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REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN
SOUTH KORDOFAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

AN ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ISSUES AND OUTREACH TO THE TARGET GROUP
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAP</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN SOUTH KORDOFAN</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY SITUATION</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUITABLE OUTREACH TO THE TARGET GROUP</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPMENT FOR PEACE: THE PROGRAMME’S CONTRIBUTION</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTACHMENT I: NORTH NORDOFAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: PRESENT STATUS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTACHMENT II: OUTREACH TO AREAS NOT CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT – SUMMARY OF ASSURANCES AND SAFEGUARDS BUILT IN TO DESIGN AND LOAN DOCUMENTS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.
INTRODUCTION

1. The proposed South Kordofan Rural Development Programme (SKRDP) was discussed during the 69th Session of IFAD’s Executive Board in May 2000. At that session, it was agreed that the proposal was technically sound. However, a number of members raised concerns about the overall environment of the Programme, questioning in particular whether the security situation could negatively affect implementation and whether this, in turn, would preclude equitable access for all target beneficiaries to the Programme’s interventions. The Board decided to postpone approval of SKRDP to the present Executive Board session, subject to a revision of the security situation with respect to implementation and the related development issues.

2. Consequently a mission, composed of the country portfolio manager and the consultant head of the Programme design team, was fielded from 15 July to 2 August 2000. Its purpose was to obtain specific information on the following issues:

(a) whether the current and likely future security situation will allow sound programme implementation; and

(b) how the Programme can effectively reach the entire target group, including people in areas not controlled by the Government.

3. The mission was initially briefed by the Government, United Nations agencies, the United Nations field security officer and other parties in Khartoum. It obtained first-hand information on the current country situation and its effects on field operations from officials of the relevant State ministries, local managers of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children Fund (SCF-United States). In addition, it visited Localities and villages in Dilling and Kadugli Provinces that have suffered from tensions or that had been inaccessible to the formulation and appraisal missions because of civil strife at the time (from December 1996 to December 1999). The mission decided spontaneously which village to visit and carried out visits without prior notice.

4. In each of the villages visited, the mission team held impromptu discussions with community leaders and the public about their perceptions of the current security situation, its evolution over the last three years, and future prospects for the successful implementation of a development programme such as the proposed SKRDP. Over the last four years, IFAD has fielded five missions to the Programme area, covering 23 of the 30 Localities that form the State of South Kordofan. These include six of the nine Localities that have been affected by some degree of insecurity or have areas that are outside of government control. The mission shared its findings in writing with UNDP, UNICEF and World Food Programme (WFP).

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1 In particular, representatives from the Embassies of Germany and The Netherlands, as well as the Chairman and members of the Transitional Council for Peace in South Kordofan.

2 The list of villages visited and names of persons interviewed is available in the mission file.
5. This information note addresses the above questions in the light of the existing policy framework. In this regard, the last ten years have been characterized by a proliferation of efforts to look at conflict in a preventive way, with a focus on the dynamics that make for domestic stability – notably democratization and equitably distributed economic growth. In view of the potential linkages of the proposed SKRDP with IFAD’s North Kordofan Rural Development Project, an account of the start-up and present status of the latter is given in Attachment I.

6. The above issues are discussed against a context of an improving overall enabling environment in Sudan. The seriousness of the Government in pursuing structural reforms was recognized by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Executive Board when it lifted, on 1 August 2000, the suspension of Sudan’s voting and related rights in the IMF, which has been in place since August 1993. This decision was taken in recognition of the fact that “Sudan has made considerable progress over the last three years in stabilizing the macroeconomic situation and moving forward the structural reform agenda under staff-monitored programs and in making payments to the IMF” 3.

7. Taking a longer-term perspective, the following conclusion of Article IV consultations with Sudan, in May 2000, emphasized both the importance of the agricultural development and the risk of inadequate development on the sustainability of the economic achievements so far: “…Directors were in general in agreement with the medium-term macroeconomic targets for the SMP4, noting that these were based on continued structural reforms across many sectors, and in particular the financial and agricultural sectors. At the same time, they recognized the risks to the program from structural weaknesses in the economy, such as low investment in physical and human capital, deteriorating infrastructure in the agricultural sector, and an unsustainable debt burden” (IMF Public Information Notice No. 00/39 dated 9 June 2000).

Historical Background on the Causes of Conflict in South Kordofan

8. The area of South Kordofan is characterized by a socio-economic system that is rather common in the Sahel and that revolves around relations between farming and herding communities, drawing their livelihoods from shared rangelands and water points.

9. Until a few years ago, relations between farmers and herders in the Sahel were assumed to have been mostly peaceful up to the colonial (or post-independence) breakdown of systems of communal ownership. Recent studies, however, have noted how the relationship between farmers and herders has always been fluid and characterized by conflict management rather than by steady peace 5.

10. In the case of the Sudan, disputes on the right of access to water wells and grazing land have traditionally been solved by recourse to local (tribal and/or religious) authorities, and communal ownership has provided reasonably resilient mechanisms for guaranteeing access to essential resources. Starting in the 1970s, however, communal management systems have been virtually disrupted by a combination of land reform (with either privatization or the assumption of “unclaimed lands” under government ownership, following the British system of land tenure), large-scale, mechanized farming projects for cash crops, and a series of recurring cycles of drought and famine, all of which have put great strain on available environmental resources.

3 Extract from the Statement of the IMF deputy Managing Director and Acting Chairman of the Executive Board of IMF, 1 August 2000.
4 Staff-Monitored Program.
11. There is indeed some evidence that poor mechanisms for resource management, especially in relation to the need to balance the interests of pastoral and farming communities, have contributed to the conflict that has now in turn worsened relations between the two groups in the target area. According to a 1995 report by a London-based Minority Rights Group non-governmental organization (NGO), the civil strife that has affected the population of the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan since the late 1960s has its origins in the take-over of Nuba arable lands by the Jellaba merchant class under mechanized farming corporation schemes, coupled with the disruption of patterns of access to migratory routes and water points traditionally used by the Baggara and Nuba in the central mountain regions. At a more general level, the abolition of the Native Administration system in the early 1970s led to the collapse of traditional conflict-management mechanisms, resulting in the intensification of intertribal conflicts and in the spread of banditry in rural areas.

12. Since the early 1980s, structural instability has been intensified by the pressure on permanent water sources due to the deterioration of existing wells (largely owing to overuse) and to the virtual halt to well-building from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. Thus, devising an efficient management system for farming and herding resources, as proposed under SKRDP, may well be a significant way of contributing to the removal of the structural causes of local instability.

Overview of the Current Situation

13. South Kordofan State faces a complex set of problems with respect to its socio-economic development. The civil strife over the last 15 years has caused serious disruption to the livelihoods of large sections of the rural population, especially in the central, southern and western Localities, where people have suffered deprivation and displacement from their traditional lands. The situation of a general deterioration of government services throughout the State and the inadequate infrastructure base at local level have not improved since the last mission. The problems are widespread and negatively affect the well-being and self-sufficiency of the majority of rural households regardless of their origin or traditional norms. Nearly a whole generation of young people 15 or under has not been to school. This situation confirms the need for a major development initiative aimed at enhancing local institutional capacity and mobilizing community participation and self-help mechanisms.

14. The mission was in the field at the beginning of the wet season. Throughout the areas travelled, it observed considerable agricultural activity, both on traditional and mechanized farms. However, planting was late and emerged crop stands were poor, partly because of late rains. Large numbers of livestock were moving along the traditional stock routes to North Kordofan State. The range generally appeared to be in very good condition, and heavy overgrazing was evident only on the stock routes.

15. Internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and people living in inaccessible areas are still facing severe hardship, and – particularly if women – often lack basic necessities. Although these groups are now receiving emergency relief aid through WFP and UNICEF, and their NGO partners, they fail to receive adequate support for local infrastructure rehabilitation and sustainable community development.

16. Limited development assistance is currently provided mainly by UNDP and UNICEF. UNDP has covered six village clusters as part of its Area Rehabilitation Scheme (ARS) in the vicinity of Kadugli. The scheme was started in 1996 and is due to close at the end of 2000. Its objectives are to improve household food security, rehabilitate basic infrastructure, support human resource development for immediate job creation, and promote peace through a well-articulated emergency-rehabilitation-to-development continuum. It has achieved the following: formation of development committees in each village with both male and female representation; establishment of community-

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6 The total area of mechanized farms is estimated to 2 million feddans or 23% of the state territory (see map).
8 Agricultural extension and credit, education, health, water facilities and roads.
managed sanduqs; and trained committees in community organization, needs assessment and sanduq management.

17. Besides its Emergency Programme under Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), UNICEF works with the State Government under its regular programme for the provision of basic community services. Such services, including health, education and water supply, are indeed key to the stabilization of the population and to ensuring a fair distribution of project benefits to the population across the political divide. This is an area where partnership between IFAD and other United Nations organizations, NGOs already operating in these fields and donors was anticipated, on the basis of parallel cofinancing. For example, the programme design was intended to supplement and build on the interventions of UNICEF and use the same modalities.

18. Although cofinancing of the community services has not yet materialized, two new initiatives have taken place that indicate a change in the perceptions of an increasing number of donors regarding the best way to tackle the problems in South Kordofan. The first is an emergency loan of USD 6.5 million from the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) to assist in providing basic services to returnees from war-affected areas. The second is the UNDP-led Nuba Mountains Assistance and Rehabilitation Programme Framework, which is pending approval by the Government, and has yet to be formulated in terms of programmes and funding arrangements. It would consist of a mechanism for resource mobilization and coordination of the interventions of a number of donors, United Nations agencies and implementing NGOs. It aims to provide assistance and rehabilitation services with special emphasis on the most directly affected populations.

19. The mission approached UNICEF and WFP representatives with a view to linking the activities of their organizations in South Kordofan with the process of community development within SKRDP. This would provide a linkage with the proposed United Nations agency framework, while ensuring the independence of the programme’s activities, which would operate under government loan mechanisms rather than through external grant channels.

Security Situation

20. The mission obtained security clearance by the designated United Nations official to proceed to South Kordofan. It was able to travel to villages in the Um Dorein Locality (in the south of Kadugli Province), where an escort was necessary in February 1999. The mission travelled without an escort to a number of villages that were inaccessible as recently as December 1999 in Salara Locality (in the south-west of Dilling Province) and Dalami Locality (in the north-central Nuba Mountains).

21. During discussions in all of these villages, community leaders and individual villagers considered development opportunities to be the priority issues rather than problems relating to local insecurity. However, there were some reported thefts of livestock, attributed mostly to bandits, and a few women in Dalami expressed concern for their own safety when travelling to and farming on their landholdings, which are distant from the villages.

22. By United Nations standards and in comparison with other regions of Sudan, the conflict in South Kordofan is characterized as one of low intensity, making it possible for United Nations agencies and their partner NGOs to deliver some development assistance, albeit on a limited scale. Available evidence shows that the general level of security throughout the State has markedly

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* The components of the programme are:
  - water and environmental sanitation, involving low-cost water technology with the installation of boreholes and hand pumps, and hafirs and slow sand filters; and
  - health, involving the supply of drugs and medicines on a full-cost-recovery basis.

* According to UNDP, Italy has agreed to finance up to USD 2.5 million towards this programme.
improved over the last three years following the signature of the peace agreement between the Government and several rebel factions in 1997. Currently the problems are concentrated in the west and central-southern parts of the state, in Dilling and Kadugli Provinces, and, to a lesser extent and intermittently, along the western boundary of Talodi Province (see map).

23. The issue of security partly overlaps with the issues of accessibility and/or control of a given area by one or the other parties in conflict. From the perspective of government services, inaccessible areas are generally confined to part of the mountainous areas, but create an insecure situation for people living in the immediately adjacent areas. These areas are generally isolated from urban centres and lack development infrastructure.

24. The area that is currently inaccessible represents less than 5% of the overall state territory, while the area that suffers from some degree of insecurity represents no more than 15%. Out of the 30 Localities that form the South Kordofan State, 26 have no significant security or accessibility problem. The Government has control of all Locality Council headquarters. From information provided by state authorities and villagers, it would appear that the situation in the four Localities where security problems are concentrated is, by province, the following:

(a) **In Dilling Province:** Of the 22 Village Council areas in **Salara Locality** (adjacent to West Kordofan State), three are inaccessible and/or insecure and one is partially secure/accessible. One third of the Village Council areas in **Dalami Locality** are inaccessible or insecure in the central and southern mountains.

(b) **In Kadugli Province:** Of the 15 Village Council areas in **Um Dorein Locality** three are partially secure. Around 40% of the Village Council areas in **Heiban Locality** are either inaccessible or insecure, and are contiguous with those in Dalami Locality.

25. It is difficult to obtain reliable data on the proportion of the Programme’s target group living under some degree of insecurity or in inaccessible areas. Recent figures quoted by different sources range from 100 000 to 300 000 people. The formulation and appraisal missions estimated that some 200 000 people were living under conditions of insecurity, taking into account the higher population density in the immediate vicinity of the mountains. For programme planning purposes, the recent mission considered that this figure is still reasonable, keeping in mind that the large majority of these populations live in accessible areas. Given recent movements of returnees probably no more than 30 000 villagers remain in inaccessible areas. The internally displaced persons and returnees, from these areas may, however, number more than 150 000. Furthermore, a large number of people have moved to other parts of Sudan over the last 15 years and may return when they consider that the conditions in their home villages have improved in terms of infrastructure and basic services.

26. At present, it appears that the net movement of people is to secure areas and, even when there is accessibility to traditional homesteads, distance usually precludes its use for agricultural production, especially by women. The mission noted that in at least a few cases, IDPs are farming larger areas and possibly better cropland than they originally had in their own villages. IDPs may be given a small amount of land by host village authorities on a short-term basis. They can usually rent land if they have the financial resources; and, if they clear new land, it is usually considered to be theirs under traditional rights, especially when they come from the same tribal group. Even so, they generally lack the basic resources to exploit the opportunities provided for them. Moreover, women are at a disadvantage, and affinity to their original homesteads remains strong.

27. The mission noted that concerned communities have developed effective coping mechanisms to minimize the consequences of insecurity; similarly United Nations agencies and NGOs have adopted precautionary measures to minimize exposure to risks, based on a constant monitoring of the situation while delivering assistance on a regular basis.
28. **SKRDP** is designed to minimize exposure to risks for staff and resources. Activities are small-scale and implementing units are local and largely self-reliant, so that the spread of conflict to some target areas should only marginally affect others. Moreover, decision-making structures are flexible, allowing for swift decisions based on close monitoring of the situation on the ground.

**Equitable Outreach to the Target Group**

29. One of the key concerns of the proposed SKRDP is the equitable distribution of benefits to the broad target group, including the provision of opportunities for people in the areas currently outside of government control. A clear strategy has been spelled out in the Programme’s design to do this, while ensuring that the overall approach to implementation is not fragmented to the detriment of sustainable development.

30. Immediate targeting of the separate components and sub-components has been determined and prioritized for the respective beneficiary groups, as well as the means of delivery of programme benefits. The selection criteria for Localities and communities are based on (a) the extent of rural poverty, (b) the extent damage caused by civil strife, and (c) the potential for demonstrating positive economic results from agricultural production for replication in other areas. While this may seem to place targeting emphasis on smallholders in specific zones of the State, it by no means precludes the early access of other rural people and transhumant livestock owners in the State to strategic programme activities. These include access to improved seeds, the development of commercial initiatives in agriculture, veterinary health services, the rehabilitation and construction of “hafirs” (large earth water reservoirs) and associated potable water points, and equitable land use in the framework of a comprehensive range management strategy. By taking this approach, the Programme will minimize the potential risk of creating inter-group disputes and problems through its targeting process. These initiatives address, to a large degree, a range of key development issues and development opportunities that are some of the root causes of conflict and constrain economic progress. The matrix of programme phasing and of outputs and responsibility for delivery is given in the following table.

31. Broad guidelines for the selection of the first participating Localities have been established to include those that are adjacent to the areas outside of Government control in order to ensure a demonstrable equity by all participants in programme benefits. Guidelines take into consideration the fact that there is a significant degree of two-way traffic from government-controlled to uncontrolled areas, where boundaries are not well defined. Population movements and contact between kinship groups will be used for outreach with the delivery of basic support as outlined in the programme design. Such support will include a minimum starter package of agricultural seed and hand tools to assist the people outside of government control in improving their food security and livelihood. Technical packages will also be disseminated through similar mechanisms. Part of the overall strategy will be to use this process and development in the adjacent areas as the means of increasing awareness of the Programme’s approach and benefits, and to encourage, in the first instance, the formation of spontaneous community groups. The objective is to assist these groups in becoming part of the mainstream of the Programme, as and when the security situation permits. Responsibility for the delivery of benefits in insecure areas or those that are inaccessible to government staff will be vested in NGOs and/or United Nations agencies that have demonstrated that they can operate under such conditions under the present humanitarian aid initiatives. The above provisions have been defined in full agreement with state and federal authorities. They are in line with the design (appraisal) and loan documents. A summary of assurances and safeguards available to IFAD to ensure compliance with these provisions, should the need arise, is given in Attachment II.
### Matrix of Programme Phasing of Outputs and Responsibility for Delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component/Outputs</th>
<th>Agricultural Extension and Smallholder Services</th>
<th>Animal Production and Range Management</th>
<th>Community Support Services c/</th>
<th>Rural Roads c/</th>
<th>Rural Financial Services</th>
<th>Institutional Strengthening</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Starter pack of seed and basic hand tools for poorest of poor</td>
<td>• Reduced incidence of animal disease and mortality</td>
<td>• Potable water supplies identified and facilities being put in place</td>
<td>• Talodi – Kadugli (ring road) constructed</td>
<td>• Mobile banking services available to beneficiaries</td>
<td>• Localities assisting rural communities in improving their livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of enhanced community-based extension services</td>
<td>• Increased off-take of improved stock breeds</td>
<td>• Primary healthcare available at community level</td>
<td>• Rural feeder roads rehabilitation and maintenance</td>
<td>• Village-based savings and credit (&quot;sanduqs&quot;) established in communities</td>
<td>• Increased community self-management capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Certified seed multiplication and supply</td>
<td>• Development of equitable communal range and land use management</td>
<td>• Access to stock water supply and community equity in water points</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Commercial initiatives (animal drawn implements/food processing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated Target Group</strong></td>
<td><strong>Secure Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>Areas with Intermittent Insecurity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Areas Inaccessible to Government Staff</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pastoralists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>610 000</td>
<td>200 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>Varies with season</td>
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All Locality centres in South Kordofan are accessible.

The phasing of Localities will be four per year from the first to the fifth project year (PY1-5) and ten over PY 6-10. Initial Localities will be selected on the basis of need – but with a demonstrably equitable distribution of benefits while ensuring the greatest opportunity to achieve targets and safeguard assets. One each Locality in the north, west, south and east of the State may be selected each project year.

- **Agricultural Extension and Smallholder Services**
  - Locality
  - Locality, NGO
  - Locality interface, NGO
  - Not concerned

- **Animal Production and Range Management**
  - State/Private Sector
  - State/Private Sector
  - State/Private Sector
  - State/Private Sector

- **Community Support Services c/**
  - State/NGO/Groups
  - Locality/NGO/Groups
  - NGO/Groups
  - State/NGO/Groups

- **Rural Roads c/**
  - Federal Government
  - State/Locality
  - Not concerned
  - Not concerned

- **Rural Financial Services**
  - ABS
  - ABS
  - Ineligible
  - Ineligible d/

- **Institutional Strengthening**
  - PMU/State
  - PMU/State
  - PMU/State
  - PMU/State

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| a/ | The target group will gain awareness and initial access to benefits by two-way movement between adjacent areas and through statewide interventions (e.g., range and land-use management). |
| b/ | Through starter pack. |
| c/ | Subject to cofinancing. |
| d/ | As per banking policy. |

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11 ABS: Agricultural Bank of Sudan.
12 PMU: Programme Management Unit.
Development for Peace: the Programme’s Contribution

32. The policy that views development and peace-building as intrinsically linked is supported in a number of key documents. The common vision underlying these documents departs from the traditional notion of a linear continuum from in-crisis relief, to rehabilitation and later development under restored security. Instead, it advocates the practical necessity and feasibility of promoting development in conflict situations in order to address the structural causes of civil strife. These include dislocations caused by development strategies neglecting the agricultural sector, misguided land reform, unfair distribution of resources, exclusion of local communities from decision-making, and competition over access to scarce water and land. Both development and peace crucially depend on governance, i.e., on the strengthening of both government institutions and civil society. All of these reasons indeed apply to the Sudan case.

33. Besides the assessment of the risks of intervening, it may be useful to review quickly what the potential contribution of the proposed Programme is to peace-building and security.

34. Admittedly, IFAD would take risks in intervening in South Kordofan at this point in time, but it is equally true that risks are incurred by not intervening. Time and again, respondents have stressed that the war was caused by the absence of development opportunities for the large majority of the population. The greatest threat to security today and in the near future in South Kordofan may well be represented by hungry young people who have nothing to lose and no peaceful source of livelihood to engage in.

35. Two main components of SKRDP are most directly related to problems that are widely believed to have triggered or exacerbated the Sudanese civil conflict, namely:

(a) the search for sustainable patterns of management of scarce resources, particularly in relation to the water and grazing land; and

(b) support for the current process of decentralization of administration and decision-making.

36. Regarding the first point, the Programme’s central strategy consists in the devolution of control over rangeland and water facilities to local communities, who will negotiate rights of access to these resources with nomadic herders, on agreed fee-for-water bases. (SKRDP Appraisal Report, Annex III: 28). Recognition of traditional tenure arrangements is also one of the goals of the Programme, based on the successful experience of another IFAD project in Sudan, the Southern Roseires Agricultural Development Project (IFAD Loan-268).

37. As far as governance aspects are concerned, SKRDP recognizes that recent efforts to devolve authority from the federal level to the level of States and Localities represent a crucial part of the process of conflict resolution and are a promising sign for the future evolution of the security situation (SKRDP Appraisal Report: 44). The Programme aims to build upon the momentum generated by this recent change of policy in order to contribute to the creation of strong local institutions.

38. Empowering women through access to decision-making at the local level is also a way to begin addressing their strategic needs, in an area where cultural factors tend to preclude or limit the presence of women in the public space. In this sense, too, the Programme strives to create incentives for reducing the vulnerability of this group in the long term, as it recognizes that the war has only

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compounded structural factors threatening their security, and that addressing these factors requires using Programme activities to encourage structural change.

Conclusion

39. In summary, the security situation in South Kordofan has significantly and consistently improved over the last three years. Insecurity is confined to limited areas and can be managed. The recent IFAD mission thus considered that SKRDP can be implemented in the prevailing circumstances. Improved security automatically improves accessibility and increases the capacity of the Programme to reach out to all groups. In addition, the IFAD mission put forward proposals that clarify the Programme’s implementation strategy, are consistent with the initial design and maximize outreach. A case in point regards the development of a strategic partnership with United Nations agencies and NGOs who are already active in South Kordofan. This partnership and its positive effect on programme outreach can be further enhanced when the current policy of major donors is changed, depending on the progress of their political dialogue with Sudan.

40. In this context, it should be stressed that there is an increasing consensus among partners that the lack of development has been a major cause of conflict and that it is now time to address the root causes of the conflict, as SKRDP does appear to do. This analysis of the linkages between development and security issues appears to be in line with several aspects of IFAD’s Policy Framework for Rural Poverty Eradication, produced by the Consultation To Review the Adequacy of Resources Available to IFAD. For instance, the framework stresses the importance of an enabling policy environment for the success of rehabilitation and development initiatives, with a focus on the need to empower rural communities and support governments as well as civil society, including “respect for traditional mechanisms through which the poor maintain access to and manage natural resources at the community level”.

41. With regard to how to use IFAD’s resources to gain leverage on governments for the creation of enabling environments, the Consultation suggests that “the opportunity should be taken to improve policy on rural poverty alleviation and related governance issues through policy dialogue and through the effects of IFAD’s programme and project-based assistance for increased participation of the poor”. Thus, IFAD’s policy appears in principle to resonate with the idea that development agencies must use their comparative advantage to create incentives for governments to foster “enabling environments”, rather than relying on conditionality to obtain policy changes before intervening. This argument should be particularly valid when the government has taken steps in a promising direction by adopting decentralizing measures and by implementing macroeconomic policies that have allowed it to recover its full membership rights with IMF.

42. Given its commitment to supporting the efforts of the international community in areas of extreme vulnerability, IFAD cannot avoid addressing the questions of how to operate in situations of conflict and how to bring its contribution to “peace-building through development”. The proposed SKRDP faces up, in informed and impartial ways, to the political impact of the decision to be present on the ground. It represents an opportunity to enable IFAD to fulfil its mandate in areas where the structural causes of food vulnerability are also part of the dynamics generating conflict.
NORTH KORDOFAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT:
PRESENT STATUS

Project Effectiveness

1. IFAD’s North Kordofan Rural Development Project (NKRDP) aims at empowering the rural communities of Um Ruwaba and Bara Provinces in North Kordofan State to improve their standard of living and particularly to ensure their food security; enhance their resilience to drought and natural disaster; and increase the sustainability and future prosperity of their way of life. It is the first IFAD-financed project to be implemented by a State, as the lead implementing agency, under The Sudan policy of federalism and decentralization. The project became effective on 14 June 2000, some 11 months after the Government signed the IFAD loan. The reasons for the delay were in part related to establishing the modalities of financing implementation and governance in a state-implemented project, and the recruitment of project staff under special service agreements.

Management

2. NKRDP has been placed firmly at state level. The Project Board of Directors is chaired by the Wali (State Governor) or his delegate, and its membership represents the interests of the state government, the local government authorities, UNDP and the beneficiaries. The project stakeholders have recommended that the Board be expanded to include representation from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) and beneficiary women. The Project Executive Group has been appointed by competitive selection, which together with remuneration packages comparable to those in the private sector, has resulted in a highly experienced and professional core project management team.

Start-up Workshop

3. The prospects for a smooth commencement to implementation has been enhanced by a high-quality, professionally organized, start-up workshop, held in El Obeid on 22-24 July 2000, which involved the active participation of all project stakeholders. The workshop provided a forum for exchange of experience and ideas. It developed, and agreed for inclusion in the project implementation manual, equitable criteria for the selection of villages and beneficiaries, to include the most needy from within the target group universe. The concerned parties also confirmed the participatory mechanisms required by the locality councils and village community groups, together with their obligations to contribute to project activities. The outcome of the start-up workshop was a firm understanding among the participants of the project’s objectives and cost-effective community-based approach, and an appreciation of the economic, social and environmental benefits that the project could bring about. To further an understanding of the project, a series of other orientation workshops are being held at provincial and locality level.

Targets for Year 2000

4. The Executive Group, with the assistance of an IFAD start-up facilitator, has produced a detailed consolidated annual work plan and budget (AWP/B) for FY1. The work plan has been prepared as component output, activities and inputs schedules, in the form of quantitative monthly targets. The budget has been prepared on a monthly cash flow basis for each output, component and cost category, together with funding requirements from the IFAD loan and the Government of The Sudan. The targets set in the AWP/B are clearly laid out and are realistic. Over the remaining five months of the financial year, the project team expects to achieve about 60% of the community outreach and participation programme proposed at appraisal for the first full year of implementation. It has taken a rational approach to the initial project implementation stage, giving emphasis to strengthening the institutional capacity of the locality councils and participating village organizations, and ensuring that the necessary resources are in place to support them. This approach should provide a sound basis for community development and assets acquisition.
OUTREACH TO AREAS NOT CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT

SUMMARY OF ASSURANCES AND SAFEGUARDS BUILT IN TO DESIGN AND LOAN DOCUMENTS

1. The assurances obtained and safeguards available to IFAD to ensure effective outreach to the target group living outside government-controlled areas are found in (a) the definition of the target group, (b) the responsibilities entrusted to an expatriate programme management adviser, and (c) in the modalities of implementation, which require the preparation of a detailed programme implementation manual, including criteria for the selection of participating communities and localities, as well as prior approval by IFAD of AWP/Bs. The mid-term assessment and the associated triggers for the second phase of the programme provide an additional guarantee.

2. These assurances are included in the negotiated financing agreement, as illustrated in the following quotations (with emphasis added):

   • “Target Group. They comprise a total number of 84 900 households, or 840 000 people, with annual incomes on the average of USD 145, compared with the GNP of USD 290 per capita. About 30% of rural households, or 260 000 people, in over 260 communities, will benefit directly from the Programme. Such target group covers communities which have suffered widespread disruption, with some 200 000 people living under conditions of uncertain security and between 33 000 to 66 000 people suffering from abject poverty in areas that are currently inaccessible to government services.”

   • “The Programme Management Adviser shall provide support to the PGM and in general to the Project Management Unit with respect to: (i) ensuring effective linkage between the planning and the monitoring process as a means to promote Programme partnerships at all levels; (ii) fostering financial and operational accountability at local levels; (iii) organising and overseeing training; (iv) establishing and ensuring an effective monitoring and evaluation system that is required as a trigger for the Second Phase; (v) facilitating outreach to areas where national staff may be precluded from working safely; (vi) undertaking as required the counterpart general management role; and (vii) facilitating the start-up of the Programme.”

   • “The Programme Management Adviser shall prepare a draft Programme Implementation Manual as soon as practicable, but in no event later than ninety (90) days after the Effective Date, setting forth, inter alia, the procedures and criteria to be used by the Programme Management Unit and the Locality Councils in the selection of target villages and Locality Councils, the methodology for the identification, appraisal and implementation of Programme activities, and the Performance Indicators.”

   • “The consolidated AWPB, as approved by the Programme Executive Board, will be submitted to IFAD and the cooperating institution for their respective comments and approval not later than sixty (60) days before the beginning of the relevant programme year.”

   • “The specific indicators that shall be used as triggers for the confirmation of funding and subsequent detailed design of the Second Phase of the Programme consist of the following pre-conditions:

      (i) the status of the security situation in which the Programme can proceed with successful implementation during the Second Phase encompassing all members of the rural community within the State”; ...