Invertir en la población rural

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Evaluación de la estrategia y el programa en el país para el Reino de Camboya

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Medidas: Se invita a la Junta Ejecutiva a examinar la evaluación de la estrategia y el programa en el país relativa al Reino de Camboya.

Preguntas técnicas:

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Resumen

A. Antecedentes

1. En 2017, la Oficina de Evaluación Independiente del FIDA (IOE) llevó a cabo la primera evaluación de la estrategia y el programa en el país (EEPP) en el Reino de Camboya. En el marco de dicha evaluación se examinó la evolución de la estrategia, los resultados y el desempeño de la asociación entre el FIDA y el Gobierno del Reino de Camboya desde que el Fondo iniciara sus operaciones en 1997, centrándose en el último decenio, en particular en la cartera de inversiones. La cartera de inversiones que abarca la EEPP comprende siete proyectos aprobados entre 2000 y 2016; actividades complementarias no crediticias, como la gestión de los conocimientos, la creación de asociaciones y el diálogo sobre políticas, en particular las donaciones, y la estrategia y la gestión del programa en el país.

2. **Objetivos.** La EEPP tuvo dos objetivos principales: i) evaluar los resultados y el desempeño de la estrategia y el programa en el país financiados por el FIDA, y ii) presentar constataciones y recomendaciones para la asociación entre el FIDA y el Gobierno del Reino de Camboya en el futuro con miras a mejorar la eficacia de la labor de desarrollo y de erradicación de la pobreza rural.

3. **Proceso de evaluación de la estrategia y el programa en el país.** El proceso de la EEPP constó de varias etapas. La primera consistió en una misión preparatoria a Camboya entre el 23 de enero y el 3 de febrero de 2017, el examen de la documentación disponible y la preparación del documento conceptual de la EEPP. Entre la misión preparatoria y la misión principal, que tuvo lugar en mayo de 2017, en marzo de ese mismo año se llevó a cabo una evaluación de los resultados del Proyecto de Mejora de los Medios de Vida Rurales en Kratie, Preah Vihear y Ratanakiri con el fin de incorporar sus constataciones a la EEPP. En la misión principal de la evaluación, que tuvo lugar del 1 al 23 de mayo de 2017, se realizaron reuniones en Phnom Penh y dos equipos hicieron visitas sobre el terreno en 10 provincias.

4. **Contexto nacional.** El FIDA inició sus operaciones en el país en 1996, en un momento de reconstrucción y rehabilitación tras casi dos decenios de guerra. Desde entonces, el país y el medio rural han cambiado radicalmente. El Reino de Camboya ha experimentado un fuerte crecimiento económico. La pobreza disminuyó del 50 % en 2007 al 13,5 % en 2014. Los ingresos de los hogares rurales han aumentado y su composición ha cambiado considerablemente: los miembros de muchos hogares pobres de las zonas rurales ocupan cada vez más puestos de trabajo asalariado en la industria nacional de la confección textil y de la construcción, o han emigrado a Tailandia, lo cual ha provocado una escasez de mano de obra en las zonas rurales. El crecimiento agrícola sostenido, aunque se ha ralentizado en los últimos años, también ha contribuido a la reducción de la pobreza rural. En la mayoría de las aldeas ha aumentado considerablemente el acceso a la infraestructura y los servicios financieros.

5. **El FIDA en Camboya.** Camboya se convirtió en miembro del FIDA en 1992, poco después de la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz de París de 1991. El FIDA aprobó el primer préstamo en 1996 para cofinanciar un proyecto con el Banco Mundial y hasta la fecha ha apoyado nueve proyectos de inversión por un valor total de USD 353,9 millones, con una financiación de USD 179,5 millones, incluídos USD 50 millones en donaciones.[1] El número total estimado de beneficiarios en la fase de diseño de estos nueve proyectos es de unos 5,69 millones de personas (1,28 millones de hogares).

[1] Donaciones en virtud del Marco de Sostenibilidad de la Deuda y el Programa de Adaptación para la Agricultura en Pequeña Escala.

6. El FIDA elaboró tres estrategias en el país bajo la forma de programas o documentos sobre oportunidades estratégicas nacionales (COSOP), en 1998, 2008 y 2013. Las prioridades y el enfoque del programa en el país han evolucionado en respuesta a las nuevas necesidades y la experiencia del FIDA en Camboya. Los COSOP de 1998 y 2008 se centraron en la agricultura y el desarrollo rural mediante un enfoque descentralizado, y contribuyeron de esta manera a la política gubernamental de descentralización y desconcentración. En el COSOP de 2013 se establecía la necesidad de pasar gradualmente de un enfoque basado en los medios de vida a una orientación al mercado, de la promoción de la descentralización de los servicios públicos a un concepto más amplio de la prestación de servicios rurales en favor de los pobres en los que participaran agentes no gubernamentales, y de adoptar un enfoque más expresamente centrado en la resiliencia de los hogares rurales pobres.

B. Resultados de la cartera de inversiones

7. **Pertinencia.** La orientación general de los proyectos se ha armonizado con las políticas gubernamentales y del FIDA, con la atención puesta en la mejora de la productividad y la diversificación y en la política de descentralización y desconcentración del Gobierno. En particular, el apoyo a la descentralización fue el elemento más visiblemente constante de la cartera anterior y fue muy pertinente para la política de descentralización y desconcentración del Gobierno.

8. Al mismo tiempo, al diseñar la cartera se tardó en reconocer cambios importantes en el contexto rural, tales como: i) la rápida evolución de las fuentes de ingresos no agrícolas y la migración, que conllevaron una escasez de mano de obra en las aldeas e hicieron que se prestara más atención al rendimiento del trabajo que al rendimiento de los cultivos, y ii) un rápido aumento de la prestación de servicios financieros, lo que ha llevado a la disponibilidad de servicios de microfinanciación en la mayoría de las aldeas. Este último cambio significó que el apoyo a los fondos rotatorios colectivos reproducido en muchos proyectos se volvió menos relevante con el tiempo. En los primeros proyectos se prestó escasa atención al acceso al mercado, pese a su inclusión en la política y la estrategia del Gobierno.

9. A excepción de los dos proyectos más recientes, los proyectos aplicaron un enfoque bastante estrecho y detallado en relación con la focalización en los pobres de las zonas rurales, pero la selección de los posibles beneficiarios no estuvo necesariamente seguida de un apoyo adecuado.

10. **Eficacia.** Los proyectos promovieron la mejora de las tecnologías agrícolas, principalmente mediante servicios de capacitación y extensión, a menudo apoyados por el uso de los fondos rotatorios colectivos. La adopción inferior a la prevista de técnicas mejoradas por parte de los agricultores se debió en parte a las deficiencias del enfoque de capacitación y extensión, así como a la falta de condiciones favorables, como por ejemplo la falta de acceso al agua o la escasez de mano de obra. El énfasis en servicios de extensión y capacitación basados en la demanda siempre ha estado en el centro de los proyectos, pero la capacitación solía seguir un enfoque descendente e impulsado por la oferta, consistente en gran medida en contenidos estándar. Sin embargo, en los proyectos recientes se han visto mejoras en el enfoque de la extensión y la capacitación.

11. Es probable que los préstamos generados a partir de los fondos rotatorios colectivos hayan apoyado la adopción de tecnologías agrícolas mejoradas, pero ese vínculo se ha debilitado con el contexto cambiante. Con el aumento de los ingresos, las remesas y otras fuentes de crédito, dichos préstamos han pasado a ser tan solo una de las varias fuentes de liquidez de muchos hogares.

12. Desde el punto de vista de la cartera, se ha tratado de mejorar la prestación de servicios y la infraestructura a nivel local dentro del marco de la política de descentralización y desconcentración del Gobierno. Los extensionistas comunitarios

contratados para los proyectos han llenado el vacío de la mano de obra gubernamental con experiencia en extensión, extremadamente limitada. En el marco de los proyectos también se apoyó a los agricultores más avanzados para que brinden asesoramiento a otros agricultores, con diversos grados de eficacia. El punto clave a destacar es que los proyectos, al canalizar las inversiones a través de estructuras descentralizadas, han proporcionado oportunidades de aprendizaje práctico al personal de los departamentos provinciales de agricultura, asuntos de la mujer y desarrollo rural y a las administraciones subnacionales. En general, el apoyo a las inversiones en infraestructura rural ha alcanzado las metas materiales y ha contribuido al mismo tiempo al proceso de descentralización, aunque también se han dado problemas de diseño y calidad en las obras civiles, como los perímetros de riego.

13. **Eficiencia.** En general, la cartera ha obtenido buenos resultados en lo que respecta a los indicadores de eficiencia relacionados con los plazos y los desembolsos, pero no muy buenos en los que concierne a la gestión y ejecución de proyectos, en particular, los sistemas de adquisiciones y contrataciones y de seguimiento y evaluación. En algunos proyectos, en particular el Proyecto de Reducción de la Pobreza y Desarrollo de Pequeñas Explotaciones en Tonle Sap y el Programa de Servicios Agrícolas para el Fomento de las Innovaciones, la Capacidad de Resistencia y la Extensión (ASPIRE), la puesta en marcha y la ejecución fueron lentas. Con unas pocas excepciones, las tasas internas de rendimiento económico estimadas alcanzaron valores aceptables, aunque inferiores a las proyecciones del diseño y las nuevas estimaciones de los informes finales de los proyectos.

14. **Impacto en la pobreza rural.** La cartera de proyectos del FIDA contribuyó a aumentar los ingresos y activos de los hogares, principalmente como resultado de las mejoras en la productividad y la diversificación de la agricultura y, en algunos casos, de las inversiones en carreteras y el riego. Sin embargo, habida cuenta de las crecientes oportunidades de generar ingresos en los sectores no agrícolas, el impacto de los proyectos a este respecto puede no haber sido un factor sustancial o decisivo en el aumento de los ingresos familiares para los beneficiarios en general. Asimismo, aunque es difícil estimar el alcance de la contribución de los proyectos dado que la importante reducción de la pobreza y mejora de la seguridad alimentaria son tendencias que se registran a nivel nacional, es muy probable que la cartera contribuyera a mejorar la seguridad alimentaria. Sin embargo, pese a este indicio positivo, la malnutrición sigue siendo un problema importante en Camboya y la contribución de los proyectos a este respecto no es evidente.

15. En lo que respecta al capital humano, muchos beneficiarios han adquirido nuevas competencias y han aplicado al menos algunas de ellas, tales como mejores prácticas agrícolas o actividades remunerativas no vinculadas a la tierra, como la confección de esteras. La capacitación ofrecida en diversas esferas también dio lugar a algunos cambios de comportamiento, como en las aptitudes de liderazgo y en una mejor alimentación infantil desde el punto de vista nutricional. Las repercusiones sobre el capital social y el empoderamiento han sido limitadas, pero hay casos de proyectos que facilitaron la formación de contactos y la creación de organizaciones rurales.

16. Los proyectos han contribuido a fortalecer la capacidad del gobierno nacional y de las administraciones subnacionales en las zonas de los proyectos, aunque esto no ha significado una mejora sostenible. La cartera del FIDA ha contribuido a mejorar algunos aspectos de las políticas e instituciones (con un apoyo sustancial de otros asociados para el desarrollo) en esferas como la promoción de enfoques participativos e impulsados por la demanda y servicios pluralistas de extensión agrícola, con la participación de proveedores de servicios del sector privado, y la introducción de nuevas instituciones de extensión, como los agentes de sanidad animal de las aldeas. Por otra parte, aunque los proveedores de servicios de extensión sobre el terreno, como los extensionistas comunitarios, operan ahora en

el ámbito de la política de extensión gubernamental, su presencia ha dependido en gran medida de los proyectos financiados por donantes y no se ha institucionalizado a nivel operacional.

17. **Sostenibilidad de los beneficios.** El problema de la sostenibilidad afecta a muchas esferas de la cartera. Se puede argumentar que es probable que los agricultores continúen aplicando tecnologías y prácticas mejoradas si el rendimiento del trabajo en la empresa es mayor o comparable al de las oportunidades alternativas. Sin embargo, para que los agricultores puedan mantenerse al día en relación con las habilidades y los conocimientos acerca de nuevas variedades, enfermedades o prácticas de manejo de plagas, necesitan servicios de asesoramiento y extensión, así como servicios de regulación que funcionen, ninguno de los cuales se ha establecido adecuadamente. Los presupuestos públicos para los servicios de extensión y apoyo a la agricultura constituyen apenas una fracción de los recursos que proporcionaron los proyectos durante el período de ejecución.

18. En todos los proyectos se apoyó la creación de grupos de beneficiarios, en su mayoría para que sirvieran como receptores de capacitación agrícola y servicios de extensión y apoyo en relación con los fondos rotatorios comunitarios, pero en el diseño de los proyectos no quedaba claro si esos grupos debían funcionar como un mecanismo temporal de prestación de servicios, solo durante los proyectos, o si debían servir de base para el desarrollo y empoderamiento a largo plazo. Se han establecido miles de grupos de fondos rotatorios comunitarios, pero no se pensó en cómo podrían sostenerse hasta bien avanzada la ejecución. Se ha tendido a prestar poca atención a la organización de los agricultores para mejorar su poder de negociación frente a otros actores del mercado. Una notable excepción al respecto son las cooperativas agrícolas formadas en el marco del Proyecto de Mejora de los Medios de Vida Rurales en Kratie, Preah Vihear y Ratanakiri también en respuesta a las nuevas oportunidades de mercado para el arroz orgánico.

19. En cuanto a la infraestructura rural, que recibió apoyo en el marco de dos proyectos que ya han concluido, su sostenibilidad suscita preocupación en razón de la limitada financiación disponible para su explotación y tareas de mantenimiento, en el caso de los perímetros de riego y las carreteras, o debido al deficiente diseño inicial, en el caso de los perímetros de riego.

20. **Innovación.** Los proyectos de la cartera han aportado algunas innovaciones, a menudo introducidas en el sistema gubernamental por el sector privado u organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG), y las innovaciones de los primeros proyectos se reprodujeron en proyectos posteriores. El Proyecto de Apoyo al Desarrollo Agrícola Descentralizado (Seila), que fue aprobado en 1999 y no forma parte de la cartera que evalúa esta EEPP, apoyó los procesos de descentralización y desconcentración y la gobernanza local para la agricultura y el desarrollo rural favorables a la población pobre y fue uno de los primeros proyectos a gran escala, financiados con fondos externos, en hacerlo; los proyectos posteriores reprodujeron y mantuvieron este tipo de apoyo.

21. Una innovación surgida del Proyecto de Desarrollo Rural Comunitario en Kampong Thom y Kampot (2001-2009), que contó con contribuciones de otros asociados para el desarrollo, fue abordar la focalización en la pobreza mediante actividades participativas de clasificación con arreglo a la renta, que ahora se ha institucionalizado como un programa gubernamental (IDPoor, por sus siglas en inglés). Las intenciones de aplicar enfoques participativos innovadores a los servicios de extensión y capacitación no se han materializado plenamente, pero en los proyectos recientes pueden observarse algunas mejoras e innovaciones. Entre ellas figuran los esfuerzos para adaptar las modalidades de capacitación a los pueblos indígenas y las minorías étnicas (Proyecto de Mejora de los Medios de Vida Rurales) y una capacitación más centrada en grupos de intereses comunes, la

capacitación de agricultores a agricultores y un modelo de asociación entre los sectores público y privado para la prestación de servicios agrícolas mediante asesores de empresas agrícolas que venderían insumos agrícolas, prestarían servicios de asesoramiento y comprarían productos agrícolas (Proyecto de Desarrollo Agrícola y Empoderamiento Económico). Además, en los proyectos recientes también se introdujeron en la capacitación de los beneficiarios algunas actividades centradas en la nutrición, principalmente para las madres de niños pequeños, sirviéndose de algunos métodos innovadores como los concursos de cocina, las madres líderes y la mercadotecnia social de madre a madre.

22. **Ampliación de escala**. La ampliación de escala fuera de la cartera del FIDA ha sido limitada. Muchas de las innovaciones han sido reproducidas en proyectos apoyados por el FIDA, aunque en versiones modificadas. Solo unos pocos casos se han ampliado y aplicado de forma más amplia, como los agentes de sanidad animal de las aldeas. Sin embargo, es probable que el diseño y la ejecución de los proyectos de la cartera del FIDA desde 1996 hayan contribuido, junto con el apoyo de otros asociados para el desarrollo, a dos orientaciones importantes de la política gubernamental en materia de extensión agrícola: que los servicios de extensión estén impulsados por la demanda y sean de carácter pluralista (es decir, que incluyan la contratación gubernamental de ONG y empresas privadas como proveedores de servicios). Si se aplicara, representaría una importante ampliación de escala que en el futuro podría atribuirse a las actividades del FIDA y otros asociados para el desarrollo.

23. En general, las deficiencias en materia de seguimiento y evaluación (SyE) y gestión de los conocimientos han limitado las posibilidades de ampliación de escala, pero el equipo de gestión del programa en el país está haciendo todo lo posible para mejorarlas.

24. **Igualdad de género y empoderamiento de la mujer.** Por lo general, los proyectos muestran un historial sólido en materia de apoyo y contribución en este ámbito. Se ha dado una buena colaboración entre el Ministerio de Asuntos de la Mujer y el Ministerio de Agricultura, Silvicultura y Pesca, así como entre sus respectivos departamentos provinciales, lo cual ha contribuido a los logros obtenidos. Se ha prestado atención a las cuestiones de género en los diseños de los proyectos en toda la cartera; las cuestiones de género se han integrado en la focalización, la capacitación, las actividades, el fomento de la capacidad y el desglose de datos por sexo. Se han realizado esfuerzos concertados para incorporar la perspectiva de género en todos los proyectos y a diferentes niveles: en la administración nacional y subnacional, entre los proveedores de servicios y los grupos de beneficiarios. La participación de las mujeres en las actividades apoyadas por los proyectos ha sido alta, aunque esto podría atribuirse en parte a cuestiones contextuales, como la migración.

25. La atención constante en las cuestiones de género ha contribuido a mejorar la participación de las mujeres en la esfera pública. A través de proyectos financiados por el FIDA que ofrecen capacitación y promueven el liderazgo de las mujeres en grupos, estas adquirieron experiencia y visibilidad para participar en grupos y plataformas públicas. También ha habido una estrecha colaboración con los coordinadores de los consejos comunales encargados de cuestiones relacionadas con la mujer y los niños, a quienes se capacitó para desempeñar mejor tareas de concienciación sobre cuestiones de género y supervisar las actividades de los proyectos desde una perspectiva de género en sus localidades. Los proyectos han apoyado el acceso de las mujeres a oportunidades económicas, como la cría de pollos, el cultivo de la huerta y actividades no vinculadas a la tierra, como la producción de brotes de frijoles y la confección de esteras y canastas.

26. **Gestión del medio ambiente y los recursos naturales**. El posible impacto negativo en el medio ambiente de la financiación del FIDA de las inversiones en infraestructura rural (por ejemplo, la rehabilitación y algunas obras de construcción de pequeñas estructuras rurales y agrícolas como perímetros de riego, caminos de acceso a las aldeas, instalaciones de agua potable, diques y sistemas de drenaje) ha sido insignificante. Varios de los proyectos han apoyado la producción orgánica o la producción con arreglo al estándar de las buenas prácticas agrícolas, lo cual es positivo. En general, el apoyo a la ordenación de los recursos naturales (los recursos forestales y pesqueros, o los que se encuentran en entornos frágiles) ha tenido un peso limitado, a pesar de la importancia de estos recursos para los medios de vida y los ecosistemas.

27. **Adaptación al cambio climático.** Las contribuciones a la adaptación al cambio climático han sido moderadas, en particular en lo que respecta a mejorar la resiliencia por medio de obras de infraestructura, aunque las intervenciones no se definieron explícitamente como parte de una estrategia de adaptación al cambio climático. En la cartera actual se han previsto intervenciones explícitamente relacionadas con el cambio climático: en el Proyecto de Reducción de la Pobreza y Desarrollo de Pequeñas Explotaciones en Tonle Sap y, en cierta medida, en el Proyecto de Desarrollo Agrícola y Empoderamiento Económico. El ASPIRE prevé un apoyo importante.

C. Resultados de las actividades no crediticias

28. **Gestión de los conocimientos.** En los COSOP de 2008 y 2013 se determinó que la gestión de los conocimientos, vinculada al diálogo sobre políticas en favor de los pobres, era un elemento clave para aumentar la eficacia del programa en el país. Se han realizado esfuerzos cada vez mayores para captar y sistematizar las experiencias y enseñanzas de los proyectos, así como para agruparlas y difundirlas. Se ha elaborado un número considerable de informes y materiales de comunicación, aunque el acceso a tales documentos o su localización no siempre ha sido fácil. Se están realizando esfuerzos considerables para mejorar los sistemas de SyE en el marco de los proyectos de inversión, como parte del seguimiento de los progresos del COSOP. Los exámenes de los programas en el país y otras actividades han brindado oportunidades para que los ejecutores de los proyectos y las partes interesadas intercambien experiencias y establezcan contactos. Hay algunos ejemplos de donaciones que facilitan la gestión de los conocimientos y contribuyen a las innovaciones y a una mayor eficacia de los proyectos de inversión, pero hasta fechas recientes no se ha prestado especial atención al establecimiento de vínculos más sólidos entre los programas financiados con donaciones a nivel regional y la cartera de inversiones.

29. **Creación de asociaciones.** Por lo general, la colaboración entre el FIDA y los organismos gubernamentales ha sido buena, por ejemplo en relación con la elaboración del COSOP y los exámenes del programa en el país, o en lo que respecta a que el Ministerio de Asuntos de la Mujer y el Ministerio de Agricultura, Silvicultura y Pesca acogieran en sus locales al oficial del programa en el país hasta que se estableció el espacio adecuado para la oficina en el país. El Gobierno demostró su reconocimiento del papel del FIDA como organismo que apoya la agricultura y el desarrollo rural en favor de los pobres al solicitar que el Fondo desempeñara un papel más importante a nivel normativo por conducto del grupo de trabajo técnico sobre agricultura y agua y considerara la posibilidad de establecer una misión residente en el país.

30. Más allá de los organismos gubernamentales, la estrategia y el enfoque de creación de asociaciones han evolucionado y se han diversificado, desde la búsqueda de oportunidades de cofinanciación y asociación con organizaciones que podrían complementar la falta de experiencia y presencia del FIDA en el período inicial de los proyectos de inversión, hasta la promoción, con contribuciones considerables al

contenido técnico, de asociaciones más amplias dentro y fuera de la cartera de inversiones. Dentro de la cartera de inversiones ha habido una diversificación de los asociados, que inicialmente eran organismos de ayuda que aportaban cofinanciación y ahora incluyen también ONG y otros actores. Las asociaciones con organizaciones de agricultores y de pueblos indígenas son una característica única del FIDA y se han desarrollado a partir de donaciones a nivel regional e iniciativas institucionales.

31. **Actuación normativa en el país**. La experiencia adquirida en varios proyectos de inversión, junto con el apoyo de otros donantes, ha contribuido y ayudado a configurar la política de extensión agrícola y la incorporación de la perspectiva de género en las iniciativas gubernamentales para el desarrollo rural y agrícola. Cabe destacar la contribución del FIDA para apoyar la participación de las organizaciones de agricultores en el grupo de trabajo técnico sobre agricultura y agua, que puede considerarse una forma indirecta de actuación normativa. Sin embargo, el apoyo estratégico y estructurado y las medidas para la actuación normativa más allá del nivel del proyecto han sido relativamente limitadas, debido a la escasez de recursos humanos en la oficina en el país y al uso poco proactivo y estratégico de las donaciones.

D. Desempeño de los asociados

32. **FIDA.** En general, el FIDA invirtió recursos y tiempo suficientes en el diseño, la supervisión y el apoyo a la ejecución de la cartera y ha demostrado sistemáticamente su disposición a brindar apoyo en los problemas de ejecución que se presentaron. El Fondo también colaboró estrechamente con otros asociados para el desarrollo (como los cofinanciadores) en el diseño y el apoyo a la ejecución. Por otra parte, la inversión adecuada y las buenas intenciones no siempre se tradujeron en un buen diseño y un apoyo eficaz a la ejecución. Hubo algunas deficiencias y demoras en la incorporación de enseñanzas extraídas, el seguimiento de un contexto rápidamente cambiante y la detección de problemas de diseño y ejecución y la adopción de medidas al respecto. Hasta finales de la década de 2000 la cartera del FIDA se mantuvo bastante estática, con los mismos enfoques y modelos, o similares, que se repetían en las distintas esferas. La escasa presencia en el país ha limitado la capacidad del FIDA de participar de manera significativa en actividades no crediticias.

33. **Gobierno.** El desempeño del Gobierno en relación con la gestión, coordinación y supervisión generales de los proyectos ha sido desigual. Algunos aspectos de la eficiencia en los que ha influido el desempeño del Gobierno resultan positivos, a saber: puntualidad, desembolsos y costos de gestión. Por otra parte, el desempeño relativo a la gestión de los proyectos ha sido variado. Dado que la unidad de apoyo a los proyectos del Ministerio de Agricultura, Silvicultura y Pesca ha existido desde el Proyecto de Apoyo Agrícola Descentralizado (Seila) y presumiblemente ha acumulado experiencia en la gestión de proyectos financiados por el FIDA y otros proyectos de donantes, las calificaciones históricas de la gestión de proyectos son inferiores a las que cabría esperar. El SyE y las adquisiciones y contrataciones se encuentran entre las áreas más débiles. En general, el Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas ha mostrado una actitud colaboradora en las diferentes etapas de los proyectos.

34. La coordinación interinstitucional en el Gobierno ha sido difícil, pero la colaboración entre el Ministerio de Agricultura, Silvicultura y Pesca y el Ministerio de Asuntos de la Mujer, y entre sus respectivos departamentos provinciales ha funcionado bien, lo cual ha redundado en la incorporación efectiva de la perspectiva de género en los proyectos.

E. Resultados de la estrategia del programa en el país

35. **Pertinencia.** El enfoque general en la pobreza rural y el desarrollo agrícola (que, en los primeros años, tuvo un mayor énfasis en la producción) se armonizó con una serie de estrategias gubernamentales. Al principio, en un país con muchos donantes, el FIDA tuvo que buscar oportunidades y asociados con los que pudiera trabajar. A partir del Proyecto de Apoyo al Desarrollo Agrícola Descentralizado, el FIDA siguió un enfoque y un criterio constantes en lo relativo a apoyar los procesos de descentralización y desconcentración mediante la inversión en estructuras descentralizadas y servicios agrícolas impulsados por la demanda, mientras que la elección de los asociados y las zonas de proyectos probablemente se basó en las oportunidades que fueron surgiendo.

36. Tras una década de operaciones con proyectos similares en diferentes zonas, se desaprovechó la oportunidad de reflexionar críticamente sobre la futura dirección estratégica del COSOP de 2008. La estrategia de 2008 carecía de claridad y dirección estratégica. El proceso de formulación del COSOP de 2013 fue más detallado y se apoyó en un amplio proceso consultivo; asimismo, el documento fue más analítico, aunque carecía aún de uniformidad en ciertos aspectos, por ejemplo, en el enfoque geográfico.

37. **Eficacia.** Debido a que los COSOP registran deficiencias en la formulación de objetivos e indicadores estratégicos, la evaluación de los logros en relación con ellos se dificulta y no resulta particularmente válida. Sobre la base de la intención de los objetivos estratégicos, las esferas en las que el programa del FIDA en el país ha hecho contribuciones en relación con las grandes orientaciones estratégicas son las siguientes: el aumento de la productividad agrícola, aunque no en niveles óptimos; los procesos de descentralización y desconcentración, especialmente en relación con la agricultura y las iniciativas de desarrollo rural, y la igualdad de género y el empoderamiento de la mujer. Parte de la cartera también contribuyó a mejorar el acceso a los mercados y servicios mediante la inversión en infraestructura rural. El acceso a los servicios de extensión agrícola ha mejorado dentro del ámbito de los proyectos, pero hay pocos datos empíricos que demuestren su institucionalización y sostenibilidad.

F. Conclusiones

38. Con el telón de fondo de un contexto nacional y rural en rápida evolución, el programa en el país ha contribuido a diversos aspectos importantes de la transformación rural. Entre ellos figura el apoyo a los procesos de descentralización y desconcentración en cuanto uno de los primeros grandes financiadores que canalizaron las inversiones a través de nuevas estructuras y marcos descentralizados, así como la igualdad de género y el empoderamiento de la mujer rural. La cartera también ha contribuido a mejorar la productividad agrícola de los hogares rurales pobres, pero se podrían haber logrado tasas más elevadas de adopción de tecnologías mejoradas si se hubieran abordado las deficiencias, por ejemplo en el enfoque de extensión y capacitación, y se hubieran tenido debidamente en cuenta otros medios de producción y otras limitaciones, como la escasez de mano de obra.

39. Tras una serie de proyectos similares, el FIDA cambió la estrategia y el diseño de sus proyectos para adaptarlos a los cambios contextuales, pero con algunos retrasos. La cartera siguió siendo en gran medida estática hasta alrededor del año 2010, en un contexto rural en evolución, con la repetición de enfoques en gran medida similares (identificación de hogares pobres, formación de grupos, capacitación y servicios de extensión agrícola combinados con el apoyo de fondos rotatorios comunitarios) en diferentes zonas geográficas. No fue sino en torno al prído comprendido entre 2010 y 2011 que se empezaron a aplicar enfoques de proyectos más centrados en el mercado, con algunos resultados alentadores.

40. La gestión de la cartera no tuvo plenamente en cuenta las consecuencias del aumento de las oportunidades de ingresos no agrícolas y la escasez de mano de obra para los hogares rurales. Por ejemplo, en el marco de los proyectos se siguió impartiendo formación en tecnologías que implicaban un uso intensivo de mano de obra. En los proyectos más recientes se ha empezado a considerar el concepto de rendimiento del trabajo en lugar de la productividad de la tierra, pero se sigue asumiendo implícitamente que los hogares rurales consideran la agricultura como el único generador de ingresos, o el más importante, sin reconocer adecuadamente que estos hogares tratan de maximizar el rendimiento del trabajo de los miembros de la familia dentro o fuera de la explotación o fuera de la aldea.

41. Aunque en una escala limitada, el apoyo a los hogares pobres para que participaran en actividades no vinculadas a la tierra o en una producción de alto valor ha tenido algunos resultados positivos, como las experiencias con las aves de corral y la artesanía. Excepcionalmente, el Proyecto de Reducción de la Pobreza Rural en Prey Veng y Svay Rieng incluyó un apoyo menor a la formación profesional para ayudar a los jóvenes a abandonar la agricultura.

42. El apoyo a los servicios de extensión agrícola impulsados por la demanda ha sido un tema constante en la cartera, con resultados desiguales. En los primeros proyectos, a los grupos de agricultores que se formaban se les solía ofrecer capacitación basada en contenidos estándar; en proyectos recientes se han incorporado mejoras para hacer que la capacitación sea más específica y orientada a la demanda. La presencia de agentes de extensión, como los extensionistas comunitarios, ha dependido principalmente de la financiación de los donantes y no se ha institucionalizado, aunque estos agentes operan ahora en el ámbito de la política de extensión del Gobierno. Sin embargo, la cartera sí ha contribuido a la introducción de servicios privados pagados por los usuarios, como los agentes de sanidad animal de las aldeas. Además, es probable que el enfoque sistemático de la cartera del FIDA en la mejora de la prestación de los servicios de extensión agrícola haya contribuido a elementos clave de la política de extensión del Gobierno en lo que concierne a servicios de extensión impulsados por la demanda y pluralistas.

43. Una agricultura y una comercialización mejoradas y sostenibles requieren no solo un asesoramiento sólido en materia de cultivos y cría de animales, sino también unos servicios de regulación eficaces. La falta de un control fitosanitario y veterinario adecuado puede poner en peligro toda la producción de un determinado cultivo o toda la industria ganadera y las exportaciones agrícolas importantes. Es preciso regular y controlar la calidad de los insumos y productos agrícolas y los productos elaborados. La eficacia del apoyo a la cadena de valor, tal y como se promueve en el marco del reciente Proyecto de Impulso a los Mercados Inclusivos para los Pequeños Productores, será limitada a no ser que se disponga de servicios de regulación adecuados.

44. Podrían haberse hecho esfuerzos más concretos y concertados para apoyar el empoderamiento de los beneficiarios y sus organizaciones. Se han establecido miles de grupos de fondos rotatorios comunitarios, pero no se ha pensado en cómo mantenerlos hasta después de su creación. Se ha prestado poca atención a la organización de los agricultores para mejorar su poder de negociación frente a otros actores del mercado. Algunas excepciones positivas son las cooperativas agrícolas que surgieron del Proyecto de Mejora de los Medios de Vida Rurales en Preah Vihear, debido en gran parte a nuevas oportunidades de mercado para el arroz orgánico.

45. Las asociaciones estratégicas con otros asociados para el desarrollo en los proyectos han contribuido a mejorar la eficacia y a aportar innovaciones, especialmente en el Proyecto de Desarrollo Agrícola y Empoderamiento Económico, como la capacitación de agricultores para grupos de intereses comunes, plataformas de múltiples

interesados y Lors Thmey, una empresa social que contrata y capacita a empresarios locales para que se conviertan en asesores de empresas agrícolas, que luego presten servicios a sus comunidades locales mediante la venta de productos y servicios agrícolas. Habida cuenta de los problemas de capacidad en el sector público, garantizar una prestación de asistencia técnica de calidad sigue siendo una estrategia válida para mejorar la eficacia y el impacto del programa en el país.

46. Los esfuerzos que se están haciendo para mejorar el SyE ofrecen oportunidades de mejorar la gestión de los conocimientos, la actuación normativa y la ampliación de escala. Sobre esta base, la última generación de proyectos, el Programa de Servicios Agrícolas para el Fomento de las Innovaciones, la Capacidad de Resistencia y la Extensión y el Proyecto de Impulso a los Mercados Inclusivos para los Pequeños Productores, podrían servir como un vehículo para facilitar y movilizar el apoyo adicional de otros asociados en dos áreas importantes del desarrollo de la agricultura en pequeña escala: la extensión agrícola y el desarrollo de cadenas de valor agrícolas en favor de los pobres.

47. Existen algunos buenos ejemplos de vínculos con donaciones (como el programa ROUTASIA[2] con PROCASUR y el programa 4FGF[3] con el Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT)), pero en general la planificación y el uso proactivos de donaciones han sido limitados. Una de las características positivas relacionadas con el mandato y los puntos fuertes del FIDA son las asociaciones con organizaciones de agricultores y organizaciones de pueblos indígenas que surgieron de iniciativas empresariales y donaciones a nivel regional. Aún podrían hacerse mayores esfuerzos para mejorar la coordinación y las sinergias entre las donaciones y los proyectos de inversión.

[2] Fortalecimiento del intercambio de conocimientos sobre soluciones innovadoras mediante la metodología de las rutas de aprendizaje en Asia y el Pacífico
[3] Programa para vincular los medios de vida de los pequeños agricultores pobres con mercados agroindustriales emergentes y ambientalmente progresivos

G. Recomendaciones

48. A continuación figuran las recomendaciones principales que se presentan a consideración del FIDA y el Gobierno del Reino de Camboya.

49. **Recomendación 1. Desarrollar e instrumentar una estrategia dual para la cartera** que apoye: i) la comercialización agrícola, con especial atención en los pequeños productores rurales relativamente avanzados, y ii) estrategias de supervivencia de los hogares pobres. Esto se ajusta en gran medida a la orientación del COSOP de 2013, donde se reconoció la necesidad de «distintas vías de desarrollo y modalidades de intervención para las personas que padecen inseguridad alimentaria, la población rural pobre que vive a nivel de subsistencia y los hogares rurales vulnerables que se encuentran justo por encima de la línea de pobreza". Es importante desarrollar e instrumentar estrategias adaptadas a los perfiles del grupo objetivo y a contextos específicos, por ejemplo, el potencial agrícola y las oportunidades de mercado en zonas geográficas específicas.

50. Para la primera categoría, el apoyo a la producción primaria puede necesitar ser más especializado y de mayor calidad técnica que el que se ha proporcionado hasta la fecha en los proyectos, y también estar determinado por las prioridades de los compradores. Si bien la capacitación en grupo puede ser relevante para algunos temas, también puede ser necesaria la asesoría técnica individual. Los servicios de asesoramiento deberían complementarse con el apoyo al acceso a los medios de producción, incluidas las tecnologías apropiadas para ahorrar mano de obra (en particular la mecanización), así como a la infraestructura de mercado. El fortalecimiento de los grupos y organizaciones de agricultores para facilitar la comercialización será un elemento importante. Si bien se puede aplicar un enfoque de cadena de valor, este debe ser flexible y dinámico para aprovechar las oportunidades cambiantes del mercado, en lugar de burocrático y planificado a largo plazo.

51. El apoyo a las estrategias de supervivencia de los hogares pobres puede abarcar actividades productivas, como actividades viables no vinculadas a la tierra y herramientas sencillas para ahorrar mano de obra, o proporcionar instalaciones de agua potable en los alrededores o un buen camino de acceso a las aldeas. Para muchos de estos hogares pobres, el énfasis puede estar puesto en las actividades agrícolas generadoras de ingresos que son complementarias de las actividades no agrícolas o fuera de la explotación. Para los jóvenes de hogares pobres que han decidido abandonar las aldeas, en el marco de la alianza entre el FIDA y el Gobierno se podría estudiar la manera de ayudarles a obtener mejores ingresos, lo que podría incluir formación profesional o asesoramiento sobre contratos y sobre cómo invertir su excedente de ingresos en remesas destinadas a las aldeas.

52. Esta estrategia dual no debería perseguirse separando a los hogares en grupos diferentes, como ocurría en los primeros proyectos, sino definiendo opciones de apoyo diferentes y flexibles, que también tendrían que adaptarse a los contextos de los diferentes lugares geográficos.

53. **Recomendación 2. Equilibrar la inversión en capital humano y organizaciones rurales apoyadas por asociados estratégicos, con elementos tangibles.** La inversión en aspectos intangibles como el desarrollo de capacidades, el capital humano y el fortalecimiento organizativo sigue siendo fundamental, y debe equilibrarse con la inversión en elementos tangibles como la infraestructura, las instalaciones de poscosecha y el acceso a financiación que permitan a los beneficiarios poner en práctica las aptitudes y los conocimientos adquiridos. La inversión en capital humano podría abarcar no solo las aptitudes productivas, sino también temas más amplios, como las cuestiones de género (tal y como se ha hecho), la nutrición, la alfabetización de adultos y la información sobre las leyes y reglamentos pertinentes. Al mismo tiempo, debe reconocerse que se necesita una perspectiva a largo plazo para la inversión en capital humano y

social y el empoderamiento. Esto es particularmente importante en Camboya, dada su historia, y se necesita cautela para no tomar una decisión de inversión basada solo en las tasas de rendimiento económico tradicionales.

54. Al apoyar la formación y el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones de la población objetivo, por ejemplo, los grupos de agricultores, se debe prestar especial atención a los principales propósitos y funciones de los diferentes tipos de organizaciones con distintos perfiles de miembros, y se debe incorporar en el diseño una estrategia de salida realista.

55. A fin de asegurar un apoyo de calidad específico para los aspectos e innovaciones intangibles, habida cuenta de la limitada capacidad del sector público, el FIDA y el Gobierno deberán buscar oportunidades para establecer asociaciones estratégicas con instituciones experimentadas que puedan prestar una asistencia técnica fundamental y apoyar al Gobierno, con cofinanciación o financiación del FIDA.

56. **Recomendación 3. Intentar que la planificación sea más estratégica y que las donaciones y la financiación proveniente de inversiones se utilicen para profundizar las alianzas con las organizaciones y asociaciones de agricultores.** Se debe continuar y fortalecer el apoyo a las asociaciones y organizaciones de agricultores y las organizaciones de pueblos indígenas, así como la formación de alianzas con ellas. Hasta la fecha, las iniciativas institucionales y las donaciones a nivel regional han facilitado los vínculos entre esas instituciones a escala nacional y del programa en el país. Es necesario planificar y utilizar más estratégicamente la financiación del FIDA, tanto en forma de donaciones como en el marco de proyectos de inversión, para trabajar con estas organizaciones de diferentes tipos y a distintos niveles. La potenciación de las asociaciones y el fortalecimiento de su capacidad pueden contribuir a: i) el empoderamiento de estas organizaciones y de sus miembros; ii) un mejor diseño de programas en el país y proyectos que reflejen las prioridades del grupo objetivo; iii) los insumos pertinentes para la supervisión y el apoyo a la ejecución, e iv) influir en la actuación normativa por conducto de organizaciones asociadas que representen a sus miembros y al grupo objetivo del FIDA.

57. **Recomendación 4. Estudiar opciones para que la cartera futura proporcione apoyo a los servicios de regulación en la agricultura.** Es probable que las diversas plataformas de cadenas de valor que se establezcan en el marco del Proyecto de Impulso a los Mercados Inclusivos para los Pequeños Productores señalen la limitación que supone la falta de servicios de regulación (como los controles fitosanitarios y veterinarios, las normas y el control de calidad, la certificación y cuestiones de inocuidad de los alimentos) y que puedan financiarse algunos servicios reglamentarios de manera *ad hoc*. Dado el bajo punto de partida, se necesitará un enfoque más sistémico y programático, que a su vez supone la movilización de financiación de diversas fuentes.

58. **Recomendación 5. El FIDA colaborará con el Gobierno para elaborar una estrategia y facilitar la movilización de otros asociados a fin de que inviertan en la agricultura en pequeña escala.** Además del posible apoyo a los servicios de regulación (recomendación 4), el Programa de Servicios Agrícolas para el Fomento de las Innovaciones, la Capacidad de Resistencia y la Extensión y el Proyecto de Impulso a los Mercados Inclusivos para los Pequeños Productores podrían servir de plataforma para atraer a otros asociados en dos ámbitos importantes: la extensión agrícola y el desarrollo de cadenas de valor agrícolas favorables a los pobres. La financiación y el papel del FIDA deberán contribuir a movilizar a otros asociados y otros recursos.

Kingdom of Cambodia
Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation
Agreement at Completion Point

A. Introduction

1. This is the first country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in the Kingdom of Cambodia by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE). The main objectives of the CSPE were to: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed country strategy and programme; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication.
2. The CSPE reviewed the evolution of the strategy, results and performance of the partnership between IFAD and the Royal Government of Cambodia since the Fund started operations in 1997, but with a focus on the period 2007-2017 particularly for the investment portfolio. The CSPE covers the investment portfolio (seven projects that were approved between 2000 and 2016), non-lending activities (knowledge management, partnership-building and policy dialogue, including grants), as well as country programme strategy and management.
3. This agreement at completion point (ACP) contains recommendations based on the evaluation findings and conclusions presented in the CSPE report, as well as proposed follow-up actions as agreed by IFAD and the Government. The signed ACP is an integral part of the CSPE report in which the evaluation findings are presented in detail, and will be submitted to the IFAD Executive Board as an annex to the new country strategic opportunities programme for the Kingdom of Cambodia. The implementation of the recommendations agreed upon will be tracked through the President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions, which is presented to the IFAD Executive Board on an annual basis by the Fund's Management.

B. Recommendations and proposed follow-up actions

4. **Recommendation 1: Develop and operationalize a two-pronged strategy for the portfolio** with support to: (i) agricultural commercialization with a focus on relatively advanced smallholders; and (ii) coping strategies of poor households. This is largely in line with the orientation of the 2013 COSOP, which recognized the need for "distinct development pathways and intervention modalities … for the food-insecure, the rural poor at the subsistence level, and vulnerable rural households just above the poverty line". It is important to develop and operationalize tailored strategies in light of the profiles of the target group and specific contexts, e.g. agricultural potential and market opportunities in specific geographical areas.
5. For the first category, support for primary production may need to be more specialized and of higher technical quality than that provided to date in the projects, and also shaped by buyers' priorities. While group-based training may be relevant for some subjects, individual technical advice may also be needed. Advisory services should also be complemented by support for access to means of production including appropriate labour-saving technologies (including mechanization), as well as market infrastructure. Strengthening of farmer groups/organizations to facilitate marketing will be an important element. While a value chain approach may be pursued, it should be flexible and dynamic in order to exploit changing market opportunities, rather than being of a long-term bureaucratic planning nature.
6. Support to coping strategies of poor households may cover productive activities such as feasible non-land-based activities and simple labour-saving tools, or

providing safe drinking water facilities nearby or a good village access road. For many of these poor households, emphasis may be on income-generating agricultural activities that are *complementary* to non-agricultural or off-farm activities. For young people from poor households who have decided to leave the village, the IFAD-Government partnership could explore ways to help them earn better incomes, possibly including vocational training or advice on contracts, and on how to invest their surplus income in the form of remittances back in the village.

7. This two-pronged strategy should not be pursued by separating households into different groups, as was the case in earlier projects, but rather by defining different flexible support menus, which would also need to be tailored to the contexts in different geographic locations.

***Proposed Follow-up**: Agreed. IFAD and the Government will adopt inclusive productivity improvement and upscaling smallholder commercialization and market linkages in a more strategic and programmatic approach going forward with clear objectives to cater to the varied contexts of the target population. This will be done in current and future projects, while being cognizant of the fact that implementing a two-pronged strategy will lead to more challenging project designs with implications on the size, duration, structure of costs, managerial capabilities to be installed and level of technical assistance required, in particular.*

At the country programme level, in order to align with the timelines and priorities of the Government's next National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP 2019-2023), the current COSOP will be extended and updated in the interim taking on board the recommendations made through the evaluation and the RGC strategic shift towards greater focus on commercialization and provision of enabling market infrastructure. The new COSOP will be informed by a COSOP completion review, learning from CSPE, this RGC shift in focus and aligned with the new NSDP.

- *The preparation of a new project concept note between RGC and IFAD will provide an opportunity to reflect on and elaborate the two pronged strategy building on the demand-driven, pluralist service provision approach initiated in ASPIRE. Other opportunities for support such as contract farming mechanisms, local market infrastructure (e.g. small irrigation schemes, local market infrastructure, roads, etc.), small and medium enterprise development will also be explored and accommodated.*
- *COSOP monitoring system online will be strengthened and produce annual note on country programme progress. Annual portfolio review workshop (AcPOR) and tripartite quarterly meetings between MEF, IFAD country office and project teams will be strengthened.*
- *IFAD participation to national think tanks (i.e. policy makers and project implementers) and thematic working groups will be strengthened.*

At the project level, in order to improve the performance (delivery, disbursement and quality outputs) of the current portfolio, each project under portfolio will reinforce the two-pronged strategy to upscale agricultural commercialization of advanced smallholders and support to resilience of poor households. For the ongoing projects:

- *ASPIRE and SRET will prioritise their interventions through the revision of the Agriculture Strategic Development Plan (ASDP) and Provincial Agriculture Strategic Development Plan (PASDP), including a refined integrated provincial zoning of (i) areas with favourable market conditions for agricultural commercialization of advanced smallholders and (ii) areas with potential to promote integrated farming system as a cooping strategy of poor households.*

- *TSSD additional financing will help LIG members to better respond to markets through Market Improvement Groups (MIGs) and promote LIG Associations in favour of poor households.*
- *AIMS will help Farmer Organizations and groups to better response to markets and at the same time bring poor households to be part of the organization*

Responsible partners: all projects/programmes, line agencies (MEF; MAFF, MoWA; MOC, etc.) and IFAD

Timeline: 2018 onward. COSOP will be updated and extended taking on board the CSPE recommendations, in the interim, in order to align the new COSOP with the Government's upcoming NSDP

8. **Recommendation 2: Balance investment in human capital and rural organizations supported by strategic partners, with tangible items.** The investment in "soft" aspects such as skills development, human capital and organizational strengthening continues to be critical, and should be balanced with investment in tangible items such as infrastructure, post-harvest facilities, and access to finance that could enable beneficiaries to put the skills and knowledge acquired into practice. Investment in human capital could cover not only productive skills but also broader subjects such as gender issues (as has been done), nutrition, adult literacy, and information on relevant laws and regulations. At the same time, it should be recognized that a long-term perspective is needed for investment in human and social capital and empowerment. This is particularly relevant in Cambodia, given its history, and calls for caution against making an investment decision based only on traditional economic rates of returns.

9. In supporting the formation and strengthening of organizations of the target population (e.g. farmer groups), careful consideration should be given to the main purposes and roles of different types of organizations with different member profiles, and a realistic exit strategy should be built into the design.

10. To ensure quality support specifically for "soft" aspects and innovations, given limited capacity in the public sector, IFAD and the Government should seek opportunities for strategic partnerships with experienced institutions that could provide crucial technical assistance and could support the Government, with IFAD co-financing or financing.

***Proposed Follow-up**: Agreed: In line with Government development strategy and Debt sustainability Strategy, IFAD and the Government will balance soft and hard investments in IFAD funded projects. Investments in hard elements and market infrastructure will be coupled with soft investments in building partnerships with private sector, service providers and technical assistance to improve the capacity of the small holder farmers for better linkage with market and sustain post-project investments.*

- *The portfolio will improve its targeting strategy by working with all groups of farmers from the poverty scale (below and above national poverty line) and adapt activities to small and medium farmers in that scope with the central focus on sustainability of livelihoods.*
- *On hard investments, IFAD and the Government will work towards IFAD operations investing more in rural infrastructure including in the field of irrigation, market infrastructure which includes road to market, village markets and production linked market facility, rural energy and microfinance.*
- *On soft investments, in addition to the soft components of the ongoing portfolio, as part of the partnership strategy of each project through service providers, partners will be identified to provide support during project implementation towards strengthening the human capital aspects. Technical*

assistance will also be sought from the academe, research institutions, as well as experienced partners to promote innovation in existing projects SRET, ASPIRE, AIMS, TSSD as demonstrated by PADEE. The key focus will be coupling skills development with provisions for enabling the application of the acquired skills to improve and sustain livelihoods.

Responsible partners: MEF and all projects/programme

Timeline: 2018 onward

11. **Recommendation 3: Pursue more strategic planning and use of grants and investment financing to deepen partnerships with farmer organizations/associations.** Support to and partnerships with farmer associations/organizations and indigenous peoples' organizations should be continued and strengthened. So far, the corporate initiatives and regional grants have facilitated linkages between these institutions at national level and the country programme. There is a need for more strategic planning and use of IFAD financing, both grants and within the framework of investment projects, to work with these organizations of different types and at different levels. Enhancing partnerships and strengthening their capacity can contribute to: (i) empowerment of these organizations and their members; (ii) better country programming and project design reflecting the priorities of the target group; (iii) relevant inputs to supervision and implementation support; and (iv) influence on policy engagement through partner organizations that represent their members and IFAD's target group.

***Proposed Follow-up**: Agreed. Each project under the portfolio will further engage and deepened partnership with existing Farmer Organizations (FOs), Cooperatives/Advance Smallholder Groups and their national federations representing smallholders, Indigenous Peoples' Organizations (IPOs) and their network and youth/women organisations. For the current portfolio:*

- *ASPIRE / SRET: (i) will further bring FO. Cooperatives/Advance Smallholder Groups and IPO representatives to engage with all policy discussion forum; (ii) will further help them to fully engage with Extension Hub; (iii) will engage farmers (for farmer-to-farmer (F2F) training), as well as FOs and IPOs and Cooperatives/Advance Smallholders Group to implement GESS (Grant for Extension Service for Smallholders) under Instrument #3 (Support to Agricultural Cooperatives and other farmers' organisations/federations representing smallholders).*
- *TSSD AF: will further strengthen the LIG national association and connect them to the existing Farmer Organization Network.*
- *AIMS: is partnering with National Farmers' Organization Federations Forum (NF3) and others and will extend their scope of work help their members to engage better with the market.*

Support of regional grant MTCP2 in support to smallholder farmer organisations co-financed by IFAD, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and European Union (EU) will be continued and where possible, beneficiary targets modified to address the RGC strategic thrust for commercialization and sustainability of livelihoods aspects. With regard to the new project, and building on the progress of AIMS, IFAD and the Government will explore the possibility to engage with agro-industry and agribusinesses as a way to involve farmers organisations in value chain development and organisation. Learning from the strengthened partnerships with smallholder farmers organizations will be embedded into future designs of projects and the country programme.

Responsible partners: all projects/programmes, line agencies (MEF; MAFF, MOWA; MOC etc.) and IFAD

Timeline: 2018 onward

12. **Recommendation 4: Explore options for supporting regulatory services in agriculture in future pipeline development**. It is likely that the various value chain platforms to be established under AIMS will point to a lack of regulatory services - such as phytosanitary and veterinary control, standard and quality control, certification, and food safety issues - as a constraint, and some ad hoc regulatory services may be financed. Given the low starting point, a more systemic and programmatic approach will be required, which in turn assumes mobilizing financing from various sources.

***Proposed Follow-up**: IFAD and the Government agree with the recommendation to strengthen regulatory services, especially in what concerns the implementation of the existing regulatory framework as compared to the creation of new regulations.*

- *Under the framework on technical working groups (coordinated by Government and DPs), Sub-Working Groups will include members from all IFAD supported project to develop and implement an action plan to support phytosanitary and veterinary control, standard and quality control, certification, and food safety as well as nutrition. The activities will be co-funded by all projects in partnership with other development partners.*
- *ASPIRE will continue developing extension services and more specialised advisory support like phytosanitary, and veterinary services with the Ministry of Agriculture.*
- *AIMS will strengthen food safety and standards with the Ministry of Commerce.*

Responsible partners: all projects/programmes, line agencies (MEF; MAFF, MOWA; MOC etc.) and IFAD

Timeline: 2018 onward. Action plan to be developed under the Technical Working Groups.

13. **Recommendation 5**: **IFAD to work with the Government to strategize and facilitate mobilization of other partners to invest in smallholder agriculture.** In addition to potential support to regulatory services (Recommendation 4), ASPIRE and AIMS could serve as a platform to bring in other partners for two important areas: agricultural extension; and pro-poor agricultural value chain development. IFAD's financing and role should help leverage other partners and resources.

***Proposed Follow-up**: IFAD and the Government agree with the recommendation to increase rural development partnerships in the country.*

- *All IFAD funded projects will mobilize more private sector investment in support of commercialization of small holder agriculture through the VC Innovation Fund (AIMS), PPP instrument (ASPIRE), and Market Infrastructure (TSSD). The projects will support the creation of an enabling environment for the engagement of the private sector.*
- *ASPIRE and AIMS will mobilize more development partners (DPs) to support Extension Services, Programme Budgeting and Markets.*
- *More partnerships MoUs at the corporate and project level with DPs will be materialized by ongoing IFAD funded projects. At the country programme level, after USAID signed a MOU with IFAD in 2017, European Union, Agence*

Française de Développement, World Bank and others will be approached to that effect.

- *All IFAD funded projects will ensure improved coordination including through thematic working groups.*
- *IFAD will increase its participation in national think tanks and thematic working groups to ensure greater visibility for smallholder agriculture in the country with the aim at strengthening partnerships and mobilizing greater financing.*

Responsible partners: all projects/programmes, line agencies (MEF; MAFF, MOWA; MOC etc.) and IFAD

Timeline: 2018 onward

Signed by:

H.E. Vongsey Vissoth
Secretary of State
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Royal Government of Cambodia

Date: 05 MAR 2018

Mr. Perin Saint Ange
Associate Vice-President, Programme Management Department
International Fund for Agricultural Development

Date: 05 MAR 2018

Kingdom of Cambodia
Country strategy and programme evaluation
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Currency equivalent

Currency equivalent

US$ 1 = KHR 4,000 (Cambodian riel)

Weights and measures

1 ton =	1,000 kg
1 hectare=	2.47 acres

Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADESS	Agricultural Support Project to *Seila*
AIMS	Accelerated Integrated Markets for Smallholders Project
APIP	Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project
APR	Asia and the Pacific Division (of IFAD)
ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPIRE	Agriculture Services Programme for Innovation, Resilience and Extension
CARD	Council for Agriculture and Rural Development
CBRDP	Community Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot
CEWs	commune extension workers
CIG	common interest group
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CRDB	Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board
CSPE	country strategy and programme evaluation
D&D	decentralization and deconcentration
DSF	debt sustainability framework
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations)
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GNI	gross national income
GRF	group revolving fund
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation Agency
HDI	human development index
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture Development
IGRF	improved group revolving fund (in PADEE)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
LIG	livelihoods improvement group
M&E	monitoring and evaluation

MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MOWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MoWRAM	Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology
MRD	Ministry of Rural Development
MSME	micro small and medium enterprise
MTR	mid-term review
MVFs	most vulnerable families
NCDDS	National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development Secretariat
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PADEE	Project for Agriculture Development and Economic Empowerment
PCR	project completion report
PDAFF	Provincial Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
PDoWA	Provincial Department of Women's Affairs
PPA	project performance assessment (now called PPE)
PPE	project performance evaluation (formerly called PPA)
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
RPRP	Rural Poverty Reduction Project in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng
RULIP	Rural Livelihoods Improvement Project in Kratie, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri
S-RET	Scaling-up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Rural Cambodia
SAW	Strategy on Agriculture and Water
SNEC	Supreme National Economic Council
SRI	system of rice intensification
TSSD	Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project
TWG-AW	Thematic Working Group on Agriculture and Water
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAHW	village animal health worker
VEW	village extension worker

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Map of IFAD-supported operations since 1996 in the Kingdom of Cambodia



IFAD

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 24-01-2017

IFAD-supported investment projects after 2000 covered in the CSPE portfolio assessment



IFAD

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 06-12-2017

Note: Stung Treng province was added in ASPIRE during the implementation.

Map of Cambodia: poverty incidence



Population density map of Cambodia



General Population Census of Cambodia, 2008. © National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Nations World Food Programme, April 2013.

Cambodia timeline since 1991: country events and IFAD activities



AIMS	Accelerated Integrated Markets for Smallhlders Project
ASPIRE	Agriculture Services Programme for Innovation, Resilience and Extension
ASSDP	Agricultural Sector Strategic Development Plan
CBRDP	Community Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot
CCSP	Climate Change Strategic Plan
COSOP	Country strategic opportunities paper/programme
NPRS	National Poverty Reduction Strategy
NP-SNDD	National Program for Sub-National Democratic Development
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan
NSFSN	National Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition
PADEE	Project for Agiculture Development and Economic Empowerment
PPRP-EMR	Policy Document on Promotion of Paddy Rice Production and Export of Milled Rice
RPRP	Rural Poverty Reduction Project in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng
RULIP	Rural Improvement Livelihoods Project in Kratie, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri
SAW	Strategy for Agriculture and Water
SEDP	Socio Economic Development Plan
SFDDR	Strategic Framework for Decentralization and De-Concentrtion Reforms
SPFLD	Strategic Planning Frameworkfor Livestock Development
TSSD	Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project

Kingdom of Cambodia
Country strategy and programme evaluation

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. In line with the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) Evaluation Policy[4] and as approved by the 119th session of the IFAD Executive Board in December 2016, the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) undertook the first country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in the Kingdom of Cambodia.

2. The Kingdom of Cambodia became a member of IFAD in 1992, soon after the Peace Agreement in 1991 which followed almost two decades of suffering from wars and social upheaval (see also the timeline presented in page ix). Since 1996, as of November 2017, IFAD has supported nine investment projects for a total project cost of US$353.9 million with financing of US$179.5 million. The total number of beneficiaries *estimated at design stage* in these nine projects is about 5.69 million people (1.28 million households.[5]

Table 1
A snapshot of IFAD operations since 1996 (as of November 2017)

Investment projects approved	9 (first loan approved in 1996)
Total amount of IFAD investment financing	US$179.5 million (including US$35 million DSF grants and US$15 million ASAP)
Counterpart funding (Government and beneficiaries)	US$75.7 million
Co-financing amount (main co-financiers)	US$98.7 million (ADB, World Bank, Germany, Finland, UNDP, FAO)
Total Portfolio cost	US$ 353.9 million
Number and IFAD financing amount of ongoing projects	4 (with US$128.7 million)
Focus of operations	1st COSOP (1998-2007): Agriculture and rural development within Seila programme 2nd COSOP (2008-2012): Agriculture and rural development within Decentralization and Deconcentration framework 3rd COSOP (2013-2018): Access to markets, resilience to climate change and shocks, strengthened rural service delivery Main common thread: agricultural training and extension services, support for decentralization and rural service delivery, rural financial services, rural infrastructure
Country strategies	1998; 2008-2012; 2013-2018
IFAD country presence	Since 2008. Currently one country programme officer. Host country agreement signed in 2015. Service level agreement with UNOPS.
Country programme managers	Benoit Thierry (May 2014-); Khalid El-Harizi (April 2011-); Youqiong Wang (1997-2011)
Lead agencies and key implementing partner agencies	Ministry of Economy and Finance; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Ministry of Interior - National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development Secretariat; Ministry of Commerce; Ministry of Rural Development; Ministry of Women's Affairs

ASAP: Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
COSOP: Country strategic opportunities paper (1998) /programme (2008 and 2013)
DSF: Debt sustainability framework

B. Objectives, methodology and processes

3. **CSPE objectives.** The main objectives of the CSPE are to: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme in the Kingdom of

[4] IFAD (2011) Evaluation Policy.
[5] Based on the IFAD database (Oracle Business Intelligence).

Cambodia; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication. The findings, lessons and recommendations from this CSPE will inform the preparation of the new IFAD's country strategy.

4. The broad evaluation questions for the CSPE are as follows: (i) to what extent has the country strategy and programme achieved intended results and impact, what are the explaining factors for performance, satisfactory or not satisfactory?; (ii) to what extent have the strategies, approaches and interventions deployed been appropriate to pursue rural poverty reduction and to achieve the desired results?; and (iii) what lessons and issues are identified for future direction for the IFAD country strategy and programme for the Kingdom of Cambodia?

5. **CSPE scope.** The CSPE reviews the evolution of the strategy, results and performance of the partnership between IFAD and the Royal Government of Cambodia since the Fund started operations in 1997; however, the performance assessment, particularly with respect to the investment portfolio, is focused on the last decade (between 2007 and 2016). The CSPE covers investment financing, non-lending activities (knowledge management, partnership-building and policy dialogue, including grants), as well as country programme strategy and management. The CSPE is informed by an analysis of wider issues related to IFAD-government partnership, such as IFAD's strategic positioning in the country vis-a-vis evolving country context, government priorities and the work of other development partners.

Table 2
Evaluability of projects covered by the 2016 CSPE

Project name	*Financing terms* [a]	Board approval	Entry into force	Completion	Status/ Disburs.% [b]	Evaluation criteria [c]
Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot (CBRDP)	HC	07/12/2000	29/03/2001	31/12/2009	(closed)	All criteria
Rural Poverty Reduction Programme in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (RPRP)	HC	18/12/2003	14/04/2004	30/06/2011	(closed)	All criteria
Rural Livelihoods Improvement Project in Kratie, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri (RULIP)	DSF grant + HC loan	18/04/2007	31/08/2007	30/09/2014	(closed)	All criteria
Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project (TSSD)	DSF grant + HC loan	17/12/2009	15/02/2010	31/08/2017	100	All criteria
Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment (PADEE)	DSF grant + HC loan	03/04/2012	08/06/2012	30/06/2018	92 [d]	All criteria
Agricultural Services Programme for Innovations, Resilience and Extension (ASPIRE)	HC loan	16/12/2014	05/03/2015	31/03/2022	15 (loan) 33 (ASAP)	Relevance, efficiency
Accelerating Inclusive Markets for Smallholders (AIMS)	HC loan	14/12/2016	28/02/2017	31/03/2023	0	Relevance

[a] Financing terms: (i) HC – highly concessional; (ii) DSF – debt sustainability framework.
[b] As of August 2017. Additional financing combined if not indicated.
[c] See Chapter 3 of the Evaluation Manual (second edition, IFAD 2015) for more information on the definition of the evaluation criteria.
[d] Not including a Global Environmental Facility (GEF) grant (SDR 4.6 million) approved in 2016 for a project integrated under PADEE, "Building Adaptive Capacity through the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Rural Cambodia (S-RET)

6. The investment portfolio included for performance assessment and rating (section III) includes seven projects (table 2), with the oldest loan approved in 2000. These projects can be grouped into four as follows: (i) three completed projects that have been subjected to project specific evaluation by IOE (CBRDP, RPRP and RULIP); (ii) two projects at an advanced stage of implementation (TSSD and PADEE);

(iii) ASPIRE at an initial stage of implementation; and (iv) AIMS approved in December 2016 with start-up/early implementation phase.

7. While the oldest two projects (Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project [APIP] and Agricultural Development Support to Seila [ADESS]) do *not* form part of the "portfolio performance assessment" (i.e. they are not rated for standard evaluation criteria), the design, implementation experience and lessons under these two projects have been reviewed to better understand the evolution and the current state of the IFAD country strategy and programme.

8. Annex V contains a list of grants which covered Cambodia under implementation after 2010. In Cambodia, there have been no stand-alone country-specific grants (i.e. not forming an integral part of the investment projects), apart from a small grant under the NGO/extended cooperation programme in mid-1990s. As part of the CSPE, about ten (out of 36) regional/global grants that covered Cambodia were sampled and reviewed, in particular to inform the assessment of non-lending activities (section IV), while the performance of grants is not rated separately. These grants were selected in consultation with the IFAD's Asia and the Pacific Division (APR) with a view to: (i) covering different types of grants (e.g. recipients, key themes/areas); and (ii) looking into indications of linkages with the investment portfolio.

9. **Methodology.** The CSPE followed the IFAD Evaluation Policy[6] and the IFAD IOE Evaluation Manual (second edition 2015). [7] The approach paper for this CSPE, including the evaluation framework and key issues for focus, served as a further and specific guidance for the exercise.

10. Three key dimensions of the country strategy and programme are assessed in the CSPE[8]: (i) investment portfolio performance, based on the standard IOE evaluation criteria for each project (such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability of benefits); (ii) knowledge management, partnership building and country-level policy engagement (each area rated); and (iii) performance of IFAD and the Government (both at project level and at the level of overall country programme management and related process). Building on the analysis on these three dimensions, the CSPE assesses the relevance and effectiveness at the country strategy level.

Figure 1
Schematic overview of CSPE building blocks

[6] http://www.ifad.org/pub/policy/oe.pdf
[7] http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf
[8] For more information, refer to the Evaluation Manual (second edition, IFAD 2015), in particular, Chapters 3 and 6. http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf



11. The performance in each of these areas is rated on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest)[9], which then informs an overall achievement rating for the IFAD-Government partnership.

12. In general terms, the principles of theory-based evaluation are applied in an attempt to evaluate plausible causal relationships between different components and activities within and across each investment project, as well as different elements of the country strategy and programme. Given the time and resource constraints, no large-scale quantitative survey was conducted for the CSPE. The evaluation has been based on a combination of a desk review of existing data and documentation (including available demographic, socio-economic and welfare statistical data), interviews and focus group discussions with stakeholders, beneficiaries, other key informants and resource persons, and direct observations in the field.

13. Triangulating the evidences collected from different sources, the evaluation gauges the veracity of reported results and impact, for example, by assessing to what extent intended results chains under the projects are corroborated by available evidence, or examining broader contextual issues and potential alternative factors for results and impact reported and reassessing the plausibility of results chains and key assumptions.

14. To guide the CSPE, an evaluation framework was developed as part of the CSPE approach paper. The evaluation questions, mostly derived from the IFAD IOE Evaluation Manual but some also adapted or added, guided data collection. In the context of IFAD's strategy and programme in Cambodia, as indicated in the CSPE approach paper, the following issues were given particular attention: (i) group development and producers organizations; (ii) access to finance and group revolving fund; (iii) agricultural advisory services for improved agricultural production; (iv) nutrition; (v) enhancing local institutions' capacity in service delivery; (vi) project management set-up; and (vii) partnerships.

15. **Sources of evidence.** The evidence for this CSPE was derived from multiple sources: (i) investment project-related documentation and records (e.g. project design review records, project design documents, supervision mission reports, mid-term reviews (MTRs), project completion reports (PCRs), M&E data, baseline survey and impact assessment reports where available, project status reports, project-specific knowledge products); (ii) documentation on selected grant projects (e.g. design reports, supervision reports, grant completion reports); (iii) country

[9] The standard rating scale adopted by IOE is: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory.

programme related documents (e.g. COSOPs, COSOP MTR, annual country programme review workshop reports, client survey, knowledge products); (iv) relevant IOE reports (in particular, CBRDP, RPRP and RULIP project evaluations, but also other evaluations); (v) country background documentation and research studies on relevant issues; (vi) Government data and statistics; (vii) self-assessments conducted for the CSPE (by the Government and IFAD); and (viii) findings and observations obtained during field visits, stakeholder meetings and interviews. The data from various sources have been triangulated to inform the CSPE assessment.

16. In Cambodia, there is a wealth of studies and secondary data on socio-economic and poverty situations, also up to the commune and also village level.[10] These were collected, reviewed and analysed to better contextualize and cross-check available baseline and impact data from the projects.

17. Data collection in the field (project sites) was undertaken in three stages which were all interlinked. First, field visits were conducted in the context of the RULIP project performance evaluation (PPE) in three provinces. Second, prior to the CSPE main mission, data collection was conducted by a national consultant through interviews and focus group discussions in connection with two closed and evaluated projects (CBRDP and RPRP) with a focus on the sustainability issue. Thirdly, the CSPE main mission undertook field visits with a focus on ongoing PADEE and TSSD. The sites for field visits were selected based on consultations with project stakeholders and also based on a number of considerations such as coverage of diversities and different contexts balancing with time constraints and overlap of interventions under different projects.

18. **Evaluation process.** The CSPE was conducted in several phases. IOE fielded a CSPE preparatory mission from 23 January to 3 February 2017. This was organized to overlap with the IFAD country portfolio review workshop held in Sihanoukville from 24 to 26 January 2017, where the IOE mission was provided a slot to provide a briefing on the CSPE. Between the preparatory mission and the main mission in May, the following activities were undertaken: (i) a desk-based review of available documentation; (ii) preparation of the draft approach paper and its finalization based on the comments by IFAD; (iii) self-assessment of project performance (by project staff/government) and non-lending activities (by IFAD and the government); (vi) data collection in the field in connection with the closed projects (CBRDP and RPRP); (v) collection of additional documentation and information, project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data, and survey data/reports; and (vi) consultations with project staff on field visits scheduling.

19. The main CSPE mission was fielded in Cambodia from 1 to 23 May 2017.[11] It started off with a kick-off meeting in Phnom Penh on 2 May 2017 convened by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) with participation from relevant agencies. Between 3-9 May and 12-17 May 2017, the CSPE team conducted field visits (split in two groups) in 10 provinces.[12] In each province, the team interacted with key stakeholders (including staff of the Provincial Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries [PDAFF], Provincial Department of Women's Affairs [PDoWA], sub-national administrations, commune councillors, service providers and rural

[10] Including the ID Poor site (http://www.idpoor.gov.kh/en/home/1/1).

[11] The CSPE team also conducted focused interviews with key government agencies to provide inputs to the ongoing corporate level evaluation (CLE) on IFAD's financial architecture undertaken by IOE. The approach paper for the CLE can be found at: https://webapps.ifad.org/members/ec/96/docs/EC-2017-96-W-P-3-Rev-1.pdf

[12] Between 3 and 9 May, the field visits covered Pursat, Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Preah Vihear provinces. This leg was mainly to cover the Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project (TSSD) and the Agricultural Services Programme for Innovation, Resilience and Extension (ASPIRE). Between 12 and 17 May 2017, the team visited to project sites of the ongoing Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment (PADEE) in Takeo, Kampot, Kandal, and Prey Veng provinces. In some places, the field visits and discussion also covered the projects which closed several years ago, namely, the Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot (CBRDP) and the Rural Poverty Reduction Project in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (PRRP).

community members) and visited project activities. In Phnom Penh, the team had meetings with government officials, project staff and implementing partners, IFAD staff, consultants who have been involved in the IFAD country programme, development partners, farmers' organizations, microfinance institutions, etc. The CSPE mission also had the opportunity to interact with the ASPIRE implementation support mission fielded by IFAD from 16 May 2017. Annex VI presents a list of key people met.

20. The team presented emerging findings at a wrap-up meeting on 22 May 2017 chaired by MEF Under Secretary of State and attended by representatives of relevant agencies and IFAD staff.

21. Following the main mission, the team continued with a further documents review and analysis of primary and secondary data obtained, including data from the field visits, project M&E data as well as official statistical data. The resulting draft report was then peer reviewed within IOE. It was thereafter shared with IFAD's Asia and the Pacific Division and the Royal Government of Cambodia. The comments by IFAD and the Government have been taken into account in the final report.

22. **Limitations.** The major limitation was related to the availability and the quality of data on outcomes and impacts, also due to inadequate M&E frameworks and inadequate definition of indicators. Where participatory impact assessments or periodical surveys in attempt to assess impact were conducted, not always were the data found to be reliable - with inconsistencies, uncertainty on the comparability of data collected at different times of the project period (baseline, mid-term and end-line), as well as the comparability between the treatment group and the control group.

23. The CSPE has drawn data and information from different sources to the extent possible (other available data, interviews and discussions and direct observations) to be triangulated with the survey findings to make an informed assessment. When available and accessible, the CSPE also revisited and reviewed the project database and original raw data sets from surveys. Furthermore, abundance of general data, statistical data, research and study reports by other institutions and the Government has helped contextualizing the project-specific data and information and the CSPE analysis.

Key points

- This is the first CSPE in the Kingdom of Cambodia. IFAD has so far supported nine investment projects for a total project cost of US$353.9 million with financing of US$179.5 million, including US$50 million in grant.
- The main purpose of this CSPE is to assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme, and generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and the Royal Government of Cambodia.
- The CSPE reviews the evolution of the strategy, results and performance of the partnership between IFAD and the Royal Government of Cambodia since the Fund started operations in 1996; however, the performance assessment, particularly with respect to the investment portfolio, is focused on the last decade (between 2007 and 2016). While the oldest two projects are not rated for standard evaluation criteria, their design, implementation experience and lessons have been reviewed to better understand the evolution and the current state of the IFAD country strategy and programme.
- The CSPE assesses the results and performance of the investment portfolio and non-lending activities, the performance of IFAD and the Government.
- The evaluation was faced with the challenge of inadequate and inconsistent data, especially about outcomes and impacts. The CSPE team drew data from multiple sources, including revisiting project database and original raw data sets where possible, and triangulate them to inform the assessment.

II. Country context and IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

A. Country context

Geography, population, economy and political system

24. **Geography.** Cambodia, with a total area of 181,035 km², shares borders with Thailand, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Viet Nam. Together with these countries and China and Myanmar, Cambodia shares the Mekong river basin. Water surfaces, including Lake Tonle Sap, occupy approximately 2.2 per cent of the total area of the country. About 33 per cent of the country's total land area is agricultural lands and 54 per cent forest.[13] Cambodia is reported to have one of the world's highest rates of deforestation.

25. Cambodia has a tropical monsoon climate with two seasons: the dry season from November to April and the wet season from May to October. Average annual rainfall is an estimated 1,400 mm, but varies widely from year-to-year and regionally. Cambodia is vulnerable to natural disasters, in particular floods (annual river flooding during the monsoon season), droughts, windstorms, and seawater intrusion and was ranked 15th on a list of countries most exposed to natural disasters worldwide for the past 45 years.[14]

26. **Population.** The population of Cambodia was reported as 15.76 million in 2016, with 79 per cent living in rural areas and 11 per cent in the capital. The population density varies significantly in different provinces, ranging from less than 20 in plateau/mountain areas to more than 200 or 300 in the plain region (see population density map in page viii and annex XII). The average annual population growth rate was stable at 1.6 per cent in the period of 2005-2016, a remarkable decline from 3 per cent in 1996 and 2.2 per cent in 2000.[15] Khmer people make up about 90 per cent of the Cambodia's population. Ethnic minorities are grouped into indigenous and non-indigenous (mostly Chinese, Vietnamese and Cham). Indigenous peoples (of about 24 groups) are estimated to number about 200,000, 1.2 per cent of the country's population. Indigenous populations, also known as the Khmer Leou ("upper Khmer"), mainly live in sparsely populated areas of the north and northeast as well as the mountainous massifs in Koh Kong, Pursat, Kampong Speu and Sihanoukville.[16]

27. **Economy.** In the past two decades, Cambodia has made significant progress in reconstruction and development. The country has recorded strong economic growth with its gross domestic product (GDP) growing at an average of 7.6 per cent per year between 1994 and 2016.[17] During 2009, real GDP growth was almost nil as a result of the global financial crisis, but recovered to 6 per cent in 2010. The gross national income (GNI) per capita grew from US$300 in 1995 to US$1,140 in 2016,[18] putting Cambodia as a lower middle income country. Factors contributing to this economic growth, among the fastest in Southeast Asia in terms of GDP, include: restoration of peace and security; large public and private capital inflows; fairly stable macroeconomic conditions; and dynamic regional markets.

28. Since around 2000, the services sector has been the biggest contributor to GDP, accounting for 41.6 per cent in 2016. The agricultural sector's contribution to GDP gradually declined from 46.6 per cent in 1993 to 31.5 per cent in 2006 and 26.7 per cent in 2016. The ratio of industry increased from 23.2 per cent in 2011 to

[13] World Bank Databank.
[14] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 2015. Overview of Natural Disasters and their Impacts in Asia and the Pacific, 1970-2014.
[15] World Bank Databank
[16] Asian Development Bank (ADB), Indigenous Peoples/ Ethnic Minorities and Poverty Reduction, Cambodia, 2002.
[17] World Bank Databank.
[18] Atlas method, current US$, World Bank Databank.

31.7 per cent in 2016.[19] Growth is mainly driven by the garment, construction and tourism sectors. Cambodia's export sector has played a vital role in the country's emergence. In 2015, garment exports accounted for 73.7 per cent of total exports.[20]

Figure 2
Cambodia GDP growth and composition (1993-2016, billion US$)



Source: World Bank Databank

29. The US dollar is used extensively in payments and deposits in Cambodia. A high degree of dollarization constrains the effectiveness of monetary policy in cushioning shocks, leaving fiscal policy as the main tool for safeguarding macroeconomic stability.

30. **Labor market.** Labor force participation in Cambodia is high and unemployment low. Between 2000 and 2010, the percentage of the working-age population increased by from 58 to 68 per cent and it is estimated to reach 72 per cent by 2020.[21] The unemployment rate decreased from 2.5 per cent of total labor force in 2000 to 0.3 per cent in 2016.[22] Nonetheless, the share of self-employed and unpaid family workers (at 59.4 per cent in 2013) remains high and most of the working population is in the informal economy or engaged in vulnerable forms of employment. High employment-to-population ratios[23] (74.5 per cent in 2013) indicate the low enrollment rate in secondary education.

31. The proportion of people working in agriculture has shown a declining trend, falling below 60 per cent by 2009 and below 50 per cent by 2013. By 2013, industry accounted for 20 per cent of employment and services for 32 per cent.[24] Sectoral movements of labor have not led to greater employment in higher-skill occupations: indeed, there have been falls in the proportion of people working in higher-skill jobs.

32. Internal and external migration further influenced the labor market. Though data are limited, the stock of Cambodian emigrants was about 1.12 million people or 7.3 per cent of the population in 2013, with about 750,000 Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand. The inward flow of remittances has been constantly increasing over the last decade, estimated to be around US$304 million in 2014, increasing from US$121 million in 2000.[25] The volume of internal migration is even larger, with more than two million Cambodians living away from their original homes, following a net rural-to-urban pattern. Both internal and external migration appears to be clustered in low-skill segments of the labour market.

33. Lack of skilled human capital presents a challenge. The Global Human Capital Report 2017 ranked Cambodia at 92nd out of 130 countries, the lowest in Southeast

[19] World Bank Databank.
[20] Ministry of Economy and Finance 2016. Cambodia Macroeconomic Monitor – Mid-year Assessment 2016.
[21] ADB, International Labour Organization (ILO), Cambodia Addressing the skills gap, employment diagnostic study, 2015.
[22] World Bank Databank.
[23] The employment-to-population ratio is the proportion of employed people in the working-age population.
[24] ADB, ILO, Cambodia Addressing the skills gap, employment diagnostic study, 2015.
[25] ADB, ILO, Cambodia Addressing the skills gap, employment diagnostic study, 2015.

Asia after Myanmar (89th) and Lao PDR (84th).[26] Cambodia has the lowest literacy rates among ASEAN countries (78.3 per cent in 2015[27]), and the average educational attainment of the labor force is currently at primary education level or even lower.[28] While Cambodia's public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP has risen in recent years, it still compares unfavorably – at 2 per cent of GDP in 2013 - with that of emerging ASEAN economies such as Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam (3.4, 4.1 and 5.6 per cent of GDP in 2013, respectively).

34. **Political system and administration.** The present state of the Kingdom of Cambodia came into existence in 1993 after almost two decades of suffering from wars and social upheaval. A military coup in 1970 launched Cambodia into civil war. The Communist Party of Kampuchea, known as the "Khmer Rouge", renaming the country as Democratic Kampuchea, was in power from 1975 to 1979 reportedly costing the lives of up to two million people. During this period, millions of mines were laid, causing thousands of deaths and disabilities since the 1980s. The Khmer Rouge government was overthrown in 1979 by invading Vietnamese troops, but conflicts and instability continued during the 1980s in the newly named People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989) backed by Viet Nam. The signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in October 1991 set the country into a process of reconstruction and elections were held in May 1993, followed by adoption of democracy and market economy.

35. Administratively, the country has 24 provinces and the special administrative unit of Phnom Penh as capital city. Each province is divided into districts (*srok*), and each district into communes (*khum*). Each municipality, which surrounds each provincial capital, is divided into sections (*khan*), each section into quarters (*sangkat*).[29] Over the last 20 years, Cambodia has embarked on several major initiatives for decentralization reform. Provinces, municipalities, districts and khan are administered by councils as boards of governors at each territorial level, and national ministries have their "general departments", and "departments" at the national level and provincial level departments (for example, Provincial Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, PDAFF), under which, their staff are also placed at district level. Each commune/*sangkat* has a commune/*sangkat* council elected every five year in a party proportional system. The first commune council elections were held in 2002.

36. Cambodia ranked 112 out of 113 countries surveyed globally and the worst in the East Asia and Pacific region for the perceived rule of law.[30] Similarly, in 2016 the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)[31] placed Cambodia at 156th out of 176 countries, the lowest-ranked among Southeast East Asian countries on the list.[32]

Agriculture

37. **Growth trend**. The annual growth rate for agriculture value added[33] between 2006 and 2009 averaged 5.4 per cent. This growth, among the highest in the world, was largely driven by crop production, mainly of paddy rice,[34] and also supported by

[26] The Global Human Capital Repot 2017 prepared for the World Economic Forum. "Human capital" is explained as "the knowledge and skills people possess that enable them to create value in the global economic system".
[27] World Bank Databank. Except for Cambodia and Lao PDR, adult literacy exceeds 90 per cent in other ASEAN countries.
[28] UNDP, Human Capital Dynamics and Industrial Transition in Cambodia, 2014.
[29] The capital city (Phnom Penh) is divided into khans, which are then subdivided into *sangkats*. Provinces are divided into municipalities and districts. While municipalities are subdivided into *sangkats*, districts are subdivided into communes and *sangkats*.
[30] The World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index Report 2016. The Rule of Law Index relies on over 100,000 household and expert surveys to measure how the rule of law is experienced in everyday life around the world. Performance is assessed through 44 indicators organized around 8 themes: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice.
[31] The Corruption Perceptions Index aggregates data from a number of different sources that provide perceptions of business people and country experts of the level of corruption in the public sector.
[32] Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2016.
[33] Based on constant local currency
[34] World Bank, Cambodia Economic Update, Adapting to Stay Competitive, 2015.

foreign investments, public expenditures in infrastructure, credit and global and regional markets boosted by the food price spike after 2008. The production of main crops experienced a dramatic increase over the past decade, due to both yield increase and expansion of cultivated areas (table 3). However, starting from 2010 the annual percentage growth rate for agriculture value added decreased from 4 to 0.2 per cent in 2015 "due largely to stagnant yield as the country confronted less favourable conditions and constraints on expansion of cultivated areas."[35] The sector's share of GDP decreased from 36.7 per cent in 2011 to 26.7 per cent in 2016.

Table 3
National data on rice, cassava and vegetables: production, area and yields (2002 and 2012)

	2002			*2012*			*Annual average growth rate, 2002–2012 (%)*		
	Production (ton)	Cultivated Area (ha)	Yield (ton/ha)	Production (ton)	Cultivated Area (ha)	Yield (ton/ha)	Production (ton)	Area (ha)	Yield (ton/ha)
Rice	3,822,509	1,994,645	1.916	9,290,940	2,980,297	3,117	9.3%	4.1%	5.0%
Cassava	122,014	19,563	6.237	7,613,697	337,800	22,539	51.2%	33.0%	13.7%
Vegetables	163,175	34,433	4,739	411,435	54,155	7,597	9.7%	4.6%	4.8%

Source: World Bank, May 19 2015: Cambodian Agriculture in Transition: Opportunities and Risks (based on MAFF data)

38. Access to credit increased for farmers from various financial service providers (such as commercial banks, microfinance institutions [MFIs], community savings groups and money lenders) improved significantly. The World Bank study noted that this increased availability of financial services was one of the main changes in rural Cambodia, with the proportion of villages having access to credit increasing from 25 per cent to above 90 per cent.[36]

39. Cambodia's main agricultural commodity is rice, accounting for about 60 per cent of the agricultural sector's value addition in GDP.[37] In 2010, the government outlined a plan aimed at becoming a major rice exporting country ("Paper on the Promotion of Paddy Production and Rice Export"). Rice production increased from 7.6 million metric tons in 2009 to about 9.4 million in 2013. Official rice exports dramatically increased from 12,610 tons in 2009 to about 378,850 tons in 2013,[38] when Cambodia accounted for more than 3 per cent of the total worldwide rice exports.[39] In addition, it has been reported that substantial amount of unmilled rice gets exported *informally*.[40] Beyond rice, the sector has also seen some diversification with a rapid growth in the production of maize, cassava, vegetables and soybeans. Fisheries and livestock (e.g. cattle, poultry) further contribute significantly to national food security accounting for 7.3 per cent and 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2010.[41]

40. **Public agricultural extension system**.[42] The government budget for and its workforce in agricultural extension has been extremely limited. According to the ASPIRE design report (working paper 3), in 2011 on average there was over one extension worker per district. This situation does not seem to have changed: there are average 4-5 staff at the level of district agricultural offices and normally only

[35] World Bank 2016. Cambodia Economic Update.
[36] World Bank. 2015. Cambodian Agriculture in Transition: Opportunities and Risks.
[37] Word Bank 2016. Cambodia Economic Update.
[38] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Agricultural Sector Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018.
[39] FAO, Cambodia Country Fact Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends, April 2014.
[40] The World Bank reported that total rice export in 2014 was conservatively estimated at 2.86 million (metric) tons in paddy equivalent, of which 2.3 million tons informally exported in the form of paddy rice and 0.37 million ton (or 0.56 million ton paddy equivalent) was formally exported in the form of milled rice.
[41] ADB, Country Partnership Strategy: Cambodia, 2011-2013.
[42] Non-public extension service providers include village animal health workers (VAHWs, which have been supported by a number of IFAD-financed and other donor-supported projects), private agents in the form of input suppliers and/or output buyers through some sort of contract farming arrangements or farmer organizations/cooperatives which provide services to their members.

one of them is an extensionist. Where donor-funded projects have come in, there have been many commune extension workers (CEWs) and village extension workers (VEWs) as field-level extension agents, but their presence has been almost entirely dependent on externally funded initiatives.[43]

41. The recently adopted extension policy provides that extension staff members at the provincial level are called agricultural extension specialists with bachelor's degree in agriculture and/or an extension diploma. District level tends to have agricultural extension advisors with a 2-year agricultural diploma and a course in extension skills. In addition there are subject matter specialists from MAFF, research institutions and universities to support the system.

42. **Constraints in agriculture.** Despite the progress made in recent years there is still scope for further gains in rice productivity, in crop diversification and improved livestock production. Constraints faced by Cambodian farmers include lack of access to quality inputs including improved seeds, lack of access to finance (particularly for poorer households), lack of functional producers groups and cooperatives, inefficient production techniques, high post-harvest losses, unreliable access to water and extreme or irregular climate events.[44] Poor road infrastructure is also a constraint. The energy sector is challenged by heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels, high energy costs and lack of access to electricity, particularly in rural areas. Electricity tariffs are higher than those in neighbouring countries[45], reflecting the high cost of petroleum-based generation and the fragmented power supply system in the country, as well as inefficiencies in power generation and transmission infrastructure.[46] The rural electrification ratio is at 16 per cent, making Cambodia the country with the lowest access to electricity in rural areas compared with the other ASEAN countries.[47]

43. Overall, the above-mentioned issues affect Cambodia's agricultural sector's competitiveness in the global and ASEAN markets, as reflected in the vegetables subsector. In 2014, the limited production capacity, high production costs and high seasonality of domestic vegetable supply resulted in 56 per cent of the demand being filled by imports that are mainly from Vietnam through informal channels.[48]

44. **Land**. Land remains a contested issue in Cambodia. During the Khmer Rouge regime, all cadastral records were destroyed, private property was abolished and large parts of the population were forcibly resettled or forced to flee due to the conflict. During the 1990s largescale refugee repatriation programmes were implemented. Over the next decades, mainly due to population growth, spontaneous settlements developed on land that was either formally part of the state domain, or of which the legal status was unclear. In 2001, a new Land Law provided the legal basis for the management and administration of land use and ownership rights. Under the framework of Land Management Policy and Land Law of 2001, the government reinforced initiatives of land titling and distribution. In particular, measures were taken to improve the management of economic lands

[43] According to the World Bank 2017 Agriculture Public Expenditure Review, in 2015 the MAFF/RGC budget allocated 3.4 billion riel for extension services and farmer organizations whereas all development partners combined provided 52.5 billion riel for extension services through projects.

[44] The proportion of irrigated land in Cambodia is significantly lower than neighbouring countries such as Viet Nam and Lao PDR, although different sources present different figures. For example, the 2015 World Bank report indicated that the actually irrigated areas in 2011-2012 in Cambodia was 8 per cent of arable land, while equipped full control irrigation areas in Myanmar, the Philippines and Viet Nam were 19, 35 and 70 per cent of arable land, respectively. Since 1960, Cambodia's mean surface temperature has increased by 0.8°C and it is continuing its rise. According to the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), rice grain yields decline by 10 per cent for each 1°C increase in minimum night temperatures during the growing period in the dry season.

[45] For example, the average electricity prices for industrial consumers range from US¢11.71 to US¢14.63 per kilowatt-hour which is the highest among the ASEAN economies (e.g. in Viet Nam the range is between 2.30 and 8.32). Source: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Energy Market Integration in East Asia: Theories, Electricity Sector and Subsidies, ERIA Research Project Report, 2011

[46] Source: ADB, Cambodia Solar Power Project.

[47] ASEAN Energy Market Integration (AEMI) Initiative, Working Paper AEMI and ASEAN Energy Poverty, 2013

[48] Nuppun Institute for Economic Research. A Policy Study on Vegetable Subsector in Cambodia, 2015.

concession, aiming to develop intensive and industrial agriculture and to settle land disputes between concessionaire companies and land occupants. In addition, since 2003 the poorest have also benefited from the allocation of social land concessions for farming and residential purposes.[49]

45. According to the 2013 "Rectangular Strategy" for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency Phase III (see also paragraph 59), the RGC had issued more than 3 million land titles to Cambodian people and granted social land concessions to 31,000 families of the poor, soldiers, and veterans. The Government also allocated land to about 500,000 families under the "Old Policy-New Action" framework.[50]

46. Despite some progress on land registration and titling, poverty and land rights, remain a serious issue. Land exploitation and speculation, and weak land governance have led to an increase in the landless population and the number of land conflicts, which have involved demonstrations, forced evictions or violence.[51]

47. The majority of Cambodian farmers are smallholders with less than two hectares per household,[52] but the average land ownership, as the population density, varies greatly between different areas. In the lowland area, a growing number of households live with less than 0.5 ha of land, which is not enough to sustain a family throughout the year.[53]

Poverty

48. Rapid growth processes made Cambodia one of the best performers in poverty reduction worldwide. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Indicator ranked Cambodia as the country with the best improvement in the region from 2000 through 2010 - above countries such as China, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. Poverty rate fell from 53.2 per cent in 2004 to 20.5 per cent in 2011 (figure 3) and to 13.5 per cent in 2014. Food poverty has also decreased substantially from 16 per cent in 2004 to 3.8 per cent in 2011.[54] Rural poverty incidence has also fallen from 27.5 per cent in 2009 to 20.8 per cent in 2012.[55] Poverty reduction in rural areas was driven by the substantial increase in rice prices, increased rice production, better rural wages, and improved income from non-farm self-employment.[56] In fact, the share of agriculture incomes for households in rural areas has dropped from 34 per cent in 2009 to 22 per cent in 2015, whereas the share of wage and salaries increased significantly from 33 per cent in 2009 to 48 per cent in 2015.[57] The Gini coefficient increased from 0.326 in 2004 to 0.374 in 2007, but it decreased every subsequent year to 0.282 in 2011.

49. Cambodia's Human Development Index (HDI) value for 2014 is 0.555 putting the country in the medium human development category and positioning it at 143rd out of 188 countries and territories. Between 1990 and 2014, Cambodia's HDI value increased on average by about 1.77 per cent yearly, positioning the country among the 40 countries in the South that have had greater gains in HDI in the period.[58]

[49] FAO, Cambodia Country Fact Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends, April 2014.
[50] This is a massive land registration campaign on untitled former forest land initiated by the Prime Minister in June 2012 under the motto "old policies - new action".
[51] International Land Coalition. National Engagement Strategy: Promoting People Centred Governance in Cambodia (2014-2015).
[52] FAO, Cambodia Country Fact Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends, April 2014.
[53] Agence Française de Développement (AFD). The fragmentation of land tenure systems in Cambodia: peasants and the formalization of land rights, June 2015.
[54] World Bank, Where Have All the Poor Gone? Cambodia Poverty Assessment 2013.
[55] World Bank Databank.
[56] World Bank, Where Have All the Poor Gone? Cambodia Poverty Assessment 2013.
[57] Cambodia Socio Economic Surveys from 2009 to 2015.
[58] UNDP, Human Development Report 2015. Work for human development. Briefing note for countries on the 2015 Human Development Report. Cambodia.

Figure 3
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines [59] and GDP per capita (2004 - 2011)



Source, World Bank, Where Have All the Poor Gone? Cambodia Poverty Assessment 2013, and World Bank Databank

50. Cambodia has also made good strides in improving maternal health, early childhood development, and primary education programs in rural areas. The maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births decreased from 472 in 2005 to 170 in 2014, and the net primary school admission rate increased from 81 per cent in 2001 to 95.3 per cent in 2014.[60]

51. Despite these achievements, a large share of the Cambodian population has moved only very slightly above the poverty line, leaving many highly vulnerable to slipping back into poverty at the slightest shock (figure 4).[61] There are significant movements in and out of poverty (annex XIII). Malnutrition rates remain high with almost 40 per cent of children under 5 chronically malnourished (stunted), over 28 per cent underweight and 10.9 per cent acutely malnourished (wasted).[62] The prevalence of stunting is one of the highest in Southeast Asia after Timor Leste and Lao People's Democratic Republic. Low wealth and mother education as well as rural residence were the main explanatory factors.[63] Nearly half of the population (6.3 million) lack access to safe water,[64] and some 3.9 million of them live in rural areas. With inadequate access to safe water and adequate sanitation and hygiene, children (41 per cent of the population) are especially vulnerable to water-borne diseases.

[59] The country's food poverty line is based on the cost of a basket of basic food items sufficient to provide 2,100 calories per person per day. The overall poverty line includes a very small nonfood allowance that is derived from the observed consumption of nonfood items in households whose total consumption is equal to the food poverty line. The average national poverty line for Cambodia in 2007 was KR2,473 per capita per day, or about US$0.62. In 2013, the Ministry of Planning (MOP) introduced new poverty lines including: (i) a food poverty line based on 2,200 calories per person per day; (ii) a nonfood component that is estimated separately for Phnom Penh, other urban, and rural areas; (iii) no imputed expenditures (such as for housing); and (iv) a token allowance for the cost of safe water. The new method remains conservative as it calculates the poverty line from the observed expenditure patterns of only the very poorest families. Please also see: Royal Government of Cambodia, Poverty in Cambodia – A new approach. Redefining the poverty line, April 2013.
[60] World Bank 2016.
[61] ADB, Cambodia Country Poverty Analysis 2014.
[62] World Food Programme.
[63] Persistent Inequalities in Child Undernutrition in Cambodia from 2000 until Today. Greffeuille and etc.; Nutrients. 2016 May; 8(5): 297. Published online 2016 May 16.
[64] UNICEF, 2014

Figure 4
Poor and near poor people (million) (2004-2011)



Source: World Bank, Australian AID, 2015. Cambodian Agriculture in Transition: Opportunities and Risks.

52. Poverty remains mainly in rural areas: 89 percent of poor households lived in rural areas in 2004 and 91 percent by 2011.[65] Main rural development challenges include ineffective management of land and natural resources, which have eroded the coping capacity of food-insecure people in recent years, environmental sustainability, regional disparity between the urban population and the rural poor, weak public service delivery. Landmines and explosive remnants of war also continue to pose obstacle especially in the countryside despite progress made in clearing them during the last two decades.[66]

Gender

53. Available data on gender-related indicators show contrasting picture for different areas. The Gender Gap Index Report[67] indicates that while the indicator on health and survival is positive ranking the country as the first (with high scores in terms of sex ratio at birth and healthy life expectancy), the gender gaps have remained the same or worsened in many areas over the years also with low ranking for some indicators such as education attainment (table 4). With overall low employment rate (paragraphs 30), the country's rankings on the following indicators are much better than the other indicators: labour force participation (44th), wage equality for similar work (20th) and estimated earned incomes (38th); but the gender gaps are much wider for skilled, technical or intellectual work (ranked over 100th). Women in Cambodia remain under-represented in decision-making positions in politics, the public sector and the judiciary.[68] Gender-based violence remains a serious issue.

Table 4
Gender Gap Index data (Inequality: 0.00; Equality: 1.00)

Gender Gap Index	*Overall*		*Economic Participation*		*Educational Attainment*		*Health and Survival*		*Political Empowerment*	
	Rank	*Score*	*Rank*	*Score*	*Rank*	*Score*	*Rank*	*Score*	*Rank*	*Score*
2006 (115 countries)	89	0.629	29	0.675	105	0.809	1	0.980	94	0.053
2014 (142 countries)	108	0.652	77	0.654	124	0.883	1	0.980	110	0.091
2016 (144 countries)	112	0.658	77	0.659	128	0.987	1	0.980	108	0.098

Source: World Economic Forum, the Global Gender Gap Report 2016.

54. While under-represented in decision-making in politics and formal spaces, rural women's participation in decision-making at household level is reportedly very high: 98 per cent of married women aged 15-49 in rural areas participate in the decision, alone or jointly with their husband, on how their owned earned money is

[65] ADB, Cambodia Country Poverty Analysis 2014.
[66] Source: UNDP.
[67] The Global Gender Gap Index examines the gap between men and women in four fundamental categories (subindexes): Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival and Political Empowerment.
[68] Ministry of Women Affairs, Policy brief 8, Leaders, Women in public decision-making and politics, Cambodia gender assessment, 2014.

spent, and 94 per cent participate in household decision-making on major purchases and for daily household needs.[69] These data are indeed striking, one of the highest for both indicators globally, and with hardly any difference from urban areas unlike many other countries.

55. An ADB report[70] listed the following as the main obstacles to further advancing women's economic empowerment in Cambodia: (i) the amount of time required to fulfil responsibilities in unpaid domestic and care work; (ii) women's low levels of literacy, education, and skills; and (iii) a lack of access to resources necessary for economic empowerment, e.g. in agriculture, business development, and wage employment.

Government's development policy framework

56. After the period of conflict, genocide and devastation, Cambodia has undergone several national development plans including the Socioeconomic Rehabilitation and Development Programmes (SRDPs, 1986-1990 and 1991-1995) which were designed to guide a centrally planned economy. The **Socio-Economic Development Plans Phase I (SEDP I)** 1996-2000 and **SEDP phase II** 2001-2005 were an important step further. Building on the progress in the preceding years, SEDP I presented for the first time an integrated medium term programme of national development within the context of a market economy.

57. The **National Strategic Development Plan** (NSDP) 2006-2010, **NSDP** Update 2 2009-2013 and **NSDP 3** 2014-2018 are five-year national development plan which coordinates the government strategies/policies and spending towards the attainment of overall development goals of Cambodia.

58. In 2002, during the implementation of SEDP II, **National Poverty Reduction Strategy** 2003-2005 and **Cambodian Millennium Development Goals** based on the localization of the Millennium Development Goals were developed. In this sense, Cambodia had three national-level overarching frameworks for the same period for both promoting economic growth and reducing poverty.

59. **The Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency** was adopted in 2004 as an economic and political platform of the third legislature of the national assembly and has been periodically updated in 2008 and 2013. The current Rectangular Strategy (Phase III 2013-2018) focuses on four key areas: agriculture, infrastructure, the private sector, and capacity-building and human resources development, while good governance is placed at its core. The four strategic objectives of the strategy are: (i) ensuring an average annual economic growth of 7 per cent; (ii) creating more jobs for people especially the youth through further improvement in Cambodia's competitiveness to attract and encourage domestic and foreign investment; (iii) achieving more than one percentage point reduction in poverty incidence annually; (iv) further strengthening institutional capacity and governance, at national and sub-national levels, and ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of public services to better serve people.

60. The current **National Strategic Development Plan** (NSDP) Update (2014-2018) is the framework to operationalize the Rectangular Strategy. It identifies the priorities, indicators and timeframe for the implementation of the Strategy and sets the responsibility of the line ministries and agencies in order to gain high benefits from ASEAN economic integration and to become an upper middle income country in 2030. The Plan aims to transform the agricultural sector from primarily depending on expanded use of available and traditional agricultural inputs, into one which primarily depends on the application of techniques, new technologies, mechanization and irrigation to improve the yield rate, and diversify activities into high value crops, livestock, and aquaculture.

[69] United Nations Statistics Division. The World's Women 2015: Trends and Statistics.
[70] Asian Development Bank. 2015. Promoting Women's Economic Empowerment in Cambodia.

61. Agricultural development is currently led by the **Agricultural Sector Strategic Development Plan** 2014-2018, a medium-term plan that specifies the policy goals and objectives, indicates development outcomes, expected outputs and activities of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) for a 5-year period. The Plan reflects the policy direction stipulated in the Rectangular Strategy Phase III and also aligns with the NSDP. The overall goal of the Plan is to increase agricultural growth to around 5 per cent per annum through the enhancement of the agricultural productivity, diversification and commercialization; the promotion of livestock and aquaculture; sustainable fisheries and forestry resources management; strengthening the institutional capacity and increasing efficient supporting services and human resource development.

62. The 17 goals of **Sustainable Development Goals** 2016-2030 are a universal set of goals and targets that UN Member States will use to frame their national agendas and development policies from 2016 to 2030. They seek to build on the Millennium Development Goals and complete what they did not achieve. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental, with the aspiration for peaceful and inclusive societies. Cambodia has started its mission since 2016 to localize the SDGs into Cambodia Sustainable Development Goals with 18 goals, though the final and formal set of those goals have not yet released.

Official development assistance

63. After the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991, Cambodia received significant global support for post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. A total of about US$2.3 billion was pledged by the international community for the 1992-1995 period. Main assistance was directed at the rehabilitation of roads, the rehabilitation and upgrading of water and electricity supply, health, education, refugee resettlement, demining, and agriculture. Technical assistance featured prominently in all assistance programmes, reflecting the acute shortage of skills in Cambodia and the country's limited absorptive capacity for traditional investment projects.[71] Between 1992 and 2006, almost US$7 billion was reportedly disbursed by development partners to Cambodia.[72]

64. In the period from 2010 to 2014 Cambodia received on average US$781 million annually in net ODA, ranked as the third largest aid recipients among South East Asia countries after Viet Nam and Myanmar. Between 2006 and 2015, the biggest bilateral donors in terms of committed aid were Japan, Korea, the United States, Australia and France. The main development multilateral agencies were the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 40 per cent of total multilateral funds committed), the EU institutions, the United Nations institutions and agencies, the Global Fund and the World Bank. IFAD was the 14th donor overall, contributing 4 per cent of total committed multilateral funds.[73] Sixty-seven per cent of committed funds within the period were in the form of grants and 32 per cent loans. The loan share has been increasing over the period.

65. Not captured in the above-mentioned data is aid from China. According to the Royal Government of Cambodia, China provided almost US$400 million annually over the last four years (2012-2015) and remains the single largest provider of external development cooperation, disbursing US$348.8 million in 2015 representing 26 per cent of total resources.[74]

[71] ADB, Country Operational Strategy Study for the Kingdom of Cambodia, Developing the Capacity for Reconstruction and Development, 1995
[72] Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC). The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report, 2007
[73] OECD Stat 2017
[74] Royal Government of Cambodia, Development Cooperation and Partnership Report, 2016.

66. Within the agricultural sector (including fisheries and forestry), donor flows[75] averaged 10 per cent of total aid between 2006 and 2015. Nonetheless, donor flows in the sector varied significantly on a yearly basis, e.g. US$28.8 million in 2007, US$56 million in 2010 and US$ 242.2 million in 2014. Main donors in the sector have been the ADB, IFAD, European Commission, France, Australia, Japan, USA and China

67. The Government's policy on managing development partner assistance, as well as for strengthening partnerships with all development actors, is articulated in the Development Cooperation and Partnership Strategy 2014-2018. This establishes the Cambodia Rehabilitation and Development Board as the national aid coordination and development effectiveness focal point.

B. IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

Overview of IFAD country strategy evolution[76]

68. Soon after Cambodia became a member in January 1992, IFAD fielded a short (about a week) reconnaissance mission at the end of March 1992. This mission produced a document called "A Strategy Report", which represented the institution's attempt to identify where and how it could support the country in the phase of reconstruction amid pouring donors and aid. Subsequently, IFAD has had three country strategies (country strategic opportunities paper/programme, COSOPs) prepared in 1998, 2008 and 2013. The focus and approach in the country programme has evolved, adapting to emerging needs and IFAD experience in the country as discussed below and shown in figure 5. Key elements of these three COSOPs are also summarized in annex VII.

Figure 5
Evolution of IFAD country strategy and programme



Source: Presentation by IFAD at the 2017 country portfolio review workshop.

69. **1998 COSOP.** The IFAD strategy developed in 1998, after the 1996 approval of the first project APIP co-financed with the World Bank, was based on a community based area development approach. Given IFAD's little knowledge of the country, IFAD's financing was to build on, upscale and add value to the successful experiences, approaches and models of NGOs and other bilateral and multilateral donors operating in Cambodia. Three IFAD funded interventions (ADESS, CBRDP and RPRP, approved in 1999, 2000 and 2003) were designed in the context of the 1998 COSOP. They focused on selected provinces and the main focus of the projects was to support pro poor agriculture and rural development within the *Seila* decentralization programme of the Government.[77]

[75] Committed equity investments, ODA grants and loans, and other official flows.
[76] Largely drawn from an IFAD publication, *IFAD and Cambodia: 1992-2015*.
[77] The Government's *Seila* programme, initiated in 1996, was a funds mobilization and coordination framework to support the deconcentration and decentralization reform agenda of the Government. *Seila* is a Khmer word meaning "foundation stone".

70. **2008 COSOP**. The two main strategic objectives of the 2008 COSOP were: (i) sustainable improvement of the livelihoods of rural poor through community empowerment, productivity improvement and improved access to assets, productive resources, rural services, rural infrastructure and markets; and (ii) promotion of D&D and local governance for pro-poor agricultural and rural development. The targeting strategy focused on female headed households, unemployed rural youth, returnees, internally displaced persons and mine victims in the areas with a high poverty concentration. Potential target areas included the more remote border provinces (mountain/plateau regions). The 2008 COSOP provided the framework for RULIP, TSSD and PADEE (approved in 2007, 2009 and 2012, respectively). These projects presented the beginning of a transition from the focus on rural livelihoods and support to decentralized services towards a more market-oriented approach in the present 2013 COSOP.[78]

71. **2013 COSOP**.[79] The current COSOP (2013-2018) underlines transitions: (i) from emphasizing a livelihoods approach to a clearer focus on expanding poor farmers' access to market opportunities; (ii) from promoting decentralization of public services to a broader concept of pro-poor rural service delivery that targets not only government agencies but also civil society and the private sector; and (iii) towards a more explicit focus on the resilience of poor rural households. It also has a strengthened focus on evidence-based policy work.

72. While continuing to address issues of the chronically poor, the COSOP also focuses on addressing challenges to the rapidly increasing group of smallholders who are just above the poverty line but are vulnerable to shocks and at risk of dropping back into poverty. The document was explicit about the need for "distinct development pathways and intervention modalities … for the food insecure, the rural poor at the subsistence level, and vulnerable rural households just above the poverty line." The needs of special groups, such as the recipients of social land concessions, were to be specifically targeted through tailor-made interventions.[80]

73. The 2013 COSOP has provided the framework for ASPIRE (approved in 2014) and AIMS (approved in 2016); as well as Building Adaptive Capacity through the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Rural Cambodia (S-RET) financed by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF, approved in 2016) and integrated into PADEE.

Overview of IFAD operations

74. **Investment portfolio.** Since 1996, IFAD has supported nine investment projects with the financing of US$180 million (see annexes IV, VIII and IX for a complete list and more details), of which about US$130 million in loans on a highly concessional terms, US$35 million in grants under debt sustainability framework (DSF) and US$15 million in grant from the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP). Currently, IFAD investment financing to Cambodia is on highly concessional terms. The amount of the project cost and the IFAD investment financing increased substantially and co-financing level fluctuated over the period (see figure 6).

[78] IFAD, Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, IFAD and Cambodia 1992-2015, 2015.
[79] The COSOP preparation process began with informal discussions in late 2011 and early 2012, leading to a scoping mission in July 2012. Background studies for the programme design were presented at a series of thematic seminars, hosted by Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC) in late September 2012. Detailed design was carried out by a mission fielded by IFAD in December 2012 and the outline design was presented to a stakeholder workshop at this time. Following review by IFAD management, the final design of the COSOP was presented to a Validation Workshop hosted by MEF in Phnom Penh on 29th April 2013.
[80] According to IFAD, such support was envisaged through collaboration with the World Bank but has not materialized due to unexpected issues on the side of the World Bank.

Figure 6
Financing patterns



Source: IFAD data (Oracle Business Intelligence)
IFAD financing include: loans, DSF grants, GEF grant (PADEE) and ASAP grant (ASPIRE).

75. The IFAD resource envelope for Cambodia based on the performance-based allocation system (PBAS) is US$39.8 million for the period 2016-2018 (about 3.9 per cent of the total allocation in APR). In terms of the portfolio size, at present Cambodia ranks 10th in the APR region.

76. Project cost by component (figure 7, for the seven projects after CBRDP) indicates that bulk of the project costs has been allocated for agricultural development and rural/microfinance.

Figure 7
Project costs by components [81]



ENRM: environment and natural resource management
Source. IFAD database (Oracle Business Inteligence)

77. The main implementing government agencies across a number of investment projects have been the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA). The National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development Secretariat (NCDDS)[82] under the Ministry of Interior has been the executing agency along MAFF for TSSD and one of the main implementing agencies for ASPIRE (for which MAFF is the lead programme agency). The Ministry of Rural Development was involved only in one project (CBRDP) and the Ministry of Commerce is the new entry in the most recent project (AIMS). In most projects, provincial departments under the national-level ministries (e.g. Provincial

[81] "Sub-component type" as classified as IFAD are numerous and there are many entries with small allocations, the CSPE team aggregated some of these categories, for example, sub-component types of "input supply" and "technology transfer" into an aggregated category of "agricultural production, research and extension".
[82] NCDD, established in 2008, is the inter-ministerial mechanism for promoting democratic development through D&D reforms.

Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Provincial Department of Women's Affairs) and sub-national administrations, including commune councils in some projects, have been the important leading agencies for implementation.

78. **Grants.** The IFAD database shows only five IFAD grants (not including DSF grants) that were exclusively and specifically for Cambodia since the beginning and they have all been in small amounts (with the largest one in the amount of US$115,000[83] and a total of US$300,000), but according to the 1998 COSOP there was also a small grant to two NGOs before the loan-operations started.[84]

79. The CSPE desk review identified thirty-five regional and global grants operational after 2010 that cover(ed) or might cover Cambodia (see annex V). Many of them involve knowledge management and capacity building initiatives, including the IFAD-financed project staff, as well as the IFAD target groups such as farmers' and indigenous peoples' organizations.[85] Main thematic areas of these grants include: (i) agricultural production and market linkage for smallholders, including a knowledge component to promote information exchange and facilitate dialogue among stakeholders; (ii) access to financial services by poor rural people; and (iii) natural resource management. The other category of grants is those for impact evaluations in IFAD-financed projects.[86]

Key points

- Over two decades preceding the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991, Cambodia suffered from wars and social upheaval. During the Khmer Rouge period in 1970s, reportedly one quarter of the county's population died.
- Cambodia has made significant progress in economic growth and poverty reduction. The poverty level went down from 50 per cent in 2007 to 13.5 per cent in 2014. However, about half of the Cambodia population is slightly above the poverty line and are at the risk of slipping back to poverty. Malnutrition rate also remains high.
- Outmigration from rural areas has been on an increasing trend. Garment factories and the construction industry, as well as Thailand are the major destinations. While the importance of non-agricultural incomes for rural households has increased drastically, this has also created labour shortage in rural areas.
- Lack of skilled human capital is a challenge. Cambodia has the lowest literacy rate (78.3 per cent in 2015) among ASEAN countries.
- Cambodia's agriculture faces challenge in terms of competitiveness in the global and ASEAN markets, given high production costs compared to other neighbouring countries and cheaper imports from other countries such as Viet Nam.
- Cambodia has received substantial support from development partners for post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. During the past decade, China has emerged as the largest donor.
- IFAD has prepared three country strategies and has supported nine investment projects with the financing of US$180 million.

[83] This was to the Government in association with the loan-financed project, Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampot and Kampong Thom (CBRDP). The grant-financed activities ran towards the end of CBRDP only for 1.5 years and closed in 2009.
[84] "To demonstrate our [IFAD] support of the increasing use of NGOs in Cambodia, in 1995, IFAD provided a NGO/Extended Cooperation Programme grant to two NGOs to support the animal control and vaccine production in the country." (1998 COSOP). This was a grant of US$75,000 (effective on 13 October 1995 and closed on 31 January 1997) provided to Church World Service (CWS) and American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).
[85] For example, Medium-Term Cooperation Programme I and II, Farmers' Fighting Poverty, and Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility.
[86] In association with RULIP (2007-2014) as part of the IFAD commitment made for the ninth replenishment process and as part of the corporate-level exercise of thirty impact evaluations led by the IFAD Strategy and Knowledge Department.

III. The investment portfolio

80. In broad terms, the investment portfolio has sought to address the following main rural/agricultural development challenges which Cambodia faced after starting to return to normalcy in 1993: (i) low agricultural productivity and low levels of technology; (ii) negligible capacity of public agricultural extension services and private services to support farmers; (iii) limited access to agricultural finance; (iv) limited rural infrastructure; and (v) need to strengthen local governance and rural service delivery through D&D. These have remained as common areas of focus throughout but with somewhat changing weight over the period. Up to around 2010, major efforts were directed at improving demand-driven public service delivery within the D&D framework and improving agricultural productivity. Since then, the portfolio has shown more attention to market-oriented agriculture through improved service delivery with public and non-public actors as well as climate resilience.

81. Out of the nine investment projects approved since 1996, seven approved during 2000-2016 are assessed in this section. Among these seven, the first three in the chronology (CBRDP, RPRP, and RULIP) have been independently evaluated by IOE. A brief review is provided below for the first two loans approved in 1996 and 1999, as they had implications for subsequent designs.

82. **Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project (APIP, 1997-2006)**. IFAD's first loan approved in 1996 (US$4.75 million) co-financed this World Bank initiated project, specifically the animal health and production component. This component was, as the much later ASPIRE, designed with a systemic sub-sector approach to (i) develop the capacity of the Department of Animal Health and Production and selected provincial offices; and (ii) promote private veterinary services.

83. The PCR specifically on IFAD-financed component of APIP[87] found that the support had improved public capacity but had no systematic data to demonstrate a change in livestock mortality. The project trained 2,800 farmers to become private village animal health workers (VAHWs), a concept which later on has been scaled up. APIP was the only project so far where IFAD support exclusively focused on the livestock and animal health sub-sector.

84. **Agricultural Development Support to *Seila* (ADESS, 2000-2006)**. The second IFAD loan approved in 1999 (US$8.6 million) was for an area-based project which included many elements and models which have been replicated in modified versions in several of the subsequent projects. The project was aligned to the Government's *Seila* framework for decentralization planning, financing and implementation. ADESS included an agricultural technology transfer component and a rural finance component, and applied a decentralized participatory implementation approach. To support ADESS implementation, a project support unit (PSU) was established in MAFF and this unit has continued to play this role in some of the later IFAD-financed projects.

85. For agricultural technology transfer, ADESS targeted: (i) very poor food insecure households with limited land; and (ii) poor households with adequate land. For the first group (very poor), the project, through "the production start-up programme", provided intensive support for three years and also inputs, for which the farmers had to repay to establish a group revolving fund (GRF). The GRF model (later through cash transfers instead of inputs and in kind) has been widely used in the

[87] IFAD prepared a PCR focusing only on the component it financed. The project performance assessment undertaken by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank (for the entire project) rated the project's overall outcome as "moderately unsatisfactory", but it also presented some positive findings on the IFAD-financed component that it had contributed to improvement in animal health, particularly in the control of contagious diseases, and productivity.

portfolio. In ADESS, while the GRF was considered to be relevant and important by the beneficiaries, its "sustainability was still at risk" at project completion.[88]

86. For the second target group (poor households with adequate land), the project through the "agricultural improvement programme" promoted crop and livestock diversification through demonstrations, training, field days and village livestock assistants.[89] Many of the technology packages have been repeated in the later projects. The beneficiaries in this second group were expected to access credit from MFIs participating in the rural finance component, to which funds were to be channelled through government's Rural Development Bank. A similar institutional arrangement is applied for value chain financing in the most recent AIMS project.

87. The ADESS self-assessment at completion[90] noted that the rural finance component was over-ambitious and had a slow start-up, highlighting explanatory factors such as "limited experience of the Rural Development Bank". It also indicated that "most farmers [the second group without GRF support] have used their own funds to apply the technology they had been taught and…achieved major increases in production" - and this was more than 10 years ago when the financial deepening process was in its early stage. On the distinction of two groups – "very poor" and "poor" households - with different support activities, the self-assessment found that this "turned out to be an artificial separation and made both groups miss some opportunities".

88. **In the self-assessments by IFAD[91], APIP and ADESS performance** was rated as moderately satisfactory. Though this CSPE or any other independent evaluation[92] has not analysed and rated these projects in detail, this seems, based on document reviews, to be a fair overall assessment.

C. Project performance and rural poverty impact

89. The five projects (CBRDP, RPRP, RULIP, TSSD and PADEE) were area-based and had main thematic elements in common as follows (see also annex IX): (i) support for agricultural technology transfer often combined with GRFs; and (ii) support for government's D&D policy though developing capacity at sub-national levels for managing service delivery, and rural infrastructure (CBRDP, RPRP and TSSD). Where appropriate, the assessment for the five projects is presented according to these thematic elements. Market linkages and non-land-based income generation activities were introduced in PADEE and TSSD. The two most recent projects, ASPIRE and AIMS, have a design and focus that is different from each other and from the earlier five projects, and therefore, their design is assessed on a project-basis.

Relevance

90. Relevance looks at the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives, including the relevance of the strategies and approaches applied to achieve the objectives.

91. **Alignment to policies, strategies and priorities. Overall, projects' orientation has been aligned with the RGC and IFAD policies and strategies**. The early projects referred to RGC's Rectangular Strategy where IFAD's support in particular was designed to support: (i) agriculture with focus on improved productivity and diversification; (ii) RGC's D&D policy; and (iii) transport infrastructure and management of water resources and irrigation. In particular,

[88] ADESS project completion digest, 2008.
[89] Many village livestock assistants later on became village extension workers (VEWs), after some training in crops
[90] ADESS project completion digest, 2008.
[91] PCR Digests prepared by IFAD based on the respective PCRs.
[92] However, during implementation of ADESS, IFAD undertook a case study of ADESS in connection with the 2004 Thematic Evaluation on Promotion of Local Knowledge and Innovations in Asia and the Pacific Region

support to decentralization was arguably the most visibly consistent element in the earlier portfolio and highly relevant to the Government's D&D policy. ADESS represented one of the first externally-funded projects to specifically support "investments through decentralized structures" as opposed to "decentralized governance with some investments attached" and similar approach was followed in the subsequent projects. On the other hand, attention to access to markets, which was already discussed in the Government's Rectangular Strategy of 2004 and the Agricultural Sector Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 as one of the strategic goals, was weak in earlier projects.

92. In 2010, the Government introduced a Policy on Promoting Paddy Production and Rice Export with the goal to achieve exports of 1 million tons of milled rice by 2015. The agricultural technology components of the older projects were supporting this goal by supporting increase in rice yields. The later projects, as from PADEE, give more attention to diversification and commercialization in line with Programme 1 of the Agricultural Sector Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018 and the National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018, which emphasise orientation towards the market and commercialization of agriculture.

93. **Overall lack of attention to fisheries[93] and forestry in the portfolio could be questioned, given their relevance to rural poor's livelihoods**, even though IFAD with limited resources would not be in a position to support the entire agricultural agenda of RGC. IFAD's portfolio has primarily supported crops and livestock whereas only marginal support has been provided in these areas, also including land management. Fisheries, mainly inland, provide livelihoods to many poor (about 2 million) and fish is the main source of animal protein (70-80 per cent). Forests still cover some 50 per cent of the land area, though down from more than 70 per cent in the 1970s, and could provide incomes from non-timber forest products for the rural poor[94] as well as "environmental protection services".[95] At the same time, the experience of other donors suggests that working on land and forest related issues, which could be highly political and sensitive, would have been challenging.[96]

94. **The earlier projects did not strictly follow the IFAD regional strategy, but the deviation is deemed appropriate**. The IFAD's Regional Strategy for Asia and the Pacific (2002) focused on indigenous peoples and remote and mountainous regions. While RULIP did include indigenous peoples as part of the target group, most projects targeted the poor irrespective of where they lived and their ethnicity. This deviation is assessed as justified given the Cambodia context and the wide prevalence of poverty at the time. Also it is in line with IOE's recommendation in the 2006 evaluation of the regional strategy[97] to apply a wider approach for targeting the rural poor.

95. **Attention to climate change has become visible.** Climate change issues were not on the agenda in the 1998/2008 COSOPs or in the design of earlier projects but were added on to the gender training in TSSD and included as a priority in technology transfer in PADEE. The 2013-2018 COSOP and the recent ASPIRE designed thereunder have an explicit emphasis on climate change. As with IFAD,

[93] Support for fishery-related activities is now expected in the TSSD additional financing phase and ASPIRE.
[94] There are reportedly also cases where rural community members themselves may be involved in illegal logging, which is mostly driven by large-scale operations.
[95] For example, forest cover helps to mitigate against flooding and droughts, and reduce siltation in hydropower dams
[96] The country assistance evaluation (1999-2006) by the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group noted that "the Bank's efforts to support reform of the forest concession system, which threatened total loss of Cambodia's timber resources, has not resolved the problem and resulted in civil society protests and an Inspection Panel investigation, which faulted the Bank on application of safeguards". There was an investigation by the World Bank Inspection Panel in 2009 with regard to land titling issues in urban areas in relation to the Bank-financed Land Management and Administration Project. Following an inquiry by the Bank's Inspection Panel, the government unilaterally decided that the Bank should cancel the undisbursed balance of the credit and sent the request for cancellation. (World Bank. 2010. *Cambodia - Land Management and Administration Project: inspection panel investigation report*.)
[97] After this evaluation, IFAD stopped preparing regional strategies.

climate change issues gradually moved to the top of RGC's agenda over the period and in 2013, RGC issued the Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan 2014-2023.

96. **<u>Targeting approach.</u> The earlier projects generally exhibited a poverty focus with similar approaches to identify prospective beneficiaries**. Targeting has been done by selection of project areas, definition of processes and criteria for establishing beneficiary groups, and selection of activities and investments eligible for support. Within the project provinces, the early part of the portfolio selected the poorer/poorest districts, communes and villages, and then identified the poorer/poorest households based on wealth ranking exercise (later the IDPoor list, see box 1), to be formed into groups. Group-based approaches in different projects are described in annex X. The process of identifying prospective beneficiaries was developed and refined, for example, in efforts to make it more participatory and easier for the results to be accepted by villagers.

Box 1
CBRDP, the Identification of Poor Households Programme ("IDPoor Programme") and poverty targeting

Around mid-2000s, the Government, with support by development partners, developed the approach of identifying the poor households in a participatory manner under the leadership of commune councils, so that certain public support can be channelled to those needy households. This resulted in "most vulnerable family list" at local level. During CBRDP, as a pilot programme supported by GTZ (collaborating on CBRDP), a "most vulnerable family fund (MVF Fund)" was also established, which apparently provided donations to community-based organizations (rather than directly to most vulnerable families) to support the most vulnerable families to start or improve income generating activities (e.g. chicken raising, cash crops, small trade).

The approach and methodology for identifying the poor was applied in CBRDP, adopted by the Government around 2006 and refined over time. Now called "the Identification of Poor Households Programme (IDPoor Programme)", it classifies household income level using a proxy means test, which assigns a household "poverty score" based on a range of information which are easily observable and verifiable, such as socioeconomic characteristics of household, construction materials, main income activity, household asset ownership, and dependency ratio. The measurement exercise covers one third of the country every year and therefore, in one location, this exercise is undertaken every three years.

The households identified as "poor" are provided with ID cards or "priority access to service cards" to allow them to have free (or lower cost) access to some public services like health services. There are two categories: so-called "IDPoor 1" (the poorest – considered as the most vulnerable) and "IDPoor 2" (poor but somewhat better off). The list of most vulnerable families in earlier years and the IDPoor information (aggregated level and individual household level) have been used by various development partners to target their support (geographic areas and household level). In CBRDP, the list of most vulnerable families was also used to provide agriculture-related training, starting agricultural inputs and capital for revolving fund.

The relevance of using the most vulnerable family list (in the past) or the IDPoor card holding status as a tool to target development assistance needs to be looked at with caution. Identifying the needy households is one step, but how to assist them is another. The IDPoor card holding status has been used mainly in relation to public social services (health, education). Support related to economic and productive activities requires more careful consideration for it to be relevant and effective.

Source: Grant agreement (grant no. DSF-8011-KH, dated 27 December 2007): Support to Most Vulnerable Family Fund for Community-Based Organizations. Internal memo for grant proposal clearance.

97. **The identification of the rural poor (prospective beneficiaries) was not necessarily followed by appropriate support**. In particular, the approach of separating beneficiaries into different categories of groups based on poverty status has a number of deficiencies. This approach was used in ADESS, CBRDP, RPRP and

RULIP with some differences[98], despite the fact that ADESS at completion had questioned this separation (paragraph 87). The projects identified and separated the very poor (most vulnerable families, those with no or little land, who would be later classified as IDPoor-1), and the poor but less poor (e.g. households with some land). The groups of the less poor were generally not provided with GRF support in cash or in kind.

98. There were a couple of issues with this "categorization and separated groups" approach. First, a rather rigid and top-down approach of placing the households (of fixed numbers) into different categories of groups was, as noted in the ADESS, somewhat "artificial". It also did not serve as a foundation for group development with sense of ownership. It was generally not made clear as to whether groups were to be a temporary project service delivery mechanism or a longer-term vehicle for development and empowerment, but the expectation for the latter has tended to emerge during project implementation. Second, it separated the very poor/poor from the better-off, literate and educated farmers who in Cambodia as in other countries are the drivers of change and contribute to the management of groups, for example by serving as leaders and treasurers of GRF groups.

99. The case of CBRDP was somewhat different in that the project design did not propose a separate category of the poor for GRF nor training as such, but rather discussed various types of groups for different purposes (e.g. self-help groups, water user groups, road maintenance groups). It was during the course of implementation that more attention was placed on targeting and supporting the most vulnerable families, based on the realization that a number of project activities (e.g. irrigation, training on rice cultivation, etc.) were not appropriate for the very poor. The support (in kind and cash) was to be channeled through community-based organizations (see box 1). In this sense, CBRDP support to most vulnerable families was focused and was to be built on mutual help and social capital. In some other projects, however, there was some mismatch between the notion of identifying the needy households and the tools and activities to support them.

100. In later TSSD and PADEE, the separation of households into distinct categories of groups based on poverty status was discontinued.[99] The profiles of group members in these two projects are quite different. In TSSD, IDPoor card holders are the majority (about 80 per cent reported) and given their small or little landholding, chicken production has been among the major project support activities. On the other hand, in PADEE, with more support for market-oriented agriculture, IDPoor card holders are about or less than 20 per cent, while the project also introduced non-land-based activities such as handicrafts, which is in particular relevant for the land-poor and women. Albeit such differences, the groups in both projects include non IDPoor card holders, possibly also because of declining poverty rate. Visits to TSSD- and PADEE-supported groups confirmed the importance to management, technology development, market access and sustainability of having the better educated and socially better-off as members of the groups.

[98] For example, RULIP had three categories of beneficiaries, placing the poorest households in most vulnerable family groups, poor households in livelihood improvement groups (LIGs), and medium households in farming systems improvement groups (FSIGs). However, support for the latter was discontinued after the MTR. In CBRDP, the approach of placing identified poor households into different categories of groups based on poverty status was less systematic, perhaps also because that the project was co-financed with GTZ and building on GTZ interventions, rather than designed mainly by IFAD. CBRDP design still proposed the identificafication of the poor and the most vulnerable families based on participatory processes, wealth ranking and other methods, but the project design did not propose placing them in separate groups. It is after MTR the project introduced a separate grouping of "most vulnerable families" to be provided with training and revolving fund support with additionally mobilized IFAD grant, but this was a small portion and only for the very poor/poorest.

[99] The original TSSD design envisaged two possible types of LIGs along the lines of the previous projects: one with a little land with farming activities and the other with no land who wish to engage in non-agricultural activities. But in actual implementation, there was no such separation of different types of groups.

101. **The recent shift in targeting approach is relevant, although it came with some delays considering the developments in the rural context**. The target group of ASPIRE is defined as farmers who can produce for the market and own consumption, as "IFAD's comparative advantage lies in assisting this group rather than chronically poor people with no productive resources, the land-poor who cannot produce for the market or better-off farmers (as out-growers)".[100] AIMS focuses support on farmers with interest in and capacity for participating in value chains, including the poor, as well as on a secondary target group of value chain actors comprising cooperatives, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), agribusinesses, etc. The aim is to make value chain integration attractive to the younger generation of farmers by turning farming into a profitable business, with competitive returns to labour so that the young do not leave in mass for better-paid jobs in the towns. Such focus is relevant as massive migration due to salary-earning opportunities (e.g. garment factories) has reduced the importance of agriculture as a main income source and resulted in labor shortages in rural areas.

102. **Design issues and adaptations. The initial design of several projects had to be revised during implementation** in order to address design deficiencies or changes in institutional context that were unforeseeable at design stage. In the latter case IFAD should be commended for its flexibility. For example, in CBRDP, the Provincial Department of Rural Development was initially responsible for implementation of the rural infrastructure component but after introduction of elected commune councils in 2002, the project established in 2005 a Rural Infrastructure Fund, which transferred contributions to the communes for prioritization and implementation by commune councils.

103. There have been flaws in some designs, such as mismatch between the budget and expected outcomes (e.g. for natural resource management in RPRP[101]), numerous challenges owing to original design in TSSD,[102]excessive number of monitoring indicators (CBRDP PPA), implicit flawed assumptions on access to water or labour availability for trained farmers to apply improved technologies (RULIP PPE). Some design issues were however also addressed during implementing through annual work planning and budgeting processes, supervision missions or mid-term reviews.

104. Some designs suffer from the "Christmas tree syndrome" with weak internal coherence between different components/elements where one project has a highly diverse menu and attempts to address many different policy concerns with a limited budget, resulting in resources being thinly spread and a large number of implementing partners, thus with coordination challenges. The feasibility and implementation procedures for these "add-ons" are often not properly assessed at design stage, for example, for e-kiosks in TSSD, low-cost bio-digesters in PADEE, numerous "non-core activities" in RULIP (e.g. young farmers' clubs) which were discontinued at MTR.[103] When these are included in design without adequate preparation as small add-ons not directly related to the main project focus, major results and outcomes become less likely. However, while the original plan to roll out

[100] ASPIRE president's report.
[101] The RPRP PPA noted that with only one per cent of the budget allocated to natural resources and environmental management it was not realistic that "the target households would be able manage their natural resources in a sustainable manner"
[102] Memorandum of understanding, TSSD project review mission led by ADB (July 2011): "The major implementation challenges in the original project design include: (i) ambitious decentralized implementation; (ii) imbalanced budget allocation and limited direct beneficiary coverage for production enhancement support; (iii) complex implementation arrangements; (iv) complex fund flow management; (v) inappropriate packaging of consulting services; and (vi) inadequate indicators.
[103] For the pilot project to establish e-kiosks in TSSD, initial design underwent several changes but no significant outcomes were produced. PADEE design included a pilot programme of introducing low-cost (<US$300) bio-digesters but it was a problem to identify such. RULIP design also included what was called by later IFAD missions as "non-core activities" – such as young farmers' clubs, women's groups, law awareness - which were discontinued based on MTR recommendation.

bio-digesters in PADEE was dropped, a low-cost design is being explored under S-RET.

105. **Another contributing factor to the complexity of more recent designs could be the significant increase in IFAD-financing.** Initially the IFAD financing per project was less than US$10 million but is now close to US$40 million for the last three projects. This, coupled with less concessional financing terms (with non-availability of DSF grant) and the Government's increasing attention to grant element, may explain the concern to balance the allocation between "software" (e.g. training, technical assistance) and "hardware" (e.g. infrastructure) and why ASPIRE comprises two highly different programmes with unclear linkage: (i) an ambitious national policy-oriented sub-sector programme for agricultural training, education and extension; and (ii) investment in climate-resilient and climate-adaptive productive agricultural infrastructure (e.g. irrigation, dykes, drainage).

106. **Not always did project designs fully capture the experiences and lessons from previous projects for better implementation**. Support for linking farmers and GRFs to MFIs was repeated three times, in the design of RULIP, TSSD and PADEE, however without major results. The issue of GRF sustainability has emerged in ADESS, CBRDP, RPRP, TSSD and PADEE when the projects approached completion rather than being addressed at design stage. The PADEE design reflected on lessons from the previous project experience on GRF and introduced a number of measures to address weaknesses identified[104] (hence, the term "improved" GRF=IGRF), but still, the design was short of a clear vision with regard to what should happen to IGRFs and groups after project closure – whether they are to be a basis for a long-term development path or an intermediate (and temporary) step (see also paragraph 98 and the section on sustainability).

107. **Agricultural development support with GRFs. Consideration of labour availability for agriculture came into project designs belatedly**. The agricultural components have been designed with the objective to improve agricultural productivity and diversification. Agricultural productivity has been defined as crop yield per hectare with the exception of PADEE and AIMS with an explicit notion of "return to labour", which for some years has been relevant to the changing rural context where many households face labour shortages due to outmigration. This issue was not adequately considered in earlier projects, which included the promotion of labour intensive production methods, like transplanting (instead of broadcasting), with limited adoption due to labour shortages.

108. **Approach and modality of farmer training and extension has had weaknesses, but have improved over time**. Agricultural technology transfer is generally sought by inviting GRF/LIG members to participate in training (often in the form of farmer field schools, FFS[105]). The menu of training topics (products and technologies) was largely fixed by the projects and, though needs assessments are conducted in some cases, a standard package is generally offered to the entire project target group, without adequately taking into consideration agro-ecological and socio-cultural differences. However, over time the portfolio has introduced

[104] These included conditional cash transfer in three tranches based on performance, use of external service providers to carry out record keeping, accounting and reporting, increased size of the group to 50 members for economies of scale. It has been noted from interviews with IFAD and key informants that initial concept for PADEE did not include the GRF support but it was included in the design based on a strong request by the Government with its emphasis on farmer organizations/agricultural cooperatives as a key entry point (letter dated 22 March 2010 from MAFF to IFAD country programme manager containing comments on the aide memoire of the World Bank/IFAD joint project preparation mission). The design team then sought to address some of the weaknesses identified in earlier projects.

[105] What is called "FFS" in Cambodia mostly comprises establishment of a demonstration plot at the field of a more advanced farmer who receives inputs and materials for the demonstration and, according to the CSPE's field visits, all training takes place at the demonstration plot. This approach is different from the FFS approach applied in some other countries, where training on a rotating basis is delivered in the farms of all or most of the students, allowing for development of context-specific solutions and engaging farmers in "action-research".

more tailor-made and demand-driven service provision also taking into consideration marketing issues, notably in PADEE but also in TSSD.

109. **GRF support had some relevance in the rural context in the early projects, but increasingly less so**. The earlier projects separated the targeted beneficiaries for agricultural training into different categories and only the groups of very poor received GRF support. The rationale was that the very poor households could not borrow from MFIs or others to buy the inputs and materials that were required to adopt the technologies they had learned in the training. GRFs were also expected to cater for emergency needs. These had some relevance and validity in the rural context at the time of design of early projects. However, with increasing availability of microfinance services and remittances, the relevance of GRFs as a source of liquidity and agricultural input finance for the poor has declined, as was also noted in the ASPIRE design.[106]

110. The second rationale for providing the GRF support only to the groups of very poor was that this was needed to incentivize households to participate in the groups and training.[107] This rationale can be debated. In fact, the risk is that it may create a situation where farmers participate in training because of the GRF subsidy rather than their being truly interested in the content of the training.

111. **Project designs have given little consideration to the GRFs' fate after projects**. Even though in earlier projects GRFs were seen as a means to promote agricultural technology adoption and not as a main objective, supervision mission and review reports have shown concerns for the sustainability of GRF. Project designs were silent on what should happen to GRFs after the project (e.g. should they be "written off" and left to the groups?), nor did they present a vision for a long-term development path for GRFs or for access to finance. Institutional development activities are considered only when the project is about to end. Project designs generally gave little consideration to savings mobilization in conjunction with GRF, despite the fact that the importance of integrating savings in the community-based lending model had already been well-recognized from earlier years.[108]

112. The early projects provided agricultural inputs to be repaid to establish the GRF. Later projects changed to cash transfers based a fixed amount per member (e.g. US$240 in PADEE) and this has created the perception among members that they have an "entitlement" to borrow at least this allocated amount and for this reason members are generally reluctant to accept new members since this could reduce their "entitlement". Thus, groups are bound to remain small. The majority of GRFs have a capital increase during the project period, but overall the loan amounts remain small and insufficient to meet the needs of successful expanding smallholders. Partnership with formal financial institutions is limited to safekeeping of funds and no groups have accessed loans from MFIs to leverage their own resources.

113. **Recently introduced approach of training smaller farmer groups in specific topics is relevant**. The model of "technology transfer + GRF" was discontinued in recent projects, ASPIRE and AIMS. Already in PADEE the linkage was relaxed. It

[106] The ASPIRE design document noted that the project "moves on from previous country programme practice in one important respect in that it does not include a component of finance for agriculture inputs. Although the poor have less access and pay higher interest rates than better off farmers, the range of credit options open to them has increased and includes tailored MFI products such as mutual guarantee group loans (avoiding need for collateral), increasingly formalised credit from input suppliers and a significant presence of savings groups and credit cooperatives as well as the traditional informal money market"

[107] This rationale was clearly expressed in discussions with project staff though not always explicit in design documents.

[108] For example, CGAP's 2006 brief noted that while recognizing promising results of community-managed loan funds and savings-based groups in remote or sparsely populated areas, financing them with external capital at the outset (e.g. revolving loan funds) would often lead to poor repayment rates and the collapse of the fund (CGAP 2006)

was recognized that the 50 members of the improved GRF (IGRF)[109] group seldom would have common technology support priorities and after the MTR, common interest groups (CIGs) were introduced. A CIG is a smaller group of farmers (5-15) with a common interest, e.g. cultivation of mushrooms, and often an interest in joint marketing. CIG members may include farmers who are not members of the IGRF.

114. **The fundamental issue with "training plus GRF" was ambiguity of the purpose of project-driven groups and rigid approach to group formation.** The main role of the groups has been to receive the projects' technical support and financial support for GRF. The group size – except for PADEE and other cases – was more or less fixed at around 25-30, mainly to keep the group size manageable for training, and possibly also to manage the physical targets (i.e. number of beneficiaries and groups). The group configuration (i.e. very poor vs. poor) was also fixed. Project designs lacked reflection, in the given and evolving rural contexts, on the potential of rural organizations over a long-term, or whether groups were to be only temporary mechanisms to channel project support.

115. **Support for RGC's D&D policy**: **The project designs have been relevant in supporting the RGC's evolving D&D policy.** The support has not been in the form of general free-standing capacity development component/activities for the D&D process but rather through giving the responsibilities for project-financed service delivery and infrastructure investments ("learning by doing"), which gradually have been transferred from central ministries to their provincial and district units (deconcentration) and to elected commune councils (decentralization). Support for local infrastructure, such as rural roads and drinking water facilities, within the D&D framework (CBRDP, RPRP, TSSD), has also been highly relevant given limited access to rural infrastructure and potential impact on rural livelihoods.

116. The portfolio has been flexible in adapting to the evolving D&D process. The responsibility for managing infrastructure investments was during implementation of CBRDP transferred to the newly elected commune councils in 2005. The engagement of commune councils in the formation and oversight of project groups and in contracting/appointing of service providers such as CEWs and VAHWs has also contributed to developing the local capacity, which provides the basis for the increasing RGC allocations to sub-national units. The involvement of commune councils has been more direct and close in TSSD, also given that support to beneficiary groups (livelihoods improvement groups) has been managed directly under NCDDS and sub-national administrations, unlike other projects where commune councils are involved through PDAFF.

117. **Design of ASPIRE. The design is complex and ambitious** in terms of the different nature of interventions and institutional set-up. Similar comment was made in the IFAD internal design quality assurance process.[110] The design applies a programmatic approach as a comprehensive sub-sector programme. It comprises: (i) three components with seven sub-components, supporting the development of the national agricultural education, training and extension system, implemented by MAFF centrally and through the PDAFF in 10 provinces in two phases by sub-national entities; and (ii) one component providing funds for decentralized investments in climate-resilient infrastructure, implemented by NCDDS through the districts. In addition there is a component for management and a steering committee, chaired by both MAFF and MEF, providing oversight and coordination.

[109] In PADEE, presumably in order to emphasize the change and improvement in how GRFs are set up and to differentiate it from earlier groups such as livelihoods improvement groups, the term "improved GRF" (IGRF) was introduced.

[110] The IFAD quality assurance meeting, 10 October 2014 noted: "The current design is an unfortunate mixture of institutional change and action on the ground which adds greatly to the complexity and threatens what at heart could be an extremely good project".

118. The design envisages that ASPIRE will help establish a resource mobilization framework to support a programme-based approach to extension where other development partners will provide financing for the extension policy and model, with an assumption that government's financing for agricultural extension will significantly increase. [111] These are part of MAFF's 2015 Policy on Agricultural Extension, but they are based on uncertain assumptions: ASPIRE design is not the result of a joint effort by several development partners aiming for a programme approach and a significant increase in the government budget allocation is a uncertain proposition – at least at the moment. The complexities of design, resulting in coordination challenges, and the relative modest capacity of MAFF to receive such large support, have challenged the implementation so far.

119. **Design of AIMS. The overall objective and direction is highly relevant to the Government policy and current contextual needs, but flexibility and adaptations in implementation will be important**. The design tends to approach value chain development through well-coordinated planning where all relevant stakeholders develop and agree on "a value chain development plan", whereas the reality is that private enterprises and farmers often taken individual decisions driven by (unforeseen) market opportunities and dynamics rather than detailed plans. Probably partly because of the emphasis on planning and coordination, the design is highly staff-intensive which could create sustainability challenges, in particular for the Ministry of Commerce with the lowest share of government budget. Some deficiencies and risks suggest the need for flexibility to make design adaptations during implementation.

120. **Summary.** Overall for the evaluated portfolio, relevance is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**. This considers a satisfactory definition of project objectives and focus, overall aligned to IFAD and RGC policies and relevant to the rural context albeit with some delays, and at the same time some deficiencies in design, proposed strategies and approaches for achieving the objectives and intended outcomes (such as targeting approach, complexity, weak internal coherence).

Effectiveness[112]

121. The effectiveness criterion assesses the extent to which the interventions have met (or are expected to meet) their objectives. This section focuses on outreach, and outcomes and initial effects of the projects, whereas broader and longer-term effects and impact will be discussed in section on rural poverty impact. The assessment is organized around the following main objectives or elements of the portfolio: (i) improved agricultural technologies and practices (including investments in irrigation); (ii) improved access to finance (mostly linked to agricultural production support); and (iii) improved local services and infrastructure within the D&D process.

122. **Outreach**. The assessment has found inconsistencies in the outreach targets (e.g. between basic project documents[113]) and uncertainty on how the counting was done for targets and reporting except for the number of group members (targets and actual). The targets were revised downward in RULIP and PADEE at MTR to

[111] Historically, the Government budget is only a fraction of the aid-financing of extension services. According to the World Bank 2017 Agriculture Public Expenditure Review, in 2015 the MAFF/RGC budget allocated 3.4 billion riel for extension services and farmer organizations whereas all development partners combined provided 52.5 billion riel for extension services through projects.

[112] IOE's evaluations of the first three projects all assessed the effectiveness as moderately satisfactory (4). For CBRDP, the IOE rating was better than the self-rating by IFAD (moderately unsatisfactory) based on lack of comprehensive assessment of effectiveness in the PCR. For RPRP and RULIP, IOE rating was lower than the self-assessment by IFAD, "satisfactory".

[113] For example, the RULIP appraisal report provided the target of 22,600 households as direct beneficiaries and 11,300 as indirect beneficiaries, whereas the financing agreement refers to 60,000 poor households. In case of TSSD, the summary section of the design report as well as the financial agreemen indicates 630,000 households but the appendix on economic analysis in the design report mentions 500,000.

reflect what was deemed realistic at the time. RPRP, PADEE and TSSD have almost exactly achieved their initial targets for project-created groups and their members (table below and table (a) in annex XI). While this is positive, it can be argued that the emphasis on physical targets may have indirectly encouraged a top-down and inflexible approach to group formation, requiring all groups to be of a certain size and neglecting different social dynamics of the various locations.

Table 5
Objectives, main elements and planned and actual outreach by project

	Main project elements [1)]	***Targeted beneficiaries***	***Reported/estimated number of beneficiaries***
CBRDP	Agriculture, D&D capacity, rural infrastructure	49,600 HHs (text) or 39,150 HHs (logframe)	165,575 HHs (NB. Labelled "direct" but this seems to include those who would be considered as "indirect" beneficiaries)
RPRP	Agriculture, D&D capacity, rural infrastructure	120,600 HHs, including 50,400 HHs through groups and indirect beneficiaries of about 37,000)	Direct: 50,400 HHs (exactly the original target for groups, through 2,016 groups equally divided to two categories) Indirect: 90,210 HHs
RULIP	Agriculture, D&D capacity, policy analysis	22,600 HHs (direct). Target for direct beneficiary HHs revised to 14,8000 at MTR	Direct: 15,669 HHs (meeting the revised target but not the original) Indirect: 8,500 HHs
TSSD	Agriculture, infrastructure, D&D capacity, access to MFIs, e-kiosks and ICT, policy & regulations	Through groups: 30,975 HHs (1,239 groups, 25 members each) In total 630,000 resource poor HHs (mainly from infrastructure) –	30,000 HHs through 1,241 groups (i.e. met the target for group formation). Commune infrastructure [ADB financed]: 373,092 HHs (direct + indirect)
PADEE	Financial services, access to technology and markets (incl. non-land-based activities), pro-poor bio-digesters	90,000 rural HHs (49,000 HHs through IGRF groups to be established in the project, but also included existing farmer organizations, etc.) The target changed to 68,200 at MTR	88,986 HHs (incl. 49,200 HH members of IGRFs) (according to data submitted by MAFF, December 2017)
	TOTAL	*Low estimate (direct):* ***203,550 HHs*** [a] *High estimate:* ***912,800 HHs***	*Low estimate (direct):* ***239,700 HHs*** [b] *High estimate:* ***782,646 HHs*** [c]

Source: PPAs, PPE, PCR, supervision/implementation support mission reports.
[a] Targets for direct beneficiaries and/or revised (downward) targets
[b] For CBRDP, one third of reported number considered, for TSSD, not including the beneficiaries from infrastructure.
[c] Including indirect beneficiaries and those from infrastructure.

123. CBRDP, RPRP and TSSD have rural infrastructure components for which it is more difficult to define the number of beneficiaries, more so for access roads, as compared to, for example, irrigation schemes. Nonetheless, CBRDP and RPRP appear to have reached the targeted number of beneficiaries from their infrastructure investments whereas the ADB-financed infrastructure component of TSSD is below initial targets. For rural roads, the beneficiaries are often labelled "indirect". However, the impact of having all-weather access to markets and services can be significant.

124. **Improved agricultural technologies and practices.** The projects promoted improved agricultural technologies mainly through training and extension services channelled through beneficiary groups established under the projects, often accompanied by GRF support. To put the project interventions into perspective, it should be underlined that Cambodia's agricultural development started at low level: very low productivity and negligible agricultural extension service delivery. "Improved technologies and practices" were not something particularly advanced, but rather relatively simple and basic good production practices, which however Cambodian farmers had not been sufficiently exposed to, particularly in earlier years. These include, for example, housing and better feeding for chicken, animal vaccination, making and use of composts, improved seeds, proper fertilizer application and weeding, etc. For rice, the training generally followed the methods under the system for rice intensification, known as SRI. [114] Some projects have also

[114] The system of rice intensification is a climate-smart, agro-ecological methodology for increasing the productivity of rice and more recently other crops changing the management of plants, soil, water and nutrients. The SRI methodology

supported irrigation infrastructure (CBRDP, RPRP and TSSD) aimed to increase yields, crop intensity and cultivated area.

125. **The portfolio has contributed to improving agricultural production practices by targeted farmers, although the extent has varied** influenced by various factors including the relevance of technologies, training modality/approach and effectiveness, prevailing conditions (e.g. access to inputs, water, markets) and capacity of farmers. Technology adoption and the data on adoption rates (usually measured as the proportion of trained farmers adopting certain techniques disseminated in training) are discussed below but some caveats should be kept in mind (see box 2). Contribution to agricultural production and productivity (beyond technology adoption) is discussed mainly in the section "rural poverty impact" later.

Box 2
Issues in measuring adoption rates and estimating production increase

Caution is needed in discussing adoption rates. For example, during the project all 25 LIG members may have participated in two or more training modules (e.g. rice, chicken, vegetables), each of which may include four or more "improved practices/technologies". Thus, a LIG member may during the project have been exposed to some 15-20 practices/technologies and it is likely that most, if not all, members would have adopted at least one of these practices. IOE's PPA of CBRDP presented project data indicating that 55,000 farmers had adopted one technology while only 11,000 had adopted more than three technologies. For some modules, it is seldom that farmers adopt all technologies, or they only do it partly, for example, they may use less fertilizer than recommended or only buy improved seeds every second year. There are often also synergies between some technologies: for example, an improved seed variety only achieves its yield potential if adequate fertilizers and water is applied. All these considerations indicate that one cannot use the crop budget based on the training module (where all improved practices are applied correctly and in right quantities) to estimate productivity and production changes. On the other hand, it is likely that some non-LIG members learn from the LIG members and adopt some technologies but data on this is not available.

126. The CBRDP PCR (and PPA) reported that: (i) the target indicator (16,000 adopters) was fully achieved if "adoption" means having adopted an average of 2-3 CBRDP recommended innovations; and (ii) estimated 100,000 farmers adopted at least one innovation. In the case of CBRDP, "adoption rate" as such was not presented and the three technologies with highest adoption rates were "cattle vaccination", followed by "use of compost" and "use of improved seeds". For RPRP, IOE's PPA found that the adoption rate of 78 per cent stated in the PCR was most likely inflated and re-estimated it to be around 55 per cent.

127. The RULIP PPE by IOE also found the adoption rates reported in the PCR (ranging between 77 and 85 per cent, except for cassava around 40 per cent) to be over-estimated, while the low figures reported in the end-line survey (not mentioned in the PCR) were based on inaccurate formula and too low. According to the PPE team's focus group discussions, for example for chicken raising which has been popular, 70 per cent of the participants had been adopters and 63 per cent continued being adopters. As for vegetable growing, 33 per cent had been adopters but that only 22 per cent continued. Vegetable growing was mostly limited to a small area around the house. A typical barrier for engaging in vegetable production was lack of access to water.

128. While all projects have promoted the system of rice intensification or SRI, few farmers have replaced the practice of broadcasting with transplanting, due to labour shortages, while more farmers apply improved seeds and composting/ fertilizer.

is based on four main principles: (i) early, quick and healthy plant establishment; (ii) reduced plant density; (iii) improved soil conditions through enrichment with organic matter; and (iv) reduced and controlled water application. (Source: Cornel University, http://sri.ciifad.cornell.edu/aboutsri/methods/index.html)

129. In TSSD as in RULIP, the top three training topics have been chicken, rice and vegetables. The CSPE mission's field visits to TSSD sites indicated a picture of adoption similar to that of RPRP and RULIP as found in the evaluations but also noted that TSSD during implementation has started to give priority to more tailor-made training and technical support, which may have resulted in higher adoption rates. Agricultural training and extension activities for LIG members in TSSD were largely focused on livestock enterprises (first and foremost chicken, but also pigs), facilitated by a service provider (a consulting firm), which has also supported training of VAHWs. The focus on livestock was relevant also given the high proportion of IDPoor[115] with little or no land and given increasing market demand.

130. **Less than expected uptake of improved techniques were in part due to weaknesses in the training and extension approach**, apart from lack of enabling conditions (e.g. lack of access to water or labour shortage). The emphasis on "demand-driven" nature of extension services and training has consistently been at the core of the projects, but the IOE evaluations of three projects found that often the training provided by the projects tended to be top-down and supply driven (e.g. largely based on standard packages, little consideration for markets), although some adjustments were introduced during the implementation (e.g. RULIP). Lack of follow up, mentoring and refresher training for farmers were also mentioned during the RULIP PPE focus group discussions.

131. **In the recent projects, there are further improvements in the approach to extension and training**. After the MTR, PADEE introduced "common interest groups" (CIGs), e.g. 7-15 farmers interested in growing mushrooms and doing joint marketing. Farmers who are not members of the IGRF groups may also participate in a CIG. Thus, there is no obligation or other pressure on farmers to participate in IGRF, and the technical support is designed according the demand of farmers and the market, and may also involve technical assistance to individual members. Therefore, adoption rates are likely to comparatively higher which is confirmed by the end-line survey finding adoption rates in the range of 63-100 per cent.

132. **The support to irrigation infrastructure in some projects[116] was not always effective.** RPRP constructed 463 km irrigation canals across 16 districts and CBRDP built seven irrigation schemes covering about 1,150 ha (for wet season[117]). In these projects, the physical targets for rehabilitation and construction of irrigation schemes were achieved overall, but as found in both CBRDP and RPRP PPAs, due to poor hydrological and engineering designs, farmers were only able to practice wet season supplemental irrigation and limited in dry season irrigation, which suppressed farm profitability and resulted in farmer dissatisfaction with services and unwillingness and incapacity to pay irrigation service fees with negative consequences on maintenance.

133. **Improved access to finance.** This objective was in many projects implicit and subsumed under agricultural production support, while it was also not necessarily limited to financing of agricultural inputs. Only in PADEE this outcome was explicit with a stand-alone component. The portfolio has sought to improve access to finance of the target group in two ways: (i) subsidies for establishing GRFs; and (ii) linking beneficiaries and their groups to formal sector finance (MFIs and banks). The latter was part of TSSD and PADEE but no substantial activities were implemented. This may partly be explained by lack of a clear strategy in the design

[115] According to the 2016 project review mission, 25 per cent was ID Poor 1, 56 per cent ID Poor 2, and 19 per cent non-ID Poor card holders.
[116] The ongoing TSSD has constructed irrigation structures covering 55,000 ha, which has been entirely funded by ADB.
[117] In CBRDP, the irrigations schemes in Kampot covered 400 ha in both seasons (wet and dry) and in Kampong Thom they covered 750 ha in the wet season and 70 ha in the dry season. (CBRDP PPA).

on how to do it but also by the fact that contextual developments (i.e. increased financial services in rural areas) reduced the need for this intervention.

134. **The GRF loans are likely to have supported the adoption of improved agricultural technologies, but this linkage has weakened with the context change**. With growing incomes, remittances and other loan sources, the GRF loans have become one of several sources of household liquidity for many households. In addition, common GRF operating modality for the purpose of simplicity – the same/similar amount for 6 or 12 months, with the entire principal being paid by the end of the term – also inevitably posed limitation to direct linkage with agricultural activities, as the loan period in most cases does not match the crop or livestock production cycles. This also raises a question on the relevance of "business planning" and cost-benefit analysis in the loan application process promoted by some projects (TSSD, PADEE), even if the intention may be good.[118] Generally high repayment rates in most GRFs have been reported and this is positive. At the same time, caution is needed in interpreting this as an indication that loans have been used for profitable investments, because all members know that soon after the end of the loan period and repayment, a new loan is released again – and also because of increasing other sources of incomes and remittances.

135. PADEE design differed from earlier projects and defined objectives and target indicators[119] for the improved GRFs (IGRFs) which were more of a financial character: (i) financial literacy; (ii) increase in IGRF capital (30 per cent after 3 years); (iii) payment of the services supporting IGRF operations; and (iv) 24,500 IGRF members have doubled their savings in their MFI/bank. The planned financial literacy training has been delivered but the majority of IGRFs will still need support from contracted "mobile field agents" when PADEE closes and there is at this stage uncertainty about whether IGRF groups will pay for the full costs (see section on sustainability). Overall the IGRF capital will increase though perhaps less than 30 per cent. The outcome target related to MFI/bank savings is likely to be met not because of the project, but perhaps for other reasons, such as remittances and work in textile factories.

136. **Improved local services and infrastructure within the D&D framework.** The projects have financed service delivery at commune and grassroots level through D&D system. In several cases, this has been done through contracting private/NGO service providers who have employed for example field extension agents or commune extension workers (CEWs) while engaging commune councils in the selection and oversight.

137. **CEWs hired by the projects have filled the gap left by the extremely limited government workforce in extension, but capacity issue remains.** The CEWs[120] have acted more as facilitators, assisting farmers to access services and manage their groups such as livelihoods improvement groups or cooperatives. Many of the CEWs are young and do not have any agricultural education or background but in principle they need two months of training in agricultural extension. They are supposed to receive specialized technical support from district agricultural offices or the service provider that engaged them. Capacity gap remains a critical issue at this level. At the same time, across the projects, their roles and required qualifications do not seem to be always clear, i.e. whether their main roles are facilitation and mobilization, support for non-agricultural activities (e.g. bookkeeping, group development), or agricultural advisory services.

[118] The CSPE mission met LIGs in Prey Veng province, which had been supported by RPRP and which after project closure had simplified the paperwork and abolished the written business plans. Instead they interviewed the borrower about the purpose; all business was allowed, weddings and similar not.
[119] President's Report, 3 April 2012
[120] According to the General Directorate of Agriculture, MAFF, there are some 1,000 CEWs in the country funded by different projects (including non-IFAD).

138. **The projects have also supported advanced farmers to provide support and advice to other farmers at village level but their effectiveness varies**. They are appointed and trained as "farmer promoters" (the term used in CBRDP), village extension workers (VEWs)[121] and/or VAHWs.[122] Support for VAHWs has been a common element in the portfolio and but they are often not provided with refresher training, good diagnostic backstopping, technical supervision and good vaccines. If they fail to generate an attractive income from the fees they charge their neighbours, they often stop serving as VAHWs. In RULIP, building a group of VEWs was difficult as they lacked capacity (most likely also due to lower capacity in project provinces compared to other provinces) and incentives.

139. PADEE has been piloting a different approach for "farmer-to-farmer" learning based on a study tour to Thailand in collaboration with an IFAD regional grant programme Routasia with PROCASUR, with "community learning centres" – basically at the farms of advanced and skilled farmers opened for other farmers to visit and learn from, against a fee. This may present an innovative approach but more research is needed to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

140. **The projects have provided the provincial departments (PDAFF, PDoWA, and rural development) and sub-national administrations with opportunities for "learning by doing".** This was done mainly through support for facilitation (transport, per diem etc.) and staff training: basically, the portfolio has not included any systematic and comprehensive capacity building support. The commune councils have been involved in village orientation meetings, farmer selection and group formation, solution of problems in groups, and monitoring agricultural training and other development activities such as: annual social audit or public hearing on GRF activities. Impact on these institutions is discussed in the section on rural poverty impact.

141. **The support for investments in rural infrastructure has overall achieved the physical targets while also contributing to the decentralization process**. In particular the portfolio (CBRDP, RPRP and TSSD) has made contribution to upgrading rural roads (a total of 2,686 km in three projects, see also table (b) in annex XI) which have improved access to markets and services, as observed during the CSPE field visits. After the MTR CBRDP, the prioritization and implementation oversight for rural road works was transferred from provincial level to the newly elected commune councils. However, there have been issues of quality and operation and maintenance, the latter especially in view of (perhaps unexpected) heavy traffic on rehabilitated roads.[123]

142. **Summary.** Overall the portfolio performance with regard to the effectiveness criterion is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**. This considers the mixed performance in achievement of outreach targets and variations in contributions to the development objective and in achieving targeted outcomes of components and sub-components. The projects contributed to improving agricultural production practices by the target group, but some weaknesses in training and extension approaches especially in earlier projects compromised the effectiveness and outcomes. GRFs are likely to have supported the adoption of improved agricultural technologies, but this linkage and the importance has declined with the context change such as the increased MFI services and remittances. All projects in the evaluated sample are rated moderately satisfactory (4) for this criterion, except for PADEE which is assessed as satisfactory (5).

Efficiency

[121] VEWs are usually former village livestock assistants who have received some training in crops but suppose to live from charging for livestock services. RULIP design included support to VEWs to take over the role of CEWs, but it was discontinued the lower capacity of the VEWs and a lack of incentive for them to remain active (RULIP PPE).
[122] According to MAFF, it is estimated that there are about than 15,000 VAHWs and 10,000 VEWs.
[123] CBRDP and RPRP PPAs.

143. The efficiency criterion provides a measure of how economically resources (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results. The standard indicator is the economic (or financial) internal rate of return (EIRR) which measures the stream of costs and benefits. Also other parameters and proxy indicators are used such as: (i) time lapse between loan approval and effectiveness; (ii) disbursement performance; (iii) project implementation and management processes; (iv) mobilization of additional financing; and (v) project management cost as percentage of total costs. The assessment focuses on five projects: CBRDP, RPRP, RULIP, TSSD and PADEE. However, for some proxy indicators data is also presented on the two older projects (APIP and ADESS) as well as for the more recent ASPIRE.

144. **Timeline. The Cambodia portfolio fares well in terms of the timeliness of key milestone events**, such as the time lapses between approval, signing, entry into force (effectiveness) and the first disbursement (see table 6). Except for TSSD, the project performance is significantly better than the average for the IFAD's Asia and the Pacific Region (APR) division (table (c) in annex XI for project specific data). TSSD suffered from slow start-up process (e.g. project staffing, preparation of work plan and budget, etc.) and slow implementation over the initial years, in part due to the design issues (see earlier footnote 104). The first withdrawal application was submitted in December 2010, about 10 months after the signing of the financing agreement with IFAD.

Table 6
Timeline between approval to first disbursement (months)

	Approval to signing	*Signing to effectiveness*	*Approval to effectiveness*	*Effectiveness to first disbursement*	*Approval to first disbursement*
Cambodia portfolio average (6 projects)	1.54	3.17	4.00	3.50	6.63
APR average*	4.33	7.24	11.56	8.73	17.68

* APR average for projects approved since 2000

145. Except for CBRDP, projects have been completed and closed according to the timeline defined in the original financing agreement. For CBRDP, loan closing was extended for two years.[124]

146. **Disbursements. The disbursement profile of the IFAD portfolio in Cambodia has been mixed, largely positive but with some outliers** (table 7). For the three completed projects (CBRDP, RPRP and RULIP), the disbursement rates at financial closing were 93, 97 and 96 per cent, respectively (table (d) in annex XI), though CBRDP achieved this with a two-year extension.

Table 7
Overall disbursement rates for ongoing projects (as of June 2017)

Project ID	*Project name*	*Financing (as approved, in approx. US$ 'million)*	*Implementation period (years)*	*Completion date*	*Disbursement rate (as at June 2017)*
1464	TSSD	13.38	7.5	31/08/2017	100
1559	PADEE	37.90 [a]	6	30/06/2018	94.8
1559	S-RET (GEF grant)	4.6	4	31/12/2020	10.9
1703	ASPIRE (loan)	26.13	7	31/03/2022	5.3
1703	ASPIRE (ASAP grant)	15	7	31/03/2022	33.2

[a] Total amount including supplementary financing approved later on.

[124] The main rationale for the two extensions in CBRDP was provided as follows: (i) the need to complete the delayed civil works for an irrigation scheme; (ii) provision of further support for the most vulnerable families to "respond to the rising food and commodity prices" - also given that there was still unspent balance in the loan and grant. In addition to CBRDP, for the older project APIP, the loan closing was extended for three years.

147. **The disbursement performance <u>during</u> implementation has been in the range of moderately satisfactory and satisfactory, except for the initial years of TSSD and at present ASPIRE**. The disbursement performance of TSSD improved significantly after the latter part of 2013[125], which coincides with the time when IFAD began to be involved more in project review missions organized by ADB as a cooperative institution.[126] The comparison of expected and actual disbursement and disbursement lag[127] (figure 8) shows that except for TSSD and ASPIRE, the disbursement has been always ahead of or close to the expected level. As of September 2017 (2.5 years after entry into force), the disbursement of the IFAD loan for ASPIRE was 5 per cent, slower than the ASAP grant (33 per cent) and the disbursement performance was rated as moderately unsatisfactory in the latest project status report (October 2017).

Figure 8
Disbursement lag



Source IFAD database (Oracle Business Intelligence) and annual portfolio review reports by the Asia and the Pacific Division. The data for 2016-2017 as of March 2017. For TSSD, PADEE and ASPIRE, disbursement rates are worked out for the total amount and not for each loan or grant. Negative figures mean faster disbursement than expected and positive figures indicate slower disbursement

148. **<u>Unit cost for rural infrastructure</u>.** The CBRDP PPA noted that the average unit investment costs for irrigation, access roads, and periodic maintenance are all within or well below the regional norms. According to the RPRP PPA, based on the PCR prepared by IFAD, the unit costs for irrigation and rural roads were found to have been relatively low (e.g. US$271/ha for irrigation rehabilitation, compared to US$477/ha for CBRDP). However, it is difficult to make a meaningful comparison between them and also with country/regional norms as these costs are influenced by various factors (e.g. locations, materials, level of "rehabilitation" or technologies required, and quality). A key point is that according to the available data the portfolio has not seen excessive and unreasonable cost for infrastructure works.

149. **<u>Implementation management and process</u>. A number of management and process issues have negatively affected the efficiency**. For the closed projects, these include weak cash flow management and control, procurement delays (RULIP), sub-optimal quality of group formation process in the initial period in RULIP leading to a substantial reduction in the target, poor quality of infrastructure and maintenance issues (CBRDP, RPRP), lower-than-expected adoption rates of improved technologies (RULIP, RPRP), and lower than expected cropping intensity in irrigation (CBRDP). Slow implementation in the early years of TSSD and current ASPIRE also affect efficiency. The country portfolio reviews of 2015 and 2017 highlighted that the Cambodia country programme is below the

[125] While the first disbursement of the IFAD financing was made in January 2011, there was no disbursement after this until August 2013.
[126] The partiticipation of IFAD staff and/or consultants in ADB-organized missions in a substantive manner is indicated in the aide memoires for the msisions after May 2013.
[127] As part of annual portfolio exercise by the IFAD Programme Management Department, expected disbursement profiles are worked out for each type of project (such as credit, livestock, research, etc.) based on the analysis of all historical loan disbursement performance. The disbursement lag is calculated as follows: [(expected disbursement amount) – (actual disbursement amount)]/expected disbursement amount..

regional averages for "compliance with IFAD procurement guidelines" and "M&E systems".

150. **Project management cost as proportion of total project cost is comparable to the IFAD standard.**[128] An analysis of the data on "financing by component" in the IFAD system shows that in the approved designs of all eight projects the average budget for management and coordination is 10.5 per cent of the total budget (see figure 7 in earlier section).

151. **The level of "operating costs" in the portfolio is within the reasonable range**. The analysis of financing by "category"[129] shows the proportion of "operating costs" to be 14.5 per cent across the portfolio (after CBRDP) with a wide variation between the projects. The case of TSSD (0 per cent) is particular since the financing was restructured for IFAD to finance only one component (livelihoods improvement), and what would normally be considered as "operating costs" were taken up mainly by the ADB. The higher proportion of "operating costs" for CBRDP, RPRP, RULIP and PADEE is due to the provision of salaries for contract staff and supplementary allowance (over normal civil servant remuneration) for being involved in project-related work. The unit cost is small but the number of persons eligible for such staff cost and allowance is high. Furthermore, in the case of PADEE, the cost of project implementing partners was also classified as "operating costs" and this also adds up.

152. **Economic efficiency. The EIRRs estimated by the CSPE are mostly above the opportunity costs of capital (12 per cent),**[130] **although they tend to be lower than indicated in self-assessment.** Estimating the likely EIRR *ex post* at project closure is challenging due to lack of reliable data on (net) benefits, issues related to the sustainability of benefits and the attribution of benefits to the projects. According to the CSPE review, economic and financial analysis presented at completion has tended to overestimate EIRRs due to the following:

- Key parameters in the economic and financial analysis (e.g. adoption rates, crop yields, etc.) were mainly obtained from project impact assessments, which tended to overestimate the net profits (RPRP and RULIP).
- The yield difference between the with- and without-project models were over-estimated (e.g. TSSD[131]).
- Most of the economic and financial analysis did not place a value on farmers' time and overlooked farmers' opportunity costs of attending training sessions.
- The CSPE field observations suggest that the assumption on continuation of project benefits used in the analysis was likely to be overestimated (e.g. TSSD and PADEE[132]): e.g. chicken raising can provide high returns but is risky with animal diseases and low level of vaccination.

153. Based on analysis of available documents and the excel files used for the economic and financial analysis by the projects/IFAD, the CSPE has recalibrated the EIRRs for

[128] The IFAD publication, "Effective project management arrangements for agricultural projects: A synthesis of selected case studies and quantitative analysis (IFAD 2014)" indicated that "IFAD's overall project management costs generally ranged between 8-24 per cent of programme costs". The Annual Report on Results and Impact 2014 by IOE included a learning theme of "project management" and indicated that "project management costs average approximately 10 per cent of total project costs in the projects reviewed

[129] Based on "super category" as recorded in IFAD database. Actual allocation used for closed projects and latest planned allocation used for ongoing projects (PADEE, ASPIRE and AIMS).

[130] For calculation of net present value, IFAD has been using a discount rate of 12 per cent (= opportunity cost of capital). For APIP and ADESS, estimated EIRR at design were 38 and 17.9 per cent, respectively.

[131] For TSSD, on average, the yield under *with project* scenario is about 1.8 times of the *without project* scenario across five different commodities, which seems to be too optimistic based on CSPE team's field visits and project survey data from other IFAD projects in the country (e.g. RULIP, PADEE).

[132] For TSSD, the model did not take into account the sustainability issue with project benefits (e.g. rundown of the infrastructure without proper maintenance (mainly for road)). As for PADEE, the economic analysis assumed full realization of the project economic benefits from year 5 to year 13 based on 100 per cent sustainability of the group activities after project closure for seven years

five projects (table 8) by correcting some of the inputs. The difference in EIRR estimates between design, completion, and the CSPE recalibration can be due to the following factors, in addition to over-estimation of incremental unit benefit as described above[133]:

- *Change of timeline:* Implementation of some projects was delayed which negatively impacted on the EIRR as it postponed project benefits further into the future (CBRDP, TSSD). CBRDP's loan closing date was extended for two years, and TSSD had a long period of delays at its initial stage.
- *Increased project costs*: Increased project costs could negatively impact on EIRR unless the benefits also increase. This was the case in RULIP and PADEE, both of which had supplementary financing funds during project implementation.
- *Decrease in actual outreach number:* A decrease in the number of beneficiaries actually reached will reduce the EIRR if other factors stay the same (RULIP).
- *Change of commodity prices*: RPRP estimated an extremely high EIRR (62 per cent) at completion as it used the high prices that temporarily applied during the food price surge in 2008, while maintaining input costs constant. The recalibration in RPRP PPA arrived at a lower EIRR of 27.5 per cent applying the overall price trend over the project duration.

154. For CBRDP and RULIP the recalibrated EIRRs do raise a question as to whether the allocation of funds for the projects was economically efficient. In the case of CBRDP, the explanatory factors for the unsatisfactory EIRR include change of time line and poor performance of some rehabilitated irrigation schemes. For RULIP, a combination of the reduction of outreach, increased financing and lower adoption rates than expected negatively affected the EIRR. [134]

Table 8
Economic internal rate of return (EIRR): estimates at design, completion and recalibrated by CSPE

Project	*EIRR*		*CSPE recalibration*	*Inflation, average consumer prices in project period (annual %)*	*Factors affecting the efficiency level****
	Design (%)	Completion (%)			
CBRDP	17	None	>10	5.81	Change of timeline (-)
RPRP	19.1	62	27.5	7.24	Change of commodity prices (-/+)
RULIP	11	35	7-12	6.40	Change of project costs & change of actual outreach number (-)
TSSD	43.7-50.3	26*	26% seems reasonable	3.35	Change of timeline (-)
PADEE	19.2		13.8**	2.79	Change of project costs (-)

Source: Project design reports, completion reports, working files for economic and financial analysis and World Bank Development Indicators 2017. IOE's recalibration for CBRDP, RPRP and RULIP is based on the project evaluations by IOE.
Notes: * Source: "Financial and Economic Analysis of Project Implementation Completion: TSSD1" (February 2017). This analysis was based on the total project cost including the ADB financing but the estimated benefits were limited to those accrued to LIG members only and not others benefiting from other interventions. Therefore, even though the unit benefits for LIG members may have been overestimated, overall the estimated EIRR of 26 per cent can be considered reasonable.
** This estimation is mainly based on the end-line household survey (2017), which showed a less than expected results for the crop yields across six different commodities. Using the original model and sensitivity analysis at the design stage, the CSPE team re-estimated the EIRR based upon a 20 per cent decrease of benefit to better reflect the survey results.
*** (+) indicates a positive effect on the design estimate of EIRR, (-) a negative effect.

[133] The CSPE recalibration includes other corrections that are not mentioned in the table, e.g. formula errors, unrealistic net profits and adoption rates, flawed calculation of labour costs, etc.
[134] In addition, the the calculation in the RULIP PCR needed to be adjusted, including: (i) formula errors in the excel file; (ii) unrealistic estimate of contribution of cucumber production to benefits, in terms of number of adopters and benefits per household (US$1,000 per HH); and (iii) overestimated technology adoption rates.

155. **Summary.** The CSPE assesses portfolio performance on the efficiency criterion as **moderately satisfactory (4)**. This considers largely satisfactory performance on various timeliness parameters, mixed – but overall positive than negative - disbursement performance, moderately unsatisfactory performance in procurement and M&E, and EIRRs that are below those estimated at design stage but are still comfortably in the positive zone for 3 out of 5 projects. The CSPE finds that all projects, for which efficiency can be assessed, have an efficiency performance in the satisfactory and moderately satisfactory zone, except for RULIP, which was assessed as moderately unsatisfactory on the efficiency criterion.

Rural poverty impact

156. This section provides an assessment of the projects' impact on rural poverty, specifically for the following impact domains: (i) household income and net assets; (ii) human and social capital and empowerment; (iii) food security and agricultural productivity; and (iv) institutions and policies.

157. The main **impact pathways** envisaged in the projects can be described as follows: (i) enhanced agricultural productivity and diversification through technology transfer and improved irrigation systems (in all projects); (ii) enhanced market access through better road connection (CBRDP, RPRP, TSSD) and/or promotion of market linkages (mainly PADEE); (iii) income gains (and asset increase) from increased (and profitable) productive activities facilitated by access to credits and economic diversification; and (iv) enhanced human and social capital through skills training and development of community infrastructure.

158. There are challenges in estimating the magnitude of the impact and determining if the impact can be attributed to the project interventions. There are limited reliable data for estimating impact although over the period, data quality has improved (see table (f) in annex XI describing the available data). The before-after comparison is in some cases invalidated by good weather conditions in the "before-situation" and bad weather conditions in the "after-situation" (e.g. PADEE) or price changes between the two situations. The comparison of "with-project" and "without-project" is likewise constrained by lack of counterfactual data and where an attempt is made to analyse treatment groups and control groups, the socio-economic features of the two groups may be too different for making a valid comparison. Finally, the with-without project analysis could in theory exaggerate impact because the project may not only have a positive impact on project beneficiaries but also a negative impact on non-beneficiaries. For example, the RULIP PCR, based on the survey data, discussed the possibility that project-related activities could dominate the workload of provincial/district government staff and diverting resources and attention away from non-project areas within the province or the district.[135]

159. The CSPE team analysed a change in the proportion of IDPoor card holders in the villages covered in TSSD and PADEE, compared with other villages in the same provinces without IFAD-supported intervention. It should be noted the IDPoor card holders were not necessarily the project beneficiaries: TSSD used it as a main targeting benchmark for outreach, but less of importance for PADEE. PADEE did not exclude better off farmers and overall about 20 per cent of the beneficiaries were IDPoor households. While the results cannot be attributed to the projects, the aim was to understand the trend. The analysis is presented in annex XIII.

160. **Household income and net assets.** Across the country, most rural households have significantly improved their incomes and assets over the evaluated period. The main contribution has come from wages and salaries, which by 2015

[135] Referring to the end-line survey results showing much higher usage of PDAFF/district agricultural office services in project households (67 per cent) than in the control group (16 per cent), the RULIP PCR noted that this may be "due to RULIP activities dominating the workload and available training budgets of the district and provincial agricultural teams".

constituted 48 per cent of total rural household income whereas income from self-employment only constituted 45 per cent of which agriculture accounted for 49 per cent. The proportion of agriculture income over total income dropped significantly from 33.6 per cent in 2009 to 22 per cent in 2015 (CSES 2009–2015). During the field visits, the CSPE noted that many households recently had constructed a new house, at a cost of about US$15,000, which was financed from salaries, remittances and MFI loans. Given this overall trend, it is difficult to assess how agricultural incomes, even where increased, may have contributed to reducing rural poverty. The assessment using household assets as an indicator faces similar challenges.

161. **While the increase in household income and assets cannot be attributed to agriculture and the portfolio, based on various data, it is fair to say that the portfolio has contributed in various ways.** Based on the effective assessment in earlier section, the contribution to households incomes has been through: (i) better crop management increasing yields of traditional crops (rice, cassava) and irrigation increasing crop production; (ii) introduction of high-value crops (vegetables) and improved animal husbandry (poultry); (iii) establishment of non-land-based activities (handicrafts, bean sprout production etc.) diversifying the income sources, especially during the dry seasons; (iv) rural infrastructure (3 projects) comprising roads, which improve market access and provide higher prices (lower transport costs); and (v) market linkage support providing higher prices and sales (albeit still recent and limited).

162. Increase in yields of rice and cassava has probably been the main contributor but not all of the increase can be attributed to the portfolio (see part on agricultural productivity below). Introduction of high value crops and poultry production has had significant impacts on the income and assets of some individual households, but fewer have benefited (e.g. for vegetables, households with access to water) and some households with poultry have made a loss due to mortality. Non-land-based activities have only benefited a small minority but occasionally with extraordinary income increases (e.g. beansprout production).

163. Increase in yields and production does not always translate into increase in income, when this can be highly contingent on the market conditions. In the case of cassava with the most impressive yield and production increase, farmers depend on buyers from Thailand and Viet Nam, who often have a local monopsony position. Prices fluctuate significantly from season to season. For the early projects, there was a significant increase in per hectare gross margins for small holder cassava farmers adopting improved technologies. These changes were mostly driven by prices that from 2005 to 2013, fresh cassava prices increased 200 percent in Cambodia, rising to $59.4/ton from $19.8/ton. However, with the lucrative gains, the cultivation area for cassava increased ten times and production increased 13 times, from 2005 to 2013, which drove down the price and the income gains from cassava growing in RULIP and PADEE. Cassava farmers, visited by the CSPE mission, reported that this year (2017) prices were so low that they made a loss or just broke even.

164. Though attribution is difficult due to above-mentioned data quality issues, the RULIP PPE, based on the analysis of the end-line survey raw data, estimated that the treatment group had crop incomes about 31 per cent higher than the control group. In PADEE, the end-line survey suggests that beneficiary households have increased their asset value by some 79 per cent compared to 50 per cent for the control group. PADEE has a fairly large volume of data both from the periodical household surveys and M&E systems, but there are still data quality issues. [136]

[136] For example, according to the survey report, the socio-economic features of treatment and control groups were not always similar. In the case of estimating incomes from vegetables and cash crops, the survey results indicated higher increase in income for the control group due to the presence of some very large producers, than in the treatment group. The CSPE team also reviewed the data on change of profit margin before and after the intervention in the management

Nonetheless, visits of the CSPE team to several PADEE sites did suggest major contributions to improvement of livelihoods and income, which can be attributed to the project (see box 3).

Box 3
Livelihoods change for the poor and economic growth for smallholders: examples from PADEE support in Saang district, Kandal province

Village No. 4 in Prasat Commune is an extremely poor village of former fishermen. Fish resources in the rivers have declined dramatically and by 2013 there were hardly any fish to catch. The area is flood-prone leaving limited possibilities for agricultural activities. Households just survived by sending their daughters to work in a garment factory. PADEE in 2013 helped 50 households to establish an Improved Group Revolving Fund (IGRF) to which PADEE transferred Riel 48 m (US$12,000) over three years. The IGRF has since increased to Riel 60 m by retaining part of the operational surplus. Members were trained in aquaculture and vegetable production (outside the wet season). Vegetable production soon became popular, supported by IGRF loans. Members have no access to other credit and on average a member borrows US$250 for inputs and materials required in the vegetable production. Today they have large fields of chilli, eggplants and yams, which have a good local market and provide the major part of their income. The group still needs support to develop joint marketing and obtain better prices but so far PADEE's support has been life-changing and perhaps life-saving.

Tual Krouch Village in Kraing Yov Commune is a much better-off village along an all-weather road and with smallholders producing for the market in nearby Phnom Penh. Some sell directly to buyers in Phnom Penh while others use the local middleman. In 2015, PADEE helped establish an IGRF with the same modalities as above. The IGRF has since increased to Riel 57 m. Members (the majority women) were trained in new technologies for paddy production and raising chicken, and in organic vegetable production using nets to avoid pests and making compost to replace chemical fertilizers. A majority have applied some of the technologies in paddy, a minority are raising chicken and a few have started organic vegetable production, which also some of their neighbours in nearby villages and groups have done. On this basis PADEE has created a network of 22 organic vegetable producers and facilitated a written contract with a buyer, which specifies amounts and prices. Today they are selling about 200 kg per day and are satisfied with the prices and income they obtain. They plan to establish an agricultural cooperative. This is a much needed development as most farmers in Cambodia still sell individually to the local middleman, and therefore have limited bargaining power.

Source: CSPE team discussion in the field

165. Roads and irrigation have had major outreach (see also effectiveness section), but also problems of sustainability and quality of technical design. With respect to the ADB-financed infrastructure in TSSD (irrigation, roads, wells), a 2016 technical audit[137] reviewed 60 sub-projects and found that 62 per cent had high to moderate impact. Focused support for market linkage is recent with relatively few beneficiaries (PADEE) but holds potential for impacts for individual households.

166. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** During the Khmer Rouge period, Cambodia's intellectual and social capital was dramatically reduced. IFAD's portfolio has in various ways attempted to improve and rebuild human and social capital, which however is a long term and challenging process.

167. **The portfolio has overall contributed to improving human capital.** Some hundred thousand villagers (estimated to be in the range of 250,000-300,000 persons) have been trained in improved agricultural technologies, and in much fewer cases, in other topics such as other income generating activities, financial literacy, leadership, gender issues and domestic violence and nutrition. It is difficult to estimate the level of uptake, but based on the available data, most likely in a

information system of PADEE but judged them to be not entirely reliable due to the unrepresentativeness of the selected agriculture business record according to the team's field visits observations. The quality of the database is still improving as it was fully introduced in 2016.

[137] Dr Srilal Perera & Mr Sar Sam Ath, March 14, 2016: Technical Audit, TSSD

majority of cases individual trainees have adopted at least some of the improved agricultural practices taught, obtained knowledge and skills and changed behavior in some ways (e.g. leadership skills, nutritional feeding of children), while there are also cases where the outcome of the training is "passing knowledge".

168. The provision of social infrastructure has also contributed to improving human capital. RPRP supported the construction of 174 classrooms for primary schools and providing vocational training to 475 school graduates to improve their off-farm employment opportunities. Drinking water wells have saved women time for other social and economic activities and reduced water-borne diseases (RPRP). Roads have improved school attendance of children (CBRDP PPA).

169. **In some cases, the groups supported by the projects helped increase social capital.** The portfolio has facilitated the creation of literally thousands of rural groups, mainly linked to GRFs, but also including farmer water users associations linked to irrigation schemes. There are cases of these groups having facilitated cooperation, trust and social capital among the members (e.g. members getting together to undertake joint productive activities). Given that CBRDP channelled financial support for most vulnerable families through community-based organizations, in some cases, this fund was still kept as a separate window as part of a bigger savings and credit group operation, and the very poor or poorest households can still access credits on lower interest rates than other members.[138] On the other hand, many groups have also disappeared after the projects without leaving behind much social capital, which can be expected when group formation is supply-driven (see also the section on sustainability).

170. A number of studies have also shown a mixed picture on social capital created through self-help groups formed/supported by development initiatives. A recent study[139] of the World Bank supported self-help groups of the poor in Cambodia, which were established to encourage savings, household production and social cohesion, did not find evidence that the intervention had improved social capital, measured by household and network surveys and lab activities that gauge trust, trustworthiness and the willingness to contribute to public goods. Studies in other countries also indicate mixed results.[140]

171. **There are examples of project-supported groups continuing to be active and/or growing, though they are a minority**. These include GRF groups (continuing credit operations), farmer water users associations, or growing agricultural cooperatives, often supported by other donors/NGOs. On the one hand, the prospect of group development relates to the motivation of group formation at onset, and on the other hand, it needs to be recognized that this is a long-term process. The CSPE mission's discussions with various groups also indicated that often members see their group as an institution created by the project/government, which has defined the by-laws and operational modalities of the group. Few groups are aware that they can change the by-laws and operational modalities – or have little idea how to approach this.[141] There are also ambiguities about who owns (or should own) the GRF capital provided by the projects, for example, if they could liquidate the GRF and share the capital, or if not, how GRF should be treated and monitored especially after project completion. This issue has been left vague, perhaps also because of the perception by government authorities

[138] Data collection exercise on CBRDP and RPRP prior to the CSPE main mission.
[139] Ban, Radu, Michael J. Gilligan and Matthias Rieger. 2015
[140] There is mixed evidence on whether self-help groups generate social capital. Deininger and Liu (2013a) report increases in social capital from Andhra Pradesh, Desai and Joshi (2013) describe greater civic engagement among self-help groups members and Casini and Vandewalle 2011) argue self-help groups fostered collective action of socially disadvantaged women. However in their study of self-help groups in Mali, Beaman et al (2014) find no effect of the programme on social capital. This contrasts the generally celebrated view that microfinance groups generate social capital, e.g. microfinance groups in India (Feigenbaum et. al 2013).
[141] Discussions with farmer water users committees and GRF groups supported by RPRP and CBRDP indicated that by-laws and management structure were hardly ever reviewed, even when they are seen to be out-of-date.

that GRF and other groups should remain under their management and control. Lastly, many surviving groups are served by the same leaders over years and face challenges of aging management team with few group members interested in taking up the positions.

172. **Food security and agricultural productivity**. **Even if the extent is debatable, it is highly plausible that the portfolio contributed to increased agricultural productivity and production** through improved agricultural technology transfer. The interventions have primarily focused on increasing crop yields rather than return to labour. The projects have recorded notable increases in yields of the key crops such as rice and cassava (table 9 below; table (g) in annex XI). For example, based on the analysis of the end-line survey data, the RULIP PPE noted that the treatment group had on average 17.3 per cent higher yield for rice than the control group. RPRP and CBRDP reported significant improvements in both wet and dry season rice yields, which were better than the change of national average. Despite natural disaster and climate constraints, PADEE project areas still show an increase in agricultural productivity, while the control groups experienced a drop in rice yield compared with baseline. A notable range of yield data by different projects can also be a reflection of differences between different geographical areas.

Table 9
Rice yields reported in the projects (tons per hectare)

	Project data (tons / hectare)		*National average or control*	
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline
RPRP (wet and dry)	2.29 (2004)*	2.63 (2010)*		
RPRP (wet and dry)	1.9**	3.0**	2.0 (2004)	2.8 (2010)
CBRDP (wet)	1.25	2.6		
CBRDP (dry)	2.6	4.0		
RULIP (wet season)	1.51	1.83		
PADEE (wet season)	2.05 (2013)	2.24 (2016)	(a) 2.1; (b) 2.25	(a) 1.9; (b) 2.08
PADEE (dry season)	4.04 (2013)	4.33 (2016)	(b) 3.7	(b) 4.3

Source: Survey data (RULIP, PADEE, TSSD), participatory impact assessment*, PDAFF**, PCRs and PPAs (CBRDP, RPRP).
(a) indicates the control group drawn from villages in project target communes (where some spill-over effects may be expected), (b) indicates the second type of control group drawn from villages in the target district but not from the target commune.

173. Over the period, impressive increases in major crop yields have been achieved nationally (table 3 earlier), although from a low base and after 2012 the growth has moderated. Based on the available data and field visits by the CSPE team, it is fair to say that the projects have made contribution to the increases in yields. But in some cases, the projects have over-estimated the extent of adoption and productivity increase (see also sections on effectiveness and sustainability).

174. **It is also plausible that the projects have contributed to improved food security, especially in earlier projects,** on the basis of positive impact on agricultural productivity including that for food crops (and in some cases also poultry) and the CSPE team's discussion in the field. Food security was a major issue in the earlier period and relevant for the early projects, but less so at a later stage.[142] Before- and after- project data all show significant improvement of the food security indicator, measured by hunger season duration or food shortage duration (table (h) in annex XI).[143] But then again, given the national trend of poverty and food poverty reduction, it is difficult to estimate the extent of project contribution. At the same time, in field visits to TSSD sites, the CSPE team also

[142] The RULIP end-line survey indicated that 87 per cent of the treatment households had three meals a day, compared to 77 per cent in the control group.
[143] The RULIP end-line survey indicated that 87 per cent of the treatment households had three meals a day, compared to 77 per cent in the control group.

received reports of some farmers with food security problems during the dry season, which they tried to address through non-agricultural jobs.

175. **Despite improved food security, malnutrition remains a major problem in general in the country, and the projects' contribution in this regard is not evident**. Some projects have supported nutrition-focused activities, namely RULIP after MTR and PADEE (see paragraph 167). The RULIP PPE reported that chronic malnutrition for children under-five in the project households remained high without much difference between the baseline and the end-line (49 and 50 per cent, respectively). PADEE reported some positive changes, i.e. a decrease in the prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under five (stunting) from baseline of 40 per cent to 33 per cent at the end-line[144], while the situation got worse for the control group. Focus group discussions with beneficiaries during the CSPE mission indicated that mothers' training on nutritious porridge preparation may have contributed to improved nutrition, but it is difficult to determine whether improvements are due to increased food availability and agricultural diversification or to increased incomes from salaries, remittances, etc.

176. **Institutions and policies. Overall, the projects have contributed to strengthening capacity of national-level government and sub-national administrations in the project areas, but this has not meant *sustainable* improvement**. The projects have been designed to support government institutions with training, transport and inputs for their work for them to contribute to achievement of project objectives in the project areas. The institutional support (with the exception of ASPIRE and APIP) has not aimed at sustainable improvement of national agricultural support services, and even in project areas the projects have not delivered a comprehensive capacity building package.

177. **IFAD's portfolio has contributed to some aspects of policies and institutions – with substantial support from other development partners**. Only ASPIRE is designed with focused support to develop government policies and institutions, but it is too early to assess impact. The other projects have introduced approaches and methods, which in some cases have been more generally adopted and integrated by RGC. IFAD's portfolio has promoted participatory and demand-driven approaches and pluralistic agricultural extension services, with the participation of private service providers. These approaches are now an important part of RGC's Policy on Agricultural Extension (2015). Together with other development partners, IFAD has supported from its first project new "institutions" in the extension system, such as VAHWs, and these are now an accepted part of the extension system. On the other hand, even if field-level extension service providers such as CEWs are part of the extension policy, their presence has largely depended on donor-funded projects and not institutionalized at the operational level. Finally, CBRDP experience contributed to the development of the IDPoor Programme by the national government, which has been used to target various development assistance and public services. In this case, however, it was other development partners such as GTZ (initiator of CBRDP) and the World Bank that contributed to the development of the system and institutionalization, rather than CBRDP or IFAD *per se*.

178. **Summary - rural poverty impact.** The portfolio has contributed to improved agricultural productivity and production, which is likely to have contributed to food security especially in earlier years and also to household incomes. However, the level of contribution was lower than intended due to some weaknesses in design

[144] The figures are a combination of "severely stunted" as reported in the baseline and endline surveys (16.1 per cent at baseline, 12.6 per cent at endline) and "stunted" (24 per cent at baseline, 20.4 per cent at endline). The indicator in the logical framework was phrased as "decrease in prevalence of chronic malnutrition in children under five", which include both "severely stunted" and "stunted". The MTR commented that "*chronic nutrition reduction target from 30 to 10 per cent appears highly unrealistic based on data on progress from RULIP and sources*". There may have been some confusion and change in the interpretation of the indicator.

and implementation. Furthermore, with growing income opportunities in non-agriculture sector and remittances, the project impacts in this regard may not have been a substantial and decisive factor in beneficiaries' household income increase. Through training mainly in agriculture but also in other topics (e.g. financial literacy), the projects would have contributed to enhanced skills and knowledge of beneficiaries. The impacts on social capital and empowerment are modest, although there are cases of project support facilitating networking and the emergence of rural organizations. The impact on institutions and policies is also mixed. On balance, overall the portfolio's rural poverty impact is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4).**

Sustainability of benefits

179. This section assesses the likely continuation of benefits that were generated by the projects beyond the phase of external funding support. Sustainability of benefits is assessed here for the following areas: (i) improved agricultural practices by beneficiaries; (ii) agricultural extension services; (iii) collective capacity and beneficiaries' organizations, including GRF groups/operations; (iv) physical infrastructure; and (v) pro-poor institutions and approaches of partners to work with the rural poor.

180. **Improved agricultural technologies and practices.** In the portfolio, adoption rates reported are in general in the range of 30–60 per cent, but higher when the technology transfer and training is more responsive to farmers' demand and markets, such as the common interest groups in PADEE. One may argue that farmers are likely to continue applying improved technologies and practices if the enterprise is profitable and provides returns on labour that are higher than or comparable to alternative opportunities, the farmers have access to means of production, and no disaster events occur. For example, a sudden outbreak of Newcastle disease may destroy a highly profitable chicken raising business. Furthermore, it is important for farmers to remain up-to-date on their skills and knowledge (e.g. new varieties, disease or pest management practices, market assessment). Thus, to what extent the farmers would continue benefiting from improved production practices (which may also need to be adapted or updated) in large part depends on the surrounding advisory and extension services (public or private – discussed in the next paragraph), as well as functioning regulatory framework and services (e.g. animal and plant disease surveillance and control, agricultural input quality, standard and food safety to counter unsafe cheap food imports).

181. **Agricultural extension services.** Project-financed service providers have promoted a major part of technology adoption in the portfolio. After project closure, at least so far, sustenance of such services by the government agricultural extension and support system has not been demonstrated.[145] According to the World Bank,[146] donor spending on extension services in 2015 amounted to KHR 52.5 billion, which was more than 10 times government spending in 2015 on "extension and farmer organizations" (KHR 3.4 billion). The dependency on donors for financing agricultural extension represents a risk to sustaining technology adoption. This also applies to private/public field extension staff such as VAHWs. Though VAHWs are supposed to sustain their function by charging farmers for their services, they do need refresher training and government supervision and backstopping. PADEE has been supporting private extension service provision in collaboration with iDE through "*Lors Thmey*" and their networks of "farm business

[145] For example, CBRDP PPA noted that the performance of public sector extension agents has been declining following project completion, which was already noted in the PCR and confirmed by the PPA mission.
[146] World Bank, Agriculture Public Expenditure Review, Power Point Presentation, July 4th, 2017

advisors".[147] This model may present a better prospect for sustainability but it is still early to tell.

182. **Beneficiaries' groups and organizations.** All projects have supported the formation of beneficiary groups, mostly to serve as recipients of agricultural training and extension services and GRF support. The projects with GRF support, except for PADEE, considered the GRFs mainly as a means to promote beneficiaries' participation in training and application of the knowledge they had obtained. Thus, if the trainees have adopted and continue to practice what they have been taught, one could argue that the GRFs have served their purpose and that their sustainability *per se* is not an issue. Whether this was indeed the thinking or not, the project designs did not provide guidance on the fate of GRFs and groups after project, i.e. whether groups/GRFs were expected to be a temporary project mechanism and to be eventually dissolved, and if so, what should the groups do with the money?

183. According to the focus group discussions by the CSPE team, the members of groups, when they have remained functional, and project/government staff would like to see the GRF operations continued: the members feel the ownership of GRFs, also because of the dividends that they receive periodically. In some cases, the groups could also generate social capital and options for networking and establishment of joint economic activities by some of the members, e.g. basket weaving and other handicrafts. Finally, in spite of the rural outreach of MFIs, there are still some few villages for which the GRF provides the main access to finance of many households.

184. In fact, various project reports (e.g. supervision, PCR) have shown that the sustainability of GRFs and the groups *is* indeed a concern. For example, both PADEE and TSSD have been working on – rather belatedly - the preparation of a strategy for longer-term development of groups. In RULIP, merging and conversion of GRF groups to agricultural cooperatives, where deemed appropriate, was pursued to sustain the groups and GRF operations.

185. There are little systematic data to indicate the sustainability of GRFs in the longer run but there are some indications from those supported by CBRDP and RPRP. [148] Based on a limited cases visited in the field, the revolving funds targeted at the most vulnerable families under CBRDP seem to have remained operational mostly as part of larger operations and groups (e.g. agricultural cooperatives, credit operations across multiple villages), often with support by other donors or NGOs. As for GRF groups supported by RPRP, it is roughly estimated that about half of them have survived.[149] Contributing factors to sustaining GRF operations and group functioning include: continued follow-up and support by other actors such as NGOs or sub-national administrations, and simplification of the paper work in the groups. The main reason for mortality included the departure of key group leaders from the village, non-payment by some members and no clear by-laws and weak management.

[147] iDE, an international NGO, is one of the main project mplementing partners for PADEE and supports "Lors Thmey", a social enterprise. Lors Thmey, which means "new growth" in Khmer, teaches local entrepreneurs to become farm business advisors who would sell agricultural products and services.

[148] Both during the data collection exercise focused on CBRDP and RPRP prior to the main mission and ths CSPE main mission.

[149] The data collection exercise (prior to the CSPE main mission) interacted with 10 groups/GRFs and found that half of them have remained operational and increased the capital. During its visit to Prey Veng province, the CSPE mission learned that a survey on the status of the RPRP supported LIGs/GRFs, six years after closure of RPRP, was being conducted. Preliminary data from Ba Phnom district showed that out of 72 livelihoods improvement groups/GRFs supported by RPRP, 75 per cent were still functioning today. However, it is noted that the case of Ba Phnom district may be exceptional since this is the only known case where the district governor established a committee to provide oversight for the GRFs supported by RPRP, with the deputy district governor being a chairperson and a district agricultural staff a deputy chairperson. One councillor from each commune participated in the two annual loan repayment days and the LIGs could also seek advice on calculations

186. PADEE is different from the preceding projects as it defines well-functioning IGRFs as an end in itself. The PADEE design introduced a number of measures to address weaknesses identified from the previous experiences but it still did not adequately reflect on a long-term vision after project closure (see also paragraph 106 and footnote 101). However, contrary to intentions, the CSPE noted higher sustainability risk with IGRFs than the GRFs of previous projects, due to the use of more sophisticated data management and reliance on external service providers.[150] PADEE partnered with FAO to install and operate through contracted mobile field agents (deployed by a contracted firm) a database programme MBWin, to facilitate monitoring at the national level and allow project staff to take remedial measures. While the system may be useful for project management or for MFIs, given how IGRFs are operated (i.e. small and simple), its relevance from the perspective of groups can be questioned.[151] In fact, MBWin and mobile field agents have made the IGRFs more dependent on external support, rather than self-reliant and sustainable.

187. Efforts are currently being made to identify arrangements for continuation of the MBWin system after PADEE closure, including IGRF paying for services by mobile field agents and operation of MBWin. One may argue that it could be more helpful to make a concentrated effort to introduce a simpler paper-based system, which the IGRF leaders would have the capacity to manage, especially if the IGRF operations remain relatively simple and not so sophisticated. After PADEE completion (mid-2018), the IGRF groups will continue to receive support from ASPIRE, specifically on the areas of capacity building for the management of farmers' cooperatives. MAFF is of the view that application of computerized MBWin system to track funds movement would still be necessary, while manual processing and recording of accounting documents also need to be strengthened.

188. Also in TSSD, initiatives are in process to improve the sustainability prospects of the LIGs/GRFs supported by the project. The plan is to establish a national LIG association, which will "replace the project" and contract the support services for the LIGs/GRFs, which will pay for the services. The challenge of this plan is the financial self-reliance and sustainability of the association. Well-managed and financially strong LIGs may have no demand for support services whereas LIGs in a poor shape, which do need support, may not have the finances to pay for it. The association may also be challenged by contextual developments - members, including leaders, leave the village and competition from MFIs reduces the members' need for the GRF.

189. If GRFs were valued and to be sustained, they could stay small, simple and informal - or the other option is to "grow" with formalisation, scaling-up and savings mobilization. The GRF model used so far is not necessarily conducive for the growth option. Projects allocate a capital subsidy based on the indicative amount per member (US$240 in PADEE), which members (wrongly) perceive as their individual entitlement to borrow and may be reluctant to "share his/her pie" and to have new members.

190. However, there are also promising examples. In Preah Vihear, RULIP has succeeded in merging groups at commune level and registering them as agricultural cooperatives, which are now actively working to mobilise new members and savings. On the other hand, the status of multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives as the only option in Cambodia (compared to single purpose cooperatives)

[150] While leaders of the older GRFs, which used simple paper forms for managing GRF finances, generally were able to explain to the CSPE mission the operational performance of last year and the balance sheet, this was not the case for the leaders of the IGRFs, who explained that the data was in the computer of the mobile field agents (MFAs) who collected the data during monthly visits, and returned processed data to the group during the next monthly visit.

[151] The data generated by the MBWin system has little value to the IGRF management who can only work with paper forms. While MBWin can be useful for MFIs (with electricity, computers, IT skills) to manage operations and portfolio-at-risk, this is not the case for IGRFs management who receive the data after one month and can easily manage portfolio-at-risk as the entire principal has to be repaid at the end of the loan term.

represents a challenge in terms of transparency and management as shown in experience in other countries, as it can be difficult to assess in which activities the cooperative makes a profit and in which a loss.

191. The portfolio has also supported establishment of groups without a GRF[152], such as farming systems improvement groups (FSIGs) of better-off rural households (RULIP) and CIGs (PADEE). The support for FSIGs was discontinued after the MTR and there may be few alive. The outlook for common interest groups in PADEE is more positive, in particular if they manage to formalize and obtain legal identity (cooperative or company), and develop joint post-harvest and marketing activities.

192. As noted in the section on effectiveness, lack of clarity on purposes and roles of groups at onset and fixed supply-driven approaches to group formation are underlying factors for sustainability issues.

193. **Physical infrastructure**. IOE's evaluations of CBRDP and RPRP presented similar concerns for the sustainability prospects of project-financed infrastructure. On rural access roads, higher than anticipated heavy traffic volumes created significant maintenance challenges. Though local maintenance teams were established, they seldom had the finances and equipment to do the required maintenance. Village access roads are a public good for which communes do assume responsibility but communes and *sangkats* have very limited funds.[153] However, the financial allocation by central government for communes and *sangkats* has been increasing, though from a negligible base, and that there are expectations that this trend will accelerate.

194. Sustainability prospects vary for the irrigation schemes, which are considered a private good where user fees need to finance operation and maintenance. Schemes with poor hydrological and engineering design provide limited increase in farmers' incomes and therefore it is difficult to mobilise the required user payments. However, the quality of irrigation schemes as such is not a guarantee for proper collection of irrigation service fees: it is also related to social and political factors, e.g. charging irrigation service fees or not being a politically sensitive issue. Wells for drinking water have also been financed, and for CBRDP it was found that the indicators for operation and maintenance performance were met.

195. The data collection exercise on CBRDP and RPRP prior to the CSPE main mission found mixed status for the sustainability of irrigation and roads. Much depended on the strength and functioning of the farmer water user committees (irrigation) and local technical committees (roads), which in turn relied on support (technical, financial or managerial) from technical provincial departments and their district offices or sub-national administrations. Interesting cases were found where GRF groups, when still functional, provided some funds for maintenance of public infrastructure from the interests earned.

196. According to the 2016 technical audit on ADB-financed commune infrastructure in TSSD,[154] 38 per cent had low impact or were poorly selected and therefore faced sustainability problems, communes have insufficient funds for operation and maintenance, and there is a tendency to prioritise investments in rehabilitation and upgrading, neglecting resources for important routine maintenance.[155]

[152] Also in recent and onging ASPIRE, smallholder learning groups are established and supported without GRF.
[153] For example, Toek Chour Commune, Preah Net Preah District, Banteay Menchey Province informed the mission that they received an annual budget of US$20,000 from central Government to finance infrastructure investments, rehabilitation and maintenance in 18 villages (some far apart) with a population of more than 10,000
[154] Dr Srilal Perera & Mr Sar Sam Ath, March 14, 2016: Technical Audit, TSSD
[155] During the CSPE exercise, additional financing for TSSD of US$10 million was being processed (not part of the CSPE scope). Unlike the original phase (when the IFAD financing was entirely for LIG development and support), the additional financing by IFAD will be invested also for infrastructure. According to IFAD (as part of the comment on the draft CSPE report), a number of measures are introduced to strengthen operations and maintenance of the infrastructure investment, such as rigorous design and formation of operations and maintenance committees and user groups.

197. **Pro-poor approaches of partners**. IFAD's portfolio has been aligned and contributed to RGC's pro-poor policies and D&D process, which are expected to continue and further deepen. In some cases, the approach of IFAD and other development partners has been adopted as government policy and will therefore be sustained, e.g. the targeting and identification of the poor (so-called "IDPoor") who receive preferential access to government health services, social subsidies etc. The continuous emphasis in the portfolio on making agricultural extension services truly demand driven is now reflected in RGC's policy on agricultural extension but implementation challenges remain.

198. **Summary.**[156] Sustainability of benefits is assessed as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**. This considers risks of sustaining technology transfer achievements also linked to the sustainability issue with agricultural extension services, lack of exit strategies at onset for GRFs and groups, and some weaknesses in operation and maintenance of rural infrastructure.

D. Other performance criteria

Innovation

199. In IFAD's previous evaluation methodology and in the PPAs for CBRDP and RPRP, innovation and scaling up were assessed jointly under one criterion but in the more recent evaluation methodology, they have been separated into two criteria, each assessed and rated separately. This CSPE follows the new methodology and separates the assessment also for older evaluations (CBRDP and RPRP).

200. **Some reported "innovations" are considered replications**. While a project evaluation focuses on one project, a CSPE has a much longer time perspective and review several projects. Therefore, what a project evaluation may assess as an innovation can be found by CSPE to be replication/scaling up of an innovation from a previous project. Evaluations and assessments of the projects approved during 2000–2016 highlight innovations which in fact were introduced in the two projects approved before 2000. This applies to VAHWs introduced in APIP, and for ADESS, the targeting approach, the model of "extension services+GRF" as well as the promotion of demand-driven extension services based on participatory needs assessment. Some "innovations" reported in the IFAD portfolio were introduced and promoted by other development partners during the same period, and it may be difficult to judge "who came first". Finally, several innovations were already introduced by NGOs whereas IFAD's portfolio has contributed to bringing these innovations into the government domain.

201. **Intentions of applying innovative participatory approaches to extension services and training were not fully achieved**. During its implementation, ADESS was case-studied for the IOE's thematic evaluation on promotion of local knowledge and innovations in Asia and the Pacific Region (2004). It highlighted that though a beneficiary demand/problem census was done, "beneficiaries [were] not being systematically invited to provide their own technical knowledge and innovation as feedback into the project". The demand/problem surveys tend to generate wish lists of respondents for government services and subsidies. Furthermore, farmers may not always be aware of the best solutions to their problems.

202. Several of the subsequent projects also sought to introduce demand-driven extension services, which were claimed as innovations (e.g. RULIP). However, despite significant variations in agro-ecological and social contexts with the project area, a standard technology transfer package was offered to the entire project area, with few adaptations. The 2015 Policy on Agricultural Extension recognizes

[156] On the sustainability criterion, IOE rated CBRDP moderately satisfactory (4) and RPRP moderately unsatisfactory (3) whereas IFAD's Programme Management Department assessed CBRDP moderately unsatisfactory (3) and RPRP satisfactory (5)

that extension services have continued to be largely supply-driven and defines the goal to make future services demand-driven.

203. **The portfolio made contributions to introducing poverty targeting approaches.** The CBRDP PPA found the approach to identify the very poor and poor households to be innovative, noting that the process involved a high degree of participation and consultation with villagers that increased the transparency and contributed to the strengthening of democratic values in communities. While the similar targeting approach using wealth ranking was followed in the earlier ADESS, the process was made increasingly more participatory. The experience in CBRDP partnering with GTZ reportedly contributed to the institutionalization of the ID Poor system by the Government, in collaboration with other partners such as the World Bank, also according to the self-assessment by IFAD for the CSPE. The IDPoor Programme has been used to target development assistance and public service to the needy. At the same time, the CSPE finds that the project approach to supporting those identified has not been always appropriate (e.g. separating the very poor to form a group of fixed number, etc. - see also paragraph 97).

204. **Contributions to D&D process.** ADESS (which is not part of the portfolio assessment) ventured into supporting D&D and local governance in relation to agriculture and rural development as one of the first large-scale externally-funded projects within the Seila framework apart from UNDP. This line of support was replicated and maintained, in particular in CBRDP, RPRP, RULIP and perhaps less visibly in PADEE (with D&D presented as more as a framework rather than an objective). CBRDP contributed to the establishment in 2005 (not in 2000 design) of a Rural Infrastructure Investment Fund, which transferred contributions to the communes for prioritization and implementation by commune councils. This contributed to the national decentralization process and involved development of capacity of commune councils, as well as village development and technical committees. The Rural Infrastructure Investment Fund was built upon a similar fund in RPRP that provided additional financing to the institutionalized Commune/Sangkat Fund which began operations in 2003, largely based on the Local Development Funds piloted by UNDP and UNCDF since 1996. Furthermore, the RPRP PPA listed community and village extension workers as well as VAHWs as innovations that brought services closer to the users, but the caveat noted by the CSPE is that these had been introduced before the project.

205. **Gender and social affairs.** There have been some innovative practices in terms of how gender issues have been integrated and promoted, especially through successful collaboration between PDAFF and PDoWA. The RPRP PPA highlighted several innovations, including: local officials receiving training on gender issues, one commune councillor per commune designated as a gender focal point and trained, and beneficiary groups trained on gender and domestic violence. In the recent projects, some nutrition-focused activities were also introduced into beneficiary training, mainly for mothers of infants, including some innovative approaches such as, e.g. "cooking competitions", "champion mothers", and "mother-to-mother social marketing".

206. **Technology transfer.** TSSD introduced the support to the establishment of hatcheries for supplying chicks to neighbouring farmers (not only GRF group members). Usually a skilled farmer, project-supported group member or not, is provided with equipment and financial support and training to establish a hatchery. Although recipients of such support are often not primary target beneficiaries since they tend to be better-off, it contributes to ensuring the supply of quality chicks to GRF members engaged in chicken production, which is a very popular enterprise among TSSD beneficiaries.

207. After the MTR, PADEE introduced "common interest groups" (CIGs) as the focus for training and technical support, including market linkage support. A CIG usually has

5-15 members who produce the same product (e.g. mushrooms, bean sprouts) and in some cases are also interested in joint marketing. The group may be composed of IGRF members as well as non-members, and members may be from different villages. Thus, the CIG removes the link between the GRF subsidy and the training.

208. PADEE has also piloted the provision of extension services through tablet devices, supported by the sub-project financed by the Korean supplementary funding (US$380,000), so-called "e-PADEE". This pilot was led by MAFF in partnership with Grameen Intel Social Business (software developer), SNV and iDE, and linked to iDE/PADEE support to *Lors Thmey* and farm business advisors who provide advisory services using the devices (see paragraph 181). The software modules introduced were on rice production and covered three topics, namely, the use of fertilizer, variety/seeds, and pest control. The report by SNV indicated that while the model may potentially be an effective and sustainable tool, especially through the partnership with the private sector, there were still some issues to be clarified in reflecting on the way forward, including the issue of licence.

209. Finally, inspired by a study tour to Thailand supported by an IFAD regional grant programme,[157] PADEE has introduced the important innovation of "community learning centres" – basically at the farms of advanced and skilled farmers opened for other farmers to visit and learn from, against a fee. The farmer visited by the CSPE team in Prey Veng, with a vegetable garden and a citrus and banana orchard, has good incomes from vegetables and selling seedlings and banana suckers as well as from receiving other farmers visiting to learn from him, each paying US$3 per day, in some cases paid for by donors but not in all cases. In turn, the visitors learned his production techniques, such as production of organic fertilizer. Thus, completely the opposite model of the extension + GRF subsidy model.

210. **Public private partnership in agricultural service provision.** PADEE's work with iDE/*Lors Thmey*[158] adopts a public private partnership model which allows co-financing the delivery of a range of services to farmers such as inputs (seeds, fertilizers), equipment (drip irrigation systems, nets, drum seeders), extension services (technical support) and market linkages. The latter is done through a network of private farm business advisors who obtain their incomes from margins on sale of inputs to farmers and vegetables bought from farmers. According to the 2017 implementation support mission, the achievements are good but the viability of the model remains to be demonstrated.[159] The Lors Thmey programme has been underway for a while with support of other donors, but it is the first time that it is implemented in partnership with RGC/MAFF. Perhaps because the features of this type of partnership are new to MAFF, the cooperation between MAFF and iDE/Lors Thmey has at times been problematic.

211. **Summary**. The portfolio has made some modest contribution to testing and generating innovations, while some of what was reported as "innovations" would be regarded as replications within the portfolio. Given the strong presence of some development partners in the sector, it is also inevitable that the first innovator and then the mover are not always clear. The most notable contributions were in CBRDP (and before that in APIP and ADESS) and later on in the ongoing PADEE. The criterion is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

Scaling up

[157] Routasia programme implemented by PROCASUR (see also the section on grants)

[158] iDE, an international NGO, is one of the main project mplementing partners for PADEE and supports "Lors Thmey", a social enterprise. Lors Thmey, which means "new growth" in Khmer, teaches local entrepreneurs to become farm business advisors who would sell agricultural products and services

[159] According to the 2017 implementation support mission, the farm business advisor network is expanding and a total of 173 farmers are under contract with Lors Thmey for their intensive vegetable production activity. So far 44 of the 100 FBAs have an annual income of more than one thousand USD from sale of inputs and the commercial margin on vegetables collection and trading.

212. This evaluation criterion concerns the extent to which the project interventions have been or are likely to be scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and other agencies.

213. **In some cases, a changing context has removed the relevance of the "innovation", and thus the rationale for scaling up**. For example, while the "extension+GRF" model (applied in different versions in five IFAD projects) had some relevance a decade ago, it is less relevant today where the rural poor have many different sources of cash and MFIs are present in most rural areas.

214. **More replication than scaling up.** Many of the innovations have been replicated within IFAD-supported projects, though in modified versions. Only a few cases have been more widely up-scaled and applied (by RGC and other development partners) such as VAHWs. However, it is probable that the design and efforts of IFAD's portfolio since 1996 have contributed, together with support by other development partners, to two important directions of RGC's 2015 Policy on Agricultural Extension: (i) extension service delivery shall be driven by demand; and (ii) extension service provision shall be pluralistic and include government contracting of NGOs and private enterprises to provide services. If implemented, that would represent a major scaling up that in the future could be credited to past activities of IFAD and other development partners.

215. **Inadequate M&E and knowledge management constrain the potential for scaling up.** Scaling up assumes that the costs and benefits, and the virtues and challenges are analysed well and documented and that the documentation is pro-actively disseminated and shared. This assumes a well performing M&E/knowledge management system, an assumption, which so far has not been satisfied in IFAD's Cambodia portfolio. However, recently major efforts are being made by the country programme management team to improve the situation.

216. **Summary**. The overall contribution of the portfolio to scaling up is assessed as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**, with considerable potential for improvement. This will require better knowledge management of innovations as a basis for pro-active promotion of scaling up. Robust evidence is required if others shall consider to adopt the innovations.

Gender equality and women's empowerment[160]

217. As from APIP gender mainstreaming has been part of project design, where gender concerns have been integrated into targeting, training, activities, capacity building and sex-disaggregated M&E. The Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA) and its provincial departments (PDoWAs) have served as an efficient implementing partner for project-financed gender activities.

218. **Collaboration between MOWA and MAFF and PDoWA and PDAFF has been good, contributing to achievements**, as found in the RPRP and RULIP evaluations by IOE. Staff of MoWA, however, proposed to the CSPE mission that MoWA be more actively engaged in future project identification and formulation. Over the period, PDoWAs have trained beneficiaries on issues related to domestic violence, sharing of household responsibilities and nutrition of young children. Recently, staff members of PDoWAs have also been charged with providing training on gender impacts of climate change, a responsibility many felt uncomfortable with, given their limited background and education in climate change.[161]

219. **The projects have made increasingly conscious efforts to recruit women for commune/village-level service providers hired for the projects** (table 10). For example, for CEWs, the projects after RPRP have in principle recruited one

[160] See also Section II.A. for some information on the gender context.
[161] The Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan (CCCSP) highlights that rural poor women are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts and therefore that there is a need to mainstream gender into climate change response measures but the CCCSP is not very helpful with respect to how this should be done

man and one woman per commune (thus, 50:50), whereas for VAHWs women have remained the minority most likely because it is more challenging to find women to play a role as VAHWs.

Table 10
Proportion of women in project-hired field level staff

Project	*Type of extension work*	*Extension workers recruited*		
		Total number	Women	
			Number	%
APIP	VAHW	2409	391	16
ADESS	PSP Extension Officer	94	20	21
CBRDP	VAHW	627	72	11
	Farmer promoter (village level)	513	98	19
RPRP	VAHW	-	-	7
	CEW	168	84	50
	VEW	616	203	37
RULIP	CEW	168	84	50

220. Throughout the portfolio, project staff and other service providers have been trained on gender concepts, issues and practical gender mainstreaming. One-off training was considered insufficient (CBRDP) but refresher training has also been provided (PADEE). When gender mainstreaming was confined to a sub-component, gender training for staff working on other components was found to be limited (CBRDP), hence from the CBRDP MTR, gender mainstreaming has been applied across the whole project.

221. **IFAD's portfolio has had high participation of women in beneficiary groups.** In many cases, women account for 50 per cent or more of registered members but in meetings and trainings women may account for more than 80 per cent as the men are busy in the fields or work outside the village. This can represent a problem where the training focuses on agricultural functions that are the responsibility of men. The joint attendance of husband and wife in gender awareness raising and gender training courses seems to be important to facilitate change (see paragraph 223).

222. **In groups supported by the projects, the proportion of women in leadership positions is relatively high**, most likely in part owing to conscious efforts and the involvement of PDoWA staff. In agricultural cooperatives supported by RULIP, the proportions of women being in leadership positions were: 45 per cent in Kratie, 37 per cent in Preah Vihear, and 23 per cent in Ratanakiri. The comparably low percentage in Ratanakiri is explained by the high proportion of ethnic minorities in the province that tend to be more male-dominated. Often women serve as the treasurer in groups, as is normally the case in their households keeping the cash box.

223. **There are reports that project-supported gender training has contributed to better sharing of workload between men and women.** The RPRP PPA generally confirmed the findings of the report prepared by the project[162] that the majority of men were changing their attitudes and behaviour to be more sympathetic of women's issues, including the sharing of the workload with women, while noting that it was difficult to attribute this to the project. According to the RULIP PPE, the group members met consistently reported that awareness on gender issues led to improved work balance at home (e.g. husbands helping more in domestic chores such as cooking, cleaning, childcare, and collecting water and firewood). The PPE noted that the training approach of involving both husband and

[162] Sopeat Mer, Report on the Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming Activities in Rural Poverty Reduction Project in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng 2004-2011.

wife from the same household was effective in facilitating these changes. At the same time, overall there was limited attention to the issue of labour shortages in the portfolio, although this is a general issue in rural areas and not necessarily specific to women.

224. **The portfolio's consistent attention to gender issues has contributed to enhancing women's participation in public spheres.** As noted earlier, while women's participation in decision-making at rural household level is high generally in Cambodia, this is not the case in public spheres. At RPRP completion, women involved in the project "had found their place in public life especially in meetings" (PPA). The Government has been committed to increasing women's participation in politics, including commune councils. Through IFAD-financed projects providing training and promoting women's leadership in groups, women gained experiences and exposure in groups and public platforms. Some of these women then have been elected for commune councils. There are no systematic data on this and attribution is not possible, but in light of the consistent efforts over close to the past two decades, it is highly plausible that the IFAD portfolio made contribution in this regard. The projects have also worked closely with commune council focal points on women and children, providing them with training to equip them better to promote gender awareness and monitor project activities from gender perspective in their localities.

225. Training on gender-related topics has had some positive effects, but behavioural change requires time and sustained support. The impact of training on beneficiaries is transient, calling for regular refresher training and/or social marketing. In CBRDP, the annual frequency of gender training was too low to have a meaningful impact (PPA). In light of the short duration of benefits from gender awareness raising and some training, the PADEE MTR recommended the replication of social marketing approaches piloted in RULIP that have facilitated behaviour change.

226. **The projects supported women's access to economic opportunities.** The project supported some key productive activities of particular relevance and benefit to women, e.g. chicken raising, vegetable gardens, non-land-based activities such as bean sprout production, and mat- and basket-weaving. These activities take place in or around the house and are easy for women to integrate in their daily schedule and household responsibilities such as child caring.

227. Data from different sources indicate a largely consistent picture of women being chiefly responsible for managing the household finance,[163] presumably including additional incomes generated from new or enhanced economic opportunities supported by the projects. The focus group discussions with women supported this, but also indicated that household expenditure is usually subject to a joint decision. High level of women's participation in household decision-making seems to be a general trend across Cambodia[164] (see also paragraph 53) and this prevailing situation would have facilitated balanced benefits to household members.

228. **The infrastructure investments have also brought benefits relevant to women and children**. Rural roads, health facilities, and wells for drinking water have helped women to save time in collecting water and travelling to markets, health centres etc. Their families benefited from improved access to health care and safe birth delivery services (RPRP). Children's school attendance is also reported to have increased by 8 per cent (RPRP).[165] However, the investment in these areas was relatively a minor part in the portfolio.

[163] The RULIP end-line survey showed that in general, high percentage of female household members (over 90 per cent for most of the agricultural commodities) tend to keep money after selling agricultural produce, both in project households and non-project households.
[164] The publication by the Ministry of Women's Affairs (2015) indicated that: "women also play a significant role in managing family finances, and have historically had a long history of economic activity, and more autonomy than many other women in Asia."
[165] The Project Performance Assessment of IOE considered it plausible to attribute these outcomes to RPRP support.

229. **In summary**, the contribution of the portfolio to gender equality and women's empowerment is assessed as **satisfactory (5)**. Attention to gender issues has been part of project designs throughout the portfolio, where gender concerns have been integrated into targeting, training, activities, capacity building and sex-disaggregated data. There have been concerted gender-mainstreaming efforts across projects and at different levels: at national level, PDAFF/PDoWA staff, service providers (e.g. CEWs), beneficiaries' groups, and sub-national administrations. Women's participation in project-supported activities has been high, which may partly be explained by the contexts (e.g. migration), and the portfolio has contributed to women's social empowerment and access to economic opportunities. MOWA and its provincial departments have served as an efficient implementing partner for project-financed gender activities.

Environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change

230. This section assesses the environmental impact and the contribution of the portfolio to improving natural resources management, climate change resilient livelihoods and ecosystems, and adaptation to the negative impacts of climate change.

231. **Environment and natural resources management.** Potential negative impacts on the environment of IFAD's financing of rural infrastructure investments (e.g. rehabilitation and some construction of minor village and agricultural structures such as irrigation schemes, village access roads, drinking water facilities, dykes and drainage system) have been negligible. Rather, some of these structures, like irrigation and dykes, contribute to improving climate change resilience. In TSSD, where ADB financed the infrastructure, the infrastructure component was placed in Category B, having some but insignificant negative environmental impacts. Environmental safeguards were introduced for the financed sub-projects.

232. Several of the projects have supported organic production or production with good agricultural practices. CBRDP established an organic rice producer association while RPRP established organic or pesticide-free vegetable growing associations; RULIP (and ADESS) promoted integrated pest management, while PADEE introduced good agricultural practice to vegetable producers as well as vegetable production in net houses. The system of rice intensification (SRI), which has been a continuous part of the technology message in the projects, involves elements that could contribute to improved management of resources. Among the various key elements of SRI, although the adoption of transplanting was found to be relatively low due to labour shortages, more farmers have applied the use of organic fertilizers/compost.

233. There has been limited attention to applying an integrated farming systems approach. Diversified and integrated farming systems are generally more climate-resilient and also more resilient to adverse market developments for one crop/product than systems based on one production line. While there may be good rationale of promoting one crop/product with promising market potential, the issue is how this production line is integrated into a diversified farming system. The case study of ADESS in IOE's thematic evaluation (2004) highlighted that the farm demonstrations were predominantly on single-aspect technologies (e.g. rice, chicken, fruits), with few exceptions such as rice/fish culture, even though farmers traditionally have operate diversified farms. With the exception of a failed attempt with farming systems improvement groups in RULIP, the predominance of the single aspect demonstration approach has continued in the subsequent projects, including the most recent ASPIRE, even though the portfolio has aimed at promoting agricultural diversification and many recognize the relevance and virtues of integrated farming systems for smallholders. The IOE thematic evaluation points to a possible explanation, which could be that technical support services are administratively organized according to products/sub-sectors.

234. Support for management of forest and fisheries resources has overall had limited weight, in spite of their importance to livelihoods and eco-systems. No attempts have been made to address (in an integrated manner) fragility issues in the eco-systems where the projects have operated (e.g. Tonle Sap). ADESS supported 41 community forest initiatives, but the impact was assessed as moderately unsatisfactory.[166]

235. The overall performance of the portfolio in the theme of environment and natural resources management is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

236. **Adaptation to climate change.** Climate change issues only came on the agenda explicitly as from TSSD, which introduced guidelines for climate proofing of rural roads and irrigation structures, and also for the design of on-farm demonstrations. Training to raise awareness about the gender implications of climate change was also introduced. The proposed extension of TSSD is expected to include more substantial and focused efforts to address climate change. Before TSSD, similar investments were made in CBRDP and RPRP but without a climate change label.

237. PADEE design did not explicitly address climate change issues but did include an *ad hoc* intervention to introduce low-cost bio-digesters, which still remains to be implemented.[167] Nevertheless, several of the PADEE-supported interventions have helped farmers to better cope with the effects of climate change, e.g. drip irrigation, net houses, crop diversification, mulching, and crop calendars. A project funded by the GEF (US$4.6 million), "Building Adaptive Capacity through the Scaling-Up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Cambodia (S-RET)" was approved in 2016 to be implemented in close integration with PADEE initially, and then with ASPIRE when PADEE is completed. S-RET will support smallholder farmers to adopt affordable renewable energy technologies such as solar water pumps, efficient cooking stoves and bio-digesters, as well as increase their knowledge of renewable energy technologies for agricultural production, processing and/or post-harvest handling. As such, S-RET is expected to generate climate benefits and improve climate resilience of some 8,000 smallholders.

238. ASPIRE is the first loan project which defines a strategy for addressing climate change, with the intention to mainstream climate change adaptation in all project components and in all extension activities, and includes a large budget for financing climate resilient infrastructure. Implementation is in start-up phase.

239. In summary, the portfolio contributed, in particular to climate change resilience, even though the interventions were not explicitly defined as part of a climate change strategy. In the current ongoing portfolio, there are explicit climate change-related interventions - in TSSD and to some extent PADEE, while major support is included in ASPIRE. On this background, the performance of the portfolio on this criterion is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

E. Overall portfolio achievement

240. Most of the projects, except for the most recent two, shared similar characteristics in terms of the thrusts and approach, i.e. extension service support plus GRF for agricultural technology transfer through groups of the rural poor with the aim to improve agricultural productivity, implemented in the D&D framework. Broadly speaking, the project objectives and thrusts (e.g. agriculture, decentralization) were aligned with the Government and IFAD policies and strategies and the country and sector contexts, especially in earlier years. But the portfolio was late in recognizing and adapting to the changes in the rural context in design and implementation.

[166] IFAD/PMD, 2008: Project Completion Digests

[167] PADEE supported design and pilot installation of a number of different low-cost biodigester designs but the original intention to roll out under PADEE was dropped. Instead, a low-cost biodigester design is being promoted under S-RET.

241. The overall portfolio achievement is rated as **"moderately satisfactory" (4)**. For most of the evaluation criteria, the ratings are "moderately satisfactory", except for "sustainability" and "scaling up", which are rated as "moderately unsatisfactory". The main sustainability issues have included: (i) Government's continued reliance on donor funding for public agricultural extension services, coupled with insufficient focused efforts in earlier years to explore "pluralistic" and sustainable model options for extension service provision; and (ii) GRFs and groups introduced without a clear vision of their role and development at onset. The performance on scaling-up beyond the IFAD portfolio has been modest, also given that many projects (except for the recent two) were more or less replicating the approaches of earlier projects. The area of stronger track record in the portfolio includes gender equality and women's empowerment, rated as "satisfactory".

242. The assessment of the individual projects is provided in annex II.

Table 11
Assessment of project portfolio achievement

Criteria	*CSPE rating*[a]
Rural poverty impact	4
Project performance	**4**
Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4
Efficiency	4
Sustainability of benefits	3
Other performance criteria	
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5
Innovation	4
Scaling up	3
Environment and natural resource management	4
Adaptation to climate change	4
Overall project portfolio achievement	**4**

a) Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided;

Key points

- Overall, portfolio design has been aligned with RGC and IFAD policies at the time of design. Except for the two most recent projects, the projects have applied a narrow and detailed approach for targeting, and the identification of prospective beneficiaries was not necessarily followed by appropriate support. In the early portfolio, poverty and food security were in focus while agricultural commercialization, profits and returns to labour are given more attention in the recent portfolio.
- Portfolio design was late in recognizing major changes in the rural context: (i) rapid development of non-agricultural income sources and migration, which created labour shortages in villages and made it relevant to focus on return to labour rather than crop yield; and (ii) a rapid process of financial deepening where today most villages have access to the services of microfinance institutions.
- In spite of good intentions, truly demand-driven service delivery was only introduced late in the portfolio, as was market-driven agricultural development and support for non-land-based activities (e.g. handicrafts).
- The portfolio has contributed to improved agricultural productivity and to less extent agricultural diversification but there are different assessments of how much. Many farmers have adopted some of the practices and technologies that they have been taught but often only partly and some have stopped the application after some time.
- The portfolio has generally performed well on efficiency indicators related to time gaps and disbursement performance but less well on project management and implementation processes, including procurement and M&E systems. The estimated achieved economic internal rates of return were mostly in the acceptable zone but lower than design projections.
- Many areas of the portfolio have sustainability challenges: rural infrastructure because of initial poor design and/or inadequate resources for operation and maintenance, the GRF's because of their design and small scale, and the adoption of improved agricultural practices because public budgets for agricultural extension and support services only constitute only a fraction of the resources provided by the projects during the project period.
- The main rural poverty impact has been in form of contributions to increasing household income and assets, primarily achieved from improvements in agricultural productivity and diversification and in some cases from investments in roads and irrigation. However, with growing income opportunities in non-agriculture sectors, the project impacts may not have been a substantial and decisive factor in overall beneficiaries' household income increase. Many beneficiaries have obtained new skills. The impacts on social capital and empowerment are modest, although there are cases of project support facilitating networking and the emergence of rural organizations Impacts on institutions and policies have been mixed.
- The portfolio has brought some innovations, often introduced by private sector/NGOs, into the government system and innovations from the early projects have been replicated in subsequent projects. Scaling up beyond the IFAD portfolio has been modest.
- The track record on project support and contribution in "gender equality and women's empowerment" has generally been strong over the portfolio.
- Environment and natural resources management as well as climate change have only been explicitly addressed and allocated major resources in the recent portfolio.

IV. Non-lending activities

243. The term "non-lending activities" describes those actions supported by IFAD and the government that are not planned or organized directly under the investment projects (financed by loans or DSF grants) but are instrumental in helping enhance the programme's development effectiveness. The assessment covers knowledge management, country-level policy engagement, and partnership building. It also includes a review of a sample of grants which covered Cambodia.

244. It is acknowledged that the lines between the activities under investment financing and "non-lending activities" are not always clear cut. Investment projects often also finance activities relating to knowledge management or policy engagement which might have broader implications beyond the specific projects, or the projects could also serve as a vehicle for partnership building. Therefore, the description and assessment below sometimes also make reference the investment projects.

245. It is important to underline that the IFAD country/field presence in Cambodia has been pursued since around 2008 but the staffing has been at minimal level, i.e. only the country programme officer, which has provided limited scope for engagement in non-lending activities.

F. Knowledge management

246. **Knowledge management – linked to pro-poor policy dialogue - was identified in the 2008 and 2013 COSOPs** as key elements to enhance the effectiveness of the country programme. While the 1998 COSOP did not specifically mention "knowledge management", a consultative forum and a feedback mechanism to enable lessons learned and best practices to feed national policy formulation is among the main thrusts in relation to its strategic focus on rural community empowerment. The explicit reference to knowledge management in the 2008 COSOPs may also have been influenced by the IFAD's 2007 knowledge management strategy at corporate level.[168]

247. While the both 2008 and 2013 COSOPs emphasize knowledge management, the latter refers to intended linkage between knowledge management and policy dialogue more explicitly. In this vein, the 2013 COSOP refers to the approach used in the COSOP formulation process with the establishment of a website combined with production on policy papers and several consultative discussions and dissemination events in collaboration with institutions such as the Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC)[169] and the opportunity for policy dialogue through "the higher-level partnerships" with MEF and SNEC.

248. **Visible efforts have been made to organize various initiatives and platforms for sharing of lessons and knowledge, in collaboration with the Government.** The main face-to-face interaction forum has been country portfolio/programme review exercises held annually at least since 2011 except for 2014 (table (i) in annex XI). The lists of actual participants of these events are not always available, but the available documents suggest that these events had (or were expected to have) the participation of: (i) staff from relevant government agencies, including senior government officials for part of the sessions; (ii) research institutions and NGOs involved in the investment projects; (iii) representatives of farmer organizations and indigenous people's organization; (iv) other development partners; and (v) IFAD staff and consultants who are involved in supervision and implementation support of investment projects.

[168] The KM strategy highlighted the following elements: (i) strengthening knowledge-sharing and learning processes; (ii) equipping IFAD with a more supportive knowledge-sharing and learning infrastructure; (iii) fostering partnerships for broader knowledge-sharing and learning; and (iv) promoting a supportive knowledge-sharing and learning culture.
[169] SNEC is a thinktankunder the responsibility of the Office of the Prime Minister playing a key role in preparing policy decisions in the country.

Participation has become more diversified over time but generally missing are stakeholders from regional grant-financed projects, except for 2017.

249. **In addition, IFAD also facilitated direct and focused interaction between stakeholders for cross learning.** These may be categorized as follows: (i) exchange visits between projects within Cambodia, e.g. between earlier RPRP and RULIP which had similar interventions (such as agricultural extension service, group development)[170]; (ii) exchange visits to other countries (e.g. government staff involved in PADEE to Thailand on "learning route" in association with an IFAD regional grant project and a visit to another IFAD-financed project (High Value Agriculture Project in Hill and Mountain Areas) in Nepal to capture experiences on value chain development).

250. Cambodia's project and non-project stakeholders were also provided with opportunities to participate in various regional workshops and fora organized by IFAD or IFAD-financed regional/global grant programmes on topics such as financial management (in 2013[171] and 2016 in Bangkok, Thailand) in association with APMAS (regional grant programme) and on gender (meeting of gender focal points from countries in the region organized by the Asia and the Pacific Division of IFAD in February 2010 in Siem Reap, Cambodia). These meetings were intended to promote knowledge sharing and networking across the countries.

251. **It is not easy to pinpoint concrete benefits from knowledge management initiatives, but there are some examples.** The exchange visit for MAFF/PDAFF staff to Thailand supported by the regional grant programme (Routasia/PROCASUR) led to the establishment in PADEE provinces of community learning centres (discussed in innovation section).

252. **Outreach of some knowledge sharing fora/events went beyond projects and their staff.** *The Cambodia Youth Forum on the Promotion of Gender Equality,* funded by the Asia and the Pacific Gender Focal Point Regional Award, was organized by MOWA in 2011 and consisted several activities with a wide range of participants (e.g. Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, youth groups, monks). The main objectives included increased the awareness and capacity of youth group on the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women. Another knowledge management event with wide outreach was the *first Asia-Pacific Local Champions Exhibition* held at the Royal University of Agriculture of Phnom Penh within the context of the PROCASUR/Routasia programme. The event hosted more than one hundred participants from eight countries in the region.[172]

253. **IFAD and IFAD-supported projects supported a number of studies and produced a large amount of knowledge products**, including those in relation to regional or corporate exercise. These include: (i) studies by IFAD or partners on specific themes, such as an assessment of rural institution in Cambodia (2009), a study on group revolving funds (2010)[173]; (ii) projects specific case studies and

[170] For RPRP and RULIP, IFAD conducted supervision missions covering the both projects at the same time and promoted exchange of experience and lessons. Exchange and coordination between RPRP and RULIP was straightforward, since they were implemented under the same unit, i.e. MAFF PSU. On the other hand, while there were also opportunities for CBRDP (which was running at the same time) to participate in such exchange, it did not materialize, apparently because of coordination challenge with another ministry, Ministry of Rural Development, and other agencies. According to the 2011 CPIS, this challenge (with coordinating with CBRDP) was duly recognized in an agricultural advisory meeting on RPRP and RULIP (April 2010). Inter-agency coordination is found to be challenging in general in Cambodia.

[171] The 2013 Asia and the Pacific Region Knowledge Sharing Forum for Financial Management.

[172] Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Tonga and Vietnam. Local champions (advanced farmers) and members of the public and private sectors showcased products, knowledge and innovations, best practices and technologies in 18 Innovation Shops. Public-private Roundtables provided space to identify concrete collaboration opportunities between local champions, rural youth and other development practitioners.

[173] Others include: an impact assessment on farmers' organizations in 2012 by CDRI; the Agri-Business Institute of Cambodia (ABiC), a local non-governmental agency, carried out a case study on decentralized rural productive service delivery introduced by CBRDP and RPRP.

lessons learned; (iii) country technical notes on indigenous peoples' issues in Cambodia (2012); (iv) studies in preparation of the 2013-2018 COSOP.

254. **The use of on-line platforms has been extensive and the amount of information is generally substantial, although the completeness and the degree of ease of access vary.** In addition to those at regional-level,[174] Cambodia-specific platforms include: Cambodiagreen (www.cambodiagreen.org) for the country programme, and project websites (www.padee.org for PADEE, www.tssdcambodia.org for TSSD, www.aspirekh.org for ASPIRE). Project websites are quite complete including a large number of documents generated in the course of implementation[175]. In particular, PADEE has an e-library containing an impressive amount of information, including case studies and videos/clips on best practices. Facebook is used extensively the projects and arguably has served as one of the important channels to disseminate news and information on the projects.

255. On IFAD's Asia site, projects and IFAD staff do not systematically or regularly contribute to feed the platform by uploading communication products, photos, news and articles, and actively participating into discussions. Blogs and discussion sections are not practically used and the number of documents is quite limited. Main posts relate to PROCASUR/Learning Route grant, APMAS, and PADEE.[176]

256. The integrated platform www.cambodiagreen.org, established as part of the 2013 COSOP preparation process, is intended to contribute to improve the dissemination of knowledge products emerging from the country programme in a comprehensive manner. On this site, too, a large number of documents and videos[177] are available, although the site seems to be still work in progress[178] and could be better organized and systematized.

257. The main source of knowledge is the experience in the investment projects and therefore, quality of knowledge and performance of knowledge management is closely linked to project M&E, which has been identified as one of the areas of weak performance in portfolio review exercise. In this regard, there have been increasing efforts on strengthening project M&E and linking it to country level programme monitoring and policy engagement.

258. **Summary.** Increasing efforts have been made to capture and systematize the project experience and lessons, and package and disseminate them. Recently, major efforts have also been made to improve the M&E systems within the investment projects. A considerable number of reports and communication materials has been made available, although access to or retrieval of these documents is not always easy. Country programme reviews and other activities have provided opportunities for project implementers and stakeholders to share experience and network with each other. There are some examples of grants facilitating knowledge management and contributing to innovations and improved effectiveness in investment projects, but it is only recently that greater attention is being paid to develop stronger linkages between the regional grant programmes and the investment portfolio. Knowledge management is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4).**

[174] Including IFAD Asia (http://asia.ifad.org/); IFAD Asia/Pacific Newsletter; social reporting blog (http://ifad-un.blogspot.it/); facebook – IFAD Asia (https://www.facebook.com/groups/ifadasia/?ref=br_rs)
[175] For TSSD: annual and quarterly reports; provincial reports; projects outputs (e.g. guidelines and operation manuals - although the majority in Khmer, newsletters (though only the one covering 2014 is in English), some videos, links to registered audios from local radio programmes.
[176] For example, interviews; articles on PADEE launch seminar, the nomination of PADEE team; case studies etc.
[177] Some of these are developed by IFAD or IFAD-financed projects (many by PADEE), and others relate to other initiatives/ partners. Those specific to IFAD Cambodia programme include those focused on specific aspects or impact of projects, interviews. Videos also cover the 2012 strategic design process of the COSOP
[178] For example: (i) it is not stable with an error/malware message displayed on every new page opened, several links do not work[178] and some sections are empty; (ii) the process to download documents is lengthy (several clicks to download a single document); (iii) documents do not have structured titles; and (iv) the site is not up-to-date.

G. Partnership-building

259. **Government partners**. The key government partner agencies have been MEF as the representative of the borrower/recipient and MAFF as the main implementing agency. MOWA became closely involved to better integrate gender issues in the projects since RPRP, and the Government partners have diversified in the later part of the portfolio, including the Ministry of Rural Development (only in CBRDP), NCDDS (TSSD and ASPIRE), Ministry of Commerce (AIMS) and SNEC (ASPIRE). Among others, annual country review meetings involving all relevant ministries serve as the opportunity to foster collaboration.

260. **There are a number of positive indications of collaboration between IFAD and the Government agencies**. The minutes of the meeting between IFAD and MEF in 2008 signed by both parties[179] shows, among others, the Government's appreciation of the IFAD's expertise on agricultural development and rural poverty reduction and its request for IFAD "to play a more important role at the policy level thorough the Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water (TWG-AW)" and "to consider establishing a country resident mission." The MEF has also been a host of the number of country programme review meetings and its staff participate in supervision missions. MAFF hosted the IFAD country programme officer in the premises until the proper country office space was set up at UNOPS very recently. SNEC worked closely with IFAD in the 2013 COSOP preparation process and hosted "thematic seminars".

261. **Development agencies. The strategy and approach for partnership-building with other development agencies in Cambodia has evolved over the period**. In the earlier period, partnership with other donors was discussed mainly in relation to collaboration in investment projects and their co-financing, and was viewed as a means for IFAD to gain experience in the country building on other initiatives.[180] Such a stance was inevitable and appropriate given that IFAD had no prior experience and limited knowledge in the country, coupled with substantial volume of aid money flowing in and the large presence of many aid agencies in the post-conflict period. Furthermore, given RGC's weak institutional capacity, partnership was pursued with development partners with the ability to provide technical assistance to support implementation.

262. **A number of partnerships have emerged mainly in the context of the investment projects and they have increasingly diversified** (table 12), even if those potentials identified in the 2008 COSOP[181] were vague and did not materialize except for co-financing with ADB for TSSD. Over the years, the role of IFAD shifted from a financier of the initiatives originated from or largely influenced by other partners (e.g. APIP by the World Bank, CBRDP by then GTZ[182]), to a financier with more involvement in technical contents. Partners have diversified from aid agencies to include NGOs and other actors, with IFAD playing a role more

[179] Meeting on 27 May 2008 between the MEF representaed by Deputy Secretary General and IFAD represented by country programme manager.

[180] The 1998 COSOP indicated that "IFAD's financing would be to upscale or build on the successful experiences and approaches and models of other like-minded donors who have been operating in Cambodia". Such approach was manifested in earlier projects, specifically, APIP (co-financed with and supervised by the World Bank after the planned co-financing with ADB fell through), ADESS (co-financing and collaboration with UNDP and AusAid, with the latter providing technical assistance), CBRDP (co-financing and collaboration with GTZ providing technical assistance), RPRP (small co-financing in the form of technical assistance by the Partnership for Local Governance), RULIP (co-financing in the form of technical assistance by UNDP).

[181] The 2008 COSOP identified the following potential: The French Development Agency (AFD) in Kratie, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri for smallholder rubber development; GTZ and the World Bank in Kratie for social land concessions; the Danish International Development Assistance/the Department for International Development (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) (DANIDA/DFID) in Kratie, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri for natural resource management and rural livelihoods; the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Ratanakiri for ecotourism and possibly for cofinancing of the new project in Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom and Siem Reap; and NGOs working in IFAD project target areas.

[182] The choice of project provinces in CBRDP (separate locations in the country) was influenced by GTZ. The CBRDP MTR commented as follows: "The relative complexity of the project design reflects the history of the project. The project design was based on continuing and scaling up activities started by two ongoing German assisted projects, one in each province, with different activities and approaches."

in mobilizing strategic partners particularly in PADEE (see paragraphs 265), but partnerships in other projects after RPRP (i.e. RPRP, RULIP, ASPIRE, AIMS) are relatively limited.

Table 12
Forms of partnerships materialized in investment projects

Form of partnership	*International financial institutions*	*UN agencies*	*Bilateral donors*	*Others / NGOs*
Co-financing investment projects (finance)	WB (APIP), ADB (TSSD)			
Co-financing through technical assistance as integral part of project		UNDP (ADESS, RULIP), FAO (PADEE)	AusAid (ADESS) GTZ (CBRDP)	
Design, oversight and support for project implementation	WB (APIP), ADB (TSSD) (supervision)		GTZ (CBRDP)	
Strategic service providers for project implementation		FAO (PADEE)		SNV (PADEE), iDE (PADEE), PROCASUR (PADEE)
Support for research and analytical work				3ie, IFPRI (ASPIRE)

Note: The table does not include grant recipients and implementers.

263. **The level of additional financing by other aid agencies has been generally low, except for APIP and TSSD**. APIP and TSSD were both initiated by the main co-financiers (the World Bank and the ADB, see figure 6 in earlier section and table (e) in annex XI) and it would be correct to say that IFAD financing was mobilized by them, rather than the other way around. ASPIRE is a special case as it has as the objective to develop a joint financing mechanism that all major development partners supporting agricultural extension and training would use in order to ensure harmonization of RGC and ODA financing of agricultural extension and training. Potentially, this could mobilize additional resources or change the channeling of resources. However, success in developing joint financing mechanisms normally requires that all the main financiers have participated in or jointly done the identification and formulation which was not the case in formulation of ASPIRE.

264. **IFAD's work and experience in supporting pro-poor agriculture and rural development is valued by other development partners**. There are concrete examples. First, the partnership with ADB on TSSD goes beyond co-financing. The TSSD redesign focused IFAD's investment on where the Fund has experience (support to groups of beneficiaries, LIGs) and IFAD brings its expertise to supervision missions. IFAD's strengths in this aspect is well-recognized by ADB, which has requested IFAD's continued co-financing of the additional financing phase – not so much because of the money but more for the knowledge.[183] Second and a very interesting case is the recent memorandum of understanding with USAID signed in January 2017, which is aimed at leveraging each other's expertise to support Cambodia's agricultural development. Furthermore, the position as the alternate facilitator for the TWG-AW also gives recognition to IFAD.

265. **Non-government partners. Recently, partnerships with non-governmental partners have been pursued to support investment projects**. They need to be distinguished from contracted service providers (or consultants) that are identified through competitive procurement processes: these strategic partners are normally identified at project design stage or during the implementation by IFAD and the Government, and part of the costs of the services they provide is financed from their own budget in some cases (which is computed as co-financing). This form of partnership emerged from PADEE which has three main project implementing partners (SNV, iDE and FAO) (table 12). While it could contribute to

[183] According to the interview with ADB by the CSPE team.

effective technical support, it is becoming more difficult to pursue such form of structured partnership, given increasing scrutiny by the Government on the use of loans for technical assistance and its preference on investment in "hardware" (e.g. infrastructure).

266. **Rural organizations. Relationship with civil society organizations is the unique aspect of the IFAD's partnership building**, supported by regional/global grants (see also the next section on grants). Two regional grants to support farmers' organizations in the region have contributed to IFAD's forging relationships with apex farmer organizations, incorporating them into programming (e.g. COSOP, project design) and facilitating their participation in the TWG-AW. Furthermore, IFAD has recently strengthened its partnership with indigenous peoples' organizations as well and this has been facilitated by IFAD's corporate-level initiative on indigenous peoples.

267. **Summary.** The performance on partnership-building is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**. The rating reflects overall good partnerships with the Government and the evolving and increasingly diversified partnerships with other development partners and non-government actors, with the latter, however, being of a more recent and not consistent phenomenon.

H. Country-level policy engagement

268. "Policy dialogue" has been an area of attention at IFAD, but recently there has been a shift to use the term "policy engagement". According to a recent publication,[184] a policy engagement is "a process for IFAD to get involved with partner governments and other national stakeholders to influence or inform policy priorities, as well as the design and implementation of public policies that shape the economic opportunities for large numbers of rural people to move out of poverty. IFAD sometimes participates directly in policy dialogue; more often, it facilitates discussion among national stakeholders, strengthens their capacity, and brings evidence to the table that can inform discussion". Support to policy making as well as institutional strengthening would have been of particular relevance in Cambodia given the loss of human resource, destruction of institutions and systems before the peace agreement.

269. **Policy-related agenda are found in all COSOPs[185] but "what" and "how" are not always clear.** It is understandable, however, that, given heavy reliance on the investment projects for any possible policy-related inputs and with substantial donor presence, it would have been difficult to be too specific. Planned areas for policy linkages indicated in the COSOPs are mostly confined within investment projects and not beyond or across the projects.

270. The 2008 COSOP has a strategic objective referring to "institutional support for evidence-based pro-poor policy making" in relation to D&D and local governance for pro-poor agricultural and rural development. The focus on D&D support (through investments through decentralized structure) is consistent from the previous 1998 COSOPs, but many items listed under this strategic objective 2 (table (j) annex XI) are rather vague in terms of what the key issues are, how to actually work on the area (e.g. "participation in district initiatives to pilot service delivery models and build links between D&D and sector programmes", "promotion of good governance") or what is entailed in "evidence-based pro-poor policy making".

[184] IFAD. 2013. County-level policy engagement: opportunity and necessity. https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/2f7ad2b7-e833-412a-aba3-8c0c94f2d99a

[185] Policy engagement issues can appear in different parts of the COSOP, i.e. a dedicated section on policy linkage, as an integral part of a strategic objective(s) or results management framework (e.g. as indicators). In the 1998 COSOP in the old format, there was a section called "area for policy dialogue" and the identified areas for policy dialogue included livestock, poverty targeting, cost effective irrigation development, the establishment of a framework for micro-credit institutions.

271. While the 2013 COSOP strategic objectives have no explicit reference to policy dialogue, the document refers to "evidence-based policy work closely linked to investment programme" and policy linkages through coordination with development partners. The results management framework also includes outcome indicators directly related to policy issues.[186] But the "policy issues to be focused" presented in the COSOP (table (k) annex XI) appear more as overall directions for ASPIRE and AIMS rather than "policy issues" *per se* (for example, "improved access of poor farmers to efficient agricultural support services").

272. **There are examples of policy-related outcomes emerging from the investment portfolio reported in the self-assessment**, including: (i) institutionalization of the IDPoor system (CBRDP with GTZ); (ii) adoption of policies including and in support of VAHWs and CEWs (e.g. APIP[187], ADESS); and (iii) adoption of the policy on agricultural extension.[188] For the institutionalization of the IDPoor system, while CBRDP (and GTZ) provided inputs, the role of IFAD – direct or indirect – to the development and institutionalization was not significant. For the latter two, given the focus of the historical IFAD-supported projects, IFAD's experience is most likely to have made contribution to policy making in these areas.

273. The ASPIRE, which is set out to provide evidence-based policy making to contribute to the agricultural extension policy implementation but the implementation has been very slow. On the other hand, reportedly ASPIRE design process influenced the decision to give PDAFF the status as budget entities within the programme budget structure and ASPIRE has then been instrumental in supporting MAFF planning and budgeting departments to develop planning instruments and budget preparation procedures to increase the autonomy of PDAFF in designing agriculture services programmes to meet the needs of their provinces, nationwide.

274. In addition, though not mentioned in the self-assessment, it is plausible that gender mainstreaming activities supported in a series of IFAD-financed projects and the collaboration with MOWA and PDAFF contributed to policy and institutional framework to promote gender equality at national and sub-national level, for example, through gender-sensitive monitoring and impact assessment and support to community council focal point for women and children.

275. **Overall, proactive efforts to bring up emerging lessons and knowledge from investment projects to higher-level platform for policy engagement have been relatively limited**. Except for the ASPIRE, implicit expectation has been that that knowledge generated from the projects would inform policy issues broadly and beyond the project level, but this was optimistic given IFAD's insufficient budget and minimum country presence (i.e. one country programme officer). The use of grants to support knowledge management and policy engagement has been rather limited. There has been hardly any country-specific grant in Cambodia, except for small grants for NGO mid-1990s and another grant in 2007 in association with CBRDP (paragraph 78, footnote 80).[189] There have been

[186] These outcome indicators are "a policy for climate sensitive agricultural extension services integrating public sector, private sector and civil society roles is developed and adopted" and "at least three major policy studies and associated publications will be produced by SNEC, discussed with stakeholders and disseminated (small grants)"

[187] The APIP PCR (specifically on the animal health and production component) reported that the project contributed to the formulation of a number of legislations and regulations, including the sub-decree on the establishment and management of VAHWs (e.g. VAHWs selection criteria, VAHS registration, etc.).

[188] The development of the policy on agricultural extension was to be supported by ASPIRE, but in the end, the policy was prepared with support by USAID shortly after ASPIRE was approved. Even without a direct role in the preparation of the policy document, given the major thrust of the historical portfolio on agricultural extension service strengthening, it can be deduced that IFAD and project experience have contributed to the policy making.

[189] Between mid-2000s and 2012, Cambodia was classified as "red" and subsequently "yellow" under DSF, which may have made more complicated or not possible to access regular grant funding. At the same time, it is noted the grant approved in 2007 in association with CBRDP came from the DSF grant funding.

a few regional grants (see also section on grant) with policy component but there is limited evidence of their policy-related outcomes.

276. The 2013 COSOP indicated the intention on "more proactive use of communication for behavioral change to reach out to a larger group of stakeholders, including policy-makers and as a follow up to the activities of the COSOP preparation process which include seminars and a dedicated website." The 2013 COSOP process itself was indeed elaborate and included four thematic seminars in September 2012, each with half-day duration.[190] These seminars, participated by high-level government officials and development partners, might have contributed to discussion on some policy and strategic issues, but here, the main objective was to receive inputs for the COSOP and the document was the output.

277. The TWG-AW (box 4) could potentially serve as a platform for policy debate but it seems that the group has so far served mainly for information exchange and debriefing. IFAD is at present the alternate facilitator on behalf of development partners for the TWG-AW (along with FAO as the lead facilitator). The alternate facilitator may not have a substantive role, but the position itself shows some recognition among the stakeholders in the sector and contributes to networking.

Box 4
Thematic working group on agriculture and water (TWG-AW) in Cambodia

Under the Aid Effectiveness Framework, the TWG-AW was established in late 2004 to increase the exchange of information among key relevant actors and promote common reflections on priority technical issues to be solved in order to enhance agricultural productivity and diversification and to improve water resources development and management. The mandate of the TWG-AW was modified in 2007 to focus its activities on the formulation of the Strategy on Agriculture and Water (SAW). After its work on the SAW, the TWG-AW became less active. In 2014, a proposal was made to restructure and revitalize the TWG-AW.

According to the TWG-AW terms of reference, the principle function of the TWG-AW is "to support the Government in its efforts to develop the agriculture sector in Cambodia in an accountable, transparent, participatory and inclusive manner", and "constitutes a link between high-level policy dialogue and field experiences and implementation: it helps translate high-level policy goals as expressed in the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP), the Agricultural Sector Strategic Development Plan (ASDP) and similar documents into sector-specific programmes and projects and conversely identifies and promotes policy goals that take account of field realities". The TWG-AW at present has membership of representatives of the government ministries, development partners, NGOs and the private sector. FAO is the development partner lead facilitator and IFAD is the alternate.

Source: Proposal for restructuring the TWG-AW, dated March 2014; TWG-AW terms of reference.

278. **A noteworthy contribution has been that IFAD facilitated the inclusion of farmer organizations in the TWG-AW membership**. This can be considered as important contribution to policy dialogue and influence, by giving a space to farmer representatives in such a forum for their exposure, information and possibly voice.

279. **Assessment summary.** Experience in a number of investment projects, along with support by other donors, has contributed to informing and shaping the agricultural extension policy and gender mainstreaming in government initiatives for rural and agricultural development. IFAD's contribution to support the participation of farmer organizations in the TWG-AW, which can be considered as an indirect form of policy engagement, is noteworthy. But strategic and structured support and actions for policy engagement beyond the project level have been relatively limited, owing to limited human resources and little proactive use of

[190] The four topics were as follows: (i) chronic poverty: causes and solution; (ii) building resilience to climate change; (iii) linking farmers to markets; and (iv) programme approach, harmonization and scaling up.

grants. The performance in country-level policy engagement is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4).**

I. Grants[191]

280. **The grants involving Cambodia have mostly had regional/global scope, with limited use of country-specific grants**. Between mid-2000s and 2012, the status of Cambodia relative to debt sustainability[192] may have made it difficult to access regular grant financing, but even before or after, there is little trace of proactive initiative to mobilize country-specific grants. There have been only five county-specific IFAD regular grants for Cambodia since the beginning and they have been in small amounts (a total of US$300,000),[193] while there were two grants only for Cambodia financed by supplementary funds, one of which has been directly integrated into PADEE. Some thirty regional and global grants involving Cambodia have been operational after 2010 (see annex V and table (l) in annex XI). In the context of the CSPE, about one third of the grants were reviewed.[194]

281. **The grants coupled with corporate initiatives contributed to fostering partnerships between IFAD and civil society organizations**, specifically, farmer organizations and indigenous peoples' organizations. This is indeed a unique feature of IFAD's partnerships. The partnership with farmer organizations (specifically, the Farmers and Nature Net [FNN] and the Cambodian Farmer Association Federation of Agricultural Producers [CFAP]) has been forged through a regional grant programme (the Medium-Term Cooperation Programme, MTCP). For example, the farmer organizations have participated in the country programme review, strategy development and project design processes. Furthermore, IFAD facilitated these farmers' organizations having been given seats in the TWG-AW.

282. Recently, IFAD has strengthened the partnership with indigenous peoples' organizations. Such linkage materialized because of IFAD's corporate initiative: the Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility[195] and the Indigenous Peoples' Forum. For the first time, their representatives were invited to the annual country programme review workshop in January 2017. Furthermore, IFAD fielded a focus mission, composed of an external consultant (specialist in indigenous peoples' issues) and a representative from the Cambodia Indigenous Peoples' Association (CIPA), to develop an entry strategy for ASPIRE to more effectively incorporate indigenous peoples' issues in the programme.

283. **Visible contribution has been made through collaboration with ROUTASIA in promoting knowledge sharing between practitioners and beneficiaries.** For example, the learning routes supported in ROUTASIA by PROCASUR with participants from Cambodia led to piloting and developing the methodology for farmer-to-farmer learning (i.e. community learning centres) in PADEE (paragraph 209).

284. **There are a couple of examples of grants contributing to the performance of investment projects.** First, APMAS-GSM contributed to enhancing the capacity

[191] As part of the investment projects, IFAD financed approximately US$35 million of DSF grants, which are not covered in this section, as they were dealt with in the section on portfolio assessment.
[192] Cambodia was classified as "red" (high risk in debt stress and therefore investment financing provided 100 per cent on grant terms) and then "yellow" (medium risk and 50 per cent grant and 50 per cent loan). The country is since 2013 classified as "green" (low risk and 100 per cent loan).
[193] The last country specific grant (US$115,000) was to the Government in association with the loan-financed project, Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampot and Kampong Thom (CBRDP). The grant-financed activities ran towards the end of CBRDP only for 1.5 years and closed in 2009. The earlier four grants were between US$25,000 and 60,000 and to support specific aspects of the investment projects (e.g. start-up).
[194] The grants reviewed [with numbering in annex V] are: 4FGF-CIAT [6], MTCP 1 and 2 [7 & 22], APMAS [9] and APMAS-GSM [12], IRRI [13], PROCASUR [16], Pro-poor policy approaches – FAO [17], Cassava – SNV [19], APRACA [20], remittances – UPU [34].
[195] CIPA was a grant recipient based on the proposal it submitted for the Indigenous Peoples' Assistance Facility financed by IFAD. As noted in the IOE's evaluation synthesis on IFAD's engagement with indigenous peoples (2015), this Facility at global and regional level running since 2007, has helped identify indigenous peoples' organizations that can be partnered in the portfolio.

of project staff and partners (in particular RULIP) for gender awareness raising and the integration of gender-sensitive monitoring. Six training/coaching sessions were organized in Cambodia.[196] For example, the grant project supported the piloting of the case-based gender process monitoring scheme in RULIP provinces. Second, 4FGF grant with CIAT also collaborated with RULIP, for example, in training of trainers and farmers, as RULIP introduced cassava as a key crop during the implementation.

285. **For other about half of the grants reviewed, the linkage with investment projects and the country programme is not clear**. These include: APRACA (MFIs participated in workshops); pro-poor policy approaches with FAO (a couple of policy studies undertaken), IRRI (drought stress-tolerant rice variety); cassava – SNV (not clear linkage with the portfolio, but rich in knowledge products); remittance services through postal networks through the Universal Postal Union.

286. **In general, proactive programming originated from the country for use of grants (county, regional/global or supplementary funds) has been limited**. As noted above, there are a number of examples of grants' positive linkage with and contribution to the portfolio and the country programme, but most of these have been the case of others' initiatives (regional grants) successfully fitting into the portfolio. In fact, the 2013 COSOP provides little thoughts on possible use of grants: the only mention is small grants, one to SNEC for policy studies and publications and another for "local leadership development" – neither of which does not seem likely to materialize.

J. Overall assessment

287. Attention to and efforts have been increasing for all areas of non-lending activities. The focus of partnerships evolved, rightly, from the search for opportunities to co-finance other donors' initiatives (preferably packaged with grant-based technical assistance) in earlier years, to the mobilization of strategic partners for investment projects and beyond. There are interesting experiences and practices emerging, especially in the recent several years and in some cases in collaboration with grants, including various knowledge products and knowledge sharing and partnership building with indigenous peoples' organizations. In general, the investment in these activities has not been consistent and strategic, also given the limited human resources in the country office. Grants could have been used to provide focused support but there has been none such. On balance, the overall assessment of non-lending activities is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4).**

Table 13
Assessment of non-lending activities

Non-lending activities	*Rating*
Knowledge management	4
Policy dialogue	4
Partnership building	4
Overall	***4***

[196] APMAS-GSM completion report. The participants included RUILP staff, MAFF, MoWA, PDAFF, PDoWA and other partners

Key points

- Increasing efforts have been made to capture and systematize the project experience and lessons, and package and disseminate them. Recently, major efforts have also been made to improve the M&E systems within the investment projects. Country programme reviews and other events have provided opportunities for project implementers and stakeholders to interact, share experience and network with each other. There are some examples of grants facilitating knowledge management which in turn contributes to the performance of investment projects.
- The strategy and approach for partnership-building has evolved and diversified, from seeking opportunities for co-financing and partnering with organizations that could complement IFAD's lack of experience and presence in investment projects, to broader partnerships outside the investment portfolio, such as farmer organizations and indigenous peoples' organizations. The latter, realized owing to regional grants and corporate initiatives, is indeed a unique feature of IFAD.
- Agenda on policy engagement is found in COSOPs but most of them do not serve as strategic guidance. While there are some examples of the project experience having contributed to informing policy issues as indirectly consequence, strategic and structured support and actions for policy engagement have been limited, owing to limited human resources and no proactive use of grants.

V. Performance of partners

A. IFAD

288. In Cambodia, IFAD has maintained the investment portfolio of two-three projects at any given time. Initially a minor co-financier of the World Bank financed project (APIP), with the country presence starting in 2008, and with the shift to direct supervision, IFAD has established itself as one of the key trusted development partners in the agriculture sector. The latter is also indicated by the nature and scope of some projects such as ASPIRE (comprehensively dealing with agricultural extension services sub-sector with policy and institutional development aspects) as well as the fact that IFAD has been appointed as the alternate co-facilitator to FAO for the development partners group in the thematic working group on agriculture and water.

289. **Strategic approach and direction**. In terms of the overall strategic approach for the country programme, IFAD has shown mixed performance. In the initial period, IFAD needed to find a space to establish itself in the country among many donors with substantial amount of money and with permanent field presence. IFAD started with a small grant to two NGOs in 1995, followed by an investment project (APIP) co-financed with the World Bank and then ADESS co-financed with Australia and UNDP. ADESS represented one of the first externally-funded projects to specifically support "investments through decentralized structures" as opposed to "decentralized governance with some investments attached" and also the first of a series of IFAD-financed projects with a consistent focus on D&D support.

290. IFAD continued to pursue collaboration with other development partners, who grant-funded technical assistance in IFAD loan projects (i.e. UNDP, Australia, GTZ). This was appropriate, as more technical backstopping support by other donor was made possible when IFAD's involvement in supervision was none or minimum. From the Government's viewpoint, it helped increase the grant element of the IFAD loans (though the IFAD financing for some of the projects was converted to DSF grants later on).

291. Even though the consistent support to D&D and partnering with other donors was relevant and appropriate, after some years of operations, IFAD could have become also more proactive and innovative. From late 1990s to around 2010, the portfolio remained static, largely replicating older project designs and approaches with limited critical reflection and limited pursuit of innovative approaches.

292. **Project design**. In terms of the number of missions and their members and time allocated, the investment made seems to be sufficient and the processes relatively thorough.[197] In most cases, if not all, the project preparation processes were based on at least three missions, inception or identification, formulation or first detailed design, and appraisal or design completion (CBRDP, RPRP, RULIP and PADEE). In some cases, analytical studies were also financed as part of the design process, for example, socio-economic diagnostic studies in the proposed project provinces (e.g. RULIP and PADEE). Where the project was to be supported/financed with other partners, the design process also entailed close collaboration and joint missions, for example, with GTZ for CBRDP, UNDP for RULIP, ADB for TSSD and the World Bank for PADEE. The collaboration with the World Bank for PADEE (previously titled "Community Based Agricultural Productivity Project") fell through in the end, and IFAD was responsive to the Government's request for redesigning the project without the Bank, which came after the quality enhancement process.[198]

[197] CBRDP PPA also commented that "substantial resources were invested in the formaltion and appraisal processes."
[198] Starting in 2010, the World Bank and IFAD fielded joint preparation missions for the project envisaged to be cofinanced, but in 2011 at a relatively late stage in the design process (after the project design had gone through the first stage of the internal review process, i.e. quality enhancement), it was decided that the World Bank would no longer be involved in the project. At this point, IFAD fielded redesign/appraisal missions in 2011.

293. On the other hand, the seemingly sufficient investment in the design process did not always translate into appropriate designs. There were some design shortcomings,[199] such as complex and ambitious design (e.g. CBRDP with many components and stakeholders; mismatch between the resource allocation and the stated ambitions; RULIP with many "non-core" activities; ASPIRE), weaknesses in identification of irrigation systems to be rehabilitated (CBRDP), the choice of the implementing agency (RPRP), over-assumption on the enabling conditions for technology adoption (RULIP), limitation in incorporating lessons from previous projects (see also Relevance section).

294. Most of the earlier projects before PADEE shared similar features though with some differences, namely, area-based, agricultural extension services, revolving fund and the implementation through decentralized structures. It is probable that the involvement of the same long-term country programme manager (over 15 years since the very beginning up to 2011) and the same leading consultants in design and supervision contributed to the similarities in the designs. The involvement of the same members could be useful in ensuring the certain level of consistencies and institutional memories but it could also sometimes prevent a "bird's eye view" and critical look, and could stifle innovative ideas and different perspectives. The adjustments occurred but somewhat late and probably not sufficiently.

295. **Supervision, periodical reviews and implementation support**. IFAD started direct supervision in 2008. This involved IFAD taking over the responsibilities for supervision from UNOPS in the middle of the project life for CBRDP and RPRP, whereas in the projects after RULIP, IFAD supervised from the beginning, except for TSSD which is supervised by ADB. The frequency of supervision and implementation support missions is satisfactory: at least one supervision mission per year and most of the time another or more implementation support missions a year. The country programme manager and/or the country programme officer are always present in or at times leading the missions. The expertise of the mission members is fairly comprehensive, including technical areas, as well as cross-cutting issues (e.g. gender, M&E) and fiduciary aspects.

296. There are a number of positive records relating to IFAD's role in supervision and implementation support including the following: (i) combining supervision missions for two projects sharing the similar practices, namely, RPRP and RULIP, promoting the exchange and learning between these projects running at the same time in different areas, as well as avoiding inconsistent messages; (ii) frequent and proactive use of implementation support missions at times focusing on common themes across the projects,[200] which demonstrates the willingness to assist in addressing emerging implementation issues; and (iii) regular participation of IFAD staff and/or consultants in the missions fielded by ADB for TSSD, where IFAD's inputs in specific areas (group development) is much appreciated by ADB.

297. In addition to fielding project-related implementation support missions, IFAD also provided various support, such as assisting in identifying potential consultants to work with the projects, facilitating linkages with the regional grant programmes (e.g. linking project staff to management training provided by APMAS), invitation of project staff to various workshops and training organized at regional/corporate level (e.g. M&E, impact assessment, gender).

298. MTRs were generally useful and contributed to improving the implementation. The CBRDP PPA found that the MTR was conducted at the appropriate time and helped resolve many implementation issues. The RULIP MTR mission is given credit for identifying opportunities to integrate nutrition issues into the project (RULIP PPA).

[199] CBRDP and RPRP PPAs.
[200] For example, the assessment of revolving fund in 2009 and the assessment of sustainability of rural institutions in 2010.

299. Several international and national consultants have repeatedly been involved in various missions in the design and during the implementation (e.g. supervision, MTR, implementation support, PCR). As in the case of project design, this is likely to have helped certain level of consistencies in the messages from different missions, but on the other hand, it might have contributed to limitation or delays in identifying design and implementation issues and acting on them. An example of this was a design issue with RULIP[201] that was detected by MTR, the team composition for which changed significantly in contrast with the earlier supervision missions led by the same key consultants who also led the design missions. The RULIP PCR also assessed that IFAD could have provided "more proactive and consistent support to projects during early years of implementation".

300. **Country programming and reviews**. In collaboration with the Government, IFAD has organized COSOP/country programming and/or country programme review workshops relatively fairly regularly – every year since 2011 except for 2014. In 2012, a number of thematic seminars were organized as part of the preparation process for the 2013 COSOP. These workshops have produced significant amount of papers and presentations, which are available at www.cambodiagreen.org established to facilitate the COSOP preparation process. These undertakings contributed to promoting collaboration and information exchange with government agencies and other partners with increased diversification. Furthermore, in the past couple of years, there has been an increased emphasis on monitoring on the progress against the COSOP objectives as a country programme rather than as a collection of distinct projects.

301. **Partnerships**. Working in partnership has been a crucial aspect of the country portfolio from the beginning and in general IFAD has done this well, even if not consistently throughout the period. IFAD and the projects it finances have fostered partnerships with various development partners in design, co-financing, implementation and research/studies, such as the World Bank (APIP), ADB (co-financing TSSD), UNDP (co-financing and technical assistance), GTZ (co-financing and technical assistance), FAO, iDE and SNV (PADEE implementing partners). The recent and more strategic approach to partnerships is seen in the memorandum of understanding signed with USAID. In case of TSSD in partnership with ADB, even though ADB is a cooperating institution, IFAD's participation and involvement in project supervision has been substantial and this has been highly valued by ADB which recognizes IFAD's experience and strengths in supporting smallholder farmers and their groups/organizations. See also section on non-lending activities.

302. **Country presence**. IFAD started engaging a national consultant as country operations and implementation support specialist in 2008 as a way to establish its field presence. The 2008 COSOP review report indicates that at that time, another consultant who was contracted by UNDP as "policy advisor" was also seen as part of the IFAD's country presence.[202] According to the same report, these two consultants (called "staff members") were seen as crucial in providing pre-implementation and implementation support, capacity building support to project staff, as well as in giving visibility with the Government and other development partners including through the participation in TWG-AW. This was indeed an accurate and relevant reflection.

303. The establishment of the IFAD country office in Cambodia was officially approved in the framework of the IFAD Country Presence Policy and Strategy of 2011. Actual Cambodia country office establishment was delayed than envisaged in this

[201] Inclusion of many small non-core activities in the design which added complexity, which were removed at the recommendation of MTR.
[202] Results-based COSOP 2008-2012: Annual Implementation Progress Review of 2008.

policy/strategy document.[203] The host country agreement was signed with the Government in August 2015 and the service level agreement was signed with UNOPS in December 2015. The position of proxy field presence held by the national consultant was then converted to an IFAD staff position. Before IFAD established its office at UNOPS premise as per the service level agreement, the IFAD national consultant (now staff) had been located at MAFF PSU. This arrangement, though a temporary one, facilitated regular interactions and preparation for and follow-up on IFAD missions and implementation issues.

304. For a limited period (about 2 years, 2014-2015), the country programme manager responsible for Cambodia was based in Hanoi, Viet Nam, which was going to be a sub-regional hub in the Asia and the Pacific region. This facilitated interaction and communication with country programme officers, the projects and other in-country stakeholders, by being in the same time zone, but the frequency or period of country visits by the country programme manager does not seem to have increased significantly, also given that he was responsible for multiple countries. Whether the country programme manager was in the region or in Rome, having only one country programme officer in the country has understandably posed limitations especially on non-lending activities.

305. **Client survey**. IFAD's regular biennial client survey (covering Cambodia in 2012, 2014 and 2016) indicates that the scores for Cambodia tend to be in the middle range among the eight countries in Asia but that for many indicators the scores slightly improved in 2014 compared to 2012, but then went down in 2016. An increase in the Government's contribution for the latest replenishment cycle of IFAD (from US$210,000 during IFAD5-9 to US$315,000 in IFAD10) can be seen as a reflection of the Government's general appreciation for IFAD.

306. **Summary.** Rating for IFAD performance is **moderately satisfactory (4).** IFAD has in general invested adequate resources and time in design, supervision and implementation support for the portfolio and consistently demonstrated the willingness to support implementation issues identified. The Fund also worked closely with other development partners (e.g. co-financiers) in design and implementation support. On the other hand, the adequate investment and good intentions did not always translate into good design and effective implementation support. There were some weaknesses and delays in incorporating lessons learned, catching up with the rapid context change, and detecting and acting on design and implementation issues. The limited country presence has constrained IFAD from meaningfully engaging in non-lending activities.

B. Government

307. The key government partner agencies have been MEF as the representative of the borrower/recipient, and MAFF, which has been the lead implementing agency for seven out of the nine projects financed so far.

308. **Project management, coordination and oversight**. The rating on project management in project status reports has been mixed between the projects and even for the same project in different years. The average score for the portfolio, ranging between 3 and 4.33 during the period 2009 and 2016, has tended to be close to or below the regional average. Given that the PSU set-up at MAFF has existed since ADESS and has presumably accumulated experience in managing IFAD-financed (as well as UNDP and Canadian development agency) projects, the historical ratings on project management are lower than one would expect. In all three closed projects (CBRDP, RPRP and RULIP), weak performance of project management had improved in the latter part of implementation.[204] With regard to

[203] Cambodia was ranked as among the top 10 countries for opening country offices in the document, but a country office was opened in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (not among the top 10) earlier instead, while the number of new country offices had to be contained.
[204] CBRDP PPA, RPRP PPA and RULIP PPE.

PADEE managed under MAFF PSU, which has generally been rated "moderately satisfactory" or "satisfactory" for most of the indicators, "quality of project management" and "coherence between AWPB and implementation" were rated as "moderately unsatisfactory" in 2016.[205]

309. The performance of ASPIRE programme management has been flagged as an issue, and was rated as "moderately unsatisfactory" in the recent MTR (October 2017). Some of the challenges emanate from the design, including the involvement of many partners and the high volume of international and national technical assistance to be managed.

310. The main executing agency for TSSD was initially only MAFF (Development Coordination Unit, and not PSU), but in light of slow implementation and challenges faced with the implementation arrangements, NCDDS was upgraded from an implementing agency to be the other executing agency. TSSD is the only project that repeatedly received rating of 2 (unsatisfactory) for project management and other parameters (e.g. M&E) in earlier years, but the project status report rating has significantly improved to moderately satisfactory or satisfactory in recent years. Consequently, additional financing by both IFAD (US$10 million) and ADB (US$45 million) has been processed in 2017.

311. The level of coordination between different ministries/departments, as well as between the national and sub-national levels has been mixed, though many projects followed the approach of establishing "provincial support teams" and "district support teams". The collaboration between PDAFF and PDoWA at provincial level in the projects like RPRP, RULIP and PADEE worked fairly well and contributed to gender mainstreaming into project activities.

312. But in other cases, inter-ministry coordination has been challenging, such as the case with TSSD between MAFF and NCDDS[206] and PDAFF and sub-national administrations, or with ASPIRE between MAFF and SNEC. The CSPE mission's field visits to TSSD provinces revealed that there are challenges with coordination between sub-national administrations managing and coordinating support to LIGs (unlike other projects where PDAFF is in lead for supporting groups) and PDAFF/district agricultural offices responsible for crop-related activities.[207] In general, the challenges faced with implementation arrangements and inter-agency coordination were also partly due to the design issues (e.g. CBRDP, ASPIRE).

313. Overall, the low level of pay for civil servants remains an issue, despite the significant increase in public sector salaries across the board over the past decade. This has necessitated the provision of incentives for Government staffers at the local level based on the "priority operating cost" scheme or something similar in order for them to take part in donor-funded projects. Government picked up this cost in ASPIRE and its own funded Boosting Food Production project. While the Government's decision to shoulder such cost can be positive, the fundamental issue is that time-bound and assignment-based "priority operating cost" type arrangements are not conducive to the development of effective and service-oriented public institutions

314. From the available record, MEF has been a collaborative partner for project design, oversight and supervision (e.g. its staff joining some supervision missions),

[205] According to the 2016 PADEE supervision mission report, the notable drop in project management performance since MTR was due to "the prolonged, confused and unsatisfactory AWPB preparation/approval process for FY2016 which has directly resulted in major delays in activities across the project…. (supervision June 2016). Furthermore, the fiduciary risk associated with the employment of close family members of senior PSU within the PSU was pointed out

[206] TSSD project review mission of 2012, "main issue is the lack of coordinated planning and implementation between MAFF and NCDDS to ensure a timely sequence of activities".

[207] In TSSD, service providers are contracted by NCDDS (including animal health and livestock services) and commune extension workers engaged by the project through the commune councils. PDAFF is responsible for crop-related demonstration and training but it is only recently that there has been more attention to linking their activities to LIG support.

indicating certain level of ownership as the recipient's representative, even though the extent of involvement has varied, perhaps also influenced by IFAD's initiatives and the nature of investment.[208] MEF has also been one of the main hosts for IFAD's country programme review workshops. SNEC has been an important high-level partner for policy issues and it closely coordinated in the 2013 COSOP preparation process, hosting technical seminars. But very limited progress has been made in the ASPIRE component SNEC is responsible for. According to the key informants, SNEC is too busy with other national priority tasks and also the extension policy is of too technical nature.

315. **Monitoring and evaluation**. This is one of the areas that have been identified as poorly performing over the years in the portfolio in the periodical self-assessment (project status reports, county programme issues sheets)[209] as well as in the annual COSOP/country programme review workshops. It should however be noted that weak performance of project-level M&E systems is a challenge across many projects and countries.

316. There are ongoing efforts to improve the M&E systems closely linked with knowledge management and with the COSOP, also with proactive support from IFAD. PADEE has pioneered the use of tablets in data collection and uploading by project-hired extension staff. For the projects after the TSSD, consultancy service for undertaking baseline, mid-term and end-line household surveys is organized into one procurement package, rather than separately, which could contribute to consistencies in the methodology and comparability between different points in time.

317. **Procurement**. Procurement is another area where the Cambodia portfolio performance has been consistently lower than the regional average. RULIP was rated "unsatisfactory" (2) in 2011 and 2012. In 2015, all projects (RULIP which was closing and the ongoing TSSD and PADEE) were rated "moderately unsatisfactory" (3) in the project status reports. As RULIP PCR puts it, weak performance in procurement, especially for those projects managed by PSU, is "inexplicable" as the PSU had implemented IFAD-supported projects over years. In 2016, the rating for two ongoing projects (TSSD and PADEE) improved to "moderately satisfactory". Procurement in ASPIRE has been particularly challenging, as reflected by the self-rating of "moderately unsatisfactory" in 2016, also due to the sheer volume of procurement of consultancy services (with significantly more requirements of international technical assistance than other projects).[210]

318. **Disbursement, financial management and audits**. As noted in the section on efficiency, the disbursement profile has been satisfactory for most of the projects, except for the initial period of TSSD and current ASPIRE. Financial management performance has been uneven, but since 2013 no project has been rated lower than 4 in the project status reports and the average rating has been better than the regional average. One of the issues of concern was delays in preparation of

[208] For example, for PADEE design missions were chaired by MAFF senior official and not MEF. For ASPIRE, MEF's involvement has been visibly much closer, in the design process, as well as in the programme oversight with the MEF Secretary of State being a co-chair with MAFF.

[209] Cambodia portfolio review report 2010-2014: "Project-level M&E systems are not reliable or functional enough to provide timely information on project performance and results, while the few available M&E data are not used by project management to make informed decisions in order to steer performance. Moreover, data on outcomes and impact are scarce, at best, highlighting the need for annual outcome surveys and more reliable impact surveys. Additional, hands-on M&E support appears therefore to be a must for the Cambodia Country Programme"

[210] UNOPS was contracted in September 2015 to support the technical assistance recruitment process in ASPIRE under the heading of human resource related services, including the preparation of terms of reference for 30 positions and managing the recruitment process. The final design mission for ASPIRE of June 2014 stated that IFAD would "seek to arrange a grant for UNOPS for the initial period of the Programme to support the implementation readiness of MAFF and specifically with establishment of the ASPIRE Secretariat". It is not clear where this "grant" was supposed to come from.

withdrawal applications for the payment to project implementation partners in PADEE, which necessitated these partners to pre-finance some of the activities.

319. In Cambodia, audits are undertaken by external auditors. The quality or timeliness of audits as assessed by IFAD has also been uneven, with the country portfolio average fluctuating between "5" in 2011 and a low "3.5" in 2014, against a more stable APR regional average of "4". It should be noted that when it was rated "moderately unsatisfactory", it was due to the delay in the submission, the limited scope of the audit or the absence of separate auditor's opinions on specific areas as required by the IFAD Guidelines on Project Audit, rather than the problem with the quality of financial statements.

320. **Counterpart funding**. Availability of counterpart funding has also been uneven. As for the closed projects (CBRDP, RPRP and RULIP), the level of counterpart funding provided was 110, 100 and 69 per cent of what was envisaged in the design. As for PADEE, according to the 2016 supervision mission report, disbursed counterpart funds account for only 51 per cent of the total commitments with less than 2 years remaining and when the disbursement of IFAD financing was close to 90 per cent. ASPIRE started with a low rating ("moderately unsatisfactory"), but the supervision noted that this was related to lesser requirements of counterpart funds than planned in the AWPB, rather than Government's delays in releasing the funds.

321. **Summary**. Most areas of the Government's performance have overall lain between moderately unsatisfactory and moderately satisfactory. Some aspects of efficiency that are influenced by the Government's performance are positive as indicated in the earlier section on efficiency (e.g. timeliness, disbursement, management cost). The record also shows that MEF as the representative of recipient has been generally collaborative at different stages of projects. The areas that have been found weaker than others are M&E and procurement. Project management performance has varied and the recent ASPIRE facing major challenges. The project evaluations of CBRDP, RPRP and RULIP have all rated the performance of the Government as "moderately satisfactory". Taking into consideration different aspects, the CSPE also rates this area as "**moderately satisfactory" (4).**

Key points

- IFAD has in general invested adequate resources and time in design, supervision and implementation support for the portfolio and it constantly demonstrated the willingness to support implementation issues identified. IFAD also worked closely with other development partners (e.g. co-financiers) in design and implementation support.
- On the other hand, the adequate investment and good intentions by IFAD did not always translate into good design and effective implementation support. There were some weaknesses and delays in incorporating lessons from the experience and detecting and acting on design and implementation issues. Up to around 2010, the IFAD portfolio remained rather static, repeating the same or similar approaches and models in different areas.
- The Government's performance in relation to overall project management, coordination and oversight has been mixed. Inter-agency coordination has been found to be challenging, but the collaboration between MAFF and MOWA and PDAFF and PDoWA has worked well, contributing to effective gender mainstreaming into projects.
- Most areas of the Government's performance have overall lain between moderately unsatisfactory and moderately satisfactory. There are positive aspects related to efficiency, as well as collaboration by MEF on project development development and oversight. The areas that have been found weaker than others are M&E and procurement.

VI. Synthesis of the country programme strategy performance

322. This section assesses the relevance and effectiveness at the country strategy level. In terms of the country strategy documents of reference, the assessment mainly focuses on the 2008 and 2013 COSOPs, while the 1998 COSOP is also discussed.

A. Relevance

323. **Alignment with national strategies and priorities. The overall orientation to the rural poor and agricultural development in the IFAD country strategy has been aligned with the government policies and strategies.** In light of the extended period of conflict and social destruction, an emphasis on social and poverty issues has been highly visible in a series of national development strategies and plans from the very beginning of the reconstruction. The agriculture sector has been seen as a contributor to both economic growth and poverty reduction.

324. The key government policy and strategy documents include: the Cambodia Rectangular Strategy (since 2005, currently in its phase III), the National Strategic Development Plans, the Strategy for Agriculture and Water and the Agricultural Strategic Development Plans. The Rectangular Strategy lists the agricultural development as one of the four "growth rectangles", along private sector growth and employment, physical infrastructure, and capacity building and human resource development. The both 2008 and 2013 COSOPs also covers infrastructure, the latter COSOP with a focus on climate resilience.

325. **Despite overall alignment of objectives, the 2008 COSOP lacked strategic direction**. The first strategic objective, "sustainable livelihoods improvement" with a long list of areas/issues (see annex VII), is quite broad, more an ultimate goal and is actually *not* "strategic". It could be supported by diverse potential interventions, such as group development, agricultural productivity, access to finance (group revolving fund), agricultural support services, market linkage, microenterprise development, water and land management, rural infrastructure, etc. Furthermore, the 2008 COSOP does not present any clear concept and potential areas for future investment. The strategic objectives in the 2013 COSOP became more pointed: access to markets, resilience to climate change and other shocks, and access to better services.

326. **More importantly, IFAD was late in recognizing and reflecting the rapid changes in the rural context in the country strategy and project designs.** The project approach and designs remained largely similar during the 2000s: agricultural extension, farmer training coupled with GRF support. Implications of massive migration to take up non-agricultural opportunities, for example, in the garment industry, resulting labour shortages and financial deepening, among other factors, were not critically reflected.

327. **Geographic focus. The COSOPs have not exhibited a clear direction in terms of geographical focus**. The 1998 and 2008 COSOPs have both referred to the selection of geographical areas (with provinces being the first level of entry) with high poverty rate. The poverty rates would have been *one of the considerations*, but in reality, other considerations (as also noted in the 2008 COSOP) were understandably the prime driver for geographical area selection, such as the presence of partners and their already existing or planned initiatives[211] and apparently the RGC's preference to distribute donor-funded agricultural sector projects in different areas. In any case, especially in earlier years, poverty rates were high in the majority of provinces, and hence "high poverty rate" *per se* was

[211] For example, the selection of two physically apart provinces in CBRDP was basically due to the on-going support by the identified co-financier GTZ which had provided support in these provinces since mid-1990s.

not a particularly meaningful criterion. For example, according to the commune database records, in 2004 there were only two provinces of the 23 provinces (not including Phnom Penh) that had less than 30 per cent of poverty incidence and 14 provinces had the poverty incidence higher than 35 per cent (annex XII).

328. **Other considerations than the poverty rates have been discussed and applied for geographical targeting, though not systematically**. These have mainly included agricultural potential, other development programmes and population. On the latter, in Cambodia, there is a wide difference in the population in number and population density by areas/province. In general, population is concentrated in plain areas in Southeast and around the Tonle Sap Lake. PADEE (designed under the 2008 COSOP) shifted a weight to population (size and density), even though the COSOP did not explicitly provide for such direction. Indeed, the PADEE provinces include provinces that have the lowest poverty rates (e.g. Kandal, Kampot, Takeo – see annex XII and maps on poverty incidence and population density in pages vii and viii).

329. In preparation of the 2013 COSOP[212], substantial efforts were invested on an analytical work supported by IFPRI to strategize for priority geographical areas for investment.[213] Even though general criteria and considerations are discussed, a clear direction does not come out. There are also some inconsistencies within the document: the 2013 COSOP main report shows an intention to work on "the Eastern half of the country to maximize synergies with the existing programme" (2013 COSOP paragraph 96), but one of the appendixes lists provinces that do not necessarily correspond to this description.[214]

330. Synergy between or consolidation of achievements from different projects at ground level - in sequence or in parallel - has been limited due to dispersed geographical coverage and time gaps. With eight investment projects (except for AIMS), IFAD operation has covered a total of 15 of 25 administrative provinces dispersed across the country: 4 provinces with one project, 9 provinces with 2 projects and 4 provinces with 3 projects (annex XII). Where there has been more than one project, two or three projects are often years apart.

331. **Targeting strategy**. **The targeting strategy has lagged behind the change of the context, emerging opportunities and development thinking.** The description of the target group and the targeting strategy has evolved, in part reflecting better diagnostic analysis and more strategic thinking, and in part reflecting the changing country context, but there was a time lag.

332. The targeting strategy in the 1998 and 2008 COSOPs is basically centred around the multiple-stage identification of geographical areas with high poverty rates (provinces, districts, communes and then villages) and then the identification of the poor households within the selected villages (using wealth ranking exercise, later also combined with the IDPoor list). The target group was categorized as very poor and poor, with the very poor comprising "most vulnerable households", the landless or those with little lands, women and women-headed households and indigenous and ethnic minority households. But they were described in general with little consideration of the differences between geographic areas. For example, land holding size varies greatly between different areas, and in sparsely populated areas, "a poor household" may have, say, more than two hectares of land. The target group and the targeting strategy described remained largely static between the 1998 and 2008 COSOPs.

[212] A longer version, "implementation version (expanded)" dated 11 April 2013. The version that was submitted to the Executive Board contains less information.
[213] Presentation by Maximo Trero (not dated) "A Typology of micro-regions for Cambodia".
[214] Battambang, Siem Reap, Kampong Thom, Kampong Chhnang, Takeo and Prey Veng, which are "high population provinces with relatively high poverty rates". The poverty rates in Takeo and Prey Veng are actually not high and also the first two province are not in the Eastern part.

333. The 2013 COSOP indicates a reorientation, with the recognition of the need to: (i) support those who may be above the poverty line but are vulnerable to shocks, in addition to those below the poverty line; (ii) incorporate slightly better-off farmers and other value chain agents; and (iii) devise distinct interventions for different groups (e.g. IDPoor 1, IDPoor 2 and those above the poverty line). This reorientation had partially emerged in the PADEE design, formulated and approved *before* the 2013 COSOP.

334. **Strategic focus and coherence**. At the very beginning of its engagement, it was challenging for IFAD to propose a coherent and strategic programme, with little experience in the country and with many donors providing grant aid. Consequently, IFAD had to look for opportunities, a space to fill in and partners. From the second project (ADESS), IFAD pursued a consistent focus and approach of supporting D&D through investment through decentralized structures and demand-driven agricultural services, while the choice of partners and project provinces was likely to be driven by emerging opportunities. IFAD decision to engage in the Seila Programme (initially through ADESS) is considered to have been arguably a critical factor in the evolution of what was initially little more than a UNDP project in five provinces, into a government-led, nationwide programme which has been continued under the leadership of NCDDS.

335. Nonetheless, the 2008 COSOP, after over 10 years of the operations in the country with 3-4 investment projects, could have been the opportunity to more critically reflect on IFAD's comparative advantage in the changing context and future direction. Instead, the 2008 COSOP was in many aspects a continuation of the 1998 COSOP, informed largely by the then ongoing (CBRDP, RPRP) and the new already designed project (RULIP), rather than serving as a guiding document for the subsequent years.

336. The list of IFAD's relative advantages provided in the 2008 COSOP is long: many of them are general and it is not clear whether and how they constitute a relative advantage. The investment projects after APIP shared similar characteristics covering different parts of the country, but the thrusts, approach and design were overall static and stagnant. The 2008 COSOP was also very broad and contained a long list of various issues and themes under different sections, many of which were left vaguely defined.[215]

337. The 2013 COSOP seems to demonstrate more critical reflection, especially in terms of targeting, and the strategic objectives are narrower. Indeed, the process for developing the 2013 COSOP was more elaborate, involving many studies and seminars with stakeholders. Nonetheless, the discussion on priority geographical areas is not consistent in different parts of the document (paragraph 327). Also, the 2013 COSOP seems to be largely hinged upon the investment portfolio with little attention to "non-lending activities": the items under "policy linkage", "partnerships" or "knowledge management" mostly relate to activities envisaged in the investment projects, except for two proposed small grants,[216] and the indicators in the results management framework are mostly tied to each project.

338. **COSOP results management framework**. A number of weaknesses are observed in the results management frameworks in the 2008 and 2013 COSOPs, for example: (i) linkages between the strategic objectives and indicators are not clear in many cases (e.g. indicator on child malnutrition for the strategic objective on resilience to climate and other shocks in the 2013 COSOP); (ii) the extent of

[215] For example, potential partnerships with AFD, DFID/DANIDA, or for opportunities for innovation. Or the intention to support "promotion of good governance" (part of strategic objective 2), "piloting the approach to learning experience from local communities for policy development and dialogue" (opportunities for innovation), or the formulation of "viable interventions for improvement of accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas".

[216] A small grant proposed for SNEC for capacity development of SNEC's secretariat in agriculture and rural development policy analysis, and another small grant aimed at establishing "locally based pools of trainers/facilitators and to develop a reliable and affordable leadership program for IFAD-supported projects in Cambodia."

expected contribution of the IFAD country programme is not clear (indicators on women in elected commune councillors or Government strategic framework for D&D reforms in the 2008 COSOP); (iii) most of the indicators in the 2013 COSOP results management framework are closely tied to each investment project and do not serve to reflect on the progress at the country programme level. These weaknesses have been gradually self-identified in the course of COSOP/country programme reviews. The results management framework of the 2013 COSOP was revised at MTR in 2016.[217]

339. **Assessment summary.** The overall focus on the rural poor and agricultural development (with more emphasis on production in earlier years) was aligned with a series of government strategies. At the onset, in a country with many donors, IFAD had to look for opportunities, a space to fill in and partners. From the second project (ADESS), IFAD then pursued a consistent focus and approach of supporting D&D through investment through decentralized structures and demand-driven agricultural services, while the choice of partners and project areas was likely to be driven by opportunities arising. After a decade of operations the opportunity to critically reflect on the future strategic direction for the new 2008 COSOP was missed. The 2008 strategy lacked clarity and strategic direction. The 2013 COSOP formulation process was elaborate and highly consultative[218] and the document was more analytical, although there were still inconsistencies, for example, on the geographical focus. The relevance of the country strategy is rated as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

B. Effectiveness

340. Assessing the achievements along the results management framework is not straightforward, also because of poorly formulated strategic objectives and indicators. Tables below provide CSPE comments on the level of achievements on the strategic objectives in two COSOPs. More details with the indicators are presented in tables (m) and (n) in annex XI).

Table 14
Achievements against 2008 COSOP strategic objectives (see table (m) in annex XI for more details)

Strategic objectives	*CSPE comment (level of achievement)*
SO1. Sustainable improvement of the livelihoods of the rural poor men and women in the project areas through community empowerment, productivity improvement and improved access to assets, productive resources, rural services, rural infrastructure and markets	Difficulties in assessment arise from very broad (and not strategic) strategic objectives, with indicators that do not necessarily measure the level of achievement against the objectives. Indicators include those related to malnutrition, agricultural productivity, rural infrastructure, gender awareness. Without being confined to the set indicators and targets, the CSPE assessment (based on the portfolio assessment) is that: (i) the most evident area of achievement is agricultural productivity improvement; (ii) access to rural infrastructure was improved, though the quality was not always good; (iii) access to assets and productive resources probably improved; (iv) access to rural services improved especially for extension services and veterinary services but sustainability is an issue; (v) progress on access to markets was limited; (vi) through fixed group-based approach, community empowerment was not sufficient. (Level of achievement: medium)
SO2. Promoting deconcentration, decentralization and local governance for pro-poor agricultural and rural development through building linkages between the D&D framework and agricultural and rural development and institutional support for evidence-based pro-poor policy making	Support to D&D process through financing the investment through decentralized structures was a consistent focus from ADESS (approved in 1999), which was one of the first large-scale externally-funded projects within the Seila framework outside UNDP support. Continuing with this line of support that started much earlier, IFAD investment contributed to D&D process, while it is also noted that there have been many development partners supporting this area. The track record and results in terms of "institutional support for evidence-based pro-poor policy making" is unclear. (Level of achievement: medium, though higher if the pre-2008 period was also to be considered)

[217] Among others, the COSOP MTR in 2015 commented that the results management framework indicators are tied to specific projects and are somewhat inconsistent and that also TSSD results were omitted.
[218] There were also four thematic seminars hosted by SNEC, each half-day, on the following themes: (i) chronic poverty: causes and solution; (ii) building resilience to climate change; (iii) linking farmers to markets; and (iv) programme approach, harmonization and scaling up (all organized in September 2012).

Table 15
Progress against 2013 COSOP strategic objectives (see table (n) in annex XI for more details)

Strategic objectives	*CSPE comment*
SO1: Poor smallholders enabled to take advantage of market opportunities	Progress being made mainly through PADEE. The indicators and targets related to ASPIRE and AIMS have been removed from the revised results management framework.
SO2: Poor rural households and communities increase resilience to climate and other shocks	The progress affected by delays in ASPIRE implementation (with climate change resilience component) Indicators in the results management framework are related to household assets and malnutrition and their linkage with the indicator is not clear.
SO3: Poor rural households improve access to strengthened rural service delivery by Government, civil society and private sector agencies	The progress affected by delays in ASPIRE implementation. Also, with respect to extension services (among "rural services" mentioned), despite a long-term engagement by IFAD in this area, access to relevant and effective services by poor rural households is still constrained and donor-dependent.

341. In summary, with regard to the 2008 COSOP, the level of achievement is considered to be moderately satisfactory. Among the items in the long list for the strategic objective 1, the country programme made reasonable progress in terms of productivity improvement, access to assets, productive resources. Results on market access were limited: it was mentioned in the COSOP only in passing and project support and focus on this aspect was limited. The country programme was coherent in supporting the D&D processes and made contribution in this regard. Delays in adjusting to the changing rural context, largely static project approaches in terms of focus, instruments, targeting and group formation, and somewhat dispersed geographical coverage have affected the achievements of the country programme.

342. In relation to the 2013 COSOP, with delays in ASPIRE implementation and with AIMS just starting up, the progress against the strategic objectives especially 2 and 3 by the end of the current COSOP period (2018) may be constrained. The targets have been adjusted taking that into consideration, also along the revision of some indicators to make them more easily measurable.

343. The main recommendations in the 2013 COSOP MTR included the need for IFAD to: (i) revise the results management framework (e.g. by revising or dropping indicators; aggregating results at outcome level across projects on a common base); (ii) extend the time-frame for achieving COSOP results; (iii) review the strategy for child nutrition; (iv) better integrate regional grants and country programme activities; and (v) establish two COSOP units for M&E and knowledge management respectively in light of their weak performance.

344. **Summary.** It is more informative to assess the effectiveness of the country strategy and programme based on the intention of strategic objectives relative to the portfolio, rather than the indicators in the COSOP results management framework many of which are not particularly meaningful. The areas where the IFAD country programme has made contributions relative to the historical strategic thrusts include: improved agricultural productivity (although not at optimal level), D&D processes, especially in relation to agriculture and rural development initiatives, and gender equality and women's empowerment. Part of the portfolio also contributed to access to markets and services through investment in rural infrastructure. Access to improved agricultural extension services has taken place within the project spheres but there is little evidence of its institutionalization and sustainability. The effectiveness of the country strategy (broader than the COSOP documents) and programme is assessed as **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

C. Overall assessment: country strategy and programme performance

345. Given the foregoing assessment of relevance and effectiveness, the overall assessment on the country strategy and programme performance is **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

Table 16
Country strategy and programme performance assessment

Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4
Overall	4

Key points

- The overall focus on the rural poor and agricultural development (with more emphasis on production in earlier years now shifting to market orientation) was aligned with a series of the government strategies.
- After a decade of the operations, the opportunity to critically reflect on the future strategic direction in relation to the new 2008 COSOP was missed. The 2008 strategy lacked clarity and strategic direction. The 2013 COSOP formulation process was elaborate and highly consultative and the document was more analytical, although there were still inconsistencies.
- Poorly formulated strategic objectives and/or indicators in the COSOPs make it difficult, and not particularly meaningful to assess the achievements against them. The assessment on the effectiveness of the country strategy and programme without necessarily being confined to the strategic objectives and indicators in the COSOPs is moderately satisfactory.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

346. This is the first country-level evaluation in the Kingdom of Cambodia assessing the Government-IFAD partnership that has spanned over the last two decades. During this period, the Fund has supported nine investment projects with the financing of US$180 million. IFAD has prepared three COSOPs in 1998, 2008 and 2013. The first two COSOPs largely focused on demand-driven agricultural services and agricultural productivity through decentralized structures, thereby contributing to D&D processes. The portfolio since 2011 and the 2013 COSOP have shown increased attention to market-oriented agriculture through improved service delivery with both public and non-public actors, as well as climate resilience. The CSPE has reviewed the evolution of the country strategy and programme in general since the Fund started the operations, while the investment portfolio assessment focused on seven projects approved after 2000.

347. The Government-IFAD partnership over the last 20 years has taken place in a rapidly changing national context. At the start of the partnership in 1996, many rural households faced poverty including food insecurity, and they had little access to infrastructure, agricultural support and financial services. Some ten-fifteen years later, food security situation improved considerably for many rural households, thanks to higher agricultural production as well as increase in non-agricultural incomes. Over the period, most villages had improved access to infrastructure and financial services considerably. The poverty level, according to the national poverty line, reduced from around 50 per cent in 2007 to 13.5 per cent in 2014. Household incomes in rural areas increased while the composition of income sources changed considerably: many poor rural households have increasingly engaged in salary work in the domestic garment industry and construction or through migration to Thailand, which created labour shortages in rural areas. Steady agricultural growth also contributed to rural poverty reduction, though the growth level shows declining trend in the past couple of years.

348. Despite these positive developments, there are still millions of "near-poor" who are only slightly above the poverty line and remain vulnerable to slipping back to poverty. There are significant movements in and out of poverty. While most have become food secure, malnutrition remains to be a problem even today. The country's human capital base remains weak.

349. While a sizable number of rural household members migrate to work in the industry sector, many others stay behind and engage in agriculture, which can still contribute to household incomes and food security. At the same time, grand-parents and women with children are increasingly dominating the population profile of many villages and both groups have limitations as to how much labour they can invest in agricultural production. The challenge is to identify ways to provide returns in smallholder agriculture that are comparable to alternative non-agriculture income sources and that would interest young rural men and women in engaging farming as a business thereby slowing down out-migration on one hand, and on the other, to support poor household members remaining in rural areas to maximize return to on-farm and off-farm activities.

K. Conclusions

350. **The country programme has made contributions in a number of important aspects of rural transformation.** These include support to D&D processes as one of the first major financiers channelling investment through emerging decentralized structures and frameworks, as well as gender equality and rural women's empowerment. Indeed, the achievement was a result of the consistent attention on these areas from ADESS, though with relatively reduced and less visible weight in more recent projects. The earlier part of the portfolio exhibited a strong poverty focus and contributed to developing approaches for identifying the poor. The portfolio has also contributed to increased agricultural productivity of poor rural

households, but higher adoption rates for improved technologies and higher benefits could have been achieved if some weaknesses (e.g. extension and training approach) had been addressed and other constraints (e.g. labour shortage, other means of production) duly considered.

351. **After a series of similar projects, IFAD's strategy and design for the projects it supports shifted in an effort to adapt to the contextual changes, but with some delays.** The portfolio remained largely static up to around 2010 amid the evolving rural context, with the repetition of largely similar approaches in different geographic areas. The projects typically employed the approach of identifying targeted beneficiaries and creating their groups, and providing them with training and extension services combined with GRF support. The projects occasionally supported rural infrastructure, but it was relatively small portions, and overall, a major part of the investments was for soft aspects (e.g. training and workshops, technical assistance) and GRF support (initially in kind and later in cash). Only from around 2010-2011 did projects start to pay more attention to market-oriented approaches and abandon the approach of segregating the target group based on their poverty status. This shift was then confirmed in the 2013 COSOP, which made explicit the intention to support rapidly increasing group of smallholders who are just above the poverty line but are at risk of dropping back into poverty, as well as those chronically poor.

352. The portfolio did not fully appreciate the implications of increasing non-agricultural income opportunities and labour shortages for rural households. For example, the projects continued to provide training in labour-intensive technology and assume that farmers had ample free time to participate in training sessions and group meetings. Recent projects (e.g. PADEE and ASPIRE) started considering the concept of "return to labour" instead of land productivity, but still implicitly assumed that rural households view agriculture as the only, or the most important, income generator - not adequately recognizing that these households would seek to maximize the returns to labour of family members on-farm or off-farm or outside the village.

353. Focused support for market-driven agricultural development was initiated only recently with some encouraging results. It started under PADEE and became the primary focus of the recent project AIMS based on a value-chain approach. Till then only sporadic and limited support had been provided to link farmers to markets. Attention to joint post-harvest activities such as storage and initial cleaning and sorting was generally absent.

354. Although on a limited scale, support to poor households to engage in non-land-based activities or high-value production has had some positive results, including poultry and handicrafts. Exceptionally, RPRP included minor support for vocational training to help youth leave agriculture. Providing the young of poor families with the skills to get good jobs outside the village is relevant but one could question if this is part of IFAD's mandate and competencies or what kind of professional partnerships IFAD should explore if support is to be provided for vocational training.

355. **Support to demand-driven agricultural extension services has consistently run through the portfolio with mixed results**. Even where projects applied demand surveys, they tended to, particularly in earlier years, offer a set menu of training and a standard model for technology transfer. Such approach affected adoption rates. It is only recently that the projects have started organizing training on specific topics for farmers with a common interest. Project subsidies for GRFs were in various ways linked to participation in training. Training and other support services were mostly delivered by project-financed private service providers, who stopped when the projects ended. However, the portfolio did contribute to introduction of user-paid private service provision, such as VAHWs, although their

effectiveness and sustainability vary and they need continued backup and diagnostic support from government. Furthermore, the consistent focus of IFAD's portfolio on improved agricultural extension service delivery is likely to have contributed to key elements in the Government's extension policy: demand-driven and pluralistic extension services.

356. **Improved and sustainable agriculture and commercialization not only requires sound advice on crop and animal husbandry but also effective regulatory services**. In the absence of proper phyto-sanitary and veterinary control, an entire crop or livestock industry and important agricultural exports can be at risk. Only a minority of animals are vaccinated, and the loss of project-supported investments in for example poultry due to diseases experienced by beneficiaries is not isolated incidences. The quality of inputs (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides) needs to be controlled to avoid fake and sub-standard products. The quality of agricultural produce and processed products needs to be regulated and controlled, and in some cases certified, in order to protect consumers and develop value chains of high value products. Food safety also concerns imports, e.g. cheap products from neighbouring countries with high contents of pesticides. Value chain development, as promoted under AIMS, will be constrained if adequate regulatory services are not available.

357. **There could have been more focused and concerted efforts to support empowerment of beneficiaries and their organizations.** Groups of targeted beneficiaries (very poor and poor) were created by the projects without a clear vision for their roles in most cases. There are good examples of these groups continuing to operate (e.g. GRFs, agricultural cooperatives), but many of them served primarily as a mechanism to receive project support. Thousands of GRF groups have been established, but only late in implementation has thought been given to how to sustain them. The projects have paid little attention to organizing farmers to enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis other market actors. Notable exceptions are the agricultural cooperatives that emerged from RULIP (in Preah Vihear), due in great part to emerging market opportunities for organic rice.

358. **Strategic partnerships with other development partners in the projects have contributed to improving effectiveness and bringing in innovations.** Most projects largely depended on the government workforce for their implementation, except for TSSD, which contracted out bulk of work to service providers through competitive process, and PADEE, which had pre-identified strategic partners (FAO, iDE and SNV) to support different project activities and provide co-financing. For PADEE, these partners evidently contributed to introducing different approaches and innovations such as farmer training to common interest groups, multi-stakeholder platforms, *Lors Thmey* and farm business advisors. While it is understandable that the Government is becoming more reluctant to use loans to finance technical assistance and services, given capacity issue in the public sector, securing quality technical assistance continues to be a valid strategy to improve effectiveness and impact of the country programme.

359. **Ongoing efforts to improve M&E offer opportunities to upgrade knowledge management, policy engagement and scaling up.** On this basis, the latest generation of projects ASPIRE and AIMS could serve as a vehicle to facilitate and mobilize additional support by other partners in two important areas in smallholder agriculture development: agricultural extension and pro-poor agricultural value chain development.

360. **There are some good examples of linkage with grants, but in general, proactive planning and use of grants has been limited.** Partnerships with farmer organizations and indigenous peoples' organizations that emerged from corporate initiatives and regional grants are one of the positive features related to

IFAD's mandate and strengths. Collaboration with ROUTASIA/PROCASUR has also led to tangible benefits in terms of introducing innovative farmer-to-farmer extension approach. More could be done to improve coordination and synergies between grants and investment projects.

L. Recommendations

361. The paragraphs that follow provide key recommendations for consideration by IFAD and the Royal Government of Cambodia.

362. **Recommendation 1: Develop and operationalize a two-pronged strategy for the portfolio** with support to: (i) agricultural commercialization with a focus on relatively advanced smallholders; and (ii) coping strategies of poor households. This is largely in line with the orientation in the 2013 COSOP which recognized the need for "distinct development pathways and intervention modalities … for the food-insecure, the rural poor at the subsistence level, and vulnerable rural households just above the poverty line". It is important to develop and operationalize tailored strategies in light of the profiles of the target group and specific contexts (e.g. agricultural potential and market opportunities in specific geographical areas).

363. For the first category, support for primary production may need to be more specialized and of higher technical quality than that provided to date in the projects, and also shaped by buyers' priorities. While group-based training may be relevant for some subjects, individual technical advice may also be needed. Advisory services should also be complemented by support for access to means of production including appropriate labour-saving technologies (including mechanization), as well as market infrastructure. Strengthening of farmer groups/organizations to facilitate marketing will be an important element. While a value chain approach may be pursued, it should be flexible and dynamic in order to exploit changing market opportunities, rather than being of a long-term bureaucratic planning nature.

364. Support to coping strategies of poor households may cover productive activities (e.g. feasible non-land-based activities, simple labour-saving tools) or establishment of safe drinking water facilities nearby or a good village access road. For many of these poor households, emphasis may be on income-generating agricultural activities that are *complementary* to non-agriculture or off-farm activities. For the youth of poor households, who have decided to leave the village, the IFAD-Government partnership may explore how to help them earn better incomes, possibly including vocational training or advice on contracts, and on how to invest their surplus income (remittances) back in the village.

365. This two-pronged strategy should not be pursued by separating households into different groups, as was the case in earlier projects, but rather by defining different flexible support menus, which would also need to be tailored to the contexts in different geographic locations.

366. **Recommendation 2: Balance investment in human capital and rural organizations supported by strategic partners, with tangible items.** The investment in "soft" aspects such as skills development, human capital and organizational strengthening continues to be critical and this should also be balanced with investment in tangible items such as infrastructure, post-harvest facilities, and access to finance that could enable beneficiaries to put the skills and knowledge acquired into practice. Investment in human capital could cover not only productive skills but also broader subjects such as gender issues (as has been done), nutrition, adult literacy, and information on relevant laws and regulations. At the same time, it should be recognized that a long-term perspective is needed for investment on human/social capital and empowerment. This is particularly relevant in Cambodia, given its history, and calls for caution against making an investment decision based only on traditional economic rates of returns.

367. In supporting the formation and strengthening of organizations of the target population (e.g. farmer groups), careful consideration should be given to the main purposes and roles of different types of organizations (with different member profiles) and a realistic exit strategy should be built into the design.

368. To ensure quality support especially for the "soft" aspects and for innovations, given the limited and weak capacity in the public sector, IFAD and the Government should seek opportunities for strategic partnerships with experienced institutions that could provide crucial technical assistance and could support the Government, either to be co-financed or financed by IFAD.

369. **Recommendation 3: Pursue more strategic planning and use of grants and investment financing to deepen partnerships with farmer organizations/associations.** Support to and partnerships with farmer associations/organizations and indigenous peoples' organizations should be continued and strengthened. So far, the corporate initiatives and regional grants have facilitated linkages between these institutions at national level and the country programme. There is a need for more strategic planning and use of IFAD financing, both grants and within the framework of investment projects, to work with these organizations of different types and at different levels. Enhancing partnerships and strengthening their capacity can contribute to: (i) empowerment of these organizations and their members; (ii) better country programming and project design reflecting the priorities of the target group; (iii) relevant inputs to supervision and implementation support; and (iv) influence on policy engagement through partner organizations that represent their members and IFAD's target group.

370. **Recommendation 4. Explore options for supporting regulatory services in agriculture in future pipeline development**. It is likely that the various value chain platforms to be established under AIMS will point to a lack of regulatory services (such as phyto-sanitary and veterinary control, standard and quality control, certification, and food safety issues) as a constraint and that some ad hoc regulatory services may be financed. Given the low starting point, a more systemic and programmatic approach will be required, which in turn assumes mobilization of financing from various sources.

371. **Recommendation 5: IFAD to work with the Government to strategize and facilitate mobilization of other partners to invest in smallholder agriculture.** In addition to potential support to regulatory services (Recommendation 4), ASPIRE and AIMS could serve as a platform to bring in other partners for two important areas: agricultural extension; and pro-poor agricultural value chain development. IFAD's financing and role should help leverage other partners and resources.

Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	*Definition* *	*Mandatory*	*To be rated*
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. *Four impact domains* • Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. • Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. • Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. • Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.	X	Yes No No No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; workload balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

Criteria	*Definition* *	*Mandatory*	*To be rated*
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Ratings of IFAD investment portfolio in the Kingdom of Cambodia[a]

Criteria	*CBRDP*	*RPRP*	*RULIP*	*TSSD*	*PADEE*	*ASPIRE*	*AIMS*	*Overall portfolio*
Rural poverty impact	4	4	4	4	5	n.a.	n.a.	4
Project performance								
Relevance	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4
Effectiveness	4	4	4	4	5	n.a.	n.a.	4
Efficiency	4	4	3	4	5	n.a.	n.a.	4
Sustainability of benefits	4	3	4	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	3
Project performance[b]	**4**	**3.75**	**3.75**	**3.75**	**4.25**	**n.a.**	**n.a.**	**4**
Other performance criteria								
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	5	4	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	5
Innovation	5	4	4	3	5	n.a.	n.a.	4
Scaling up	4	3	3	3	4	n.a.	n.a.	3
Environment and natural resources management	4	4	4	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Adaptation to climate change	n.p.	n.p.	n.p.	4	3	4	n.a.	4
Portfolio performance and results[c]	**4**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**5**			

[a] Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

[b] Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

[c] This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management and adaption to climate change.

Final ratings of the country strategy and programme in the Kingdom of Cambodia

	Rating
Project portfolio performance and results[a]	**4**
Non-lending activities[b]	
Country-level policy engagement	4
Knowledge management	4
Partnership-building	4
Overall non-lending activities	**4**
Performance of partners	
IFAD[c]	4
Government[c]	4
Country strategy and programme performance (overall)[d]	4
Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4

[a] Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings.

[b] Not an arithmetic average for knowledge management, partnership-building and country-level policy engagement.

[c] Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings. The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

[d] This is not an arithmetic average of the ratings of relevance and effectiveness of the country and strategy programme and performance. The ratings for relevance and effectiveness take into account the assessment and ratings of portfolio results, non-lending activities and performance of partners but they are not an arithmetic average of these.

IFAD-financed investment projects in the Kingdom of Cambodia

Proj ID	*Project name*	*Total project cost (US$)*	*IFAD Financing (US$)*	*Co-financer Amount (US$)*	*Government (US$)*	*Coop Institution*	*Approval Date*	*Signing Date*	*Entry into Force*	*Current Completion Date*	*Closing Date*
1100000517	Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project (APIP)	35 105 000	4 747 000	27 002 000 (IDA)	3 356 000	IDA	11/09/1996	27/09/1996	22/09/1997	31/12/2005	30/06/2006
1100001106	Agricultural Development Support to Seila (ADESS)	11 548 000	8 599 000	1 777 000 (Australia)	1 156 000	UNOPS	08/09/1999	05/10/1999	16/02/2000	31/03/2006	30/09/2006
1100001175	Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot (CBRDP)	22 851 000	9 994 000	9 734 000 (Australia, Germany, WFP)	1 822 000	IFAD	07/12/2000	11/01/2001	29/03/2001	31/12/2009	30/06/2010
1100001261	Rural Poverty Reduction Project in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (RPRP)	19 620 000	15 493 000	2 439 000 (WFP)	757 000	IFAD	18/12/2003	19/12/2003	14/04/2004	30/06/2011	31/12/2011
1100001350	Rural Livelihoods Improvement Project in Kratie, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri (RULIP)	13 685 000	12 014 000 (10.76 mill DSF grant and 1.2 mill loan)	1 163 000 (UNDP)	508 000	IFAD	18/04/2007	28/05/2007	31/08/2007	30/09/2014	31/03/2015
1100001464	Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project (TSSD)	55 301 000	13 380 000 (50% loan and 50% DSF grant)	36 448 000 (ADB, FinaInd)	5 473 000	ADB	17/12/2009	15/02/2010	15/02/2010	31/08/2017	28/02/2018
1100001559	Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment (PADEE)	46 144 000 (51 886 000 actual)	37 900 000 (20.4 mill loan and 17.5 mill DFS grant)	6 502 000 FAO, iDE, SNV, GEF/SCCF	5 290 000	IFAD	03/04/2012	08/06/2012	08/06/2012	30/06/2018	31/12/2018
1100001703	Agriculture Services Programme for Innovation, Resilience and Extension (ASPIRE)	82 249 000	41 131 000 (incl.14.9 mill ASAP grant)	13 627 000 (3IE-UK, TBD, USAID)	18.686 000	IFAD	16/12/2014	05/03/2015	05/03/2015	31/03/2022	30/04/2022
2000001268	Accelerating Inclusive Markets for Smallholders (AIMS)	61 613 000	36 257 000		8 654 000	IFAD	14/12/2016	28/02/2017	28/02/2017	31/03/2023	30/09/2023

IFAD-funded grants in the Kingdom of Cambodia under implementation after 2010

A. Global/regional grants that cover Cambodia

	Grant number	*Grant title*	*Grant recipient*	*Effective*	*Closing date*	*IFAD Financing (US$)*	*Countries involved*
1	1000001711	Program for Accelerating the Financial Empowerment of Poor Rural Communities in Asia and the Pacific through Rural Finance Innovations	Asia-Pacific Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (APRACA)	11/01/2007	30/09/2012	1,200,000	Countries in the Asia-Pacific region (including Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, the Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam).
2	1000002830	Programme for Knowledge Networking for Rural Development Asia/Pacific (ENRAP III)	International Development Research Centre (IDRC)	14/09/2007	31/03/2011	1,085,000	Most countries in the Asia-Pacific region
3	1000002733	Programme for Enhancing Agricultural Competitiveness of Rural Households in Greater Mekong Sub-region	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	20/09/2007	31/03/2013	609,000	Greater Mekong Sub-region – including Cambodia
4	1000003086	Programme on Rewards for Use of and Shared Investment in Pro-poor Environmental Services (RUPES II)	World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)	15/10/2008	31/03/2013	1,500,000	Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam
5	1000003087	Regional capacity building and knowledge management for gender equality	FAO	09/01/2009	31/12/2011	1,500,000	Global
6	1000003085	Programme for Linking Smallholder Livelihoods of poor Smallholder Farmers to Emerging Environmentally Progressive Agro-Industrial Market (4FGF)	International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT)	14/01/2009	30/09/2013	1,500,000	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam
7	1000000099	Medium Term Cooperation Programme with Farmers Organizations in the Asia and the Pacific Region: Southeast Asia sub-programme (MTCP I)	FAO (for region wide activities + Southeast Asia + China) and Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) (for South Asia sub-programme)	17/06/2009 for SEWA; 23/11/2009 for FAO	31/12/2012	1,420,000 (1,083,000 to FAO, 337,000 to SEWA	Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam
8	1000003375	Enabling Poor Rice Farmers to Improve Livelihoods and Overcome Poverty in South and Southeast Asia through the Consortium for Unfavourable Rice Environments (CURE I)	International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)	28/07/2009	31/03/2014	1,500,000	Cambodia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand Viet Nam
9	2000001187	Asian Project Management Support (APMAS) programme	Asian Institute of Technology (AIT)	18/12/2009	30/06/2014	1,400,000	Cambodia, India, Lao PDR, Viet Nam

	Grant number	Grant title	Grant recipient	Effective	Closing date	IFAD Financing (US$)	Countries involved
10	1000003535	Global Mechanism of the UNCCD in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa for the Programme for Designing Integrated Financing Strategies for UNCCD Implementation in Selected Countries of Asia And Latin America	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)	26/02/2010	30/6/2013	1,250,000	Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Vietnam (Bhutan and Nepal replaced by Pakistan and Myanmar)
11	1000003619	Programme for the Development of knowledge-sharing Skills	FAO	26/04/2010	30/09/2012	950,000	All Asian countries
12	1000003041	The Asian Project Management Support Programme – Gender Sensitive Management	AIT	28/04/2010	30/03/2013	200,000	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam
13	1000003832	Improving Livelihoods and Overcoming Poverty in the Drought-Prone Lowlands of South-East Asia	IRRI	16/12/2010	30/06/2015	1,200,000	Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand
14	1000003916	Study on Water interventions for improving smallholder farming and rural livelihoods in Asia and the Pacific	FAO	30/03/2011	31/01/2014	250,000	Asia and the Pacific Region (including Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal and the Philippines
15	1000004071	Improved Forage-Based Livestock Feeding Systems for Smallholder Livelihoods in The Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam (CLV) Development Triangle	CIAT	16/09/2011	31/03/2016	1,500,000	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam
16	1000004070	Strengthening Knowledge-Sharing on Innovative Solutions Using the Learning Routes Methodology in Asia And the Pacific	PROCASUR Asia Corporación Regional de Capacitación En Desarrollo Rural	27/10/2011	30/06/2016	1,000,000	Grant open to all countries in the Asia-Pacific region
17	1000004008	Pro poor Policy Approaches to Address Risk and Vulnerability at the Country Level	FAO	13/02/2012	31/12/2016	1,500,000	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Nepal, Viet Nam
18	1000004067	Disseminating CGIAR challenge programme on water and food innovations (CPWF) and adoption process for water and food, and piloting their mainstreaming in the IFAD portfolio	International Water Management Institute-Challenge Programme on water and food (IWMI-CP)	07/05/2012	31/12/2014	1,000,000	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Iran, Kenya, Laos, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam and Zimbabwe
19	1000004356	Inclusive Business Models to Promote Sustainable Smallholder Cassava Production	SNV Netherlands Development Organisation	13/12/2012	31/12/2015	1,199,000	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam

	Grant number	Grant title	Grant recipient	Effective	Closing date	IFAD Financing (US$)	Countries involved
20	1000004382	Enhancing the Access of Poor Rural People to Sustainable Financial Services Through Policy Dialogue, Capacity-Building and Knowledge-Sharing in Rural Finance	APRACA	21/01/2013	30/09/2016	1,100,000	Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal
21	1000004450	Securing Access to Land for the Rural Poor	International Land Coalition (ILC)	04/02/2013	30/09/2015	2,000,000	Global initiative with nine countries chosen (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Bolivia and Togo).
22	2000000074	Medium Term Cooperation Programme with Farmers Organizations in the Asia and the Pacific Region (MTCP II)	Asian Farmers' Association for Sustainable Rural Development (AFA)	04/09/2013	31/03/2019	2,000,000	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu and Viet Nam
23	2000000045	IFAD support to the process of the United Nations World conference on Indigenous Peoples	International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)	02/10/2013	30/06/2017	900,000	Global
24	2000000165	Country Level Support to External Validity of Project Impact Evaluations	International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie)	13/12/2013.	31/12/2017	500,000	Minimum of 24 participating countries involved. For APR: Bangladesh, China, Cambodia, India, Laos, Pakistan, Philippines
25	2000000094	Enabling Poor Rice Farmers to Improve Livelihoods and Overcome Poverty in South and Southeast Asia through the Consortium for Unfavourable Rice Environments (CURE 2)	IRRI	13/03/2014	31/03/2018	1,500,000	Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam.
26	2000000124	Developing Inclusive Financial Systems from improved access to financial services in rural areas	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	05/05/2014	30/04/2018	1,500,000	Selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (in particular India, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines)
27	2000000270	Strengthening Knowledge Sharing on Innovative Solutions Using the Learning Routes Methodology in Asia and the Pacific – Phase 2	PROCASUR	23/06/2014	31/12/2016	1,000,000	Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Nepal, Thailand and Viet Nam
28	2000000493	Indigenous Peoples' Assistance Facility	Indigenous Peoples' International Centre for Policy Research and Education (Tebtebba)	14/10/2014	30/06/2018	526,600	Asian and Pacific countries of the indigenous peoples' communities and their organizations awarded IPAF sub-grants

	Grant number	Grant title	Grant recipient	Effective	Closing date	IFAD Financing (US$)	Countries involved
29	2000000729	Technical Support to Four Ex-post Impact evaluations using mixed methods approaches	University of East Anglia (DEA)	01/11/2014	30/11/2016	500,000	Cambodia, Ghana, Lao PDR
30	2000001053	Promoting People-Centred Land Governance with International Land Coalition Members	ILC	15/12/2015	30/06/2018	2,000,000	Global
31	2000001103	Scaling up Sustainable Land Management (SLM) Practices by Smallholder Farmers: Working with Agricultural Extension Services to Identify, Assess and Disseminate SLM Practices	The University of Bern	29/02/2016	30/09/2019	2,000,000	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Uganda
32	2000000361	Agricultural Transformation and Market Integration in the ASEAN Region: Responding to Food Security and Inclusiveness Concerns	International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)	13/05/2016	31/01/2021	2,500,000	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Philippines, Viet Nam

B. Non-IFAD grants that cover Cambodia

	Grant number	Grant title	Grant recipient	Effective	Closing date	Grant amount (US$)	Grant source	Coverage
33	2000001276	Farmers' Fighting Poverty/ASEAN	AgriCord	06/05/2016	12/09/2019	6 700 000	European Union	ASEAN Countries
34	2000000214	Technology as Development Solution: Use of ICT to Improve Livelihoods of the Poorest in Remote Rural Areas	Government of Cambodia	31/10/2013	31/12/2015	380 000	Korean supp. funds	Cambodia
35	COFIN-EC-26-UPU – FFR	Development of access to remittance services through postal networks in underserved areas in the Asia region	Universal Postal Union (UPU)	22/05/2012	31/08/2013	380 000	Spanish supplementary. funds	Cambodia
36	2000001538	Managing Aquatic Agricultural Systems to Improve Nutrition and Livelihoods in Selected Asian and African Countries: Scaling Learning from IFAD-Worldfish Collaboration in Bangladesh under the Programme Putting Research into Use for Nutrition, Sustainable Agriculture and Resilience (PRUNSAR)	World Fish Center	24/05/2016	30/09/2019	1 956796, including 2% CSP to the Trustee (World Bank / CGIAR Fund)	European Union	Cambodia, Zambia Indonesia and Thailand

List of key persons met[219]

I. Phnom Penh

Name	Sex	Position	Organization
Government			
Bilateral meetings			
H.E. Hem Vanndy	M	Under Secretary of State	Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)
H.E. Pen Thirong	M	Director General, General Dept of International Cooperation and Debt Management (GDICDM)	MEF
Houl Bonnaroth	M	Deputy Director, Dept of Multilateral Cooperation	MEF
Mean Sam An	M	Chief, Office of Multilateral Cooperation, GDICDM	MEF
Keo Vibol	M	Deputy Chief, Office of Multilateral Cooperation, GDICDM	MEF
Yim Keorithy	M	Programme Budget Coordinator Office of Multilateral Cooperation GDICDM	MEF
H.E. Mam Amnot	M	Secretary of State	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
Ouk Saroeun	M	Deputy Director General, Department of Agricultural Cooperative Promotion	MAFF
Hok Kimthourn	M	ASPIRE Programme Manager	ASPIRE Secretariat, MAFF
Nak Rotha	M	Procurement Specialist	MAFF PSU
Kung Kea		GDA Focal Point for PADEE, General Directorate of Agriculture	MAFF
Mao Minea and his 4 staff	M	Director of DAE, MAFF	MAFF
Ngan Chamroeun	M	Undersecretary of State MOI; Executive Deputy Head, NCDDS	Ministry of Interior
H.E. Chan Darong	M	Director General for Technical Affairs	Ministry of Rural Development
Suon Prasith	M	AIMS Project Director	Ministry of Commerce
Long Kemvichet	M	Acting Director, Department of International Cooperation	Ministry of Commerce
Maun Chansarak	M	Director Social Planning Department & Database Manager of IDPoor Programme	Ministry of Planning
Meeting with ASPIRE stakeholders (2 May 2017)			
Hok Kimthourn	M	Manager	ASPIRE Secretariat
Kong Chanthan	M	Climate Resilience Specialist	NCDDS
Chreay Chamroeun	M	CRE	NCDDS
Renato Lee	M	Programme Advisor	ASPIRE Secretariat
Nhem Sovatha	M	DPM	DPS/DAF
Kong Sophon	M	PB Finance Specialist	DPS/DAF
Chin Samouth	M	DPM	GDA/ASPIRE
Kong Bunna	M	Programme Budgeting M&E Specialist	ASPIRE/DPS/MAFF

[219] Including key people met during the CSPE preparatory mission in January 2017, data collection exercise for CBRDP and RPRP in March and April 2017, and the CSPE main mission.

Name	Sex	Position	Organization
Chy Ponlork	M	Procurement Assistant	ASPIRE/SEC
Mark Fenn	M	Consultant	MAFF
Henderic Pommier	M	Consultant	MAFF
Chanrithy Pol	M	KM and IT Advisor	GDA/DAE
San Yos	M	M&E Officer	MAFF PSU
Mao Minea	M	Director	DAI/GDA
Khean Sovannara	M	Chief of FSE	DAE/GDA
Yim Samnang	F	Agriculture Exension Advisor	GDA/DAE
Hourt Khieu	M	National Consultant	GDA/DAE
Yim Soksophors	M	National Consultant	GDA/DAE
Chim Linna	M	National Consultant	ASPIRE/SFC
Lawrence Kaaria	M	International MIS Specialist	ASPIRE
Meeting with PADEE team (2 May 2017)			
Pen Vuth	M	PADEE Project Manager	MAFF/PSU
Vong Chhim Vannak	M	National Rural Finance coordinator, FAO (PADEE implementing partner)	FAO
Seng Tuy	M	Deputy Manager	PADEE
Chhieu Chhinarath	F	M&E Officer	MAFF/PSU
San Yos	M	M&E Officer	MAFF/PSU
Meeting with TSSD team (3 May 2017)			
H.E. Ny Kimsan	M	Director of Programme Management and Support Division, NCDDS / TSSD Project Manager	NCDDS
Tuy Peau	M	D&D Management Advisor, TSSD	TSSD/NCDDS
Sem Rithivuth	M	Livelihoods Improvement and Gender Expert	TSSD/NCDDS
Nop Novy	M		TSSD/NCDDS
Kick-off meeting at MEF (2 May 2017 at MEF)			
Pen Thirong	M	Director General	MEF
Chan Darong	M	Director General	Ministry of Rural Development
Houl Bonna Roth	M	Deputy Director	MEF
Meas Sam An	M	Chief	MEF
Hok Kimthourn	M	Manager	ASPIRE/SEC
Meng Sakphouseth	M	Country programme officer	IFAD
Huon Charpho	M	Deputy Office and Finance	Ministry of Interior, Admin
Mao Narith	M	National M&E specialist, PADEE	PSU, MAFF
Seng Tuy	M	Deputy Project Manager	PADEE/MAFF
Suon Prasith	M	Deputy Director General	Ministry of Commerce (MoC)
Keo Vibol	M	Deputy Chief	OMGR/MEF
Long Kemvichet	M	Acting Director	TICO/MOC
Sieng Komira	M	Deputy Director	PSD/MOC
Wrap-up meeting at MEF, 22 May 2017			
Hem Vanndy	M	Under Secretary of State	MEF
Houl Bonnaroth	M	Deputy Director of Department	MEF

Name	Sex	Position	Organization
Keo Vibol	M	Deputy Chief, OMC2	MEF
Tim Sovanndy	M	Officer, OMC2	MEF
Neou Borin	M	Officer, OMC2	MEF
Seang Phoumira	M	Deputy Director of Department	Ministry of Commerce
Kim Lydeth	M	Deputy Bureau Chief, DICO	Ministry of Commerce
Em Channan Oudom	M	Assistant	ASPIRE Secretariat
Mao Narith	M	M&E Specialist	PADEE
Pen Vuth	M	Advisor	MAFF
Chan Darong	M	Director General	Ministry of Rural Development
International development agencies			
Claire Van der Vaeren	F	United Nations Resident Coordinator	United Nations
Gianpietro Bordignon	M	Representative & Country Director	World Food Programme (WFP)
Francesca Erdermann	F	Deputy Country Director	WFP
Aldo Spaini	M	Head of Supply Chain Management and Procurement	WFP
Meng Chanthoeum	M	Programme Policy Officer, Productive Asset and Livelihood Support	WFP
Etienne Careme	M	Operations Officer	FAO
Ann Chansopheak	F		FAO
Iean Russel	M	Senior Policy Advisor	FIRST Programme (FAO)
Vong Chim Vanak	M	Rural finance coordinator (PADEE implementing partner)	FAO/PADEE
Sang Lee	F	Agriculture Officer, Office of Food Security and Environment	USAID
Vuthy Theng	M	Project Management Specialist (Agriculture and Economic Department)	USAID
Mok Tonh	M	Development Assistance Specialist - M&E, Office of Food Security and Environment	USAID
Kanako Okamura	F	Representative (Agriculture Sector)	JICA
Haruko Toyama	F	Agriculture & Economic / Private Sector Development Section	JICA
Dang Thuy Trang	F	Environment Specialist, Cambodia Resident Mission	ADB
Hem Chanthou	M	Senior Project Officer	ADB
Pieter Ypma	M	Market Development Manager	CAVAC (project funded by Australia)
Non-governmental and other organizations			
Seng Sary	M	Procasur Cambodia focal point	Procasur
Mike Roberts	M	Country Director	iDE
Shaun Waits	M	Chief Executive Officer	iDE
Ros Kimsan	M	COO the "Lors Thmey" ("New Growth") Programme, establishing a network of Farm Business Advisers	iDE
Bernard Conilh de Beyssac	M	Inclusive Business and agribusiness cluster specialist, PADEE coordinator	SNV
Yun Mane	F	(former) Executive Director	Cambodia Indigenous Peoples Alliance

Name	Sex	Position	Organization
Sok Sotha	M	Managing Director, Cambodian Farmers Association Federation of Agricultural Producers	CFAP Cambodia
Meas Sovanthy	M	Agri-business Coordinator	CFAP Cambodia
Chhong Sophal	M	Programme Coordinator	Farmer and Nature Net
Pan Sopheap	M	Executive Director	Farmer and Nature Net
Oeur Sothea Roath	M	Interim CEO	Credit Bureau Cambodia
Yon Sovanna		General Secretary	Cambodia Microfinance Association (CMA)
Vong Sarinda		Cooperative Officer	CMA
Other resource persons			
Dara Rat Moni Ung	M	Former project staff/advisor	
Julian Abrams	M	IFAD consultant	
Chea Sereyvath	M	Director/Solutions Architech	Blend Solution
Oum Narin	M	Team leader, TSSD service provider (animal health and production improvement programme)	CADTIS-Consultant
Sinn Por	M	Deputy Assignment Manager, TSSD service provider (animal health and production programme)	CADTIS-Consultant

II. Provinces/field

A. Meetings at provincial headquarters[220]

Name	Sex	Position	Institution
Meeting at PDAFF, Prey Veng, 28 March 2017 (focus on closed RPRP)			
Sam Sarun	M	Deputy Director/PDAFF	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Khat Sok Eng	M	PPCA/PADEE	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Prum Sophat	M	M&E/Baphnom district	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Chhun Sovannareth	M	M&E/Kanh Chreach district	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Y Sok	M	M&E/Kamchay Mear district	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Heng Phallay	M	M&E/Saraing district	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Leang Heang	M	M&E/Sithor Kandal district	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Kim Chantha	F	M&E/Kampong Trabek district	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Sam Sivuthna	M	M&E/PDAFF	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Sros Hun	M	Admin staff/PDAFF	PDAFF, Prey Veng
Meeting at PDAFF, Svay Rieng, 30 March 2017 (focus on closed RPRP)			
Sok Sotheavuth	M	Deputy Director/PDAFF and PPM	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Ouk Chantha	M	PPCA/PADEE	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
So Saran	M	CEW/Tasours commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Kung Phally	F	CEW/Traperng Sdao commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Ich Sophay	M	CEW/Chambok commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Porng Sam An	M	CEW/Porng Teuk commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Mom Sopheap	F	CEW/Ang Prasrer commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng

[220] Except for the list of participants at the meeting in Kandal on 12 May 2017

Name	Sex	Position	Institution
Ou Phalla	M	CEW/Bos Mon commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Sao Bory	M	CEW/Chmar commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Sao Kea	M	CEW/Kampong Chamlorng	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Orn Sour	M	Coordinator/Svay Chrum district	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Preap Sophea	F	CEW/Daung commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Meas Many	M	M&E/Romduol district	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Hong Malen	F	CEW/Svay Chek commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Mom Saphan	M	MTST/Romeas Hiek district	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Roth Kunthea	F	CEW/Porthi Reach commune	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Cheng Sam Oeurn	M	MTST/Svay Chrum	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Chhim Sorphorn	F	Gender/PDOWA	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Meup Sinat	M	CEW/Preah Ponlor	PDAFF, Svay Rieng
Meetings in Kampot, 18-19 April 2017 (focus on CBRDP)			
Hor Sarin	M	Director/PDRD	Provincial Department of Rural Development, Kampot
Sam Ny	M	Deputy Director/PDRD	PDRD
Em Ngourn	M	Bureau Chief/Rural Water Supply	
Sok Vibol	M	Bureau Vice Chief/Rural Economic Development	
Kim Sotheary	F	Governor/Chumkiri district	
Yin Oun	M	Bureau Chief	
Sours Nem	M	Commune Chief, Srer Khnong commune, Chumkiri district	
Siv Pheng	M	Governor, Dang Tung district	
Meetings in Kampong Thom, 20-21 April 2017			
Plang Salan	M	Deputy Director/PDRD	Provincial Department of Rural Development
Khum Thy	M	Commune Chief, Chamnar Krom commune, Storng district	Chamnar Krom commune council
Thy Nam	M	Member, CC	Commune council
Nil Kimyun	M	Member, CC	Commune council
Kann Sokha	F	Member, CC	Commune council
Meeting at Provincial Government, Kampong Cham Province, 3 May 2017 (team B)			
Poy Sokchea	M	Provincial Facilitator	Kampong Cham
Em Vicheth	M	Advisor	CNDDS
Lor Ra	M	SSP2 - DAM	SBK
Oum Chanthy	M	LGFSA	NCDDS
Oum Narin	M	Team Leader	SSP3
Sin Por	M	DAM	SSP3
Sem Rithivuth	M	RLIGCE	TSSD-PIC
Som Somphors Bopha	F	Administrator	SBK-SSP2
Thong Sambon	F	Team Leader	SBK-SSP2
Em Vissoth	M	LIMCA	TSSD-Kampong Cham
Meeting at Provincial Government, Kampong Thom Province, 5 May 2017 (team B)			
Sor Paho	M	Provincial Facilitator	
Thy Bunhak	M	DFT	Baray District, KPT

Name	Sex	Position	Institution
Kong Vuthy	M	DFT	Stoeung Sen district, KPT
Yum Hoeun	M	DFT	Prasath Balang dist., KPT
Lak Sao Chan	F	DFT	Sandan district, KPT
Kheat Dan	M	DFT	Stoung district, KPT
Thong Sambon	M	Team Leader	SBK-SSP2
Mop Prong	M	DAM	SBK-SP2
Som Somphors Bopha	F	Administrator	SBK-SSP2
Chan Sokleng	F	LGFSA	Kampong Thom Hall
Muong Samoeun	M	PPMA	Kampong Thom Hall
Or Sopheap	F	Accountant	Kampong Thom Hall
Sem Rithivuth	M	RLIGCE	TSSD-PIC
Meeting at PDAFF, Pursat province, 4 May 2017 (team A)			
Lay Visit	M	Director	PDAFF
Sun Vann	M	Management Advisor	PDAFF
Uk Kunthea	M	Finance staff	PDAFF
Sao San	M	PFPA	PDAFF
Kung Chanthan	M	CRS	PDAFF
San Yos	M	M&E Staff	MAFF-PSU
Heung Makara	M	Vice Chief of office	PDAFF
Tuon Vathanak	M	Technical Staff	PDAFF
Vann Sokhom	M	Vice Chief of office	DoA, Bakan district
Men Chanthon	M	PC	NCDD
Vong Vang	M	DoA staff	Pursat
Torm Tin	M	DoA staff	Bakan district
Bou Sokchea	F	DoA staff	Pursat
Mer Chantre	F	DoA staff	Pursat
Ros La	M	Vice Chief of office	Krakor district
Yim Sophy	F	DoA staff	Pursat
Toch Sokun	F	Cashier	PDAFF
Banteay Meanchey, 5 May 2017 (team A)			
Va Viseth	M	LIMCA	TSSD-BMC
Pring Chab	M	RFC	SBK-SSP2
San Veasna	M	DAM	SBK-SSP2
Porch Sovann	M	PPM	TSSD-BMC
Thong Saiyann	M	DAM	CADTIS-SSP3
Khut Sopheak	F	Gender Staff	PDoWA
Hay Samnang	M	PID Directpr	Provincial Office of BMC
San Yos	M	M&E Officer	MAFF-PSU
Meeting at PDAFF, Preah Vihear province, 8 May 2017 (team B)			
Poeung Try Da	M	Director PDAFF	Preah Vihea
Kem Pong Vireak	M	Deputy Director	PDAFF
Prum Vimean	M	PSMA	PDAFF
Hong Sophea	M	M&E Advisor	Provincial Department of Health

Name	Sex	Position	Institution
Phet Chno	M	PFPA	PDAFF
Dy Reaksmey	M	AEO	PDAFF-Preah Vihear
Some Da	M	AEO	PDAFF-Preah Vihear
Lun Pul	M	AEO	PDAFF
Kean Kun	M	OACP	PDAFF
Kheng Sovanrathana	M	OACP	PDAFF
Kong Chanthan	M	CRS	NCDDS
Meeting at Siem Reap Provincial Office, 8 May 2017 (team A)			
Hem Puthy	M	PFT	Provincial Office
Duch Kim Dorn	M	PFT-TSSD	TSSD-Provincial Office
Leng Nath	M	PMA	TSSD-Provincial Office
Kean Chamnan	M	LIMCA	TSSD-Provincial Office
Thorng Sam Bon	M	Team Leader	SBK/SSP2
Preung Chap	M	Finance Advisor	SBK/SSP2
Sorm Somphors Bopha	F	Administration	SBK/SSP2
Chum Baraing	M	Deputy Team Leader	SBK/SSP2
San Yos	M	M & E Officer	MAFF-PSU
Lem Chan Ly	M	Finance Officer	Provincial Office
Pheng Buntha	M	DAM	SSP3
Ros Kheng	M	LGFSA	Provincial Office
Sem Rithyvuth	M	RLIGCE	TSSD-PIC
Meeting at PDAFF, Takeo province, 12 May 2017 (team B)			
Name	Sex	Position	Institution
Gnet Sophea	F	Project Manager	PDAFF
Pi Sea	M	Admin Officer	PDAFF
Seang Phally	M	M&E	Provincial Cabinet
Sor Sareung	M	Training Officer (TO)	Provincial Cabinet
Gnet Sarin	M	Department??	Samrong District
Keo Kim Va	F	Gender	Kirivong District
Gnib Srorn	M	Project Manager	PDAFF
Roat Pana	F	Officer	PDoWA
Nov Narin	M	M&E	Bati District
Sak Vorn	M	M&E	Tram Kok
Chea Chheang Ly	M	Project Coordinator	AVSG
Hout Long	M	Manager	IDE-Lors Thmey
Touch Sreang	M	Gender Officer	Mongkul Borey District
Maak Satha	F	Gender Officer	Traeng District
Pouy Ratha	M	Project Manager	Mongkul Borey District
Teuk Kim Born	M	Project Manager	Kirivong District
Tep Puthy	M	M&E	Mongkul Borey District
Sor Vim	M	M&E	Koh Andeth
Chav Neung	M	PMEA	PDA Takeo
Men Rithy Sen	M	PPCA	PDAFF-Takeo

Name	Sex	Position	Institution
Tep Kor	M	M&E	Kirivong District
Chhay Sareth	M	Training Officer (TO)	PDAFF-Takeo
Tae Cheath	M	M&E	Traeng District
Sor Sam	M	Training Officer (TO)	PDAFF-Takeo
Prak Socheat	F	Department of Women Affare	Bati District
Phoung Chhim	M	Project Manager	Bati District
Gnun Ti	M	Project Manager	Traeng District
Sin Sameun	F	Gender Officer (District)	Koh Andeth
Oung Touch	F	M&E	Samrong District
Chey Chanly	F	Gender Officer	Samrong District
Meeting at PDAFF, Kampot, 16 May 2017 (team A)			
Sam Sovanna	M	PPM	PDAFF
Imchhun Vicheth	M	Technical Staff	PDAFF
Poch Chan Thony	F	Technical Staff	PDAFF
Nob Sophary	F	PMEA	PDAFF
Roath Seth	M	M&E Officer	PDAFF
Heav Kung	M	PPCA	PDAFF
Chhan Samay	M	Staff	PDoWA
Lay Haon Sothea	F	Staff	PDoWA
San Yos	M	M&E Officer	MAFF-PSU
Chan Ny	F	Staff	PDAFF
Loch Savoeurn	M	Staff	PDAFF
Ork Sarath	M	M&E Officer	PDAFF
Meeting at PDAFF, Prey Veng Province, 16 May 2017 (team A)			
Oum Vanthoeun	M	Provincial Facilitator	Peareang district, PVG
Prum Sothath	M	M&E Officer	Baphnom district, PVG
Heng Phallay	M	M&E Officer	Peareang district, PVG
Muth Chanthan	F	Gender Officer	Mesang district, PVG
Prach Saroeun	F	Gender Officer	Baphnom district, PVG
Preap Phalla	F	Econ. Growth Officer	Women's Affairs
Bith Dan	F	Gender Officer	Peareang district, PVG
Yin Sopheap	F	Gender Officer	Kampong Trabek district
Chan Sokhom	F	Gender Officer	Svay Antor district
Yoeun Horn	F	Gender Officer	Peam Chor district
Khieu Sophorn	F	Gender Officer	Preah Sdach district
Them Khom	M	Project Leader	Kanchreach district, PVG
Chhun Sovanreth	M	M&E Officer	Kanchreach district, PVG
Khun Kimlun	F	M&E Officer	Preah Sdach district
Srey Chunly	M	District facilitator	Kampong Trabek district
Kim Chantha	F	M&E Officer	Kampong Trabek district
Leang Heang	M	M&E Officer	Sithor Kandal district
Seng Sambath	F	Gender Officer	Sithor Kandal district
Sok Makara	M	M&E Officer	PVG Hall

Name	Sex	Position	Institution
Bun Sakhan	M	Technical Officer	PDAFF, PVG
Oum Yuth	F	PPFMC	PVG Hall
Bin Chhom	M	Financial Officer	PDAFF, PVG
Yim Youkong	M	District Facilitator	Sithor Kandal district
Chhon Cheang	M	District Facilitator	Kamchay Mear district
Khin March	F	Gender Officer	Kamchay Mear district
Hin Vanny	M	District facilitator	Baphnom district, PVG
Heang Linna	F	Gender Officer	Kanchreach district, PVG
Sok San	M	M&E Officer	Peam Chor district
Oum Sok	M	M&E Officer	Kamchay Mear district
Dim Sitha	M	M&E Officer	Svay Antor district
Sok Sambo	M	District facilitator	Svay Antor district
Phat Srey Sros	F	Gender Officer	Peam Ro district
Hun Samphors	M	Team Leader	Peam Ro district
Tep Sareth	M	M&E Officer	Mesang district, PVG
Sak Sorth	M	District facilitator	Mesang district, PVG
Sam Sarun	M	PPM	PDAFF, PVG
Khat Sok Eng	M	PPCA	PDAFF, PVG
Chhan Sokha	M	PHEA	PDAFF, PVG

B. Bilateral meetings

Date	Name	Sex	Position/Institution	Locations
	Commune council		Reakchey commune, Baphnom district	Prey Veng
29/03/17	Commune council member	M	Sdao Korng commune, Baphnom	Prey Veng
30/03/17	Var Sarith	M	Chief, FWUC, Porthi Reach commune, Svay Chrum district	Svay Rieng
29/03/17	CC member	M	Sdao Korng commune, Baphnom	Svay Rieng
30/03/17	CC Chief	M	Thlork commune, Svay Chrum district	Svay Rieng
31/03/17	CC Chief	M	Bos Morn commune, Romduol district	Svay Rieng
04/05/17	Svay Veasna	M	CEW, Svay Ath commune, Municipality	O-Sdav village, Svay Ath commune, Municipality: Pursat
04/05/17	Tuon To	M	Chick broiler farmer in TSSD	Siem Boy village, Prey Char commune, Choeung Prey district, **Kampong Cham**
05/05/17	Hul Kimthon	F	CWCC, Teuk Cheu commune,	Teuk Chour commune Preah Neth Preah district, **Banteay Meanchey**
05/05/17	Yum Yoeun	M	District Facilitation Team (TSSD)	Prasath Balang district, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Kheak Dan	M	District Facilitation Team (TSSD)	Stong district, **Kampong Thom**

Date	Name	Sex	Position/Institution	Locations
05/05/17	Lak Saochan	F	District Facilitation Team (TSSD)	Sandan district, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Leng Sokhey	F	Accountant in DFT (TSSD)	Santuk district, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Tuy Vichet	M	District Facilitation Team (TSSD)	Stoeung Sen and Stong district, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Hul Sinin	M	District Facilitation Team (TSSD)	Baray district, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Pel Bunrith	M	Chick broiler farmer in TSSD	Sroyov Choeung village, Sroyov Commune, Stoeung Sen district, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Ouk Sereyrath	F	CEW	Sroyov Commune, Stoeung Sen district, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Suon Chamroeun	F	Commune Councilor	Sankat O Kunthor, Krong Stoeung Sen, **Kampong Thom**
05/05/17	Leam Kimly	F	CEW	Sankat O Kunthor, Krong Stoeung Sen, **Kampong Thom**
06/05/17	Khun Uch	F	CEW, Kumrou commune,	Prey Veng 2 village, Kumrou commune, Thmor Puok district, **Banteay Meanchey**
06/05/17	Seab Than	F	Commune Councilor	Prey Mrey village, Panheum commune, Prasath Balang district, **Kampong Thom**
08/05/17	Huot Chanthan	F	CEW, Sra Nger commune	Rumdeng village, Sra Nger commune, Kralanh district, **Siem Reap**
08/05/17	Un Phal	M	VAHW, Rumdeng village	Rumdeng village, Sra Nger commune, Kralang district, **Siem Reap**
08/05/17	Leng Ratana	F	Gender staff, PDoWA	Ta Chek village, Sra Nger commune, Municipality: **Siem Reap**
08/05/17	Oum Narin	M	Project Manager/CADTIS/SSP3	Ta Chek village, Sra Nger commune, Municipality: **Siem Reap**
08/05/17	Reum Rim	F	Lead vegetable farmer (ASPIRE)	Kampot village, Rohas commune, Roveang district, **Preah Vihear**
08/05/17	Ting Pheak	F	Lead pig farmer (ASPIRE)	Koulen Choeung village, Koulen Choeung comune, Koulen district, **Preah Vihear**
09/05/17	Chay Kare	M	CEW, Samrorng commune, Sotr Nikum district	Beth Meas village, Samrorng commune, Sotr Nikum district, **Siem Reap**
09/05/17	Sorm Vuth	M	CEW and VAHW, Reussey Leu commune, Chi Kreng district	Samrorng Kach Chorch village, Reussey Leu commune, Chi Kreng district, **Siem Reap**
09/05/17	Kung Chantha and his 3 staff	M	Deputy Director of PDAFF	PDAFF office, **Siem Reap**

Date	Name	Sex	Position/Institution	Locations
	Khat Sok Eng	M	Provincial Project Coordination Adviser	PDAFF **Prey Veng**

C. Group discussions in the field

Date (team)	Group	Locations	No. of people
Data collection exercise prior to CSPE main mission (focus on RPRP and CBRDP)			
28/03/17	LIG/GRF management and members (RPRP, non-PADEE target)	Prey Samlanh village, Roka commune, Pea Raing district, **Prey Veng**	12 pers. (1 man)
28/03/17	LIG/GRF management and members (RPRP, non-PADEE target)	Prey Kralanh Thom village, Prey Samlech commune, Pea Raing district, **Prey Veng**	11 pers. (2 men)
29/03/17	LIG/GRF management and members (RPRP, non-PADEE target)	Snuol village, Theay commune, Baphnom district, **Prey Veng**	7 pers. (2 men)
29/03/17	LIG/GRF management and members (RPRP, PADEE target)	Trabek village, Sdao Korng commune, Baphnom district, **Prey Veng**	7 pers (1 man)
30/03/17	GRF/LIG management and members (RPRP)	Anh Chanch village, Porthi Reach commune, Svay Chrum district, **Svay Rieng**	12 pers. (1M)
30/03/17	GRF/LIG management and members (RPRP)	Tey Year village, Thlork commune, Svay Chrum district, **Svay Rieng**	11 pers (2M)
31/03/17	GRF/LIG management and members (RPRP)	Trapern Pha Av village, Porng Teuk commune, Romduol district, **Svay Rieng**	4 pers. (3M)
31/03/17	GRF/LIG management and members (RPRP)	Bos Phlaing village, Bos Mon commune, Romduol district, **Svay Rieng**	6 pers. (2M)
31/03/17	GRF/LIG management and members (RPRP)	Porn village, Daung commune, Romeas Heak district, **Svay Rieng**	6 pers (1M)
31/03/17	GRF/LIG management and members (RPRP)	Khbal Krapeu village, Pra Srer commune, Romeas Heak district, **Svay Rieng**	8 pers. (3M)
18/04/17	FWUCs	Stung Phe Irrigation, Srer Cherng commune, Chumkiri district, **Kampot**	3 pers. (all men)
18/04/17	Credit group	Prey Khmao village, Srer Khnong commune, Chumkiri, **Kampot**	3 pers (all women)
19/04/17	FWUCs	Beung Nimul Irrigation, Beung Nimul commune, Chhouk district, **Kampot**	1 per (man)
19/04/17	Credit group	Kha-cheay village, Damnak Sokrom commune, Dang Tung district, **Kampot**	11 pers (7 M, 4 F)
19/04/17	LTCs	Kha-cheay village, Damnak Sokrom commune, Dang Tung district, **Kampot**	3 pers (1 F, 2 M)
20/04/17	FWUCs of Beung Leas/Roluos	O-Kanthor Khang Thbong village, O-Kunthor commune, Steung Sen district, **Kampong Thom**	4 pers. (3M, 1F)
20/04/17	Villagers who used deep water well	Prasat village, Preah Damrei commune, Storng district, **Kampong Thom**	7 pers. (5F, 2M)
20/04/17	Credit group from 5 villages (Kanteub, Botum	Pagoda located in Botum Lech village, Rung Roeung commune, Storng district, **Kampong Thom**	14 pers. (5F)

Date (team)	Group	Locations	No. of people
	Keut, Botum Lech, Prum Srey, Kantong Rong)		
21/04/17	Credit group from Neang Noy village and Sapor village	Chamnar Krom commune office, Storng district, **Kampong Thom**	3 pers. (all men)
21/04/17	LTCs from Sandan village	Chamnar Krom commune office, Storng district, **Kampong Thom**	3 pers. (all men)
21/04/17	Credit group	Kampong Kdei village, Kampong Chen Thbong commune, Storng district, **Kampong Thom**	1 (man)
CSPE main mission			
03/05/17 (A)	FFS members of ASPIRE	O-Sdav village, Sangkat: Svay Ath, Municipality: **Pursat**	4 (3 women)
03/05/17 (A)	FFS members of ASPIRE	O-Thkov village, Roleap commune, Municipality: **Pursat**	2 (all women)
03/05/17 (B)	Kampong Cham Organic Cooperative (IFAD Assistance ended in 2014)	Koh Rokar Knong village, Koh Rokar commune, Kang Meas district, **Kampong Cham**	Treasurer Ms. Heang Sipho, with 12 pers (8 women)
04/05/17 (B)	Well-performing LIG (TSSD)	Prey Char Knong village, Prey Char commune, Choeung Prey district, **Kampong Cham**	16 (10 women)
04/05/17 (B)	Under-performing LIG (TSSD)	Bati village, Prey Char commune, Choeung Prey district, **Kampong Cham**	20 (13 women)
04/05/17 (B)	Meeting with commune council in Prey Char commune (TSSD)	Prey Char commune, Choeung Prey district, **Kampong Cham**	CC Chief Mr. Sem Suy with 5 pers (0 women)
04/05/17 (B)	LIG members and management	Ang village, Trapeang Kor commune, Choeung Prey district, **Kampong Cham**	16 pers (12 women)
04/05/17 (B)	Meeting with commune council in Trapeang Kor commune (TSSD)	Trapeang Kor commune, Choeung Prey district, **Kampong Cham**	CC Chief Mr. Teng Seng with 4 pers (0 women)
05/05/17 (A)	Meeting with CC, CEW, CWCC, VAHW and visit one muscory duck demo	Anlung Thmor village, Roharl commune, Preah Neth district, **Banteay Meanchey**	18 (1 man)
05/05/17 (A)	Meeting with CC, CEW, CWCC, VAHW	Poy Svay villaege, Roharl commune, Preah Neth Preah district, **Banteay Meanchey**	14 (2 men)
05/05/17 (A)	LIG members and management	Teuk Chour village, Teuk Chour commune, Preah Neth Preah district, **Banteay Meanchey**	16 (1 man)
05/05/17 (A)	LIG members and management	Ta-Siev village, Teuk Chour commune, Preah Neth Preah district, **Banteay Meanchey**	9 (2 men)
05/05/17 (B)	Meeting commune council in Chrob commune (TSSD)	Chrob commune, Santuk district, **Kampong Thom**	CC Dpty Chief Mr Kim Run with 4 pers. (0 women)
05/05/17 (B)	Meeting commune council in Sroyov commune (TSSD)	Sroyov commune, Stoeung Sen district, **Kampong Thom**	CC Chief Ms. Som Thy with 3 pers. (1 woman)
05/05/17 (B)	Meeting with District Agriculture Office, Kong Stoeung Sen, Kampong Thom province (TSSD)	District Agriculture Office, Kong Stoeung Sen, **Kampong Thom**	DFT Team Leader Mr. Kong Vuthy with Mr. Khut Vibol, Extension Officer, Mr. Muong

Date (team)	Group	Locations	No. of people
			Samoeun, PPMA, Mr. Sean Sam Ang, DFT TSO (0 women)
05/05/17 (B)	O Kunthor Mean Chey Cooperative (TSSD)	O Kunthor Choeung village, O Kunthor Sangkat, Krong Stoeung Sen, **Kampong Thom**	Cooperative Treasurer Ms. Chan Yin with 15 pers (10 women)
06/05/17 (A)	Meeting with CC, CEW, CWCC, VAHW and visit one chick demo	Prey Veng 1 village, Kumrou commune, Puok district, **Banteay Meanchey**	20 (6 men)
06/05/17 (A)	Meeting with CC, CEW, CWCC, VAHW and LIG	Prey Veng 2 village, Kumrou commune, Puok district, **Banteay Meanchey**	20 pers (3 men)
06/05/17 (B)	LIG members and management, Prey Mrey village (TSSD)	Prey Mrey village, Panheum commune, Prasath Balang district, **Kampong Thom**	LIG Leader Ms Sam Ny (with 22 pers. (16 women)
06/05/17 (B)	LIG members and management in Marak Kor village (TSSD)	Marak Kor village, Toulkreul commune, Prasat Balang district, **Kampong Thom**	LIG Leader with 22 pers. (17 women)
08/05/17 (A)	LIG members and management	Rumdeng village, Sra Nger commune, Kralanh district, **Siem Reap**	24 (5 men)
08/05/17 (A)	LIG members and management	Ta-Chek village, Sra Nger commune, Municipality: **Siem Reap**	20 (2 men)
08/05/17 (B)	Animal Vaccination Campaign in TropengtunTem village	Tropengtun Tem village, Romtum Commune, Roveng District, **Preah Vihear**	Service providers and 14 villagers 8 women)
08/05/17 (B)	SLG members and management in Kampot village (ASPIRE)	Kampot village, Rohas commune, Roveang district, **Preah Vihear**	SLG Leader Ms Prom Sothoeun with 20 pers. (16 women)
08/05/17 (B)	Thkeng Agriculture Cooperative (ASPIRE)	Thkeng village, Rohas commune, Roveang district, **Preah Vihear**	Cooperative Leader with 4 pers. (0 women)
08/05/17 (B)	Indigenous peoples' village (SLG starting in ASPIRE)	Bong Kanphal Village, Romtum Commune, Rovieng District, **Preah Vihear**	SLG leader with 27 pers. (17 women)
09/05/17 (A)	LIG members and management and visit on non-LIG diffusion member	Beth Meas village, Samrorng commune, Sotr Nikum district, **Siem Reap**	16 (4 men)
09/05/17 (A)	LIG members and management	Samrong Kanh-chorch village, Reussey Leu commune, Chi Kreng commune, **Siem Reap**	17 (1 man)
09/05/17 (B)	Farmer need assessment in Srolaiy Village (ASPIRE)	Srolaiy Village, Tbeng Pi Commune, Kulen District, **Preah Vihear**	Trainers and 22 participants
09/05/17 (B)	KomPos Kamsikor Agriculture Cooperative (ASPIRE)	Koulen Choeung village, Koulen Choeung commune, Koulen district, **Preah Vihear**	Cooperative Leader Mr. Deap Chom with 21 pers (16 women)
12/05/17 (B)	IGRF group	Srei Krong Reach village, Krang Leave commune, Bati district, **Takeo**	About 28 (8 men)
12/05/17 (A)	IGRF, mat making	Prek Ta Ong I village, Ong commune, Peam Oknga district, **Kandal**	
12/05/17 (A)	IGRF, mushroom value chain	**Kandal**	

Date (team)	Group	Locations	No. of people
13/05/17 (B)	IGRF, vegetable	Prasat commune Saang district, **Kandal**	
13/05/17 (B)	Vegetable producers (with Lors Thmey farm business advisor) – incl. members of Trapeang Chauk agric cooperative	Vegetable collection point, Trapeang Chauk village, Tram Kak commune, Tram Kak district, **Takeo**	11 (5 women)
13/05/17 (B)	Egg producers	Egg collection point, Kul Korm village, Tram Kak commune, Tram Kak district, **Takeo**	12 (5 women)
13/05/27 (B)	Handicraft group/IGRF members	Khvav village, Lumchang commune, Samraong district. **Takeo**	About 40 mostly women
13/05/17 (B)	IGRF members, common interest group members, nutrition activities	Ponleu village, Chamreah Pen commune, Samraong district, **Takeo**	About 40 mostly women
16/05/17 (A)	Improved Group for Choeung Phnom commune (PADEE)	Choeung Phnum Commune, Baphnom district, **Prey Veng**	Group Leader Ms So Setha with 11 pers. (7 women)
16/05/17 (A)	LIG members and management (RPRP)	Trabek village, Sdao Korng commune, Baphnom district, **Prey Veng**	LIG Leader Mr Hem Phoeung with 10 pers (6 women)
16/05/17 (B)	IGRF members and management	Porng Teuk village, Srer Cherng commune, Chumkiri district, **Kampot**	10 (2 men)
16/05/17 (B)	IGRF members and management and visit one chick hatchery	Srer Cherng village, Srer Cherng commune, Chumkiri district, **Kampot**	16 (1 man)
17/05/17 (B)	IGRF and CLC members and management	Konsat village, Konsat commune, Teuk Chhou district, **Kampot**	23 (1 man)
17/05/17 (B)	IGRF members and management	Angkor Peak village, Damnak Sokrom commune, Dang Tung district, **Kampot**	21 (4 men)
17/05/17 (A)	Handicraft Common Interest Group (PADEE)	Boeung Antong village, Svay Chrum commune, Mesang district, **Prey Veng**	Dpty Group Leader Mr. Thi Eat with 30 pers. (24 women)
17/05/17 (A)	Bean Sprout Common Interest Group (PADEE)	Snay Bon village, Chi Phoch commune, Me Sang district, **Prey Veng**	Group Leader: Mr Toeum Noeun with 10 pers. (7 women)

Key elements of 1999, 2009 and 2013 COSOPs

	1998 COSOP	*2008 COSOP*	*2013 COSOP*
Strategic objectives	• Main thrusts of the community based strategy: (i) Focus on household food and income security of the poor, particularly of female headed families; (ii) Promotion of economic growth at households level by empowering local communities to efficiently and sustainably manage productive resources; (iii) Promotion of a consultative forum and development of a feedback mechanism to enable lessons learned and best practices to feed national policy formulation; (iv) Development of an implementation support mechanism; • Community based area development approach followed rather than a sectoral approach in view of the social and economic situation of Cambodia and the short duration of IFAD's operations in the country; • Orientation and pilot phase of about two years before a large-scale investment programme is initiated.	• SO1: sustainable improvement of the livelihoods of rural poor men and women in the project areas through community empowerment, productivity improvement and improved access to assets, productive resources, rural services, rural infrastructure and markets; • SO2: promotion of "decentralization and deconcentration" (D&D) and local governance for pro-poor agricultural and rural development through building linkages between the "decentralization and deconcentration" framework and agricultural and rural development and institutional support for evidence-based pro-poor policymaking.	• SO1: Poor smallholders are enabled to take advantage of market opportunities; • SO2: Poor rural households and communities increase resilience to climate change and other shocks; and • SO3: Poor rural households gain better access to strengthened rural service delivery by government, civil society and private-sector agencies.
Opportunities for innovation	• Good potential for substantial increases in productivity of rice and for crop and income diversification because of the lack of past investment in the sector; • Rural development context (e.g. good natural resources; extensive cultivable land areas; rehabilitation of the irrigation system and provision of improved inputs for agriculture; better water control and the possibility of producing two crops in a wet season: • Complementary role to be played by IFAD compared to other donors/NGOs operating in the country; added value IFAD brings in upgrading other development initiatives; • Some sectors being neglected by other interventions (livestock, fisheries, community forestry).	• Replicating initiatives that IFAD has successfully piloted in the design of the SAW programmes and in new projects (e.g. replicating the network of private-sector village animal health worker (VAHWs) and their associations; mainstreaming the use of volunteer Village Extension Workers (VEWs) to complement public extension-service provision; institutionalizing the most-vulnerable families approach as a targeting tool; mainstreaming beneficiary impact assessments to assess and enhance the quality of service delivery; replicating the system of gender focal points, incorporating an additional role in gender analysis and economic empowerment of rural women); • Other: (i) furthering the successful group revolving fund concept; (ii) extending the role of VAHWs; (iii) influencing commune councils to reorient the priorities of the Commune/Sangkat Fund to include investment to improve livelihoods and agricultural productivity; (iv) participating in district initiatives to pilot service delivery models; (v) further piloting the delegation of agency functions for agricultural extension to commune councils; and (vi) further piloting the approach to learning experience from local communities for policy development and dialogue.	Innovations may range from new business models for the delivery of agricultural education and services, through commercialization for smallholders of different production technologies, labour-saving equipment, and provision of new financial products to help manage risk and increase access to working capital, to adaptation responses to climate change. The COSOP's core approach to innovation and scaling up is to systematically identify, rigorously test, refine and then scale up promising innovations that are proven to work efficiently. Mechanisms to implement this approach include: (i) agricultural education and service delivery; (ii) promotion of inclusive markets for smallholders and commodity-specific intervention strategies and action plans; and (iii) development of evidence-based policymaking.

	1998 COSOP	2008 COSOP	2013 COSOP
Target group and geographical coverage/ coverage	• Female headed households, unemployed rural youth, returnees, internally displaced persons and mine victims in the areas/ provinces with a high poverty concentration; • Geographically phased approach to start project interventions initially in a limited number of poor provinces in the Southeast and Northwest with simple projects that have fast impact on improved household food and income security.	• Target group: (i) rural poor households, with access to only small areas of land, that lack other productive assets and that may very likely be food insecure and indebted, with little if any access to off-farm employment opportunities; (ii) agricultural landless people willing to learn skills for livestock-raising, off-farm income-generating activities or wage employment; (iii) women/woman-headed households with large number of dependents; and (iv) other rural poor households; • Targeted areas in which: (i) poverty rates are high and the Cambodia Millennium Development Goals are most in need of improvement; (ii) there are opportunities to improve agricultural productivity and develop strategic partnerships with other agencies; and (iii) there are no major, ongoing, externally financed agricultural and rural development programmes; • Potential target areas in the next COSOP period include the more remote border provinces (Mountain/Plateau regions), e.g. Mondul Kiri, Stung Treng and Oddar Meanchey and also Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom and Siem Reap.	• Targeting continue to address the issues of the chronically poor (below the poverty line); • Gender targeting builds on IFAD's experience in the country (gender disaggregated targets for interventions and specific activities that promote the economic empowerment of rural women); • Targeting approaches to be more flexible and diversified to include slightly better-off farmers and other value chain agents (beyond farming); • Distinct development pathways and intervention modalities devised for the food insecure, the rural poor at the subsistence level, and vulnerable rural households just above the poverty line; • The needs of special groups, (e.g. recipients of social land concessions and poor farmers whose rights on land have been recently recognized) also specifically targeted through tailor-made interventions.
Policy dialogue	• Although IFAD's involvement in Cambodia has been limited, several policy issues were developed for the livestock sector (e.g. National strategy for Animal Health and Production); Two studies to be done for further policy dialogue; • Other areas include: (i) refining the approach to poverty targeting in the next 5-year Socio-Economic Development- Plan; (ii) Introducing a policy for cost effective irrigation developments; (iii) establishing the framework for micro-credit institutions and orientating them more towards agricultural production credit.	• As a member of the Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water (TWGAW), IFAD to contribute to the design of selected subsector programmes of SAW applying lessons learned in order to promote: policy changes in the areas of improved rural service delivery; improved access of rural poor people to agricultural inputs, resources and markets; and reflection of the perspectives and priorities of rural poor people in development programmes; • IFAD to work closely with the Government and other development agencies to formulate viable interventions for improvement in: (i) access to water for agriculture; (ii) access to agricultural research and extension services; (iii) access to agricultural input and produce markets; and (iv) accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas.	• Strengthened focus on evidence-based policy work; • Better linkages sought through a combination of service delivery and efficient collaboration at the national level with institutions with clear mandates for policy reform; • IFAD to promote policy linkages through coordination with development partners (e.g. through cofinancing; knowledge-sharing and collaboration with private sector/civil society); • IFAD to assist MAFF in mainstreaming "farming as a business" in its policies and programmes (e.g. by developing a policy of agricultural extension services that integrates the public and private sectors and civil society; testing innovative service delivery including public/private partnerships and performance-based budgeting). • Support to existing cooperatives/farmer groups with the potential to link with buyers; Development of tailored interventions to support poor households with recent access to land to be scaled up and incorporated into official policies; • Contribute to mainstreaming climate change resilience considerations across the Government's rural development policies and programmes by

	1998 COSOP	2008 COSOP	2013 COSOP
			supporting the design of extension materials that incorporate e.g. resilience aspects, innovations in information;
Country programme management	Not mentioned/addressed	• Country programme to be managed by the country programme management team; • Synergy to be built among ongoing and new investment projects, supervision and implementation support and the technical assistance and policy grants programmes; • Practice of annual country portfolio reviews to continue, (with the government, ADB and the World Bank to join); • The counsel of the country portfolio and policy adviser and the inclusion of a policy analysis component in RULIP to enable IFAD to contribute more effectively to country programme management and implementation support; coordination and in-country policy dialogue; • IFAD to gradually take over supervision and implementation support responsibilities in line with the IFAD Supervision Policy. • Strengthened implementation support to be provided to improve project performance (e.g. for: availability of counterpart funds for unexpected/unplanned emergency activities; quality of service provision; institutional building of local/grass-roots organizations; M&E; compliance with procurement procedures; participation of women in decision-making; technical capacity of technical staff).	• IFAD's field presence to be maintained at current levels with one country programme officer (CPO) in-country, working alongside the country programme manager; • COSOP implementation to be overseen by a programme secretariat with a strategic and policymaking role and a multisector coordination mandate. Responsibility to be carried out by the secretariat of ASPIRE; • COSOP to continue building a renewed focus on delivery of impacts and outcomes, both in the overall COSOP and within the projects. To be achieved through an explicit focus on improved management and decision-making processes, as well as investment in enhanced management information systems for both existing and new projects.
Partnerships	• IFAD's financing would be to upscale or build on the successful experiences and approaches and models of other like-minded donors who have been operating in Cambodia. Partnership with them is thus considered key for IFAD's intervention; • Agencies with potential for collaboration identified (UNDP/SIDA/UNCDF; AUSAID; WFP; FAO; DANIDA; ADB) as well as NGO having played a major role in development processes.	• IFAD to continue partnerships with government agencies, development agencies, private sector and civil society; • MEF as the key government counterpart; CARD and NCDD, for policy guidance at the national level; MAFF, MOWA, MOWRAM and MRD at subnational levels; • Policy analysis and dialogue through: (i) regular interaction between country programme manager, staff from government agencies and project management teams; (ii) follow-up from country portfolio and policy adviser; (iii) annual COSOP/country programme reviews; and (iv) supervision and implementation support; • Potential development partners: French Development Agency; GTZ; WB; DANIDA/DFID; ADB; NGOs; • IFAD to continue participating in harmonization and alignment process through technical working groups and to consider the request from MRD to join the Technical Working Group on Infrastructure;	• Active collaboration with a range of country partners as an essential feature and modality of project design, financing and implementation; • Continuation and deepening of the partnership with MAFF through ASPIRE, aimed at developing a national extension service, building on the approach initiated by PADEE; • Continuation of partnership with current cofinanciers and implementation partners (e.g. SNV, IDE, AVSF, FAO and GEF/UNDP), and further partnership development (e.g. with the private sector) also in terms of knowledge management activities and development of innovations; • IFAD grant financing available to develop its partnership on policy coordination with the Government through SNEC; • Strategic partnership between IFAD and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

	1998 COSOP	2008 COSOP	2013 COSOP
		• Existing partnerships with international and local NGOs and farmers' organizations to continue (e.g. in the provision of animal health services, microfinance, training, knowledge sharing).	for developing national policy analysis and formulation capacities; • In the context of a collaborative agreement between IFAD and ADB, joint portfolio reviews to be carried out; • IFAD to participate in key partners' respective strategy design processes.
Knowledge management	The promotion of a consultative forum and development of a feedback mechanism to enable lessons learned and best practices to feed national policy formulation is among main thrusts of the community based strategy;	• Knowledge management and communication to contribute to the realization of the strategic objectives, in line with the IFAD Strategy for Knowledge Management; • Arrangements already in place to be improved, including: (i) annual assessments of impact by the beneficiaries of each project for feedback into the annual project planning process; (ii) regular policy guidance meetings; (iii) annual portfolio review meetings; (iv) the annual Sector Policy and Institutional Assessment of the Rural Development Sector Framework under the PBAS; and (v) specific studies to focus on key rural poverty reduction issues; • Future project designs to include explicitly stated approaches to knowledge management and learning from innovation in order to support the pro-rural-poor policy dialogue and institutions; • At the regional level, country programme stakeholders to be supported by the regional programme for Knowledge Networking for Development in Asia/Pacific Region, as a means of accessing knowledge acquired by other IFAD programmes and of communicating country-level knowledge from Cambodia to others.	• Knowledge management and communication as key priorities identified for improved programme delivery; • New features and reinforced capacity for monitoring outputs and impact (e.g. the use of innovative web-based technology and databases to feed into knowledge gaps in assessment of the impact of microfinance and extension approaches); • Regarding climate change, information and knowledge gaps to be addressed through ASAP financing. The country programme to build alliances with national research institutes, universities and national resource people, key in developing policy feedback and carrying out analytical work; • Successful methods to be continued (e.g. COSOP design process involving the establishment of a website, combined with the production of policy papers and several dissemination events in collaboration with institutions such as SNEC); • Knowledge to be mobilized through the projects and to feed into country-level policy dialogue through higher-level partnerships with MEF and SNEC.

Investment projects: target group, targeting approach and project objectives in design documents

Project areas	Target group, expected beneficiaries	Targeting approach / strategy	Project objectives
ADESS			
Four provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Pursat and Siem Reap.	Male- and female-headed households resident in the Project Area identified as "poor" and "very poor" households by villagers during the village wealth ranking exercise undertaken during local planning process, with particular attention given to women. All poor and very poor households. The four groups likely to be amongst the target group are: i. 224 300 families with less than 1.2 ha of land; ii. 3 089 unemployed youths; iii. those among the 13 917 mine victims who are able to participate in productive activities; and iv. 3 361 families of returnees from the border and IDPs. 64 500 households to benefit directly from the project. Beneficiaries. The expected numbers of beneficiaries are 64 505 households in total, including: i. 16 630 household under PSP; ii. 30 000 households under AIP; and iii. an additional 17 875 households under savings and credit programme for farm and off-farm income generating activities. Together these households are equivalent to 17% of the total number of rural households and 26% of the estimated households in the target group. Household not directly targeted by the project will also benefit from the expanded agricultural extension services and improved livestock performance as a result of the activities of the village livestock assistants and farmer field days.	First area targeting (communes and villages based on poverty ranking) and secondly targeting within village using wealth ranking undertaken by villagers themselves using their own criteria which is part of the local planning process. Project assistance to the very poor, under the Production Start-up Programme (PSP), will target villages with the highest levels of food insecurity regardless of district location, while the activities under the Agricultural Improvement Programme (AIP) will respond to the demand from the communes/villages as expressed during the participatory planning process and district integration workshops.	To create a sustained increase in farm incomes and a more diversified pattern of crop and livestock production for about 64 500 households of the Target Group.
CBRDP			
Provinces of Kampong Thom and Kampot.	To benefit those poor rural households resident in the Project Area whose per capita per annum income does not exceed the equivalent of USD 112 (or such other amount as the Borrower and the Fund may agree from time to time), with particular attention given to women. 77 400 rural households (40% of the local rural population) who live below the poverty line of USD 112 per capita per year will comprise the target group.	Project activities will start in the districts already targeted by GTZ (three in Kampong Thom and four in Kampot) with especially high levels of poverty. The project will use the WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) index to identify additional poor communes for inclusion in the project. Within poor communes the most vulnerable villages will be selected in a transparent way during discussions at commune level involving representatives of all villages in the commune and district staff of all concerned line agencies. Within the villages the villagers will agree a list of the most vulnerable families	To assist approximately 39 150 poor households in the Project Area to sustain increased food production and farm incomes from intensified and diversified crop and livestock production and increase the capacity of the members of the Target Group to use the services available from the

Project areas	Target group, expected beneficiaries	Targeting approach / strategy	Project objectives
		through wealth ranking or other methods facilitated by the CD teams so appropriate activities can be targeted to these families. Within villages project activities will be targeted to the poor and women in different ways, e.g. food for work for infrastructure construction will self-target the poor and in particular the landless, including women, as the levels of payment are insufficient to interest those who are better off. The project has included funds for special agricultural and livestock programmes that will respond to the special interests of different sub-groups as identified during the PRAs and local planning processes. All proposals for infrastructure investment will have to meet poverty, cost and technical criteria before their inclusion in the project AWPB. MTR in PY3 will assess the effectiveness of the project's approach to targeting and propose revisions if necessary. The project will also target women in two other ways. First, they will be the managers of the water supply schemes and will also be members of the irrigations users committees and road maintenance groups. Subjects identified for demonstrations reflect the particular interests of the poor and women e.g. chicken production. Second, the use of family agreements will enable women to participate in training and other activities. In the training programmes in the Project Implementation Manual, women farmers should be encouraged to participate in all the training activities, including technical training, training in the management of the water supply systems and rural access roads and beneficiary monitoring, so that they will become agents of change in the social and economic development and play a more effective role in decision making both within the family and at the community level.	government and other sources for their social and economic development.
RPRP			
Provinces of Prey Veng and Svay Rieng.	Poor rural households below the poverty line in the Project Area, with particular attention given to women.	The 698 000 people (about 143 000 households), 49% of the population in the project area who are living below the poverty line will comprise the target group of the proposed project. Among this total, the project will target two mail groups: i. the poorest households who experience food shortages for 6-9 months a year, have little land, or even no land, few livestock and many dependants; and ii. the poor who have slightly more resources but still experience food shortages for several month a year. Both these groups contain female-headed households who account for 21% of total households in the project area.	(i) Enable approximately 120,600 poor households to sustain increased food production and incomes from intensified and diversified crop, livestock production and other sources and to manage their natural resources in a sustainable manner; (ii) Improve the capacity of the rural poor to plan, implement and manage their own social and economic development, including rural infrastructure development; (iii) Strengthen capacity of government and other services providers to support the rural poor in a participatory and gender-sensitive manner to plan and carry out development

Project areas	Target group, expected beneficiaries	Targeting approach / strategy	Project objectives
			programmes that respond to the priorities of the rural poor.
TSSD			
Provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom and Siem Reap.	630 000 households in approximately twenty-eight districts in the four participating provinces of Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom and Siem Reap.		Increase the agricultural productivity and improve access to markets within the Project Area.
PADEE			
Provinces of Kampot, Kandal, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng and Takeo.	246 communes (out of 535 communes) in 36 districts (out of 50). Following consultations with the local authorities, between five and eight target communes were selected in each District from those with a poverty headcount over 19% and with a total of more than 200 poor families; and with more than 500 hectares of rice cultivation. Districts with an insufficient number of eligible communes were not selected. The resulting 246 selected communes present an average poverty rate of 26.4% versus 22.3% for the 535 existing communes. Resource poor rural women and their households, and smallholder rice farmers in particular.	Beneficiaries of project activities will be selected through a two stage method. First, communes and districts have been selected within the five project provinces based on poverty incidence and headcount, potential for agricultural production and cost efficiency criteria. At a second stage, during implementation households within selected communes will be chosen based on participatory wealth ranking (as per past IFAD projects) and on assessment (including self-assessment) of willingness to participate and ability to fulfil the project associated tasks responsibly.	To improve agricultural productivity and to diversify the sources of income of rural households living in poverty in the Project Area.
ASPIRE			
Initially be implemented in the provinces of Battambang, Kampong Chhnang, Kratie, Preah Vihear and Pursat	Include rural poor smallholders as well as productive poor farmers who have the potential to produce for the market, as well as for their own consumption, and can invest in improving productions.	In targeting geographical areas and individual farmers, ASPIRE will place emphasis on maximising the cost-effectiveness of funds used. At the individual level, ASPIRE will seek to maximise the poverty reduction impact by targeting smallholder farmers who are either poor or near-poor and vulnerable to falling into poverty due to climate, market or other shocks but who have productive potential and can take advantage of market opportunities. These farmers will not (as in the past) be identified primarily through a wealth ranking process but by self-selection of farmers into programmes designed for the target group. Where it is necessary to ration access to the ASPIRE farmer groups, willing farmers who are classed as poor (ID-Poor 1 or 2) will have priority.	Enhanced models of agricultural services are formulated and put into practice by 2021 in order to assist a diversity of smallholder farmers to contribute to broad-based economic growth through profitable and resilient farm businesses. This will be achieved through three independent outcomes: (i) a national investment programme that ca be supported by multiple donors is designed to implement an updated extension policy allowing smallholder farmers access to quality information services; (ii) MAFF has instructional and human resources capacity to manage an effective, demand-driven system linking researchers and knowledge-

Project areas	Target group, expected beneficiaries	Targeting approach / strategy	Project objectives
			based agencies to extension agents in the public and private sectors, and in the civil society, as well as to farmers; and (iii) at least 120 000 smallholders have improved and resilient farm as a result of integrated, demand-led extension services and investments in climate resilient infrastructure.
AIMS			
Initially to work in 15 provinces based on the 5 flagship commodities selected by the same number of multi-stakeholder platforms and 3 inter-regional technical hubs.	Smallholder farm households, including poor and near poor farmers, participating in the supported value chain who voluntarily collaborate in project activities, including as well, agricultural cooperatives; farmer organizations, Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), agribusinesses, service enterprises, and industry associations. In all parts of the country, with actual locations determined by the selection of priority value chains and the associated areas engaged in the value chains from production to the market.	Important aspects in the targeting approach: • Selection of a portfolio of value chain which have credible potential for inclusive growth and also are accessible to a range of different types of farming households with different resources and capabilities. • Selection of the geographical locations (e.g. production clusters) around which to anchor VC intervention activities. • The way in which specific interventions were designed and delivered, including the phasing of delivery, to maximize the likelihood that increasing numbers of poorer smallholders can also participate profitably in the growth of the local VCs over time. AIMS smallholder beneficiaries may expect to include around 27% ID poor.	To increase returns from farming for smallholders, including poorer farmers and youth, through efficient public sector investment. There are expected to be 75,000 direct household beneficiaries from the Project within increased household assets of at least 25 per cent. To deliver substantia and sustained direct financial benefits to +75,000 smallhoder farmers and agribusinesses through the inclusive development of selected value chains for higher value agricultural products serving domestic and export markets.

Main thematic elements of investment projects

Project Name	Agricultural Technology Transfer	Group Revolving Funds (GRFs) linked to ag technology transfer	NRM, Environment& Climate Change	Agricultural Marketing/ Value Chain Dev	Rural Finance through MFIs and Banks	Rural Infrastructure	Local Government, Capacity& Community Development
Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot (CBRDP)	Some support	Some for Most Vulnerable Families				Main component (roads, drinking water, irrigation, buildings)	Major element – TA for capacity development
Rural Poverty Reduction Programme in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng (RPRP)	Major Component	Major GRF element	Some			Some	Substantial support
Rural Livelihoods Improvement Project in Kratie, Preah Vihear and Ratanakiri (RULIP)	Major Component Extension Self-help Groups for food security	Major GRF element		Some support for market-oriented agriculture	Support to linking farmers and groups to MFIs Not implemented		Substantial support
Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project (TSSD)	Extension for paddy farmers	Major GRF element		Some support to promote participation in value chains	Support to linking farmers and groups to MFIs Not implemented	Substantial support (ADB financed)	Substantial support Also for improving policy environment
Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment (PADEE)	Major component Extension agents and business advisers	Major GRF element "Improved GRFs"	Some Bio-digesters	Substantial support	Support to linking farmers and groups to MFIs: not implemented		
Agricultural Services Programme for Innovations, Resilience and Extension (ASPIRE)	Major support for extension, for agricultural policy research, analysis and development, - focus on introducing and upscaling innovative extension models – engagement of IFPRI as partner for agricultural policy development		Major support for climate resilient agriculture, both TA and infrastructure, innovation grants	Public-private partnerships		Infrastructure investments for climate resilient agriculture	*(continued)*
Accelerating Inclusive Markets for Smallholders (AIMS)	If required by needs of the VC	If required by needs of the VC		Main component supports value chain development, including agribusinesses and MSMEs, also support for VC innovation (open for national coverage, depending on the nature of the value chain)	Major credit component for VC actors including agri-businesses and MSMEs		(national VC perspective, new national implementing partners – Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Finance)

Project approaches for beneficiary group formation

Project	Group name	Poverty profiles of members	Project support
ADESS	Groups for "productivity start-up support" programme ("PSP groups")	Very poor households, including those without access to cropland, in villages with high levels of food insecurity in both the lowlands and uplands. Membership initially set at 30, reduced to 20 during implementation.	Training and extension, inputs, revolving fund
	Groups for "agricultural improvement programme " ("AIP groups")	Poor families who had adequate land but lacked knowledge on how to fully exploit it.	Demonstrations, training, extension, and associated field days. No support for GRF. AIP group members were expected to benefit in terms of better access to finance as a result of the other project component on rural finance (but this was not achieved)
RPRP	Livelihood improvement group (LIG)	Very poor households including the landless who lack the resources to be productive and suffer from the high levels of food insecurity 25 members per group.	Provision of agricultural and non-agricultural inputs on a grant basis, construction materials for rice banks, establishment of GRFs, farmer training support for extension and financial management.
	Farming systems improvement group (FSIG)	Poor households who have slightly more resourced 25 members per group.	Training and extension services. No GRF support.
RULIP	Most vulnerable family group (MVFG)	Poorest / very poor 10-15 members per group.	Training and extension services, GRF support. In addition, US$50 for essential food and health needs (RULIP MTR)
	Livelihoods improvement group (LIG)	Poor households with small area of land, which have potential for productivity improvement due to a lack of access to knowledge and resources. 20-25 members	Training and extension services, GRF support. GRF support initially both inputs and cash, but later coverted to cash only (over US$100 per household)
	Farming systems improvement group (FSIG)	Poor (but less poor) households with land, but lack the knowledge and skills associated with using improved technologies. 20-25 members per group.	Training and extension services, no GRF support
TSSD	Livelihoods improvement group (LIG)	Poor households with little land, poor women headed households, the landless and poor households from ethnic minorities. The design envisaged two types of groups as the previous projects: (i) households with a little land, either rice fields and/or household plots, who wish to improve the productivity of their land through crop and/or poultry production; and (ii) those who have no land and wish to engage in non-agricultural activities. However, this separation was not pursued. 25 members per group. According to the 2016 project review mission aide memoire, 25% IDPoor 1, 56% IDPoor 2	Training and extension services, GRF support GRF support in three tranches for US$240 per member: 1st tranche of US$100/member, 2nd tranche of US$80/member, 3rd tranche of US$60/member (US$6,000 per group in three tranches). (2016 project review mission aide-memoire)
PADEE	No specific name for groups. Can be referred to as "improved GRF" (IGRF) groups"	Poor households based on wealth ranking exercise. 50 members per group "to allow economies of scale" In actual implementation, about 20% of members IDPoor card holders (in later years). (project monitoring data)	Provision of financial and technical support for "improved GRF" (IGRF). IGRF support in the amount of US$80 per member per year over three years (i.e. US$12,000 over three years per group). (PADEE design document)
ASPIRE	Smallholder learning group (SLG)	Approximately 25 farmers each which will be formed from interested farmers or may be based on an existing group such as a farmer cooperative. Support to be designed to be attractive to productive smallholders who are poor and / or vulnerable.	Structured 3-year learning and support programme: training, farmer-to-farmer learning. No GRF support.

Complementary tables for CSPE assessment

Table (a)
Objectives, main elements and planned and actual outreach by project

	Objectives abbreviated, targeted beneficiaries	*Main project elements [1)]*	*Reported/estimated number of beneficiaries [source]*	*CSPE comments*
CBRDP	Reduced poverty/increased income for 49,600 HHs (text) or 39,150 HHs (logframe)	Agriculture D&D capacity Rural infrastructure	165,575 HHs (direct) [PCR/PPA]	All HHs living in a village with a CBRDP supported road were regarded as "direct" beneficiaries and it is likely that the majority of reported beneficiary HHs fell into this category. The figure may also include double counting.
RPRP	Reduced poverty/increased income for 120,600 HHs, incl. 50.400 HHs through groups	Agriculture D&D capacity Rural infrastructure	Direct: 50,400 HHs, Indirect: 90,210 HHs [PCR/PPA]	50,400 are the members of groups. It is not clear how the number 90,210 (indirect beneficiaries) was arrived at. It may be through rural infrastructure, though some of these would be considered to be "direct" beneficiaries.
RULIP	Improved livelihoods for 22,600 HHs (text) or 60,000 HHs (logframe).	Agriculture D&D capacity - improved services – agriculture, health Policy analysis	Direct: 15,669 HHs Indirect: 8,500 HHs [PCR/PPE]	The target was changed to 14,800 HHs at mid-term. 15,660 includes group members and community-level service providers.
TSSD	Livelihoods of 630,000 resource poor HHs improved (major part from infrastructure)	Agriculture Infrastructure D&D capacity Access to MFIs e-kiosks and ICT Policy & regulations	30,000 HHs through groups [PSR 04/2017] Commune infrastructure [ADB financed]: 373,092 HHs (direct + indirect) [ADB, 2017: summary of project performance]	IFAD support is focused on the LIG component, which has supported over 1,200 groups.
PADEE	Improved livelihoods for 90,000 rural HHs (49,000 primary beneficiary households)	Financial services Access to technology and markets (incl. non-land based activities), pro-poor bio-digesters	88,986 HHs, incl. some 49,200 HH members of IGRFs receiving support [data submitted by MAFF to CSPE team, Dec 2017]	
TOTAL	Targeted beneficiaries *Low estimate (direct, revised):* **203,550 HHs** *High estimate*: **912,800 HHs**		*Low estimate* (direct): approx. **239.700 HHs**[a] *High estimate*: **782,646 HHs**	

[a] For CBRDP, on third of reported number considered. For TSSD, not including the beneficiaries from infrastructure.

Table (b)
Rural roads constructed or rehabilitated

Project	*Rural road rehabilitated/constructed (kilometres)*	*Estimated number beneficiary HHs*
CBRDP	355	10,450
RPRP	1,914	23,000
TSSD	417	(+10,000)

Table (c)
Timeline between approval to first disbursement (months)

Project ID	*Project name*	*Approval to signing*	*Signing to effectiveness*	*Approval to effectiveness*	*Effectiveness to first disbursement*	*Approval to first disbursement*
1175	CBRDP	1.15	2.53	3.68	0.72	4.41
1261	RPRP	0.03	3.85	3.88	0.43	4.31
1350	RULIP	1.32	3.13	4.44	1.61	6.05
1464	TSSD	1.97	0[a]	1.97[a]	10.95	12.93
1559	PADEE	2.17	0[a]	2.17[a]	4.57	6.74
1703	ASPIRE	2.60	0[a]	2.50[a]	2.73	5.33
	Average	**1.54**	**3.17[b]**	**4.00[b]**	**3.50**	**6.63**
	*APR average***	*4.33[c]*	*7.24[c]*	*11.56[c]*	*8.73[d]*	*17.68[d]*

[a] Since the General Conditions for Agricultural Development Financing was amended in 2009, financing agreements between IFAD and governments enter into force upon the signature by both parties (unless the respective financing agreement states th at it is subject to ratification). Prior to this, financing agreements used to contain conditions for effectiveness, upon fulfilment of which the financing agreement was declared effective. Hence, for the financing agreements signed after this change, the date of effectiveness, or now called "entry into force" is the same day as the date of the financing agreement.
[b] In light of the point above, the average is computed without data on TSSD, PADEE and ASPIRE.
[c] For projects in APR approved between 2000 and 2009.
[d] For projects in APR approved between 2000 and 2015.

Table (d)
Overall disbursement rates (at closing and current as of June 2017)

Project ID	*Project name*	*Financing (at closing or as approved, in approx. US$ 'million)[a]*	*Implementation period (years)*	*Financial status or completion date*	*Disbursement rate (at closing or as at June 2017)*
1175	CBRDP	9.99	9	Closed (2-year extension)	92.9
1261	RPRP	15.49	7	Closed	97.1
1350	RULIP	12.01	7	Closed	96
1464	TSSD	13.38	7.5	31/08/2017	100
1559	PADEE	37.90	6	30/06/2018	94.8
1559	S-RET	4.6	4	31/12/2020	10.9
1703	ASPIRE (loan)	26.13	7	31/03/2022	5.3
1703	ASPIRE (ASAP grant)	15	7	31/03/2022	33.2

[a] Total amount for RULIP and PADEE, including supplementary financing approved later on.

Table (e)
Co-financing mobilization

	APIP	*ADESS*	*CBRDP*	RPRP	RULIP	TSSD	PADEE	ASPIRE	AIMS	Average
Co-financing ratio against US$1 by IFAD (as approved)	6.40	0.34	1.29	0.27	0.14	3.13	0.37	1.00	0.70	0.97
Actual (for closed projects)	5.44	0.35	1.17	0.03	0.14	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.84
Main co-financiers (not govt or beneficiaries)	IDA		GTZ/DED	None		ADB	GEF	CSF (local govt?)	Private sector	

Source: IFAD data (Oracle Business Intelligence), PCRs for the closed projects

Table (f)
Overview of data available for assessing rural poverty impact

Project	***Baseline***	***Midline***	***Endline***	***Other data***	***Notes***
RPRP	None	None	A small household survey	None	No information of sample size and lack of counterfactual group
CBRDP	None [a]	None	Project impact assessment (PIA)	None	The PIA has little information on HH income or expenditure and limited data on agricultural yields
RULIP	RIMS and household baseline survey (2007/2008)	RIMS and household survey-midterm (2011)	RIMS household endline survey (2014)	impact evaluation conducted by SKD (2015) PIA	The RIMS/household end-line survey data has no valid baseline for both the treatment and control groups.
TSSD	RIMS and household baseline survey (2014)	None	None	LIGs baseline social-economic survey (2016)	Little information available for assessing project impact
PADEE	Main impact assessment study - baseline survey (2014)	Main impact assessment study –midterm survey (2016)	Main impact assessment study –midterm survey (2017)	IFPRI e-PADEE baseline survey report (2016); AOS**	The only project with a valid panel data set. Minor problems exist in sampling methods.

RIMS= Results and Impact Management System; SKD=Strategy and Knowledge Department in IFAD; AOS=annual outcome survey

[a] There was a 2004 study by CBRDP in which crop and animal production/yields were systematically measured for a statistically representative sample of beneficiaries, but this only covered part of the CBRDP lifecycle, and not the entire project period

Table (g)
Overview of change of crop yields in the projects

	Project data		*National average/control*		*Notes*
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	
RPRP	2004	2007			
Rice yield (wet and dry)	2.29 t/ha*	2.63 t/ha*			
	1.9 t/ha**	3.0 t/ha**	2.0 t/h	2.8 t/h	These improvements were equal to or better than the national average.
CBRDP					
Rice yield (wet)	1.25 t/ha	2.6 t/ha			
Rice yield (dry)	2.6 t/ha	4.0 t/ha			
RULIP			control		
Rice (wet season)	1.51 t/ha	1.83 t/ha			The treatment group on average has 17.3 per cent higher rice yields than the control group if using the model with communal individual effects. The difference can mainly be explained by higher ownership of hand tractors and adoption of rice seed practice.
PADEE	2013	2016	Control		
Rice (wet season)	2.05 t/ha	2.24 t/ha	CD1=2.1 t/ha CD2=2.25 t/ha	CD1=1.9 t/ha CD2-b=2.08 t/ha	Wet season rice increased only very slightly in Kampot and Kandal, with Prey Veng having the highest increase in yield, while Takeo decreased.
Rice (dry season)	4.04 t/ha	4.33 t/ha	CD2=3.7t/ha	CD2-b=4.3/ha	Increases in yield for dry season were more significant, however,
Watermelon		4.43t/ha		CD1=3.8 t/ha CD2-b=0.6 t/ha	
Mungbean	1.03 t/ha	0.8 t/ha		CD1-b=0.6 t/ha CD2=0.8 t/ha	It was reported by the endline survey that many cash crops were damaged (e.g. mungbeans in Kampot and Takeo; sweet corn in Takeo)

Source: RIMS baseline, endline household surveys (RULIP, PADEE, TSSD), PIA, PCRs, and PPAs (CBRDP, RPRP)
Notes: * PIA ****** Provincial Department of Agriculture
CD1 means control domain 1 and they are drawn from villages located in project target communes (where some spill-over effects may be expected from the project). CD2 means control domain 2 and they are drawn from villages in the same target districts project but from non-target communes.

Table (h)17
Percentage of households experiencing a "hungry period" in three projects

	Baseline	*Endline*
CBRDP	43% (2002)	31% (2007)
RPRP	22% (2007)	6% (2010)
RULIP	18% (2007)	1% (2014)

Source: CBRDP PPA, RPRP PPA, RULIP PPE

Table (i)
Annual county programme review meetings since 2011

Date	*Event title*	*Areas and focus*	*Note*
24-26 January 2017	Annual country programme review (ACPoR)	(i) review of project performance and country programme and the attainment of the COSOP strategic objectives and contribution to achieving the intended results of the COSOP; (ii) resolving bottlenecks that impede enhancement of project management and implementation; (iii) M&E, MIS, KM and knowledge sharing best practices.	"Hosted" by on-going projects each day. Only one not in Phnom Penh (Sihanoukville)
21 April 2016	Country portfolio review and COSOP midterm review (MTR) workshop	(i) review of the country portfolio; (ii) identification of key problems and solutions, and finding responsive remedies for the bottlenecks in project management; (iii) review of the draft findings of the COSOP MTR.	
12-13 Feb 2015	COSOP annual review workshop	(i) review of the progress of COSOP; (ii) review of outstanding issues in implementation of COSOP.	.
29 April 2013	2013-2018 COSOP validation workshop	(i) review and validate the final design of the COSOP 2013-2018; (ii) agree on a work-plan and partnership arrangements for preparation of phase 1 of financing for the COSOP.	Hosted by MEF
2012		Several events and workshops for the preparation/design of the new 2013-2018 COSOP	
19-20 Dec 2011	COSOP annual review workshop	Validation of the COSOP annual implementation progress report	Hosted by MEF and co-hosted by IFAD

Sources: workshop reports and concept notes

Table (j)
Policy and institutional agenda listed in 2008 COSOP

Relevant COSOP sections and key points
Under strategic objective 2 (= *promotion of "decentralization and deconcentration" (D&D) and local governance for pro-poor agricultural and rural development through building linkages between the D&D framework and agricultural and rural development and institutional support for evidence-based pro-poor policy making*) - Development of approaches to improving service provision at field level - Piloting of expansion of Commune/Sangkat Fund to include investment in agriculture/rural development - Participation in district initiatives to pilot service delivery models and build links between D&D and sector programmes - Promotion of good governance - Encouragement of more women to stand for election to commune councils and other organizations - Capacity-building of commune councils, etc
Policy linkages - IFAD to contribute to design of sub-sector programmes as a member of thematic working group on agriculture and water - To work with the Government and other agencies to formulate viable interventions: (i) access to water for agriculture; (ii) access to agricultural research and extension services; (iii) access to agricultural input and produce markets; (iv) accountability, transparency and corruption

Table (k)
Policy issues as outlined in the 2013-2018 COSOP

Policy issue	*IFAD' role*	*How to influence change*
Strategic objective 1: Poor smallholders enabled to take advantage of market opportunities		
Increased knowledge and capacity of poor smallholders to diversify production and connect with markets	Assist MAFF in mainstreaming farming as business' considerations in its programs Supporting farmers in setting up successful farm business ventures	• Setting up and creating capacity in common interest groups to connect efficiently with markets • Supporting existing cooperatives and farmer groups with potential to link with buyers • Establishing a dialogue at central MAFF level with partners on mainstreaming farming as business into MAFF policies and programmes • Supporting innovations in service provision and other for successful farm business ventures
Strengthened capacity of very poor and landless households with recent access to land to improve their livelihoods	Development of a tailored intervention model for support to poor households with recent access to land, which can be scaled-up and incorporated into official policies	• Designing and field testing climate resilient agriculture systems for support to poor households with recent access to land through Social Land Concessions and disseminating findings • Strengthened capacity of very poor/landless households with recent access to land to improve their livelihoods
Strategic objective 2: Poor rural households and communities increase resilience to climate change and other shocks		
Increased preparedness of poor rural households for dealing with climate change and other shocks	Support mainstreaming of climate change considerations and resilience across Government's rural development policies and programs	• Supporting design of extension materials which incorporate resilience factors • Supporting innovations in ICT and financial instruments for improved farmer response to shocks • Building capacity for mainstreaming climate change concerns in provincial level planning processes and raising awareness on resilience both centrally and with decentralized rural service delivery agents
Strategic objective 3: Poor rural households improve access to strengthened rural service delivery by Government, civil society and private sector agencies		
Improved access of poor farmers to efficient agriculture support services	Supporting MAFF/MEF to develop a policy of agricultural extension services integrating public and private sectors, and civil society	• Supporting policy dialogue and technical assistance policy development • Testing innovative service delivery mechanisms including public-private partnerships and performance-based budgeting

Source: partial extract from 2013 COSOP table 1 policy linkage

Table (l)
Overview of regional/global grants by IFAD involving Cambodia (operational after 2010)

Scope / number of countries involved	*Number of grants*	*Examples of grants (key themes and recipients)*	*Combined IFAD grant amount*
Between 3 and 5	12	Capacity building in project management (AIT), forage and livestock (CIAT), pro-poor policy (FAO), cassava and marking (SNV), policy dialogue and KM in rural finance (APRACA), impact evaluation (Univ of East Anglia)	13 408 000
Between 6 and 10	5	Rice (IRRI), environmental services (ICRAF), KM/ learning routes (PROCASUR)	6 920 000
Initiative with overall APR coverage	6	Rural finance (APRACA), IPAF (Tebtebba)	6 011 600
Global	9	Challenge programme – water (IWMI), Global Mechanism, International Land Coalition, impact evaluation (3ie)	9 850 000

Main types of grants

- Agricultural research or commodity-focused (e.g. livestock, rice, cassava)
- Knowledge sharing and innovations (e.g. using the learning routes methodology) and scaling up best practices
- Capacity building of IFAD-financed project staff (e.g. project management, gender-related issues)
- Capacity building of IFAD target groups including farmers' and indigenous peoples' organizations

Main thematic areas:

- Agricultural production and market linkage for smallholders, including a knowledge component to promote information exchange and facilitate dialogue among stakeholders
- Access to financial services by poor rural people (two of the three in this area have been implemented by APRACA, and focus on the conduct of studies, strengthening of key stakeholder participation, technical support, pilot-testing of innovations, dissemination of best practices, packaging of training materials, and conduct of regional and national fora)
- Natural resource management

The other category of grants is those for impact evaluations in IFAD-financed projects. In association with RULIP (2007-2014) as part of the IFAD commitment made for the ninth replenishment process and as part of the corporate -level exercise of thirty impact evaluations led by the IFAD Strategy and Knowledge Department

Main grant recipients:

- Fourteen grants: research centers and universities as grant recipients (e.g. CIAT, ICRAF, IFPRI, IRRI, IWMI and the World Fish Center)
- Six grants: FAO is the main recipient among international organizations with six grants awarded mainly in the fields of capacity building and knowledge management.
- Eleven grants: CSOs and NGOs for knowledge management and capacity building (e.g. PROCASUR, SNV, APRACA) as well as for initiatives that target farmers' organizations and indigenous peoples (e.g. AgriCord, AFA, SEWA, Tebtebba)

Table (m)
Achievements reported against 2008 COSOP results management framework

Outcome indicators related to SOs	*Status reported (in 2013 COSOP)*	*CSPE comment*
SO1. Sustainable improvement of the livelihoods of the rural poor men and women in the project areas through community empowerment, productivity improvement and improved access to assets, productive resources, rural services, rural infrastructure and markets		
In communes receiving IFAD assistance: (1) Proportion of underweight, stunted and wasted children 26%, 26% and 10% respectively, by 2012 (2) 137,000 smallholders (40% report at least a 25% increase in crop and livestock production) (3) By 2012 where IFAD financed rural infrastructure investment, 44% of the rural population with safe drinking water; 24% of the rural population with access to improved sanitation; and (iii) 50% of communes invested in road improvements (4) Performance rating, with a target satisfaction rate of 80%, of the: (i) service providers (private and public); and (ii) the commune council infrastructure investments (5) Women account for 50% of the wage employment in agriculture (6) 25% of groups assisted by IFAD projects have women in their management committees (7) 70% of the adult population is aware that violence against women is a crime	(1) Not available (2) 221,808 smallholder households reached (61-75% reported increase in yield or production of crops/livestock) (3) 4% of target rural households with investment in drinking water supply points had access to safe drinking water, (ii) no related intervention and no data for sanitation indicator, and (iii) 2,213.6 km rehabilitated (4) CBRDP satisfaction rate is (i) 75-80% for VAHWs, NGOs and PDAs, and (ii) 50-90% for CCs *RPRP 96% of farmers expressed satisfaction with CEW. RULIP: No data.* (5) Not available (6) Approximately 27% (7) RULIP MTR states 99% of adult population aware of law against domestic violence, up from 97% at baseline.	Difficulties arise from a very broad (and not strategic) strategic objectives, resulting in indicators that do not necessarily measure the level of achievement against the objectives. The main investment projects reflected here are CBRDP, RPRP and to less extent RULIP. All projects had geographical targeting but in most cases not all villages in selected communes are targeted. Therefore, it is not clear how meaningful it is to have % measurement at commune level. The linkage with IFAD support (and to what extent IFAD could have realistically been expected to contribute) is not clear for some indicators, for example, women accounting 50% of the wage employment, in agriculture.
SO2. Promoting deconcentration, decentralization and local governance for pro-poor agricultural and rural development through building linkages between the D&D framework and agricultural and rural development and institutional support for evidenced-based pro-poor policy making		
(1) Government Strategic Framework for D&D reforms developed (2) Enforcement of pro-poor and gender sensitive operational policies and procedures for decentralized planning, financing and implementation increased (3) Enforcement of pro-poor sub-decrees issued in favour of targeting resources to the rural poor, including women and members of the indigenous ethnic minority groups (4) 20% of the commune councillors elected in 2012 are women (5) % increase in the CC budget for agricultural and rural development and service delivery	(1) Developed and approved in 2005. NDSNDD is being finalized *(Note: IFAD is a member of TWG D&D)* (2) In progress (3) Not yet in place; however, the First Three Year Implementation Plan (2011-2013) of the NDSNDD should bring about most of these (4) 14.6% in 2008 (following the second commune council elections in 2007) (5) An increase by 3% in 2008 against 2007, 31% in 2009 against 2008, and 10% in 2010 against 2009. There is a small decrease from 2010 to 2011.	At least for some indicators and achievements reported, it is plausible that IFAD support contributed, especially for (2) and (3), the latter having led to the institutionalization of ID poor system?? As for (1), the level of contribution is not clear, also given that there have been many development partners supporting this area. For (4) and (5), the linkage with IFAD support is not clear

Source: 2013 COSOP, appendix IV Previous COSOP Results Management Framework

Table (n)
Progress against 2013 COSOP results management framework

Original outcome indicators	*Modification made at MTR 2016*	*Achievements reported*	*CSPE comment*
SO1: Poor smallholders enabled to take advantage of market opportunities			
Average labour productivity of 49,000 targeted HHs increases by 25% (PADEE)	MODIFIED: At least 3 major extension packages shown to increase productivity of own-farm labour by 25%.	Measurement in progress	The original indicator would have been difficult to measure (as recognized by MTR)
Average HH non-rice agricultural production of 49,000 targeted HHs increased by 20% (PADEE)			
80% of IGRFs increase the size of their fund by 30% after three years (not including Group Conditional Capital Transfers) (PADEE)	MODIFIED: 80% of GRF (at least 1,780 GRFs) shown to have retained surplus averaging 10% of capital value at the start of the year, each year for three years (excluding additional transfers received)	On track	1,780 represents 80% of PADEE and TSSD GRFs.
Average HH agricultural production value of 100,000 targeted HHs increased by 15% (ASPIRE)	MODIFIED: Average HH agriculture production value of 64,000 smallholder HHs has risen by 15% after three years' participation in programme activities	On track	
Net farming income of 1,500 poor farm HHs with access to new land above poverty line level (ASPIRE)			
15 innovation sub-projects at different development stages approved for financing under iRAD (ASPIRE)	MODIFIED: 15 innovation sub-projects at different development stages approved for financing	No progress	
Minimum of 20% increase in average net farming income of 80,000 HH participating in 8 value chains (AIMS)	MODIFIED: Net cash income from farming of 64,0000 smallholder HHs increased by 20% after 3 years' participation in programme activities	On track	
SO2: Poor rural households and communities increase resilience to climate and other shocks			
Value of household assets owned by participating households increased on average by 25% (PADEE)	MODIFIED: Value of HH assets owned by 64,000 smallholder HHs increase by average of 25% after 3 years participation in programme activities	On track	
Percentage of children under 5 suffering from chronic malnutrition disaggregated by gender is reduced by 10% in targeted communes (Mainstreaming Nutrition Activities)	MODIFIED: % children under 5 in 64,000 target HHs suffering from chronic malnutrition (stunting) reduced by 10% after 3 years participation in programme activities	On track	
(New indicator)	NEW: % of COSOP local level investments targeted to most vulnerable 40% of Communes measured by CVI	Waiting for COSOP MIS system to report on target communes of TSSD, PADEE, ASPIRE within 40% most vulnerable	
SO3: Poor rural households improve access to strengthened rural service delivery by Government, civil society and private sector agencies			
A policy for climate sensitive Agricultural Extension Services integrating public sector, private sector and civil society roles is developed and adopted (ASPIRE)	A policy for climate sensitive Agricultural Extension Services integrating public sector, private sector and civil society roles is developed and adopted (ASPIRE)	Done (Policy adopted 2015)	Policy on Agricultural Extension was approved but it was mainly supported by USAID
40% increase in the number of agriculture education and extension service providers that are using good quality extension materials reviewed and disseminated by MAFF (ASPIRE)	40% increase in the number of agriculture education and extension service providers that are using good quality extension materials reviewed and disseminated by MAFF (ASPIRE)	Measurement in progress	
At least three major policy studies and associated publications will be produced by SNEC, discussed with stakeholders and disseminated (Small grants)	MODIFIED: At least three major policy studies and associated publications will be produced by discussed with stakeholders and disseminated	No progress	
Ex-post economic rate of return of directly supervised projects financed under COSOP is at least 15%	Ex-post economic rate of return of directly supervised projects financed under COSOP is at least 15%	On track	

Province-wise data: poverty level, population and project coverage

	Province	APIP (1997-2005)	ADESS (2000-06)	CBRDP (2001-09)	RPRP (2004-11)	RULIP (2007-14)	TSSD (2010-17)	PDEE (2012-21)	ASPIRE (2015-22)[b]	Commune Database: Predictive Poverty Rates[c]					ID Poor incidence 2010-11	Multidimentional poverty index	Population			Population density		
										2004	2007	2009	2011	2012			1998	2008	2013	1998	2008	2013
1	Banteay Meanchey		X				X			39.9	34.1	31.3	28.3	25.5	26%	0.18	577 772	677 872	729 569	86.5	101.5	109.2
2	Battambang		X						X	37.8	33.3	29.9	27	24.8	34%	0.16	793 129	1 025 174	1 121 019	67.8	87.6	95.8
3	Kampong Cham[a]	X					X			33.1	29	25.8	22.3	20.4	NA	0.23	1 608 914	1 679 992	1 757 223	353.7	369.3	386.3
4	Kampong Chhnang								X	37.9	35.6	32.3	29.5	27.7	37%	0.27	417 693	472 341	523 202	75.7	85.6	94.8
5	Kampong Speu									41.4	37.3	32.2	28.8	27.7	21%	0.21	598 882	716 944	755 465	85.3	102.2	107.7
6	Kampong Thom			X			X			41.1	**37.7**	**34.4**	**31.6**	**29.1**	NA	0.27	569 060	631 409	690 414	41.2	45.7	50.0
7	Kampot			X				X		26.6	23.4	20.5	22.1	20.4	16%	0.21	528 405	585 850	611 557	108.4	120.2	125.5
8	Kandal							X		27.6	21.2	17.6	16.1	14.6	21%	0.17	1 075 125	1 091 170	1 115 965	301.3	305.8	312.8
9	Kep									33.6	28.6	22.8	18.5	16.5	18%	0.21	28 660	35 753	38 701	85.3	106.4	115.2
10	Koh Kong									34.8	31.1	26.7	23.6	20.3	19%	0.19	116 061	117 481	122 263	10.4	10.5	11.0
11	Kracheh or Kratie	X				X			X	**43.9**	**41.5**	**38.6**	**35.4**	**32.6**	36%	0.3	263 175	319 217	344 195	23.7	28.8	31.0
12	Mondul Kiri									**47**	**42.4**	**38**	**36.8**	**32.9**	27%	0.4	32 407	61 107	72 680	2.3	4.3	5.1
13	Othdar Meanchey									**46.6**	**42.3**	**38.6**	**35**	**34.3**	30%	0.23	68 279	185 819	231 390	11.1	30.2	37.6
14	Pailin									**41.7**	36.9	31	26.7	23.9	32%	0.16	22 906	70 486	65 795	28.5	87.8	81.9
15	Phnom Penh									6.8	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.1	NA	NA	999 804	1 501 725	1 688 044	1 473.6	2 213.4	2 488.1
16	Preah Sihanouk									31.6	25.2	21.1	18.2	15.6	23%	0.19	171 735	221 396	250 180	197.9	255.1	288.2
17	Preah Vihear					X			X	**50.7**	**45**	**41.5**	**39**	**36.2**	32%	0.36	119 261	171 139	235 370	8.6	12.4	17.1
18	Prey Veng	X			X			X	(X)	33.2	30.2	27.3	23.7	21.9	27%	0.22	926 042	947 372	1 156 739	189.6	194.0	236.9
19	Pursat		X						X	40.7	**37.5**	**34.1**	**30.3**	27.8	34%	0.28	360 445	397 161	435 596	28.4	31.3	34.3
20	Rattanakiri					X				**50.7**	**45**	**41.5**	**39**	**36.2**	26%	0.4	94 243	150 466	183 699	8.7	14.0	17.0
21	Siem Reap		X				X			**42.2**	36	32.4	30	**28.8**	31%	0.24	696 164	896 443	922 982	67.6	87.0	89.6
22	Stung Treng									**46.6**	**42.3**	**38.6**	**35**	**34.3**	NA	0.36	81 074	111 671	122 791	7.3	10.1	11.1
23	Svay Rieng	X			X			X	(X)	32.5	27.8	23.6	19.3	17.4	21%	0.22	478 252	482 788	578 380	161.2	162.8	195.0
24	Takeo							X	(X)	31.6	28.1	25.2	22.5	19.9	21%	0.21	790 168	844 906	923 373	221.8	237.1	259.2
	Cambodia																**11 437 656**	**13 395 682**	**14 676 591**			

[a] The Kampong Cham province was divided into two and a new province Tbong Khmum was created in 2013.

[b] X indicates the phase 1 provinces, (X) indicates the phase 2 provinces

[c] Bold font indicates the top eight provinces (higest poverty rates).

Poverty trend in Cambodia and selected project sites

372. Overall, Cambodia has experienced dramatic increases in income and reduction in poverty for the last two decades, but many of them remained vulnerable to external shocks. Between 2000 and 2015, annual growth in Cambodia's GDP averaged 7.8 per cent, raising GNI per capita to US$ 1 140 and reducing poverty rates from over 60 per cent to 13.5 per cent in 2014. Income poverty has declined consistently, and the sharpest reduction in national poverty occurred between 2007 and 2009, mainly driven by increases in crop prices and agricultural wages (OECD, p.17). Thus the majority of households are currently still distributed between the poverty and vulnerability lines.

373. Households categorized by IDPoor as poor or very poor show significant movement in and out of poverty. A further look using the IDPoor dataset informed the movement between poor and non-poor between 2008 and 2014. Over half of the households categorized as non-poor remained out of poverty over the three waves. Among those categorized as poor in each of the first two waves, about one-third transitioned out of poverty by the third survey, while one-third remained poor and one-third fell into extreme poverty. About half of the very poor in each of the first two waves transitioned out of poverty, but about 6% fell back into extreme poverty thereafter.

Figure
Transitions in household poverty in Cambodia, % of population (IDPoor waves: 2008/09, 2010/11 and 2013/14)



Source: OECD (2017)

Note: This graph shows the movement of Cambodian households between states of welfare between 2008 and 2014. The population observed in this graph belong to a restricted subset of the IDPoor panel sample. The percentages listed in black indicate the share of households that fall under each poverty category within each wave (time period). The percentages listed in grey indicate the share of households within each category of poverty that make a transition to the next poverty state (indicated by the direction of the flow). The direction of each transition can be identified by the origin and end point of the flow. The nomenclature of the graph is that used by the IDPoor programme. Poverty categories are assigned according to the final scores of a proxy means test, described in Annex 1.2. *Source*: Authors' calculations based on MOP (2016), IDPoor data (2008-2014).

IDPoor Programme: The Identification of Poor Households Programme (IDPoor) classifies household income level using a proxy means test, which assigns a household "poverty score" based on a range of information which are easily observable and verifiable, such as socioeconomic characteristics of household, construction materials, main income activity, household asset ownership, and dependency ratio.

- Non-poor: Households with a score that ranges between 0 and 44 are classified as "non-poor".
- Poor ("IDPoor 1"): Households with a score falls within the range of 45 to 58 points are classified as "poor".
- Very poor ("IDPoor 2"): Households classified with a score greater than 58 are classified as "very poor".

374. The following part of this annex presents the analysis of poverty trend in the geographical areas (villages) assisted by TSSD and PADEE, compared with other villages in the same provinces without intervention using the IDPoor dataset. This aims to further explore the overall poverty impact in the project areas covered by TSSD and PADEE. A caveat here is that the IDPoor status holders are not necessarily the project beneficiaries. TSSD used it as a main targeting benchmark for outreach, but less of importance for RULIP and PADEE. For PADEE, the project did not exclude better off farmers and overall about 20 per cent of the beneficiaries were IDPoor households.

375. With respect to TSSD, poverty rates in TSSD project areas dropped significantly faster than control villages using IDPoor data. The unavailability of project specific follow-up surveys makes the assessment difficult. Using a second-hand dataset (IDPoor), the CSPE team made a crude comparison of poverty reduction between TSSD project areas and non-project areas. The poverty rate in this assessment was estimated by the proportion of family within a village holding IDPoor poverty card. The CSPE found a significant poverty reduction rate for TSSD project areas after controlling village fixed effects: after the TSSD interventions, on average a village in TSSD area reduced the incidence of poverty by 3.3 per cent more than the one in control areas during the project period (See Graph XXX) and the result is statistically significant. However, there is insufficient evidence to attribute the change to TSSD alone.



Graph X.a Percentage of IDPoor2 Households in TSSD and non-TSSD areas before and after intervention



Graph X.b Percentage of IDPoor Households in TSSD and non-TSSD areas before and after intervention





Notes: TSSD is implemented between 2012 and 2018, and the verticle line is to indicate the year when TSSD started to be implemented.
Source: IOE's calculations based on IDPoor data (2009-2016).

376. **PADEE project areas on average show slower poverty reduction.** The graphs depict the transition of poverty rates between 2009 and 2016. The figure, together with the regression analysis, indicate that PADEE project areas on average have slower poverty reduction after project intervention compared with control areas, especially compared with CD2, and the results are statistically significant. However, as mentioned earlier, this method can't be used to assess the poverty impact of the PADEE projects as PADEE included better-off farmers, who are non-IDPoor.



Graph X.a Percentage of IDPoor2 Households in PADEE and non-PADEE areas before and after intervention



Graph X.b Percentage of IDPoor Households in PADEE and non-PADEE areas before and after intervention





Notes: PADEE is implemented between 2012 and 2018, so the year 2013 was when PADEE started to be implemented.
Source: IOE's calculations based on IDPoor data (2009-2016).

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