

a

**IFAD**

**INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT**

**Executive Board – Seventy-Ninth Session**

Rome, 10-12 September 2003

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

**COUNTRY STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES PAPER**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS</b>	iii
<b>WEIGHTS AND MEASURES</b>	iii
<b>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</b>	iii
<b>COUNTRY MAP</b>	iv
<b>IFAD PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW</b>	v
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	vi
<b>I. INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II. ECONOMIC, SECTORAL AND RURAL POVERTY CONTEXT</b>	<b>1</b>
A. Country Economic Background	1
B. The Agricultural Sector: Opportunities and Constraints	2
C. The Rural Poverty Context: Opportunities and Constraints	4
D. National Strategy for Rural Poverty Reduction	6
<b>III. LESSONS FROM IFAD’S EXPERIENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO</b>	<b>6</b>
A. Previous IFAD Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	6
B. Lessons of IFAD Experience	7
<b>IV. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR IFAD</b>	<b>8</b>
A. IFAD’s Strategic Niche and Proposed Thrusts	8
B. Main Opportunities for Innovations and Project Interventions	10
C. Outreach and Partnership Possibilities with NGO, National and Local Initiatives	10
D. Opportunities for Linkages with Other Donors and Institutions	11
E. Areas for Policy Dialogue	11
F. Action Areas for Improving Portfolio Management	12
G. Tentative Lending Framework and Rolling Programme of Work	12
<b>APPENDIXES</b>	
<b>I. COUNTRY DATA</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>III. STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>IV. IFAD’S CORPORATE THRUSTS AS RELATED TO THE PROPOSED COUNTRY PROGRAMME</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>V. ACTIVITIES OF OTHER PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT – ONGOING AND PLANNED</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>VI. KEY FILE TABLES</b>	<b>7</b>



**CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS**

Currency Unit	=	Franc Congolais (CDF)
USD 1.00	=	CDF 420
CDF 1.00	=	USD 0.00238

**WEIGHTS AND MEASURES**

1 kilogram (kg)	=	2.204 pounds (lb)
1 000 kg	=	1 metric tonne (t)
1 kilometre (km)	=	0.62 miles (mi)
1 metre (m)	=	1.09 yards (yd)
1 square metre (m <sup>2</sup> )	=	10.76 square feet (ft <sup>2</sup> )
1 acre (ac)	=	0.405 hectare (ha)
1 hectare (ha)	=	2.47 acres (ac)

**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

BSF	Belgian Survival Fund for the Third World
EMRRP	Emergency Multisectoral Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
MAPE	<i>Ministère de l'agriculture, des pêches et de l'élevage</i> (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

**GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO****Fiscal Year**

1 January – 31 December

COUNTRY MAP



Source: IFAD

*The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers of boundaries, or the authorities thereof*

### IFAD PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

Project Name	Initiating Institution	Cooperating Institution	Lending Terms	Board Approval	Loan Effectiveness	Current Closing Date	Loan/Grant Acronym	Currency	Approved Loan/Grant Amount	Disbursement (as % of approved amount)
Smallholder Maize Project	World Bank	World Bank	HC	17 Sep 80	11 May 81	30 Jun 90	L - 1 - 47 - ZR	SDR	12 150 000	97
Lulua Agricultural Development Project	World Bank	World Bank	HC	12 Dec 84	07 Feb 86	30 Jun 92	L - 1 - 160 - ZR	SDR	6 550 000	45
South Shaba Agricultural Development Project	IFAD	World Bank	HC	28 Apr 87	14 Oct 88	31 Dec 94	L - 1 - 200 - ZR	SDR	6 050 000	65

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### General

1. In December 2002, an agreement to pay the arrears of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to IFAD was signed by the Government and IFAD. It was formally approved at the Seventy-Eighth Session of the IFAD Executive Board, in April 2003. For this reason and in light of the peace process in which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is currently engaged, IFAD intends to reactivate its portfolio in the country, which was suspended in 1993.

2. Until 2001, the economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in a state of stagnation and decline. However, in May 2001, the Government adopted an interim enhanced economic recovery programme, with the support of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The objective has been to stabilize the macroeconomic framework through liberalization of the economy, to control inflation and to create the conditions for a return to growth. Performance has been remarkable, particularly in inflation control, exchange rate stabilization, public expenditure reform and debt management.

### Rural Poverty

3. In 2001, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was USD 107. Eighty per cent of the population is extremely poor. Poverty affects all social categories and the entire country, but especially the provinces under rebel occupation. The main causes of rural poverty are: (a) the effects of warfare, (b) isolation (condition of roads, closure of rivers), (c) the derisory state of social services and facilities, (d) the low productivity of agriculture and small-scale fishing and (e) the lack of marketing opportunities.

4. In 2002, the number of vulnerable people reached almost 20 million, most of whom were living in rural areas. Malnutrition has become a major public health problem. In November 2000, the World Food Programme estimated that 33% of the population had serious food needs. According to the United Nations Children's Fund/United States Agency for International Development, 34% of households have no food reserves. Malnutrition among children has been estimated at 40%, and 20% are experiencing severely retarded growth.

### The Agricultural Sector and Rural Development

5. Food production is almost entirely in the hands of small farmers engaged in traditional agriculture on small plots of land. Agricultural production involves mainly cassava, maize and groundnuts, which account for over 80% of agricultural GDP. Major urban centres, including Kinshasa, Mbuyi Mayi, Kisangani and Lubumbashi, are supplied with local food by hundreds of thousands of informal traders. The food supply of towns during the 1990s was affected by five factors: (a) the rapid growth in the urban population due to insecurity in rural areas, (b) the decline in urban demand induced by widespread urban poverty, (c) the interruption of basic food supplies between the north and south of the country along the Congo River, which enhanced the role of Bas-Congo and Bandundu in supplying Kinshasa, (d) the deterioration in the road infrastructure and (e) the rapid expansion of urban and peri-urban agriculture as a survival strategy.

6. Years of neglect, under-investment and political turbulence have led to a situation where public sector institutions function poorly or are non-existent in the rural sector. In most rural areas, religious organizations are the only providers of access to social services and development microprojects. However, since 1990, the growth of civil society organizations has been rapid. During the 1990s, civil society showed its readiness to work in partnership with farmers and donors.



## Lessons from Past Experience

7. Relevant lessons have come from two sources: previous IFAD experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (from three loans and from one grant of the Belgian Survival Fund for the Third World, (BSF) and general IFAD experience with post-crisis interventions. The lessons from the experience of the Democratic Republic of the Congo include the need realistically to evaluate government cofinancing capacity at the design stage, as well as the capacity to manage the recurrent costs during the post-project period; the need to place a high priority on investment in transport infrastructure and on the improvement of market access, and the need to recognize the importance of strengthening the capacities of grass-roots women's groups given that management training and functional literacy are necessary to make other project activities more effective.

8. The post-crisis related lessons include the need initially to focus on activities with short-term impacts and with emphasis on agricultural production and income-generation, the importance of encouraging local initiative and the necessity of ensuring a shift from emergency help to development through an appropriate combination of grants and loans.

## IFAD's Strategic Framework

9. The strategic axes proposed for IFAD's operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are closely linked to the Strategic Framework and the regional strategy for Western and Central Africa. The general objective is to *improve food security among poor rural communities by supporting the transition from emergency assistance to development*. Specific objectives are to:

- *support the growth of agricultural production* by providing inputs (improved seeds, pesticides, small tools and so on) and promoting technologies designed to increase productivity;
- *improve marketing channels* through investment in infrastructure (farm access roads, port facilities and so on), the provision of market information and improvement in commodity market organization;
- *strengthen organizational capacities* among small producer groups to help them achieve better market access and improve their living conditions, and
- *increase the access of impoverished communities to health and nutrition services*, including awareness programmes on HIV/AIDS with major support from BSF.

10. Strengthening women's capacities and power to act is also a key challenge. Because men and women carry out different activities in rural areas and often have unequal access to services, it is necessary to take account of these imbalances in project design. IFAD will adopt an integrated regionally based approach (combining economic and social activities and community development). In order to have a rapid and significant impact, IFAD's future operations will be placed geographically according to the following four criteria: the zone must have considerable agricultural potential, ease of market access, a small requirement for security and the zone must have received little assistance up to now.

## Provisional Country Programme

11. A programme of three or four projects is proposed, with a global envelope of between USD 40 million and 50 million over the next four or five years. Loans will be combined with BSF grants, and other cofinancing will be sought, especially for investments in transportation infrastructure. A grant programme should also be formulated because of the delays inherent in the development of loans. This support can initially be provided in the form of essential agricultural inputs and fishing equipment for communities which have been completely decapitalized by war and which lack the minimum resources necessary to survive. This can serve as a foundation for relaunching development activities.



## **DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

### **COUNTRY STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES PAPER (COSOP)**

#### **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. In December 2002, an agreement to pay the arrears of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to IFAD was signed by the Government and IFAD. It was formally approved at the Seventy-Eighth Session of the IFAD Executive Board, in April 2003. For this reason and in light of the peace process in which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is currently engaged, IFAD intends to reactivate its portfolio in the country, which was suspended in 1993.

2. This first Country Strategic Opportunities Paper (COSOP) sets out a medium-term strategy for IFAD operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It forms the basis for IFAD support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the next three to five years. A post-conflict strategy is proposed to ensure the transition from emergency humanitarian assistance to sustainable development. A mission went to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in February 2003 to prepare a draft COSOP. The mission consulted the Government, farmers and fishermen, civil society organizations and donors. In addition, the mission drew on the results of a workshop on the current state of food security organized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) during the same period. In May, the COSOP was validated at a workshop involving representatives of the Government, civil society, farmers and the private sector.

#### **II. ECONOMIC, SECTORAL AND RURAL POVERTY CONTEXT**

##### **A. Country Economic Background**

3. The Democratic Republic of the Congo<sup>1</sup> is situated in central Africa and covers 2.3 million km<sup>2</sup>, the third largest African country in terms of surface area. The country is bordered by Angola, The Congo, the Central African Republic, The Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The population was 53.9 million in 2001, with an average annual growth rate of 3.2%. Some 70% of the population live in rural areas. Apart from the large towns, the average demographic density (22 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>) is among the lowest in Africa. The highest concentrations of rural populations are in Bas-Congo, the Kinshasa-Kwilu-Mbuyi Mayi-Lubumbashi belt, and the north of Equateur and Kivu. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is potentially one of the richest countries in Africa, with considerable mineral resources, notably copper, cobalt, diamonds, uranium, tin, gold, silver, coal, zinc and oil. In addition, the country has 6% of the world's forest reserves and considerable agricultural potential. Unfortunately, a legacy of economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption has meant that this potential has never been translated into satisfactory standards of living for the population. In 2001, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was estimated at USD 107. In the same year, the human development index of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ranked the country 142nd out of 162 countries.

4. From about 1974 until 2001, the economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in a state of stagnation and decline. However, since May 2001, the Government, under the Presidency of Major-General Joseph Kabila, has adopted an interim enhanced economic recovery programme with the support of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The objective is to stabilize the macroeconomic framework of the country through the liberalization of the economy, control inflation and create the conditions for a return to growth. Performance has been remarkable. Inflation fell from 630% at the end of 2000 to 10% for 2002. The exchange rate has stabilized. Government revenues have risen, and the Government has taken steps to improve budget management and increase the

---

<sup>1</sup> The country is divided into provinces, districts, territories and sectors.

health and education budgets. Following these results, in June 2002, the International Monetary Fund approved assistance of USD 750 million for a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The three-year Emergency Multisectoral Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (EMRRP, April 2002-July 2005) seeks to relaunch the Congolese economy and implement rapid measures to combat poverty among the population. Financing is being provided by several donors, led by the World Bank.

5. External debt was estimated at USD 12.9 billion on 31 December 2000 (300% of GDP and 900% of the value of exports), with arrears accounting for 75% of the total debt. In December 2002, the arrears to IFAD were approximately USD 8.5 million. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is eligible for assistance through the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. The Government has undertaken to initiate the necessary steps, and an agreement on the decision is envisaged for 2003.

6. The share of agriculture in GDP rose from 34% in 1990 to 58% in 2000 due to the sharp decline in the contribution of the mining sector (from 10.1% to 6.4%) and manufacturing (from 8.1% to 4.1%). Services accounted for 26.4% of GDP in 2000. From 1990 to 2000, the growth rate in the agricultural sector was negative (minus 15%). Imports of food staples fluctuated at around USD 150 million annually (rice, wheat, vegetable oil and animal products).

7. The Lusaka Accord in August 1999 led to a cease-fire in the civil war that began with the effort to bring down the Mobutu regime. Since the signing of the accord, the country has been divided between the national Government in the south-west and several rebel factions in the north and east that control 40% of the country. During 1999-2001, the humanitarian situation in the area occupied by the rebels deteriorated because of inter-ethnic conflict and a total lack of social services.

8. In December 2002, a second peace accord was signed in Pretoria. This accord provides for the unification of the country and power-sharing between the central Government and the other signatories of the accord. The new Government will prepare for parliamentary elections. Since the signing of the accord, the situation has been slowly returning to normal throughout the country, notably with the resumption of traffic on the Congo River between the south and the north of the country.

9. The economic, social and environmental cost of the conflict has been enormous. The number of war victims in the rebel area alone is estimated at between two and three million since August 1998. The United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is supervising the peace accords.

10. Since 2001, most donors have resumed development assistance. With the return to normality in many parts of the country, the next few years will see a reduction in emergency assistance and a shift to development assistance.

## **B. The Agricultural Sector: Opportunities and Constraints**

11. The territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is divided into three main agro-ecological areas: the central basin, the surrounding plateaux and the Eastern Highlands. The Congo River, 4 300 km long, and its many tributaries irrigate the central part of the country. The central basin covers a third of the country, with alternating equatorial forest and marshes. This area is sparsely populated. The plateaux bordering the central basin are covered with savannah and are more densely populated. The mountainous area of Kivu is characterized by a very high population density. The rains are regular and abundant throughout the country and allow two planting seasons a year.

12. GDP in the agricultural sector fell from USD 3.4 billion in 1990 to USD 2.1 billion in 2000, a drop of 38%. The rate of the rise in food production (2% annually) was much slower than the rate of demographic growth (3.2% annually) because of the massive decapitalization of traditional and modern agricultural enterprises. Since the looting of 1993, the deterioration in the economic and

social infrastructure in rural areas has led to a decline in the land under cultivation and a return to subsistence farming, especially in Equateur, Eastern Province, Maniema and north Katanga. Insecurity on the Congo River was especially damaging to agricultural marketing and food security.

13. Food production is almost entirely in the hands of small farmers engaged in traditional agriculture on small plots of land. Modern enterprises were largely abandoned during the looting in 1991 and 1993 and the wars of 1996 to 2001. Agricultural production involves mainly cassava, maize, bananas and groundnuts and accounts for over 80% of agricultural GDP. The problems encountered by farmers in the various agro-ecological areas of the country are summarized in Appendix VI, Table 2.

14. Urban centres are supplied with locally produced food by hundreds of thousands of informal traders. The main urban centres are Kinshasa (population 8 million), Mbuyi Mayi (1.5 to 2 million), Kisangani and Lubumbashi (about 1 million each). This informal system is extremely flexible. The food supply of the towns during the 1990s was determined by five factors: (a) the rapid growth in the urban population due to insecurity in rural areas, (b) the decline in urban demand induced by widespread urban poverty, (c) the interruption of basic food supplies between the north and south of the country along the Congo River, which enhanced the role of Bas-Congo and Bandundu in supplying Kinshasa, (d) the deterioration in road infrastructure and (e) the rapid expansion of urban and peri-urban agriculture as a survival strategy.

15. Appendix VI, Table 3 comprises a matrix which takes stock of the strengths and weaknesses of the principal institutions in rural areas. In general, the public institutions involved in rural development are extremely weak in terms of technical skills, managerial capacity and the availability of financial and material resources. Civil servants receive next to nothing in terms of salaries and benefits. Public services are largely absent outside of Kinshasa. This was the case for most of the duration of the Mobutu regime, but in recent years the problem has been aggravated by conflict. To the extent that the void in service delivery has been filled, this has been accomplished by missionaries, private companies (palm oil plantations, forestry enterprises and so on), local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with very modest resources, and spontaneous initiatives among individuals and small groups. A summary of this situation follows below.

16. **The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock** (MAPE) operates in rural areas through provincial inspectorates. There are specialist services in the following fields: the popularization of agriculture (the National Agricultural Popularization Service), agricultural statistics (the National Agricultural Statistics Service), the management of seed production (the *Service national de semences* – SENASEM – the National Seed Service), rural water (the National Rural Water Service), the monitoring of the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads (the Directorate of Rural Roads) and the development of family fish-farming (the National Fish-Farming Service) and fishing (the National Fisheries Service), especially on a small scale. In addition to an almost total lack of financing, MAPE and its local agencies suffer from a shortage of staff in terms of both numbers and qualifications. In recent years, the National Rural Water Service has undertaken a number of drinking water projects in partnership with international NGOs and the United Nations Children's Fund. The Directorate of Rural Roads, after a long period of lethargy, is becoming increasingly involved in implementing programmes supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the European Union and Belgian Technical Cooperation. In the case of agricultural popularization, the creation of the National Agricultural Popularization Service, driven by financing from UNDP, FAO and the World Bank, marked a start in the harmonization of approaches and methods in the 1990s. The cessation of the financing paralysed the work of these services. However, with limited donor assistance over the last few years, some of these agencies are slowly beginning to provide services once again.

17. **Agronomic research.** The National Institute for Agronomic Studies and Research has seven research stations and centres established in the main agro-ecological regions of the country. Following the end of assistance from USAID, the World Bank and UNDP in the early 1990s, the institute faced

many difficulties, namely, a scarcity of financial and material resources and many staff losses. At present, with the emergence of diseases among cassava, the institute is increasingly involved in a programme for the production of healthy cassava cuttings that is being implemented with technical assistance from FAO, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and the South-East Consortium for International Development, a consortium of the United States universities.

18. **NGOs.** Until 1990, the development of national NGOs was strongly discouraged by the Government. Community mobilization was the almost exclusive domain of Mobutu's one-party regime. In most rural areas, religious organizations were the only providers of access to social services and development microprojects. However, with the first steps towards political liberalization in April 1990, the growth of civil society organizations became exponential. During the 1990s, civil society (NGOs, associations) showed its readiness to work in partnership with farmers and donors.

19. The number of NGOs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is estimated at over 1 000, but most of these are 'fictitious'. There are several NGO framework platforms. The most important ones are the National Council of Non-Governmental Organizations for Development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Federation of Civil NGOs for Economic Matters of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The former consists of 11 NGO regional councils and specializes in humanitarian work and community development. The latter assists NGOs concentrating on activities such as the marketing of agricultural products, the rehabilitation and maintenance of rural roads using labour-intensive approaches, community organization and microcredit development.

20. **Development and emergency projects.** At present, the projects in rural areas consist mainly of emergency operations with extensive civil society involvement. MAPE staff also assist. Although considerable work is being done, the effort meets only a small part of the enormous needs of rural communities. There are only a few agricultural development projects.

21. The agricultural component of EMRRP comprises activities aimed at achieving a rapid development impact, including: (a) emergency operations to restart food production, (b) market improvement through the rehabilitation of priority basic facilities, (c) capacity-building in the private sector (including NGOs and farmer associations) and certain essential government services. The EMRRP executing agency, the Central Coordination Bureau, organizes procurement, recruits service providers and supervises the administrative and financial aspects of implementation. The MAPE experts are responsible for technical aspects. Activities in the agricultural sector are carried out by NGOs. The agricultural component of EMRRP has been implemented in the southern provinces of the country. Progressive extension to the whole country is foreseen.

22. **Microfinance in rural areas.** At present, the Congolese financial sector consists of 14 banks (only eight are still active) and 138 *Coopératives d'épargne et de crédit* (COOPECs) (savings and loan cooperatives), grouped under two umbrella organizations, the Union of Savings and Loan Cooperative Federations and the National Confederation of Savings and Loan Cooperatives. The COOPEC movement (the members of which are small traders and farmers) began in the 1970s. In 1987, the cooperatives held the equivalent of 7% of banking sector savings. In the 1990s, looting, hyperinflation and inconsistent monetary measures severely weakened the financial system, including the COOPECs. During the 1990s, many microfinance institutions (MFIs) were created by NGOs to manage lines of credit financed by donors. The majority of COOPECs and MFIs are in the town of Kinshasa and the provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu. There are a few schemes in the hinterland of the country's other main towns. Increasingly in recent years, small groups (usually women) have started revolving microsavings and credit schemes, inspired by traditional *likilemba* systems (in Lingala).

### C. The Rural Poverty Context: Opportunities and Constraints

23. In 2001, GDP per capita was USD 107. Eighty per cent of the population is extremely poor. Poverty affects all social categories and the entire country, but especially the provinces under rebel

occupation. According to the UNDP national *Human Development Report 2000*, GDP per inhabitant in 1998 was above the average of USD 107 in the provinces of Kinshasa (USD 323), Katanga (USD 138), Bas-Congo (USD 127) and North Kivu (USD 110). The poorest provinces were Equateur (USD 25), Eastern Province (USD 31), Bandundu (USD 32) and Eastern and Western Kasai (USD 81). The main causes of rural poverty are: (a) the effects of warfare, (b) isolation (condition of roads, closure of rivers), (c) the derisory state of social services and facilities, (d) the low productivity of agriculture and small-scale fishing and (e) the lack of marketing opportunities.

24. A national survey by UNICEF and USAID (2002), calculated human development indexes by province. The ranking of the provinces, in descending order, is as follows: (1) Kinshasa, (2) Bas-Congo, (3) Eastern Kasai, (4) Katanga, (5) Western Kasai, (6) Bandundu, (7) Maniema, (8) North Kivu, (9) South Kivu, (10) Eastern Province and (11) Equateur.

25. The total workforce in the public and private sectors was only 593 000 in 1999, reflecting the disappearance of the formal sector. The average wage in the public sector in 2002 was USD 15 per month. The active population is either unemployed, or underemployed in rural areas or in the informal sector.

26. **Food security.** In 2002, the number of vulnerable people had reached almost 20 million, made up of 16 million victims of economic crises, 2 million internally displaced persons, 330 000 refugees and 700 000 households taking in displaced persons. Malnutrition has become a major public health problem. In November 2000, the World Food Programme estimated that 33% of the population had serious food needs. According to UNICEF/USAID, 34% of households have no food reserves. Malnutrition among children has been estimated at 40%, and 20% are estimated to suffer from severely retarded growth.

27. **Education.** According to UNICEF/USAID, only slightly over half of all children aged 6 to 11 years attend school. Equateur and North Kivu have the lowest rates (37 and 34%, respectively). School attendance among children aged 6 to 11 years is markedly higher in urban areas (72%) than in rural areas (43%). In the country as a whole, 31% of children aged 6 to 14 years have never attended school. The Congolese school system is no longer effective. Teachers have hardly been paid for ten years, and training and retraining facilities are non-existent. Since 1990, there has been scarcely any investment in school buildings and teaching material. Furthermore, donors have focused primarily on health, while neglecting education. The adult illiteracy rate was 59% among women and 29% among men in 1998. The poor school attendance is causing illiteracy levels to rise.

28. **Health.** Life expectancy at birth was 46 years in 1998, compared with 59 years for all of sub-Saharan Africa. This low level is associated with an infant mortality rate of 127 per 1 000 live births, infant-child mortality of 215 per 1 000 and maternal mortality of 2 000 per 100 000 live births. These exceptionally high rates indicate a real human catastrophe due to the effects of war. Only 45% of the population have access to medical services, while only about 42% have access to drinking water. Just one child in five is fully vaccinated. A similar proportion of children have never been vaccinated against any childhood disease (UNICEF/USAID, 2001). Vaccination coverage is higher in urban areas than it is in rural areas.

29. The incidence of HIV/AIDS was estimated at 5.1% nationally in 2001 and was causing 300 000 deaths a year. In the east of the country, the incidence may be as great as 12%. In 1999, the rate of HIV/AIDS among pregnant women was 8%. HIV prevalence continues to rise. Malaria is responsible for 52.4% of all registered deaths.

30. A large number of health facilities and schools in rural areas is derelict. Some health centres and schools are receiving financial support from international donors, but with no contribution from the State. Indicators for education, food security and women and child health are particularly low in the provinces of Maniema, Equateur and South Kivu.

31. **Gender.** Social and economic indicators for women are especially unfavourable, particularly in rural areas. Women and children have borne a special burden during the civil strife. The number of widow-headed households has grown. As in some other countries affected by civil war, rape has been used as a tool of terror and intimidation against civilians by the various warring factions (most recently in the Ituri Forest). On the positive side, the awareness among agriculturalists of the importance of working with women is much greater now than it was before. Post-conflict agricultural assistance efforts have made progress in targeting women in the distribution of seeds and tools. Due to the overwhelming importance of women as food producers, many development projects now work primarily with women's groups.

#### **D. National Strategy for Rural Poverty Reduction**

32. The interim Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper, prepared in February 2002, has three pillars: (a) the restoration and consolidation of peace, (b) macroeconomic stabilization and the relaunching of pro-poor growth and (c) building on existing community initiatives and drawing on survival strategies in the absence of the state. The short-term objectives (2002-05) are: the rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure and the rehabilitation of human capital and capacity-building for governance at all levels. In the longer term, these strategies are intended to assist economic recovery and the transition to sustainable pro-poor growth.

33. The rural development objective of the Congolese Government is to achieve food security and combat poverty by reviving the agricultural sector. For the medium term, the Government has identified the following priorities: (a) to recapitalize the agricultural and livestock production sector, (b) improve agricultural productivity, (c) strengthen marketing and (d) promote rural community organizations.

34. The state's principal role is to guarantee effective agricultural services. The disappearance of MAPE services in rural areas has been mainly due to inadequate budget allocations in the past. In the medium term, the resources for agricultural services will remain limited, given the enormous needs in all sectors. A partnership among civil society, the Congolese state, the private sector and donors will be crucial.

### **III. LESSONS FROM IFAD'S EXPERIENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

#### **A. Previous IFAD Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

35. Before IFAD assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was suspended in 1993, IFAD operations involved the financing of three loans, as follows:

- The *Eastern Kasai Maize Project* (Loan 47-ZR, 1980-90) focused on maize production among small farmers. Initially, the project showed good results, but later suffered from inadequate counterpart funding and management problems. The project was cofinanced by the World Bank and the African Development Bank.
- The *Lulua Agricultural Development Project* in Western Kasai (Loan 160-ZR, 1984-92) was an integrated rural development project in the Lulua Valley. The project was cofinanced by the World Bank.
- The *Shaba Hinterland Development Project* (Loan 200-ZR, 1988-94). The project area covered the green belts around the towns of Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi and was cofinanced by the World Bank. The objectives were to: (a) increase production and soil fertility through the introduction of modern inputs and (b) improve living conditions in villages by strengthening the capacity of village groups and through the rehabilitation of roads.



36. In addition to these three projects, a community development project for Bumba in Equateur was developed and formulated in 1991, but was never started. The three planned components were: (a) agricultural production and marketing involving community development activities, research and development, seed production, the distribution of inputs and small tools, popularization and the maintenance of farm access roads, (b) the rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure and (c) project management.

37. During the period of suspension, the Project for the Support of Initiatives of Women's Associations in North Kivu, financed through a Belgian Survival Fund for the Third World (BSF) grant of USD 5.6 million, was operational from July 1999 to December 2002. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation was the executing agency. The institutional vacuum at the local level and the worsening security situation led to considerable delays in execution and high operating costs. Components were: (a) energy saving methods, (b) community development and (c) reforestation.

38. In 2002, IFAD also made a USD 200 000 post-conflict grant for the revival of agricultural and fishing activities among vulnerable communities (including persons displaced by war) in the Mbandaka zone of Equateur. The grant provided essential agricultural inputs and fishing equipment for communities along the Congo River. The impact was immediate and significant. As of February 2003, the number of beneficiaries stood at 4 400 farmers and 2 900 small-scale fishermen. The operation is organized by FAO and implemented by national NGOs.

39. Lastly, a multicountry technical assistance grant for cassava production, managed by IITA, was submitted to the Executive Board in December 2002. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the participating countries.

## **B. Lessons of IFAD Experience**

### **Lessons of IFAD experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

40. The main lessons of IFAD's experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the period 1982-93 are as follows:

- Projects suffered from limited counterpart funds despite their inclusion in the Government's Priority Investment Programme. At design, financing capacity must be evaluated realistically.
- The recurrent charges of the projects proved unsustainable by the state during the post-project period, and for this reason most of the results achieved were not sustainable.
- Transport infrastructure and market access are priorities in the Congolese context.

41. The experience gained through the BSF project in North Kivu demonstrated the importance of strengthening the capacities of grass-roots women's groups. Management training and functional literacy campaigns targeted at women were necessary to make the other project activities (the promotion of improved stoves, income-generating activities and so on) more effective. However, the institutional vacuum at the local level and the state of the infrastructure can lead to considerable delays in recruiting staff and subcontractors, can hold up the implementation of actions and can reduce effectiveness. In such an environment, the cost of technical assistance both national and international was high. Moreover, the project concentrated on long-term objectives (the improved management of natural resources). Post-crisis interventions should focus on activities with short-term impacts and emphasizing agricultural production and income-generation.

### **Lessons of the experience relating to post-crisis support**

42. IFAD has considerable experience with post-crisis interventions involving both natural crises (drought, floods, hurricanes and typhoons) and manmade ones (civil disorder and armed conflict). The relevant lessons for future IFAD interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo include:

- *The restoration of production capacity as a top priority.* The civil war seriously disrupted agriculture and food production, thereby endangering the subsistence systems especially of the most vulnerable rural poor. The rural world has been stripped of capital, and most roads are impassable. In the short and medium term, IFAD operations should therefore aim at a rapid restoration of production capacity. Moreover, as the bulk of IFAD's resources are made up of loans, and debt problems have been aggravated by the conflict, it is most appropriate from a public finance perspective to restart local production so as to alleviate balance of payments problems. Priority activities should thus comprise repairing and restoring the community economic and social infrastructure which has been damaged, raising the availability of inputs and agricultural implements, improving the marketing of inputs and production, and supporting income-generating activities.
- *Encouraging local initiative.* Wars and disasters often make beneficiaries realize that, if they are to survive, it is vital for them to become more self-reliant. This is particularly true when governments collapse. Consequently, communities often launch self-help projects. Development experts should be aware of these initiatives and build on them. In a post conflict context, it is also critically important to understand that community initiatives have the potential to serve as catalysts in the consolidation of peace at the local level.
- *Ensuring a shift from emergency help to development through an appropriate combination of grants and loans.* While the international community is increasingly concerned with the need to facilitate the transition from assistance to development in crisis-ridden countries, there is often a considerable gap in terms of planning, time and resources between the moment when humanitarian assistance ends and the moment when development activities should be in place. In countries suffering from war, there is a danger that the public and politicians will not be able to see the benefits of peace, thereby encouraging a resumption of conflict since the underlying problems that led to the conflict have not been resolved.

43. If IFAD projects and programmes aiming at a new start after a crisis can be financed by loans, it is essential to establish a well-designed programme of grants given the time needed to set up the projects. A strategic selection of grants also promotes more contact with effective partners who might eventually be associated in loan projects. IFAD fortunately has several grant programmes that could be mobilized and become operational rapidly after the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly special operating funds, the extended cooperation programme with NGOs and the supplementary funds allocated by bilateral and multilateral donors.

#### IV. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR IFAD

##### A. IFAD's Strategic Niche and Proposed Thrusts

44. IFAD's regional strategy in Western and Central Africa has four objectives: (a) strengthening the capacities of the rural poor and their organizations and refocusing rural development policies and institutions on the poor, (b) increasing the productivity of agriculture and natural resources and improving access to technology, (c) increasing rural incomes through better access to capital and markets and (d) reducing vulnerability to the main threats to the means of subsistence among farmers, especially conflicts and HIV/AIDS. In conformity with the regional strategy, the three cross-cutting approaches to be introduced into the design and execution of programmes are: (a) investment targeted at women, (b) strengthening participation and (c) drawing on local knowledge.

45. The strategic axes proposed for IFAD operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are closely linked to the regional strategy. The general objective is to *improve food security among poor rural communities by supporting the transition from emergency assistance to development*. Specific objectives are to:

- *Support the growth of agricultural production* by providing inputs (improved seeds, pesticides, small tools and so on) and promoting technologies designed to increase productivity,
- *Improve marketing channels* through infrastructure investment (farm access roads, port facilities and so on), more market information and improvements in commodity market organization,
- *Strengthen organizational capacities* among small producer groups to help them achieve greater market access, improve their living conditions and work together to consolidate the peaceful resolution of conflict at the local level and
- *Increase the access of impoverished communities to health and nutrition services*, including awareness programmes on HIV/AIDS, with major support from BSF.

46. Strengthening women's capacities and the power of women to act is also a key challenge. Because men and women carry out different activities in rural areas and often have unequal access to services, it is necessary to take account of these imbalances in project design. They must also be closely monitored during implementation. Diagnostic studies will be undertaken to shed more light on this problem.

47. IFAD will adopt an integrated regionally based approach (combining economic and social activities and community development). In order to have a rapid and significant impact, future IFAD operations will be geographically placed according to the following four criteria:

- The area must have a *considerable agricultural potential*. Such potential can be determined by the role played by the area in the past as a provider of foodstuffs (cassava, rice, maize, beans, fish) and perennial crops (palm oil, coffee, cocoa, rubber).
- *The potential for market access* of the area or region. If a given region does not have a minimum level of access to major centres of consumption, rural development activities are doomed to failure. The existence of a usable primary road or navigable river will thus be a determining factor in choosing where to locate future IFAD operations.
- *A minimum level of security*. Fortunately, with the presence of the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many of the areas affected by the war are now secure. However, certain areas are still unstable and not yet ready to host development projects. IFAD should target areas that have already been made secure and in which the risks of future instability are not too great.
- *Areas which have received little assistance up to now*. In close collaboration with the Government and other donors, IFAD will endeavour to work in areas that have not received much assistance to date. Yet a degree of flexibility should be maintained: even in 'well-covered' areas, current operations are primarily of a humanitarian nature.

48. Given the severe depth of rural poverty throughout the country, poverty-based regional targeting is believed to be of limited practical relevance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet targeting at the project level will be very important and must be closely analysed during project design and carefully monitored during implementation through participatory rural appraisals and diagnostic surveys. Given the overall context post-conflict, it will be critical to understand how different groups in project zones have been affected by war and how they interact and to tailor interventions accordingly. For example, within a given project zone, it is possible to find internally displaced persons who are from nearby or very distant zones, local households that have taken in some of these displaced persons, returning populations, households that have lost the means to gain livelihoods due to pillage, and households that have been relatively unaffected by war. As in other contexts, it will also be important to understand the livelihood systems among the poor and less poor and among men and women and to design interventions that respond to the varying needs. Because of the close collaboration foreseen with BSF, the ability of the IFAD portfolio to respond to urgent

health and nutrition needs, especially among vulnerable women and children, will be greatly enhanced.

## **B. Main Opportunities for Innovations and Project Interventions**

49. Taking account of the zoning criteria set out in paragraph 47 above, the first two projects will be in Equateur (Bumba and Mbandaka zones) and in the hinterland of Mbuyi Mayi (Eastern Kasai).

50. The territory of Bumba was identified as an IFAD area of operations in 1991. This option offers the best opportunities in terms of impact and viability over the short term. Bumba is known for its tradition of rice and maize farming. It is situated on the banks of the Congo River in the province of Equateur and has always been the outlet port for the local hinterland. For almost five years, Bumba has had no access to the Kinshasa market, and its farmers have reverted to subsistence farming. Infrastructure is completely dilapidated. A link to the hinterland of Mbandaka is also foreseen because an interesting community dynamic has been initiated with an Italian-financed IFAD post-conflict grant.

51. The second loan project will be east of Kabinda (hinterland of Mbuyi Mayi). Since the 1980s, the town of Mbuyi Mayi has been experiencing a population explosion. At the same time, there has been no public investment in the areas that supply the town since the end of the Eastern Kasai Maize Project in 1990.

52. The projects will be comprised of the following activities: agricultural production and marketing support, community development, the rehabilitation of farm access roads and river access routes and the rehabilitation of social services (health, nutrition, basic education, drinking water, environment). For each project, BSF cofinancing will be sought to support the social and community components. Cofinancing for infrastructure investment will also be sought.

53. In most of the country, the microfinance sector is non-existent in rural areas. Commercial banks are present in only two or three cities (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Mbuyi Mayi). Yet opportunities exist to develop pilot grass-roots microfinance initiatives using the traditional systems of *tontines* as a starting point. The creation of small working capital funds for farmer and small-scale fishing groups is a possibility.

54. With respect to project design and implementation:

- Each project will be managed by a small project management unit.
- Service providers (NGOs, public services, farmer associations, the private sector) will carry out activities using performance-based contracting. Strengthening the capacity of some service providers will be essential.
- BSF components will be prepared simultaneously along with loan projects so as to maximize synergies among the various components.
- Given the incidence of HIV/AIDS, it is crucial that all projects endeavour to improve the level of knowledge, attitudes and practices relating to HIV/AIDS. Assistance to communities is needed to sensitize them about safe practices, and to support needs to be furnished for coping strategies.

## **C. Outreach and Partnership Possibilities with NGO, National and Local Initiatives**

55. Civil society and NGOs showed rapid growth during the 1990s. As a result of the emergency programmes of the various donors, much experience was acquired that allows the serious NGO partners to be winnowed from the chaff. Moreover, the implementation of these emergency programmes served as an opportunity to strengthen the capacities of many fledgling national NGOs.

56. Many international NGOs are present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most specialize in emergency agricultural and health operations. In Equateur, for example, CDI-Bwamanda carries out activities in the Gemena and Bumba areas (seed multiplication, agricultural marketing, road maintenance, health and education).

57. Donors tend to use international NGOs as service providers. These in turn work with local NGOs. The international NGOs have a good knowledge of the capacity of local NGOs and also have sound financial management and organizational structures.

#### **D. Opportunities for Linkages with Other Donors and Institutions**

58. **Seed multiplication.** Collaboration with the multidonor cassava project and FAO is possible. FAO has launched five projects with the objective of the multiplication and distribution of sound cassava cuttings throughout all the provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Emergency actions in seed multiplication could be consolidated. In addition, in December 2002, the IFAD Executive Board approved a grant to IITA to combat cassava diseases in Central Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the target countries.

59. Within the framework of the African Rice Initiative, which is a priority action within the New Partnership for African Development, possibilities also exist to extend New Rice for Africa upland rice varieties to appropriate agroclimatic zones such as Bumba and other traditional rice-producing areas of the country. Such activities would be closely coordinated with the West African Rice Association.

60. Support for post-conflict programmes. IFAD should continue to support the relaunch of agricultural activities among war-affected rural communities. These activities should be developed and carried out within the general framework of United Nations post-emergency programmes and should in particular be coordinated with current FAO and UNDP programmes.

61. **Community participation.** The World Bank's EMRRP programme contains a community participation component that includes activities in agriculture (seed multiplication and cassava cuttings, fish-farming, small livestock, village poultry farming), agricultural marketing (farm access roads, market information), education and health. In 2003, the EMRRP executing agency, the Central Coordination Bureau, launched activities in seed multiplication and cassava cuttings in the country's southern provinces. Other components are currently being prepared. Partnership with the bureau is essential. This requires facilitation between local NGOs in the project area (as service providers) and the bureau (as project financier).

62. **The rehabilitation of farm access roads.** Several donors have financed the use of labour-intensive techniques in the rehabilitation and maintenance of farm access roads. Donors have contracted the United Nations Office for Project Services, the *Centre de développement intégré* (CDI)-Bwamanda, the Directorate of Rural Roads and local NGOs as service providers. It is important to make use of this expertise. In addition, EMRRP has a large budget for the rehabilitation of farm access roads.

63. **Social sector.** In the health sector, the Government sees NGOs and international organizations such as UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Fometro and Memisa as important partners in the development of sustainable decentralized health care systems. Several donors have made major investments in the health sector, but the needs are still enormous. BSF-financed operations need to be consistent with national health sector policies.

#### **E. Areas for Policy Dialogue**

64. The agricultural component of the interim Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper is still inadequately developed. It does not fully reflect the importance of the agricultural sector to the

Congolese economy, nor its potential contribution to national poverty-reduction. IFAD could assist in strengthening this aspect of the full Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper currently under preparation. In addition, the importance of agriculture is not reflected in MAPE's ordinary and investment budgets. IFAD could take part in a dialogue to increase the budgetary allocations to the rural sector, as well as examine ways to make public services more responsive to the needs of the rural population. However, the near total absence of government services outside Kinshasa means that efforts at national policy dialogue need to be tempered with realism. Beyond major macroeconomic policy changes, many measures taken at central level will have little impact in rural areas in the near future. Realistically, there is a much greater likelihood that policy dialogue for rural poverty-reduction will yield more concrete results if it is conducted at the local level in the context of IFAD rural development projects.

65. Unfortunately, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has a long history of poor governance at all levels. One way this has been manifested at regional and local levels relates to official harassment. Farmers and traders have complained for many years of informal taxation and harassment by public authorities. While there is little that can be meaningfully done at the national level (for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph), in those regions where IFAD will implement investment operations, IFAD can strengthen farmer groups and trader associations so that they can more effectively combat this harassment. Among other things, this might involve the organization of regional forums in the project zones so that farmers and traders engage in dialogue and negotiate with local authorities on measures to reduce such harassment. Assistance from local NGOs will be crucial in this effort. The growth of NGOs over the last decade and the relatively greater freedom that populations have to express their opinions since the fall of Mobutu represent an opportunity for pursuing such dialogue, an opportunity that did not exist just a few years ago.

#### **F. Action Areas for Improving Portfolio Management**

66. Past IFAD projects operated in a difficult economic and institutional environment, with adverse effects on efficiency and effectiveness. The environment is still difficult. To improve project management, it will be desirable to:

- Put in place measures to ensure transparency and accountability in project management. This will include regular audits of project accounts and the active follow-up of audit recommendations. In addition, performance-based contracting systems will be put in place so that service providers are regularly evaluated for the services rendered, and contracts will be terminated if performance is found to be unacceptable.
- Show flexibility in the planning of activities.
- Invest in simple operations that are easy to manage and supervise.
- Work directly with grass-roots NGOs, while recognizing the necessity to analyse sufficiently the references of NGO service providers. (A good reputation is worth more than the most competitive bid in the present environment).
- Use international NGOs or organizations, such as FAO, with a presence in the provinces as intermediaries between the project and local NGOs and for the purpose of building up the capacity of the local NGOs.

67. IFAD will continue to work within the context of the multilateral framework for debt servicing and arrears management that culminated in the arrears agreement of December 2002. This will include participation in the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, for which a decision is foreseen this year.

#### **G. Tentative Lending Framework and Rolling Programme of Work**

68. For two years, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been developing positively within the current peace process. This has permitted the implementation of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment programmes and the World Bank's EMRRP. The return of donors and the gradual transition from the state of emergency to sustainable development should be

set within this framework. For these reasons and in light of the scale and severity of rural poverty in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a loan programme for three or four projects is proposed with a global envelope of USD 40 million to 50 million over the next four or five years. The pace of project preparation would be about one project a year. Loans will be combined with BSF grants, and other cofinancing will be sought, especially for investment in transport infrastructure.

69. A grant programme should also be formulated because of the delays inherent in the development of loans. This support can initially be provided in the form of essential agricultural inputs and fishing equipment for communities which have been completely decapitalized by war and which lack the minimum resources necessary for survival. This can serve as a foundation for relaunching development activities.

70. With support from bilateral trust funds or IFAD's own resources, IFAD will explore the possibility of recruiting a post-conflict expert to be assigned to Kinshasa. This person would cover both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Congo-Brazzaville, where he or she would prepare and monitor post-conflict grants, as well as help in relaunching operations (grants and loans) in both countries. The expert could also participate in policy initiatives such as the development of the Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper, as appropriate.





APPENDIX I

COUNTRY DATA

<b>Land area (km<sup>2</sup> thousand) 2001 1/</b>	2 267	<b>GNI per capita (USD) 2001 1/</b>	80
<b>Total population (million) 2001 1/</b>	52.35	<b>GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2001 1/</b>	-7.1
<b>Population density (people per km<sup>2</sup>) 2001 1/</b>	23	<b>Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 2001 1/</b>	357
<b>Local currency</b>	CFA Franc Congolais (CDF)	<b>Exchange rate: USD 1 =</b>	CDF 420
<b>Social Indicators</b>		<b>Economic Indicators</b>	
Population (average annual population growth rate) 1995-2001 1/	3.0	GDP (USD million) 2001 1/	5 187
Crude birth rate (per thousand people) 2001 1/	45	Average annual rate of growth of GDP 1// 1981-1991	0.7
Crude death rate (per thousand people) 2001 1/	17	1991-2001	-4.3
Infant mortality rate (per thousand live births) 2001 1/	129	Sectoral distribution of GDP 2001 1/	
Life expectancy at birth (years) 2001 1/	46	% agriculture	56
Number of rural poor (million) (approximate) 1/	n/a	% industry	19
Poor as % of total rural population 2/	n/a	% manufacturing	4
Total labour force (million) 2001 1/	21.64	% services	25
Female labour force as % of total 2001 1/	43	Consumption 2001 1/	
<b>Education</b>		General government final consumption expenditure (as % of GDP)	1
School enrolment, primary (% gross) 2001 1/	47 a/	Household final consumption expenditure, etc. (as % of GDP)	93
Adult illiteracy rate (% age 15 and above) 2001 1/	37	Gross domestic savings (as % of GDP)	6
<b>Nutrition</b>		<b>Balance of Payments (USD million)</b>	
Daily calorie supply per capita, 1997 2/	1 755	Merchandise exports 2001 1/	750
Malnutrition prevalence, height for age (% of children under 5) 2001 3/	38 a/	Merchandise imports 2001 1/	1 024
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5) 2001 3/	31 a/	Balance of merchandise trade	-274
<b>Health</b>		Current account balances (USD million)	
Health expenditure, total (as % of GDP) 2001 1/	1.5 a/	before official transfers 2001 1/	n/a
Physicians (per thousand people) 1999 1/	n/a	after official transfers 2001 1/	n/a
Population using improved water sources (%) 2000 3/	45	Foreign direct investment, net 2001 1/	n/a
Population with access to essential drugs (%) 1999 3/	n/a	<b>Government Finance</b>	
Population using adequate sanitation facilities (%) 2000 3/	21.	Overall budget deficit (including grants) (as % of GDP) 2001 1/	0.1/
<b>Agriculture and Food</b>		Total expenditure (% of GDP) 2001 1/	0.1
Food imports (% of merchandise imports) 2000 1/	n/a	Total external debt (USD million) 2001 1/	11 392
Fertilizer consumption (hundreds of grams per ha of arable land) 2001 1/	1 a/	Present value of debt (as % of GNI) 2001 1/	222
Food production index (1989-91=100) 2000 1/	83	Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services) 2001 1/	2
Cereal yield (kg per ha) 2001 1/	782	Lending interest rate (%) 2001 1/	165 a/
<b>Land Use</b>		Deposit interest rate (%) 2001 1/	n/a
Arable land as % of land area 2000 1/	3		
Forest area as % of total land area 2000 1/	60		
Irrigated land as % of cropland 2000 1/	0.1		

a/ Data are for years or periods other than those specified.

1/ World Bank, *World Development Indicators* CD ROM 2003

2/ UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2000

3/ UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2003

## LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

	Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<b>GOAL</b>	To improve food security among poor rural communities by supporting the transition from emergency assistance to development.	<p>Percentage increase in rural per capita income.</p> <p>Percentage reduction in number of rural households below the poverty line.</p> <p>Improved health and nutrition status of vulnerable groups.</p>	<p>Impact assessment household surveys and specific poverty studies.</p> <p>Evaluation reports.</p> <p>National and regional statistics.</p>	<p>Conflict does not resume and peace is sustainable.</p> <p>Commitment by all stakeholders to participate in peace-building efforts.</p>
<b>PURPOSE</b>	<p>To support growth of agricultural production.</p> <p>To improve marketing channels.</p> <p>To strengthen organizational capacities among small producer groups.</p> <p>To increase access of impoverished communities to health and nutrition services.</p>	<p>Food production has increased. Farmers affected by warfare are recapitalized and have more access to basic inputs (seeds and tools).</p> <p>Marketed surpluses increased of key staple crops, with farmers receiving better prices than before. Sustainable road maintenance systems in place.</p> <p>Farmers are better organized for marketing their crops.</p> <p>Effective access to basic health services increased. Awareness of improved health and nutrition practices greater and HIV/AIDs prevention awareness raised.</p>	<p>Programme supervision reports.</p> <p>Evaluation reports.</p> <p>Project-level impact studies.</p>	<p>Project-level interventions effectively targeted at the rural poor.</p> <p>Macroeconomic policies remain conducive to agricultural and rural development.</p> <p>The Democratic Republic of the Congo remains current on debt payments (and does not fall back into arrears).</p> <p>Primary transport arteries (national highways and major rivers and their tributaries) remain open to commercial traffic.</p>

## STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS

Institution	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities/Threats
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence of human resources with good basic training.</li> <li>• Coverage of country by rural development support services.</li> <li>• Existence of a rural development strategy document.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High concentration of experts at central level. Lack of qualified staff in the provinces.</li> <li>• Low wages and irregular payment.</li> <li>• Lack of a staff retraining programme.</li> <li>• Deterioration in working conditions.</li> <li>• Poor coordination of agricultural promotion and research.</li> <li>• Insufficiency or absence of an operating and investment budget.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progressive return of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.</li> <li>• National capacity-building projects.</li> </ul> <p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Delays in implementing the peace accords.</li> <li>• Unreliable ordinary budget.</li> </ul>
National Institute for Agronomic Studies and Research	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research stations in all the agro-ecological areas.</li> <li>• Healthy plant material available. Close collaboration with the multidonor cassava project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low wages, lack of operating funds, state of facilities.</li> <li>• Quantity of plant material.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential of the centres in the context of seed and plant multiplication.</li> </ul> <p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of state financing.</li> </ul>
National Rural Water Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human resources with good basic training.</li> <li>• Decentralized facilities.</li> <li>• Participatory development policy.</li> <li>• Training of water committees and local mechanics.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Obsolete equipment, lack of operating funds, low wages.</li> <li>• Retraining personnel necessary.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IFAD financing to strengthen capacity and preparatory studies for work.</li> <li>• Experience of working with World Vision and the African Development Bank.</li> </ul> <p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Departure of qualified personnel.</li> </ul>

## IFAD'S CORPORATE THRUSTS AS RELATED TO THE PROPOSED COUNTRY PROGRAMME

IFAD'S STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK	REGIONAL STRATEGY	THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO COSOP
<p><i>IFAD believes that increasing access to assets (human, social, natural, technological and financial assets) is crucial for broadbased growth and poverty reduction. Thus, it fosters social development, gender equity, income-generation, improved nutritional status, environmental sustainability and good governance within the following three strategic objectives:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>⇒ strengthening the capacity of the rural poor and their organizations,</i></li> <li><i>⇒ increasing access to financial services and markets,</i></li> <li><i>⇒ providing equitable access to productive natural resources and technology.</i></li> </ul>	<p><i>In close correspondence with the IFAD Strategic Framework, the Regional Strategy is comprised of four strategic objectives (SOs):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>⇒ SO#1: Strengthen the capacity of the rural poor and their organizations and improve the pro-poor focus of rural development policies and institutions.</i></li> <li><i>⇒ SO#2: Raise agricultural and natural resource productivity and rural incomes.</i></li> <li><i>⇒ SO#3: Increase rural incomes through improved access to financial capital and markets.</i></li> <li><i>⇒ SO#4: Reduce the vulnerability of rural livelihoods to major threats.</i></li> </ul> <p><i>The Regional Strategy has three cross-cutting themes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>⇒ investing in women,</i></li> <li><i>⇒ enhanced participation,</i></li> <li><i>⇒ building on indigenous knowledge.</i></li> </ul>	<p><b>Strategic Objectives</b></p> <p><b>SO#1:</b> IFAD will facilitate the strengthening of organizational capacities among small producer groups to help them achieve greater market access, improve their living conditions and work together to consolidate the peaceful resolution of conflict at the local level.</p> <p><b>SO#2:</b> IFAD will support the growth of agricultural production by providing inputs (improved seeds, pesticides, small tools and so on) and promoting technologies designed to increase productivity.</p> <p><b>SO#3:</b> IFAD will seek to improve marketing channels through infrastructure investment (farm access roads, port facilities and so on), more market information and improvements in commodity market organization. For infrastructure investments, IFAD will seek cofinancing from other donors.</p> <p><b>SO#4:</b> With BSF support, the access of impoverished communities to health and nutrition services will be increased. This will include awareness programmes on HIV/AIDS.</p> <p><b>Cross-Cutting Themes</b></p> <p>⇒ <b>Women:</b> Through participatory rural appraisals and diagnostic surveys, IFAD will endeavour to understand the livelihood systems of men and women and design interventions that respond to the varying needs. With BSF assistance, IFAD's ability to respond to urgent health and nutrition needs, especially among vulnerable women and children, will be enhanced.</p> <p>⇒ <b>Participation:</b> Community participation will be essential to all project activities and will take various forms (community-based seed multiplication, development of sustainable local road maintenance systems, policy dialogue with local authorities on informal taxation, health and nutrition interventions and so on). Participatory rural appraisal exercises will occur at project design and during the planning of project activities during implementation. Participatory monitoring and evaluation systems will be put in place for regular monitoring and generating feedback on the effectiveness and relevance of project interventions.</p> <p>⇒ <b>Indigenous knowledge:</b> IFAD will encourage local initiatives such as community-initiated efforts at self-reliance. In war-torn countries where public services have collapsed, communities often launch self-help projects. IFAD will become aware of these initiatives and build on them. In a post conflict context, it is also critically important to understand that community initiatives have the potential to serve as catalysts for the consolidation of peace at the local level.</p>

## ACTIVITIES OF OTHER PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT - ONGOING AND PLANNED

Donor	Nature of project/programme	Field of action	Status	Potential synergy with IFAD
International Monetary Fund	Interim enhanced economic recovery programme.	Macroeconomics and finance.	In progress.	Institutional level (arrears).
World Bank	EMRRP, community development component: multiplication of cuttings and seeds, small livestock, poultry, fish farming, fishing, rice-growing. Farm access roads.	An initial phase in the south of the country and progressive extension to national coverage.	In progress (2002-06).	Collaboration in the rehabilitation of roads. Other: price information systems, small livestock and fish-farming, seeds, cuttings.
African Development Bank				
UNDP	Institutional and human capacity building in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.	National (mainly urban centres).	From 2001.	Minimal.
FAO/emergency	Emergency assistance to farmers (supply of seeds, agricultural, fishing and livestock inputs), support for nutrition centres, rehabilitation of access roads, multiplication of seeds and plants, technical assistance.	National.	In progress.	Consolidate the achievements of emergency activities. Organize IFAD grants. Coordinate cuttings and seed activities.
FAO/development	Urban and peri-urban horticulture.	Towns of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Mbuyi Mayi (second phase).	First phase (1999-2003). Second phase extension to 2004.	Coordinate operations around the town of Mbuyi Mayi.
	Environmental management, fisheries development, rural radio, restructuring of MAPE.	National.	In progress.	Rural radio (information system). Coordination in the area of environment.
	Agricultural recovery programme.	Kinshasa, Katanga, Eastern and Western Kasai.	In progress (2000-03).	Lessons from the evaluation report. Consolidate activities (seed, credit, small livestock).
	Special Food Security Programme.	Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, Katanga.	Signed in February 2003.	Limited. Different areas of operation.
Belgian Government	Emergency agricultural programme: food security through support for survival strategies, supply of seed and related inputs. Strengthening of vegetable production, multiplication of cassava cuttings. Farm access roads. Health sector.	Kinshasa, Katanga, Bandundu, Equateur, Eastern and Western Kasai, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo	Actions in progress.	Complementary to IFAD initiatives.

Donor	Nature of project/programme	Field of action	Status	Potential synergy with IFAD
Multidonor: implemented by IITA, FAO, South-East Consortium for International Development	Multiplication of cassava cuttings.	National level.	Actions in progress (2001-06).	Potential synergy with IFAD projects.
IFAD/BSF	Community-building, reforestation.	North Kivu.	Closed (1998-2002).	Use the lessons learned.
UNICEF	Provision of teaching materials, functional literacy, nutritional education, support for health centres and protection of women.	Bas-Congo, Eastern and Western Kasai, Katanga, North Kivu, South Kivu.	Actions in progress.	Coordination necessary in the province of Eastern Kasai.
World Food Programme	Emergency food aid, distribution of seed protection rations, food for work (agriculture and access road maintenance).	Combat areas and areas with high concentration of internally displaced persons.	Actions in progress.	Coordination necessary in the hinterland of Mbuyi Mayi. Consolidate activities.
European Union	Food security, relaunch of agricultural and fishing activities, support for agricultural research and introduction of an information system, road maintenance, seed multiplication, social sector.	Frontline areas. North Equateur (CDI-Bwamanda), Kwilu (Bandundu).	Actions in progress.	Coordination necessary in Equateur and Eastern Kasai (seed, roads, social sector).
France	Emergency programme (relaunch of cassava and sweet potato production).	Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Katanga, Kinshasa.	In progress (1999-2002).	Little synergy.
German Agency for Technical Cooperation	Support for the NGO platform (Federation of Civil NGOs for Economic Matters of the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Support for the microfinance institutions platform (Group of Institutions in the Decentralized Financing System of the Democratic Republic of the Congo).	National level.	In progress.	Coordination in the field of microfinance.
USAID	Food security (supply of essential agricultural inputs, multiplication of healthy cassava cuttings), emergency support for coordination of farmers. Microcredit in the perennial crops sector. Multidonor project.	Provinces of Bandundu, Kinshasa, Katanga, North Kivu and Eastern Province.	First phase (1998-2002). Second phase: in preparation.	Different areas of operation.

**KEY FILE TABLES**  
**Table 1: Rural Poverty and the Agricultural Sector**

<b>Priority area</b>	<b>Principal problems</b>	<b>Necessary actions</b>
Rural roads	Farm access roads and main roads have been seriously degraded and damaged by the war. Lack of sustainable road maintenance schemes.	Major investment in road repairs as a priority in areas of agricultural potential. Trial or organize high labour-intensive public works and restore system of local maintenance crews ( <i>cantonnage</i> ).
River routes	Closure of the Congo River between the south and the north of the country. Dilapidated port installations. Lack of dredging for several years.	Political negotiations and restoration of national unity. Rehabilitation of port installations. Financing of dredging.
Social services and infrastructure	Social infrastructure seriously damaged in rural areas because of lack of financing for a decade. Decline in school attendance levels, deterioration of mother and child health indicators.	Restore health and education infrastructure. Strengthen rural communities to improve access to social services. Provide equipment and staff for schools and health centres in rural areas.
Agricultural production	Considerable decapitalization of farmers (loss of tools, seeds, livestock). Virtually no access to agricultural inputs. Isolation of production areas and lack of marketing opportunities.	Organize multiplication of seeds and cuttings through farmer groups. Projects in poultry breeding, small ruminants, fish-farming.
Agricultural marketing	Disappearance of formal buyers of agricultural products and formal distributors of inputs. Farmers lack organization and information and are in a weak bargaining position with traders.	Support development of micro-enterprises. Training and organization of farmers, organize market information systems.
Rural finance	Lack of microfinance systems in rural areas in the north and north-east of the country; limited number of COOPECs and MFIs in the south-west. Working capital funds provided through emergency interventions, but not sustainable. Insufficient management capacity.	Support the development of decentralized financial services. Staff training.
Government agencies in the agricultural sector	MAPE's lack of capacity to provide essential services. Government research, seed multiplication and dissemination inoperative.	Adequate MAPE financing within the framework of the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Work with other donors to create and train service providers with emphasis on a decentralized approach.
Small-scale fishing	Lack of appropriate facilities. Inefficient processing methods. Lack of appropriate financial services. Shortage of promotion services. Limited access to inputs in the market.	Organization of training in processing methods. Help with the reconstitution of material and equipment through an appropriate and relevant credit system.

**Table 2: Diagnostic of Target Groups and Priority Needs**

<b>Classification</b>	<b>Diagnostic of problems</b>	<b>Priority needs</b>
<b>Farmers in mountain areas</b> Bukavu/South-Kivu Butembo-Luotu Butembo-Beni/North-Kivu	Displaced persons are estimated at 2 million; some are constantly being displaced. Degradation of roads. Population density and shortage of land. Soil fertility. Total decapitalization of farmers.  Principal crops: <i>leguminous crops, fruits and vegetables.</i>	Pacification of the country. Rehabilitation of basic social and economic infrastructure. Restoration of minimum production capacity of households. In the very short term, emergency operations should be considered. Horticultural products.
<b>Traditional farmers in highland areas</b> Ituri Lubumbashi-Kolwezi axis	Ituri War-displaced persons. Total destruction of production capacity. Return to subsistence farming. Cattle herds destroyed.  Lubumbashi-Kolwezi axis Degradation of roads and public infrastructure. Lack of seeds and quality inputs. Low agricultural prices. Lack of outlets.  Principal crops: <i>maize, beans, soya, vegetables.</i>	Ituri: Pacification of the country. In the short term, food distribution to communities affected by the crisis. Distribution of seeds, farm tools and fishing inputs. Projects in the livestock breeding sector (breed-stock, appropriate credit, inputs).  Lubumbashi-Kolwezi axis  Rehabilitation of social and transport infrastructure. Distribution of seeds, farm tools and fishing inputs. Projects in the animal sector (fish-farming, village poultry farming, small ruminants). Microcredit systems.
<b>Traditional farmers in the upland savannahs</b> Bas-Congo Bandundu Eastern Kasai Western Kasai North Katanga	Total destruction of production capacity. Return to subsistence farming. Destruction of roads and public infrastructure. Low productivity of agricultural and livestock activities. Low agricultural and livestock prices. Weak bargaining power of farmers. Principal crops: <i>Cassava, maize, rice, beans, groundnuts, niebe, soya, vegetables.</i> Small livestock: <i>sheep, goats, poultry.</i>	Rehabilitation of roads and public infrastructure. Organize seed and plant multiplication. Strengthen production capacity (tools, microcredit systems, advocacy). Strengthening of farmer organizations. Projects in the animal sector (fish-farming, village poultry farming, small ruminants).
<b>Farmers in forest areas</b> Equateur Eastern Province Bas-Fleuve.	Equateur, Eastern Province War-displaced persons. Total destruction of production capacity. Destruction of roads and public infrastructure. Return to subsistence farming.	Equateur, Eastern Province Pacification of the country. Rehabilitation of roads and public infrastructure. Organize seed and plant multiplication.



Classification	Diagnostic of problems	Priority needs
	<p>Total lack of markets for perennial crops.</p> <p><i>Bas-Fleuve</i></p> <p>Dilapidated transport infrastructure and public services. Low prices for food and perennial crops.</p> <p>Low productivity of plant and animal production.</p> <p>Principal crops: <i>Cassava, rice, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, bananas, plantains.</i></p> <p>Small livestock: <i>sheep, poultry, small-scale fishing.</i></p>	<p>Organization of agricultural markets (creation of markets, information systems).</p> <p><i>Bas-Fleuve</i></p> <p>Rehabilitation of roads and public infrastructure. Organize seed and plant multiplication.</p> <p>Strengthen production capacity (tools, microcredit systems, popularization).</p> <p>Organization of marketing.</p> <p>Strengthening of farmer organizations.</p> <p>Projects in the animal sector (fish-farming, village poultry farming, small ruminants).</p>
<b>Traditional fishermen</b> (interior of the country)	<p>Lack of sufficient marketing opportunities. Low level of organization and training. Access to inputs (lack of distribution facilities). Poor quality of processed products. High processing wastage. Lack of a market for fresh fish (because of handling problems).</p>	<p>Pacification of the country.</p> <p>In the short term, continue distribution of fishing gear (with contributions from fishermen).</p> <p>In the medium term, training, organization of fishermen.</p> <p>Improved processing.</p>
<b>Horticulture in urban and peri-urban areas</b>	<p>Low productivity. Poor organization. Low prices and high losses.</p> <p>Principal crops: <i>vegetables, rice, small livestock.</i></p>	<p>More support at present for approaches developed by the project to support urban and peri-urban horticulture (inputs, training, microcredit systems, marketing).</p>

**Table 3: Institutional Matrix (SWOT Analysis)**

Directorate of Rural Roads	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence of provincial branches.</li> <li>• Establishment and training of local road maintenance committees.</li> <li>• Partnership with international NGOs.</li> <li>• Experienced and trained engineer-trainers to train those involved (local development organizations, the team leaders and foremen on road works involving highly labour-intensive methods).</li> <li>• Involvement in farm access road rehabilitation programmes financed by donors (Belgium, European Union, UN Office for Project Services).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insufficient operating credits.</li> <li>• Low wages paid by the state.</li> <li>• Inadequacy of farm access road maintenance programmes.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Directorate of Rural Roads is involved in EMRRP (World Bank).</li> <li>• Contacted by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation to develop a training project for its personnel.</li> </ul> <p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk of staff leaving due to low wages.</li> </ul>
Microfinance institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emergence of a large number of MFI.</li> <li>• The Congo Central Bank has taken steps to regulate the sector.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Absent from rural areas.</li> <li>• Poor service by the sector in the past. COOPECs often lost the public's trust.</li> <li>• Creation of MFI is often supply driven.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence of working capital funds and MFIs.</li> </ul> <p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stability of the franc Congolais.</li> <li>• Excessive regulation of MFIs by the Congo Central Bank.</li> </ul>
Local NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local NGOs are often contracted by donors and international NGOs to execute agricultural development projects.</li> <li>• Presence of a large number of local NGOs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly varying capacities. Very limited resources. High cost.</li> <li>• Sector lacking in transparency. Many opportunist organizations.</li> <li>• Need additional training.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The international NGOs know the local NGOs and can be used as intermediaries.</li> </ul> <p>Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunism in the sector.</li> </ul>
International NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Many NGOs in several sectors, especially in the provinces of Bas-Congo, Bandundu, Eastern and Western Kasai.</li> <li>• Stable and experienced organizations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited number in some provinces in the north and east of the country.</li> <li>• Few NGOs in the agricultural sector.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can serve as intermediaries between the IFAD project and local NGOs.</li> </ul>

Rural communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the south and west of the country (Bas-Congo, Bandundu, the Kasais, South Katanga, many communities are organized into self-help groups.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communities have very little means and poor management capacity.</li> <li>Communities are not well organized.</li> <li>Communities have been destroyed in the rebel area in the east of the country.</li> </ul>	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Survival systems which arose during the crises.</li> </ul> <p><i>Threats</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communities are used to receiving gifts under the emergency arrangements. A new attitude is necessary.</li> </ul>
-------------------	---	--	---

