Investing in rural people

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# Progress report on the implementation of the performance-based allocation system and the Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism

## Addendum

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# Progress report on the implementation of the performance-based allocation system and the Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism

## Addendum

1. The Executive Board is invited to take note of the attached additional information relating to the progress report on the implementation of the performance-based allocation system (PBAS) and the Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism (BRAM) for both the Twelfth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (IFAD12) and IFAD13. Section I provides an overview of the implementation of IFAD12 as the cycle completes. Section II is forward-looking and focuses on IFAD13. Section III updates the Executive Board on the implementation of the Graduation Policy.

2. Annex I contains the 2024 country scores by region and the country allocations for IFAD13 (2025–2027). It also contains indicative BRAM amounts per country.

3. Annex II presents details of the rural sector performance assessments for the IFAD13 cycle, in line with the criteria for such assessments as set out in the PBAS formula and procedures document.[1] These assessments are part of the rural sector performance score used in the calculation of the country performance rating. Such rating is then used to calculate the country performance score and country allocation.

## I. Implementation of the PBAS and BRAM in IFAD12 (2022–2024)

4. **Background**. During a special session of the Executive Board in February 2022, Management presented a list of the countries accessing PBAS and BRAM resources for IFAD12. It also shared the individual country PBAS allocations, and indicative amounts of BRAM resources that eligible countries could access based on demand. For IFAD12, Management made a number of commitments in relation to the share of core resources allocated to Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, low-income countries (LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), and countries with fragile situations. These commitments applied to the share of resources at the beginning of the IFAD12 cycle, and they have all been met.[2]

5. The IFAD12 cycle concludes at the end of 2024. The following paragraphs report on the implementation of IFAD12, the reallocation processes that took place, and the actual use of resources as at end-of-cycle.[3]

6. **IFAD12 programme of loans and grants (PoLG).** The IFAD12 PoLG volume at the beginning of the cycle stood at US$3.5 billion. Throughout the replenishment cycle, Management informed the Executive Board on the status of IFAD12 contributions received[4] and, in December 2023,[5] the Board was advised that the overall volume of the IFAD12 PoLG was to be lowered to US$3.354 billion to ensure that it reflected the actual level of contributions and concessional partner loan resources mobilized. This reduction did not affect the volume of resources available to individual countries with approved or planned investment projects in the pipeline.

7. During the IFAD12 cycle, two additional elements affected the distribution of resources across the PoLG. The first was the shift to Debt Sustainability Framework

[1] EB 2017/120/R.2.
[2] EB 2022/S12/R.2.
[3] The analysis of IFAD12 delivery as at 18 November.
[4] Update on the Sustainable Level of IFAD12 PoLG: EB 2021/133/R.13 and EB 2022/136/R.10/Rev.1. As at 14 July 2022, the level of resource mobilization for IFAD12 leaves a gap of US$23.4 million towards the mobilization requirements for the updated PoLG of US$3.5 billion. Additional pledges from other Member States are still being pursued.
[5] EB 2023/140/R.10.

(DSF) eligibility of two countries that, at the beginning of the cycle, had access to IFAD loans. This led to the utilization of the DSF reserve – created in IFAD12 specifically for this purpose – and therefore to an increase in the volume of DSF resources delivered compared to the original IFAD12 amount (as reflected in table 1). The second element related to the various reallocations of both core and borrowed resources. To optimize the delivery of IFAD resources, and in line with standard operating practice in previous cycles, Management undertook reallocations as they became necessary. In doing so, while safeguarding the financial sustainability of the Fund, some small shifts across the funding sources within the PoLG took place.

8. These shifts within the PoLG are reflected in table 1, which shows (i) IFAD12 PoLG volume and composition at the beginning of the cycle, (ii) the volume of resources resulting from the reduction in late 2023, (iii) the final composition as a result of the shifts in resources in 2024, and (iv) the resources projected to be delivered by December 2024. At the time of writing, IFAD is projected to deliver 99 per cent of the total IFAD12 PoLG, 100 per cent of its core resources and 98 per cent of BRAM resources.

Table 1
**IFAD12 PoLG size and composition throughout the cycle and projected delivery**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Financing source* | *Original PoLG composition* | *PoLG 2023* | *PoLG 2024* | *Projected PoLG delivery* | *Projected % delivery* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PBAS loans | 1 860 | 1 836 | 1 847 | 1 846 | 100 |
| DSF | 425 | 434 | 432 | 432 | 100 |
| BRAM | 1 091 | 1 042 | 1 042 | 1 025 | 98 |
| Regular grants | 75 | 40 | 32 | 32 | 100 |
| DSF reserve | 50 | - | - | - | |
| **Total** | **3 501** | **3 354** | **3 354** | **3 336** | **99** |

9. **IFAD core resources (PBAS and DSF) delivery**. At the beginning of the IFAD12 cycle, a total of 66 countries were eligible to access PBAS and DSF resources: 24 LICs and 42 LMICs. Since then, two additional countries with access to IFAD core resources have entered the IFAD12 country list: Somalia (DSF) and Zambia (PBAS). The total number of countries therefore remains within the limit of 80. Looking at the totality of core resources throughout the IFAD12 cycle, the amount of PBAS and DSF resources projected to be approved between 2022 and 2024 stands at US$2.27 billion. Changes in the distribution of resources are due to the release of resources by some countries and the reallocation of resources to others as per usual practice. This is reflected in table 2.

Table 2
**Core resources available at the beginning of IFAD12 and projected approvals by regional division**

| | ***Initial allocations*** | | | ***Projected approvals*** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Regional division* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* |
| APR | 14 | 592.2 | 26 | 12 | 556.2 | 24 |
| ESA | 16 | 705.3 | 31 | 17 | 829.6 | 36 |
| LAC | 4 | 52.0 | 2 | 4 | 67.0 | 3 |
| NEN | 10 | 259.0 | 11 | 7 | 180.5 | 8 |
| WCA | 22 | 663.0 | 29 | 21 | 645.6 | 28 |
| **Total** | **66** | **2 271.6** | **100** | **61** | **2 278.8** | **100** |

Table 3
**PBAS and DSF funds available at the beginning of IFAD12 and projected approvals by income category**

| | *Initial allocations* | | | *Projected approvals* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Income category* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* |
| LICs | 24 | 957.7 | 42 | 21 | 931.6 | 41 |
| LMICs | 42 | 1 313.9 | 58 | 40 | 1 347.2 | 59 |
| **Total** | **66** | **2 271.6** | **100** | **61** | **2 278.8** | **100** |

10. **Borrowed resources delivery**. The BRAM was implemented in IFAD12 for the first time. At the beginning of IFAD12, a total of 48 countries[6] were assessed as being eligible for BRAM resources and confirmed interest in accessing them: 8 LICs, 28 LMICs and 12 upper-middle-income countries (UMICs). Since then, one additional BRAM-eligible country has entered the IFAD12 country list. Among the reasons for the reduction in the number of countries accessing BRAM resources are changes to the international economic context and in countries' fiscal landscapes, the decision of countries to programme operations using only the PBAS resources available to them, and specific country situations. Furthermore, as BRAM accessibility depends on creditworthiness and risk implications, in some cases the eligibility status of countries may have varied during the cycle. At the end of the cycle, the number of countries projected to access BRAM resources stands at 32: 6 LICs, 20 LMICs and 6 UMICs.

11. At the time of writing,[7] the total amount of BRAM resources projected to be approved stands at US$1,025 million. These resources were approved in 32 countries (6 LICs, 20 LMICs and 6 UMICs). Table 4 shows the distribution of total BRAM resources by regional division and income category. Changes in the distribution of resources are due to the release of resources by some countries and the reallocation of resources to others as per usual practice.

Table 4
**BRAM funds distribution at the end of IFAD12 by region and income category**

| | *Initial amounts* | | | *Approvals* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Regional division* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* |
| APR | 13 | 434.1 | 42 | 6 | 416.5 | 41 |
| ESA | 7 | 52.5 | 5 | 7 | 57.5 | 6 |
| LAC | 10 | 278.7 | 27 | 6 | 182.0 | 18 |
| NEN | 9 | 160.7 | 15 | 6 | 154.8 | 15 |
| WCA | 9 | 116.5 | 11 | 7 | 214.6 | 21 |
| **Total** | **48** | **1 042.4** | **100** | **32** | **1 025.3** | **100** |

| | *Initial amounts* | | | *Approvals* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Income category* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* |
| LICs | 8 | 63.5 | 6 | 6 | 49.7 | 5 |
| LMICs | 28 | 477.1 | 46 | 20 | 573.2 | 56 |
| UMICs | 12 | 501.8 | 48 | 6 | 402.5 | 39 |
| **Total** | **48** | **1 042.4** | **100** | **32** | **1 025.3** | **100** |

12. IFAD12 was the first cycle in which the BRAM was implemented. Throughout the cycle, Management has identified several important lessons that will inform the future implementation of the BRAM, including in IFAD13. Comparing the number of

[6] A total of 52 countries were considered BRAM-eligible ahead of the beginning of the cycle. Some became ineligible soon after due to issues related to debt distress, shifts to a de facto government, or changes in government position. The BRAM resources associated with these countries were used in 2023 to reduce the volume of BRAM resources within the IFAD12 PoLG, as reflected in table 1. Therefore, the four countries in question and their associated amounts were not included in the analysis provided in this section.
[7] 18 November 2024.

countries that were eligible to access BRAM resources in IFAD12 and the number of countries that actually absorbed BRAM resources, one observation is that BRAM demand seems more volatile than the demand for IFAD core resources. As done in IFAD12, IFAD will ensure flexibility in the management of BRAM resources, balancing availability with the demand for funds.

13. Changes in the macroeconomic context and at country level seem to also have had an impact on countries’ decisions to borrow BRAM resources. IFAD country teams will need to maintain close relationships with borrowers to manage risks due to changing situations at country level in the future.

14. As regards other factors, the size of the BRAM envelope that a country can access does not appear to have an impact on the uptake of such resources by country partners. When additional resources are available, a healthy demand for additional BRAM resources exists.

15. **IFAD12 PoLG delivery**. This section consolidates the IFAD12 delivery across its three funding sources (PBAS loans, DSF grants and the BRAM). IFAD expects to succeed in delivering 99 per cent of the IFAD12 PoLG, as shown on table 5.

Table 5
**IFAD12 delivery by funding source**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Financing source* | *PoLG October 2024* | *Projected IFAD12 PoLG delivery* | *Projected % IFAD12 delivery* |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBAS loans | 1 847 | 1 846 | 100 |
| DSF | 432 | 432 | 100 |
| BRAM | 1 042 | 1 025 | 98 |
| Regular grants | 32 | 32 | 100 |
| DSF reserve | - | - | - |
| **Total** | **3 354** | **3 336** | **99** |

16. The volume of approvals by region and income category is shown in table 6, which also compares the resources distributed at the beginning of the cycle with the resources projected for approval. By the end of IFAD12, a total of US$3.3 billion is expected to be delivered across 67 countries: 21 LICs, 40 LMICs and 6 UMICs. The APR and ESA regions absorbed most of the core and borrowed resources, followed by WCA, NEN and LAC. The shares of overall resources (core and BRAM) across regions have seen only slight variations during IFAD12 – never exceeding 4 percentage points, as shown in table 6. The same behaviour can be observed across income categories.

Table 6
**Core and BRAM funds distribution at the end of IFAD12 by region and income category***

| | ***Initial allocations*** | | | ***Approvals*** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Regional division* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* |
| APR | 15 | 1 026.3 | 31 | 13 | 972.6 | 29 |
| ESA | 16 | 757.8 | 23 | 17 | 887.1 | 27 |
| LAC | 11 | 330.7 | 10 | 7 | 249.0 | 8 |
| NEN | 14 | 419.7 | 13 | 9 | 335.3 | 10 |
| WCA | 22 | 779.5 | 24 | 21 | 860.2 | 26 |
| **Total** | **78** | **3 314.0** | **100** | **67** | **3 304.2** | **100** |

| | ***Initial allocations*** | | | ***Approvals*** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Income category* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* | *No. of countries* | *US$ million* | *%* |
| LICs | 24 | 1 021.2 | 31 | 21 | 981.3 | 30 |
| LMICs | 42 | 1 791.0 | 54 | 40 | 1 920.4 | 58 |
| UMICs | 12 | 501.8 | 15 | 6 | 402.5 | 12 |
| **Total** | **78** | **3 314.0** | **100** | **67** | **3 304.2** | **100** |

* The difference in the total approvals in table 6 and the projected delivery in table 5 is that table 6 does not include funds from the regular grants programme.

# II. Implementation of the PBAS and BRAM in IFAD13 (2025–2027)

17. **PBAS, BRAM and core additional climate contributions.** The PBAS and BRAM will remain the two key resource distribution mechanisms for public sector lending in IFAD13. The PBAS will be used to define country allocations associated with core resources for LICs and LMICs, while resources accessed through BRAM will be available to eligible LICs, LMICs and UMICs. In addition, in IFAD13, IFAD also launched additional climate contributions (ACCs) as a new form of voluntary additional contributions to the Fund's core resources, which will be distributed using the PBAS formula and approach.[8]

18. **IFAD13 commitments on resources distribution**. For IFAD13,[9] IFAD has committed to continue allocating 100 per cent of core resources to LICs and LMICs. Commitments were also made on the share of core resources to be allocated through the PBAS to various country groupings, to maximize resources to those most in need:

    (a) **Monitorable action 10:** Allocate at least 30 per cent of core resources to countries with fragile situations (based on the 2024 World Bank list of countries with fragile and conflict-affected situations).

    (b) **Monitorable action 28:** Increase the share of core resources allocated to LICs to 45 per cent. Continue to allocate 100 per cent of core resources to LICs and LMICs, aim to allocate 60 per cent to Africa, and 55 per cent to sub-Saharan Africa, while also ensuring that UMICs can access between 11 and 20 per cent of the IFAD13 PoLG through the use of borrowed resources.

19. **IFAD13 PoLG volume and composition**. The IFAD13 PoLG stands at US$3.405 billion; the composition of the PoLG is reflected in table 7. IFAD investment projects (i.e. sovereign operations) will be funded through DSF grants, PBAS loans, ACC DSF grants, ACC loans and BRAM funding. The country-level PBAS and core ACC allocations (both loans and DSF grants), as well as the BRAM indicative country amounts described in this addendum and reflected in annex I were produced using the volumes of resources detailed in table 7.

Table 7
**IFAD13 PoLG volume and composition**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Type of resources* | *IFAD13 amount* | *IFAD12 PoLG 2023* |
|---|---:|---:|
| DSF | 435 | 434 |
| PBAS loans | 1 873 | 1 836 |
| ACC DSF | 20 | - |
| ACC loans | 55 | - |
| BRAM | 857 | 1 042 |
| Regular Grants | 50 | 40 |
| DSF reserve | 25 | - |
| Private Sector | 90 | - |
| **Total** | **3 405** | **3 354** |

20. **Countries accessing IFAD13 resources**. As agreed during the IFAD13 Consultation, country selectivity principles have been applied, and the number of countries accessing new financing during the cycle remains within the maximum number of 80. The country selectivity criteria ensure country readiness and enhance the efficient use of IFAD's resources. These three actionable criteria include strategic focus (a valid country strategy is available early in the cycle);

[8] GC 47/L.5, annex VII.
[9] GC 47/L.5, annex I.

absorptive capacity (all operations effective for more than one year must have disbursed funds at least once in the previous 18 months) and ownership (no approved loans pending signature for more than 12 months). Following the application of the country selectivity criteria, 22 LICs, 39 LMICs and 19 UMICs have been identified to access IFAD13 resources; the distribution by region and income category is reflected in table 8.

Table 8
**IFAD13 country list, by region and income category**

| | *Income Category* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Region* | *LICs* | *LMICs* | *UMICs* | *Total* |
| APR | 0 | 11 | 4 | 15 |
| ESA | 9 | 7 | 1 | 17 |
| LAC | 0 | 2 | 9 | 11 |
| NEN | 2 | 8 | 4 | 14 |
| WCA | 11 | 11 | 1 | 23 |
| **Total** | **22** | **39** | **19** | **80** |

21. **Alignment with IFAD13 resource distribution commitments. All IFAD13 commitments on the distribution of core resources to LICs, LMICs, LICs, Africa, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and countries with fragile situations have been met**. This is reflected in table 9. Regarding the commitment on access by **UMICs** to between 11 and 20 per cent of the IFAD13 PoLG through BRAM, based on the **BRAM indicative amounts** reflected in annex I, **UMICs may currently access 15 per cent of the IFAD13 PoLG**.

Table 9
**Performance against IFAD13 commitments on the distribution of core resources**

| | *IFAD13* | |
|---|---|---|
| *Country groupings* | *Achieved* | *% target* |
| Core resources to LICs & LMICs | Yes | 100% |
| Core resources to LICs | Yes | 45% |
| Africa | Yes | >=60% |
| SSA | Yes | >=55% |
| Countries with fragile situations | Yes | >=30% |

22. **Factors affecting resource distribution at the country level in IFAD13**. Three main[10] elements determine the volume of resources that are available at individual country level in the IFAD13 cycle: the volume of resources available, the number of countries that access such resources, and the specific commitment the organization has made during the replenishment process in relation to the distribution of resources to LICs. Each of these elements has an impact on country-level resources in absolute terms, both individually and through a combined effect.

23. The first element, i.e. the **volume of resources available**, is reflected in table 7.

24. **Number of countries.** Eighty countries will have the opportunity to access IFAD13 resources. At the start of the IFAD12 cycle, 78 countries were identified to access resources. While the difference in the overall figures is small, there are significant variations in the number of countries that can access each source of funds. In IFAD12, the number of LICs, LMICs and small states that could access IFAD's core resources stood at 66; as compared to 62 for IFAD13.[11] This decrease is the result

[10] For resources distributed using the PBAS formula and approach, the values associated with each of the variables in the formula for each country would also affect the resulting resources, both at individual country level and, collectively, for all countries accessing resources.
[11] IFAD's Graduation Policy, under Pillar 1, foresees special provisions for small states to allow them to access IFAD's concessional resources. In line with this, in IFAD13 the list of countries that are eligible to access core resources includes Tonga. While Toga is a UMIC, it is also a small state and based on its current debt assessment it can access IFAD resources on grant terms (DSF).

of some shifts in income classifications across the cycle – for example, two LMICs shifted to UMIC status – while some countries were not prioritized for IFAD13 either because country level circumstances do not allow the channelling of resources or because IFAD13 will focus on the implementation of operations approved in IFAD12.

25. Looking at this list more closely, and at DSF-eligible countries specifically, the number of countries that can access DSF grants in IFAD13 has grown to 19, compared to 15 in IFAD12. In addition, some of these countries were not in the IFAD12 list or were not DSF-eligible in IFAD12. The combination of a stable volume of DSF resources and an increase in the number of countries accessing it, together with changes in the individual country composition of the DSF-eligible country list leads to an overall decrease in resources for individual DSF countries.

26. Regarding countries accessing PBAS loans, there have been significant shifts in resources and in the number of countries accessing them. In line with the IFAD13 commitment to ensure access by LICs to 45 per cent of IFAD's core resources, the overall resources available to this country income group have increased with respect to IFAD12. At the same time, compared to IFAD12, the number of LICs that will access PBAS loan resources in IFAD13 has decreased from 12 to 9.[12] The combined increase in resources and decrease in the number of countries accessing them has led to an increase in the resources to individual LICs accessing PBAS loans.

27. Conversely, the **increase in core resources to LICs in IFAD13** leads to a decrease in the volume of core resources that LMICs can access. This is the case, specifically, for LMICs that access PBAS loans. While there are fewer PBAS-borrowing LMICs in IFAD13 than in IFAD12 (34 versus 39 respectively), the decrease in resources and some changes to the composition of the list of countries have led to a decrease in resources at country level for several LMICs accessing PBAS loans in IFAD13, when compared to the previous cycle.

28. As regards BRAM, 45 countries have been assessed as BRAM eligible[13] in IFAD13, compared to 52 at the start of IFAD12. Given the overall volume of BRAM resources in IFAD13, some countries see an increase in individual BRAM resources available, while in other cases a reduction is observed when compared to the previous cycle. This is offset by a higher level of concessionality compared to IFAD12, both in terms of PBAS versus BRAM (PBAS accounted for approximately 68 per cent of the PoLG in IFAD12, while in IFAD13 it represents 70 per cent), and in terms of further optimization of IFAD's concessional offer (56 per cent in IFAD12 compared to 60 per cent in IFAD13).

29. **Overall PBAS and BRAM resources distribution**. Tables 10 and 11 show the IFAD13 overall distribution of resources by region and by income group for PBAS (including ACCs/climate top-ups) and BRAM resources. When core (PBAS and ACCs/climate top-ups) and BRAM resources are combined, LMICs receive 51 per cent of the total resources, followed by LICs (34 per cent) and UMICs (15 per cent). From a regional perspective, APR has the largest share (30 per cent), followed by ESA (27 per cent) and WCA (24 per cent).

[12] The decrease is due to some LICs that were in the IFAD12 list not being included in the IFAD13 list, and to some LICs that were eligible to access PBAS loans in IFAD12 becoming DSF-eligible in IFAD13.

[13] In addition to the selectivity criteria applied to all countries accessing IFAD resources in IFAD13, to access the BRAM, countries need to comply with a further criterion of eligibility based on their level of indebtedness. Other principles governing access to borrowed resources through the BRAM are: (i) supply of borrowed resources; (ii) risk-based country limits; (iii) differentiated financing conditions; and (iv) demand-based access. (EB 2021/134/INF.2.)

Table 10
**IFAD13 initial allocated total resources (PBAS, ACCs and BRAM) by region**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Region* | *IFAD13 US$* | *%* |
|---|---:|---:|
| APR | 966 | 30 |
| ESA | 879 | 27 |
| LAC | 251 | 8 |
| NEN | 362 | 11 |
| WCA | 781 | 24 |
| **Subtotal** | **3 240** | **100** |
| DSF reserve | 25 | - |
| **Total** | **3 265** | **-** |

Table 11
**IFAD13 initial allocated total resources (PBAS, ACCs and BRAM) by income category**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Income category* | *IFAD13 US$* | *%* |
|---|---:|---:|
| LICs | 1 091 | 34 |
| LMICs | 1 653 | 51 |
| UMICs | 494 | 15 |
| **Subtotal** | **3 240** | **100** |
| DSF reserve | **25** | **-** |
| **Total** | **3 265** | **-** |

30. The following sections examine the distribution of resources for each source of funding (PBAS, core ACCs and BRAM) and the specific reasons for this outcome.

31. **PBAS implementation in IFAD13**. For the 62 countries[14] that are eligible to access PBAS resources (PBAS loans and DSF) in IFAD13, the individual country allocations were derived using the PBAS formula. In line with the PBAS approach, minimum and maximum allocations have also been applied.[15] The resulting distribution by region is reflected in table 12. Table 13 shows the distribution by income, highlighting the 45 per cent of core resources allocated to LICs as per the IFAD13 commitment.

Table 12
**IFAD13 PBAS allocations by region**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Regional division* | *US$ million* | *Share of traditional core resources (%)* |
|---|---:|---:|
| APR | 565.86 | 25 |
| ESA | 792.42 | 34 |
| LAC | 32.44 | 1 |
| NEN | 237.36 | 10 |
| WCA | 679.92 | 29 |
| **Total** | **2 308** | **100** |

[14] IFAD's Graduation Policy, under Pillar 1, foresees special provisions for small states to allow them to access IFAD's concessional resources. In line with this, Tonga is included in IFAD13 the list of countries that eligible to access core resources. While Toga is a UMIC, it is also a small state and based on its current debt assessment it can access IFAD resources at grant terms (DSF).
[15] Minimum allocations are set at US$4.5 million, and the maximum volume of resources an individual country can access is equivalent to 5 per cent of the total volume of resources available for sovereign operations. This is in line with the PBAS approach and methodology approved by the Executive Board in 2017.

Table 13
**IFAD13 PBAS allocations by income category**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Income category* | *IFAD13 US$* | *IFAD13 %* |
|---|---|---|
| LICs | 1 039 | 45 |
| LMICs | 1 264 | 55 |
| **Total** | **2 308*** | **100** |

* Total includes US$4.5 million for Tonga. Although classified as a UMIC, Tonga is also a small state and can therefore access core resources and is currently eligible for DSF resources.

32. For five countries (table 14), Management has proposed capping the allocations derived from the formula to the volume of resources the countries received in IFAD12, based on the following rationale: (i) potential absorption capacity; and/or (ii) size and/or performance of the ongoing portfolio in the country, where a focus on consolidation is believed to be more appropriate than further expansion.

33. Table 14
**Proposed IFAD13 capped allocations**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Region* | *Country* | *Formula-based allocation* | *Capped amount* |
|---|---|---|---|
| WCA | Burkina Faso | 83.8 | 58.2 |
| WCA | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 88.6 | 40.8 |
| WCA | Mali | 62.1 | 49.2 |
| WCA | Niger | 108.7 | 80.4 |
| ESA | South Sudan | 15.8 | 10.0 |

33. **Core ACCs/climate top-ups**. Core ACCs will be implemented in IFAD13 for the first time. ACCs will boost predictability and ex ante integration of climate finance within IFAD's regular programmes in the form of climate top-ups allocated through the PBAS formula and approach.[16] Core ACCs will exclusively finance climate activities, classified according to the multilateral development banks (MDBs) methodology. These climate top-ups will be made available to countries on their usual lending terms and financing conditions, including for countries eligible for grant financing under the DSF. Core ACCs will support activities that directly contribute to climate adaptation and/or climate mitigation, which are eligible to be reported as 100 per cent climate finance according to the MDB methodology. The ACC climate finance will be over and above the 45 per cent of PoLG climate finance target that IFAD has committed to deliver in IFAD13.

34. The volume of climate top-ups allocated stands at US$75 million, to reflect the volume of ACC contributions received to date and the minimum expected volume of planned contributions.[17] As core ACCs follow the same approach as other IFAD core resources that finance sovereign operations, these are divided into ACC loans (US$55 million) and ACC DSF grants (US$20 million). These resources were distributed to countries eligible to access core resources using the PBAS formula (62 countries). A minimum amount of ACCs per country has been set at US$0.8 million, to facilitate programming. The resulting distribution by region and by country income group is shown in tables 15 and 16.

[16] GC 47/L.5.
[17] Should this not materialize then the volumes will be reduced during the cycle.

Table 15
**IFAD13 ACC distribution by region**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Region* | *IFAD13 US$* | *Share (%)* |
|---|---|---|
| APR | 19.2 | 26 |
| ESA | 21.0 | 28 |
| LAC | 1.6 | 2 |
| NEN | 9.8 | 13 |
| WCA | 23.1 | 31 |
| **Total** | **75.0** | **100** |

Table 16
**IFAD13 ACC distribution by income category**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Income Category* | *IFAD13 US$* | *Share (%)* |
|---|---|---|
| LICs | 28.0 | 37 |
| LMICs | 46.2 | 62 |
| **Total** | **75.0*** | **100** |

* Total includes US$800,000 for Tonga. Although classified as a UMIC, Tonga is also a small state and can therefore access core resources and is currently eligible for DSF resources.

35. **BRAM implementation in IFAD13**. As regards **borrowed resources**, these will be accessed based on demand and in line with the principles outlined in the BRAM document approved by the Board in April 2021. Based on the selectivity and eligibility criteria, 45 out of the 80 IFAD13 countries have been identified as BRAM eligible. Out of these, 5 are LICs, 22 are LMICs and 18 are UMICs. For the purposes of assessing the total amount of resources available to BRAM-eligible countries, Management has developed a BRAM distribution scenario that identifies indicative country amounts that would be available should all BRAM-eligible countries access available resources. These indicative amounts are provided to facilitate programming, and do not yet reflect countries' confirmed demand. An additional process to assess real demand in eligible countries will be carried out early in 2025 to finalize envelopes based on availability and demand. In setting such indicative BRAM amounts, the maximum volume of resources set to be accessed by any country (core and borrowed resources) has been taken into account.

Table 17
**IFAD13 country list of BRAM-eligible countries by region and income**

| | ***Income category*** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Region*** | *LICs* | *LMICs* | *UMICs* | *Total per region* |
| **APR** | 0 | 6 | 3 | 9 |
| **ESA** | 3 | 4 | 1 | 8 |
| **LAC** | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| **NEN** | 0 | 5 | 4 | 9 |
| **WCA** | 2 | 7 | 1 | 10 |
| **Total** | **5** | **22** | **18** | **45** |

Table 18
**BRAM distribution across regions**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Region* | *IFAD13 US$* | *Share (%)* |
|---|---|---|
| APR | 381.5 | 45 |
| ESA | 65.5 | 8 |
| LAC | 217.0 | 25 |
| NEN | 115.0 | 13 |
| WCA | 78.0 | 9 |
| **Total** | **857.0** | **100** |

Table 19
**BRAM distribution across income country groups**
(Millions of United States dollars)

| *Income Category* | *IFAD13 US$* | *Share (%)* |
|---|---|---|
| LICs | 25.0 | 3 |
| LMICs | 342.5 | 40 |
| UMICs | 489.5 | 57 |
| **Total** | **857.0** | **100** |

# III. Implementation of the IFAD Graduation Policy

## A. Introduction

36. The Executive Board approved the IFAD Graduation Policy[18] in September 2021. The policy is guided by the principle of universality and IFAD's mandate to serve its developing Member States, while focusing on poor, food-insecure and vulnerable rural people. Graduation is firmly based on a process of consensus-building and consultation with Member States and is guided by criteria established in the policy and agreed targets to ensure full transparency. The policy comprises four pillars and provides clarity on the distribution of IFAD's financial resources (pillar 1) and the financing conditions and pricing of borrowed IFAD resources (pillar 2). Pillars 3 and 4 articulate in detail the criteria and process, and address situations of possible reversal of the socioeconomic development of an IFAD Member State. In line with the commitment made in the policy, the sections below report on the policy's implementation.

## B. Implementation status by pillar

### Pillar 1. Distribution of IFAD's financial resources

37. As per the policy, IFAD's core resources are fully allocated to LICs and LMICs, with lending to UMICs funded from borrowed resources managed under the BRAM. UMICs receive between 11 and 20 per cent of the overall PoLG and, at present, are projected to receive 15 per cent for IFAD12. IFAD Management is reporting annually to the Executive Board on the status of the allocations, the distribution of resources among country groups, and changes in Member States' gross national income (GNI) per capita relative to the Graduation Discussion Income (GDI).[19]

### Pillar 2. Financing conditions and pricing of borrowed resources

38. As set out in pillar 2 of the policy, IFAD's financing conditions and pricing are set to ensure that IFAD recovers the cost of borrowing and differentiates among countries in different income groups, while remaining competitive and attractive vis-à-vis countries' other sources of development financing. This differentiation in the financing terms is reflected in different elements of pricing, with tailored maturity periods, grace periods and maturity premiums. Recent updates on ordinary loan pricing[20] and the revised Integrated Borrowing Framework[21] are aligned with the requirements of the policy.

### Pillar 3. Trajectory for UMICs reaching GDI threshold

39. **Update of country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) guidelines.** Following the approval of the policy, IFAD updated the guidelines and procedures for COSOPs to provide guidance to country teams on the preparation of new COSOPs for countries that have passed the GDI threshold for three consecutive years. The guidelines are available on IFAD's website.

40. **Prioritization of country strategy and programme evaluations (CSPEs)**. As set out in the policy, Management liaised with the Independent Office of Evaluation

[18] EB 2021/133/R.5.
[19] EB 2022/137/R.3 and EB 2022/137/R.3/Add.1/Rev.2.
[20] EB 2023/138/R.7.
[21] EB 2023/138/R.8.

of IFAD (IOE) to prioritize the undertaking of CSPEs for countries that have per capita incomes above GDI for three consecutive years. This was to ensure that, to the extent possible and resources permitting, new COSOPs are informed by the recommendations emanating from CSPEs. In the IOE work programme for 2023 and 2024, IOE has made provision for CSPEs for Argentina, China, Dominican Republic and Türkiye. As communicated to the Membership at the September 2024 Executive Board, and as envisioned in the policy, the undertaking of CSPEs has not been possible in all cases, due to issues of timing, budget and human resources.

41. **Preparation of CSPEs and COSOPs for countries above GDI.** As outlined in the annex of the policy, in 2021, before the beginning of the current replenishment cycle, a total of eight Member States – Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Montenegro and Türkiye – were above the GDI threshold for three years consecutively.

42. The CSPE process has been completed in China, Argentina and Türkiye and is well advanced in Dominican Republic.

43. The new COSOPs are programmed for discussions with the Executive Board in either 2024 or 2025.

44. Country-by-country progress is shown below:

(i) **Argentina.** A CSPE has been completed (in October 2024) and a new COSOP is scheduled for review by the Executive Board in December 2024.

(ii) **Brazil.** A discussion was held with IOE on the possibility of a CSPE, but given that a new COSOP design process had already been scheduled for early 2023 with the incoming Government, the timing was not conducive. The new COSOP for Brazil was reviewed by the Executive Board in September 2024.

(iii) **China.** The CSPE was finalized in September 2023. The new COSOP will be reviewed by the Executive Board in December 2024.

(iv) **Cuba.** In 2021, the Government discontinued the convertible Cuban peso, leaving the Cuban peso as the only remaining local currency.[22] As a result of this monetary unification, the GDP per capita decreased significantly and has stayed well below the GDI[23] (figure 1). Consequently, it is recommended that Cuba be removed from the list of eight countries.

Figure 1
**Example of GDP drop below GDI level: Cuba**




(v) **Dominican Republic.** IOE is currently conducting a CSPE, which is expected to conclude in March 2025. A new COSOP will be presented for Executive Board review in December 2025.

[22] https://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/especiales/goc-2020-ex68%20Implementaci%C3%B3n%20Porceso%20ordenamiento,%20precios%20bodega.pdf
[23] –United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) statistics: https://statistics.cepal.org/portal/cepalstat/dashboard.html?theme=2&lang=en

(vi) **Mexico.** Given that the most recent CSPE was published in 2019 and that a COSOP for the period 2020–2025 is already in place, a new COSOP is not scheduled until 2025.

(vii) **Montenegro.** A new COSOP will be reviewed by the Executive Board in December 2024. The design of the COSOP has incorporated insights gained from a recent programme performance evaluation of the Rural Clustering and Transformation Project. Montenegro last received IFAD funding during the IFAD10 cycle.

(viii) **Türkiye**. IOE completed a CSPE in June 2024. The insights gained are feeding into a new COSOP, which will be reviewed by the Executive Board in May 2025.

45. As shown above, by the end of IFAD12, and with the removal of Cuba from the list, for three out of seven countries above GDI (Argentina, China, Türkiye), IOE expects to have completed a CSPE, providing recommendations to feed into new COSOPs. A fourth CSPE will be concluded in the first quarter of 2025 for Dominican Republic.

46. As already communicated to the Executive Board in December 2022 and December 2023, while it was originally hoped that Management would approve all new COSOPs by the end of 2024, several of them will be deferred to 2025 to allow time for IOE to complete its assessments and for the CSPEs to inform the new COSOPs. By the end of 2024, four COSOPs will have been finalized, for Argentina, Brazil, China and Montenegro. The remaining COSOPs – for Türkiye, Dominican Republic, and Mexico – will be finalized in 2025.

47. The COSOPs for countries that have surpassed the GDI for three consecutive years are being prepared in line with the COSOP guidelines, published on IFAD's website in July 2024, which reflect the criteria and process set out in the policy. IFAD country teams and technical specialists are preparing the COSOPs in close consultation with the Member States concerned. In line with the policy, IFAD is committed to supporting partner countries throughout the whole COSOP process. At the completion of the COSOP period, both IFAD and the Member State will assess the country's progress and readiness to graduate from IFAD's financial support. The decision will be based on a discussion between the Member State and IFAD on the basis of the criteria of the policy. The universality principle governs IFAD's relationships with its Member States, and all countries will continue to have access to diverse support and services related to the sharing of knowledge, technical expertise and policy engagement, including through instruments such as South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) and reimbursable technical assistance.[24]

### Pillar 4. Addressing reversals due to economic shocks

48. None of the eight countries mentioned in the policy has graduated, hence pillar 4 does not yet apply. With respect to seven of the eight countries listed, it can be confirmed that all of them have an applicable GNI per capita above the latest GDI of US$7,895, issued by the World Bank in July 2024. As outlined earlier, it is recommended that Cuba be removed from the list.

## C. Post-graduation

49. IFAD continues to engage with a wide range of Member States across all Lists, including those that do not access IFAD financial resources, in various forms of partnership and cooperation including knowledge-sharing and policy engagement on Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2, climate and other IFAD-relevant themes, as well as SSTC and reimbursable technical assistance.

[24] GC 44/L.6/Rev.1.

## D. Reporting on implementation progress

50. As envisaged in the policy, Management has reported annually on implementation progress. A first annual update was presented as part of the results-based programme of work to the Executive Board at its session held in December 2022,[25] and subsequently to the Governing Council in February 2023. A second update was presented in December 2023[26] and subsequently in February 2024 to the Governing Council. This constitutes the third annual update. As envisaged in the policy, IFAD also presented a progress report to the IFAD13 Consultation on 2 November 2023.[27]

51. In addition to formal reporting commitments to governing bodies, IFAD convened an informal seminar on 30 October 2024 to provide further opportunities to Member States to discuss implementation of the policy.

**Key learning from the Executive Board consultation.**

52. All IFAD COSOPs are presented to Executive Board consultations and, if requested by members, can also be included in the agenda for in-session discussion. The Brazil COSOP was discussed at a Board consultation on 11 September 2024 and, in response to a request from members, was included for in-session discussion on 18 September 2024. A summary of key learning is provided below:

(i) IFAD continues to ensure broad in-country consultations with the development community during the design of COSOPs.

(ii) IFAD is placing greater emphasis on how new COSOPs and associated projects shift focus in line with the Graduation Policy.

(iii) IFAD is ensuring that the SDGs selected are closely linked with IFAD's areas of work, as per criterion 3 of the Graduation Policy.

(iv) IFAD is ensuring the application of realistic COSOP completion targets – a standard that ensures achievable and measurable outcomes.

(v) IFAD will seek to ensure that Executive Board comments are integrated during annual COSOP implementation reviews, therefore reinforcing accountability and responsiveness.

(vi) IFAD is actively learning from other international financial institutions with graduation policies, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Asian Development Bank.

(vii) IFAD will continue to make every effort to prioritize undertaking CSPEs ahead of COSOPs, and will continuously incorporate lessons learned to guide and improve future designs.

## E. IFAD Member States above the GDI threshold

53. As per the policy, the starting point for the process is triggered when a country remains above the GDI, as defined and annually updated by IBRD, for at least three consecutive years prior to an IFAD financing cycle. This minimizes the risk of a country starting the process and then shortly afterwards facing a reversal.

54. For IFAD12, the 2021 GDI threshold of US$7,155 was applied. For IFAD13, a new 2024 GDI threshold of US$7,895, issued in July 2024, will be applied. Based on this new figure, two new countries have surpassed the GDI threshold for three years consecutively: Costa Rica and Serbia. Only Costa Rica is being proposed for IFAD financing during IFAD13. Management will engage with Costa Rica to develop a new COSOP during the IFAD13 period, for approval before the end of 2027.

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[25] EB 2022/137/R.3/Add.1/Rev.2.
[26] EB 2023/140/R.15/Add.1.
[27] IFAD13/3/INF.2/Rev.1.

# 2024 PBAS country scores and IFAD13 resources distribution for 2025–2027

Table 1
**Asia and the Pacific (APR)**

| | *IFAD13 PBAS formula variables* | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Country* | *GNIpc (US$)*[1] | *Rural population*[2] | *IVI score* | *RSPA score* | *PAD score* | *Lending terms 2025* | *IFAD13 PBAS allocations* | *ACC allocations* | *BRAM tentative envelopes* |
| Bangladesh | 2 860 | 103 186 611 | 1.43 | 4.00 | 5.93 | Blend | 71 667 000 | 2 221 000 | 35 000 000 |
| Bhutan | 3 590 | 440 646 | 1.38 | 4.30 | 5.73 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 7 114 000 | 800 000 | 4 500 000 |
| Cambodia | 1 810 | 12 555 214 | 1.34 | 3.70 | 5.91 | Blend | 31 608 000 | 980 000 | 15 000 000 |
| China | 13 400 | 514 625 547 | 1.22 | 4.10 | 5.66 | O | | | 130 000 000 |
| Fiji | 5 580 | 388 571 | 1.39 | 3.90 | | HC | | | 7 000 000 |
| India | 2 540 | 909 103 694 | 1.36 | 4.10 | 5.13 | O | 154 665 000 | 4 793 000 | |
| Indonesia | 4 870 | 115 929 739 | 1.38 | 4.20 | 4.52 | O | | | 65 000 000 |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | 2 120 | 4 698 466 | 1.46 | 3.50 | 4.66 | Blend | 18 290 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Nepal | 1 370 | 23 949 789 | 1.36 | 4.10 | 4.64 | HC | 38 892 000 | 1 205 000 | 15 000 000 |
| Pakistan | 1 500 | 146 871 954 | 1.48 | 3.50 | 5.89 | Blend | 97 271 000 | 3 014 000 | N/A |
| Papua New Guinea | 2 840 | 8 762 681 | 1.50 | 4.00 | 2.90 | Blend | 17 265 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Philippines | 4 230 | 60 124 523 | 1.29 | 4.20 | 5.91 | O | 47 443 000 | 1 470 000 | 65 000 000 |
| Sri Lanka | 3 540 | 17 913 898 | 1.42 | 3.90 | 5.85 | Blend | 32 624 000 | 1 011 000 | N/A |
| Tonga | 5 000 | 82 161 | 1.51 | 3.50 | 5.76 | D | 4 500 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Viet Nam | 4 180 | 60 110 890 | 1.25 | 3.90 | 5.76 | O | 44 521 000 | 1 380 000 | 45 000 000 |
| **Total APR** | | | | | | | | **966 634 000** | |
| **Total IFAD** | | | | | | | | **3 240 000 000** | |

Acronyms: GNIpc = gross national income per capita; IVI = IFAD Vulnerability Index; RSPA = rural sector performance assessment; PAD = portfolio performance and disbursement measure; D = grant under Debt Sustainability Framework; HC = highly concessional; O = ordinary; B = blend; SHC/HC = super highly concessional/highly concessional; PBAS = performance-based allocation system; ACC = additional climate contribution; BRAM = Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism.

Table 2
**East and Southern Africa (ESA)**

| | IFAD13 PBAS formula variables | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Country* | *GNIpc (US$)*[1] | *Rural population*[2] | *IVI score* | *RSPA score* | *PAD score* | *Lending terms 2025* | *IFAD13 PBAS allocations* | *ACC allocations* | *BRAM tentative envelopes* |
| Angola | 2 130 | 11 357 911 | 1.49 | 4.00 | 4.42 | O | 26 784 000 | 830 000 | 5 000 000 |
| Botswana | 7 620 | 730 881 | | | | O | | | 25 000 000 |
| Burundi | 230 | 11 033 140 | 1.64 | 3.60 | 4.67 | D | 36 765 000 | 1 320 000 | N/A |
| Eritrea | 610 | 2 113 634 | 1.50 | 1.80 | 5.82 | D | 13 790 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Eswatini | 3 860 | 906 244 | 1.35 | 3.70 | 5.87 | HC | 8 930 000 | 800 000 | 4 500 000 |
| Ethiopia | 1 130 | 95 419 819 | 1.59 | 3.60 | 5.93 | D | 66 843 000 | 2 400 000 | N/A |
| Kenya | 2 110 | 38 365 351 | 1.48 | 3.90 | 5.89 | Blend | 53 130 000 | 1 646 000 | N/A |
| Lesotho | 1 160 | 1 615 275 | 1.36 | 3.80 | 5.88 | Blend | 15 788 000 | 800 000 | 5 000 000 |
| Madagascar | 530 | 17 802 497 | 1.65 | 3.40 | 5.89 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 135 243 000 | 1 862 000 | 4 500 000 |
| Malawi | 640 | 16 737 373 | 1.48 | 3.90 | 5.92 | D | 36 539 000 | 1 312 000 | N/A |
| Mozambique | 530 | 20 382 557 | 1.55 | 3.70 | 5.92 | D | 42 883 000 | 1 539 000 | N/A |
| Rwanda | 980 | 11 335 032 | 1.52 | 3.80 | 5.95 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 91 410 000 | 1 259 000 | 7 000 000 |
| South Sudan | 1 040 | 8 640 034 | 1.61 | 1.60 | 3.94 | D | 10 000 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| United Republic of Tanzania | 1 210 | 41 469 278 | 1.49 | 3.90 | 5.67 | HC | 62 145 000 | 1 926 000 | 10 000 000 |
| Uganda | 980 | 34 867 562 | 1.40 | 3.80 | 5.88 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 132 606 000 | 1 826 000 | 4 500 000 |
| Zambia | 1 320 | 10 856 322 | 1.54 | 3.90 | 5.90 | D | 26 186 000 | 940 000 | N/A |
| Zimbabwe | 1 740 | 11 035 651 | 1.53 | 3.60 | 5.74 | HC | 33 382 000 | 1 034 000 | N/A |
| **Total ESA** | | | | | | | | **879 018 000** | |
| **Total IFAD** | | | | | | | | **3 240 000 000** | |

Acronyms: GNIpc = gross national income per capita; IVI = IFAD Vulnerability Index; RSPA = rural sector performance assessment; PAD = portfolio performance and disbursement measure; D = grant under Debt Sustainability Framework; HC = highly concessional; O = ordinary; B = blend; SHC/HC = super highly concessional/highly concessional; PBAS = performance-based allocation system; ACC = additional climate contribution; BRAM = Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism.

Table 3
**Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)**

| | *IFAD13 PBAS formula variables* | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Country* | *GNIpc (US$)*[1] | *Rural population*[2] | *IVI score* | *RSPA score* | *PAD score* | *Lending terms 2025* | *IFAD13 PBAS allocations* | *ACC allocations* | *BRAM tentative envelopes* |
| Argentina | 12 520 | 3 538 169 | 1.40 | 4.00 | 5.85 | O | | | 10 000 000 |
| Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | 3 600 | 3 567 293 | 1.35 | 3.90 | 5.77 | O | 15 896 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Brazil | 9 070 | 26 802 756 | 1.21 | 4.00 | 5.86 | O | | | 60 000 000 |
| Colombia | 6 870 | 9 303 087 | 1.24 | 4.20 | 5.58 | O | | | 35 000 000 |
| Costa Rica | 13 850 | 931 164 | 1.23 | 4.60 | | O | | | 10 000 000 |
| Dominican Republic | 9 700 | 1 814 255 | 1.23 | 4.30 | 3.58 | O | | | 10 000 000 |
| Ecuador | 6 510 | 6 375 065 | 1.38 | 3.90 | 3.63 | O | | | 10 000 000 |
| El Salvador | 4 920 | 1 599 772 | 1.26 | 3.50 | 5.75 | O | | | 7 000 000 |
| Haiti | 1 740 | 4 771 013 | 1.70 | 3.20 | 5.15 | D | 16 539 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Mexico | 12 100 | 23 851 973 | 1.20 | 4.20 | 4.96 | O | | | 45 000 000 |
| Peru | 6 990 | 7 246 510 | 1.24 | 4.20 | 5.87 | O | | | 30 000 000 |
| **Total LAC** | **251 035 000** | | | | | | | | |
| **Total IFAD** | **3 240 000 000** | | | | | | | | |

Acronyms: GNIpc = gross national income per capita; IVI = IFAD Vulnerability Index; RSPA = rural sector performance assessment; PAD = portfolio performance and disbursement measure; D = grant under Debt Sustainability Framework; HC = highly concessional; O = ordinary; B = blend; SHC/HC = super highly concessional/highly concessional; PBAS = performance-based allocation system; ACC = additional climate contribution; BRAM = Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism.

Table 4
**Near East, North Africa and Europe (NEN)**

| Country | *IFAD13 PBAS formula variables* | | | | | *Lending terms 2025* | *IFAD13 PBAS allocations* | *ACC allocations* | *BRAM tentative envelopes* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *GNIpc (US$)*[1] | *Rural population*[2] | *IVI score* | *RSPA score* | *PAD score* | | | | |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 8 160 | 1 624 323 | 1.23 | 4.10 | 5.87 | O | | | 7 000 000 |
| Djibouti | 3 450 | 242 299 | 1.59 | 3.40 | 5.88 | D | 4 500 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Egypt | 3 900 | 63 288 984 | 1.44 | 3.60 | 5.87 | O | 52 620 000 | 1 631 000 | 10 000 000 |
| Jordan | 4 460 | 920 216 | 1.35 | 3.90 | 5.86 | O | 8 759 000 | 800 000 | 10 000 000 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 1 700 | 4 345 338 | 1.32 | 3.50 | 5.84 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 20 254 000 | 800 000 | 4 500 000 |
| Montenegro | 11 500 | 196 601 | 1.28 | 3.60 | 5.56 | O | | | 7 000 000 |
| Morocco | 3 700 | 13 261 106 | 1.42 | 4.30 | 4.06 | O | 22 843 000 | 800 000 | 42 000 000 |
| Somalia | 610 | 9 269 800 | 1.84 | 2.20 | | D | 15 134 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Sudan | 990 | 30 017 260 | 1.77 | 2.80 | 5.92 | D | 45 360 000 | 1 628 000 | N/A |
| Tajikistan | 1 440 | 7 165 189 | 1.39 | 3.60 | 5.77 | D | 18 921 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Tunisia | 3 770 | 3 680 902 | 1.33 | 3.90 | 5.90 | O | 15 908 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Türkiye | 11 650 | 19 491 054 | 1.28 | 4.10 | 5.88 | O | | | 20 000 000 |
| Ukraine | 5 070 | 11 918 960 | 1.32 | 4.00 | | O | | | 4 500 000 |
| Uzbekistan | 2 360 | 17 659 618 | 1.35 | 3.30 | 5.86 | Blend | 33 061 000 | 1 025 000 | 10 000 000 |
| **Total NEN** | | | | | | | | **362 244 000** | |
| **Total IFAD** | | | | | | | | **3 240 000 000** | |

Acronyms: GNIpc = gross national income per capita; IVI = IFAD Vulnerability Index; RSPA = rural sector performance assessment; PAD = portfolio performance and disbursement measure; D = grant under Debt Sustainability Framework; HC = highly concessional; O = ordinary; B = blend; SHC/HC = super highly concessional/highly concessional; PBAS = performance-based allocation system; ACC = additional climate contribution; BRAM = Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism.

Table 5
**West and Central Africa (WCA)**

| | IFAD13 PBAS formula variables | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Country* | *GNIpc (US$)*[1] | *Rural population*[2] | *IVI score* | *RSPA score* | *PAD score* | *Lending terms 2025* | *IFAD13 PBAS allocations* | *ACC allocations* | *BRAM tentative envelopes* |
| Benin | 1 440 | 6 737 804 | 1.47 | 3.80 | 5.90 | Blend | 28 742 000 | 891 000 | 10 000 000 |
| Burkina Faso | 850 | 15 444 193 | 1.61 | 3.70 | 5.91 | HC SSE | 58 200 000 | 1 550 000 | N/A |
| Cabo Verde | 4 280 | 192 536 | 1.38 | 3.90 | 5.74 | HC | 4 744 000 | 800 000 | 5 000 000 |
| Cameroon | 1 650 | 11 519 271 | 1.44 | 3.60 | 3.36 | Blend | 22 484 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Central African Republic | 470 | 3 180 355 | 1.53 | 3.00 | 5.76 | D | 19 247 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Chad | 710 | 13 459 197 | 1.60 | 3.30 | 5.86 | D | 33 464 000 | 1 201 000 | N/A |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 660 | 52 646 504 | 1.53 | 2.60 | 3.57 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 40 800 000 | 1 638 000 | 4 500 000 |
| Congo | 2 470 | 1 866 395 | 1.47 | 3.40 | 4.92 | Blend | 12 571 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2 670 | 13 332 774 | 1.41 | 3.70 | 5.76 | Blend | 30 070 000 | 932 000 | 12 000 000 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 5 240 | 435 193 | 1.38 | 2.90 | | O | | | 7 000 000 |
| Gambia (The) | 830 | 978 107 | 1.56 | 3.40 | 5.78 | D | 10 781 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Ghana | 2 340 | 13 852 530 | 1.32 | 4.00 | 4.64 | Blend | 26 135 000 | 810 000 | N/A |
| Guinea | 1 360 | 8 638 099 | 1.38 | 3.60 | 5.77 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 29 362 000 | 910 000 | 5 000 000 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 900 | 1 157 142 | 1.52 | 2.50 | 2.18 | D | 5 096 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Liberia | 730 | 2 489 270 | 1.50 | 3.40 | 5.93 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 51 584 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Mali | 860 | 12 326 936 | 1.56 | 3.40 | 4.81 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 49 200 000 | 1 149 000 | N/A |
| Mauritania | 2 150 | 2 040 577 | 1.63 | 3.50 | 4.47 | Blend | 13 998 000 | 800 000 | 5 000 000 |
| Niger | 600 | 21 788 903 | 1.69 | 3.40 | 5.92 | 80% SHC/20% HC | 80 400 000 | 2 011 000 | N/A |
| Nigeria | 1 930 | 101 577 732 | 1.48 | 3.30 | 5.88 | Blend | 77 319 000 | 2 396 000 | 15 000 000 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 2 480 | 55 153 | 1.41 | 3.00 | 5.79 | D | 4 500 000 | 800 000 | N/A |
| Senegal | 1 660 | 8 815 832 | 1.54 | 3.90 | 2.34 | Blend | 17 969 000 | 800 000 | 10 000 000 |
| Sierra Leone | 560 | 4 832 942 | 1.62 | 3.40 | 5.85 | D | 23 952 000 | 860 000 | N/A |
| Togo | 1 030 | 4 961 543 | 1.43 | 3.50 | 3.27 | HC SSE | 39 303 000 | 800 000 | 4 500 000 |
| **Total WCA** | | | | | | | | **781 069 000** | |
| **Total IFAD** | | | | | | | | **3 240 000 000** | |

**Acronyms: GNIpc = gross national income per capita; IVI = IFAD Vulnerability Index; RSPA = rural sector performance assessment; PAD = portfolio performance and disbursement measure; D = grant under Debt Sustainability Framework; HC = highly concessional; O = ordinary; B = blend; SHC/HC = super highly concessional/highly concessional; PBAS = performance-based allocation system; ACC =** additional climate contribution**; BRAM = Borrowed Resource Access Mechanism.**

# Footnotes

[1] World Bank Atlas methodology https://data worldbank org/indicator/NY GNP PCAP CD.

[2] World Bank Rural Population https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/SP RUR TOTL.

# 2024 rural sector performance assessment (RSPA) scores

Table 1
**Asia and the Pacific**

| *RSPA indicator* | *Bangladesh* | *Bhutan* | *Cambodia* | *India* | *Lao People's Democratic Republic* | *Nepal* | *Pakistan* | *Papua New Guinea* | *Philippines* | *Sri Lanka* | *Tonga* | *Viet Nam* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1) Policies and legal framework** | 4.2 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 4.3 |
| 1.1) Policies and framework for rural development and rural poverty alleviation | 4.4 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.7 |
| 1.2) Legal frameworks for and autonomy of rural people's organizations | 4.2 | 4.2 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 |
| 1.3) Representation and influence of rural organizations and rural people | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 5.0 | n/a | 4.7 |
| **2) Rural governance, transparency and public administration** | 3.7 | 4.9 | 2.5 | 4.3 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.3 |
| 2.1) Quality and transparency of allocation of resources for rural development | 4.8 | 5.1 | 2.8 | 4.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.4 |
| 2.2) Accountability, transparency and corruption | 2.7 | 4.8 | 2.1 | 3.8 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.2 |
| **3) Natural resources and environmental policies and practices** | 4.4 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 3.9 |
| 3.1) Environmental assessment policies and grievance mechanisms | 4.0 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 3.0 | 3.5 |
| 3.2) National climate change policies | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 3.4 | 4.0 | n/a | 4.0 |
| 3.3) Access to land | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 3.7 |
| 3.4) Access to water | 5.2 | 5.4 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 4.3 | n/a | 4.3 |
| **4) Financial policy, access to services and markets** | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 2.8 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 3.0 |
| 4.1) Access to and use of rural financial services | 4.0 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 2.9 |
| 4.2) Investment climate for rural business | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 1.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 3.0 | 2.2 |
| 4.3) Access to agricultural input and produce markets | 3.9 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 4.3 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.9 | n/a | 2.9 |
| 4.4) Access to extension services | 5.0 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 4.0 |
| **5) Nutrition and gender equality** | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 4.5 |
| 5.1) Nutrition policy framework and outcomes | 4.7 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 4.7 |
| 5.2) Policy framework for gender equality | 3.4 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 4.4 |
| **6) Macroeconomic policies and conditions for rural development** | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.7 |
| 6.1) Monetary and exchange rate policies | 3.8 | 3.1 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 3.3 | 5.2 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 5.3 |
| 6.2) Fiscal policy and taxation | 3.0 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.8 |
| 6.3) Debt policy | 4.6 | 2.9 | 4.9 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 4.9 |
| 6.4) Trade policy | 3.0 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.7 |
| **RSPA overall score** | **4.0** | **4.3** | **3.7** | **4.1** | **3.5** | **4.1** | **3.5** | **4.0** | **4.2** | **3.9** | **3.5** | **3.9** |

Table 2
**East and Southern Africa**

| *RSPA indicator* | *Angola* | *Burundi* | *Eritrea* | *Eswatini* | *Ethiopia* | *Kenya* | *Lesotho* | *Madagascar* | *Malawi* | *Mozambique* | *Rwanda* | *South Sudan* | *United Republic of Tanzania* | *Uganda* | *Zambia* | *Zimbabwe* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1) Policies and legal framework** | 4.4 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 1.5 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.3 |
| 1.1) Policies and framework for rural development and rural poverty alleviation | 4.5 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 5.1 |
| 1.2) Legal frameworks for and autonomy of rural people's organizations | 3.7 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 1.0 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 3.6 |
| 1.3) Representation and influence of ROs and rural people | 5.0 | 4.7 | n/a | 4.4 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 3.9 | n/a | 4.7 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 4.2 |
| **2) Rural governance, transparency and public administration** | 3.3 | 2.5 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 1.0 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.0 |
| 2.1) Quality and transparency of allocation of resources for rural development | 3.8 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 2.4 | 4.0 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 1.0 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.0 |
| 2.2) Accountability, transparency and corruption | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.0 |
| **3) Natural resources and environmental policies and practices** | 4.2 | 3.9 | 1.8 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 1.3 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 3.7 |
| 3.1) Environmental assessment policies and grievance mechanisms | 4.7 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 4.9 | 3.7 |
| 3.2) National climate change policies | 4.4 | 4.4 | n/a | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 4.5 | n/a | 3.5 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.5 |
| 3.3) Access to land | 3.8 | 4.0 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 1.5 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 2.8 |
| 3.4) Access to water | 3.8 | 4.0 | n/a | 4.2 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 3.4 | 4.8 | 3.7 | 4.5 | n/a | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.7 |
| **4) Financial policy, access to services & markets** | 4.3 | 4.0 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| 4.1) Access to and use of rural financial services | 4.2 | 3.9 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| 4.2) Investment climate for rural business | 3.9 | 3.9 | 1.0 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 1.8 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 1.5 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.3 |
| 4.3) Access to agricultural input and produce markets | 3.9 | 3.4 | n/a | 3.3 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.0 | n/a | 3.8 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 3.8 |
| 4.4) Access to extension services | 5.0 | 4.8 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 2.5 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 5.2 | 4.7 |
| **5) Nutrition and gender equality** | 4.2 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 4.1 |
| 5.1) Nutrition policy framework and outcomes | 4.3 | 4.7 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| 5.2) Policy framework for gender equality | 4.2 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 1.5 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 4.2 |
| **6) Macroeconomic policies and conditions for rural development** | 3.5 | 2.7 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 1.9 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.0 |
| 6.1) Monetary and exchange rate policies | 4.2 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.1 |
| 6.2) Fiscal policy and taxation | 4.2 | 2.6 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.5 |
| 6.3) Debt policy | 3.0 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 3.6 |
| 6.4) Trade policy | 2.8 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 3.8 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 2.6 |
| **RSPA overall score** | **4.0** | **3.6** | **1.8** | **3.7** | **3.6** | **3.9** | **3.8** | **3.4** | **3.9** | **3.7** | **3.8** | **1.6** | **3.9** | **3.8** | **3.9** | **3.6** |

Table 3
**Latin America and the Caribbean**

| *RSPA indicator* | *Bolivia (Plurinational State of)* | *Haiti* |
|---|---|---|
| **1) Policies and legal framework** | 4.6 | 3.8 |
| 1.1) Policies and framework for rural development and rural poverty alleviation | 4.4 | 3.1 |
| 1.2) Legal frameworks for and autonomy of rural people's organizations | 4.4 | 3.8 |
| 1.3) Representation and influence of ROs and rural people | 5.0 | 4.4 |
| **2) Rural governance, transparency and public administration** | 3.6 | 1.4 |
| 2.1) Quality and transparency of allocation of resources for rural development | 4.3 | 1.1 |
| 2.2) Accountability, transparency and corruption | 3.0 | 1.8 |
| **3) Natural resources and environmental policies and practices** | 4.1 | 3.4 |
| 3.1) Environmental assessment policies and grievance mechanisms | 4.5 | 2.5 |
| 3.2) National climate change policies | 3.2 | 4.1 |
| 3.3) Access to land | 4.5 | 3.2 |
| 3.4) Access to water | 4.1 | 3.7 |
| **4) Financial policy, access to services and markets** | 3.3 | 3.6 |
| 4.1) Access to and use of rural financial services | 2.7 | 4.3 |
| 4.2) Investment climate for rural business | 3.5 | 2.0 |
| 4.3) Access to agricultural input and produce markets | 2.6 | 3.8 |
| 4.4) Access to extension services | 4.4 | 4.5 |
| **5) Nutrition and gender equality** | 4.7 | 3.3 |
| 5.1) Nutrition policy framework and outcomes | 4.6 | 3.7 |
| 5.2) Policy framework for gender equality | 4.7 | 2.8 |
| **6) Macroeconomic policies and conditions for rural development** | 2.8 | 3.6 |
| 6.1) Monetary and exchange rate policies | 3.3 | 3.6 |
| 6.2) Fiscal policy and taxation | 2.1 | 2.7 |
| 6.3) Debt policy | 2.9 | 4.7 |
| 6.4) Trade policy | 2.9 | 3.6 |
| **RSPA overall score** | **3.9** | **3.2** |

Table 4
**Near East, North Africa and Europe**

| *RSPA indicator* | *Djibouti* | *Egypt* | *Jordan* | *Kyrgyzstan* | *Morocco* | *Somalia* | *Sudan* | *Tajikistan* | *Tunisia* | *Uzbekistan* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1) Policies and legal framework** | 3.8 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 |
| 1.1) Policies and framework for rural development and rural poverty alleviation | 4.5 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 4.0 |
| 1.2) Legal frameworks for and autonomy of rural people's organizations | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 2.5 |
| 1.3) Representation and influence of ROs and rural people | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 5.0 | n/a | 3.9 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 2.8 |
| **2) Rural governance, transparency and public administration** | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 2.2 |
| 2.1) Quality and transparency of allocation of resources for rural development | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 1.7 | 4.5 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 2.3 |
| 2.2) Accountability, transparency and corruption | 2.3 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 3.5 | 2.1 |
| **3) Natural resources and environmental policies and practices** | 3.5 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 1.8 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| 3.1) Environmental assessment policies and grievance mechanisms | 3.3 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
| 3.2) National climate change policies | 3.0 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 5.0 | n/a | 3.7 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.5 |
| 3.3) Access to land | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 1.0 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.5 |
| 3.4) Access to water | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.7 | n/a | 3.2 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.0 |
| **4) Financial policy, access to services and markets** | 2.9 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 4.6 | 2.2 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 4.5 | 3.2 |
| 4.1) Access to and use of rural financial services | 2.6 | 3.8 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| 4.2) Investment climate for rural business | 3.7 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 2.4 | 4.6 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 4.5 | 4.0 |
| 4.3) Access to agricultural input and produce markets | 2.0 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 2.5 | 5.1 | n/a | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 3.2 |
| 4.4) Access to extension services | 3.1 | 3.7 | 4.9 | 2.0 | 4.6 | 2.5 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 5.1 | 1.7 |
| **5) Nutrition and gender equality** | 3.2 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 3.6 |
| 5.1) Nutrition policy framework and outcomes | 2.9 | 3.3 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| 5.2) Policy framework for gender equality | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.5 |
| **6) Macroeconomic policies and conditions for rural development** | 4.2 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 3.7 |
| 6.1) Monetary and exchange rate policies | 5.2 | 2.6 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| 6.2) Fiscal policy and taxation | 4.0 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| 6.3) Debt policy | 3.9 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 3.9 |
| 6.4) Trade policy | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 3.6 |
| **RSPA overall score** | **3.4** | **3.6** | **3.9** | **3.5** | **4.3** | **2.2** | **2.8** | **3.6** | **3.9** | **3.3** |

Table 5
**West and Central Africa**

| *RSPA indicator* | *Benin* | *Burkina Faso* | *Cabo Verde* | *Cameroon* | *Central African Republic* | *Chad* | *Democratic Republic of the Congo* | *Congo* | *Côte d'Ivoire* | *Gambia (The)* | *Ghana* | *Guinea* | *Guinea-Bissau* | *Liberia* | *Mali* | *Mauritania* | *Niger* | *Nigeria* | *Sao Tome and Principe* | *Senegal* | *Sierra Leone* | *Togo* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1) Policies and legal framework** | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.8 |
| 1.1) Policies and framework for rural development and rural poverty alleviation | 3.3 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 3.1 |
| 1.2) Legal frameworks for and autonomy of rural people's organizations | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| 1.3) Representation and influence of ROs and rural people | 4.7 | 4.7 | n/a | 4.7 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.7 | n/a | 3.9 | 4.7 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 3.9 | n/a | 4.4 | 3.9 | 4.7 |
| **2) Rural governance, transparency and public administration** | 3.5 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.1 |
| 2.1) Quality and transparency of allocation of resources for rural development | 3.6 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| 2.2) Accountability, transparency and corruption | 3.4 | 3.1 | 4.5 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 4.5 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 2.9 |
| **3) Natural resources and environmental policies and practices** | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 2.7 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| 3.1) Environmental assessment policies and grievance mechanisms | 4.5 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 4.7 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.3 |
| 3.2) National climate change policies | 5.0 | 5.1 | n/a | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 4.8 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 4.0 | n/a | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 4.3 | n/a | 3.3 | 4.6 | 4.4 |
| 3.3) Access to land | 3.6 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 4.4 |
| 3.4) Access to water | 4.5 | 3.8 | n/a | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 1.9 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 3.0 | n/a | 3.2 | 4.4 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.8 | n/a | 4.7 | 3.9 | 3.7 |
| **4) Financial policy, access to services and markets** | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 2.3 | 4.1 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 3.7 |
| 4.1) Access to and use of rural financial services | 2.7 | 2.3 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 2.0 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 4.0 | 3.1 | 3.3 |
| 4.2) Investment climate for rural business | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 4.1 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 3.1 |
| 4.3) Access to agricultural input and produce markets | 3.2 | 4.6 | n/a | 4.3 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 2.7 | n/a | 3.1 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 2.0 | n/a | 3.8 | 2.8 | 3.4 |
| 4.4) Access to extension services | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 5.0 | 3.9 | 5.1 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 1.7 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 |
| **5) Nutrition and gender equality** | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 3.6 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
| 5.1) Nutrition policy framework and outcomes | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 2.3 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 2.5 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 4.4 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 2.4 | 3.1 |
| 5.2) Policy framework for gender equality | 3.2 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 2.1 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 3.1 |
| **6) Macroeconomic policies and conditions for rural development** | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.4 |
| 6.1) Monetary and exchange rate policies | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 3.4 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 4.2 |
| 6.2) Fiscal policy and taxation | 2.7 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 2.2 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.1 |
| 6.3) Debt policy | 3.8 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.7 |
| 6.4) Trade policy | 3.8 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 4.1 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 2.6 |
| **RSPA overall score** | **3.8** | **3.7** | **3.9** | **3.6** | **3.0** | **3.3** | **2.6** | **3.4** | **3.7** | **3.4** | **4.0** | **3.6** | **2.5** | **3.4** | **3.4** | **3.5** | **3.4** | **3.3** | **3.0** | **3.9** | **3.4** | **3.5** |