular, there is no guidance on how IFAD will strengthen country-level coordination for knowledge and learning, complementarities and synergies, ownership and sustainability and leverage.
58. The Review of the implementation of the Partnership Strategy during IFAD 9 and Priorities for IFAD10 updates the four strategic partnership priorities identified in the Partnership Strategies, to align them with the Pillars of Results Delivery of the Strategic Framework 2016 – 2025. It specifies the action areas through which the Partnership Strategy identifies, as (a) better management of partnerships, (b) knowledge management and communication for partnerships, (c) increased partnership skills and capacity and integration into business processes; and (d) effective monitoring of implementation.
59. The new IFAD **Strategic Framework 2016-2025** identifies partnerships both as one of its five principles of engagement and also as one of the means of strengthening the quality of IFAD’s country programmes. In addition to strengthening successful existing partnerships - collaboration with the Rome-based

¹³ A similar definition of collaborative partnerships was adopted by some other UN organisations, such as UNIDO and WFP.

agencies will be of strategic priority - and developing new ones, especially with partners with complementary areas of expertise, the IFAD Framework calls for IFAD to continue to engage with the international development community to build support around global issues affecting rural communities. At country level, it calls for IFAD to facilitate multi-stakeholder partnerships between governments, the private sector and small-scale rural producers; through amongst other mechanisms, South-South and Triangular Cooperation.

60. The Report on the Consultation on the **Eleventh Replenishment** of IFAD's resources (2017) commits IFAD to further strengthen its partnerships with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP), and a range of institutions such as multilateral development banks, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, bilateral development agencies, the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, foundations, non-government organizations (NGOs), farmers' associations and the private sector (para. 8). Under IFAD11, the fund has committed to increase its focus on country-level partnerships through stronger country presence.¹⁴

Partnership instruments

61. In IFAD's business model, partnerships with governments are the basis for the formulation and implementation of rural development programmes that respond to country- and area-specific needs. However, the success of these programmes very much relies on collaboration with other development partners, research institutions, the business sector and civil society. IFAD has a small range of instruments available to foster partnerships.
62. **Formal partnerships.** Some partnerships are formalized through Memoranda of Understanding or different types of agreements such as:
- **loan agreements** with Member States governments at the country level; this is the most common form of partnership that provides the foundation of IFAD's work at country level.
 - **supplementary funds agreements** at different levels with multilateral and bilateral organizations such as the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, World Bank, EU.
 - **grants agreements** for projects and activities at the global, regional and national levels with a number of networks and knowledge platforms which pioneer innovation in research for agricultural development (often with research or civil society organizations)
 - **institutional partnership agreements** with UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral development agencies.
63. **Informal partnerships.** Many partnerships and particularly those at the national and local levels are less formal and are not governed by any form of agreement. They function effectively on the basis of long-term cooperation and established trust and might end with project completion. For instance, some partnerships are established at the local level for knowledge sharing. Informal partnerships are established as well at ICOs level where they contribute to dialogue and networking. Other informal partnerships often work with civil society organizations and development partners.
64. **Brokering.** In addition to the above instruments, IFAD brokers partnerships between different players, promoting and facilitating partnerships between national or local governments and rural producers' organizations, between governments and private-sector players, or between rural producers' organizations and the private sector.

¹⁴ See IFAD11 consultation document "Enhancing IFAD11 business model to deliver impact at scale".

Global partnership initiatives

40. **Global partnerships are highly visible and receive a lot of attention at corporate level.** The IFAD partnership strategy (2012) has a strong focus on global partnership initiatives. It is, however, not explicit on the links between global, regional and country partnership initiatives. Spin-offs from global partnership initiatives thus may not be clearly perceived and reported as such at country level.
65. IFAD has been promoting certain **partnership modalities to strengthen cooperation and synergies with certain partners at global, regional and country levels.** These include RBA cooperation, South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) and private sector partnerships. These synergies were expected to serve multiple partnership objectives, including knowledge sharing, coordination and leveraging resources.
66. **PPPP.** IFAD is promoting the “4P” arrangement of public-private-producer partnerships, which ensures that smallholder producers are respected partners and that important partnership principles, such as transparency, fairness and accountability are followed, especially when it comes to recognizing local communities’ tenure rights (to land, water and forests), the role of women and environmental issues. IFAD’s experience in partnering with the private-sector centres on its role as a facilitator and ‘honest broker’. As stated in IFAD’s Strategic Framework 2011-2015, “As local and international private companies increasingly invest in agriculture, IFAD will partner with them to build mutually beneficial relations between small-scale producers and larger enterprises.” Through the projects and programmes that it supports, IFAD has forged partnerships between private companies and groups of small-scale producers along specific value chains.
67. **South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC).** South-South and Triangular Cooperation is a broad framework for promoting and supporting collaboration among countries of the South in areas such as transfer of knowledge, technology, policies and other resources.¹⁵ Since 2008 IFAD supports SSTC as an explicit corporate agenda item. SSTC are particularly intended to strategically reposition IFAD among a diverse group of middle-income countries (MICs) with differentiated services which has been discussed since IFAD8. As part of its Strategic Framework 2016-2025, as well as of the IFAD’s Approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation, IFAD plans to strengthen its work in the area of SSTC, seeing it as an integral part of its business model and of its country programming process. Through SSTC activities embedded within its countries portfolios, IFAD has the capacity to mobilize, connect and act as a broker for rural poor people across countries of the Global South. SSTC are particularly important for IFAD to work with upper MICs.
68. **RBA cooperation.** Collaboration among the United Nations Rome-based agencies (RBAs), FAO, IFAD, and WFP, is a core priority for all the three organizations at country, regional and global levels. In 2016, based on a request from their membership countries, the RBAs produced a document that outlines their joint efforts: *Collaboration among the United Nations Rome-based Agencies: Delivering on the 2030 Agenda*. The current and ongoing priorities for RBA collaboration are: country-level implementation of the 2030 Agenda; nutrition; resilience; data and statistics; and joint technical support to the Committee on World Food Security (CFS). In 2015, all three RBAs collaborated on 26 projects in 21 countries. According to the CLE on decentralisation ICOs generally viewed IFAD’s participation

¹⁵ The “Framework of operational guidelines on United Nations support to South-South and triangular cooperation” (2012) suggested the definition of SSC as “a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions.”

in the One UN Initiative as a low priority, given that IFAD's operating model is different and more akin to that of multilateral development banks (MDBs).

69. **Civil society organizations** are seen as core partners for achieving IFAD's mandate and strategic objectives. The 2011 – 2015 Strategic Framework included support to rural producers' organizations as an area of thematic focus. The partnership strategy (2012) lists civil society among the key partners for IFAD, but it does not outline a specific strategy for partnering with CSOs, nor specific objectives. IFAD also partners directly with international CSOs. For example, Oxfam Novib is working on integrating household approaches in agricultural extension, value chains and rural finance in sub-Saharan Africa, in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda with support from an IFAD grant,.
70. **Farmers' Organizations** and Rural Cooperatives are key partners within the framework of IFAD's strategic framework and working with them is a high priority. At country level, IFAD's partnerships with farmers' organizations have focused on two main strategies consisting in enhancing FOs' involvement in IFAD's Country Strategies (COSOP) and projects' design and enhancing FOs involvement in the implementation of IFAD-funded projects through a tripartite partnership between governments, IFAD and FOs. At the regional level, IFAD has supported the institutional development of FOs networks through regional programmes, including through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC). At the global level, in 2004 IFAD launched the Farmers' Forum as the overall framework of the partnership between IFAD and farmers' organizations.
71. **Indigenous peoples.** Since its establishment in 1978, IFAD has paid particular attention to indigenous peoples' issues, mainly in Latin America and Asia. The main instruments for IFAD's partnership support to indigenous peoples are loans, grants at country and regional levels and participation in the global debate on indigenous peoples' issues. The Indigenous Peoples Policy (2009) encourages IFAD to promote systematic dialogue with representatives of national and subnational indigenous peoples' organizations to share information, consult with them on COSOPs, and promote their participation in institutional outreach and learning events. However, at country level reference to indigenous peoples and their issues is not always explicit or and they may be discussed as part of "the vulnerable" or the "marginalized" in IFAD documents and CSPEs.

Monitoring partnerships

72. COSOPs are seen as the main tool for strategic planning, managing and monitoring of partnerships at country level.¹⁶ At the moment, performance on partnership is monitored through the annual client survey, which covers a selection of countries only.¹⁷ In 2017, partnership building was satisfactory in 33 per cent of the countries surveyed only. The highest scores were noted for ESA. Partnership building scores in 2016 and 2017 were below the 2014 scored.¹⁸
73. In response IFAD management has since then committed to generate better partnership results under the IFAD11 period through enhanced emphasis on organizational decentralisation and non-lending activities.¹⁹

C. IOE evaluations of partnership performance

74. Stagnating performance on partnership has also been noted in the **IOE Annual Report on the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI)**. The 2017 ARRI indicated a steady decline in evaluation ratings for partnership building, with moderately satisfactory or higher ratings declining from 91 per cent (2009-11) to

¹⁶ See IFAD11 Replenishment Outcome Document "Leaving no one behind", December 2017

¹⁷ In 2017 34 countries were invited to participate in the client survey but only 30 had eligible responses.

¹⁸ Recent activities and initiatives to better focus and selectivity and regular monitoring/reporting of partnership and providing stronger incentives to prioritize partnership-building include the revision of the RB-COSOP guidelines and new Supervision guidelines.

¹⁹ 2017 RIDE

75 per cent (2011-14) to 62 per cent, (2013-15).²⁰ The percentage of fully satisfactory ratings did not increase since 2006 and actually declined after 2011. At the same time the percentage of moderately unsatisfactory ratings remained stable (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2

Percentage of partnership-building ratings in 3-year moving averages (2006-2016)



Source: IFAD IOE ratings database (2017) – compiled from data in annex VII.3

75. **Poor performance of a range of countries in recent years indicates continued problems with partnerships in these countries and in partnership building in general.** Fully satisfactory performance was found only in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (ESR, WCA). The East and Southern Africa Division (ESA) with the highest frequency of satisfactory ratings. Notably, ESA is the only region without moderately unsatisfactory ratings (see Table 3 in Annex VII.1). Part of the reason for the very positive results for ESA have been the strong emphasis on partnership building in the region by the donor community and Governments after the Paris 2005 declaration on alignment and harmonization, with many countries developing Joint (Donor) Assistance Strategies during that period (as well as in a few West-African countries such as Mali). Least satisfactory performance has been noted in MICs (NEN, LAC, APR). The Latin America and the Caribbean Division (LAC) has the highest number of moderately unsatisfactory ratings. While there are some positive examples for partnerships improvements in some countries this finding still suggests IFAD to be more specific on partnership goals and strategy in MICs.
76. This ESR found to some extent the ratings decline is less related to the number of partnerships than to their quality and results. **Fully satisfactory performance was noted only in countries where all three categories of partnerships were present.** This indicates the need for a having a mix of partners and types of partnership engagement to achieve good results at country level (see figure 1 in Annex VIII.2). Moreover, IFAD expectations of partnership building have changed over time. There is now more attention from IFAD management (and evaluators) on partnerships, reinforced by the 2011 partnership strategy, increased country presence and improved COSOPs. All these factors put the bar for performance in partnership building higher.
77. **Outlier analysis.** The ESR has looked at the outliers that had CSPE ratings for partnership building that were higher or lower than the average “moderately satisfactory” (4). These outliers are the seven CSPEs where partnership has been rated “moderately unsatisfactory” (3) and the five CSPEs where partnership have

²⁰ The 2017 ARRI notes that while partnerships with government have been positive, there was scope for improvement in partnerships with other IFIs and private entities. Similarly, ICOs could develop substantive partnerships, rather than just the number of partnerships.

been rated “satisfactory” (5) in the sample of 36 CSPEs for this ESR. Countries that had a **broad-based partnering approach** and **good strategic focus** together with a **strong non-lending programme** were rated high, while those that heavily depended on Government as key partner and had missed opportunities to partner with other actors were rated low. The examples are presented in further detail in the following chapter.

Table 1
Overview of outliers

<i>Positive outliers (“satisfactory”)</i>	<i>Negative outliers (“moderately unsatisfactory”)</i>
Broad-based partnering approach (Madagascar, Niger) Strong support to FOs (Madagascar, Mali, Niger) Collaboration with RBAs (Mali, Mozambique)	Few partnerships outside Government (Bolivia, Gambia, Nigeria, Turkey)
Strong cofinancing (Mali)	Little or no cofinancing (Nigeria, India)
Successful PPPP (Uganda)	Missed opportunities to partner with private sector (Ecuador, India, Nigeria, Turkey)
Good alignment, donor coordination (Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Uganda); Strong non-lending activities (Madagascar) Focus on complementarities (Niger, Uganda).	Lack of strategic focus (Nigeria) Weak or unrealistic COSOP goals (Ecuador, Indonesia)

Source: IOE review of CSPEs in Annex VII.3

Key points from chapter II


- The rural transformation agenda under the Agenda 2030 will require IFAD to work with a **broader range of partners** and to adjust its operational model by improving resource mobilisation, allocation and utilisation from diverse sources.
- IFAD’s business model relies on strong partnerships with Government.
- Main **partnership instruments** are loans and grants. Besides IFAD has a limited range of instruments available for partnership building, such as dialogue, networking and brokering.
- Many partnerships at national and local levels are less formal and not governed by any form of agreement.
- One of the most prevalent forms of partnerships is **cofinancing**, mostly with international financial institutions (IFIs) and bi-laterals (including the EU through a global partnership).
- According to IOE evaluations, poor performance of a range of countries in recent years indicates that partnerships have been too narrow or too weak to support IFAD’s goals in these countries.
- Fully satisfactory performance was noted only in countries where all three categories of partnerships were present.
- Countries that had a **broad-based partnering approach** and **good strategic focus** together with a **strong non-lending programme** were rated high by IOE.
- Countries that heavily depended on Government as key partner and had missed opportunities to partner with other actors were rated low.

III. Main findings from the synthesis

D. Relevance and prevalence of partnership categories

78. This section will discuss the relevance and importance of the three main partnership categories at IFAD that were already briefly presented in the ToC, based on the CSPE sample reviewed by this ESR. It will also review the importance of certain key IFAD partners, using data from the recent PRM survey.
79. This ESR uses **three main categories of partnerships** for country engagement that are primarily defined by (i) cofinancing and other financial arrangements, (ii) knowledge and learning, and (iii) coordination and cooperation for various purposes and partnership outcomes. They build on similar categories applied by the 2016 ADB partnership evaluation²¹.
80. Figure 3 shows the sample CSPEs, or countries, that are reporting nothing, some, substantial and very strong partnerships in each of the three categories. 'Very strong' or 'substantial' partnerships are reported for cofinancing partnerships (16 countries), followed by knowledge and learning (14 countries) and coordination and cooperation partnerships (12 countries). For a significant number of countries there was no evidence reported in the CSPEs on the respective partnership category (8 or 7, depending on category).

Figure 3
Importance of different partnership categories



Source: CSPE review, compiled from data in Annex V.1

Cofinancing partnerships

81. Financing partnerships (or cofinancing)²² combine the financial resources of partners to support development efforts and create cofinancing opportunities. This includes joint or parallel financing of classical IFAD loan projects with international partners (IFIs, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), etc.).²³ Cofinancing is also sometimes found in grants, such as in the form of contributions from Governments or private sector. For IFAD an important goal for seeking cofinancing, in addition to

²¹ AfDB 2016

²² According to the definition in OECD 2007, Glossary of Statistical Terms, cofinancing is "The joint or parallel financing of programs or projects through loans or grants to developing countries provided by commercial banks, export credit agencies, other official institutions in association with other agencies or banks, or the World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions."

²³ Financing partnerships may increasingly also consist of domestic cofinancing in recipient countries, cofinancing with international or national foundations, CSOs or private sector as partners (partly financed through global trust-funds), and sizable government counterpart funding in IFAD loan- or grant-funded projects (e.g. in well-funded MICs).

increased outreach and impact, is to leverage additional resources into the agricultural sector.

82. In fact IFAD anticipates that future sources of cofinancing will have to shift and diversify with the changing opportunities and demands of IFAD's clients and partners, particularly MICs and private sector (PRM Replenishment Paper 2017). Yet CPMs also note that each region also faces different specific situations regarding domestic cofinancing.²⁴
83. **International cofinancing** mainly comes from multilateral sources. Between 2003 and 2015, IFAD's top cofinancing partners were the International Development Association (\$1.0 billion), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (\$0.8 billion), OFID (\$0.5 billion), African Development Bank (AfDB) (\$0.3 billion), Islamic Development Bank (\$0.1 billion) and the European Union (\$0.1 billion) (Source: Decentralization CLE).

Box 2

CPM feedback from on the importance of cofinancing partners

At country level, the relative importance of cofinancing partners shows a slight difference, as indicated in the feedback from CPMs collected through the PRM survey (see annex III). For the CPMs, the most important partner for cofinancing is Government, followed by various multilateral agencies, with OFID, World Bank and EU as the most important ones. GEF is mentioned as a cofinancing partner only once. The private sector has played a role in cofinancing in 6 countries, according to the survey. The feedback from CPMs also indicated difficulties in partnerships, in particular with the EU.

84. IFAD also mobilizes **supplementary project funds** outside of the regular replenishment (and its regular grant programme of work), sometimes covering important thematic niches²⁵ or collaborating with other Global Funds.²⁶ For instance, the IFAD-GEF partnership is a particularly important and long-running source of supplementary funds and cooperation that capitalizes on linkages between GEF strategic priorities and IFAD programmes and projects, to make them mutually reinforcing and to ensure maximum financial and ecological sustainability.²⁷ Within the CSPEs reviewed there were references to GEF partnerships in Brazil,²⁸ Jordan and Ecuador.
85. Cofinancing partnerships are more important in LICs than in MICs, as are coordination and cooperation partnerships. Knowledge and learning partnerships are more often reported for MICs.

²⁴ According to CPMs in ESA, MICs are not particularly keen to provide high domestic cofinancing as they prefer IFAD to help them through knowledge and technological innovations


²⁵ For example environmental funds (such as the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme, ASAP, and GEF) and some assorted other topics (such as ICT, supported by the Government of Korea; remittances and agricultural risk management supported by the EU)

²⁶ For example the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme, GAFSP

²⁷ The IFAD-GEF unit became the environment and climate division (ECD) in 2010. It works with country programme managers (CPMs) to design components that complement IFAD loan-funded projects by reinforcing the sustainability of outcomes to enable governments to meet their national commitments on environment and climate.

²⁸ Also see Brazil case study on scaling up, presented in Chapter III F.

Figure 4

Importance of partnerships by country category - countries reporting substantial and very strong partnerships by MIC and LIC country category

Source: CSPE review, compiled from data in Annex V.1

Knowledge and learning partnerships

86. Knowledge and learning (K&L) partnerships are alliances and networks that focus on generating and transferring knowledge and innovations in a particular sector or theme, and on learning and applying this knowledge in operations and harmonizing approaches. Knowledge and learning partnerships at IFAD have two main purposes: first, to add technical content to IFAD interventions and facilitate innovations, such as through applied and action research. And secondly, to facilitate exchange and learning on best practices and to inform policy engagement, to allow for mainstreaming and scaling-up of IFAD interventions. The main instruments for knowledge and learning partnerships are grants for partners at regional level, in countries and through SSTC.
87. K&L results and related grants are not as rigorously designed, monitored and reported as loan projects, most importantly, they are not assembled in a corporate data base which often makes it difficult to know and assess their effects, even in countries and for IFAD country offices (ICOs) where they are active. The storage and retrieval of grants documentation and data has been weak, which limited learning from results.²⁹ In addition, knowledge and learning partnerships include a number of informal partnerships with international and national partners, which are often mentioned in the COSOP and the related documentation, but outcomes from these partnerships are not systematically documented.
88. The PRM survey (see annex III) mentions Government as the most important partner for knowledge and learning at country level, followed by research institutes and multilateral agencies, in particular the RBAs. However, despite the RBAs being rated as the "second most important partner" there was very limited evidence on results from RBA partnerships in the CSPEs under review.

Coordination and cooperation partnerships

89. Coordination and cooperation partnerships are tactical and strategic relationships with development partners, beyond the first two categories, to further help IFAD implement its corporate objectives and country strategies. They seek to promote broad-based cooperation at country level in coordinating development approaches and acting as partners, in project and program design, loan and grant investments,

²⁹ Since the 2009 policy strategic workplans for grants are required, at corporate level. But these workplans are not always transparent, poorly monitored, and apparently not too well aligned with country COSOPs. In countries grants are to be used to further COSOP objectives (grants to be integrated in and linked through COSOP). Yet many grants respond to ad-hoc requests from proposals, rather than follow a strategic plan. This may change with the new 2015 grant policy. For the purposes of this ESR the 2009 grant policy is used as reference since application of and results from the 2015 grant policy and procedures would be too early to be captured by CSPEs or other evaluations.

analytical work and policy engagement. They may be more oriented towards improved service delivery through partnerships (such as cooperation with RBAs, IFIs and Governments) or to generating links across areas (such as health, education and agriculture) to produce synergies. The extent of cooperation in these partnerships may vary. Coordination and cooperation partnerships could be related to IFAD loan projects or to the broader non-lending program.

90. Coordination and cooperation partnerships are often **informal** and therefore not systematically documented and tracked.

Less frequent partnerships

91. Within the portfolio reviewed by this ESR some partnerships are reported more frequently than others, as indicated in the sections above and further discussed in the following sections. It becomes evident that not all partnerships and, even more importantly, not all partnership outcomes are equally well reported. However some partnerships are simply less common or frequent and hence there is less evidence available on the outcomes.
92. The PRM survey sheds some light on this. For some partners, although they appear as a strategic priority at global level, there is actually no or limited engagement in many countries. Indigenous peoples groups were prominent partners in LAC and APR only; in the other regions they are not even present. It also appears that there is no or limited engagement with several of the multi-lateral and bilateral agencies in a number of countries (e.g. WFP, CGIAR, IFIs, World Bank) (see annex III).


Key points from Section A – Relevance and prevalence

- IFAD partnerships can be classified into three categories. These three categories of partnerships are equally important and they have **complementary roles** to play in enhancing IFAD's development effectiveness at global, regional and country levels.
- **Financing partnerships** (or cofinancing) combine the financial resources of partners and are (almost) always formal. The most important partner for cofinancing is Government, followed by various multilateral agencies, with OFID, World Bank and EU as the most important ones.
- **Knowledge and learning partnerships** are formal and informal alliances and networks that are often supported through regional and country grants.
- **Coordination and cooperation partnerships** are relationships of tactical or strategic importance, sometimes funded by grants. But they are often informal and therefore not systematically documented and tracked.

E. Differences in partnership modalities, instruments and partners in MICs and LICs

93. IFAD's partnership strategy is not explicit on how partnerships should be developed in different types of countries. Yet there are important differences with regard to the relevance and importance of different partnership modalities, instruments and partners in MICs and LICs. These differences will be reviewed in the following section for the four country categories commonly used by IFAD (lower-income countries (LICs), upper MICs, lower MICs and countries with fragile or the Most Fragile Situations (MFS). The information is based on the 36 reviewed CSPEs.
94. The **prevalence of partners** shows some variation between the different country categories. Partnerships with International Development Partners and IFIs are more frequently reported in LICs. Private sector and farmers' organizations are slightly more frequent partners of IFAD in MICs.

Figure 5
Proportion of partner types (out of all partners) reported in LICs and MICs



Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V tables 4 – 5

95. **Partnership goals and partnership requirements and preferences are very different in LICs, lower and upper MICs and MFSs.** They also vary by region and depend on the primary beneficiaries. The most notable differences exist between Latin America, Eastern Europe and parts of NEN and those of sub-Saharan Africa and much of Asia where IFAD works. Latin America includes a number of advanced countries with strong national and regional CSOs.

Box 3

Feedback from CPMs – Partnerships differ in MICs and LICs

According to the PRM survey, partnerships were less satisfactory in upper and lower MICs. In LICs the majority of partnerships were found at least moderately satisfactory. The survey indicates that partnerships with indigenous peoples groups, farmers' organizations and FAO were working well in upper and lower MICs. The Feedback from lower MICs indicates difficulties in partnerships with traditional donors (EU, World Bank, bilateral agencies) and research/academic institutions.

96. **Middle-income countries** are a very heterogeneous category, including lower and upper MICs.³⁰ The diversity within MICs as a group makes generalizations difficult and poses challenges to IFAD's overall approach and strategy. It is clear that what MICs need from IFAD is changing.³¹ Government roles and demand for partnerships, including the partnership with IFAD, change over time as economies grow, the rural sector diversifies and the structure and patterns of rural poverty evolve. **Upper MICs** are interested in SSTC and technical know-how, in addition to being recipients of IFAD loans, and they are often also emerging donors.
97. **Low-income countries** require more interaction with Government and investment into basic partner capacity building than MICs. IFAD needs more non-governmental partners for project implementation, coordination and service delivery where government capacities are weak (often LICs, MFSs) or in countries affected by natural and political calamities. For the same reasons, **fragile and conflict-affected states** that have many problems with Government performance require special attention to alternative partnerships in order to ensure effective delivery of projects and services.

³⁰ Over 100 countries with GNI per capita of US\$ 1,036 to US\$ 12,615 are classified as MICs. They range in size from China, Brazil and India to Antigua and Lesotho. 72 percent of IFAD's recipient Member States are currently (2012) classified as MICs, compared with 57 per cent in 2004. The proportion of LICs will continue to decrease. In 2012, IFAD disbursed around 70 percent of its resources to MICs, as compared with 38 percent in 2004 (IOE ESR on MICS 2014)

³¹ See ESR on Middle-income countries


Box 2

Case study Nepal: CSO partnership in Nepal

Nepal is an example for partnerships with CSOs in difficult environments and fragile and conflict affected states. In Nepal, IFAD directly builds on the 2006 policy on IFAD Crisis Prevention and Recovery that suggests identifying relevant institutional development competencies in rural organizations, CSOs and CBOs for enhancing social cohesion and community resilience in rural areas. While most partners are financed through project loans the CSPE points out that cooperation works better through grants, partly due to public procurement rules. Secondly, there apparently is a drawback to generating thousands of non-sustainable beneficiary groups as “partners” to deliver goods and services. At the time of the CSPE (2012), there were few self-reliant and sustainable farmer organizations in Nepal. In general, the multitude of CSOs and beneficiary associations complicates partnering and synergies in Nepal. The CSPE concludes for Nepal that there are too many project-dependent beneficiary groups, but a shortage of profitable enterprises and sufficiently strong community organizations.

98. **The review of CSPEs shows that partnership instruments and modalities vary between MICs and LICs. Loans and grants** are almost equally used in MICs and LICs. While loan-funded projects are still a priority in many MICs, non-lending activities – knowledge management, policy engagement and partnerships – become particularly important in MICs, as is the scaling-up agenda. In MICs partnerships are more often geared towards communicating IFAD approaches and experiences, alliance building and lobbying. Interestingly IFAD is more likely to adopt a **brokering** role in MICs, the increasing requirement for IFAD to work more indirectly with a wider range of partners and enable them to play a greater role in development in these countries.
99. **Dialogue and networking** are more common in LICs, mainly because in many LICs there is a more elaborate structure of development assistance to support dialogue and networking among development partners and IFAD has to play a direct role in it. In general, donor cooperation – and the platform it provides for dialogue and networking - is somewhat weaker in MICs than in LICs, in particular in upper income MICs. **RBA cooperation** appears to be more common in LICs for the same reason.

Figure 6

Partnership instruments and modalities in LICs and MICs (Prevalence in CSPE sample)

Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V tables 4 – 5

100. **Knowledge and learning** is relatively more *in demand* in higher income countries (MICs) than in lower income and fragile countries although *importance* of K&L may not actually vary. **SSTC** as a special mechanism of South-South knowledge transfer is of highest importance for the upper middle-income countries, at least on the supply side; while all countries may participate in taking part in related exchanges.

101. **PPPPs** have higher prevalence in LICs despite their weaker economy. Apparently, in the absence of effective government funding, IFAD has placed greater emphasis on bringing in the private sector to provide critical services and investments in LICs. On the other hand, there seem to have been either less attention to or fewer opportunities to broker PPPPs in MICs although the private sector is more present in those countries. An alternative reason could be that in MICs the private sector is more mature and may neither require, nor desire, public sector interventions.

Key points from Section B – Differences in MICs and LICs

- **IFAD's partnership strategy does not specify the strategic focus of partnership development in different types of countries. Yet, partnership goals and partnership requirements and preferences are very different in LICs, lower and upper MICs and fragile and conflict affected states.**
- **Upper MICs** are interested in technical know-how and SSTC, in addition to being recipients of IFAD loans, and they are often also emerging donors.
- In **low-income countries** and **fragile and conflict-affected states** IFAD relies to a greater extent on partners outside of government. But overall, the number of partnerships is lower in LICs than in MICs.
- **Dialogue and networking** are more common in LICs, mainly because in many LICs there is a more elaborate structure to support dialogue and networking about development partners.
- MICs often have significant domestic **cofinancing**, particularly upper MICs. Cofinancing opportunities with other donors decrease with country income level, while those with Government and other domestic partners increase.

F. Effectiveness of various partnership categories and types of engagement

Cofinancing partnerships

102. In line with the globally growing importance of cofinancing, the ESR found strong and substantial evidence of **international cofinancing** with other donors in many countries within the CSPE sample (annex VII.3). For the related evaluation periods five countries had international cofinancing ratios above 100 per cent: Ghana, Mali, Nepal and Uganda (annex IV.2); while 22 countries had less than 50 per cent, the lowest being Brazil, Nigeria, China and Vietnam.³²
103. **Cofinancing opportunities with other donors clearly decrease with country income level**, while those with Government and other domestic partners increase. There is a large amount of **Government cofinancing** in Brazil, China, Nigeria, Pakistan and Uganda (>100 per cent) (annex IV.2), and significant amounts of non-Government domestic cofinancing can be found in India and Uganda (50–100 per cent). This indicates the potential of tapping other cofinancing sources beyond international donors, particularly in emerging lower MICs, such as Nigeria, India and Uganda and in upper MICs.
104. **Cofinancing with other donors** worked best in countries with long-term trust built-up between partners (Ethiopia, Ghana), and where the number of IFAD cofinancing partners are not too large (sometimes there is reference to too many scattered and small cofinancing partnerships, such as in Kenya, Nicaragua). It helps when donors are 'like-minded' in their development philosophy and approaches, as was the case in the Republic of Moldova.
105. In some countries, cofinancing is the rule, rather than the exception (such as in Mali), in others it is not encouraged (e.g. Nigeria) or difficult in practice because

³² These figures are based on the IFAD GRIPS data base, but only include countries with CSPEs in 2006-2016

aid is primarily provided through budget-support. In some countries high cofinancing shares may be driven by individual projects, such as in an IFAD-WB cofinanced project in Nepal. Country specific cofinancing also varies dramatically by the period examined and the source of project cofinancing information (planned at design or actually cofinancing in the end).

106. **A number of CSPEs describe international cofinancing as 'under-exploited' and recommend stronger pursuit of cofinancing**, in particular with other MDBs (Brazil, China, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Vietnam and others). The CSPEs refer to several reasons why cofinancing may be difficult for IFAD, or even impossible. Often these are related to Government and other donor preferences. In many countries Governments prefer to work separately with donors, for a variety of reasons. And there often is no solid base or rationale for cofinancing as other donors are on different time lines or there is not sufficient overlap of interests and priorities, or of targeted areas or beneficiaries. Even in countries with good cofinancing it is sometimes difficult to align schedules with others (Mali). In many countries cofinancing was limited due to prevailing and preferred budget support by Government and other major donors.

Hypothesis testing: *The hypothesis that (international) cofinancing may be over-rated for country partnership outcomes was rejected for seven countries (although there was some evidence to its full or partial veracity in other countries).*

107. Cofinancing may be over-rated for resource mobilisation, but it has an important place for country partnership outcomes, particularly through its co-variant effects, such as for complementarities and policy engagement. This has been confirmed by the lessons from other IFIs (see Chapter IID) and the cofinancing analysis conducted by this ESR (see Chapter IIIE). But as with so many partnership efforts, cofinancing also entails certain costs and trade-offs. A recent study conducted by RIA³³ concluded that projects with large amounts of cofinancing often disburse slower.

Knowledge and learning partnerships (K&L)

108. **Much of the IFAD support for knowledge and learning work comes from grants.** Global and regional grants cover 70 per cent by numbers and 77 per cent by volume of all grants (according to the CLE Grants).³⁴ IFAD grants are provided for agricultural research, knowledge management, policy engagement, and capacity building for government and CSOs, particularly for pro-poor research on innovative approaches, strengthened partners' institutional and policy capacities, enhanced advocacy and policy engagement and sharing of knowledge for development impact.³⁵ FAO is the single biggest grant recipient of IFAD with 7.6 percent of total grants between 2004 and 2013 (CLE grant). Grants for FAO included knowledge work, policy engagement, and capacity building.³⁶ ICARDA and ICRAF were ranked 2nd and 3rd according to the CLE.³⁷

Hypothesis testing: *Knowledge and learning were found in half of the CSPEs (18 countries) to be significantly positively correlated to research grants to international and national institutions and country level work by these organizations. In general, grants were found critical for effective partnerships in 15 countries.*

³³ IFAD. Disbursement performance of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 2017.

³⁴ The 2015 IFAD Policy for Grant Financing maintains grants at 6.5 per cent of the projected IFAD annual programme of loans and grants, distributed to global and regional grants (5 per cent) and country specific grants (1.5 per cent), which would correspond to 70 per cent for global and regional grants of all grants.

³⁵ IFAD 2015 Policy for Grant Financing, para. 8

³⁶ Topics covered Animal Health Packages for the Rural Poor, Wheat Rust and Early Warning, Poultry Development, Fostering Financial Innovations (CABFIN), and Capacity Development for Better Management of Public Investments in Small Scale Agriculture.

³⁷ The CLE does not present outputs and outcomes of collaboration with FAO, but it looked at conditions under which grants to UN agencies are working. This included the presence of some specific and cutting-edge thematic/technical/normative expertise; and, secondly, leadership in high-level policy discussion and dialogue, strength of network and demonstrated convening capacity.

109. **Grants allow IFAD to collaborate with a wide range of institutions** that have a comparative advantage in certain areas and can therefore provide complementary input to advance IFAD's mandate (CLE grants). Grants have been instrumental in fostering cooperation with other institutions, such as the Indigenous Peoples' Forum and regional farmer federations. Often grants enabled IFAD to broaden its partnerships beyond the loan projects and cooperate with research institutions and civil society organizations. In a number of cases these partnerships have helped to develop innovative approaches or knowledge products. For example, in Nepal, IFAD is very active on K&L with many CSOs, including a programme with SNV (an international Dutch NGO) on developing an innovative and inclusive business approach. In Mali, grants resulted in improved techniques and approaches in IFAD micro-finance interventions. The RuralStruc grant is an example of an innovative partnership grant, implemented in cooperation with a French NGO, to produce a major study to prepare a project for unemployed youth (FIER). The revised 2009 grant policy had already included private sector as recipient for IFAD grants.
110. **A large share of IFAD funding for knowledge and innovation goes into global and regional grants, but these have been insufficiently linked with the country programmes.** The IOE CLE grants found too few links between global and regional grants and individual country programmes, such as loan-funded investment projects and country policy engagement. Results and learning from such grants inadequately benefit country programmes, although many are simply multi-country programs, not addressing trans-border issues or public goods. The CLE argued that some grant activities at country level could be better carried out by national rather than international institutions (research). The CSPEs noted for Ecuador, Nigeria, and Tanzania that there was too little integration of regional grants with the national IFAD programme and networking between grants and loans in general. The China CSPE found little awareness among Chinese primary IFAD partners of IFAD global and regional grants that also operate in China. Global and regional grants insufficiently linked to the main lending programme.
111. **Grants that go to international research organizations often do not lead to uptake of innovations in the country.** The CSPE for India missed the incorporation of CG centers in India and finds their operations in the country not clear. It notes too little linking up of the country programme with reputed national and international specialists and think tanks despite all the grants to International Research Institutions active in the country. Similarly, the CSPE for Nigeria reports a considerable number of grants for innovation for technology (e.g. for IITA on cassava); but their effectiveness and link-up with loan activities in the country is spurious. Vertical connections between research grants to IRRI and WorldFish are somewhat better in Bangladesh where they are strategic and at least partly connected to the country program. An exception to weak regional/country linkages is found in the Philippines where innovation grants with international centers were well related to several projects, mainly helped by the strong presence of international centers in the country.

Coordination and cooperation partnerships

112. IFAD country partnerships for coordination and cooperation tend to have multiple purposes, ranging from specific project-based cooperation and better service delivery to long-term alliances, from aiming at policy engagement and influence, to scaling-up to addressing specific gender interests and those of marginalized groups and indigenous peoples. Partnerships with RBAs, other donors, CSOs/FOs and private sector are very diverse.

Hypothesis testing: *Coordination and cooperation partnerships work best when accompanied by regular country and global interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities of involved agencies (19 countries).*

113. **Coordination and cooperation partnerships with international donors can be an effective vehicle for leveraging policy influence in countries with a well-functioning aid coordination structure.** The best examples for coordination and cooperation partnerships are national working groups for agriculture or specific sub-sectors in agriculture and rural development. Consultative partnerships with other donors are particularly strong in many sub-Saharan countries with strong donor Joint Assistance Strategies, such as Tanzania, Zambia, or Uganda. In Tanzania, the ASDP (Agriculture Sector Development Programme) as the key Government/donor aid delivery mechanism is seen as very important for influence and leverage. Sometimes these partnerships are being organized in the context of the UN and UNDAF (Niger, Pakistan, Yemen).
114. **Cooperation partnerships with civil society organizations (CSOs) can be important for leveraging influence on specific issues that are at the core of IFAD's mandate.** Strategic partners in this respect are farmers' organizations and indigenous people's organizations. IFAD's work with farmers' organizations is particularly strong in Latin America, the Sahel and parts of Asia; and in countries that emphasize cooperative development (Rwanda and Vietnam).³⁸ Other case studies of strong and long-term work with Farmers Organizations were found in Mali (since 1999), Niger, Vietnam and Nicaragua.³⁹ IFAD receives supplementary funds from the European Union for support to farmer organization networks.
115. **Grants are an important instrument for partnerships with non-governmental organizations.** Partnerships with civil society organizations (CSOs) were in the majority of cases established through grants. In the CSPE sample, CSO partnerships were established through grants in 21 countries; through loans only in 9 countries. Partnerships with farmers' organizations were through grants in 7 countries, through loans in 3 countries.
116. **Partnerships with CSO platforms and apex organizations enable more strategic engagement.** The low capacity of CSOs to engage with development partners was often found to be a limitation.⁴⁰ IFAD's partnership with CSO platforms or apex organizations was instrumental to overcome these constraints and leverage influence in policy processes. In the case of AROPA⁴¹ in Madagascar (2007-08) the national Apex Farmer Organizations played an important role in the country programme strategy design. National and provincial FOs were active members of the 2006-2012 COSOP Preparation Committee and in the 2015-2019 COSOP they worked in thematic groups and sub-groups to propose key strategic areas of intervention. They also have four seats at the national CPMT contributing to tripartite discussions with IFAD and the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture. In Senegal, the national apex FOs participated to the 2010-2015 COSOP design process through various multi-stakeholder workshops and the validation workshop contributing to the identification of key areas for IFAD investments.

³⁸ Some of the information in the following section comes from the 'Partnership in Progress 2014-2015 Report' to the sixth global meeting of the Farmers' Forum in conjunction with the thirty-ninth session of IFAD's Government Council, 15-16 February 2016

³⁹ IFAD-supported farmers' organizations in Mali were chosen in 2016 to receive a direct grant from the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme for strengthening the 'missing middle' of producer organizations in value chains. IFAD FO Focus in Niger is on decentralization and independent community structures for better market integration. In Vietnam IFAD's strategy is to work with farmers' and women's unions. The IMPP project partnered successfully with a Women's Union vocational training centre, associated with a textile company. The DBRP project piloted enterprises with Farmers' Union to supply decorative leaves and flowers.

⁴⁰ See: IEG Evaluation of Engaging Citizens for Better Development Results (2017); also ADB evaluation of partnerships (2016)

⁴¹ Projet d'Appui au Renforcement des Organisations Professionnelles et aux Services Agricoles

Box 3

Case study India: IFAD a partners of choice in remote areas of India

In a large lower middle-income country like India, the government views IFAD as a partner of choice in remote areas where agricultural productivity is lagging and poverty incidence is high. State governments also value IFAD's cooperation due to its attention to quality, reaching deeper in poverty layers, support to imaginative and innovative solutions and some tolerance for risk taking. For example, the North-East Region Community Resource Management Project (NERCORMP) works with 21 tribes, each with its own language, customs and systems of land tenure and local governance. Some of the project villages are situated in conflict-prone areas characterised by rivalries between tribes. In many projects local authorities are involved at all levels and provide political and technical support. In two projects (OTELP and NERCORMP), close interaction and partnership with the District Magistrate facilitated the recognition of forest and land rights for tribal poor and leveraged resources from national schemes for watershed management projects.

117. There are only very few references in the assessed CSPEs to partnerships with **Indigenous Peoples**, most notably the report on India, where Scheduled Tribes are actually one of the main IFAD target category (see also case study in scaling-up section). In Vietnam one project (3PAD) worked specifically with ethnic minorities to promote agro-forestry, eco-tourism, agribusiness and PPPP for sustainable forestland use. Interestingly, in Ecuador the CSPE reported some resentment for preference for Indigenous Peoples compared with similarly poor other smallholder farmers. The other countries where activities targeted to Indigenous Peoples are mentioned in the reviewed CSPEs are Argentina and Bolivia, but without providing much detail.

Key points from Section C – Effectiveness of partnership types

- **Cofinancing** from international and domestic partners has been important in many countries, but often the CSPEs found that opportunities for cofinancing were not sufficiently pursued. In particular there is scope for IFAD to tap into significant domestic cofinancing in upper MICs.
- Cofinancing may be over-rated for resource mobilisation, but it has an important place for country partnership outcomes, particularly through its co-variant effects, such as for complementarities and policy engagement.
- **Knowledge and learning** were found to be significantly positively correlated to research grants to international and national institutions and country level work by these organizations.
- In general, grants are critical for effective partnerships. However, a large share of IFAD grant funding goes to international research organizations that often do not lead to uptake of innovations in the countries.
- **Coordination and cooperation** partnerships work best when accompanied by regular country and global interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities of involved agencies. These types of partnerships are often very effective in policy engagement.

G. Effectiveness of specific partnership modalities**RBA cooperation**

118. **Despite RBA cooperation being a corporate priority, in general, IFAD partnership with RBAs and UN was found to be weak.** The majority of CSPEs do not report significant involvement, sometimes referring to underexploited potential, particularly with FAO (Kenya)⁴². The PRM survey showed that country

⁴² The approach paper referred to the KCEP-CRAL Kenya as an example where FAO, WFP and IFAD have come together in partnership.

programme managers were relatively satisfied in engaging with FAO, although it is not clear in what context (e.g. FAO Investment Centre project design, IFAD grant to FAO, or other form of cooperation). The ESR SSTC also noted that opportunities with RBAs around SSTC have not been fully exploited. Nevertheless, a few positive country examples of partnerships with FAO and WFP were found, among others in Brazil, China, Mali, Mozambique and Turkey.

Hypothesis testing: *In 11 of the 36 CSPEs there was some indication that interagency coordination with RBAs works best where there are clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level.*

119. **There are only few cases of RBA collaboration reported on specific projects**, such as those in Mali (PIDRN and PIDRK); and on formulation with the FAO Investment Centre. With WFP in several FSN activities; outreach to conflict areas. Mozambique appears to have had one of the strongest long-term collaborations with RBAs among the CSPEs reviewed. First in a market support project from 2008-11, then in an EC-funded MDG1c project to promote nutrition. This included joint field visits. Still, the CSPE reports that there have been many coordination issues, particularly as RBA modes of operation are different. In addition, complementarities between RBAs have apparently not been optimal.
120. **For pragmatic reasons, ICOs are often hosted within other RBAs**, but as noted by the CLE decentralisation (2016) this usually did not strengthen substantive and programmatic collaboration due to differing business models and priorities. An exception may be China where IFAD used to share office premises with WFP and developed a joint IFAD/WFP programme from 1999 to 2005. There is also cooperation with the FAO Investment Centre on project design and implementation assistance.
121. **RBA cooperation seems to have been more successful within the context of wider coordination among development partners and in particular the UN**. For example for Brazil the CSPE reported a good partnership with RBAs, particularly in the UN coordination group. There was for instance joint policy engagement on family farming. IFAD joined forces with RBA in SSTC and in the Africa Brazil Food 'Purchasing from Africans for Africans' Programme (PAA). RBA was strategically emphasized in the 2008 COSOP, but the latest CSPE (2015) still recommends more work with RBAs. Otherwise partnerships with RBAs were rated low in LAC according to the PRM survey.⁴³

South-South and Triangular Cooperation

122. Most IFAD supported SSTC activities consist of mutual learning and horizontal SSTC (regional grants); there are also a few country grants to strengthen MIC capacity interested in sharing knowledge which have been increasing in recent years, as well as solution-driven models for specific investment projects. SSTC has mainly taken the form of knowledge sharing, through field visits and conferences/workshops and policy engagement. Successful SSTC has been reported for Brazil
123. **Most SSTC have been carried out in Latin-America and through Latin-American countries** (with some outreach to sub-Saharan Africa), with China and Turkey as two relative new-comers with mixed results so. Brazil facilitated most SSTC exchange with other countries, many of them in the Latin America region, but several also in sub-Saharan Africa (see Mercosur case study). The CSPE for Brazil counted 24 IFAD K&L grants that operate in the country, 9 of which were on

⁴³ Various initiatives on RBA collaboration are ongoing, such as the FAO investment Centre (TCI) grant on 'Capacity Development for Better Management of Public Investments in Small-Scale Agriculture in Developing Countries', the Canada funded 'Programme to Strengthen the Resilience of Livelihoods in Protracted Crisis Contexts in DRC, Niger, and Somalia', a grant to fund joint activities among WFP, FAO and IFAD in the target countries, and partnerships initiatives such as CABFIN. Yet it is not always clear which of these involve actual country-level partnerships with more enduring effects or are just based on country case studies or training and one-shot K&L activities

SSC. SSTC was applied for knowledge exchange with Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia through the 'Learning Route' and other SSTC grants.

124. **In other cases SSTC has not taken off yet due to a lack of clarity on strategic focus and priorities.** For China the CSPE recommended to better define the IFAD/China niche in SSTC (as of 2013) and then expand it in future. CSPEs from Ecuador and Nicaragua missed the strategic orientation of SSTC. SSTC in Turkey apparently had not really taken off yet due to incompatibilities of IFAD priorities and what the Government wanted. While IFAD was interested in promoting farmer organizations and CSOs Government priorities were more general value chain directed. Also, as pointed out by the PRM paper for the 2017 Replenishment meeting, it is important to work not only well with Governments and come up with mutually agreeable objectives and programmes, but also to have proper institutional global arrangements (lead agencies) to carry out the tasks.
125. The ESR on SSTC found that although SSTC has been a high IFAD priority, there still is too little clarity on expected contributions and impact pathways leading to sustainable rural transformation. Many SSTC activities under loan-financed projects tend to be one-off study tours and exchange visits, rather than part of programmatic and strategic interventions that are clearly linked to the IFAD country programmes (SSTC ESR 2016 para. 41). A relatively programmatic approach to supporting mutual learning has been taken mainly in the context of regional grants. Furthermore, there is demand for more diverse and alternative support for SSTC to map and disseminate opportunities for MICs and their private companies to invest in agricultural development in third countries.
126. IFAD Management confirmed that most of the SSTC activities were undertaken in an ad-hoc manner and that a more organised and focussed approach will be required in the future to ensure synergies across relevant institutional priorities, such as partnership-building and resource mobilisation, and linkages with corporate processes such as innovation, learning and scaling-up.⁴⁴ For the same reason IFAD has prepared a new strategy for SSTC (2016) which focuses on two pillars, technical cooperation and investment promotion.⁴⁵

PPPP (Public-private-producer partnerships)

127. IFAD's work on brokering PPPPs, particularly through supporting farmer access to markets and linkages with traders and agribusiness linkages has been taking off relatively recently, since around 2009/10 with a few exceptions before (as the Uganda vegetable oil project, see box below). PPPPs are frequently related to support for FOs and cooperatives. Increasingly, sub-national PPPP platforms are being used as a vehicle to bring actors together and catalyze linkages.

⁴⁴ RIDE 2017, p. 11

⁴⁵ IFAD's Approach to South-South and Triangular Cooperation. December 2016.

Box 4

Case study Uganda: Brokering a public-private producer partnership in the Vegetable oil development Project Implementation period: 1997-2010

This innovative project was one of the first large public-private-producer partnerships (PPPP) for agribusiness for Uganda. IFAD played a key brokering role from the outset. It conducted a feasibility study with the World Bank and engaged in environmental impact assessments, ensured a pro-poor focus for the PPP, and supported the government 'behind-the-scenes' when securing a private investor and during subsequent negotiations with company over redesigning the project.

One of the key factors of success was the strong leadership of the Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), which created a conducive environment for the private sector. Despite vested interests and adverse publicity, senior officials played a major role in pushing the project forward, thanks to their participation in the Land Acquisition Taskforce, Vegetable oil development Council and Impact Monitoring System. Government commitment to the project is also demonstrated by the fourfold increase in its financial support, from US\$3.8 million to US\$12 million. The private-sector demonstrated strong commitment to the realisation of the oil palm subproject and a significant patience with the Government over its negotiation of the agreement and slow pace of land acquisition. Its commitment is also reflected in the size of the investment and the speed of its implementation.

128. **Cooperation with private sector for value chain development in PPPPs becomes important when market opportunities develop and marketable surplus is generated.** There are several good starts on PPPP and there is even some relatively advanced and innovative work, particularly around contract farming in Madagascar, Mozambique and the Republic of Moldova. There also has been a strong orientation towards PPPPs and enterprise development in Vietnam since 2008. At the time of the CSPE (2010) IFAD had already managed to influence Government decrees on PPPP as well as guidelines/manuals for cooperative organizations.
129. In Madagascar IFAD provided strong value chain support through forging partnerships of farmers' organizations with the private sector (processors, exporters etc.). An innovative approach was taken in Mozambique in the Community Investor Partnerships project (ProParcerias). Cofinanced with the Netherlands and FAO Models of contract farming and PPPPs were tested, analyzed and synthesized by local university graduates for dissemination. An IFAD project in the Republic of Moldova established good public-private partnerships with commercial banks and out-grower schemes and helped develop enterprises through business development services. For the MUVI project in Tanzania the CSPE pointed to high transaction costs of this particular PPPP, offset with only modest benefits.
130. **Farmers and their organizations are a key part of PPPP.** Farmer organizations bring together a larger number of smallholder farmers and increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the private sector in value chain development.
131. IFAD also works directly with private or semi-private companies, mostly financial institutions and banks in the provision of rural finance (as in Mali). And in Kenya IFAD is involved in some limited private sector engagement with Equity Bank in the context of an AGRA project.
132. **But there are also a number of countries where reportedly not much progress has been made with the private sector** (e.g. in Ethiopia or Gambia) or where efforts are only at a start, such as in the case of India private sector cooperation in dairy and with larger companies (Tata, Tesco). In two other countries (Nepal and Ghana), the CSPEs (both of 2010) clearly pointed out that not less than a partnership paradigm and attitude shift by the Government would be needed to achieve more support for profitable enterprises for commercialization

and value chains (Nepal) and for the Government to develop stronger capacities and a different mentality for working with the private sector (Ghana). For Ghana, work with the private sector in value chains was regarded as very deficient, both from IFAD and Government side, and the CSPE calls in particular for strengthening advance analytical capacity for planning interventions with the private sector.

Box 5

Lessons on successful PPPPs

In its 2015 study for IFAD⁴⁶ on “Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships (PPPP) in Agricultural Value Chains” (2015) IDS concluded that **PPPPs require a clear rationale and objectives, that incentives of partners should be well aligned, and that partners with the right competencies should be identified e.g. through competitive bidding, partner due diligence processes, or working with already established partners.** PPPP outcomes would depend on critical aspects of design, in particular risk-sharing and mechanisms that manage, mitigate or share these risks and that address unequal power relations that exist in vertically coordinated value chains. All partners, including farmers and their organizations, need to have ownership of the PPPP, with clear roles and responsibilities that reflect their priorities and interests. For the public sector a proactive approach should be taken to assure public accountability and transparency. Agreements are needed for partners to feel confident that the other partners will perform theirs. Building trust is of paramount importance in PPPPs. To make PPPPs sustainable capacity needs to be built to respond to changes in complex market systems, challenges as well as opportunities, and to adapt to the unexpected. This includes performance monitoring, with indicators that reflect joint PPPP objectives, and spaces for communication, negotiation and conflict resolution. While agricultural value chain PPPPs are time-limited interventions they need to modify the incentives, capabilities and behaviour of different actors to ensure that they will continue their roles in the long term.

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134. **Government commitment to and support for private sector development is key to IFAD’s ability to design effective investment operations in agriculture and rural development.** In Zambia, the enabling environment is not

⁴⁶ Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships (PPPP) in Agricultural Value Chains (2015)

⁴⁷ Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships (PPPP) in Agricultural Value Chains (2015)

universally favorable for private sector engagement in IFAD projects. While a number of project specific partnerships with the private sector yielded some positive results, the focus on alternative project delivery mechanisms (public/private mix) since the 1997 COSOP is still regarded as incipient, mainly due to the unclear policy approach of Government to private sector participation in IFAD projects.

Hypothesis testing: *The ESR hypothesis that PPPs are most effective when Government has generated a supportive environment for private sector engagement was validated in 13 CSPEs. And another aspect of Government support was found important in 9 countries: PPPs are most effective when IFAD works across Ministries (Agriculture, Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, Environment etc.).*

135. **The range of instruments available for PPPs is limited, particularly for support of SMEs and risk sharing mechanisms.** Often support for the private sector through Government ensured loans is problematic. Very little use has been made of the grants programme to support private-sector development, for example in terms of promoting policy engagement and knowledge management (2011 CLE). The COSOP formulation process could be used to more systematically discuss opportunities and constraints for rural private sector development and to promote a dialogue within the country on these issues.
136. The IOE 2011 corporate evaluation on private-sector development and partnership strategy underlined the limitations of the existing instruments and explains why using sovereign loans is not effective for private sector promotion. The evaluation concluded that directly lending to the private sector, including small and medium enterprises, agro-processors, microfinance institutions, cooperatives, farmers' associations and commercial banks could provide significant advantages to the rural poor.
137. IFAD management is aware that there is scope to strengthen private sector partnerships and preparations for a new **private sector instrument** are underway. The Smallholder and SME Investment Finance Fund (SIF) would be a step toward providing needed flexibility for IFAD to begin to fill the gap.⁴⁸ An Instrument like the SIF would probably require more of a Private Sector window/branch within IFAD, but could potentially be very interesting. The GAFSP has been trying to do something similar through joint programming with IFC, with some success. IOE is currently in the process of evaluating such an instrument, including its potential risks, overhead and transaction costs if lending is done with individual firms.
138. **Uncertainty about private sector target group.** While IFAD's commitment to make the private sector an integral partner has been growing over time (and particularly since the 2011 CLE) there is still some uncertainty on what should be considered the prime private sector target group in IFAD. The 2011 CLE already pointed out that the private sector is not a homogenous group of actors. Entrepreneurial farmers, farmers' associations, agribusinesses and other commercial firms, as well as large national and international conglomerates, all form part of the growing private sector target group in developing countries. The private sector definition lumps together operators at the smaller (rural) end of the private-sector continuum including agro-processors, and other rural micro-entrepreneurs, as well as national, regional and international operators.

⁴⁸ This information comes from the PRM 2017 Replenishment Note: IFAD11 – Leveraging partnerships for country-level impact and global engagement


Key points from Section D – Effectiveness of modalities

- Despite **RBA cooperation** being a corporate priority, in general, IFAD partnership with RBAs and UN was found to be weak.
- Cooperation with **private sector** for value chain development becomes even more important when market opportunities develop and marketable surplus is generated. So far, the range of instruments available for PPPs is limited, particularly for support of SMEs and risk sharing mechanisms. There is also some confusion among staff and clients about IFAD's primary private sector target group(s).
- **SSTC** has received much attention recently, but so far there are only a limited number of countries where successful SSTC has been reported in the CSPEs. The effectiveness of SSTC appears to be limited by missing links with country programmes, clarity on partner contributions and impact pathways as well as missed opportunities to link SSTC with cofinanced projects in well-resourced MICs.

H. Significant partnership outcomes

139. Most of the reported results are related to **influencing policy, knowledge and learning and leveraging resources**. These are all types of outcomes that received high attention from IFAD and been actively promoted through dialogue, participation in working groups and support of new strategy development, research grants and capacity building, for the latter, particularly of CSO/FO partners. Country ownership, synergies and sustainability are less reported outcomes.


Figure 7
Outcomes reported for MICs and LICs



Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V.3 tables 2 – 5

140. The comparison between earlier CSPEs and the later CSPEs (see figure above) shows that there is a notable shift among outcomes over time: **Leveraging resources and cofinancing became less important** in the CSPEs after 2012. Also, partnerships seem to be less geared towards achieving **sustainability and country ownership** through long-term partnerships and capacity building with Government and other national partners (e.g. CSOs, private sector). On the other hand more results on **scaling-up** have been reported, although they are still patchy in the overall picture.

Figure 8
Change of outcomes reported between 2006-2011 and 2012-2017 CSPEs



Source: CSPE review, see data in annex V.3 tables 4-5; annex V.3 tables 2- 3

141. More outcomes had been reported **in LICs on leveraging resources, alignment and harmonization, and complementarities**. Given the overall structure of aid in LICs, and aid dependence of LICs vs. MICs, this is not surprising. In contrast, for MICs, the analysis finds more outcomes in knowledge and communication.
142. Almost one third of partnership outcomes are achieved with Governments, most of them in the areas of influencing, alignment and knowledge. IFIs are important partners, particularly for achieving leverage, knowledge, influence and synergies. CSOs and FOs are important partners for improved partner capacities, knowledge and influence.

Enabling knowledge, learning and innovation

143. Very strong and visible engagement on **knowledge and learning**, with demonstrated results, were reported for Brazil, Mali, Nepal and the Philippines, and for Argentina in the context of policy engagement. Positive experience with knowledge platforms was reported for Argentina, Ecuador, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique and Philippines. Study tours and events found their way into the CSPE in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Moldova, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal and Vietnam. Events with high visibility took place in the Philippines, Vietnam as well as in Madagascar and Moldova.
144. **Outcomes from knowledge and learning partnerships are often insufficiently known, documented and linked.** For many countries, the CSPE observed certain weaknesses in K&L, particularly the missing linkages between regional and country K&L and missing synergies between lending and non-lending projects and in-country K&L (as already reported above). This is partly due to the execution of IFAD grants and the fact that partnerships have not been established with longer-term perspectives, as envisaged by the grant policy, especially when delivered as one-off grants (CLE grant financing para. 29). Furthermore grants funding is often scarce at country level. There is usually limited involvement of CPMs in grant allocation and management decisions which somewhat limits their strategic use for country partnership purposes and outcomes.
145. In several countries the CSPEs found very few synergies between lending and non-lending activities. In Zambia, non-lending consisted mostly of regional and global grants that were not well connected to the country programme, with very few country grants available. As a result, there was not much systematic K&L visible in the country to reinforce the lending portfolio.

146. **In-country analysis and sharing of experiences and lessons learnt from IFAD projects and from targeted sub-sectors is often particularly weak, due to lack of funds, attention or K&L strategies.** This was for instance reported for Ecuador where there were insufficient contributions from country projects to knowledge work due to insufficient M&E and best practice gathering. In other countries some positive knowledge capturing was found in IFAD projects (Rwanda), but not beyond. There was no real knowledge strategy for knowledge partnering and exchange. In this respect, a particularly interesting case study for a country K&L initiative was found in the Philippines (box below). Through annual two-day events, IFAD brings together different partners to showcase its projects and best practices and to influence policies. One of the key enabling factors for K&L in the Philippines was that the IFAD CPO is well trained as an expert in knowledge management.

Box 6

Case study Philippines: Innovative knowledge partnership through IFAD Knowledge and Learning Market (KLM)

Supported by a regional ENRAP⁴⁹ grant, the KLM initiative has been using partnerships to broaden knowledge sharing and learning since 2007. While IFAD allocates a budget for the KLM, the other stakeholders contribute in cash and kind. Transportation expenses of participants are borne by their respective organizations. Different costs items (e.g. lunches, dinners, fellowship nights) are "sponsored" by a specific organization. With this "sharing" set-up comes ownership of the activity. "And when there is ownership, there is complete commitment without counting the costs or asking what's in it for me"⁵⁰.

This resulted in multiple champions and helped foster replication of good practices across projects. The KLM was crucial in creating wider visibility for IFAD operations in the Philippines. Some participants credited the KLM as an effective tool for influencing policies, noting that the presence of agencies like the National Economic and Development Authority, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Agriculture alongside representatives of farmers groups and NGOs were crucial in the advancement of policy engagement.

Influencing policy through partnerships

147. IFAD recognizes the importance of an enabling policy environment to support and accelerate agriculture and rural development at the corporate level. Policy engagement is a key feature in the MTP of IFAD 10 (2016-18). IFAD selectively engages in policy engagement aimed at reducing rural poverty and empowering beneficiary organizations to gain policy influence. The IFAD 2012 partnership strategy sees as one of its six priorities for IFAD to act as a **broker and facilitator** to achieve better inputs into policy engagement at country level, to bring various partners together, and to support the capacity (and interest) of different players to engage in partnerships and make them better partners for the other players.
148. In 14 countries the importance of **Government buy-in into IFAD objectives** and the underlying messages was underlined. Sometimes Government support was helped by support units established in relevant ministries (in 5 cases). But while partnering with other donors can be critical, it does not automatically guarantee success for achieving more leverage as pointed out for Ghana and the case of a cofinanced programme with WB and AfDB. In the case of Ghana, IFAD innovative interventions were not yet sufficiently mature and tested when the cofinanced project was implemented. IFAD policy influence only started in later phases of the multi-phase programme and missed the earlier cofinancing opportunity for influence and scaling-up.
149. **Knowledge generated from loans and grants provides the basis for IFAD's policy engagement.** The CSPE for Bolivia pointed to the importance to define a

⁴⁹ Knowledge Networking for Rural Development in Asia/Pacific Region.

⁵⁰ KLM story book: A decade of sharing and learning.

policy engagement strategy based on knowledge acquired and, in addition, opportunities for scaling-up. In Nicaragua, Government policies were influenced through accumulated knowledge gained from IFAD projects and communicated through special initiatives, such as round tables. Policy engagement was enhanced through capacity building of partners. In Ghana, IFAD had some good policy influence mostly related to two projects (rural finance and enterprise development) that contributed to conducive rural finance policies and building of meso-institution. In Mali, IFAD tried to boost its policy influence on the National Microfinance Strategy Action Plan plus other Micro-Finance related activities through a series of concrete technical and mission support. In Ethiopia, the CSPE concluded that policy engagement would have benefited from more systematic knowledge and learning activities. Similarly in Senegal, there was little attention to knowledge and learning in the country and hence little was achieved in terms of policy influence.

150. **IFAD's policy engagement involves bringing together a wider range of partners, including governments, rural producer organizations and other donors, in line with its brokering mandate.** The CSPEs present a number of good examples of IFAD's brokering role, such as its advocacy in Mali and Madagascar for FO participation in the development of new Agriculture Sector Programmes. In Madagascar IFAD facilitated strong FO policy engagement and influence on land tenure security and contributed to the development of a national strategy for agricultural finance. IFAD also has a strong influence on shaping policies related to agricultural services through CSA and on vocational training. In Niger, IFAD worked with WB, EU, and AFD on policies related to NRM, farmer organizations and land tenure. Sometimes brokering policy influence requires a special grant as in the case of Nepal where IFAD helped the Government to formulate its new 2012 Agricultural Development Strategy through a US\$500,000 DSF grant, in collaboration with the ADB and other partners.

***Hypothesis testing:** Skilled IFAD staff helps in policy engagement and dialogue, preferably with specialized technical knowledge and communication abilities. It also is useful to strategically chose the topics of engagements of interest and buy-in to Government (14 countries) and to have a long-standing relationship with relevant Ministries and technical or policy units within these Ministries (5 countries). In general, good communication skills, trust- and team-building are highly important for country level partnerships, particularly for those of policy engagement and influence (14 countries).*

151. **Successful policy influence combines financial and non-financial instruments, together with long-term partners.** Successful project interventions achieve more influence when they are accompanied by K&L and related events, funded from special grants or integrated into projects and with good integration and roles for key project partners. Influencing Government partners is helped when IFAD ICO staff is well qualified in the technical and communication aspects of dialogue - which is not always the case - or when alternative arrangements are made to communicate policy messages. Often long-term partners, in particular CSOs may be indispensable for this process.
152. **Policy influence has been sometimes achieved through SSTC.** Policy influence through SSTC was most important in Argentina and neighbouring Brazil, particularly on family farming and rural poverty. In Latin America, IFAD has nurtured many partnerships for this purpose with CSOs (REAF, FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR), governments, and the regional economic community MERCOSUR. The box below provides some details on the IFAD-Mercosur policy partnership for Argentina.

Box 7

Case study Argentina: Policy influence through IFAD-MERCOSUR partnership for family farming

Argentina is a founding member of MERCOSUR, a Regional Economic Community. Since 1999 IFAD has supported policy engagement on rural development in the Southern cone with five consecutive sub-regional grants to the programme IFAD-MERCOSUR. IFAD has contributed to generating debate on rural poverty in Argentina and raised the sector's profile in a country that has traditionally been oriented towards agroindustry for export. IFAD's policy engagement helped to link various sectors of the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments involved in poverty eradication. In particular, at the federal government level, IFAD contributed to communicating and understanding the concept of rural development and family agriculture in the Ministry of Economy and Production and to the Secretariat for Budget. The rural poverty debate, the participatory approach of the Government and the push of rural associations in search of political participation led the Government of Argentina to create the National Forum for Family Agriculture (FONAF) in 2006 through Resolution 132/06. This Forum brings together more than 900 small- and medium-sized rural producers from all over the country who associate some 180,000 families and provide a fundamental platform to discuss development policies in this sector.

153. **Policy engagement benefits from partnerships with other donors,** particularly through cofinancing. In Niger, policy dialogue by WB, EU and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) contributed to enhancements on policies and strategies for NRM, farmer organizations and land issues. In some countries, cooperation with other donors happened in the context of supporting the Government in coming up with new agricultural or rural development strategies, as for Nepal, where IFAD worked together with AsDB and others in providing strategic, technical and financial assistance for strategy development.

***Hypothesis testing:** Policy engagement works best when it includes MDBs or RBAs, a hypothesis proven true for 19 of the countries included in the CSPE review sample.*

154. **Partnerships with civil society can be very effective for leveraging policy influence.** One of the most prominent cases is Bangladesh, where the IFAD loan provides strong support for a CSO Apex organization, the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), that implement in particular micro-finance projects through other NGOs and community based organizations (CBOs). This is a good example where an IFAD loan has the potential, with the support of the Government and the CSO, to have significant multiplier effects and to contribute to learning and advocacy. Similarly, in Brazil a number of IFAD loan and grant activities are executed with CSOs and FOs that partly co-finance these activities. An example is the CSO PROCASUR that was started by IFAD. In Nicaragua, IFAD generated a Fund for Strengthening Policies and Strategies (FONDEPOL) to facilitate work with CSOs, universities and consultants. In Argentina, there are many CSO grant-based partnerships to influence policy (REAF, FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR).

Box 8

Policy engagement through farmers' organizations in Nepal

In Nepal, the regional grant Medium Term Cooperation Programme with Farmers' Organizations in Asia and the Pacific Region (MTCP), an IFAD administered grant financed by the EU and Switzerland, was the entry point for partnership with the Nepalese Peasants Coalition (NPC), an existing broad-based platform composed of various FOs. MTCP fostered NPC's lobbying, advocacy and campaigning agenda, leading to policy changes. It supported the engagement of FOs in policy dialogue with the government leading to the revision of two key programmes of strategic relevance to FOs: the national Agricultural Development Strategy (ADS), and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) cooperation.⁵¹

155. In Nepal, the regional grant Medium Term Cooperation Programme with Farmers' Organizations in Asia and the Pacific Region (MTCP), an IFAD administered grant financed by the EU and Switzerland, was the entry point for partnership with the Nepalese Peasants Coalition (NPC), an existing broad-based platform composed of various FOs. MTCP fostered NPC's lobbying, advocacy and campaigning agenda, leading to policy changes. It supported the engagement of FOs in policy dialogue with the government leading to the revision of two key programmes of strategic relevance to FOs: the national Agricultural Development Strategy (ADS), and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) cooperation.⁵²
156. **Partnerships with indigenous peoples' organizations were instrumental for addressing indigenous peoples' issues at policy level.** The ESR on Engagement with Indigenous Peoples reported a number of good examples of IFAD's influence on policies and institutions related to access to land and natural resources by indigenous peoples, e.g. in India (land titling in traditional forest lands), Philippines (certificate of ancestral domain titles), and Viet Nam (forest use certificates). The India CSPE recognized that the tribal projects have given IFAD an important voice in the national policy debates on tribal rights, especially on land rights of tribal peoples.
157. CSPEs also point to several factors limiting the impact of policy influence, in particular the **interest or capacity of Government** to listen and absorb policy suggestions. For Bangladesh two factors played a role: the limited policy 'resonance' of Government, with a heavy bureaucracy that is difficult to influence, and secondly, the fact that IFAD country office staff qualifications were not sufficient for developing strong policy links with important ministries. This is an issue that resonates in several other countries such as in Mozambique and will be dealt with in another section of the report in more detail. In Rwanda, IFAD provided substantial grants and TA to the Government for agricultural strategy development since 2004, yet its influence has been very limited, because Government interest had been low even in areas with ongoing projects (such as finance and enterprise development).

Scaling-up

158. As both the Strategic Framework 2011-2015 and the Ninth Replenishment document make clear, if IFAD is to achieve its ambitious goals in terms of rural poverty reduction, it needs to treat the scaling up of successful approaches and innovations as "mission-critical", by ensuring systematic attention to scaling up in country programme development and management. The 2012 Partnership Strategy puts scaling-up at the top of its list of partnership priorities. Effective partnerships are a prerequisite for scaling up: the issue is relevant to partnerships for better

⁵¹ The Medium-Term Cooperation Programme for Farmers Organizations in Asia and the Pacific, https://www.ifad.org/topic/how_fo/regional/tags/10629915

⁵² The Medium-Term Cooperation Programme for Farmers Organizations in Asia and the Pacific, https://www.ifad.org/topic/how_fo/regional/tags/10629915

programmes and projects, for better inputs into global policy engagement and for increased mobilization of resources.

159. IFAD also has a new strategy for scaling-up (2015). Scaling up is to be done by partners, not IFAD itself, with IFAD being catalytic in identifying capable actors and developing strategic alliances and partnerships to support scaling up of innovations. The ESR on scaling up results (2017) identified three routes for scaling-up: 1. integrating IFAD-funded projects into broader public ones; 2. appropriation of IFAD concepts by partners, e.g. donors, governments, private sector etc. and 3. informing public policies through project experiences.
160. The review of CSPEs and the ESR on scaling up suggests that with few exceptions **IFAD does not yet sufficiently and strategically address the scaling-up of its innovations**, partly as it has been confined in the past to leaving this matter to cofinancing, mostly by other donors, or to broadening IFAD reach through local replication. Almost all COSOPs since 2010 have made reference to scaling up, but few have articulated a strategy for it.⁵³ Only two – Liberia and Viet Nam – included fully developed scaling-up strategies.
161. **Government support was always crucial for scaling-up.** Without strong partnerships with national and local governments, even successful projects tended to work in isolation (Laos, Dominican Republic⁵⁴). Limited fiscal space appears to be an important factor (Brazil and India) but can in certain cases be alleviated by funds from other external donors. In Pakistan the CSPE concluded that innovations and their scaling-up may require different partners in government – and beyond – than the usual ‘administrators and implementers’. Partnerships with the Apex Poverty Alleviation Fund and with Government institutions at federal and provincial levels helped with scaling-up. As already reported under the section of Indigenous Peoples above, in North-East India IFAD works closely with State Governments to transfer know-how and quality project implementation methods to ultimately scale-up, in many projects focusing on Indigenous Peoples (Scheduled Tribes).⁵⁵
162. **Even where scaling-up may be achieved at local and sub-national levels, it often does not reach the national level**, for instance through effective policy engagement, broader mainstreaming in policies and strategies and sufficient domestic cofinancing. There often simply is no adequate IFAD strategy and measuring in countries beyond the end of projects, and COSOPs in the past have paid too little attention. In China, more technical cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture at national level could have led to wider scaling-up of IFAD innovations, which the CSPE saw, at least partly, caused by limited IFAD outreach, policy influence and lack of senior ICO staff in Beijing. In Brazil, there was some scaling-up, and the CSPE therefore recommended cooperation with wider range of federal agencies and more cofinancing and knowledge sharing with other IFIs or attraction of domestic private cofinancing.
163. **Scaling up relies on a wider range of partners.** The CSPEs provide some good examples for scaling up through private sector and civil society partners, such as on rural micro-finance in Mali – through partnerships with multiple service providers and very successfully with ‘ABC’, a private for-profit company with a social mandate. In Vietnam, scaling up included market-oriented institutional capacity building, with specific and quantifiable goals: local agencies established, public-private producers’ platforms, K&L systems established. Where IFAD relied too much on Government for scaling up, this has crowded out partnerships with CSOs and private sector, as in Nigeria. Also in Gambia scaling-up was limited through

⁵³ As noted by the ESR on scaling up

⁵⁴ These are country examples from the IOE ESR on scaling up

⁵⁵ The case of India also provides examples of three different scaling-up modalities: 1. Expanded geographical coverage; 2. Shift from project to the policy level; 3. Adoption of project approaches by public programmes (fiscal space).

official partnerships with finance institutions that were not very effective and not interested to sustain risk-sharing mechanisms beyond project end.

Box 9

Case study Brazil - Sertão: Supplementary funding and environmental knowledge partnership with GEF. Upscaling NRM and environmental sensitization.

The Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project (\$15.5 million) was funded by the GEF and the Government of Brazil, complementary to the IFAD-financed Dom Helder Câmara Project (DHCP). The significant achievements of the Sertão project were both out-scaled and up-scaled. Scaling-up was supported through a series of activities including the creation of social organizations the Social Control Organization (OCS) for Organic Production and Participatory Organization for Organic Compliance Assessment-OPACs. They have the potential to increase the number of households adopting organic production through training workshops involving large audiences, exchanges and learning events⁵⁶. South-South and Triangular Cooperation in the form of South-South knowledge exchanges was also crucial to the scaling-up of this project. This included exchanges with Cape Verde and Kenya and presentations in Senegal. The Project also hosted a group of 28 leaders of farmers, peasants and indigenous organizations from seven South American countries.

164. **In loan projects partnerships with CSOs were often initiated with a view of scaling up.** Examples include Bangladesh, Brazil, Rwanda Mozambique and Kenya. However, in a number of cases it was found that **partnerships with CSOs were either too scarce or ineffective for scaling up.** The Ghana CSPE misses sufficient numbers of partnerships with CSOs, particularly in rural finance that would be needed for better scaling-up. It found that IFAD scaling-up of innovations relied too much on IFAD's own resources, rather than co-financiers, CSOs and Government. For Zambia the CSPE found that alternative service delivery mechanisms through CSOs and private sector do not yet work too well for scaling-up. And limited cofinancing hinders scaling-up in livestock project. Working with apex organizations, such as PKSf in Bangladesh systematically through project execution and scaling up has been more successful.

Box 10

Case study Bangladesh: APEX institutions deliver funding, financial and technical services

Donors often use Apex institutions to deliver funding and financial and technical services more efficiently in countries where Micro-finance institutions (MFIs) appear too small or numerous for direct funding relationships. Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) has a clear mandate by the Government since 1990 as an apex fund with the mandate of providing resources to MFIs to alleviate poverty. PKSf plays an important role in the microfinance sector in Bangladesh. PKSf has constantly been seeking to improve services to its member MFIs and has operated in a cost-effective way. All projects with PKSf rely on NGOs for implementation.

IFAD's collaboration with PKSf has been a very effective mechanism for sustaining and scaling up successful microfinance approaches promoted by IFAD projects within its large network. Agriculture microcredit, seasonal loans, and the combined credit and business development service introduced under earlier projects (MFTSP and MFMSFP) are now part now PKSf's regular loan programme. The organization has recently created two technical, non-financial cells on agriculture and livestock that are providing follow up support to activities introduced in the projects with their own funds. Small value chain pilots in MIDPCR and FEDEC have helped a number of partner organizations learn the principles of market development and later, to expand market development activities of their own with the support of PKSf. Value chain strengthening activities are being scaled up in the design of the IFAD PACE project (Promoting Agricultural Commercialization and Enterprises).

Synergies and complementarities

⁵⁶ Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project -Sertão Project, Grant Agreement GEF-FSP-002-BR, Final Evaluation.

165. IFAD's partnership strategy emphasises complementarity as an important principle of partnerships. Where partnerships combine complementary strengths they are more likely to lead to outcomes that are mutually beneficial. Synergies are more difficult to put into practice and there are fewer cases reported. IFAD's unique experiences on the ground are an important contribution that can create synergies and complementarities.
166. Nurturing long-term partnerships seems to be an important factor that may lead to significant synergies between partners and initiatives. **Longer-term partnerships with CSOs and FOs** often originate in projects, but they may deliver wider synergies and complementarities, as shown in the example of Bangladesh above.
167. **Cofinancing can create synergies and complementarities.** Positive examples of policy influence and scaling-up were reported for a joint IFAD/World Bank pastoral livestock programme in Ethiopia; for scaling-up with ADB in Indonesia; and promising partnerships with GEF on promoting climate change adaptation in Jordan. In contrast, for Rwanda, the CSPE explicitly stated that there was not much cooperation beyond a financial relationship with OFIN, AfDB and bi-laterals.

***Hypothesis testing:** Key country strategic partnerships with IFIs such as ADB, AfDB and GEF can benefit from regular interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, to identify commonalities and complementarities among partners, including at regional and global level (validated for 19 countries).*

168. **Partnerships established through grants can create wider synergies.** In Ecuador, the Rural Dialogue Group is key for IFAD knowledge work and policy influence. This advisory group was triggered through a regional grant and consists of academics, CSOs and other stakeholders.
169. In the second part of the zero-decade the **UNDAF and One-UN processes** played an important role in some countries for coordination, in search for synergies and complementarities, such as in Niger or Pakistan. In some countries, new partnerships have developed from these processes, such as a joint UN country team/UNDAF programme in North East India and some emerging cooperation in Ethiopia, in a country project with WFP and a regional project with FAO. In Ghana, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania, ICOs engage in sector working groups.

Leveraging resources

170. In general, cofinancing at IFAD is well understood as a critical instrument for **enhancing impact through leveraging resources and corporate visibility, scaling-up of IFAD innovations and policy engagement.** It sometimes is also seen as a way to reduce administrative costs, particularly when IFAD is a junior partner in a cofinancing arrangement. At corporate level, cofinancing is entangled with IFAD resource mobilization, particularly of supplementary funds.
171. Review of financial data shows that the **absolute amount of international and domestic cofinancing increased significantly** between IFAD 7 (2007-09) and IFAD 9 (2013-15). International cofinancing doubled from US\$997 million to US\$1.783 billion while domestic cofinancing, most of it from national Governments, tripled from US\$941 million to US\$2.916 billion over this period (table 2)⁵⁷ In upper middle-income countries the share of domestic cofinancing was above average under IFAD 7 (49 per cent) and further increased under IFAD 9 (to 60.9 per cent). Domestic cofinancing remained saw a slight increase in lower middle-income countries (from 32.3 per cent to 35.4 per cent) and in low-income countries (from 21.2 per cent to 27.9 per cent).

Table 2
IFAD cofinancing trends 2007-15 (all countries)

⁵⁷ IOE calculation based on IFAD internal data

<i>IFAD replenishment period</i>	<i>IFAD</i>	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>International</i>	<i>IFAD</i>	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>International</i>	<i>Total</i>
	USD million		Percent			USD million	
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1,731	941	997	47.2	25.7	27.2	3,668
IFAD 8 (2010-12)	2,695	2,355	1,484	41.2	36.0	22.7	6,534
IFAD 9 (2013-15)	2,916	2,261	1,783	41.9	32.5	25.6	6,960

Source: GRIPS (see data in annex IV.1)

172. The amount of financial resources leveraged is better captured in the cofinancing ratio – i.e. the amount of US\$ mobilized through cofinancing vs. the IFAD loan itself. Review of corporate-level financial data shows that although the absolute amount of cofinancing has increased, **the cofinancing ratio was relatively stable** in recent years. After a strong increase from 1.12 in IFAD 7 to 1.42 in IFAD 8 (2010-12) it was reduced only slightly to 1.39 in IFAD 9 (2013-15). But again, the ratio declined significantly for low-income countries (from 1.26 for IFAD 7 to 1.03 for IFAD 9), while it increased dramatically in both lower and upper MICs (annex IV.1 table 1.1 – 1.4).

Table 3

Cofinancing ratio per country types (2007-15)

<i>IFAD replenishment period</i>	<i>IFAD</i> <i>(overall)</i>	<i>LIC</i>	<i>Lower MICs</i>	<i>Upper MICs</i>
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1.12	1.26	0.90	1.03
IFAD 8 (2010-12)	1.42	1.37	1.29	2.51
IFAD 9 (2013-15)	1.39	1.03	2.20	2.83

Source: GRIPS (see data in annex IV.1 tables 1 – 4)

173. Despite the strategic importance of cofinancing for IFAD, the target for IFAD 10 (2016-18) has been set at a moderate cofinancing ratio of 1.2. This target falls back behind the IFAD 9 performance and may be too low to address the need for increased cofinancing in LICs.
174. The **Asian Development Bank** is currently one of IFAD's largest co-financiers. Between 2006 and 2016 IFAD approved 10 projects in 5 countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Philippines) with US\$ 849 million in ADB cofinancing, and has identified a pipeline of future cofinanced investments.⁵⁸ The critical element for the success of this partnership is leadership, sending a clear signal from IFAD Regional Directors to all CPMs on the importance of developing and maintaining the ADB partnership. Cofinancing with ADB was also helped by a similar strong corporate focus in the ADB.⁵⁹ This "structured partnership" with the ADB is built on an MoU and a Framework for Cofinancing Agreement. The relationship is maintained through business planning meetings at the HQ Management level as well as the country level and through a focal point in each of the institutions. It is based on a partnership strategy, which articulates complementary areas for financing.

⁵⁸ Source: IFAD GRIPS

⁵⁹ See also annex IX on lessons from other IFIs

175. IFAD has a similar partnership with the **African Development Bank**. It is much lower by volume of cofinancing than the one with the ADB. Except for the occasional reference to cofinanced projects with the AfDB in CSPEs in Africa and certain obstacles due to Government objection or prevailing unfavourable budget-support circumstances in sub-Saharan Africa the ESR did not find much information in reviewed synthesis documents on the IFAD/AfDB partnership.

Box 11

Cofinancing analysis: Internationally cofinanced projects perform better.

IOE has evaluated 188 projects through PPEs, PCRVs and IEs during the 2006-16 period, 111 of them cofinanced by international donors. The analysis shows that for all performance indicators (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact and sustainability there was a higher proportion of cofinanced projects that performed moderately satisfactorily or higher (i.e. 4-6) than of projects that were not cofinanced (figure 3 and table 3). All differences between the two groups were statistically significant, except for relevance. Those statistically significant were so at the 99 per cent confidence level, except for poverty impact, which is significantly different in the two groups only at the 90 per cent confidence level. There may also be differences amongst the regions.

176. International cofinancing often does not mobilize additional resources but it facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results. This is in line with findings by the 2016 ADB evaluation that also showed better performance of cofinanced projects. Outcomes such as enhanced synergies and policy engagement were already discussed above. As shown in the box above cofinanced projects have performed significantly better in IFAD.

Key points from Section E – Partnership Outcomes

- IFAD's **policy engagement** involves bringing together a wide range of partners, including governments, rural producer organizations and other donors, in line with its brokering mandate. Policy engagement works best when it includes MDBs or RBAs. Partnerships with civil society can be very effective for leveraging policy influence.
- Government support was always crucial for **scaling-up**, but successful scaling up relies on a wider range of partners. CSOs were instrumental for scaling up in several cases, but in a number of cases partnerships with CSOs were either too scarce or ineffective for scaling up.
- Outcomes from **knowledge and learning partnerships** are often insufficiently known, documented and linked. A large share of IFAD funding for knowledge and innovation goes into global and regional grants, but these are frequently insufficiently linked with the country programmes. Grants that go to international research organizations often do not lead to uptake of innovations in the country.
- Cofinancing has increased in absolute terms, in particular in MICs, but the cofinancing ratio, a proxy for the amount of **funding leveraged by IFAD**, did not increase and actually declined in LICs.
- Where partnerships combine complementary strengths they are more likely to be mutually beneficial. Cofinancing can create **synergies and complementarities**. Longer term partnerships with CSOs and FOs can create synergies.

I. Enabling and limiting factors

177. **Overview.** This chapter summarizes the evidence on overall factors that reinforce good partnerships or that may work against them. This includes findings on the specific role of Government as a partner and its support for different kinds of IFAD partnerships and on the effects of IFAD decentralization and Country Offices (ICO).

178. The chapter starts with drawing attention to the need to balance the positive outcomes expected from partnerships with their costs, to ensure appropriate partnership funding and effectiveness and to come up with the most efficient partnerships and approaches for different settings.

Costs and benefits of partnerships.

179. Based on the ToC presented in Chapter I, this ESR has been looking for potential gains, costs and risks of such partnerships. Costs and benefits of partnerships need to be considered together, not separately. They are critical when choices are being made about what partnerships to concentrate on among a range of opportunities, with a short- and long-term perspective.

180. **Potential gains** of partnerships include outcomes such as influencing policies, scaling-up and leveraging of funds, complementarities and synergies knowledge and learning, alignment and ownership and sustainability.

181. On the other side, **transaction costs** may incur in terms of time spent for arranging and managing partnerships, trust building etc., coordination costs, partner finance and resource problems, delays caused through partnerships and a range of other transaction costs. The cost ledger also has to consider certain partnership transaction risks, such as uncertainty about partner qualifications, partner delivery capabilities, and reputational risks of associating oneself with questionable partners. It also became evident from some of the case studies - such as long-term collaboration with CSOs in Bangladesh or Latin-America, close partnerships with Governments, and long-term cofinancing experience with IFIs (e.g. Ethiopia) - that **some of these transaction costs and reputational risks can be reduced through longer-term relationships and trust building.**⁶⁰

Box 12

Apex organizations can decrease transaction costs

The creation of apex organizations in countries such as Bangladesh and Mali has decreased the transaction costs for partnerships with civil society organizations. In Mali, prior experience and increasing trust in the relationship between IFAD and FOs led to the establishment of the National Coordination Agency for Farmers' Organizations under a Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme grant. The creation of the apex organization has decreased transaction costs for IFAD and the FOs because it reduced the time spent on coordination.

182. The IFAD partnership strategy (2012) acknowledges that IFAD has a number of partnerships that developed in an ad-hoc manner, a few of which incur high costs while offering limited benefits⁶¹. The strategy therefore proposes a more selective approach and greater focus on partnership outcomes. Yet, although IFAD uses substantial amounts of funds for partnering (mostly grants, but sometimes also loans; and occasionally through third parties), there is no programmatic or partnership specific assessment (or assessment tool for that matter) that would include a cost-benefit analysis of these partnerships.

183. The reviewed CSPEs for this ESR reiterate in general terms the call for **partnership selectivity at country level** and **greater consideration of the benefits and expected costs** of partnerships. The balancing of benefits, costs and transaction costs of partnerships are somewhat reflected in the ubiquitous observation that there are too few staff in general, qualified staff and staff focusing on partnerships, in particular at the country level. High transaction costs due to the decentralised governments have been noted by the CSPEs in Nigeria and Indonesia (see below).

⁶⁰ Brinkerhoff 2002 and Picciotto 2004. Jobin, Dennis. 2008. *A Transaction Cost-Based Approach to Partnership Performance Evaluation*. Sage Publications, London. Vol I 4(4):437-465. <http://evi.sagepub.com/content/14/4/437>

⁶¹ Partnership Strategy, Exec. Summary, para. 4


Box 13

Case study – transaction costs for partnerships in Indonesia

The 2014 CSPE notes that in Indonesia partnerships with subnational governments have been a particular challenge, given the wide geographical coverage of the programme and the high level of decentralisation. Thus, there were high transaction costs associated with partnership building. According to the CSPE, IFAD had neither the resources nor the local presence required to do this effectively. Furthermore the strategic objectives of the COSOP (2009 – 2013) were very broad and it did not provide selectivity criteria for partnerships. The Client surveys showed IFAD as a partner in Indonesia on a low score of 4.9. In 2016 the score had increased significantly to 5.28. The 2015 COSOP Results Review explains that had improved because it focused on partnerships for maximum impact and resources, such as public-private-partnerships, both with international corporations and national companies in order to maximum impact and resources. Furthermore, IFAD strengthened partnerships with other development agencies and, as a result of this effort, leveraged a significant cofinancing opportunity with the Asian Development Bank.

184. The **force-field analysis** (figure 9 below) presents the most important costs and the resources required for country partnerships as observed in the CSPEs. The analysis draws from the data reviewed by this ESR that specifically looked at the enabling and disabling factors for country partnerships. Enabling factors are depicted in green, costs and risks in red. The numbers reported on the arrows indicate the number of CSPEs reporting on each factor.

Figure 9

Force-field diagram: Forces working for or against partnerships

Source: compiled by IOE team

*Note: The disaggregated costs in this diagram are often used to illustrate different faces of the same problem and therefore may result in double counting. Transaction costs were often not explicitly mentioned in the CSPE but deduced from the underpinning problem.

185. **The enabling factors** include IFAD country presence and Government capacity, which are the strongest supportive forces for effective partnership building in countries. COSOP guidance, Government preferences and an enabling partnership environment matter, too, as positive forces. They are followed by clear corporate vision and adequate resourcing of partnership building.

Hypothesis testing: *Although it often helps to have COSOPs with clearly defined and selective partnership priorities, relying on well-formulated and prioritized COSOPs was in practice not found sufficient for good partnerships building. In 10 countries, the quality of partnership propositions in COSOPs had little correlation with actual later partnership performance.*

186. **Forces that may work against partnerships** include several costs and risks associated with partnerships. The most important cost is the time it takes to organize and manage partnerships, followed by various costs related to monitoring and enforcing them. In particular **donor coordination** is considered to be time consuming. Often ICO staff are members of the UN country teams, but their participation is deliberately limited because such meetings were often viewed as time consuming and not adding much value to IFAD's operations, leading to a pragmatic decision to participate selectively in such meetings (CLE on Decentralization).

Box 14

Nigeria – without donor coordination partnerships remained piecemeal

The 2016 CSPE notes that without a strong coordinating function or office in Government IFAD partnerships have been largely piecemeal. Institutional coordination with IFAD had been limited due to the dismantlement of project coordination unit within the Ministry of Agriculture in 2007. As such, there has been little cross-over between IFAD programmes and partner government institutions which may have otherwise deepened partnerships and prolonged institutional memory between IFAD and government.

187. Furthermore, the **risk of partner default** can be high, such as when partners have problems mobilizing finance of their own or other resources. This suggests a need to be careful and duly diligent in partner identification and monitoring and to mitigate against the risk of partner default when possible. A third complex of counter-productive forces is related to the potential threat for IFAD of potentially **losing organizational core values** in partnerships. Avoiding this risk may require a process of consensus building that sometimes could be lengthy and costly. The focus group conducted during this ESR highlighted in particular the risk of working with the private sector. **Private sector partners** often want IFAD to absorb their risk and high transaction costs in working with smallholders. For this reason IFAD's brokering role of organising beneficiaries in cooperatives and farmers organizations to reduce risk and transaction costs and of bringing in public sector institutions and support facilities is of primary importance.

The partnership ladder – how partnerships evolve


188. Longer-term partnerships are important as they help to reduce some of the transaction costs and risks related to partnership building. Partnerships are a process that has to evolve, often starting with a functional working arrangement in a project. Partnerships that have proven to be beneficial can grow further and even broaden beyond their original purpose, as mutual trust and understanding increases.
189. The Partnership ladder⁶² visualises the increasing intensity of collaboration as partners, partly through successively increasing the level of mutuality and trust in the relationship. The ladder moves from mere implementation at the lower rungs, such as a subordinate contractor in a project, to a partnership that increasingly emphasizes mutual sharing of information, joint decision-making, and acting together with equality in decision-making rather than in a hierarchical relationship. At the upper two levels, independent initiatives of partners would be supported and certain tasks such as scaling-up would be completely delegated or handed over to the partner.

⁶² Based on the model of a partnership ladder developed by BOND (Stobart 2010)

190. For the countries reviewed by this ESR almost two-thirds of partnership collaboration clustered around implementation and sharing of information (63.8 per cent), the two lowest rungs of the ladder. The two most important partners here were Government (34) and CSOs (20). (see annex V.4)
191. For research institutions, emphasis was on sharing information (and implementation) rather than acting together and handing over, for instance on capacity building or policy engagement. This could be a missed opportunity. Similarly, for the private sector.
192. At a higher level of the ladder, other partners' initiatives were supported in 17.2 per cent of cases, mainly those of international development partners, Governments and CSOs/FOs. This is a positive sign. And similarly, the fact that there indeed was some acting together of IFAD with CSOs and FOs in at least 8 identified cases/countries.⁶³ Finally, there were some few cases where IFAD supported initiatives had been handed over or scaled up by Government.

Figure 10

Partnership ladder, indicating percentage of partnerships reported in CSPEs (2006-2016)



Source: CSPE review; see data in annex V.4

193. The partnership ladder suggests that **most partnerships are still driven by IFAD and focussed around the implementation of IFAD-supported initiatives**. There is limited attention to principles of aspects of jointness, e.g. mutuality and complementarity. Partnerships are less oriented towards joint decision making and action. Only in a few cases is IFAD likely to take a backseat and continue supporting its partners while handing over initiatives for scaling-up.

Government as partner and Government's role in partnership building

194. In IFAD's business model, partnerships with governments are the basis for the formulation of rural development programmes that respond to country- and area-specific needs. The central role of Government and other public institutions for IFAD is a cross-cutting theme in this report. It is the most important and ubiquitous relationship that IFAD has in countries around the world and it strongly affects IFAD partnership effectiveness with third parties. Governments continue to play a critical role for all forms of partnerships and innovations, through setting partnering priorities, enabling policy environments and providing other partnership support, in projects and non-lending activities.

Hypothesis testing: *The original ESR hypothesis that Government capacities, governance and decentralization strongly influence the results and effective impact pathways for different forms of partnerships was found valid in 31 of 36 CSPEs.*

⁶³ it should be noted that there may be some under-reporting on 'acting together'

195. Furthermore, many of the reviewed CSPEs mentioned that IFAD collaboration with Government at central and sub-national levels was as a critical factor for achieving good partnership results. Effectiveness and success of country partnerships with other development partners, research institutions, civil society and business sector often depended on Government support, policies and ownership.

Box 15

Government ownership enables multi-stakeholder policy engagement in Brazil

In Brazil, the Specialized Meeting on Family Farming-REAF has been a success story, involving a tripartite partnership – IFAD, Farmers' organizations and government officials. IFAD supported REAF technically and financially through a grant which was at the foundation of IFAD's policy dialogue programme in Brazil. The high ownership and commitment by government to rural poverty reduction created a favourable context for policy dialogue. The role of grass-roots civil movements such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra has been as well instrumental supported by favourable government legislation enacted through the Constitution of 1988 and subsequent government decrees.⁶⁴ Through REAF, the Government of Brazil and IFAD managed to successfully bring to the attention of all MERCOSUR governments the priorities of family farmers, and include their representatives in the dialogue alongside government officials to define policies and programmes that affected their lives. IFAD, in conjunction with the IDB, supported the creation and structuring of a Sub-secretariat for Rural Development and Family Agriculture.

196. IFAD has good cooperation with central Governments in many countries, and often provides far-reaching support to focal points, coordination units and steering committees within Governments, such as in Madagascar, Moldova and Kenya (annex VI.4). In some CSPEs, it was specifically and positively noted that Government collaboration went beyond the Ministry of Agriculture (Ghana), with IFAD reaching out to those of Trade and Commerce, Local Governments or Finance to better achieve its agenda.
197. Table 4 below shows that strong Government capacity and support is a key factor for partnership outcomes at country level. In countries where IFAD has strong partnerships with central or sub-national Government institutions, critical partnership outcomes are more often achieved, particularly in the areas of knowledge and innovation, and sustainability and ownership. Weak Government partnerships are more common in fragile situation, where partnership results, such as on policy influence and complementarities and synergies, are primarily achieved through non-governmental partners, as in the case of Nepal.

Table 4

Partnership outcomes identified in countries where IFAD collaboration with and support for central and/or sub-national governments is strong or weak

IFAD collaboration with and support for Government	Outcomes				
	Influencing	Scaling-up and mainstreaming	Complementarities/ synergies	Knowledge and innovation	Sustainability and ownership
Strong (central and/or sub-national)	Brazil* Ghana Madagascar Mali Nicaragua Niger Nigeria*	China Mali Nigeria* Sudan	China Mali Moldova Nicaragua Niger Uganda Nigeria*	Brazil* India* Madagascar Mali Moldova Nicaragua Niger	China India* Mali Moldova Rwanda Uganda
Weak	Nepal Yemen		Nepal Yemen	Nepal	

* Weak with central government and strong with sub-national units

Source: CSPE review - cross-tabulation of annex V.1 and annex VI.4

⁶⁴ Brazil CSPE 2015

198. **Decentralised government structures** (state or other sub-national level) are found in some large MICs (e.g. Brazil, India, Nigeria), and state governments are often the main counterpart for implementation and dialogue in these countries. Strong governments at central or local level can facilitate and reinforce certain forms of partnerships (such as cofinancing) and facilitate influence and scaling up through strategic adoption of enabling policies and strategies and good coordination (e.g. Brazil, Ethiopia, Tanzania).
199. **IFAD's reliance on sub-national partnerships in MICs to some extent explains low partnership ratings.** The ESR reviewed IFAD partnerships with Government in further depth in 15 countries. In 7 countries, IFAD had a strong collaboration with central Government; in 8 countries with sub-national Government. 7 out of these countries were MICs; the average partnership rating for these countries was 3.7. The average partnership ratings for countries with strong central government collaboration (both MICs and LICs) was 4.3 (See annex VIII.3 table 1.2)
200. Strong Government support and alignment for IFAD's partnering with other development partners also can contribute to better partnership results. Yet, there are examples where good partnership results were achieved even under weak Government support or coordination structures. In those cases strong partnering with other Government levels (such as the central level in China), with local governments (Nigeria) or with civil society (Bangladesh) have enabled results, e.g. on scaling up and knowledge and innovation (see annex VI.4).
201. The process of aid alignment and harmonization played a large role for the relationship with Governments, in particular in sub-Saharan African countries after the 2005 Paris agreement (Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda). While often helpful for strategic direction and efficiency, division of labor and ownership, some of these processes also led to side-effects that limited certain forms of classical partnerships, for instance when several IFIs expanded their budget support (Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Gambia) or when expansion of collaboration with CSOs and private sector was not regarded as a main priority (Tanzania).

Box 16

Case study Mali – donor-coordinated grants

In Mali donor-coordinated grants were used to engage with a wide range of partners. For instance, the RuralStruc grant on "Structural changes in rural economies linked to globalization" was financed by IFAD with the World Bank, CIRAD, and French cooperation. The Babyloan grant with its innovative approach of creating a crowdfunding platform for youth allowed partnerships with the private sector ABC Microfinance and a French NGO (the Rural Development Research Group-GRDR). The Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme-GAFSP through its Missing Middle Initiative-MMI initiative allocated a grant of US\$2.6 million to National Coordination Agency for Farmers' Organizations in Mali-CNOP with IFAD as the implementing institution.

202. In certain cases, **strong reliance on and cooperation with Government can also limit opportunities for partnering with others**, or 'crowding them out' as was reportedly the case in Nigeria, Nicaragua, China and Turkey. In several countries Government preferences concerning IFAD partnering and policy engagement were to some extent limiting IFAD partnerships. This was the case for cofinancing in China, Ethiopia and Vietnam; or working with CSOs and private sector in (e.g. in Turkey, China or Nigeria). In such cases IFAD may need to cautiously search for pathways to broaden its partnering opportunities. The dilemma of strong Governments for partnering is also discussed in the box below.

Box 17

Case study Turkey: The pros and cons of strong government ownership

The Government of Turkey demonstrates a good level of ownership and commitment to the IFAD-supported portfolio at both the central and the provincial levels. It contributes to planning exit strategies for all projects, and its continued support has been a key dimension in ensuring sustainability. In Sivas Erzincan Development Project (SEDP) and Diyarbakir Batman Siirt Development Project (DBSDP), for example, the Government is providing budgetary support for post-project activities. This responds to re-training needs, facilitates financing of local consultancies as well as the purchasing of necessary equipment as needed. The overall policy environment has been supportive, and the Government is generally open to new ideas from IFAD. However, the COSOP 2006 highlighted that having the public sector dominating the management of regional and rural development programmes created a disincentive to the emergence of national or local initiatives outside the public domain. As a result there were no foreign NGOs and few national NGOs with the required capacity to provide broad based services and collaboration with private sector was only incipient.

Country Offices and their role for partnerships

203. Over the past 10 years IFAD country presence increased systematically and many new IFAD Country Offices (ICO) were opened (CLE Decentralization). ICOs were supposed to play a catalytic role in non-lending activities including country partnerships, such as in donor coordination and the One-UN agenda. In addition to better understanding of institutional and policy context country presence in principle offers opportunities for regular and in-depth consultations with partners.
204. **IFAD country presence was found to be a defining factor explaining performance on partnerships, in particular in MICs.** The ESR identified ICO presence in the 36 reviewed CSPEs. 24 countries had ICO presence at the time of evaluation; these had an average partnership rating of 3.9 compared to an average of 3.6 for those without ICO presence. LICs had better average ratings than MICs whether they did or did not have ICOs. These can be explained because in many of the LICs where IFAD did not have an ICO, it relied to a greater extent on cofinancing partnerships.⁶⁵
205. The IOE corporate level evaluation (CLE) of IFAD's decentralization experience (2017) also found that the contribution of country presence (ICOs) was notable in the case of partnership building, but it was more limited for knowledge management and policy engagement. According to the CLE, **ICOs helped in particular to increase the frequency and quality of interactions with national government counterparts and IFAD's participation in sectoral donor coordination groups.** ICOs also contributed to some additional cofinancing, through IFIs and domestic finance, and more contacts with Rome-based and other UN Agencies in countries.
206. ICOs, particularly CPM-led ones, had opportunities to enhance long-term engagement with national policy makers (building relationships, trust and understanding of local priorities, constraints), basing suggestions for policy reform on good practices documented in knowledge products and grounded in project experience; and participating in sector working groups and engaging with all relevant actors (e.g., Philippines; Kenya; Peru; Ecuador; Bolivia). On the other hand, because of their small size and competing priorities, relatively little ICO staff time was allocated to policy engagement as already pointed out above.
207. The effectiveness of ICOs is often based on number and seniority of staff available in the offices and can be very negatively affected by high CPM turnover. Good coverage of partnerships and their allocation of time to partnerships among competing priorities are often determined by the interests, experience and

⁶⁵ Within the CSPE sample, international cofinancing exceeded 50 percent in 11 out of 15 LICs at the time of the CSPEs.

initiatives of CPMs, CPOs and other support staff, among the many competing priorities. Leadership provided by regional directors also was found to influence ICO priorities.

Box 18

Nigeria – Limited ICO capacity does not allow effective policy engagement

The CSPE Nigeria (2016) concluded that IFAD's role and influence is partial also as a result of limited ICO capacities, given the wide geographic and thematic spread of the portfolio. There is clear direction from the division to focus ICO capacity on state-level implementation support. The ICO staff level is on the low side, given the size of the portfolio and its wide geographic spread. In particular, the number of staff was found insufficient, while existing skills appear in line with the existing focus on implementation support. This focus on implementation is however not always understood by other development partners, who expect IFAD to be represented at a large number of meetings. The distinct role of the country programme *manager*, whose main role is to support programme implementation, differs from that of other organizations whose representative or director has a clear mandate to focus on donor coordination and policy engagement.

208. While basic IFAD support functions to country offices through the IFAD Field Support Unit have improved, they are mostly technical: information, communication, local administration, infrastructure etc. But the envisaged process of delegation of authority has progressed slowly.
209. These CLE findings are very much in line with those in the review of the CSPEs by this ESR. **ICO resources and staff qualification were ubiquitously mentioned in CSPEs as the main reason for less work than had been planned in COSOPs on partnerships and non-lending in general, and in particular for deficiencies in K&L.**

***Hypotheses testing:** A well-staffed IFAD country office was ranked among the top ones and positively validated in 22 out of 36 CSPEs. The importance of resources for partnerships received attention in 18 countries. The importance of good communication practices and specific expertise of ICO staff and partners for promoting certain types of partnership engagement and related outcomes was underlined in 14 CSPEs.*

210. **The advantages of ICOs for country partnership building were clearly recognized and evident in the CSPEs.** Nevertheless, IFAD seems to be underestimating the resources (time, skills and funds) and the institutional/corporate support requirements for country partnerships (transaction costs), an important factor which can lead to sub-optimal partnership outcomes at country level (see para. 151). These variables were related to the capacity of the IFAD country office to deliver. According to the CSPEs many ICOs are overstretched and their staff are not always well qualified or supported to perform all the tasks assigned and expected from them.

Key points from Section F – Enabling and limiting factors

- **IFAD country presence** and **Government capacity** are the strongest supportive forces for effective partnership building in countries.
- In the larger MICs (e.g. Brazil, India, Nigeria), state governments are often the main counterpart for implementation and dialogue.
- IFAD's **reliance on sub-national partnerships in MICs** to some extent explains low partnership ratings.
- IFAD country presence was found to be a defining factor explaining performance on partnerships, in particular in MICs.
- The importance of a **well-staffed IFAD country office** was positively validated in 22 out of 36 CSPEs.
- Some of these transaction costs and reputational risks can be reduced through **longer-term relationships and trust building**
- Most partnerships are driven by IFAD and focussed around the implementation of IFAD-supported initiatives. There is limited attention to principles of **mutuality** and **complementarity**.

IV. Lessons from this ESR

General lessons

211. Critical **enabling factors for achieving good partnership results** include:
- partnering with the right partners in Government, including state, provincial and local authorities;
 - well equipped, supported and motivated ICO staff that see partnership results as a major part of their TOR;
 - a solid analysis of relative costs and benefits of partnerships and, based on that, a selective approach;
 - a differentiated approach according to country context; and
 - a corporate approach that supports partnering and partnering outcomes as the core of a long-term vision of integrated loan and grant operations in country, rather than separating lending and non-lending objectives.
212. **Building up partner capacity.** IFAD as a non-implementing agency needs to systematically rely on and strengthen capacities and contributions of various partners to achieve its broader country objectives beyond projects.⁶⁶ This means to **utilize and build up the comparative strengths** of different types of partners. Different partners have different tasks to fulfill; their capacities vary significantly in different settings.
213. For good performance, partnering requires more **continuity through long-term strategic partnering with a broadened set of partners, selectively chosen for country priorities.** Partnerships call for major efforts and often long-term trust-building to work out well, to be effective, efficient and sustainable. At the same time, they have to be bound by common objectives and results. Long-term graduation paths for partners need to be laid out.
214. In countries with weak Government institutions and strong donor support there has often been a proliferation of CSOs and CBOs in programme implementation due to weak Government implementation capacities. But without a clear strategy, sufficient support, capacity building and selectivity **CSO partnerships** have not been effective. Establishing CSO apex organizations has been an important strategy to mitigate this risk.
215. **Partnership benefits and costs.** Partnerships have to be assessed in view of their relative benefits and costs. Partnerships are often costly and there always will be underinvestment in partnerships, unless benefits are visible, costs are realistically assessed and efforts by ICOs are institutionally rewarded. The costs and risks can be reduced through longer-term relationships and trust building and other enabling factors.
216. **Scaling-up.** Scaling-up is about partnering, but it is also about the wise use of K&L and closely related to policy engagement. Innovations and their scaling-up may require different partners in government – and beyond - than the usual ‘administrators and implementers’⁶⁷. The ESR on scaling-up synthesized three conclusions: Emphasis needs to be on scaling-up “results” rather than on just approving larger loans, cofinancing and IFAD ‘auto-scale-up’. Scaling-up often necessitates leveraging funds, but not always. And Communities of Practice are one of the ways to mainstream innovation experiences for scaling up by others, as well as farmer field schools and participatory planning at the district level as happened in Tanzania.
217. **Principles of mutuality and organizational identity** appear important in IFAD partnerships in country programmes and projects, where there is quite a bit of

⁶⁶ “As a small organization, partnering to increase impact will be a vital element of how IFAD work in the future” (PRM 2017 Replenishment Paper)

⁶⁷ An observation from the Pakistan CSPE

hierarchical relations through the loan and grant mechanisms that may or may not affect the quality of mutuality and distinct entity of partners.

Lessons on partnership outcomes

218. Most **partnership types of engagement** are important in one way or the other for each of the six major partnership outcomes (table 5).

Table 5

Importance of different partnership types of engagement and country partnership outcomes

Partnership type	Policy influence	Scaling up	K&L innovations	Complementarities, synergies	Ownership & Sustainability	Leveraging resources
Cofinancing with other donors	++	++	+	+++	+	+++
Cofinancing with Government and domestic partners	++	+++	+	+++	+++	+++
SSTC	++	++	+++	++	+++	++
RBA	++	+	+	++	+	+
PPPP	++	++	++	+++	+++	++
CSO/CBO (<i>national</i>)	++	++	++	++	+++	+
CSO (<i>international</i>)	+	++	+++	++	+	++
FOs	+++	++	+++	++	+++	+
Indigenous groups	+++	+	++	++	+++	+

Source: CSPE review (see data in annex V.1)

219. Partnerships around K&L, FOs and indigenous groups are most important to achieve real and lasting **policy influence**, due to their sustainability. While, as a matter of fact, cofinancing partnerships are also likely to be highly relevant, as can be SSTC, RBA and partnerships with CSOs and private sector.
220. **Scaling up** could be achieved in the best way through working with Government and domestic partners, preferably through cofinancing, and through enhancing K&L, particularly on the learning side. Cofinancing with other donors, CSOs or through SSTC could also play a major role in scaling up.
221. **Knowledge and innovations** could benefit most from partnerships with international, regional and national research organizations, in collaboration with CSOs. Farmers' organizations could be a particularly important reservoir and fountain of knowledge and innovations.
222. **Exploiting synergies and complementarities** appears to be most important in setting up PPPPs and pursuing cofinancing opportunities vis-à-vis division of labor, but is relevant in the selection of all partners.
223. Almost all types of partner engagement work strongly towards **ownership and sustainability**.
224. **Leveraging resources** is currently seen as strongly linked with cofinancing with international donors and Government, but there is scope to leverage more resources through SSTC and PPPP.

Key lessons from this ESR

- Partnerships have to be programmatic, with clear objectives and results-oriented, time-bound, and sufficiently resourced.
- Partnerships for development tend to be fluid.
- Principles of mutuality and organizational identity are important for effective partnerships.
- Partnering requires more continuity through long-term strategic partnering with a broadened set of partners, selectively chosen for country priorities.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

J. Conclusions

225. This ESR is not simply about partnerships, it is about specific partnership results (outcomes), and how these results can be best achieved through different forms of partnerships, with the best partners, most effectively and efficiently, and in the right way for the country and regional context.
226. **The quality of partnerships matters, but the mix of partnership types is important to achieve results, too.** A good mix of partnerships along the three categories - cofinancing, knowledge and learning, coordination and cooperation – is important to achieve greater outreach and complementarity of results, for instance for scaling up and creating synergies.
227. **The ESR noted the insufficient focus on results.** Partnerships are at the core of corporate IFAD priorities of scaling-up, knowledge generation and learning, and policy engagement and influence. Yet there is no coherent framework to capture the comprehensive results from partnerships. The effectiveness of COSOPs in guiding partnership building has been overestimated. COSOPs often express programmatic intentions that are frequently more politically driven than by real opportunities and available resources on the ground. Partnership building is often ad-hoc and lacks an adequate resource framework; results are not tracked. The long-term nature of partnerships and their contributions across a wider range of outcomes is not captured.
228. **IFAD's partnership strategy does not provide sufficient guidance on how partnership results will be achieved at country level.** The importance of country partnerships is insufficiently reflected in the corporate partnership strategy (2012). In addition, IFAD has to refine its cofinancing strategy beyond the global level and move more strongly to the country level for cofinancing and resource mobilization and support country teams in this. The 2012 Partnership Strategy identifies increased mobilization of resources as one of four categories of partnerships, but refers mainly to global resource mobilization of supplementary funds for IFAD than to classical cofinancing in projects. The importance of mobilising domestic resources is highlighted in the IFAD11 paper (2017), but this does not replace the need for a more specific strategy and guidance.
229. **The limited range and versatility of partnership instruments restrict the potential to achieve better development results.** The IFAD category of 'non-lending activities' currently lumps together policy engagement, knowledge and partnership building, but does not capture key partnership outcomes such as scaling-up, ownership and sustainability or leverage that may grow out of (loan) projects or are inherent parts of these projects. For example, grants are primarily used for knowledge and learning purposes, but those partnerships may also create wider or higher-level impacts, such as scaling up or policy influence, if done in a more strategic manner. In a similar vein, cofinancing is not just about resource mobilisation, but it also facilitates other benefits, such as synergies and complementarities.
230. **Corporate support and sensitivity for country teams and country level planning of partnership building are important.** Country partnership work and outcomes need to be institutionally acknowledged and well integrated into overall IFAD country level programming. Currently, formal and informal corporate incentives do not encourage ICOs to undertake partnership activities, such as policy engagement. Corporate support may be required to help country teams to identify better ways of planning partnerships according to country opportunities and resources, and monitoring them. This includes help for country teams to mobilize the necessary partnership resources.

231. **Finally, there are many good practices on partnerships that can be shared.** Good practices include designing partnerships in a way that they are programmatic with clear objectives, and are results-oriented and time-bound. It is also important that partnerships are sufficiently resourced or clear resource mobilization paths are feasible and envisaged. Also, that partnership engagement rules are sufficiently long-term and flexible to gradually strengthen the ties with partners. And that emphasis is on capitalizing on partnership synergies, exploitation of comparative advantages and avoidance of overlap.

K. Recommendations

232. **The partnership environment and expectations are changing fast**, with a rapidly changing aid environment, the growing importance of MICs, the increased attention to non-lending and the search for new donors in the agricultural sector. The assessment of the partnership strategy in 2018 provides an opportunity to critically review the relevance and effectiveness of IFAD's partnerships. The commitments made for IFAD11 are encouraging and supported by the recommendations emerging from this review.
233. The ESR recommends three areas of action that would enhance the performance of country partnerships through (a) guiding the preparation of partnership strategies tailored to specific conditions and needs of MICs and LICs; (b) more strategic use of partnership instruments and modalities; and (c) improved accountability for partnership results.
234. **Recommendation 1. Prepare a revised corporate partnership strategy with a clear focus on country-level partnership outcomes.** Global partnerships are important for IFAD to fulfil its mandate. But, in line with IFAD's new business model, support for partnership building has to move from global to regional and country levels. A revised partnership strategy should include a clear vision as well as specific guidance on country partnership approaches and outcomes that would motivate country programme staff and enable greater synergies between different parts of the organizations. The revised strategy would recognise the importance of country-level partnerships and specify the corporate support, capacity building and incentives for ICOs to undertake outcome-oriented partnership building within and beyond projects. It would provide clarity on the specific types of partnership engagement, the instruments and expected results in different settings. Furthermore, the revised strategy would
- a. Include a results-based management framework, based on a wider set of instruments (beyond loans and grants) to facilitate partnerships with a wider range of partners, including private sector.
 - b. Provide guidance on how to combine these instruments for key IFAD objectives of influencing policy, scaling-up innovations, knowledge and learning, synergies and sustainability, and leverage.
 - c. Include specific partnership strategies for different country categories (LICs, lower and upper MICs, MFS).
 - d. Clarify the approach to preparing partnership strategies as part of the COSOPs, guide greater selectivity in partnering (including a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis), determine the principle partnership outcomes to be achieved as the means for achieving them, and identify entry points for engagement with Governments on the broader framework for partnerships.

235. Recommendation 2. Streamline the application of partnership instruments and modalities with a view on partnership results.

- a. With regard to loans as partnership instrument, IFAD needs to identify a wider range of specific **cofinancing** options at global and country levels⁶⁸. The current confusion between cofinancing – mainly for enhanced partnership outcomes and aggregate leverage of funds for agriculture – and resource mobilisation – for an expanded IFAD loans and grants portfolio (including supplementary funds) – needs to be overcome. IFAD would be well advised to adopt specific strategies for mobilising cofinancing in MICs and LICs. And IFAD should systematically monitor and report results of cofinancing partnerships beyond indicators of ‘bigger’ loans and lower IFAD transaction costs, to include specific country partnership outcomes, in particular policy influence and scaling-up.
- b. For **grants** as a key partnership instrument, improved IFAD internal mechanisms are required to align regional and country grants, including SSTC, and to ensure that they provide more mutual support of lending operations and the country-level partnership outcomes envisaged in the COSOPs. The IFAD11 commitment 3.4. to strengthen synergies between lending and non-lending engagement is important and encouraging in this respect. In a similar vein more grant funds should be mobilised for longer-term partnership building with CSOs, FOs, indigenous groups and private sector (SMEs) and strengthening their capacities, particularly for countries where Governments are less supportive of use of loans for these activities. And finally, support to CSOs should have a long-term perspective on institutional effectiveness and sustainability beyond the project level, for example through support of CSO apex or umbrella organizations.
- c. With regard to PPPP, IFAD needs to recognise the challenges of PPPP partnerships and devise effective mechanisms to address them head on. This includes being upfront about the risks of PPPP and devise strategies to mitigate them. Updating IFAD's strategy for engagement with the private sector and enhancing instruments to collaborate with the private sector and foundations (IFAD11 commitment 1.2. Action 6) will be an important step. In addition IFAD should also continue the use of regional and sub-national platforms for PPPP to support networking and mutual learning.

236. Recommendation 3. Strengthen corporate accountability for partnership results through a coherent approach for monitoring and evaluating partnerships.

- a. The IFAD11 commitments include a number of monitorable actions that are relevant in this respect: to improve monitoring and reporting on cofinancing by source and country category, and better measure IFAD's crowding in of private investment (Action 5 under Commitment 1.2); to develop and implement a framework to strategically plan and monitor IFAD's partnerships at country, regional, global and institutional levels (Action 27 under Commitment 3.5.)
- b. Furthermore, IFAD should adopt consistent evaluation criteria and indicators for assessing the quality and effectiveness of partnership building for IFAD self- and independent evaluations and improve the system of monitoring, reporting and evaluating key partnership outcomes at country and IFAD corporate level, including ex-post cofinancing achievements (beyond ex-ante GRIPS). This would include at least some country-specific partnership

⁶⁸ Similar cofinancing principles could also be applied to certain forms of IFAD grants that could benefit from cofinancing.

indicators and targets (COSOPs) – based on common IFAD-wide ones - that should be reviewed and revised as necessary in annual COSOP reviews.

- c. The corporate database of grant-financed partnerships should be enhanced by including results in terms of key partnership outcomes.
237. And finally, global partnerships that are of strategic importance to IFAD and may need to be enhanced should be evaluated. In this respect, IOE should consider evaluating the RBA partnership

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Evaluation framework and hypotheses

1.1 Evaluation framework

<i>Review question</i>	<i>Review method</i>
Overall trends and patterns	
Q.1. What are the trends and patterns with regard to different types of partners and forms of engagement for the review period and how can they be explained?	Quantitative analysis of PPA/PCRIV ratings (2006 – 2016)
Q.2. How do they differ for different types of countries (MFS, MICs, LICs)?	Quantitative analysis of PPA/PCRIV ratings (2006 – 2016)
Q.3. What explains the good or poor performance on partnership building in “outlier” countries?	Qualitative evidence from selected CPEs and background information; interviews
Cofinancing partnerships	
Q.4. How can the decrease in cofinancing partnerships be explained?	Qualitative analysis of selected PPEs of cofinanced projects, supplemented by analysis from CPEs and COSOPs
Q.5. To what extent are cofinancing partnerships affecting the achievement of IFAD’s goals at country level?	Analysis from CPEs and COSOPs
Government partners	
Q.6. What roles do government partners play in partnership building and how do these affect the achievement of IFAD’s partnerships outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs
Knowledge and learning partnerships	
Q.7. How do country, regional and global knowledge and learning partnerships enhance IFAD’s partnership outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Q.8. How do partnerships with academic institutions, think tanks and research centres contribute to an enhanced knowledge of the results of IFAD financed operations on the ground? What are the practices for engagement with academic institutions and research centres?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Private sector	
Q.9. How do partnerships with the private sector influence the achievement of IFAD’s partnership outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Civil society	
Q.10. To what extent did partnerships with civil society (e.g. Novib) enable more effective interventions in partner countries?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Interagency coordination	
Q.11. How effective was IFAD’s role in interagency coordination, in particular with RBAs and other IFI’s working in the agricultural sector?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by case studies and feedback from selective interviews/survey responses
Q.12. What is the relevance and impact of IFAD global partnerships for IFAD partnership outcomes and goals at country level?	Qualitative evidence from 40 CPEs, supplemented by qualitative analysis of selected global partnerships and feedback from interviews/survey responses
IFAD as partner	
Q.13. What do other partners expect from IFAD and to what extent has IFAD been able to match these expectations?	Client surveys
Q.14. What evidence is there from independent evaluations	Evidence from 40 CSPEs and selected PPEs

to confirm that IFAD is a valued partner?

Synthesis of findings

Q.15. Which types of partners and which forms of engagement work best and under what conditions?	Synthesis of the above; PMD focus group discussion
Q.16. What are the key enabling factors for partnership building?	Synthesis of the above; PMD focus group discussion
Q.17. What configurations of partnership arrangements are most effective within a given country context?	Partnership rubric
Q.18. Can the downward trend on partnership performances, as identified in the 2016 ARRI, be confirmed (or not), and how can it be explained?	Interpretation of CPE ratings against synthesis findings

1.2 Hypotheses on enabling factors and transaction costs and risks.

1. Decentralized and sufficiently staffed country teams are among the most important factors for partnership outcomes
2. Striking good partnerships requires a strategic and practical approach, at corporate and country levels
 - 2.1 A clear corporate partnership vision, strategic support and institutional acknowledgement are important for country partnerships
 - 2.2 Incorporating and measuring partnership results and rewarding them /introducing incentives supports partnership outcomes
 - 2.3 Partnerships that are clearly defined and prioritized in COSOPs produce good results
 - 2.4 Potential partners that are well screened for delivery capacity
 - 2.5 Best practices in partnership are well incorporated in partnership design and implementation (well bound, results oriented, ownership etc.)
3. IFAD underestimates resources (time, skills and funds) and institutional/corporate support requirements for country partnerships (transaction costs) which leads to sub-optimal partnerships outcomes at country level
4. Global partnerships often do not sufficiently acknowledge country specific priorities, conditions and constraints and therefore sub-optimally contribute to achieving country partnership outcomes
5. IFAD overrates cofinancing partnerships vis-à-vis other partnership types of engagement to achieve influence and positive country partnership outcomes
6. Communication skills and trust-building are highly important for partnerships
7. Government capacities, governance and decentralization strongly influence the results and effective impact pathways for different forms of partnerships.

8. Partners and types of engagement

- 8.1 Partnerships with CSOs work better through provision of non-lending grant support than within projects
- 8.2 PPPPs are most effective when Government has generated a supportive environment for private sector engagement
- 8.3 PPPPs are most effective when IFAD works across Ministries (Agriculture, Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, Environment etc.)
- 8.4 Key strategic partnerships with IFIs such as AfDB, AsDB and GEF require regular (global) interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities

8.5 Grants and supplementary funding for non-lending work are critical for effective partnership activities and outcomes

8.6 Work at country level through research grants to international and national institutions supports knowledge partnerships in countries and related outcomes

8.7 Hypotheses on policy engagement

8.7.1 Policy engagement works best where Skilled staff on policy issues available

8.7.2 Policy engagement works best where Support units are established in relevant ministries

8.7.3 Policy engagement works best where Dialogue includes RBA and MDBs

8.7.4 Policy engagement works best where Government buy-in into IFAD objectives

8.8 Interagency coordination with RBAs works best where there are clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level.

8.9 IFAD overrates cofinancing partnerships vis-à-vis other partnership types of engagement to achieve influence and positive country partnership outcomes

Senior independent adviser's report


1. Building Partnerships for Enhanced Development Effectiveness being prepared by IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation is timely as IFAD seeks to step up its development impact including through decentralization and partnerships in the field. Crucial to the success of this endeavor is both the quality, independence and rigor of the evaluative findings and their acceptance, adoption and follow through by Management. This reviewer is satisfied with evidence on these two planks thus far and is optimistic about the value addition and usefulness of this work.
2. This reviewer has given comments and inputs on the draft approach paper, earlier drafts of the paper and ongoing discussions and feedback with stakeholders including IFAD management. The organization and accessibility of the report have improved vastly, with much greater granularity and country flavor to the findings. The link among findings, conclusions and recommendations are clear. The messages and priorities for action come through. The transparency and frankness on the data base and limitations of the evidence base are articulated.
3. Similar exercises have been carried out at other organizations including the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, which this reviewer has supervised. Each situation is different. But one message that seems common across the differing settings is the value of keeping they eye focused both on the costs of building partnerships (such as the time and administrative finances needed to sustain them) and the benefits (such better leveraging and synergies of rural interventions), which can vastly exceed the costs but if and only if reforms are carried out to make the partnerships work better. Thus the recommendations to make partnerships work better are the crux of this exercise.
4. Leading up to the recommendations, the findings on the nature of partnerships are key. If I may stress an often-forgotten aspect, it is the link between (i) partnerships that improve program delivery (say via financing of programs inter alia with Rome based organizations, MDBs and governments); and (ii) partnerships in generating working links (say health, education, agriculture etc.) that produces synergies. Some findings suggest a positive performance of knowledge partnerships and weak performance of partnership building and policy dialog. Is it because the abovementioned synergies work better in one and not the other, and if so why and what can be done?
5. The report has mined the available data from evaluations and discussions with the Board, Operations, peer reviewers and other stakeholders very well. Going forward, more can be done on ratings and evaluation criteria that can give a stronger basis for such synthetic work. In all such synthetic work, the evaluation criteria need to be carried through rigorously—relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and overall impact. Country typologies mentioned in the report are very useful. But how strong are the CSPEs and do they need strengthening?
6. The case studies are hugely important. We might be able to mine the country focus further. The analysis shows differences by country groupings and by instruments, as well as trends in partnership outcomes. Can we learn more from the vast difference in partnership effectiveness across ESA and LAC for example? Middle income countries are noted as having better outcomes than low income ones , but is that always so?
7. The report has important conclusions on policy change, scaling up, synergies, and leverage which are especially important whenever the share of an organization in financing or a program is relatively modest. IFAD's Board and Management should be congratulated on seeing the value of its contributions within the broader context of all that others too are doing and seeking to raise its impact inter alia through making partnership's work better. The question now would be if these intentions

will be translated into operational priorities with the needed financing and staff power allocated.

8. The report has important conclusions on the role of trust, country ownership, continuity of efforts and predictability (of financing as well), strategic approaches, monitoring and evaluation. These points merit follow up in future work. It surely seems key to have country and government ownership and capacity for good partnership outcomes. How do we square that with the observation that government being the key player can also limit impact of partnerships? Similarly the formality of the partnership arrangements adds to administrative costs, but formal arrangements seem to work better in terms of their effectiveness.
9. The follow up to the report both on the part of the evaluators and Management as well as the Board is crucial. What markers will evaluators assess over time and report on progress? How will Management and the Board ensure the needed staffing, resources and most importantly priorities for integrating partnerships more squarely into IFAD strategy?
10. This reviewer would like to express his deep appreciation for the quality and integrity of the process, the preparedness and commitment of those he was involved with and pleasure for being part of this evaluation exercise.


PRM IFAD Country Level Partnership Survey 2017

Figure 1
Most important partners for cofinancing




Source: PRM survey 2017

Figure 2
Most important partners for knowledge and policy engagement



Source: PRM survey 2017

Figure 3
Partners with limited or no engagement



Source: PRM survey 2017

Cofinancing data

4.1 Cofinancing trends by IFAD replenishment periods.

Table 1

IFAD Cofinancing trends 2007-15 (all countries)

IFAD replenishment period	Cofinancing ratio Co- vs. IFAD	IFAD Domestic International			IFAD Domestic International			Total USD million
		USD million			Percent			
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1.12	1,731	941	997	47.2	25.7	27.2	3,668
IFAD 8 (2010-12)	1.42	2,695	2,355	1,484	41.2	36.0	22.7	6,534
IFAD 9 (2013-15)	1.39	2,916	2,261	1,783	41.9	32.5	25.6	6,960

Source: IFAD GRIPS

Table 2

IFAD low-income countries 2007-15

IFAD replenishment period	Cofinancing ratio Co-fin. vs. IFAD	IFAD Domestic International			IFAD Domestic International			Total USD million
		USD million			Percent			
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1.26	1,034	495	803	44.3	21.2	34.4	2332
IFAD 8 (2010-12)	1.37	1,856	1,583	965	42.1	35.9	21.9	4,404
IFAD 9 (2013-15)	1.03	2,084	1,180	972	49.2	27.9	22.9	4,236

Source: IFAD GRIPS

Table 3

IFAD lower middle-income countries 2007-15

IFAD replenishment period	Cofinancing ratio Co-fin. vs. IFAD	IFAD Domestic International			IFAD Domestic International			Total USD million
		USD million			Percent			
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	0.90	557	341	159	52.7	32.3	15.0	3,668
IFAD 8 (2010-12)	1.29	665	485	374	43.6	31.8	24/5	6,534
IFAD 9 (2013-15)	2.20	709	803	759	31.2	35.4	33.4	6,960

Source: IFAD GRIPS

Table 4

IFAD upper middle-income countries 2007-15

IFAD replenishment period	Cofinancing ratio Co-fin. vs. IFAD	IFAD Domestic International			IFAD Domestic International			Total USD million
		USD million			Percent			

<i>IFAD replenishment period</i>	<i>Cofinancing ratio</i>	<i>IFAD Domestic</i>	<i>International</i>	<i>IFAD Domestic</i>	<i>International</i>	<i>Total</i>		
	Co-fin. vs. IFAD	USD million		Percent		USD million		
IFAD 7 (2007-09)	1.03	34	134	272	49.3	38.2	12.5	3,668
IFAD 8 (2010-12)	2.51	172	287	145	28.5	47.5	24.0	6,534
IFAD 9 (2013-15)	2.83	123	287	61	26.1	60.9	13.0	6,960

Source: IFAD GRIPS

4.2 High cofinancing trends

Table 1

Countries with relatively high cofinancing

<i>Ratio co-financier to IFAD loan in country</i>	<i>Number of countries</i>	<i>Countries</i>
International cofinancing		
≥100%	4	Ghana, Mali, Nepal, Uganda
≥50 - <100%	11	Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Jordan, Niger, Madagascar, Pakistan, Philippines, Tanzania, Yemen
Domestic cofinancing		
≥50%	3	India, Uganda
≥10 - <50%	7	Bangladesh, Brazil, Equador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nicaragua, Nigeria
Government cofinancing		
≥100%	5	Brazil, China, Nigeria, Pakistan, Uganda,
≥50% - <100%	11	Argentina, Brazil, Equador, Ghana, India, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal

(only countries with CSPEs in 2006-2016, based on GRIPs information [cofinancing at design])

Source: annex V table 3

CSPE review quantitative data

Table 1
Partnership assessment matrix (source: CPMs)

Country (partnerships ratings)	Partnership types			Outcomes					Outputs											Cofinancing share (intern, GRIPS)
	Cofinancing (non-Government)	Knowledge and learning	Coordination and cooperation	Influencing	Scaling-up and mainstreaming	Complementarities / synergies	Knowledge & Innovation	Sustainability and ownership	Working groups	Partner capacities	Cofinanced projects (intern., GRIPS) ⁶⁹	Grants	Policy engagement	Knowledge platforms	Events	Study tours/ Learning routes	Vertical collaboration	PPPP	Alignment and harmonization	
Argentina 2009 (4)	-	+++	+	+++	+	++	+++	++	-	++	+	++	+++	++	+	+	++	-	+	16%
Bangladesh 2014 (4)	+++	++	+++ NGOs	+	++	+	++	++	+	+++	++	++	+	-	-	++	+++	+	-	74%
Bolivia 2013 (3)	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	++	++	+	+	+	Reg.	++	-	-	-	47%
Brazil 2015 (4)	-	+++	+	++	+	+	+++	+	-	+	+	++	++	+	+	++	+	+	+	12%
Brazil 2007 (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	0%
China 2013 (4)	-	+	++ WFP	+	++	++	+	++	+	++	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	++	8%
Ecuador 2012 (3)	++	++	+	+	-	+	++	+	+	++	++	++	+	++	-	++	+	+	++	71%
Ethiopia 2015 (4)	+++ WB	+	++ WB - AfDB	+	++	++	+	++	+	+	++	+	++	+	-	+	+	+	+++	72%
Gambia 2015 (3)	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	++	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	77%
Ghana 2010 (4)	++ WB, AfDB	+	++	++	+	+	+	+	++	-	+++	+	++	++	-	-	+	+	++	104%
India 2015 (3)	+	++	+	+	+	+	++	++ State	+	+	+	++	-	-	+	-	+	+	++	11%
Indonesia 2012 (3)	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	++ Mars	++	-	32%

⁶⁹ International cofinancing only (GRIPS information). Legend: - = <10%; + 10 - < 50%; ++ 50 - < 100%; +++ > 100%; country portfolio at time of CSPE evaluation

Country (partnerships ratings)	Partnership types			Outcomes					Outputs											Cofinancing share (intern, GRIPS)
	Cofinancing (non- Government)	Knowledge and learning	Coordination and cooperation	Influencing	Scaling-up and mainstreaming	Complementarities / synergies	Knowledge & Innovation	Sustainability and ownership	Working groups	Partner capacities	Cofinanced projects (intern., GRIPS) ⁶⁹	Grants	Policy engagement	Knowledge platforms	Events	Study tours/ Learning routes	Vertical collaboration	PPPP	Alignment and harmonization	
Jordan 2011 (4)	+++ GEF etc.	++	-	-	+	-	++	+	-	+	++	++	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	76%
Kenya 2010 (4)	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	++	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+++	31%
Madagascar 2012 (5)	++	++	++	++	-	+	++	+	++	++	++	+	++	++	+	-	+++	+++	++	58%
Mali 2012 (5)	+++	+++	++	++	+++ MF	++	+++	++	++	++	+++	++	+++	+	+	-	+++	+	+++	115 %
Mali 2006 (3)	+	++	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	++	++	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	51%
Moldova 2013 (4)	++	+	+	+	+	++	++	++	++	-	+	-	-	+	++	++	++	++	++	15%
Morocco 2006 (4)	+	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	++	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	32%
Mozambique 2016 (5)	++	++	+++	++	+	+++	++	++	+	++	+	++	+	++	++	+	+++	+++	++	47%
Nepal 2012 (4)	++ WB, ADB	+++	+	++	-	++	+++	+	+	++	+++	+++	++	-	-	+	++	++	++	133 %
Nicaragua 2016 (4)	++	+	+	++	+	++	++	+	++	++	+	++	++	+	+	++	++	++	++	33%
Niger 2009 (5)	++	+	++	++	-	+++	++	+	+	++	++	++	++	+	+	-	-	-	+++	73%
Nigeria 2015 (3) 2008 (4)	- Govt.	++	+	++	++	++	+	-	++	+	- 2015 + 2008	++	++	+	-	+	+	+	+	5% 11%
Pakistan 2007 (4)	++	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	++	++	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	57%
Philippines 2016 (4)	+ADB	+++	++ Res	++ Tech	++ Tech	++ Res	++	+	-	+	++	++	+	++	+++	-	++	+	-	84%
Rwanda 2010 (4)	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	++	+	++	+	++	-	+	+	++	+	+	+++	43%
Senegal 2013 (4)	+	-	++ POs	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	++	+	+	+	43%

Country (partnerships ratings)	Partnership types			Outcomes					Outputs											Cofinancing share (intern, GRIPS)
	Cofinancing (non-Government)	Knowledge and learning	Coordination and cooperation	Influencing	Scaling-up and mainstreaming	Complementarities / synergies	Knowledge & Innovation	Sustainability and ownership	Working groups	Partner capacities	Cofinanced projects (intern., GRIPS) ⁶⁹	Grants	Policy engagement	Knowledge platforms	Events	Study tours/ Learning routes	Vertical collaboration	PPPP	Alignment and harmonization	
Sudan 2008 (3)	+	-	-	+	++	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	37%
Tanzania 2014 (4)	++	+	+++ ASDP	+	++	+++	+	++	++	++	++	+	+	+	+	-	++ Local	++	+++	92%
Turkey 2015 (3)	-	++	+	+ Pol	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	++	-	+	13%
Uganda 2011 (5)	++	+	+++	+	-	+++	+	+++ UJAS	++	+	+++	+	+	+	+	-	+++	+++	+++ UJAS	120 %
Vietnam 2010 (4)	-	+	+ PS	+ Proj.	+	+	+ WG	++	++ Gov.	+	-	+ PPP P	+ Proj.	+	+++	++	++ Local	++	++	9%
Yemen 2010 (4)	++	-	+	++	+	++	+	+	+	+	++	+	++	+	-	+	+	+	++	60%
Zambia 2013 (4)	-	+	+	++	-	+	+	++	++	+	+	+	++	+	-	+	+ Reg	+	++	20%
Counts																				
Totals	47	46	44	40	28	47	49	39	34	41	52	49	39	33	23	28	46	37	49	
+	11	13	16	13	11	15	17	17	12	14	15	14	13	21	13	10	13	16	12	
++	12	9	8	12	7	10	10	11	11	12	13	16	10	6	2	9	9	6	12	
+++	4	5	4	1	1	4	4	0	0	1	4	1	2	0	2	0	5	3	7	
-	8	8	7	9	16	6	4	7	12	8	4	4	10	8	18	16	8	10	4	

Legend: - no reported partnership engagement; + some engagement (but under-exploited); ++ substantial engagement, visible, strategic; +++ very strong and visible engagement, demonstrated high-profile results; in terms of quantities, but also quality of partnership engagement. **Note:** An assessment of '-' does not necessarily mean that there is no engagement, but that it may be minor or there is no reference in the CSPE in terms of partnerships. For instance, projects may be well aligned with Governments, but there may have been no particular partnership effort on alignment, harmonization and use of country systems. Secondly, this table refers to information from CSPEs at the time of the evaluation. Performance may be different as of 2017.

Source: compiled by IOE based on CSPE reviews. Cofinancing data is derived from annex VII.3 table 1

5.2 Partnership types of engagement

The following tables (1 to 4) provide the incidences of types of engagement and were compiled by IOE based on the CSPE reviews found in annex V.1.

Table 1
Types of engagement 2006 – 2017 (n=36)

Partners	Types of engagement									Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Loans	Grants	Supplementary	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs		
Government	36	14	1	15	4	22	6	1	14	112	21.3
Regional Economic Communities	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	4	0.8
International Development Partners	24	18	3	5	13	18	7	7	2	94	17.9
IFIs	21	5	0	3	6	9	0	0	1	45	8.6
Local financial institutions	7	3	0	6	0	2	0	0	1	19	3.6
Development Banks	6	2	0	4	0	2	0	0	3	17	3.2
Research Institutions/Universities	4	23	0	4	7	4	2	0	0	44	8.4
CSOs/IP organizations	9	21	0	14	15	12	5	0	9	85	16.2
Farmers' organizations	3	7	0	14	8	7	4	0	9	52	9.9
Private sector	11	3	0	14	6	3	1	0	15	53	10.1
TOTAL	121	97	4	79	59	81	26	8	54	525	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	55.5	44.5		36.1	26.9	37.0	29.5	9.1	61.4		

Note: use 1 to match partners with types of engagement. Each CSPE may include several types of engagement. Each Type of engagement could be associated to one or more partners.

Table 2
Types of engagement 2006 – 2011 (n=15)

Partners	Types of engagement									Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs		
Government	14	3	0	6	1	9	1	0	5	39	22.0
Regional Economic Communities	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	1.7
International Development Partners	8	4	0	2	4	6	4	1	0	29	16.4
IFIs	8	1	0	2	3	3	0	0	0	17	9.6
Local financial institutions	3	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	8	4.5
Development Banks	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	2.8
Research Institutions/Universities	1	8	0	1	3	2	1	0	0	16	9.0
CSOs/IP organizations	3	8	0	5	7	2	2	0	3	30	16.9
Farmers' organizations	0	2	0	5	3	2	1	0	4	17	9.6
Private sector	3	1	0	3	1	1	0	0	4	13	7.3
TOTAL	43	29	0	27	22	28	10	1	17	177	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	59.7	40.3		35.1	28.6	36.4	35.7	3.6	60.7		

Table 3
Types of engagement 2012 - 2017 (n=21)

Partners	Types of engagement									Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs		
Government	22	11	1	9	3	13	5	1	9	73	21.0
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.3
International Development Partners	16	14	3	3	9	12	3	6	2	65	18.7
IFIs	13	4	0	1	3	6	0	0	1	28	8.0
Local financial institutions	4	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	11	3.2
Development Banks	3	2	0	3	0	2	0	0	2	12	3.4
Research Institutions/Universities	3	15	0	3	4	2	1	0	0	28	8.0
CSOs/IP organizations	6	13	0	9	8	10	3	0	6	55	15.8
Farmers' organizations	3	5	0	9	5	5	3	0	5	35	10.1
Private sector	8	2	0	11	5	2	1	0	11	40	11.5
TOTAL	78	68	4	52	37	53	16	7	37	348	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	53.4	46.6		36.6	26.1	37.3	26.7	11.7	61.7		

Table 4
Types of engagement Low Income Countries (LIC) (n=14)

Partners	Types of engagement										Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs			
Government	14	4	1	2	1	8	1	1	4		35	18.6
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		1	0.5
International Development Partners	10	8	1	1	6	8	2	3	1		39	20.7
IFIs	11	2	0	0	3	5	0	0	1		22	11.7
Local financial institutions	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		5	2.7
Development Banks	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1		6	3.2
Research Institutions/Universities	2	8	0	0	3	1	0	0	0		14	7.4
CSOs/IP organizations	4	12	0	6	4	2	0	0	4		32	17.0
Farmers' organizations	1	3	0	5	4	1	0	0	3		17	9.0
Private sector	7	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	5		17	9.0
TOTAL	53	41	2	19	22	27	3	4	19		188	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	56.4	43.6		27.9	32.4	39.7	11.5	15.4	73.1			

Table 5
Types of engagement Middle Income Countries (MIC) (n=22)

Partners	Types of engagement										Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Loans	Grants	Supplementary Funding	Brokering	Networking	Dialogue	SSTC	RBA	PPPPs			
Government	22	10	0	13	3	14	5	0	10		77	22.8
Regional Economic Communities	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0		3	0.9
International Development Partners	14	10	2	4	7	10	5	4	1		55	16.3
IFIs	10	3	0	3	3	4	0	0	0		23	6.8
Local financial institutions	5	1	0	5	0	2	0	0	1		14	4.2
Development Banks	4	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	2		11	3.3
Research Institutions/Universities	2	15	0	4	4	3	2	0	0		30	8.9
CSOs/IP organizations	5	9	0	8	11	10	5	0	5		53	15.7
Farmers' organizations	2	4	0	9	4	6	4	0	6		35	10.4
Private sector	4	2	0	11	5	3	1	0	10		36	10.7
TOTAL	68	56	2	60	37	54	23	4	35		337	100.0
Percent (column of engagement type sub-group)	54.8	45.2		39.7	24.5	35.8	37.1	6.5	56.5			

5.3 Partnership outcomes

The following tables (1 to 5) provide the incidences of partnership outcomes and were compiled by IOE based on the CSPE reviews found in annex V.1.

Table 1
Partnership outcomes 2006 - 2017 (n=36)

Partners	Outcomes									Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership		
Government	22	5	7	3	10	16	4	13	9	89	29.7
Regional Economic Communities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.3
International Development Partners	7	4	14	6	1	5	1	9	0	47	15.7
IFIs	5	2	13	3	1	2	0	3	0	29	9.7
Local financial institutions	0	1	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	7	2.3
Development Banks	2	0	2	0	3	1	0	1	1	10	3.3
Research Institutions/Universities	6	1	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	16	5.3
CSOs/IP organizations	10	4	2	1	13	0	1	13	3	47	15.7
Farmers' organizations	7	3	1	0	12	0	0	10	2	35	11.7
Private sector	4	1	0	1	7	0	1	5	0	19	6.3
TOTAL	64	21	41	14	51	25	7	62	15	300	
Column percentage	21.3	7.0	13.7	4.7	17.0	8.3	2.3	20.7	5.0		

Table 2
Partnership outcomes 2006 - 2011 (n=15)

Partners	Outcomes									Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership		
Government	10	0	4	1	4	5	1	6	3	34	33.0
Regional Economic Communities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.0
International Development Partners	1	2	5	1	0	0	0	2	0	11	10.7
IFIs	2	0	7	1	1	0	0	1	0	12	11.7
Local financial institutions	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	3.9
Development Banks	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	3	2.9
Research Institutions/Universities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	4	3.9
CSOs/IP organizations	3	1	2	1	3	0	1	4	2	17	16.5
Farmers' organizations	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	4	2	13	12.6
Private sector	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	3.9
TOTAL	22	4	21	5	15	5	2	21	8	103	
Column percentage	21.4	3.9	20.4	4.9	14.6	4.9	1.9	20.4	7.8		

Table 3
Partnership outcomes 2012 – 2017 (n=21)

Partners	Outcomes										Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership			
Government	12	5	3	2	6	11	3	7	6	55	27.9	
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	
International Development Partners	6	2	9	5	1	5	1	7	0	36	18.3	
IFIs	3	2	6	2	0	2	0	2	0	17	8.6	
Local financial institutions	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	1.5	
Development Banks	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	7	3.6	
Research Institutions/Universities	5	1	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	12	6.1	
CSOs/IP organizations	7	3	0	0	10	0	0	9	1	30	15.2	
Farmers' organizations	5	2	0	0	9	0	0	6	0	22	11.2	
Private sector	2	1	0	0	7	0	1	4	0	15	7.6	
TOTAL	42	17	20	9	36	20	5	41	7	197		
Column percentage	21.3	8.6	10.2	4.6	18.3	10.2	2.5	20.8	3.6			

Table 4
Partnership outcomes 2006 – 2017 Low Income Countries (LIC) (n=14)

Partners	Outcomes										Total (rows)	% (rows)
	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership			
Government	6	0	1	1	3	7	2	3	3	26	26.3	
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	
International Development Partners	3	2	6	2	0	3	0	4	0	20	20.2	
IFIs	3	1	5	2	0	1	0	1	0	13	13.1	
Local financial institutions	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2.0	
Development Banks	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2.0	
Research Institutions/Universities	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	4.0	
CSOs/IP organizations	3	1	2	1	4	0	0	2	1	14	14.1	
Farmers' organizations	2	1	1	0	5	0	0	3	0	12	12.1	
Private sector	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	6	6.1	
TOTAL	20	6	17	7	16	11	3	15	4	99		
Column percentage	20.2	6.1	17.2	7.1	16.2	11.1	3.0	15.2	4.0			

Table 5
Partnership outcomes 2006 – 2017 Middle Income Countries (MIC) (n=22)

Partners	Outcomes										Total (rows)	%
	Influencing	Scaling-up	Leveraging resources	Complementarities/Synergies	Partner capacities	Alignment, harmonisation, use of country systems	Sustainable, effective M&E	Knowledge and communication	Ownership			
Government	16	5	6	2	7	9	2	10	6	63	31.3	
Regional Economic Communities	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.5	
International Development Partners	4	2	8	4	1	2	1	5	0	27	13.4	
IFIs	2	1	8	1	1	1	0	2	0	16	8.0	
Local financial institutions	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	5	2.5	
Development Banks	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	1	1	8	4.0	
Research Institutions/Universities	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	12	6.0	
CSOs/IP organizations	7	3	0	0	9	0	1	11	2	33	16.4	
Farmers' organizations	5	2	0	0	7	0	0	7	2	23	11.4	
Private sector	3	1	0	0	4	0	0	5	0	13	6.5	
TOTAL	44	15	24	7	35	14	4	47	11	201		
Column percentage	21.9	7.5	11.9	3.5	17.4	7.0	2.0	23.4	5.5			

5.4 Partnership ladder

The following table provides the strength of engagement and was compiled by IOE based on the CSPE reviews found in annex V.1.

Table 1
Partnership ladder 2006 - 2017 (n=36)

Partner	Partnership ladder						Total (rows)	% (rows)
	1. Partner Implementation	2. Sharing Information	3. Deciding Together	4. Acting together	5. Supporting initiatives	6. Handing over/Scaling-up		
Government	34	17	5	8	10	8	82	25.6
Regional Economic Communities	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.3
International Development Partners	10	19	3	7	13	1	53	16.6
IFIs	9	12	2	6	5	1	35	10.9
Local financial institutions	7	3	0	0	2	1	13	4.1
Development Banks	2	1	0	1	3	0	7	2.2
Research Institutions/Universities	12	13	0	3	5	2	35	10.9
CSOs/IP organizations	20	16	0	4	8	2	50	15.6
Farmers' organizations	7	5	0	4	5	1	22	6.9
Private sector	10	7	0	2	3	0	22	6.9
TOTAL	111	93	10	35	55	16	320	100.0
Column percentage	34.7	29.1	3.1	10.9	17.2	5.0		

5.5 Hypothesis testing

1. Hypotheses. The theory of change led to the formulation of a number of hypotheses that were used in the review and analysis of CSPEs, CLEs and other documents in this evaluation synthesis report (ESR) (see annex I). There are two types of hypotheses.
2. The first set relates to the enabling factors and transaction costs and risks as identified in the ToC. Among others they refer to the relevance of a clear corporate partnership vision and strategic approach, decentralized country teams for partnerships, country priorities and various resources and capacities.
3. The second set is related to hypotheses on specific partnership categories and modalities that were derived from a review of literature and interviews.

Table 1
Hypothesis testing 2006 - 2017

Hypotheses	Correct	Not correct	Partially correct
General			
1. Decentralized and sufficiently staffed country teams are among the most important factors for partnership outcomes	22	0	7
2. Striking good partnerships requires a strategic and practical approach, at corporate and country levels	20	0	3
2.1 A clear corporate partnership vision, strategic support and institutional acknowledgement are important for country partnerships	24	0	0
2.2 Incorporating and measuring partnership results and rewarding them /introducing incentives supports partnership outcomes	3	0	0
2.3 Partnerships that are clearly defined and prioritized in COSOPs produce good results	10	10	7
2.4 Potential partners that are well screened for delivery capacity	20	2	2
2.5 Best practices in partnership are well incorporated in partnership design and implementation (well bound, results oriented, ownership etc.)	19	0	1
3. IFAD underestimates resources (time, skills and funds) and institutional/corporate support requirements for country partnerships (transaction costs) which leads to sub-optimal partnerships outcomes at country level	18	3	2
4. Global partnerships often do not sufficiently acknowledge country specific priorities, conditions and constraints and therefore sub-optimally contribute to achieving country partnership outcomes	8	2	2
5. IFAD overrates cofinancing partnerships vis-à-vis other partnership types of engagement to achieve influence and positive country partnership outcomes	2	7	4
6. Communication skills and trust-building are highly important for partnerships	14	0	0
7. Government capacities, governance and decentralization strongly influence the results and effective impact pathways for different forms of partnerships.	31	0	0

Hypotheses (continued)	Correct	Not correct	Partially correct
Partners and types of engagement	0	0	0
8.1 Partnerships with CSOs work better through provision of non-lending grant support than within projects	0	3	1
8.2 PPPPs are most effective when Government has generated a supportive environment for private sector engagement	13	0	0

Hypotheses (continued)	Correct	Not correct	Partially correct
8.3 PPPPs are most effective when IFAD works across Ministries (Agriculture, Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, Environment etc.)	9	1	1
8.4 Key strategic partnerships with IFIs such as AfDB, AsDB and GEF require regular (global) interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities and complementarities	19	0	1
8.5 Grants and supplementary funding for non-lending work are critical for effective partnership activities and outcomes	15	0	2
8.6 Work at country level through research grants to international and national institutions supports knowledge partnerships in countries and related outcomes	18	0	0
8.7.1 Policy engagement works best where Skilled staff on policy issues available	9	0	0
8.7.2 Policy engagement works best where Support units are established in relevant ministries	5	0	2
8.7.3 Policy engagement works best where Dialogue includes RBA and MDBs	19	0	0
8.7.4 Policy engagement works best where Government buy-in into IFAD objectives	14	0	1
8.8 Interagency coordination with RBAs works best where there are clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level.	11	2	1

4. **The most frequently confirmed hypotheses** were those that proposed a high influence of Government capacities and governance on partnership results (31), secondly, a clear IFAD corporate partnership vision, strategic support and institutional acknowledgment for country partnerships (24) and, thirdly, a well-staffed IFAD country office. Also very important were good screening of partners (20), a strategic, selective and practical approach to partnerships (20), incorporation of best practices in partnership design (19), and a proper estimation of the resources required for partnerships (18).⁷⁰
5. Interestingly, although it often helps to have **COSOPs with clearly defined and prioritized partnerships** (or in reverse, partnership building can go wrong when they are not), relying on well formulated and prioritized COSOPs was not found sufficient for good partnerships building in practice. In 10 countries the quality of partnership propositions in COSOPs had little correlation with actual later partnership building, or partnership building may have been positive although it was not well addressed in the COSOP.
6. **A number of hypotheses dealt with specific partners types of forms of engagement.** A hypothesis that assumed that **(international) cofinancing may be over-rated for country partnership outcomes** was soundly rejected for seven countries (although there was some evidence to its full or partial veracity in some other countries, but the overall numbers are low). Cofinancing has an important place for country partnership outcomes, particularly through its co-variant effects, such as for complementarities and policy engagement (a qualitative finding from CSPEs). **Knowledge and learning** were found in half of the CSPEs (18) to be significantly positively correlated to research grants to international and national institutions and country level work by these organizations. In general, grants are critical for effective partnerships (15). **Coordination and cooperation partnerships** work best when accompanied by regular country and global interaction and communication on country and thematic priorities, commonalities

⁷⁰ While it is appropriate to primarily point out and focus on hypotheses that were validated in a large number of countries, these numbers are only indicative, particularly in the case of hypotheses that were neither confirmed nor rejected in many countries (i.e. those with a low count). In those cases related issues may simply not have been prominently on display during the time of the country evaluations.

and complementarities of involved agencies (19). Clear corporate agreements on scope and outcomes at country level were found useful in 11 countries for cooperation between Rome-based Agencies, but did not guarantee good partnership outcomes in all countries.

7. **IFAD policy engagement** is often more effective when it includes either other IFIs or Rome-based Agencies. This was the case in 19 countries. Skilled IFAD staff helps in policy engagement and dialogue, preferably with specialized technical knowledge and communication abilities. It also is useful to strategically choose the topics of engagements of interest and buy-in to Government (14) and to have a long-standing relationship with relevant Ministries and technical or policy units within these Ministries (5). In general, good communication skills, trust- and team-building are highly important for country level partnerships, particularly for those of policy engagement and influence (14).
8. In terms of IFAD **work with CSOs** no preference was found in the CSPEs for support of CSOs through grants compared with project loan funds, if anything, it is apparently just the opposite. But the issue was discussed in very few CSPEs (4 only). Work with the **private sector and PPPs** is most effective when Government generated a supportive environment for private sector engagement (13) and when IFAD work across Ministries (9) to include those beyond Agriculture, such as Ministries of Commerce and Trade, Industry and Small Business Development, Environment etc.).

CSPE review qualitative data

6.1 Country examples for strong and weak cofinancing partnerships

Strong partnerships <i>(positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)</i>	Weak partnerships <i>(not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)</i>
Cofinancing	
<p>ECUADOR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cofinancing improved in recent years (Spanish Trust Fund, GEF, WB). Government important co-financier. But cofinancing is still underexploited. <p>ETHIOPIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Long-term WB cofinancing is regarded as a model for influence and long-term impact (in the context of a program for pastoralists) - But Government did not support the proposed IFAD/AfDB project cofinancing partnership <p>INDONESIA (ADB)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cofinancing with ADB (P4K) is noteworthy <p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong cofinancing; many IFAD partners <p>TANZANIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cofinancing is relatively good, mainly through Agriculture Sector Development Programme - ASDP (but mechanisms of cofinancing are not quite clear. Is it cofinancing, parallel funding or basket funding?) <p>NIGER</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quite a few cofinancing partners, WB, AFD, WADB, BSF, UNDP, WFP and others (including UN system) <p>YEMEN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Significant cofinancing in Yemen (expanded to EU and IsDB before CSPE). 	<p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CSPE recommends more cofinancing and knowledge sharing with IFIs (currently no international or domestic private cofinancing (→ little leverage). <p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - only 8 per cent cofinancing; IFAD has few contacts with other IFIs and other donors (except WFP). Few partnerships with multi- and bilateral partners (partly due to China Govt. preference for division of labor). <p>GAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Few other donors and opportunities; Donor Joint Assistance Strategy is built on budget support (WB/AfDB) in which IFAD cannot be part; some cofinancing with AfDB <p>INDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relatively high domestic cofinancing; some limited cofinancing with WB and DfID (14 per cent CSPE) but still too little for large-scale upscaling beyond state project areas <p>MOLDOVA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some good cofinancing with USAID, DANIDA ("like-minded donors"); but below potential (cofinancing was not explicitly encouraged by 2007 COSOP) <p>MOZAMBIQUE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There is some cofinancing with the EC; but overall cofinancing is under-exploited, particularly with WB and AfDB <p>NEPAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Despite financial support by IFAD for the Agriculture Development Strategy (ADS), there is limited cofinancing. Agricultural partners prefer to work individually in Nepal, partly related to area specific focus and division of labor and to weak Government. There is one larger cofinanced project with the WB (PAF) (which may explain the high cofinancing rate in GRIPS of 133 per cent) <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Almost no donor cofinancing (e.g. WB, DfID, USAID); missed opportunities <p>SENEGAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some cofinancing with WB, WADB and EU food facility; but too little for having sufficient financial leverage <p>ZAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very limited cofinancing, low Government counterpart funding. All of this is considered important for broader delivery and upscaling. <p>JORDAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much interaction with other donors, low cofinancing

Strong partnerships <i>(positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)</i>	Weak partnerships <i>(not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)</i>
Cofinancing	
	<p>KENYA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Too many scattered and small cofinancing partnerships with a variety of donors (AGRA, BSF, GEF, OFIN, UNDP), not sufficiently sub-sector focused - Few strategic opportunities for major cofinancing, since several partners focus on budget-support (KJAS) - CSPE recommendation: Scope for partnerships with WB, AfDB, USAID should be pursued more actively <p>RWANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some limited cofinancing with OFIN, AfDB and bilaterals. Not much cooperation beyond financial relationship. No systematic extension in line with COSOP suggestions. <p>VIETNAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Little cofinancing from IFIs or others (not encouraged by Government). Upscaling mainly through Government mainstreaming of integrated rural approaches. <p>PAKISTAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Changing roles of cofinancing by WB and AsDB: IFAD moving from junior to senior partner and back again; party driven through need for supervision partners until 2007 - Other potential cofinancing partners (IsDB and UN system) were not explored; COSOP is vague on who to partner with

6.2 Country examples for strong and weak knowledge and learning partnerships

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
Knowledge and Learning Grants (mostly regional research)	
<p>BANGLADESH - Purposive research grants: IRRI / WorldFish / vertical connections regional grants/country grants; strategic and somewhat connected to country program</p> <p>BOLIVIA - Some IFAD grants produced good results (mostly regional), such as PROCASUR (Rural Development Training). Global grant to Bioversity (strong on PPPP, quinoa, germ banks). But little synergy between IFAD grants and country loans.</p> <p>BRAZIL - Many grants (24), 9 of which on SSC. For instance, EMBRAPA was supposed to 'socialize' innovations. But in general, there is limited information to assess ultimate grant results.</p> <p>ECUADOR - There is focus on knowledge management through various grants. K&L is at the core of partnerships in Ecuador, mostly through Government projects and regional grants.</p> <p>MALI -Long-term research with CG Bioversity informed PAPAM project design</p> <p>NEPAL - Successful ICRISAT grant on grain legumes - Partnership with ILO did not work out due to their inexperience in the field - Program with SNV (intern. NGO) on developing innovative and inclusive business approach (<i>note: not clear whether this is international or national grant</i>)</p> <p>NIGERIA - Considerable number of 'grants for innovation' for technology (e.g. IITA on cassava); but not clear on effectiveness.</p> <p>PHILIPPINES - Grants for innovation with International centers were well related to projects in 2 out of 3 cases; → influence through innovations; complementarities and synergies; helped by strong presence of international centers in country</p> <p>ZAMBIA -Regional grants do involve some activities for Zambians (e.g. exchange visits, training). SSTC. Various regional knowledge platforms are being utilized.</p> <p>NIGER - Mostly through regional and country grants for international institutions; and also through grants to NGOs to accompany IFAD projects (action research)</p> <p>PAKISTAN - ICARDA worked in Pakistan area development project. ICARDA innovative grant work to be upscaled.</p>	<p>CHINA -Little awareness among Chinese primary IFAD partners of IFAD global and regional grants that also operate in China. Global and regional grants insufficiently linked to main lending programme.</p> <p>INDIA - Knowledge sharing mainly visible at project level - Incorporation of CG centers in country operations not clear - CSPE: too little linking up with reputed national and international specialists and think tanks; despite all the grants to International Research Institutions</p> <p>TANZANIA - Regional grants funded Tanzanian Apex organizations (CSOs, Finance, Coops); but insufficient amount and country responsibility for grants. Better links of lending with non-lending would be desirable.</p> <p>TURKEY - K&L could be important in context of SSC. ICARDA has regional IFAD grant. FAO cooperation could be tapped. But not well integrated.</p> <p>MOROCCO - No knowledge and learning strategy, K&L mainly project related - Regional and global grants exist, but there is insufficient synergy between grants and projects (only few inputs, such as from ICARDA); insufficient policy engagement</p>

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
K&L in-country	
<p>ECUADOR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rural Dialogue Group (regional grant triggered; consisting of academics, CSOs etc.) is key for IFAD knowledge work and policy influence. But broadening of partners is needed. <p>INDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There are some knowledge partnerships with NARS <p>MADAGASCAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD established various Union Associations and Regional Federations for knowledge and learning <p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Grant-financed activities very prominent. Grants resulted in improved techniques and approaches in micro-finance. RuralStruc grant may be good example for P. through grants (this includes a French NGO). This grant produced a major study that was used for project development (FIER) for unemployed youth and crowd funding in France. <p>MOLDOVA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some exchange with neighboring countries Belarus and Armenia. - Exchange starting with Agrarian University of Moldova (conservation agric.; GEF) <p>MOZAMBIQUE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some good K&L cooperation, particularly on models of PPPP and nutrition - Some limitations due to limited ICO capacities <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Value of 'networking between grants and loans' could be enhanced. - Grants should increasingly move focus from technology to markets research. <p>PHILIPPINES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong partnership on knowledge and learning (K&L), grant-based (case study); includes various policy engagements; but outcomes are somewhat controversial; public and IFAD peers are not well involved - Key enabling factor for K&L: CPO well trained and expert in KM <p>GHANA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - K&L mostly related to specific projects, long-term Government relationship (IFAD focal point etc.); electronic platform (FIDAFrique) 	<p>ECUADOR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not sufficient contribution from country projects to knowledge work (due to insufficient M&E and best practice gathering). Too little integration of regional grants into national IFAD programme. <p>SENEGAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much knowledge and learning going on - CSPE recommendation: broaden partnerships for knowledge and cofinancing <p>ZAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited synergies between lending and non-lending (mostly regional and global grants). Relatively few country grants for Zambia. - Not much systematic K&L visible in country itself. <p>RWANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some positive knowledge capturing in IFAD projects, but not beyond. No real knowledge strategy for knowledge partnering and exchange. Some regional grants (e.g. in finance) with workshops in Kigali. Not much mention in CSPE of applied research. <p>VIETNAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD is about to improve knowledge sharing through establishing a country wide M&E system, partnering with international institutions (such as IFPRI et al.)
SSTC	
<p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 9 of 24 grants cover SSC activities; but limited information to assess ultimate grant results <p>MOZAMBIQUE</p>	<p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Need to better define IFAD/China niche in SSTC (CSPE recommendation) and expand cooperation in SSTC in future (as of 2013)

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
<p>- International SSTC workshop in Maputo on China/IFAD SSC partnership</p> <p>ZAMBIA Regional grants do involve some SSTC activities for Zambians (e.g. exchange visits, training)</p>	<p>ECUADOR -SSTC is not strategic</p> <p>NICARAGUA - There are some partnerships through regional IFAD projects, some SSTC: PROCASUR, Learning routes; but not well integrated in country</p> <p>TURKEY -SSTC has not really taken off yet</p>

6.3 Country examples for strong and weak coordination and cooperation partnerships

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
Coordination and cooperation	
General	
<p>MADAGASCAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relatively strong coordination and cooperation partnerships, with various local agencies and donors - Strong collaboration with FOs <p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Partnerships are at the core of Mali country programme” - Multiple partnerships through long-term alliance with farmer organizations, cofinanced projects (BFS), K&L, and general alignment/donor coordination in joint strategy; - Specific domain focus of IFAD in Mali is important for strategic partnering: IFAD sub-sectoral focus is on micro-finance, irrigation and youth; partnerships exist in all these areas. - CSPE 2012 suggests more systematic involvement of private entrepreneurs and professional organizations 	<p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Need for broader partnering has been emphasized, particularly for scaling-up; with various Government institutions, domestic co-financiers and donors; not much private sector involvement, except in one project (Dom Helder Camara project) <p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CSPE encourages broader partnerships with other donors, CSOs and private enterprises <p>ETHIOPIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CSPE identified room for improvement in partnerships, for instance in partnering with CGIAR centres (beyond ILRI where the ICO is located) <p>INDONESIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong partnership with Government and PPPP with MARS (cocoa, vertical value chain). Important cofinancing with ADB in irrigation (innovative IFAD content). Limited effectiveness of partnership with ENRAP (regional grant). Some work with ICRAF and Asian NGO Coalition. - No strategic approach to partnerships in the past. Absence of strategy and selectivity in 2008 COSOP which was strong on goals, but weak on implementation arrangements. Absence of CO until 2012. - CSPE recommendation: Selectivity in partnerships is key. Assess strengths and weaknesses of partners given high transaction costs in partnership building. <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The main problem is not the quantity of partnering activities (there are many of them), but the range of partners and partnership quality - Partnerships are not sufficiently strategic. Grants not linked with projects. Nigeria should focus on fewer, but more strategic and varied partnerships, broadening the range of partners. - Project vs. programmatic partnerships: partnerships followed projects and programs and are not COSOP strategy driven; more ‘one-off’ partnerships; CSPE recommendation: more strategic alliance with CSOs, not just for service provision. - There is some cooperation with private sector, but insufficiently exploited right now (particularly private sector as co-financiers) - Very limited strategic partnerships beyond Government and project implementation. One positive example with CSO: Songhai Benin; creating business

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
	<p>opportunities and employment for rural youth</p> <p>TURKEY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negative outlier due to very low partnering, weaknesses in Government; heavily centralized decision-making processes. Negative example for overly centralized Government decision making; Government dominance; few CSO and other empowered decentralized partners (FOs etc.) - No foreign NGOs and few national NGOs. Government programs unable to attract private sector. - IFAD not present in country; this would be key for a potential collaboration with IFIs (WB, IsDB, EC); no significant bilateral donor presence in Turkey <p>YEMEN</p> <p>Country context: Country with fragile situations (MFS)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good IFAD coordination with development partners. Good alignment and harmonization (Paris/Accra). UNDAF process is an important coordination mechanism in the country. But no specific examples of coordination and cooperation partnerships. - Strong COSOP emphasis on partnering since 1997. In retrospect overly ambitious. IFAD CO since 2007. - Private sector partnerships as a response to weak Government capacities. Since 2008 move to 'private-sector led approach'.
RBA	
<p>BANGLADESH</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some with WFP but not prominent <p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good partnership with RBA; UN coordination group. Joint policy engagement on family farming. Joining forces with RBA in SSC and in Africa Brazil Food 'Purchasing from Africans for Africans' Programme (PAA); RBA was strategically emphasized in 2008 COSOP, but latest CSPE (2015) still recommends more work with RBAs. <p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very good long-term collaboration with WFP (used to share office premises, joint programme 1999-2005)). But WFP partnership has been significantly changed and reduced in intensity in recent years. <p>ETHIOPIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some recent activities reported with WFP (country) and FAO (regional; grant); but not yet much to show for <p>INDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD is working on developing a joint UN country team/UNDAF program in the North East. <p>INDONESIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much follow-up on RBA cooperation propositions in 2008 COSOP; except for collaboration with WFP in PIDRA project 	<p>ECUADOR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nothing on RBA, except for suggestion that FAO could be a partner on land issues <p>GAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much collaboration with UN Agencies <p>MADAGASCAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some policy engagement and UNDAF participation <p>MOLDOVA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - nothing on RBA <p>NEPAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much with RBA; except for FAO as service provider in one project. <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - not mentioned in CSPE summary <p>SENEGAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - not mentioned in CSPE summary <p>TANZANIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - not much on RBA, despite shared office space with FAO (no IFAD grants to FAO mentioned); some plans for future cooperation with WFP. Full participation in UN too 'onerous' (time-consuming) for small IFAD CO. <p>GHANA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - nothing on RBA <p>KENYA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - not much, potential remains underexploited, particularly with FAO <p>WANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some but apparent minor work with WFP on food-for-work <p>UGANDA</p>

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
<p>MALI -Some collaboration with RBAs in projects (PIDRN and PIDRK); on formulation (FAO/IC). With WFP in several FSN activities; outreach to conflict areas.</p> <p>MOZAMBIQUE - Strong and long-term collaboration with RBAs, FAO and WFP. First in market support project 2008-11, then in EC funded MDG1c project to promote nutrition. Joint field visits. Still, many coordination issues, complementarities between RBAs have not been optimal.</p> <p>TURKEY - Successful policy engagement together with FAO and other partners for G20 meeting (influencing). But in general, weak partnerships with RBAs and UN.</p> <p>UNDAF:</p> <p>JORDAN - Some policy engagement under UNDAF and some brokering of dialogue Government – Research Institutions</p> <p>NIGER - Relatively strong coordination with UN organizations within the UNDAF context</p> <p>YEMEN - UNDAF process is an important coordination mechanism in the country.</p> <p>PAKISTAN - UN system is mentioned as major national consultation mechanism where IFAD participates. Some future projects have been signed with WFP and FAO (as of 2007).</p>	<p>-nothing on RBA</p> <p>VIETNAM -Nothing on RBA. One-UN initiative too time-consuming.</p> <p>MOROCCO -nothing on RBA</p>
IFIs, bi-laterals, and supplementary fund	
<p>ETHIOPIA - Positive long-term collaboration with WB, but the Government blocked cofinancing with AfDB.</p> <p>MADAGASCAR -Cofinanced with OFID, EU, GEF and MCA, but not prominently mentioned in CSPE summary</p> <p>MALI -Cofinancing strong with WB, EC, WADB, Belgium Fund for Food Security (rate of 115 per cent, up from 51 per cent in 2006); but some difficulties in aligning schedules, including for design.</p> <p>MOLDOVA -Cofinancing with like-minded donors (USAID, DANIDA), but below potential and CSPE recommends to extend (cofinancing was not explicitly encouraged in 2007 COSOP)</p> <p>NEPAL -Limited number of partners, but a large cofinancing collaboration with the WB; IFAD also worked with ADB and others on the Agriculture Development Strategy. Many other donors prefer to work for themselves (regional division of labor)</p> <p>NICARAGUA</p>	<p>BRAZIL - In 2006 there was weak collaboration with IFIs and bilaterals; in 2015 there was no cofinancing or major collaboration with other international partners (except for GEF).</p> <p>CHINA - Particularly weak partnerships with multi- and bilateral partners (partly due to China Govt. preference for division of labor); this contributed to less scaling-up, fewer other potential partnership outcomes, and relatively high IFAD transaction costs in China - CSPE recommends broader partnering, including with research, private sector and IFIs</p> <p>ECUADOR -Some cofinancing with GEF and WB, Spanish Trust Fund; became better in recent years</p> <p>GAMBIA -limited donor presence in The Gambia; budget support by other donors; some cofinancing with AfDB</p> <p>INDIA -some limited cofinancing with WB and DfID; little collaboration with others partly as IFAD is working in region without major overlap with other donors.</p>

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
<p>- Some significant collaboration with IFIs, but more in terms of bringing in partners than volume (33 per cent); some donor interaction through PRORURAL round table which allows for joint planning of future programmes</p> <p>TANZANIA</p> <p>- ASDP (Agriculture Sector Development Programme) is the key Government/Donor mechanism; important for influence, cooperation and joint/parallel funding/leverage. Recently ASDP experienced some donor fatigue. - Partnering with AfDB in sugar-cane outgrowing scheme, Bugawaya</p> <p>ZAMBIA</p> <p>- Partnerships with other donors largely consultative, little joint action. Strong network of consultations at national level (Agricultural Consultative Forum, ACPG), One UN. But few specific outcomes are mentioned in CSPE. No specific IFAD partnership with other donor is singled out.</p> <p>NIGER</p> <p>-Quite a few cofinancing partnerships with WB, AFD, WADB etc. Working with WB, EU, and AfD on policy engagement (NRM, farmer organizations and land issues)</p> <p>UGANDA</p> <p>-significant work with other partners in UJAS process. Good cofinancing with WB and AfDB, in 4 out of 9 projects since 2017</p> <p>Suppl.GEF:</p> <p>BRAZIL</p> <p>- Collaboration with GEF (Sertão Project); on land degradation in North-East and innovative, sustainable techniques; complementary to IFAD Dom-Helder Camara project (DHCP).</p> <p>ECUADOR</p> <p>-Some collaboration with GEF mentioned</p> <p>JORDAN</p> <p>- Partnership with GEF is promising on climate change and other issues.</p>	<p>MOZAMBIQUE</p> <p>-some cofinancing, but overall under-exploited, particularly with WB and AfDB</p> <p>NICARAGUA</p> <p>- Some significant collaboration with IFIs, but more in terms of bringing in partners than volume (33 per cent); some donor interaction through PRORURAL round table which allows for joint planning of future programmes</p> <p>NIGERIA</p> <p>-Not much cofinancing with international partners; nor major interactions</p> <p>SENEGAL</p> <p>-some cofinancing with WB, WADB and EU food facility, but too little to have any leverage</p> <p>KENYA</p> <p>-Cooperation and cofinancing are too little and too scattered, despite KJAS. Problems partly due to importance of budget support under KJAS. CSPE recommendation: partnership opportunities with WB, AfDB, USAID should be more actively pursued.</p> <p>RWANDA</p> <p>-Some cofinancing, but not extended as suggested in COSOP. No cooperation with cofinancing partners beyond finance</p> <p>VIETNAM</p> <p>-Only with GIZ and Luxembourg. Cofinancing is not encouraged by Government.</p>
Civil Society / NGOs	
<p>BANGLADESH</p> <p>-Strong support for CSO Apex organization PKSF, APEX of CSOs/micro-finance, through project loan funding.</p> <p>BRAZIL</p> <p>- A number of activities with CSOs and FOs that execute and partly cofinancing IFAD activities (e.g. PROCASUR, an NGO started by IFAD).</p> <p>MADAGASCAR</p> <p>- Strong policy engagement and influence: such as on land tenure security; bringing in FOs on agricultural sector program design; development of national strategy for agricultural finance. strong influence on shaping policies related to agricultural services (through the CSA), and on vocational training</p>	<p>CHINA</p> <p>- some partnerships with CSOs, but not well exploited</p> <p>ECUADOR</p> <p>- Rural Dialogue Group (regional grant triggered; consisting of academics, CSOs etc.) is key for IFAD knowledge work and policy influence. But broadening of partners is needed.</p> <p>GAMBIA;</p> <p>-not much work with CSO; IFAD is not strong with NGOs (even when scaling-up)</p> <p>NIGERIA</p>

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
<p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -working with French international organization on prominent project for supporting youth; long-term alliance with farmer organizations <p>MOZAMBIQUE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - quite a bit of project-based partnerships with CSOs <p>NEPAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD uses national and international CSOs strategically as partners for project implementation, since Government is weak. Both through project and grants. It works better through grants. Example ICIMOD grant (mountain development); - Multitude of NGOs and beneficiary associations complicates partnering and synergies in Nepal <p>NICARAGUA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fund for Strengthening Policies and Strategies (FONDEPOL) was created to facilitate NGOs, universities and consultants. <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -In general, very limited strategic partnerships beyond Government. One positive example with CSO: Songhai Benin; creating business opportunities and employment for rural youth. <p>ZAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Many specific project partnerships. Partnerships with NGOs yielded some good results, but these implementation partnerships differ quite a bit in results, depending on capacities. <p>ARGENTINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Many partnership activities for policy influence with CSOs (REAF, FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR). SSC. <p>KENYA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good partnerships with some CSOs (e.g. AGRA) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in the context of projects <p>RWANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most work with CSOs is done through projects (as contracted service providers). Much capacity building in projects of cooperatives for production and finance, for local water-shed management committees etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Too much reliance on Government. Crowding out of private sector and CSO. <p>TANZANIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gaps in ASDP for working with CSO; better mechanisms needed for partnerships with CSOs (some support through grants to Apex organizations) <p>TURKEY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No foreign NGOs and few national NGOs <p>SUDAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak partnerships with NGOs and research - No vision in COSOP on how to utilize grants and partnerships
Farmers' associations	
<p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Working with FOs that execute IFAD activities <p>MADAGASCAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD brought in FOs in the design of the agricultural sector program 	

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
<p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very strong work with Farmers Organizations, over a long period (since 1999); FO chosen in 2016 for GAFSP grant - Strongly working on decentralization; capacity building in local communities, decentralization mechanisms <p>NICARAGUA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Strong partnerships with rural producer organizations <p>PHILIPPINES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Three K&L events (KLMs) produced policy statements; FOs and CSOs very engaged on Family Farming <p>SENEGAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong on IFAD partnerships with producer organizations. Capacity building on management, negotiations, market chains, value addition, and M&E <p>NIGER</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong support for FOs, work at local level with CSOs and CBOs <p>RWANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most work with FOs is done through projects. Much capacity building in projects of cooperatives for production and finance, for local water-shed management committees etc. <p>VIETNAM</p> <p>Strong work with farmers' and women's unions in projects. IMPP partnered successfully with textile company, associated with Women's Union vocational training centre. DBRP piloted enterprises with Farmers' Union (decorative leaves and flowers).</p>	
Indigenous peoples	
<p>BOLIVIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Three grants for PRAIA (indigenous peoples). <p>INDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong focus on Indigenous Peoples ('Scheduled Tribes') in the North East; some good examples of scaling-up <p>ARGENTINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some ongoing work with indigenous groups <p>VIETNAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One project (3PAD) with ethnic minorities: Agro-forestry, eco-tourism, agribusiness, PPPP for sustainable forestland use. 	<p>ECUADOR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -some resentment expressed about <i>too much</i> focus on indigenous groups vs. others with similar poverty level
PPPP	
<p>INDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Incipient private sector cooperation; some value chain focus in dairy; piloting with large companies (Tata, Tesco 	<p>ETHIOPIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PPPP – “did not lead to much”

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
<p>etc.)</p> <p>INDONESIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PPPP with MARS is prominent, but confined to cocoa sector <p>MADAGASCAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong value chain support; forging of partnerships of farmers' organizations with private sector (processors, exporters etc.) <p>MOLDOVA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good public-private partnerships with commercial banks, out-grower schemes, BDS enterprise development - Farmer cofinancing: leveraging investments through farm credit <p>MOZAMBIQUE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Innovative project approach in Community Investor Partnerships (ProParcerias). Contract farming. Cofinanced with Netherlands and FAO. Models of PPPP tested and synthesized by local university graduates. <p>TANZANIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MUVI project of business support services offers valuable lessons of project-based partnering, particularly on PPPP <p>ZAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A number of project specific partnerships. Partnerships with private sector yielded some good results, but these implementation partnerships differ quite a bit in results, depending on capacities. - Focus on alternative project delivery mechanisms (public/private mix) since 1997 COSOP, but still 'incipient', partly due to unclear policy approach of Government to PS participation <p>KENYA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some limited private sector engagement with Equity Bank (AGRA project) <p>UGANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PPPP in oil palm development project since 2004/05 <p>VIETNAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong orientation towards PPPPs and enterprise development since 2008. Some work with private sector, but still at a relatively early stage (as of 2010); - IFAD influence on PPPP decree and guidelines/manuals for cooperative organizations - CSPE recommends: stronger market approach, from enabling environment to PS as partner, linking businesses with provinces (vertical approach), linking up with IFIs/IFC for expertise on PS 	<p>GAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much work with private sector <p>NEPAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CSPE recommendation: partnership paradigm shift is needed towards support for <i>profitable</i> enterprises for commercialization and value chains; and towards sufficiently strong and sustainable CSOs and community organizations - several activities were supported, but too little strategic capacity building of profitable and sustainable enterprises. <p>GHANA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Work with private sector in value chains very deficient (note, this was in 2010), both from IFAD and Government side; need for strengthening advance analytical capacity for planning, plus stronger Government capacities and a different mentality for working with private sector

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
Policy engagement (<i>national and project</i>)	
<p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy engagement, particularly on family farming (with MERCOSUR governments) and in the context of FO support (grant to REAF) <p>ETHIOPIA (WB)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy engagement important; but should be 'selective' and related to IFAD investments. Could be reinforced by more systematic knowledge and learning activities. <p>MADAGASCAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong policy engagement and influence: land tenure security; agricultural sector program, bringing in FOs; development of national strategy for agricultural finance <p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in Agric. Sector Program, advocating for FO participation - Concrete technical and mission support for National Microfinance Strategy Action Plan plus other Micro-Finance related activities <p>NEPAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy influence: Strong collaboration with Government and other donors on new 2012 Agricultural Development Strategy (ADS), US\$ 500k DSF grant (with ADB and others); CSPE recommends follow-up on alignment <p>NICARAGUA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government policies were influenced, through accumulated knowledge gained from IFAD projects and some special initiatives (round tables). Policy engagement was supported by capacity building. <p>PHILIPPINES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The three Knowledge and Learning Market events produced policy statements <p>TURKEY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Successful policy engagement in the context of the G20 meetings (influencing) <p>ZAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Many good examples of IFAD 'policy engagement' and influence, almost all of them project related. Except for dialogue on maize subsidies – but not clear whether any partnership/alliance is behind this. <p>ARGENTINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy influence is most important in Argentina, particularly on family farming and rural poverty. Many partnership activities for this purpose with CSOs (REAF, 	<p>BANGLADESH</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited policy 'resonance' of Government - Government bureaucracy heavy, difficult to influence - Country office staff qualifications are important for developing strong policy links with important ministries <p>BOLIVIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited results on policy engagement, except for occasional project impact. CSPE recommends defining a policy engagement strategy based on knowledge acquired and opportunities for scaling-up. <p>ETHIOPIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy engagement important; but should be 'selective' and related to IFAD investments - Could be reinforced by more systematic knowledge and learning activities, <p>INDONESIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much institutional incentive for CPM for policy engagement <p>MOZAMBIQUE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not that much policy engagement at national level, due to limited ICO capacity. Influence via specific project outcomes and activities. <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some policy engagement and impact on Rural Finance (RUFIN); under RUFIN project financial service provision to the rural poor was formally accepted by Bank of Agriculture and Central Bank. But in general, limited national policy leverage due to lack of cofinancing and international cooperation. <p>RWANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD provided substantial grants and TA to Rwandan Government for agricultural strategy development since 2004, yet its influence has been very limited; even in areas with ongoing projects (such as finance and enterprise development). Government interest in IFAD advice is not high. But then, the supply of qualified information from the ICO is also quite low. <p>SENEGAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some project level policy influence (e.g. PROMER II on SME). Not much knowledge and learning going on, so little influence that way. <p>JORDAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Long-term relationship with Credit Institution (ACC) but not much policy influence. - Some policy engagement

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
<p>FIDAMERICA, PROCASUR).</p> <p>GHANA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some good IFAD policy influence, mostly related to two projects (rural finance and enterprise development); contributed to conducive rural finance policies and meso-institutions. Going further in policy engagement would require stronger analytical capacity and technical skills of country IFAD staff. Cofinancing with World Bank and AfDB was still not sufficient to achieve more leverage and scaling up. <p>NIGER</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influencing Microfinance Strategy (March 2004) and National Cereal Banks Management Strategy plus Early Warning Systems; contributions limited due to lack of permanent IFAD presence - Working with WB, EU, and AfD on policy engagement (NRM, farmer organizations and land issues) <p>VIETNAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD influence on PPPP decree and guidelines/manuals for cooperative organizations <p>YEMEN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some good examples of policy engagement, mostly project related and IFAD driven (e.g. on participation in rural road access; specific resources had been provided for policy engagement). But also policy engagement for better implementation delivery through private sector (EOF, see above). <p>MOROCCO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence mainly in terms of IFAD project innovations (such as participatory approaches in irrigation; drinking water supply); some on collective land management <p>SUDAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy engagement and influence on Government limited to project level; suggestion in CSPE to broaden policy engagement. - Policy engagement in project in Gash province - supported through Italian grant on land and water management - led to policy change and enhanced women farmer access to land 	<p>under UNDAF and some brokering of dialogue Government with research institutions</p> <p>KENYA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Positive: Robust partnership with Government. Focal points in many Ministries. IFAD contributed to Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy process. - But: CSPE on policy engagement: "IFAD has not engaged sufficiently in policy processes and in developing strategic partnerships". The CO's overall capacity and resources to engage in policy engagement remain constrained.
Scaling-up	
<p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More technical cooperation with MoA at national level could lead to wider scaling-up of IFAD innovations - Influence higher at sub-national than national level, partly due to placement of CPM in Rome, and non-senior level ICO staff. CSPE recommendation: more strategic staffing of ICO, CPM to be placed in China. <p>INDIA</p>	<p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not much happened on broader scaling-up. CSPE recommends cooperation with wider range of federal agencies; more cofinancing and knowledge sharing with IFIs (currently no international or domestic private cofinancing (→ little leverage). <p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -More technical cooperation with MoA at national level could

<p style="text-align: center;">Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)</p>
<p>The case study “Demand driven partnership with State Government” discusses some success in IFAD transfer of know-how, quality of project implementation and scaling-up in North-East India with Indigenous Peoples.</p> <p>INDONESIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some scaling up of projects through Government happened in P4K project (with ADB) and in PIDRA <p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Positive example for scaling-up micro-finance through partnerships, with private service provider ABC (this is a profitable company with a social mandate); but also with multiple other providers. <p>PAKISTAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good IFAD partnerships with Apex Poverty Alleviation Fund and with Government institutions at federal and provincial levels. This helped with scaling-up. <p>SUDAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Positive replication and scaling-up of projects was reported 	<p>lead to wider scaling-up of IFAD innovations; IFAD influence is higher at sub-national than national level, partly due to the placement of CPM in Rome.</p> <p>ECUADOR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Close alignment with Government offers opportunity for IFAD projects to become ‘laboratories’ for rural development; provided non-lending activities are strongly supported. Focus on innovations <i>and</i> scaling up, in addition to non-lending. But not happening yet. <p>GAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD strong in Rural Finance, but limited through official partnerships with finance institutions that are not that effective; they are not interested to sustain risk-sharing mechanisms beyond project end - No research link <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Too much reliance on Government. Strong Government cofinancing. Crowding out of private sector and CSO. This limits scaling-up. <p>ZAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alternative service delivery mechanisms do not yet work too well for scaling-up. Limited cofinancing hinders scaling-up in livestock project. <p>GHANA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some cofinancing with the WB came too early in a rural finance project, before IFAD piloting of innovations had been done. For this reason scaling-up did not work well. - Some partnerships with CSOs are there (international and national) but could be stronger (e.g. in rural finance) and would be needed for better scaling-up. - In sum, IFAD innovations scaling-up relied too much on IFAD’s own resources, rather than co-financiers and Government <p>KENYA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - limited scaling-up due to unexploited partnership opportunities with other development partners and CSOs <p>PAKISTAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Innovation and its up-scaling may require different partners in government – or beyond - than the usual ‘administrators and implementers’

Table 6.4 Country examples for strengths and weaknesses in partnerships with Government

Strong partnerships (positive partnerships, strengths emphasized)	Weak partnerships (not much going on, weaknesses emphasized)
Role of Government, alignment, dominant Governments, weak Governments	
<p>MADAGASCAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good collaboration with Government. The IFAD programme support unit in MoA is very useful, also in charge of coordination and policy engagement - Strengthened partner capacities, particularly of various Chambers of Commerce and rural financial institutions <p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong partnership with MoF at national level, and strong implementation partnerships at sub-national level, mostly with Government institutions. But Government also limits partnership opportunities with others to some extent, particularly on partnering with other donors and cofinancing, and to a lesser extent with CSOs and private sector. <p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The high-level Mali aid architecture, alignment and harmonization in a crowded agricultural aid sector are very good; there is a common country assistance strategy. - But there are some limitations for aid coordination, absorption and implementation as well as policy engagement <i>at mid-level Government</i> <p>MOLDOVA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong IFAD Programme Steering Committee (IPSC) and Implementation Unit (CPIU) in Ministry of Agriculture <p>NICARAGUA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong IFAD relationship with the Government is noted but limits non-Governmental relationships to some extent. <p>UGANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good aid alignment through Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) and Government poverty reduction and agricultural strategies. Significant IFAD contribution to alignment and harmonization between 2004 and 2010. <p>GHANA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong partnership with Government, including several ministries apart from Agriculture (such as Finance, Trade, Local Government). Reliable counterpart funding. Good Government meso-support in micro-finance. - Good alignment, harmonization and use of country systems. Strong COSOP partnership advocacy in 1999 and 2006 COSOPs helped. - Government coordinated IFAD programme well, supported with IFAD grant (\$200k); pre-ICO (CO opened only in late 2010) 	<p>BANGLADESH</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited policy resonance in Government. Government bureaucracy is heavy. The right ICO staffing is important for good working relationship with Government <p>ETHIOPIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relatively strong Government role; implies some limitations for IFAD, such as limited partnership opportunities (such as AfDB cofinancing). <p>GAMBIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Long history of IFAD collaboration in The Gambia. IFAD is well respected in country and by the Government. - But the MoA had major problems in recent years with frequent staff turnover, at all levels. IFAD may also have gotten too much 'stuck' with the Ministry of Agriculture rather than expanding to other Ministries of interest to the Portfolio (e.g. Trade and Commerce; Environment etc.). This is affecting the policy engagement. - Main problem: no IFAD country office, limited IFAD presence <p>INDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus on work with selected State Governments - Limited policy engagement and too few contacts to central Government (missed chance for scaling-up beyond project areas) - Few partnerships at national/federal level <p>NEPAL</p> <p>Country context: Country with fragile situations (MFS)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High instability, political uncertainty, country office staff turn-over - Weak implementation capacity; need to work with CSOs and private sector <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alignment and harmonization; strong COSOP intentions, but limited success, due to weak Government; CSO support through Government difficult <p>NIGERIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High domestic cofinancing (mostly Government; 164 per cent); but not much private cofinancing; too much reliance on Government; not sufficient hiring of private sector expertise in projects - Projects with typical partnership outputs and outcomes (policy engagement, partnership networking capacity building etc.) still rely too much on Government - Too much reliance on Government. Strong Government

<p>KENYA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Robust partnership with Government. Focal points in many Ministries. IFAD contributed to Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy process. <p>NIGER</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD has a very close alignment with Government and others, particularly in the post-2004 crisis response process <p>RWANDA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IFAD partnership with Government at all levels is growing, particularly after increased country presence in 2010. Yet need for more active IFAD participation and profile in national working groups. - IFAD provided substantial grants and TA to Rwandan Government for agricultural strategy development since 2004, yet its influence has been very limited; even in areas with ongoing projects (such as finance and enterprise development). - Government interest in IFAD advice is not high. But then, the supply of qualified information from the ICO is also quite low. CSPE rec.: The roles of IFAD HQ, Nairobi regional office and ICO need to be clarified, particularly in terms of backstopping for non-lending. <p>TANZANIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ASDP is the key Government/donor aid mechanism for agriculture and rural development; important for influence, cooperation and joint and parallel funding as well as leverage. Recently ASDP experienced some donor fatigue. CSPE recommends for IFAD to expand partnerships more strongly beyond Government. 	<p>cofinancing. Crowding out of private sector and CSO.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak federal level Government planning, coordination and oversight capacities. Too little diversity of IFAD partners within Government to achieve knowledge transfer and sustainability. <p>SENEGAL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A country with relatively low agricultural performance. And with politicized agricultural priorities and approaches. Inefficiencies. <p>TURKEY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negative example for overly centralized Government decision making; Government dominance; few CSOs and other empowered decentralized partners (FOs etc.) - Country particularly interested in global IFAD experience for regional South-South Cooperation <p>VIETNAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CSPE suggestion: increase low counterpart funding from Government (currently at 26 per cent, in 2011) <p>YEMEN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak Government. Need for widening the range of partners for project implementation. Moving from an unsuitable Government Cooperative Bank to a Public Fund (the EOF) and to work with the Social Fund for Development (which originally was created upon World Bank suggestions). <p>PAKISTAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overall, non-lending received little attention in country programme - Work in remote and conflict prone areas may require different forms of partnerships, but no provisions were made
<p>Sub-national: State and local Government</p>	
<p>BRAZIL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -There is good decentralized work with Governments. 98 per cent Government cofinancing, this appears to be partly state governments. There also appears to be some financing and supervision support from national Development Banks (Paolo Silveri), but we do not have info in CSPE? <p>CHINA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -strong implementation partnerships at sub-national level, mostly with regional and local Governments <p>INDIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus on work with selected State Governments <p>MALI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Very strong links to local communities and institutions 	<p>BOLIVIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CSPE recommends partnering better in targeted territories, particularly with municipalities, but also with other relevant actors. - Some capacity building of beneficiaries was achieved in certain projects (PROMARENA), but little for local municipalities.

<p>GHANA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- IFAD reached out to sub-national public administration (region and districts) <p>VIETNAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Important relationships with provincial and local Governments. CSPE suggestion: increase counterpart funding from Government (at 26 per cent in 2016; related IFAD guidelines on targets for MICs are currently [2010] missing) <p>SUDAN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Strong IFAD project partnerships at local level with a network of partners in communities (WUA and CDC) and with the local authorities	
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IOE project evaluation datasets

7.1 IE, PPE, PCRV 2006-2016 dataset

Table 1

Cofinancing figures (in US\$), ratios and core evaluation criteria for project evaluations (IEs, PPA/PPEs, PCRVs) conducted between 2006-2016 (n=188)

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD Total	Sum of Government* Total	Sum of INT Total	Sum of Domestic partners	Total	government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	national cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Albania	PE	1100001129	13 667 341	4 152 812	4 609 699	-	22 429 852	30%	0%	34%	5	3	3	3
Albania	PPA	1100001339	7 999 993	6 741 693	9 512 059	4 241 018	28 494 763	84%	53%	119%	3	3	4	3
Argentina	PE	1100000506	16 515 000	11 549 000	8 324 000	-	36 388 000	70%	0%	50%	4	4	4	4
Argentina	PCRv	1100001098	17 500 000	7 500 000	-	22 695 933	47 695 933	43%	130%	0%	4	4	3	4
Argentina	PCRv	1100001279	20 000 000	9 000 000	-	-	29 000 000	45%	0%	0%	3	4	3	4
Armenia	PPA	1100001307	15 300 840	5 988 063	5 521 651	-	26 810 554	39%	0%	36%	4	5	5	5
Armenia	PCRv	1100001411	12 400 148	7 019 612	11 998 590	-	31 418 350	57%	0%	97%	4	5	5	4
Azerbaijan	PCRv	1100001148	8 999 993	887 181	110 486	-	9 997 660	10%	0%	1%	4	4	4	4
Azerbaijan	PPA	1100001289	12 554 968	4 210 317	7 392 918	-	24 158 203	34%	0%	59%	4	4	5	3
Azerbaijan	PCRv	1100001398	17 195 917	14 629 042	-	-	31 824 959	85%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Bangladesh	PCRv	1100001165	21 973 000	4 767 000	7 545 000	-	34 285 000	22%	0%	34%	5	5	4	4
Bangladesh	PCRv	1100001322	24 946 873	9 954 241	4 751 552	-	39 652 666	40%	0%	19%	5	5	5	4
Bangladesh	PCRv	1100001355	19 450 366	2 591 068	62 489 501	6 210 614	90 741 549	13%	32%	321%	4	4	5	4
Bangladesh	PPE	1100001402	35 030 946	59 996	-	-	35 090 942	0%	0%	0%	4	5	5	4
Belize	PE	1100001067	2 293 379	1 065 579	3 400 802	-	6 759 760	46%	0%	148%	5	3	3	4
Benin	PE	1100001127	13 113 725	2 270 473	3 904 082	88 523 184	107 811 464	17%	675%	30%	4	3	4	3
Benin	PCRv	1100001211	10 008 519	2 646 222	10 009 219	23 443 477	46 107 437	26%	234%	100%	4	3	3	3

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD Total	Sum of Governments* Total	Sum of INT Total	Sum of Domestic partners	Total	government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	national cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Benin	PCRv	1100001250	10 005 178	4 783 054	-	18 091 753	32 879 985	48%	181%	0%	5	4	3	4
Bhutan	PPA	1100001296	14 006 653	4 027 335	1 618 659	-	19 652 647	29%	0%	12%	5	5	4	4
Bolivia	PPA	1100001145	12 042 464	2 916 096	-	-	14 958 560	24%	0%	0%	4	5	3	4
Bosnia	PCRv	1100001342	12 616 825	4 267 828	5 950 891	-	22 835 544	34%	0%	47%	4	4	4	4
Brazil	PPE	1100001335	30 500 331	30 000 113	-	-	60 500 444	98%	0%	0%	5	4	4	5
Burkina Faso	PCRv	1100001103	9 375 913	2 448 264	-	-	11 824 177	26%	0%	0%	4	4	3	5
Burkina Faso	PE	1100001132	11 440 000	19 750 000	79 800 000	1 582 018	112 572 018	173%	14%	698%	5	5	4	4
Burkina Faso	PCRv	1100001220	12 067 094	6 314 556	8 484 114	-	26 865 764	52%	0%	70%	5	4	4	4
Burkina Faso	PCRv	1100001247	16 028 700	9 440 500	12 843 861	375 000	38 688 061	59%	2%	80%	5	5	4	5
Burkina Faso	PCRv	1100001368	11 437 492	2 623 860	4 999 906	173 075	19 234 333	23%	2%	44%	4	3	2	2
Burundi	PPA	1100001105	19 998 285	4 762 055	9 465 192	-	34 225 532	24%	0%	47%	5	5	5	4
Burundi	PCRv	1100001291	16 367 725	1 686 141	14 602 398	4 080 602	36 736 866	10%	25%	89%	5	5	3	4
Burundi	PCRv	1100001358	13 977 671	3 837 079	-	141 201	17 955 951	27%	1%	0%	5	5	4	4
Cambodia	PPA	1100001175	9 994 469	3 123 238	9 733 691	11 575 327	34 426 725	31%	116%	97%	4	4	4	4
Cambodia	PPA	1100001261	15 492 951	1 687 232	2 439 492	-	19 619 675	11%	0%	16%	4	4	4	3
Cambodia	PCRv	1100001350	12 014 359	507 871	1 162 957	-	13 685 187	4%	0%	10%	5	4	3	4

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD Total	Sum of Governments* Total	Sum of INT Total	Sum of Domestic partners	Total	government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	national cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Cameroon	PCR	1100001136	11 757 225	2 755 315	-	-	14 512 540	23%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Cameroon	PCR	1100001238	13 128 011	8 549 350	-	4 223 014	25 900 375	65%	32%	0%	3	3	2	3
Cape Verde	PCR	1100001015	13 498 289	22 596 454	-	-	36 094 743	167%	0%	0%	4	5		4
Chad	PCR	1100001144	11 673 600	1 943 000	4 014 000	-	17 630 600	17%	0%	34%	4	4	4	4
Chad	PCR	1100001259	13 000 306	1 311 255	-	-	14 311 561	10%	0%	0%	4	2	2	2
Chad	PCR	1100001283	13 206 924	1 843 374	-	-	15 050 298	14%	0%	0%	3	2	2	NA
China	PE	1100001048	26 499 262	26 347 519	2 823 511	-	55 670 292	99%	0%	11%	5	6	5	5
China	PE	1100001123	28 990 000	66 954 000	10 400 000	-	106 344 000	231%	0%	36%	5	5	5	4
China	PE	1100001153	30 434 000	65 638 000	11 200 000	-	107 272 000	216%	0%	37%	5	6	5	5
China	PPA	1100001223	28 966 000	54 057 000	7 280 000	1 200 000	91 503 000	187%	4%	25%	3	4	4	4
China	PPA	1100001227	14 668 612	405 949	-	-	15 074 561	3%	0%	0%	4	5	4	5
China	PCR	1100001323	25 148 199	29 866 326	-	-	55 014 525	119%	0%	0%	5	5	5	5
Colombia	PE	1100000520	16 000 000	9 662 000	288 000	-	25 950 000	60%	0%	2%	6	5	6	5
Colombia	PCR	1100001294	19 999 535	12 075 938	-	141 943	32 217 416	60%	1%	0%	5	4	5	5
Comoros	PCR	1100001241	7 253 694	1 387 408	983 123	-	9 624 225	19%	0%	14%	4	3	3	3
Congo	PCR	1100001216	11 909 288	3 243 258	-	1 550 000	16 702 546	27%	13%	0%	4	2	1	3
Congo	PCR	1100001327	8 407 222	4 912 625	7 489 343	21 079 568	41 888 758	58%	251%	89%	3	3	3	3
Cote d'Ivoire	PCR	1100001133	11 173 701	2 851 864	-	-	14 025 565	26%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Djibouti	PPA	1100001236	3 596 867	1 168 386	101 000	-	4 866 253	32%	0%	3%	4	4	4	3
Djibouti	PCR	1100001366	6 000 000	2 798 417	3 362 111	-	12 160 528	47%	0%	56%	5	4	4	4
Dominican Rep	PE	1100001068	12 000 309	5 069 179	-	-	17 069 488	42%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4

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Public														
DR Congo	CSPE/PCRV	1100001244	14 761 534	1 828 492	6 009 182	-	22 599 208	12%	0%	41%	3	3	3	3
DR Congo	PPE	1100001311	15 828 323	4 000 778	6 255 464	-	26 084 565	25%	0%	40%	3	3	2	3
Ecuador	PCRV	1100001297	14 842 342	9 452 190	-	-	24 294 532	64%	0%	0%	5	4	4	4
Egypt	PPE	1100001204	18 484 767	35 865 644	400 000	-	54 750 411	194%	0%	2%	4	4	3	4
El Salvador	PCRV	1100001215	19 999 904	5 112 265	-	91 551	25 203 720	26%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4
Eritrea	PCRV	1100001359	20 588 182	12 943 323	-	-	33 531 505	63%	0%	0%	5	4	4	4
Ethiopia	PE	1100000342	17 450 000	1 770 000	-	189 140	19 409 140	10%	1%	0%	5	3	3	2
Ethiopia	PE	1100001173	25 689 944	4 459 828	37 498 310	-	67 648 082	17%	0%	146%	5	5	4	5
Ethiopia	PCRV	1100001237	19 999 885	9 955 062	30 000 201	-	59 955 148	50%	0%	150%	5	4	4	4
Ethiopia	PCRV	1100001292	27 204 900	7 894 665	-	-	35 099 565	29%	0%	0%	3	3	3	3
Ethiopia	PPA	1100001458	39 010 000	19 703 500	80 006 200	832 103	139 551 803	51%	2%	205%	4	5	5	4
Georgia	PE	1100001035	6 570 288	4 391 437	15 035 678	-	25 997 403	67%	0%	229%	4	3	4	3
Georgia	PPA	1100001147	7 999 987	1 159 580	73 657	637 500	9 870 724	14%	8%	1%	2	2	2	2
Georgia	PPA	1100001325	9 999 742	7 304 994	14 499 859	-	31 804 595	73%	0%	145%	4	4	4	4
Ghana	PE	1100000477	10 061 000	1 255 300	-	-	11 316 300	12%	0%	0%	4	2	4	2
Ghana	PE	1100001124	11 595 326	1 949 417	-	-	13 544 743	17%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Ghana	CPE/PPA	1100001134	11 002 000	1 358 000	10 144 000	-	22 504 000	12%	0%	92%	4	5	4	5
Ghana	PCRV	1100001183	12 335 055	47 247 739	-	-	59 582 794	383%	0%	0%	3	4	3	4
Ghana	PCRV	1100001187	11 245 121	7 836 667	10 011 250	-	29 093 038	70%	0%	89%	6	5	4	4
Grenada	PCRV	1100001181	4 193 682	1 277 333	2 191 425	33 130 000	40 792 440	30%	790%	52%	4	3	2	3

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Guatemala	PCR	1100001085	15 004 000	5 958 000	5 043 000	-	26 005 000	40%	0%	34%	5	4	3	4
Guatemala	PCR	1100001274	30 000 000	8 000 000	10 000 000	-	48 000 000	27%	0%	33%	4	2	1	2
Guinea	PE	1100001003	10 014 000	3 727 000	4 482 000	-	18 223 000	37%	0%	45%	5	2	2	3
Guinea	PCR	1100001135	14 015 248	5 791 304	-	4 626 369	24 432 921	41%	33%	0%	4	3	2	3
Guinea-Bissau	PCR	1100001278	4 681 830	894 860	-	-	5 576 690	19%	0%	0%	5	3	2	3
Haiti	PCR	1100001070	15 357 000	4 743 000	-	-	20 100 000	31%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Honduras	PCR	1100001128	16 500 292	4 677 941	4 500 035	431 085	26 109 353	28%	3%	27%	4	4	3	3
Honduras	PCR	1100001198	20 000 000	4 300 000	7 000 000	-	31 300 000	22%	0%	35%	4	4	3	3
India	IE	1100001063	22 999 702	8 125 192	10 539 184	-	41 664 078	35%	0%	46%	4	4	3	3
India	PPA	1100001121	21 960 999	-	23 543 427	-	45 504 426	0%	0%	107%	5	5	5	4
India	PPA	1100001226	39 920 091	20 922 602	-	-	60 842 693	52%	0%	0%	3	4	4	3
India	PCR	1100001381	30 168 971	4 210 375	-	-	34 379 346	14%	0%	0%	3	2	2	3
Jordan	CPE/PPA	1100001071	4 002 846	5 045 304	-	-	9 048 150	126%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Jordan	PPA	1100001092	10 143 093	5 411 783	12 567 191	-	28 122 067	53%	0%	124%	4	4	4	4
Kenya	PCR	1100001114	10 918 885	3 059 350	4 102 081	-	18 080 316	28%	0%	38%	4	4	3	4
Kenya	PCR	1100001234	16 739 540	4 089 125	4 866 489	530 703	26 225 857	24%	3%	29%	5	5	4	5
Kenya	PCR	1100001243	21 496 502	2 244 074	-	-	23 740 576	10%	0%	0%	5	5	3	4
Kenya	PCR	1100001330	23 929 984	2 660 189	-	5 388 273	31 978 446	11%	23%	0%	4	4	4	4
Korea DPR	PE	1100001154	24 442 300	10 151 100	7 179 300	-	41 772 700	42%	0%	29%	4	5	3	4
Kyrgyzstan	PPA	1100001434	9 000 000	3 543 000	10 852 000	-	23 395 000	39%	0%	121%	5	5	4	4

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Laos	PE	1100001207	13 413 663	4 205 908	3 524 952	-	21 144 523	31%	0%	26%	5	4	5	4
Laos	PPA	1100001301	20 490 063	4 624 879	3 331 068	-	28 446 010	23%	0%	16%	5	4	5	4
Laos	PCR	1100001396	2 994 228	1 878 925	13 473 288	-	18 346 441	63%	0%	450%	5	4	3	3
Lesotho	PPA	1100001150	10 129 436	1 885 293	-	-	12 014 729	19%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4
Madagascar	PCR	1100001239	14 500 119	5 992 130	7 663 705	-	28 155 954	41%	0%	53%	4	4	4	4
Malawi	PPE	1100001164	14 779 747	1 782 826	-	-	16 562 573	12%	0%	0%	4	3	2	4
Mali	PCR	1100001356	11 335 827	2 965 205	8 528 980	-	22 830 012	26%	0%	75%	5	3	3	3
Mauritania	PE	1100001179	11 326 700	8 117 000	3 489 900	-	22 933 600	72%	0%	31%	4	3	3	3
Mauritania	PCR	1100001180	10 128 402	1 415 853	-	-	11 544 255	14%	0%	0%	4	4	3	4
Mauritania	PPA	1100001255	11 408 000	8 151 000	14 358 000	4 000 000	37 917 000	71%	35%	126%	6	5	3	4
Mauritius	PPA	1100001093	11 116 523	5 267 163	-	-	16 383 686	47%	0%	0%	4	4	3	4
Mauritius	PCR	1100001357	6 001 331	7 847 624	1 078 741	-	14 927 696	131%	0%	18%	4	3	2	3
Mexico	PE	1100000494	10 415 000	6 760 000	-	-	17 175 000	65%	0%	0%	5	4	3	2
Mexico	PCR	1100001141	25 000 000	30 000 000	-	-	55 000 000	120%	0%	0%	3	2	2	3
Mexico	PCR	1100001268	15 000 000	9 000 000	4 000 000	-	28 000 000	60%	0%	27%	4	2	2	1
Mexico	PCR	1100001349	24 973 000	7 985 000	-	2 446 300	35 419 300	32%	10%	0%	4	3	4	3
Moldova	PPA	1100001340	13 024 000	4 472 000	-	-	17 496 000	34%	0%	0%	4	4	5	4
Moldova	PCR	1100001449	13 243 207	4 173 286	-	-	17 416 493	32%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4
Mongolia	PE	1100000502	5 038 000	442 000	-	716 527	6 196 527	9%	14%	0%	5	3	4	2
Mongolia	PPA	1100001205	14 806 136	2 693 036	-	-	17 499 172	18%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Morocco	PE	1100000356	22 215 100	17 648 500	12 667 200	1 910 335	54 441 135	79%	9%	57%	4	5	5	3

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD Total	Sum of Governments* Total	Sum of INT Total	Sum of Domestic partners	Total	Ratio of government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of national cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Morocco	PCR	1100001010	19 520 000	29 900 000	-	900 000	50 320 000	153%	5%	0%	5	4	4	4
Morocco	PPA	1100001178	18 027 553	11 966 010	169 396	-	30 162 959	66%	0%	1%	5	5	4	4
Morocco	PCR	1100001230	6 360 503	2 545 242	332 682	990 000	10 228 427	40%	16%	5%	5	4	3	4
Morocco	PCR	1100001388	18 756 464	8 287 830	-	500 000	27 544 294	44%	3%	0%	5	4	4	3
Mozambique	PE	1100000359	12 403 000	3 608 000	4 115 000	1 651 250	21 777 250	29%	13%	33%	5	3	3	4
Mozambique	IE	1100001184	18 000 348	3 373 286	9 209 266	-	30 582 900	19%	0%	51%	4	4	4	4
Mozambique	PCR	1100001267	9 459 565	2 217 940	21 795 808	-	33 473 313	23%	0%	230%	3	3	3	3
Nepal	PCR	1100001285	14 707 749	1 062 060	-	-	15 769 809	7%	0%	0%	5	5	4	4
Nicaragua	PPE	1100001120	14 200 000	2 878 000	3 500 000	1 100 400	21 678 400	20%	8%	25%	5	4	4	5
Nicaragua	PCR	1100001256	14 000 001	3 004 544	3 995 456	-	21 000 001	21%	0%	29%	4	3	3	4
Niger	PE	1100000434	14 900 000	3 700 000	1 400 000	2 900 000	22 900 000	25%	19%	9%	4	2	2	2
Niger	PCR	1100001221	10 003 439	3 782 544	3 774 986	-	17 560 969	38%	0%	38%	5	5	4	4
Niger	PCR	1100001443	16 000 466	10 862 406	34 675 902	-	61 538 774	68%	0%	217%	5	4	5	4
Niger	PCR	1100001591	13 000 482	1 348 652	21 360 270	-	35 709 404	10%	0%	164%	5	5	5	4
Nigeria	PPA	1100001196	42 900 001	70 500 000	3 200 000	2 810 000	119 410 001	164%	7%	7%	5	5	4	4
Pakistan	PE	1100000524	16 490 000	8 508 000	-	1 538 469	26 536 469	52%	9%	0%	4	5	4	3
Pakistan	PCR	1100001078	17 154 043	4 531 753	-	-	21 685 796	26%	0%	0%	4	2	2	3
Pakistan	PPA	1100001245	21 766 389	8 969 363	-	-	30 735 752	41%	0%	0%	4	4	4	4
Pakistan	PCR	1100001324	26 456 496	-	-	80 351	26 536 847	0%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4
Pakistan	PCR	1100001385	26 389 066	3 030 565	-	-	29 419 631	11%	0%	0%	4	4	5	2
Pakistan	PCR	1100001413	35 006 314	-	-	-	35 006 314	0%	0%	0%	5	5	6	5

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD Total	Sum of Governments* Total	Sum of INT Total	Sum of Domestic partners	Total	Ratio of government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of national cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Panama	PCRv	1100001199	24 999 692	8 000 301	-	6 991 600	39 991 593	32%	28%	0%	4	3	3	3
Paraguay	PCRv	1100001333	15 116 028	2 717 584	-	404 780	18 238 392	18%	3%	0%	5	5	4	4
Peru	PE	1100001044	18 922 518	11 971 412	-	465 524	31 359 454	63%	2%	0%	6	4	5	5
Peru	PCRv	1100001240	24 585 386	9 892 779	-	1 762 048	36 240 213	40%	7%	0%	5	5	3	5
Philippines	PE	1100000486	9 240 000	13 190 000	19 060 000	-	41 490 000	143%	0%	206%	5	4	4	3
Philippines	PE	1100001066	15 539 800	2 613 400	-	-	18 153 200	17%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4
Philippines	PPA	1100001137	14 805 000	6 766 000	-	2 262 000	23 833 000	46%	15%	0%	5	5	4	5
Philippines	PPE	1100001253	21 700 788	654 672	891 705	9 513 000	32 760 165	3%	44%	4%	4	4	4	4
Romania	PE	1100001052	16 464 350	5 567 484	5 086 875	-	27 118 709	34%	0%	31%	4	4	4	3
Rwanda	PCRv	1100001149	15 927 404	4 781 325	12 168 199	-	32 876 928	30%	0%	76%	5	4	4	3
Rwanda	PCRv	1100001232	16 262 539	2 524 272	5 663 838	821 398	25 272 047	16%	5%	35%	5	4	4	3
Rwanda	PCRv	1100001276	14 914 105	2 652 136	-	-	17 566 241	18%	0%	0%	5	4	4	3
Rwanda	PPA	1100001320	13 909 935	6 433 372	14 817 766	248 000	35 409 073	46%	2%	107%	6	5	5	4
Sao Tome et Principe	PCRv	1100001027	12 978 882	2 181 918	1 451 398	-	16 612 198	17%	0%	11%	5	5	3	5
Solomon Islands	PCRv	1100001565	3 995 540	926 722	25 474 231	-	30 396 493	23%	0%	638%	4	4	3	4
Sri Lanka	IE	1100001254	22 310 900	3 433 700	4 660 000	-	30 404 600	15%	0%	21%	5	5	4	4
Sri Lanka	PCRv	1100001346	29 877 163	3 607 634	-	3 330 053	36 814 850	12%	11%	0%	3	3	3	3
Sri Lanka	PCRv	1100001351	4 697 000	-	-	-	4 697 000	0%	0%	0%	4	3	3	3
Sudan	PCRv	1100001140	18 023 915	5 059 465	16 131 000	1 062 898	40 277 278	28%	6%	89%	5	4	4	4

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD Total	Sum of Governments* Total	Sum of INT Total	Sum of Domestic partners	Total	government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	national cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Sudan	PPA	1100001263	24 945 703	13 622 430	-	-	38 568 133	55%	0%	0%	3	3	4	2
Swaziland	PCR	1100001159	14 957 984	20 264 892	81 322 143	-	116 545 019	135%	0%	544%	4	3	2	3
Syria	PCR	1100001073	20 166 210	18 005 315	64 986 641	-	103 158 166	89%	0%	322%	4	4	3	3
Syria	PCR	1100001233	17 550 679	9 109 022	19 490 544	-	46 150 245	52%	0%	111%	5	2	2	2
Syria	PCR	1100001357	6 001 331	7 847 624	1 078 741	3 778 816	18 706 512	131%	63%	18%	4	3	3	3
Tanzania	PE	1100001086	17 054 000	3 795 000	4 409 000	-	25 258 000	22%	0%	26%	6	4	4	4
Tanzania	PE	1100001151	16 342 100	3 092 205	4 336 546	-	23 770 851	19%	0%	27%	4	5	3	3
Tanzania	PE	1100001166	16 345 006	5 922 761	30 572 986	-	52 840 753	36%	0%	187%	4	5	4	4
Tunisia	PCR	1100001213	23 243 633	19 723 000	6 986 763	-	49 953 396	85%	0%	30%	4	3	4	4
Tunisia	PCR	1100001299	20 490 011	14 790 955	5 023 942	-	40 304 908	72%	0%	25%	5	4	4	3
Turkey	PPA	1100001189	13 078 584	7 061 959	9 902 410	-	30 042 953	54%	0%	76%	4	4	5	
Uganda	PCR	1100001021	19 900 000	6 940 000	-	-	26 840 000	35%	0%	0%	5	5	3	5
Uganda	PE	1100001060	12 588 046	2 523 421	5 532 912	-	20 644 379	20%	0%	44%	6	4	5	3
Uganda	CPE/PPA	1100001122	13 219 700	2 833 500	-	-	16 053 200	21%	0%	0%	5	5	5	4
Uganda	PCR	1100001158	17 500 000	21 570 000	68 860 000	-	107 930 000	123%	0%	393%	4	4	3	3
Uganda	PCR	1100001197	18 429 231	1 453 013	-	-	19 882 244	8%	0%	0%	4	4	4	3
Uganda	PCR	1100001419	31 986 391	6 122 129	43 830 006	341 377	82 279 903	19%	1%	137%	4	4	5	4
Uruguay	PPA	1100001161	14 000 000	10 500 000	-	457 000	24 957 000	75%	3%	0%	5	5	3	5
Venezuela	PE	1100000521	11 986 600	7 129 900	2 802 000	-	21 918 500	59%	0%	23%	5	4	5	5
Venezuela	PCR	1100001186	12 999 656	4 000 548	-	181 195	17 181 399	31%	1%	0%	4	3	3	4
Venezuela	PCR	1100001252	15 000 344	4 000 226	4 000 006	-	23 000 576	27%	0%	27%	4	4	4	4

Country	Type of evaluation	Project ID	Sum of IFAD Total	Sum of Governments* Total	Sum of INT Total	Sum of Domestic partners	Total	government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	national cofinancing to IFAD financing	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Vietnam	CPE/PCRV	1100001091	15 432 792	3 697 983	-	-	19 130 775	24%	0%	0%	5	5	5	5
Vietnam	CPE/PPA	1100001202	20 906 000	4 493 000	5 033 000	-	30 432 000	21%	0%	24%	5	5	4	5
Vietnam	PCRV	1100001272	24 751 650	14 032 044	-	-	38 783 694	57%	0%	0%	5	4	5	4
Vietnam	PCRV	1100001374	26 388 000	5 210 000	4 502 000	-	36 100 000	20%	0%	17%	5	5	5	5
Yemen	PE	1100001075	12 109 135	3 911 249	1 000 544	-	17 020 928	32%	0%	8%	4	3	3	2
Yemen	PCRV	1100001095	12 241 362	4 069 035	664 578	-	16 974 975	33%	0%	5%	4	4	3	3
Yemen	PCRV	1100001195	21 514 578	2 549 188	-	-	24 063 766	12%	0%	0%	5	5	4	4
Yemen	PCRV	1100001269	14 349 089	8 196 652	-	-	22 545 741	57%	0%	0%	4	5	3	4
Yemen	PCRV	1100001293	12 908 140	1 047 791	-	-	13 955 931	8%	0%	0%	5	4	3	4
Yemen	PCRV	1100001403	16 582 329	5 971 511	19 599 550	-	42 153 390	36%	0%	118%	4	4	3	3
Zambia	PPA	1100001039	12 632 604	1 550 019	1 812 016	-	15 994 639	12%	0%	14%	3	2	2	2
Zambia	PCRV	1100001280	13 811 012	3 187 401	-	-	16 998 413	23%	0%	0%	4	4	3	4

* Includes beneficiary contributions

Source: IFAD GRIPS; IOE evaluation database

7.2 IE, PPE, PCRV in CSPE-evaluated countries 2006-2016 dataset

Table 1

Project evaluations (IEs, PPA/PPEs, PCRVs) conducted in countries that had a CSPE between 2006-2016 (n=96)

Country	Number of evaluations	IFAD financing	Government* cofinancing	Domestic partner cofinancing	International cofinancing	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing
Argentina	3	54 015 000	28 049 000	-	8 324 000	52%	0%	15%
Bangladesh	4	101 401 185	17 372 305	26 936 951	74 786 053	17%	27%	74%
Bolivia	1	12 042 464	2 916 096	-	-	24%	0%	0%
Brazil	1	30 500 331	30 000 113	-	-	98%	0%	0%
China	6	154 706 073	243 268 794	6 210 614	31 703 511	157%	4%	20%
DR Congo	2	30 589 857	5 829 270	-	12 264 646	19%	0%	40%
Ecuador	1	14 842 342	9 452 190	-	-	64%	0%	0%
Ethiopia	5	129 354 729	43 783 055	22 629 568	147 504 711	34%	17%	114%
Ghana	5	56 238 502	59 647 123	979 572	20 155 250	106%	2%	36%
India	4	115 049 763	33 258 169	130 058 414	34 082 611	29%	113%	30%
Jordan	2	14 145 939	10 457 087	-	12 567 191	74%	0%	89%
Kenya	4	73 084 911	12 052 738	-	8 968 570	16%	0%	12%
Madagascar	1	14 500 119	5 992 130	91 551	7 663 705	41%	1%	53%

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of evaluations</i>	<i>IFAD financing</i>	<i>Government* cofinancing</i>	<i>Domestic partner cofinancing</i>	<i>International cofinancing</i>	<i>Ratio government financing to IFAD financing</i>	<i>Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing</i>	<i>Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing</i>
Mali	1	11 335 827	2 965 205	-	8 528 980	26%	0%	75%
Moldova	2	26 267 207	8 645 286	4 348 469	-	33%	17%	0%
Morocco	5	84 879 620	70 347 582	80 351	13 169 278	83%	0%	16%
Mozambique	3	39 862 913	9 199 226	832 103	35 120 074	23%	2%	88%
Nepal	1	14 707 749	1 062 060	-	-	7%	0%	0%
Nicaragua	2	28 200 001	5 882 544	4 000 000	7 495 456	21%	14%	27%
Niger	4	53 904 387	19 693 602	-	61 211 158	37%	0%	114%
Nigeria	1	42 900 001	70 500 000	-	3 200 000	164%	0%	7%
Pakistan	6	143 262 308	25 039 681	16 345 205	-	17%	11%	0%
Philippines	4	61 285 588	23 224 072	4 223 014	19 951 705	38%	7%	33%
Rwanda	4	61 013 983	16 391 105	637 500	32 649 803	27%	1%	54%
Sudan	2	42 969 618	18 681 895	870 304	16 131 000	43%	2%	38%
Tanzania	3	49 741 106	12 809 966	-	39 318 532	26%	0%	79%
Turkey	1	13 078 584	7 061 959	-	9 902 410	54%	0%	76%
Uganda	6	113 623 368	41 442 063	37 756 369	118 222 918	36%	33%	104%

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of evaluations</i>	<i>IFAD financing</i>	<i>Government* cofinancing</i>	<i>Domestic partner cofinancing</i>	<i>International cofinancing</i>	<i>Ratio government financing to IFAD financing</i>	<i>Ratio of domestic financiers to IFAD financing</i>	<i>Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing</i>
Vietnam	4	87 478 442	27 433 027	1 200 000	9 535 000	31%	1%	11%
Yemen	6	89 704 633	25 745 426	1 069 398	21 264 672	29%	1%	24%
Zambia	2	26 443 616	4 737 420	431 085	1 812 016	18%	2%	7%

* Includes beneficiary contributions
Source: IFAD GRIPS; IOE evaluation database

7.3 CSPE 2006-2016 dataset

Table 1

Cofinancing ratios (government, other domestic financiers, and international) and selected IOE ratings by portfolio evaluated by CSPE between 2006-2016

Country	Country classification at time of evaluation	Region	CSPE publication	CSPE coverage	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of other domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Partnership building	COSOP performance	Overall IFAD-government partnership
Argentina	UM	LAC	2010	1988-2008	73%	0%	16%	4	4	4
Bangladesh	LM	APR	2015	2004-2014	37%	13%	74%	4	5	5
Bolivia	LM	LAC	2014	2005-2012	55%	0%	47%	3	4	4
Brazil 1	UM	LAC	2008	1997-2007	93%	43%	0%	3		
Brazil 2	UM	LAC	2015	2008-2015	157%	40%	12%	4	n.r.	5
China	UM	APR	2014	1999-2013	132%	9%	8%	4	5	5
Congo, The Democratic Republic	L*	WCA	2016	2003-2015	18%	0%	46%	3	3	
Ecuador	UM	LAC	2013	1997-2012	73%	19%	71%	3	3	3
Ethiopia 1	L	ESA	2009	1997-2007	37%	13%	75%	5		
Ethiopia 2	L	ESA	2016	2008-2015	33%	37%	72%	4	5	5
Gambia	L	WCA	2016	2004-2014	17%	1%	77%	3	3	3
Ghana	LM	WCA	2011	1998-2010	94%	15%	104%	4	4	4
India 1	L	APR	2010	1987-2009	50%	77%	25%	3	5	5
India 2	LM	APR	2016	2010-2015	69%	86%	11%	3	4	4
Indonesia	LM	APR	2014	2004-2012	28%	4%	32%	3	3	3
Jordan	UM	NEN	2012	1996-2011	75%	1%	76%	4	3	3
Kenya	L	ESA	2011	2000-2011	19%	63%	31%	4	4	4
Madagascar	L	ESA	2013	2000-2012	28%	0%	58%	5	5	5

Country	Country classification at time of evaluation	Region	CSPE publication	CSPE coverage	Ratio government financing to IFAD financing	Ratio of other domestic financiers to IFAD financing	Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing	Partnership building	COSOP performance	Overall IFAD-government partnership
Mali 1	L	WCA	2007	1997-2006	30%	1%	51%	3		
Mali 2	L	WCA	2013	2007-2012	50%	0%	115%	5	4	4
Moldova, Republic of	LM	NEN	2014	1992-2012	39%	9%	15%	4	3	4
Morocco	LM	NEN	2008	1999-2006	97%	0%	32%	4		
Mozambique 1	L	ESA	2010	1993-2009	49%	1%	34%	4	5	4
Mozambique 2	L*	ESA	2017	2010-2016	32%	6%	47%	5	4	
Nepal	L	APR	2013	1992-2012	31%	2%	133%	4	4	4
Nicaragua	LM*	LAC	2017	1999-2016	25%	11%	33%	4	4	
Niger	L	WCA	2011	1997-2009	34%	1%	73%	5	4	4
Nigeria 1	L	WCA	2009	1998-2008	105%	10%	11%	4		
Nigeria 2	LM	WCA	2016	2008-2016	69%	2%	5%	3	4	4
Pakistan	L	APR	2008	1990-2007	170%	3%	57%	4		
Philippines	LM*	APR	2017	2003-2015	63%	3%	84%	4	4	
Rwanda	L	ESA	2012	2000-2010	28%	3%	43%	4	5	5
Senegal	LM	WCA	2014	2004-2013	53%	0%	43%	4	4	4
Sudan	LM	NEN	2009	1994-2007	38%	1%	37%	3		
Tanzania, United Republic of	L	ESA	2015	2004-2014	20%	0%	92%	4	4	4
Turkey	UM	NEN	2016	2003-2015	43%	0%	13%	3	4	4
Uganda	L	WCA	2013	1997-2011	246%	95%	120%	5	4	4
Viet Nam	LM	APR	2011	2000-2010	26%	2%	9%	4	5	5

<i>Country</i>	<i>Country classification at time of evaluation</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>CSPE publication</i>	<i>CSPE coverage</i>	<i>Ratio government financing to IFAD financing</i>	<i>Ratio of other domestic financiers to IFAD financing</i>	<i>Ratio of International cofinancing to IFAD financing</i>	<i>Partnership building</i>	<i>COSOP performance</i>	<i>Overall IFAD-government partnership</i>
Yemen	LM	NEN	2012	2000-2010	29%	6%	60%	4	4	4
Zambia	LM	ESA	2014	2003-2013	24%	4%	20%	4	4	4

* refers to countries whose classification at 2015 was known

Note: there are 40 CSPEs in this list. 4 were not reviewed

Source: IFAD GRIPS; IOE evaluation database

Additional supporting tables and figures

8.1 CSPE data set analysis

Table 1
CSPE sample composition by country classification

	LIC	MIC	total
APR	3	6	9
ESA	7	1	8
LAC	0	6	6
NEN	0	6	6
WCA	4	3	7
Total	14	22	36

Source: CSPE review, see data in annex VII.3 table 1

Table 2
Partnership building ratings, country classification, and ICO presence country - 2006-2016

Country	Evaluation Year	Partnership building rating	COSOP performance rating	Overall IFAD-government partnership	Country classification – LIC (L) / MIC (LM/UM)	Year of ICO presence
Brazil	2006	3			UM	2011
Mali	2006	3			L	2011
Morocco	2006	4			LM	2016
Ethiopia	2007	5			L	2005
Pakistan	2007	4			L	2011
Nigeria	2008	4			L	2005
Sudan	2008	3			LM	2005
Argentina	2009	4	4	4	UM	-
India	2009	3	5	5	L	2001
Mozambique	2009	4	5	4	L	2011
Niger	2009	5	4	4	L	2014
Ghana	2010	4	4	4	LM	2010
Kenya	2010	4	4	4	L	2008
Rwanda	2010	4	5	5	L	2010
Vietnam	2010	4	5	5	LM	2005
Yemen	2010	4	4	4	LM	2007
Jordan	2011	4	3	3	UM	-
Uganda	2011	5	4	4	L	2008
Ecuador	2012	3	3	3	UM	-
Indonesia	2012	3	3	3	LM	2015
Madagascar	2012	5	5	5	L	2008
Mali	2012	5	4	4	L	2011
Nepal	2012	4	4	4	L	2008
Bolivia	2013	3	4	4	LM	2004
China	2013	4	5	5	UM	2005
Moldova	2013	4	3	4	LM	-
Senegal	2013	4	4	4	LM	2005
Zambia	2013	4	4	4	LM	2012
Bangladesh	2014	4	5	5	LM	2012
Tanzania	2014	4	4	4	L	2004
Brazil	2015	4	n.r.	5	UM	2011
Ethiopia	2015	4	5	5	L	2005
Gambia	2015	3	3	3	L	-
India	2015	3	4	4	LM	2001

Country	Evaluation Year	Partnership building rating	COSOP performance rating	Overall IFAD-government partnership	Country classification – LIC (L) / MIC (LM/UM)	Year of ICO presence
Nigeria	2015	3	4	4	LM	2005
Turkey	2015	3	4	4	UM	-
DR Congo	2016	3	3		L	2005
Mozambique	2016	5	4		L	2011
Nicaragua	2016	4	4		LM	-
Philippines	2016	4	4		LM	2009

Source: IOE ratings database 2017; World Bank Country & Lending Groups FY 2017

Legend

	CSPE were not included in analysis
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
Table 3
Frequency of partnership-building ratings by rating and region from CPEs/CSPEs conducted between 2006 and 2016

Region	Rating						Total	Average
	3		4		5			
	Frequency	% of total	Frequency	% of total	Frequency	% of total		
APR	3	33%	6	67%			9	3.7
ESA			6	60%	4	40%	10	4.4
LAC	3	50%	3	50%			6	3.5
NEN	2	33%	4	67%			6	3.7
WCA	4	44%	3	33%	2	22%	9	3.8
Total	12	30%	22	55%	6	15%	40	3.9

Source: IFAD IOE ratings database (2017) – compiled from data in annex VII.3 table 1

8.2 Partnership-building rating and CSPE review analysis

Figure 1
Combination of partnership categories and partnership ratings



Source: Annex V.1 table 1; Annex VIII table 2

Table 1
Partnership outcomes identified in countries where government support for IFAD collaboration with partners is strong or weak

Government support for IFAD collaboration with partners	Outcomes				
	Influencing	Scaling-up and mainstreaming	Complementarities/ synergies	Knowledge and innovation	Sustainability and ownership
Strong (strong aid alignment)	Ghana Mali	Ethiopia* Mali Tanzania*	Ethiopia* Mali Tanzania* Uganda	Mali	Ethiopia* Mali Rwanda* Tanzania* Uganda
Weak	Nicaragua Nigeria	Bangladesh China Nigeria	China Nicaragua Nigeria	Bangladesh Nicaragua	Bangladesh China

* Good aid alignment and weak in government support for partnering

Source: CSPE review - cross-tabulation of annex V.1 table 1 and annex VI.4

8.3 Partnership-building rating, Government support and ICO presence analysis

Government support and partnership-building rating analysis

Table 1.1

Number and percentage of CSPE countries identified to have strong government support by country classification

Country classification	Strong IFAD collaboration with and support for:	
	Central Government	Sub-national Government
LICs	5 (71.4%)	1 (12.5%)
MICs	2 (28.6%)	7 (87.5%)
Total	7	8

Source: annex VI.4; annex VIII table 2

Table 1.2

Average partnership-building rating of CSPE countries identified to have strong government support by country classification

Country classification	Strong IFAD collaboration with and support for:	
	Central Government	Sub-national Government
LICs	4.4	5
MICs	4	3.7
Overall average	4.3	3.9

Source annex VI.4; annex VIII table 2

ICO presence and partnership-building rating analysis

Table 2.1

Number and percentage of CSPE countries with or without ICOs at time of evaluation by country classification

Country classification	ICO:	
	Present	Not present
LICs	11 (%)	4 (%)
MICs	13 (%)	9 (%)
Total	24	13

Source: annex VIII table 2

Table 2.2

Average partnership-building rating of CSPE countries with or without ICOs at time of evaluation by country classification

Country classification	ICO:	
	Present	Not present
LICs	4.2	3.8
MICs	3.7	3.6
Total	3.9	3.6

Source: annex VIII table 2

Lessons from other IFIs

Overview

1. Several other international finance institutions (IFIs) have addressed partnership performance in their evaluations in recent years. But only the ADB carried out a full-fledged partnership evaluation (2016), focusing on its corporate and global partnerships and their effectiveness in cofinancing, knowledge management, and coordination. Until 2015 the World Bank Group (IEG) had a strong program of evaluations of Global Partnerships, such as the GEF, the Climate Investment Funds, or the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) of which a total of 26 were done. Certain other partnership aspects were included in its regular evaluations but without clear guidelines. Since then IEG moved to mainstream the evaluation of partnerships systematically as a cross-cutting theme in its evaluations and to strengthen its overall partnership evaluation methods and capacities. The AfDB's Comprehensive Evaluation of Development Results of October 2016 includes some comments on partnerships at country level. AfDB also carried out a Trust Fund evaluation in 2013. GEF assessed its partnership recently in the context of an evaluation of GEF Programmatic Approaches (2017).
2. Many of the findings and lessons learnt in these evaluations refer to management and effectiveness of trust funds and global partnership programs – that are of relevance for IFAD's grants programmes. There are also important lessons with high relevance for IFAD on other institutions' experience and lessons with partnerships in cofinancing, knowledge management, PPPs and CSOs. Specific lessons in fragile states and for small states were found in two WBG evaluations that may be of interest in these environments. Several evaluations included some general best practices for partnerships and limitations. These lessons will be presented in a summarized form in the following.

Lessons from IFI evaluations of partnerships

3. **Trust Funds.** Multi- and bilateral trust funds, their management and value-addition to the regular loan programme are an important partnership theme for the MDBs. These trust funds are comparable to IFAD supplementary funding and grant programmes. In an evaluation of ADB's three financing partnership facilities (FPF⁷¹) in the areas of water, regional cooperation and integration, and clean energy ADB found clear **advantages of consolidating individual trust funds in operational platforms**. These could be achieved through diversifying the sources of finance thereby improving relevance and financial sustainability and through efficiency gains from increased economies of scale in trust fund management. But issues remained in terms of complex administrative modalities and chronic implementation delays at project level in these FPFs.
4. In a similar vein, the 2013 AfDB evaluation of procedural effectiveness of trust funds identified unrealistic expectations at fund establishment on delivery of results and **high transaction costs** for Trust Fund Management that are not covered by additional administrative resources. It also found weak internal Bank performance indicators on trust fund disbursements, costs and processing times. Particular problems were encountered in working with CSOs in trust funds, as the AfDB does not have sufficient capacity and resources to discern NGOs' administrative capacity and provide "on the ground" support when necessary.
5. The 2011 World Bank Group evaluation of Trust Fund Support for Development led to the realization that while **trust funds can add value by providing coordinated grant financing, the interests among donors, recipients and the World Bank may diverge on fund allocation decisions and management**. Notably, many trust funds of global scope at the WB were found to

⁷¹ Financing Partnership Facilities (FPF) are defined as operational "platforms" for strategic, long-term and multi-partner cooperation that link various forms of assistance in a coordinated manner for well-defined purposes.

involve insufficient recipient participation and clear outcome objectives, and often not consistently working in accordance with aid effectiveness principles of country ownership and donor coordination. Separate umbrella trust fund arrangements for regional and global, country, and multi-donor/multi-recipient trust fund management are expected to strengthen effectiveness, efficiency and accountability for results.

6. **Global Partnerships.** Since the early 2000s, The World Bank developed a strong capacity for Evaluations of Global Partnerships. A 2015 review of these evaluations⁷² summarized four main challenges to the relevance and effectiveness of these Global Partnership programs that were frequently observed: (i) There is a risk of **proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives with inappropriate earmarking**, and parallel budgeting and approval processes. It is also not always clear that dedicated programs raise overall development funding. Rather the basic assumption is that donor aid budgets are fixed; (ii) Such Global Programs may **miss opportunities to link up with the Bank's mainstream work and in particular its country programs**; (iii) How can effective oversight and accountability be ensured in these Global Partnerships? **Many global and regional activities are neither tracked in any portfolio data base nor expected to produce results**; and (iv) Many of these Global Programs **miss clear goals and indicators and independent evaluations**.
7. **Cofinancing.** Lessons on cofinancing as a major partnership activity are largely related to the definition of cofinancing, the additionality of resources mobilized through cofinancing, their effectiveness and transaction costs, and the measurement and reporting of cofinancing results.
8. In recent years ADB has achieved a relatively high cofinancing ratio and cofinanced projects performed better according to the 2016 partnership effectiveness evaluation. But it was also noted that the definition of cofinancing was changed to include certain parallel project components by other donors and commercial cofinancing categories that are 'debatable', partly pushed by ambitious Bank targets. **While a lot of collaborative cofinancing does not mobilize additional resources** the evaluation positively pointed out that **cofinancing facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results**. But there were also reports on difficulties and complexities in administration, reporting and partner relations management in cofinancing. A common problem was inadequate accounting of partner contributions in cofinanced projects. Moreover, reporting cofinancing as value-addition – such as for policy influence and scaling up – would require different reporting systems and parameters.
9. In a similar vein, the AfDB comprehensive evaluation of development results found that AfDB **cofinancing is not sufficiently oriented towards mobilizing additional resources** for the Bank and projects, although positive practices were encountered in some cases. One example of this was promoting and attracting private sector financing into private-public partnerships (PPPs). But in general, leveraging in projects was more ad-hoc than driven by strategic goals set forth in the country strategies.
10. The IEG evaluation on World Bank engagement in small states (2016) shows that **even under supportive and favorable circumstances cofinancing can be complicated**. World Bank and ADB cofinanced a number of specific projects in Pacific Islands and worked to harmonize procedures along with alternating lead roles in specific sectors and countries. This was done in the context of the Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility that coordinates efforts supporting infrastructure

⁷² IEG (2015). *Opportunities and Challenges from Working in Partnership: Findings from IEG's Work on Partnership Programs and Trust Funds*. A learning focused note of World Bank findings on global and regional partnership programs over the last 10 years. World Bank. Washington, DC.

financing in the region (funded mainly by Australia and New Zealand). The facility also conducts research and analysis on infrastructure needs and priorities and provides technical assistance – which offers a good basis for achieving policy influence and scaling-up beyond projects. In the end, it was concluded that cofinancing was ‘helpful’, yet that it remains challenging to put joint financing between the ADB and the World Bank into practice, especially applicable rules and procedures on procurement.

11. **Knowledge partnerships** in ADB take a large share of the Bank’s corporate partnerships portfolio (62 percent – considerably more than was found at country level in this ESR for IFAD), and their numbers doubled between 2009 and 2015. Yet the quality of these knowledge partnerships is often deemed problematic, without clear results frameworks, poor reporting and dispersed management. For instance, **introducing knowledge hubs proved mostly not successful due to poor design and focus, under-funding, and lack of linkages** with ADB technical staff. In contrast, effective knowledge partnership in ADB consisted of collaboration on specific initiatives that led to more systematic and joint project preparation and implementation, engagement of high-level persons in conferences and policy engagement, completion of a series of publications or events, sometimes with joint funding (WWF). In sum, what worked in ADB was to **avoid vagueness and to link up knowledge partnerships with ADB technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement**.
12. The AfDB evaluation focused more on influence of its knowledge work (ESW) on policies and strategies. It concluded that mostly due to insufficient communication the knowledge partnerships did not work out optimally, which meant that the Bank’s results were not fully leveraged to country needs and that the Bank is still perceived as a financier rather than a provider of knowledge and advice. The exception was **fragile situations in which the Bank was able to use its brand and relationships to engage in influential policy engagement**. By contrast, no specific patterns emerged for MICs and LICs.
13. In its support for promoting global data partnerships and evidence for country policy decision making, the World Bank identified **well-aligned partnership engagements as a cornerstone of its success**, in addition to technical expertise, sustainable approaches and linking global and national needs.⁷³ But changes in the global partnership landscape and the emergence of new development partners increasingly reduce the World Bank’s effectiveness at the country level in supporting data production, promoting open data, building statistical capacity and encouraging country clients to share data in a system-wide approach.
14. In terms of knowledge partnerships, the World Bank evaluation on urban transport (2017) found that though the World Bank Group’s finance is small compared to the unmet need, it has proven its ability to use its knowledge and convening power to spread good practices and promote South-South learning, because of the **continuity of the support** and the **capacity building** provided.
15. **PPPP**. Lessons and Best Practices on PPP/PPPPs from WB/IEG and IDS are clear in their conclusions that designing, structuring, and implementing PPPs remains a challenging and complex endeavour that requires a good rationale, clear roles and participation for all actors, and follow-up for sustainability. The IEG 2015 evaluation on Support for Private Partnerships firmly sees their **success mainly dependent on the enabling environment they are embedded in and the role and capacity of the public sector for reform and support**.
16. The four main lessons from **IEG’s PPP evaluation** (2015) are that, first, most of the upstream work aimed at sector reform failed in almost half of the cases

⁷³ Data and Evidence: The Foundation of Development Policy, IEG Evaluation (2017)

because of the **complexity and political implications of the reform processes**. At the project level, contingent liabilities for governments that emerge from PPPs are rarely fully quantified, although project design tends to give attention to ensuring adequate risk sharing. Secondly, **strong government commitment and the availability of a government champion** to promote the PPP agenda and ensure inter-ministerial coordination were the most important drivers of success for upstream work. Countries need to be sufficiently mature and ready to apply the concept of PPPs well. Third, **capacity building for PPPs** and building the **legal and institutional framework** were found to be the second most frequently addressed enabling factors. Fourth, the market structure of a sector must create conditions for the private sector to operate and regulatory bodies should be competent and protect operators from political interferences. Frequent **stakeholder consultation** and **active involvement of local staff** likewise contributed to the success of policy reform. And **staying engaged beyond financial closure of a PPP** is a strategic necessity.

17. **IEG's evaluation on urban transport** (2017) underlines the **importance of linking upstream PPP reform work and downstream projects** through better communication between the Bank's various Agencies and departments, and added that the financial sustainability of the participating private sector is key for provision of services.
18. In its **2015 study for IFAD** on "Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships (PPPP) in Agricultural Value Chains" (2015) IDS concluded that **PPPPs require a clear rationale and objectives, that incentives of partners should be well aligned, and that partners with the right competencies should be identified e.g. through competitive bidding, partner due diligence processes, or working with already established partners**.
19. PPPP outcomes would depend on critical aspects of design, in particular risk-sharing and mechanisms that manage, mitigate or share these risks and that address unequal power relations that exist in vertically coordinated value chains. All partners, including farmers and their organizations, need to have ownership of the PPPP, with clear roles and responsibilities that reflect their priorities and interests. For the public sector a proactive approach should be taken to assure public accountability and transparency. Agreements are needed for partners to feel confident that the other partners will perform theirs. Building trust is of paramount importance in PPPPs.
20. To make PPPPs sustainable capacity needs to be built to respond to changes in complex market systems, challenges as well as opportunities, and to adapt to the unexpected. This includes performance monitoring, with indicators that reflect joint PPPP objectives, and spaces for communication, negotiation and conflict resolution. While agricultural value chain PPPPs are time-limited interventions they need to modify the incentives, capabilities and behaviour of different actors to ensure that they will continue their roles in the long term.
21. Related to PPPPs, but from a slightly different angle, **ADB's partnership effectiveness evaluation** pointed out that in the new partnership world ADB's function would be increasingly to nudge larger companies to change certain market behaviours, among others vis-à-vis smallholder farmers, partly through working with CSOs in shifting the civil society-business relationship towards constructive engagement with these private sector companies.
22. **Civil Society**. Administrative lessons are in the centre of ADB's partnership effectiveness evaluation for working with CSOs. As ADB engages CSOs mostly as contractors procurement issues assume high importance. Engaging with CSOs is found to be highly time-consuming and staff intensive. CSOs often lack the capacity to comply with ADB procurement and reporting requirements (as do many

- UN organizations). This limits ADB's partnership effectiveness and efficiency with CSOs considerably.
23. At a different level, a recent approach paper for the **WBG IEG Evaluation of Engaging Citizens for Better Development Results** (2017) systematically reviewed lessons learnt on engagement with CSO and citizens and pointed to important lessons and variations in the effectiveness of citizen engagement - through CSOs and other forms - depending on context, nature of intervention, and type of outcome. The gist of these reviews is that **citizen engagement can lead to improved outcomes in some circumstances, but that no effects or even adverse effects are also possible**. Much depends on what type of development outcome one looks at, the vehicle for participation, a variety of contextual factors, and the quality of implementation.
 24. The strongest positive evidence for effective collaboration links citizen engagement to improved delivery of public services such as water, health, and education. Citizen engagement can contribute to increase access to and quality of services, and make them more responsive to user needs. There is also evidence of positive outcomes in areas such as empowerment, social inclusion, and cohesion; local public goods such as public safety; and processes for citizen participation in public financial management and natural resource management. But there were often no results or even negative outcomes in the form of state failure to respond to citizens' claims, instances of participatory processes that were manipulative or unrepresentative, and violent oppression of citizen demands.
 25. Contextual factors often explain mixed outcomes of citizen engagement. There are demand-side factors (people's willingness and capacity to engage) and supply-side factors (politicians' and officials' willingness and capacity to respond to citizen voice and participation); and legal, economic, and political factors (history, power relations, legal frameworks, and so on). Inequality and the possibility for elite capture are often highlighted as contextual factors that may cause negative outcomes. Often **the adoption of measures to ensure that beneficiaries are adequately informed and consulted (transparency and involvement) is seen as a powerful way to ensure positive results**.
 26. **Lessons in MFS and Small States**. The WB Group experience with "Engagement in Situations of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence" (IEG evaluation of 2016) raises two principle lessons on working with UN agencies and with multi-donor trust funds.
 27. Strong World Bank Group-United Nations partnership would have been particularly important in the fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) context, as the United Nations agencies have political and security-related skills and contacts that the World Bank needs to leverage, and the UN system is the prime actor on the humanitarian front. But the evaluation found that partnerships with UN Agencies were not systematic and their frequency and effectiveness varied across the countries and themes. The existing system did not encourage building partnerships because of perceived high transaction costs, lack of strong staff incentives, incompatibility of the fiduciary and legal frameworks, and competition for influence and limited donor resources. A more nuanced strategic and technical dialogue would be needed to delineate respective roles and comparative advantages.
 28. **Multi-donor trust funds in these fragile environments were seen as vital strategic tools in conflict regions**, but their **effectiveness was found to be limited** due to weak links to the rest of the World Bank portfolio. Global thematic trust funds (State and Peace-Building Fund, Global Program of Forced Displacement, others) were helpful in supporting synergies in the FCV context. However, their impact (particularly in MICs) was diminished by their fragmentation.

29. A 2016 IEG clustered Country Program Evaluation (CPE) concerned small states (population of less than 1.5 million). Effective ways for development partners to join forces are particularly important in small states, where financing from partners is often more of a lifeline to economic viability than in larger states.
30. Given small states' limited capacity for coordinating donor support, coordinated action among development partners crucially lowers transactions costs for client countries. The programs reviewed used a number of vehicles and modalities that facilitated unified or at least coordinated support (in addition to for forums for regular coordination among key donors, used notably in the Pacific and the OECS). More engagement on a regional or multi-country level was for instance facilitated through multi-country vehicles for strategy, analytic and advisory activities, and financing that could address shared agendas in a harmonized way. For instance, the World Bank was one of multiple partners supporting the Caribbean Growth Forum, a process for identifying and acting on constraints to competitiveness in which a regional platform underpinned country-specific reform agendas.
31. A striking example of clarifying and simplifying the donor interface on policy reforms with the government was in Tonga, where ADB, the World Bank, and the EU initially decided to provide budget support on an individual basis to offset the negative impact of the global crisis on remittances. Overall, these programs had several pages of separate policy conditions. At the government's request, the World Bank took the lead to propose a coordinated approach with a common framework with fewer conditions.

Good partnership practices

32. Good partnership practices depend very much on the type and modality of partnerships and engagement and the settings. But there are some general lessons that were drawn in some evaluations. The Joint Evaluation of Agriculture and Rural Development in Africa by IFAD and AfDB of 2009 whose findings are already incorporated in the 2012 IFAD Strategy pointed to the principle needs for **partnerships to be programmatic, with clear objectives and results-oriented, time-bound, and sufficiently resourced.**
33. General conclusions from the ADB evaluation emphasized **flexible engagement rules** that may enable strengthening ties with partners over time. Secondly, the ADB evaluation found that its **formal partnerships are more often effective than non-formal ones.** Third, where partnerships allow players to **capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps** positive results could be expected. Gains from aligning interests and tapping into partner strengths allow them to have a stronger voice with the government in promoting reforms, for example. The evaluation also pointed out that one of the main advantages of ADB as a partner is that it is valued by others for its technical expertise and good working relationships with Governments.
34. Related to the point on flexible engagement the ADB evaluation notes that **partnerships for development tend to be fluid.** Partnerships may begin as a strategic coordination partnership among donors to harmonize or boost synergy in a country and then be transformed into finance or knowledge and learning partnerships. Partnerships with CSO or private sector often begin in loan funded projects with specific delegated implementation tasks before being expanded to wider collaborative partnerships for sectoral capacity building or policy engagement, possibly including grant or other finance mechanisms.
35. The ADB evaluation also pointed to the positive effect of applying two partnership principles, those of **mutuality** and **organizational identity.** Mutuality refers to the need for horizontal coordination and accountability among partners and equality in decision-making, without hierarchical relations. Organizational identity is the ability of each organization to maintain its core values, distinct organizational entity and constituencies over time with the partnership.

36. AfDB's comprehensive evaluation found that the effective engagement in partnerships depended mostly on the existence of an established framework of country coordination partnerships. Where they did not exist, the Bank had not taken counter-initiatives, such as with emerging donors. Secondly, the presence of the Bank country office provided a positive context for a better understanding of country constraints and needs. In particular it allowed for improved dialogue and consultation with a diversity of stakeholders. In fragile situations, longstanding partnerships facilitated the Bank's work, despite the challenges of working in settings constrained by capacity or resources.

Limitations to partnering

37. A recent GEF evaluation on Programmatic Approaches (2017)⁷⁴ identified the complexity of several of its programs as an issue of concern for performance, including the increased number of partner agencies. In order to enhance its impact and to provide integrated solutions to the environmental challenges GEF increasingly engages in programmatic approaches. The multi-dimensional nature of programs has generated greater need for multiple partners, coordination and management, with implications for efficiency, results and performance.
38. But the evaluation clearly shows that complexity is the most significant challenge to program performance. In particular, multi-agency programs face major obstacles, posed by their different mandates, operating practices and M&E systems. Unless management and supervision systems for programs are substantially improved and more appropriately resourced, program implementations are unlikely to perform as anticipated.
39. For ADB partnerships are clearly hampered by cumbersome and inflexible ADB procedures, insufficient staff resources assigned to project supervision and lack of harmonization of ADB procedures with partners' procurement and disbursement procedures. Moreover, ADB's organizational structure for partnerships developed organically, rather than by design, and it has turned into a rather fragmented model. There is now duplication of efforts for partner relations and management of trust funds.

Evaluating partnerships

40. During the November 2017 meeting of the Evaluation Coordination Group (ECG) several methodological issues around partnership evaluations were brought up.
41. ADB noted as a limitation that evaluations were not able to capture the contributions of partners, mainly because of insufficient result frameworks and because mutual results were insufficiently tracked.
42. IEG pointed out that they found it methodologically difficult to evaluate certain partnership outcomes, such as "convening power". Partnership evaluations did not work particularly well in WBG/IEG country programme evaluations in the past, because they were crowded out by the multitude of issues that the evaluations had to address. In general, as partnership evaluations were increasingly mainstreamed into IEG evaluations at all levels they found it necessary to build better capacity to evaluate partnerships and to better define country-specific partnerships and evaluation criteria. Also IEG has invested into strengthening staff capacity to evaluate partnerships, which includes having dedicated staff with special skills such as social networking analysis.
43. For GEF important aspects to look at in partnerships and partnership value addition – and to be included in results-based frameworks and evaluations - would be their strategic relevance, value-for-money, efficiency of governance arrangements,

⁷⁴ Evaluation of programmatic approaches in the GEF Volume I – Main report May 3, 2017 (prepared by the Independent Evaluation Office of the GEF)

comparative advantages, sustainability and contributions to transformational impacts.

Key lessons

- The proliferation of uncoordinated partnership initiatives in Global Partnership programmes can be reduced by linking those initiatives with country programmes and establishing effective oversight, setting goals and tracking results.
- Cofinancing often does not mobilize additional resources but it facilitates coordination and ultimately better project results.
- Effective knowledge partnerships avoid vagueness and build strong links with the organization's technical expertise, project preparation and high-profile engagement.
- PPPP success mainly depends on the enabling policy and governance environment they are embedded in and the role and capacity of the public sector for reform and support.
- Frequent stakeholder consultation and active involvement of local staff likewise contributed to their success.
- Staying engaged beyond financial closure of a PPPP is a strategic necessity.
- PPPPs require clear rationale and objectives, that incentives of partners are well aligned, and that partners with the right competencies are identified e.g. through competitive bidding, partner due diligence processes, or working with already established partners.
- Partnerships with CSOs and citizen engagement can lead to improved outcomes in some circumstances, but no effects or even adverse effects are also possible.
- Flexible engagement over time may enable strengthening ties with partners.
- Formal partnerships are more often effective than non-formal ones.
- Where partnerships allow players to capitalize on synergies and coordination and to minimize overlaps positive results could be expected.
- IFAD has to utilize and build up the comparative strengths of different types of partners for development effectiveness.

Case studies

Country: Argentina

Case: Partnership for family farming

IFAD-MERCOSUR partnership for family farming

IFAD Policy engagement in Argentina - financed mainly through grants - has played a pivotal role in promoting rural development and family farming in the country and has contributed to achieving deep-seated institutional change. Policy engagement in Argentina was three-pronged through: i) IFAD activities in MERCOSUR; (ii) the activities of IFAD-funded projects; and (iii) IFAD's direct support to the rural-poverty debate financed by a grant at the national level.

IFAD-MERCOSUR policy engagement deserves particular attention. Since 1999 IFAD has supported policy dialogue on rural development in the Southern cone with five consecutive sub-regional grants to the programme IFAD-MERCOSUR. Argentina is a founding member of MERCOSUR and has actively participated in the meetings of the Commission on Family Farming of MERCOSUR (REAF). Therefore, IFAD-MERCOSUR activities had a direct impact on policy dialogue in Argentina. IFAD-MERCOSUR partnership is characterised by two phases: the first served to promote convergence of policies on family agriculture among member countries; the second to promote the effective participation of small farmers' associations in decision-making processes on rural development policies in member countries.

Within the framework of REAF IFAD has contributed to generating debate on rural poverty in Argentina and raised the sector's profile in a country that has traditionally

been oriented towards agroindustry for export. IFAD's policy dialogue helped to link various sectors of the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments involved in poverty eradication. In particular, at the federal government level, IFAD contributed to expanding the concept of rural development and family agriculture to the Ministry of Economy and Production and to the Secretariat for Budget. The rural poverty debate, the participatory approach of the Government and the push of rural associations in search of political participation led the Government of Argentina to create the National Forum for Family Agriculture (FONAF) in 2006 through Resolution 132/06. This Forum brings together more than 900 small and medium-sized rural producers from all over the country who associate some 180,000 families and provide a fundamental platform to discuss development policies in this sector.

IFAD, in conjunction with the IDB, supported the creation and structuring of a Sub-secretariat for Rural Development and Family Agriculture (SSDRyAF), which was raised at the Secretariat level in October 2009 with the creation of MAGPyA (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries). Furthermore, IFAD contributed to the creation of a national section of the REAF in Argentina and the Provincial Fora of Family Agriculture. The latter have contributed not only to increasing the dialogue between rural organizations and the Government, but also have strengthened the dialogue between social movements. The establishment of these institutions suggests the sustainability of IFAD policy engagement in Argentina and the probable achievement of long-term policy results.

Country: Brazil

Case: Knowledge partnership with GEF

Project: The Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project (complimentary to Dom Hélder Câmara Project)

Implementation period: 2007-2013

Main documents: Final evaluation GEF⁷⁵ – The IFAD-GEF Advantage⁷⁶–PPE Dom Hélder Câmara Project⁷⁷

Project objectives and rational

The sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project was designed as a complementary initiative to the IFAD-financed Dom Helder Câmara Project (DHCP) to work in various areas of the semiarid north-eastern Brazil. It is financed by the GEF. The project has a budget of US\$15.5 million, of which US\$5.8 million is provided by GEF through a grant and US\$10.0 million through the Government of Brazil. It started in early 2009. Taking into consideration the problem of land degradation and its causes, the overall goal of the Sertão Project was to minimize the causes and negative impacts of degradation of both the land and the integrity of the Caatinga biome, through the implementation of sustainable land use systems.

Government ownership and alignment:

The Sertão Project proved to be consistent with national environmental policies in Brazil. It is considered as a concrete contribution to the implementation of the National Programme to Combat Desertification. Project actions fall under the Thematic Areas of Poverty and Inequality Reduction and Sustainable Expansion of Production Capacity (BRASIL-MMA, 2005). The project was well aligned with the principles and guidelines of the National Biodiversity Policy. This alignment shows that, beyond country ownership of the broader objectives of the Project, there was consistency between the Project objectives and the national government objectives of preserving the Caatinga biome and reducing poverty, which already existed.

IFAF-GEF Complementarities in strategies and policies: The GEF-IFAD partnership in Brazil is based on the

willingness to integrate the major issues linked to land and natural resource degradation into development initiatives aimed at poverty reduction and productive activities. More precisely, IFAD supports GEF in the consolidation of its portfolio for land degradation and strengthening the capacity necessary for the protection of the global environment. The project also maintains consistency with the IFAD' Strategy on Natural Resources Management, Environmental Protection and Poverty Reduction, by promoting social development, the equity of gender issues, the generation of income, environmental sustainability and good governance. The GEF and IFAD partnership in this project reflects complementarities in strategies and policies such as south-south cooperation and scaling up.

IFAD-GEF Strategic objectives: The project objectives were consistent with the GEF focus area "Land Degradation" and Operational Strategy on Sustainable Land Management (defined in GEF 3 – OP 15)⁷⁸. It is also consistent with IFAD Priority: Strategic Objective 5 of the 2011-2015 Strategic Framework – A base of natural and economic resources for rural women and men more responsive to climate change, environmental degradation and the transformation of markets."

IFAD, through its policies and strong track record of working with rural women and men and their institutions, as well as its alliances with sector experts offered GEF the unique entry points to achieve its goals and scale up its support. The GEF played a critical role in deepening IFAD's engagement with environmental and climate change concerns.

IFAD Supervision and Technical Support:

Starting in 2009 the supervision mission began to be performed directly by IFAD. There were also visits by the IFAD person responsible for liaising with the GEF that were also much appreciated by the Project team, as the issues of greatest concern to the GEF were brought to the fore more directly. In addition to these initiatives in the area of supervision, IFAD also helped by providing technical support. It was this IFAD support that helped define an environmental and production planning methodology and, subsequently, then allowed for the organization of a small training program on this subject. This initiative was able to train

⁷⁵ Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project -Sertão Project, Grant Agreement GEF-FSP-002-BR, Final Evaluation, 2014

⁷⁶ The IFAD-GEF Advantage Partnering for a sustainable world, 2014. a review prepared by the IFAD Environment and Climate Division based on project documentation

⁷⁷ Project Evaluation, 2011

⁷⁸ The GEF-3 corresponds to the Plan for the period July 2002-June 2006.

84 people, mostly technical staff from the assistance organization teams.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation: SSTC has increasingly been recognized as a key priority for IFAD to achieve its mandate of rural poverty reduction. In this regard, a series of exchanges have taken place within the framework of the project. Under IFAD's coordination, a team from the Cape Verdean program visited Brazil and got familiarized with the work implemented by the Sertão Project and a team from this latter visited Cape Verde. The project also caught the attention of the Senegalese ambassador to Brazil, who took the initiative to invite Project representatives to make a presentation of their work in his country. The Project also hosted a group of 28 leaders of farmers, peasants and indigenous organizations from seven South American countries. In August 2012, the Central Sertão region was visited by a Kenyan researcher, a partner of Embrapa Sheep and Goats, who was interested in the subject of raising these animals and recovering degraded areas.

Scaling up: Considering the achievement of the Sertão project in identifying and using innovative practices in resources management of the Caatinga biome, some results are being replicated both in its coverage area and elsewhere, building on various types of projects and state government programmes. Moreover, the Project conducted a series of activities to reach a wider audience and replicate its results (ranging from the creation of social organizations, such as OCS – Social Control Organization for Organic Production and Participatory Organization for Organic Compliance Assessment-OPACs, that have the potential to increase the number of households adopting organic production, to training processes involving large audiences in workshops, exchanges and learning events).⁷⁹

Knowledge: The Sertão Project generated and implemented innovative, sustainable production practices. It also financed a range of complementary activities such as experimental learning and environmental incentives, the introduction of environmental education in schools, monitoring of environmental effects in georeferenced territories, gas emission inventories of biodigesters and experimental treatment of wastewater for application in vegetable production.

Sustainability: Through the IFAD-GEF partnership, the Sertão Project was successful in generating sustainable production practices as a means to address and incorporate the environmental dimension into the conversations and practice of beneficiary women and men farmers. Project benefits not only led to changes in habits when dealing with natural resources, but also increased the awareness of the need to maintain them, making references to combating land degradation in the semi-arid region.

IFAD-GEF more outcomes

The IFAD project and the GEF collaborated to improve water management (a critical resource in the arid north-east) of some 3,466 families.⁸⁰ It contributed to improving the lives of about 11,727 families through better management of natural resources. It resulted moreover in strengthening of Local Organizations, Market access and Poverty Reduction. Project results include improved food security, increased value of local resources, and enhanced self-esteem among households involved. The project developed markets for indigenous and organic products. It supported production initiatives that started to generate additional income because they increased diversity and productivity, but also because they promoted access to new markets.

⁷⁹ Sustainable Land Management in the Semi-Arid Sertão Project -Sertão Project, Grant Agreement GEF-FSP-002-BR, Final Evaluation

⁸⁰ The IFAD-GEF Advantage Partnering for a sustainable world (Innovative certification process in Brazil)

Country: India

Case: Demand-driven partnership with State governments

Main sources: CSPE 2010 – CSPE 2016 – COSOP Review Report 2015 – COSOP 2018-2024 (*under development*) - India Country Programme Manager Rasha Omar, India Programme Officer, Aissa Toure

Context:

IFAD has been working in India for more than 30 years. India - a federal union of twenty-nine states and seven union territories- is IFAD's largest borrower and one of its main contributors. Since 1979 IFAD, has financed 28 projects through 32 loans. The national counterpart funding has been 27.4 per cent of total portfolio costs. External donor co-financing mainly took place until the beginning of the last decade to a level of 14 per cent. The balance funding came from national financial institutions and foundations and beneficiaries' contributions. IFAD opened its country office in New Delhi in 2001 with an out-posted CPM since 2016. IFAD is working at the grass-roots level, targeting its activities to the poorest and most vulnerable groups in rural society, such as small-scale and marginal farmers, women, tribal communities and scheduled castes.

Comparative advantage of IFAD: In a large lower middle-income country like India, beyond IFAD's financing role, there has been demand from the government for IFAD to be an active player bringing in its comparative advantage. The multidimensional intervention paradigm of the IFAD-funded portfolio (combining social capital, agriculture development, non-agriculture livelihood, financial services etc.) responds well to structural poverty issues in the targeted areas. As an IFI that works exclusively in the area of agriculture and rural transformation, the government views IFAD as a partner of choice in piloting innovations that contribute to the goal of doubling farmers' incomes, in real terms, by 2022, particularly in geographic areas where agricultural productivity is lagging and poverty incidence is higher. State governments value IFAD's cooperation due to its attention to quality, reaching deeper in poverty layers, support to imaginative solutions and some tolerance for risk taking. The North East Region Community Resource Management Project-NERCORMP is an example. The Project works with 21 tribes, each with its own language, customs and systems of land tenure and local governance. There are multiple tribes even within the domain of a single District Support Team. Some of the project villages are situated in pockets prone to conflicts

arising from rivalries between tribes that sometimes disrupt normal life.

IFAD's culture of constructive support and attention to quality

State governments value IFAD's culture of constructive support and attention to quality. They appreciate IFAD's flexibility in responding to changing needs and adapting to emerging circumstances during the project cycle. They positively recognize IFAD's modus operandi: bestowing full responsibility and authority of implementation to the designated government agencies and being available to provide guidance and problem-solving support when needed. They also appreciate IFAD's emphasis on quality of implementation and not just on expanding coverage, as well as allowing flexibility for risk taking and experimentation for innovation. Positive feedback from different stakeholder groups on the process and quality of the supervision and the follow-up missions are noted. Under the Post-Tsunami project, IFAD's supervision helped partners re-designing the project. In Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed District Programme-CAIM and Mitigating Poverty in Western Rajasthan Project-MPOWER, IFAD's supervision helped shift from output-based payment system to input based system to NGO, improving their performance.

The valued IFAD' culture is seen in successful projects like OTELP and NERCORMP where there is an involvement from the authorities at all levels, convinced of the validity of the projects' approaches. The two projects gathered strong functional and cooperative relationship at all levels to mobilize political and technical support for implementation. In OTELP and NERCORMP, close interaction and partnership with the District Magistrate leveraged implementation of forest and land rights for tribal poor as well as resources from Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-MGNREGS and National Rural Livelihood Mission -NRLM for the implementation of watershed management projects.

Government promoting scaling up: The commitment and support to IFAD's mandate is also translated into high co-funding levels and scaling up efforts. IFAD-supported programmes and projects have been a starting point for larger development initiatives. Many successful models, piloted by IFAD projects, have now been scaled up by state governments and other development partners. In the case of NERCORMP, A third phase, NERCORMP III, for US\$90 million covering new districts targeting 58,850 beneficiary households in

1,177 villages was launched in 2014 as a six-year project. It is funded exclusively by the Government of India (central level) to expand NERCORMP II activities to new districts. NERCORMP I model has been expanded by the World Bank Project (North East Rural Livelihoods Project) in four new states of North Eastern India, following the Government's request. For OTELP, the Government of the state of Odisha has decided to rapidly upscale the project's activities through a new phase called OTELP+, to consolidate the achievements in OTELP target districts and extend activities to new districts and blocks. This experience underlines the importance of the government's ownership of the projects.

Convergence with government programmes: One of the Government's expectations for IFAD assistance is enhancing the effectiveness of public expenditure associated with the implementation of national- and state-level schemes through convergence. In recent years, across its portfolio, IFAD has honoured the request to facilitate convergence with national anti-poverty programmes. All projects have made concerted efforts towards convergence with national and state level government schemes to maximise the benefits to the communities. This is done by advocating with the concerned departments and educating/empowering communities to access their entitlements. Both projects, Integrated Livelihood Support Project-ILSP and Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme-JTELP, have taken into account the substantial government funds available under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-MGNREGS which guarantees 100 days of wage-employment annually to the rural poor and the National Rural Livelihood Mission-NRLM which focuses on savings, credit and income generation. Additionally the design of JTELP includes a significant contribution from the Special Central Assistance to the Tribal Sub-Plan-SCA to TSP. Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed Districts Programme-CAIM project is also designed to use IFAD funds essentially for catalysing convergence with government programmes. The APDMP has significant convergence resources with convergence of USD 42.3 million from Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme- MGNREGS and USD 2.9 million from Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana-RKVY and other schemes of the central and state governments to cover water conservation infrastructures and protective irrigation.

It is important to note that partnership-building with IFI and Bilateral donors has been limited and the present level of interaction is only one of information exchange and consultation during project formulations. The central government was in favour of specialized and separate financing by multilateral donors, rather than co-financing. A point in case was the second phase of NERCORMP, initially envisaged as a co-financed by IFAD and the World Bank but later separated in two projects, each funded by one of the two organizations. Also, in some tribal areas, IFAD has been the only international agency allowed to intervene. In the case of bilateral donors, most have dramatically reduced the size of their cooperation in India resulting in fewer cofunding opportunities. The collaboration with private actors is emerging⁸¹. In the case of UN agencies: there has been little substantive cooperation with UN agencies in the portfolio or non-lending spheres, (as noted in the CSPE 2016). The IFAD business model is different from other UN agencies making a unified programme more difficult to conceive and implement; No particular instrument to cement such collaboration. According to the CPM, the situation is changing as follows : (i) RBA collaboration is a high priority for all 3 agencies and human and financial resources are being allocated for this; (ii) Country grants are increasingly being used in IFAD for Technical Assistance TA and combining this with loan financing. Such TA grant is paving the way for expanding FAO Technical Assistance to the portfolio; (iii) the UN Resident Coordinator in India recognizes the diversity of business models in UN country team but is determined to develop priority programs to achieve SDG 2030 that are articulated around the comparative advantage of each UN agency. IFAD ICO is participating in the priority programme for ending stunting which is directly contributing to SDG 2; (iv) the government now expects the RBA to work together and provide expertise/share innovations with regards SDG 2, as well as act as a vehicle to disseminate Indian expertise, innovations and achievements to the rest of the world.

⁸¹ Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed District Programme-CAIM cooperates with private sector companies.

Country: Mali

Case: Partnership at the core of Mali country programme

Main sources: CSPE 2013 – Country Strategy Note 2016 – Country Programme Manager Mali, Philippe Remy

Context

Partnerships are at the core of Mali country programme. Since the beginning of its operations in Mali in 1982, IFAD has financed 13 projects (of which five are active) at a total cost of US \$ 488 million. The contribution of the Malian State corresponds to 16% and of the co-financing of 10 projects to 45%, from development partners - including the World Bank (20%), the West African Development Bank (3%) and the European Commission (5%). Enabling factors that are at the base of the successful partnerships include strategic framework, country presence, country programme management teams and grants financed activities.

Strategic framework identifying key and relevant partnerships

Strategic and relevant partnerships are part of the country strategic framework. For instance, the 2007 COSOP had identified partners and sub-sectors where partnerships would be particularly relevant, West African Development Bank (infrastructures), Belgium Fund for Food Security (health, primary education), World Bank (agricultural activities), United Nations Capital Development Fund and United Nations Development Programme (micro finance).

The 2016 Country Strategic Noteⁱ indicated that collaboration with technical and financial partners will continue to be a priority, particularly with FAO and WFP in improving the food and nutritional security of the rural poor and capitalizing on good practices. The note highlighted as well the importance of partnership with pertinent private sector actors involved in building production infrastructure, disseminating technical packages and building stakeholder capacity such as partnering through grants with ABC Microfinance. The selection of this latter, relevant to the programme, was reinforced by its status as a private company with a social purpose, seeking to develop a structure that is both economically viable and socially oriented, and reinvesting profits in its activities.

Another guideline in Mali country program strategy is the partnership with the Farmers' organizations and their involvement in the projects. The country program maintains regular relations with these organizations, enabling them to express their views on their

involvement in projects/programs supported by IFAD. Beyond this collaboration, support to their different functions (economic, advisory and advocacy) facilitates the participation of the rural poor in the definition and implementation of activities supported by IFAD on the one hand, and on the other hand, in the political dialogue and within the agricultural sectors. The involvement of Farmers' organizations started in 1999 with FODESAⁱⁱ. This project was conceived as a project based on the requests of the producers and co-managed by their representatives at the regional level in charge of identifying and then selecting the projects to be financed. Another two projects PAPAMⁱⁱⁱ and FIER^{iv} operate on the same principle of closely involving producers representatives in their activities. In FIER, partnership with FOs plays a role in strengthening the capacity of youth focal point at the village level and in the sustainability of the project.

Country Presence, through Country Programme Officer and a CPMT:

Recently IFAD made a lot of progress on partnerships because of the country presence considered as key. In Mali, the program management team includes government representatives at the central level, project teams, federations of farmers' organizations and other partners. In Rome, the program management team includes members from the West and Central Africa and other IFAD divisions such as the Policy and Technical Advisory Division, the Financial Services Division and the Office of Partnerships and Resource Mobilization, Colleagues at FAO headquarters. The Rome subgroup is very active in the set-up of the programme and particularly during the crisis situation in March 2012, it was critical to take the option to stay in the country, implementing activities in the Northern Mali through partnerships with UN agencies and NGOs .

Partnership-building through grants financed activities:

Grants contribute to engage with a wide range of partners (institutions, Union, Universities, NGOs as implementing partners). For instance, the RuralStruc grant on "Structural changes in rural economies linked to globalization" was financed by IFAD with the World Bank, CIRAD^v, and French cooperation, to better understand the changes affecting agriculture and rural areas in developing countries and to improve public policies accordingly. The results were widely disseminated and served as a basis for the design of the project FIER. The Babyloan grant with its innovative approach of creating a crowdfunding platform to collect funds for the young supported by

FIER, allowed partnerships with the private sector ABC Microfinance and a French NGO (the Rural Development Research Group-GRDR), which will be the catalyst in the partnership between the Malian community in France and the Malian rural youth. The selection of ABC as the grant recipient was reinforced by its status as a private company with a social purpose, seeking to develop a structure that is both economically viable and socially oriented, and reinvesting profits in its activities. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme-GAFSP through its Missing Middle Initiative-MMI initiative allocated a grant of US \$ 2.6 million to National Coordination Agency for Farmers' Organizations in Mali-CNOP with IFAD as the implementing institution to promote the economic integration of rural youth into poultry and fish farming and their linkage with stakeholders from the private sector.

Partnership Outcomes:

Partnership with the Belgian Fund for Food Security through the PIDRN resulted in a remarkable improvement in terms of health and nutrition in Mali: the programme has contributed to the improvement of the population geographical access to health structures following the construction of eight equipped Community Health Centers-CSCOMs. Moreover, there was a significant decrease in the malnutrition rate between 2008 and 2014, despite the onset of the northern crisis and its persistence. The current rate of malnutrition-23% is below the WHO critical threshold compared to 38% in 2008.

Partnership with the Global Environment Facility-GEF led to the scaling up of the Communal Climate Change Adaptation Plans-PCA^{vi} within the PAPAM/ASAP^{vii} components, expanding them to thirty municipalities. The development of Communal Climate Change Adaptation Plans is a new participatory approach (based on the lessons learned in the FODESA and PIDRN projects in Mali), which makes it possible to analyse the environmental vulnerabilities of municipalities and basins in order to determine adaptation measures.

Partnership with Farmers' organizations led to the establishment of a new partnership between IFAD and GAFSP: The National Coordination Agency for Farmers' Organizations in Mali-CNOP requested specifically IFAD as the implementing institution of the GAFSP grant to promote the economic integration of rural youth into poultry and fish farming and their linkage with stakeholders from the private sector, allowing IFAD to engage with GAFSP.

Country: Philippines

Case: Knowledge partnership through IFAD Knowledge and Learning Market KLM

Main sources: CSPE 2017 - A decade of sharing and learning, IFAD Knowledge and Learning Market in the Philippines – Programme Officer Philippines, Tawfiq El-Zabri

Context: The Knowledge and Learning Market was created by IFAD as an annual, two-day, public event where IFAD project implementers, the government, civil society organizations, farmers' organizations, indigenous peoples, and the private sector come together to share best practices, showcase their advocacies, products and accomplishments, and engage the government in a mutually-beneficial manner to come up with policies that will benefit the country's rural poor. The platform consists of exhibits, product displays, interactive workshops, testimonies and cultural performances, financed by IFAD. ENRAP (Knowledge Networking for Rural Development in Asia-Pacific region) has also provided funding in the first three years of KLM.

IFAD's Knowledge Strategy: Knowledge partnership in the Philippines was anchored in the specific objectives of the KM strategy in the Philippines, guided by the ENRAP grant programme. Funded by IFAD and implemented by IDRC (International Development Research Centre), ENRAP provided technical and financial resources that built capabilities of participating projects in knowledge sharing and facilitation. The emanating Philippines KM strategy included a components to foster partnerships for broader knowledge-sharing and learning through expanding networks. Under this component and as part of the early implementation of the IFAD Strategy for Knowledge Management, several KLM events with different focus were conducted. Those events provided the venue for policy makers, implementing government agencies and partners (NGOs, Cooperatives, Government agencies, Indigenous groups, Research institutions etc.) to exchange ideas and project learnings, as well as interact and share information with the general public and foster stronger partnership.

Expertise at the country office: The role of country office has been instrumental and crucial in facilitating knowledge management initiatives. It used its network towards convening events, promoting communication and knowledge exchange, facilitating the organization of fora and platforms where exchange can take place, and working with various partners to secure their leadership.

The specific expertise in the country office was another added value. The appointment in the country office of a knowledge management officer/CPO with a clear role in knowledge and information sharing helped establish a comprehensive approach for knowledge management and provided key inputs to partnerships.

Ownership and shared responsibilities:

There is shared management, as each step in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the KLM is undertaken by a Technical Working Group (TWG) composed of representatives of IFAD, the government and NGOs. While IFAD allocates a budget for the KLM, the other stakeholders do their share. Transportation expenses of participants are borne by their respective organizations. Costs for portions of the event – lunches, dinners, fellowship nights – are "sponsored" by a specific organization. Facilitators for some of the workshops come from the participating organizations or the TWG, as well as the legwork for inviting participants, dressing up the venue, manning the registration area, and ushering the guests. With this "sharing" set-up comes ownership of the activity. "And when there is ownership, there is complete commitment without counting the cost or asking what's in it for me" (the KLM story book: *A decade of sharing and learning*). This ownership created multiple champions and helped foster replication of good practices across projects.

Impact: The KLM was crucial in creating wider public visibility for IFAD operations in the Philippines. There has been positive feedback on from all sectors, but more so among participants from local governments units (LGUs) and local communities coming from outside Manila. As expressed, the "KLM helps give recognition to communities, increases their capacity to advertise themselves, gives community leaders confidence in that they themselves can give direct testimonies of their own situations and achievements." This process, as noted by community participants, gives local communities a greater sense of ownership over their projects.

A major outcome was social networking which opened up opportunities for continuing intercommunications through email and internet.

Some participants credited the KLM as an effective tool for generating policies, aside from sharing of knowledge, noting that the presence of agencies like National Economic and Development Authority, Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Agriculture and other relevant government agencies,

alongside representatives of farmers groups and NGOs were crucial in helping to move along policy dialogs. In fact, three KLMs went beyond showcasing IFAD-supported projects and sharing of stories and best practices, as these became policy review and generation sessions. The last two KLMs (KLM-8 and 9), were in fact renamed Knowledge and Learning Market – Policy Engagement (KLM-PE), leading to some successes, like the revision in the LGU-NGO cost-sharing mechanism for rural infrastructure projects - *Declaration for IYFF^{viii} (KLM-PE 9)*. The KLM-10 served as the Philippine IYFF platform, and as national mechanism of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), Farmers Forum (FAFO), and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), among others. Being an “open to the public” event, the KLM also became a way for the projects to engage the general public, not just the “public” of the project. The KLM was also seen as complementing IFAD’s annual portfolio review as it became a means for the projects to discuss their accomplishments and voice out their challenges.

Country: Turkey**Case:** Partnership with the Government**Main sources:** CSPE 2016, PCRs SEDP & DBSDP⁸² - COSOP 2006, COSOP 2016
Dina Saleh, Country Programme Manager -
Sylvia Schollbrock, NEN portfolio adviser**Country context:** Turkey has experienced rapid growth and development over the last decade, and is currently classified as an upper middle-income country. It has the eighteenth largest economy in the world; it is a European Union-EU accession candidate; and it is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD and the G20.

IFAD started operations in Turkey in 1982, and since then it has financed ten projects for a total of US\$661.1 million; Turkey's contribution corresponds to 49 per cent of the costs, and co-financing accounts for 22 per cent. The Government of Turkey in particular the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and IFAD have developed a solid and strategic partnership, leading to effectiveness in improving the incomes and quality of life of the rural poor. The Fund also maintains a good working relationship with the Ministry of Development and the Under-Secretariat of Treasury, the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency-TIKA.

Comparative advantage of IFAD and expertise: In a large upper middle-income country like Turkey, beyond IFAD's financing role, there has been demand for IFAD to be an active player in sharing its knowledge and experience as a way to provide additional value to the partnership. From Turkey's perspective, IFAD is recognized and appreciated for its rural poverty focus, technical expertise, country experience, and its potential to bring international knowledge and experience to Turkey. IFAD's added value in Turkey lies in partnering with the Government in finding new solutions to reduce regional and socio-economic disparities, as well as provide capacity-building in project design and management of rural development interventions, M&E, participatory approaches, targeting and technical solutions. IFAD is in a strong position because of its good relation with the government and focuses on rural poverty in remote rural areas where other IFIs and development partners do not work. Where

needed it works in complementarities rather than in co-financing. This is the comparative advantage the Turkish government is looking for when partnering with IFAD.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation:

SSTC has increasingly been recognized as a key priority for IFAD to achieve its mandate of rural poverty reduction. The Government expressed an interest in working with IFAD to co-finance projects and provide technical assistance through SSTC, mainly through TIKA, the government agency responsible for SSTC and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock-MFAL. A pilot initiative was undertaken in 2014 which facilitated training in Turkey for 14 participants from Sudan, Morocco, Yemen and Tunisia. The 14 participants learned from Turkish experience on issues related to water development and farmer's organizations.

MFAL views IFAD as more than a lending institution and looks to it for extending cooperation in agriculture and rural development between Turkey and other countries of interest to the Government of Turkey, particularly in Central Asia, the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. Turkish officials indicated that they needed internationally-accepted training to be able to work in other countries and could contribute through Turkish expertise in value chains, food safety, food processing, agricultural machinery and minimizing food losses and waste in production and consumption.

Government capacities and ownership:

The Government of Turkey demonstrates a good level of ownership and commitment to the IFAD-supported portfolio at both the central and the provincial levels. It has participated actively in the design of programmes, preparation of the two country strategies (and the 2010 addendum), and has participated actively in supervision missions. It has complied with loan covenants and has provided timely counterpart funds. The Government contributes to planning exit strategies for all projects, and its continued support has been a key dimension in ensuring sustainability. In Sivas Erzincan Development Project-SEDP and Diyarbakir Batman Siirt Development Project -DBSDP, for example, the Government is providing budgetary support for post-project activities. This facilitates re-training needs, financing of local consultancies as well as the purchasing of necessary equipment as needed. The overall policy environment has been supportive, and

⁸² Project Completion Report, Sivas-Erzincan Development Project, 2013
Project Completion Report Diyarbakir, Batman & Siirt Development Project, 2015

the Government is generally open to new ideas from IFAD.

COSOP guidance: The COSOPs identified key international partners for IFAD (such as EU, WB and UNDP) and note that private or public/private partnerships were required. The COSOP also pointed to promising opportunities with farmer and other representative organizations including chambers of commerce and industry and chambers of agriculture as well as Agricultural Credit Cooperatives. "Through its existing and future programmes in Turkey, and in partnership with the EU, UNDP and the World Bank, IFAD will contribute in providing its knowledge and experience in these various issues, and in engaging in policy dialogue with the Government and its partners when appropriate. IFAD can contribute to the debate on the financial sector reform to avoid distortions and promote healthy competition among providers of commercial financial service to rural areas. IFAD can also be involved in pushing for the development of the microfinance sector".⁸³

Alignment in policies and objectives: The COSOPs document show alignment with national strategies and plans: all COSOP documents had clearly defined strategic directions, supported by the national strategies and plans, specifying the sectors and sub-sectors in which IFAD intended to cooperate with the Government of Turkey, and provided references to national strategies and plans in support of some or many of these choices. The country is a signatory to the Principles of Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which has been integral to its South-South Cooperation Programme. Since 2012, Turkey has been making US\$200 million available annually to Least Developed Countries for technical cooperation projects and scholarships.

Knowledge: Some valuable innovations in techniques and approaches were introduced such as the introduction of natural treatment of waste water plant using constructed wetland system⁸⁴ and the use of solar energy to pump water for irrigation purpose is another innovative technology for the region that saves money.⁸⁵ These technologies has a potential of being replicated.

As noted in the CSPE 2016, there are opportunities to strengthening and diversifying IFAD partners in Turkey. However, it is important to note that IFAD has been focusing on its partnership with the government and would seek partnership with other stakeholder where needed. Moreover, Turkey does not have a significant bilateral donor presence; IFAD's partnerships with cooperating partners in Turkey are limited and the level of co-financing mobilized from other donors has been overall weak. The COSOP 2006 highlighted that the public sector dominated the management of regional and rural development programmes and that this had been a disincentive to the emergence of national or local initiatives outside the public domain. As a result there were no foreign NGOs and few national NGOs with the required capacity to provide broad based services and collaboration with private sector only incipient.

⁸³ Country Strategic Opportunities Paper 2016

⁸⁴ Project Completion Report, Sivas-Erzincan Development Project

⁸⁵ Project Completion Report Diyarbakir, Batman & Siirt Development Project, Project Completion Report, Sivas-Erzincan Development Project

Country: Uganda

Case: Public-private partnership

Project: Vegetable oil development Project

Implementation period: 1997-2010

Main documents: PPE VODP⁸⁶ – Brokering development (Uganda case study)⁸⁷

Country context: Agriculture is one of the mainstays of Uganda's economy, accounting for 22 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and engaging two-thirds of the economically active population (UBOS 2010, 2013). The idea of producing oil palm in Uganda dates back to the 1960s, with seedlings imported from West Africa in the 1970s for use in trials in three areas (including Kalangala, which produced the best results, influencing the choice of area for the Vegetable Oil Development Project (VODP) when discussions were taking place in the 1990s).

Project objectives and rationale⁸⁸: The overall goal of the Vegetable Oil Development Project (VODP) is to increase household cash income of smallholders by revitalizing and increasing domestic vegetable oil production, in partnership with the private sector. An innovative, high-profile project, VODP represents one of the first large public-private partnership (PPP) in agribusiness for Uganda.

Alignment in policies and objectives:

Government: The VODP is highly relevant to government policy, precisely to the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture as a source of growth and poverty reduction, and on fostering partnerships with the private sector in that process. It is also relevant to its objectives of promoting import substitution and export diversification.

IFAD: In 2005, the Fund developed a strategy for partnership with the private sector through which it would seek to forge develop partnerships with a range of private sector operators. VODP is the first PPP of the kind envisaged under this strategy.

Donor policies and programmes: The Government has promoted donor coordination and alignment since the early 1990s. It has encouraged the development of joint sector working groups and pooled funding mechanisms, and Uganda was the

first country to see the adoption of a joint assistance strategy by several major donors (2005). IFAD contributes actively to policy dialogue within the donor working group on agriculture including that on the vegetable oil subsector.

Private sector: In the face of high income-elasticity of demand for vegetable oil and the growing prosperity of Uganda and its neighbours, investment in the subsector was bound to offer attractive returns to the private sector. Partnership with the Government that would resolve the land problem was therefore attractive. Some form of smallholder involvement was also necessary because of the large numbers of *Kibanja* tenants occupying the available private land. Support from a donor like IFAD would provide financial, institutional and technical support to such farmers, at least in the early years.

Clear responsibilities and roles – Ownership - Expertise and comparative advantage:

The PPP in the Oil Palm Subproject is a fully integrated oil palm value chain, with forward and backward linkages addressing all chain requirements from inputs and production to marketing and processing. The parties involved are: Government of Uganda (represented by the VODP) - Bidco, the private investor and majority shareholder in Oil Palm Uganda Limited (OPUL)-Smallholder farmers, represented by the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust (KOPGT)-IFAD as a broker. The arrangements between the parties are well structured, with their roles and responsibilities clearly articulated in two agreements, one between Bidco and the government and a tripartite agreement signed between the government, the KOPGT and OPUL. There is also an agreement between IFAD and the government, on financing of the loan⁸⁹.

The government: strong ownership and commitment to the project at all levels of government. Through the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), it provided strong leadership and a conducive environment for the private sector. Despite the opposition of vested interests and adverse publicity, senior officials have played a major role in pushing the project forward, thanks to their participation in the Land Acquisition Taskforce, VODC (vegetable oil development council) and Impact Monitoring System. Government commitment to the project is also demonstrated by the fourfold increase in its financial support, from US\$3.8 million to US\$12 million.

⁸⁶ Project performance evaluation-Vegetable Oil Development Project

⁸⁷ Brokering development – Enabling factor for Public-Producer Partnerships in Agricultural Value Chains (Uganda case study), IFAD & IDS, 2015

⁸⁸ Due to the controversy surrounding the potential environmental impact of the oil palm subproject, a detailed environmental management plan was put in place and has been monitored closely. (The implementation of environmental protection measures for oil palm has been satisfactory as noted in the project evaluation).

⁸⁹ Brokering development, Uganda case study

The private-sector: has demonstrated strong commitment to realisation of the oil palm subproject and an extraordinary degree of patience with the Government over its negotiation of the agreement and slow pace of land acquisition. Its commitment is reflected in the size of the investment and the speed of its implementation.

IFAD: partner to the Ugandan government, has played a key brokering role from the outset, conducting a feasibility study with the World Bank and engaging in environmental impact assessments, as well as ensuring a pro-poor focus for the PPP. It also supported the government 'behind-the-scenes' when securing a private investor and during subsequent negotiations with Bidco over redesigning the project.

KOPGT: a trust, representing the interests of farmers, national and local government, local NGOs and VODP. It has developed into an effective organization that provides a range of services including farmer organization, extension and loan administration.

The Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association (KOPGA): formed by some farmers, it gives farmers a platform in which to discuss and formulate proposals or requests that can then be negotiated within KOPGT.

Outcomes: The PPP has been linked to positive changes in food security as a result of intercropping, improved land tenure security for participating farmers, improved transport infrastructure, good production levels of oil palm, capacity-building and new opportunities for empowerment.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Same as 4

List of key people met

(in alphabetical order)

Mr Mohamed Abdelgadir, Country Programme Manager, NEN
Mr. Yolando C. Arban, Country Programme Officer, APR
Mr. Willem Bettink, Chief, Technical Units, PRM
Ms Oana Denisa Butnaru, Temporary Partnership Officer, PRM
Mr. Tawfiq El-Zabri, Programme Officer, Philippines
Ms Courtney Hood, Partnership and Resource Mobilization Officer, PRM
Mr Steven Jonckheere, K&M and M&E Officer, WCA
Mrs. Raniya Sayed Khan, Results Specialist, PMD
Mrs. Louise McDonald, Programme Officer, ESA
Mr. Norman Messer, Senior Technical Specialist, PTA
Mrs. Bernadette Mukonyora, Programme Analyst, ESA
Mrs. Rasha Omer, Country Programme Manager, India ICO
Mrs. Elena Pietschmann, Programme Officer, ESA
Mr. Claus Reiner, CPM, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay
Mr. Philippe Remy, Country Programme Manager, Mali
Mrs. Dina Saleh, Country Programme Manager, Turkey
Mrs. Sylvia Schollbrock, Portfolio Adviser, NEN
Mr. Abdelkarim Sma, Regional Economist, NEN
Mr. Paolo Silveri, Country Programme Manager, Brazil
Mrs. Aissa Toure, Programme Officer, India
Mr. Leon Williams. Partnership and Resource Mobilization Officer, PRM
Mr Jinkang Wu, Director, Asia & Pacific Liaison Office & Special Adviser to the President,
PRM
Mrs. Fatima-Zohra Yaagoub, Associate Partnership Officer, PRM

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