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Investir dans les populations rurales

Rapport annuel 2021 sur les résultats et l'impact des opérations du FIDA

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Pour: **Examen**

Table des matières

Remerciements	ii
Résumé	iii
Appendice	
Main report: 2021 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations	1

Remerciements

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Rapport annuel 2021 sur les résultats et l'impact des opérations du FIDA

Résumé

A. Introduction

1. Le présent document correspond à la 19^e édition du Rapport annuel sur les résultats et l'impact des opérations du FIDA (RARI), établi par le Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA (IOE). Le RARI présente une synthèse des résultats des opérations financées par le FIDA, fondée sur les évaluations menées par IOE, et met en évidence les problèmes et les enseignements transversaux en vue d'aider le FIDA à améliorer son efficacité dans le domaine du développement. Il vise à favoriser la responsabilisation à l'égard des résultats et à promouvoir l'introspection et l'apprentissage au sein du FIDA, en proposant un certain nombre d'analyses des données factuelles issues des évaluations.
2. **Contenu principal du RARI de 2021.** Conformément aux éditions précédentes, le RARI de 2021 comprend des sections standard dans lesquelles sont analysés les historiques des notes de performance issues des évaluations menées au niveau des projets (évaluations de la performance des projets, évaluations de l'impact et validations des rapports d'achèvement de projets) et les résultats des évaluations de stratégies et de programmes de pays (ESPP). En outre, le présent RARI renferme des discussions axées sur l'apprentissage, portant sur deux thèmes: i) les facteurs qui affectent l'efficacité des projets, étant donné que ce critère a toujours été marqué par une performance médiocre par rapport aux autres critères d'évaluation; ii) la performance des opérations menées dans les pays en situation de fragilité, ce qui témoigne de l'intérêt que le Conseil d'administration et la direction du FIDA portent à cette question et de l'importance qui lui est accordée dans le cadre de la Douzième reconstitution des ressources du FIDA (FIDA12)¹.
3. **Méthode.** Les données utilisées pour les analyses incluses dans le RARI proviennent principalement des évaluations de projets et des ESPP réalisées par IOE. D'autres produits d'évaluation, tels que les synthèses d'évaluation, sont également évoqués, le cas échéant. Les notes de performance (sur une échelle de 1 à 6²) attribuées par IOE dans les évaluations menées au niveau des projets et les ESPP sont exploitées dans le cadre des analyses quantitatives. Comme par le passé, l'analyse des notes de performance des projets est présentée par année d'achèvement des projets. Une moyenne mobile sur trois ans est utilisée pour lisser les variations interannuelles. Le cas échéant, une combinaison de statistiques descriptives et inférentielles est employée.
4. À l'exception de l'analyse des historiques des notes de performance, la section sur les activités hors prêts s'appuie sur les ESPP les plus récentes (pour le Maroc, le Niger, l'Ouganda et le Soudan). Quant à l'analyse qualitative de la performance des projets en matière d'efficacité, un ensemble de facteurs récurrents communs a été identifié, sur la base d'un examen des évaluations; les résultats pertinents de ces évaluations (facteurs influençant positivement ou négativement l'efficacité) ont ensuite été extraits et synthétisés. Une série de questions directrices a été utilisée pour l'analyse qualitative des opérations dans les contextes fragiles.

¹ Dans le cadre de FIDA12, le FIDA s'est engagé à améliorer l'attention portée aux facteurs de fragilité et à allouer au moins 25% des ressources de base aux pays en situation de fragilité.


² La notation, comprise entre 1 et 6, correspond aux résultats suivants: 1 = Très insuffisant; 2 = Insuffisant; 3 = Plutôt insuffisant; 4 = Plutôt satisfaisant; 5 = Satisfaisant; 6 = Très satisfaisant.

B. Performance du portefeuille de projets

5. **Au cours de la dernière période de trois ans (2017-2019), la majorité des notes de performance étaient supérieures à 4 sur une échelle de 1 à 6, ce qui équivaut à une note plutôt satisfaisante ou supérieure.** La part des projets jugés plutôt satisfaisants ou mieux va de 56% pour ce qui est de l'efficacité à 87% concernant l'innovation. En ce qui concerne les résultats globaux des projets (fondés sur l'évaluation de tous les critères, à l'exception de la performance du FIDA et des pouvoirs publics), 76% des projets ont été jugés plutôt satisfaisants ou mieux (figure A).

Figure A

Pourcentage de projets ayant obtenu une note supérieure à 4 (plutôt satisfaisant ou mieux) sur une échelle de 1 à 6, entre 2017 et 2019 (année d'achèvement du projet), par critère d'évaluation.



Source: Base de données sur l'évaluation fournie par IOE (données des VRAP et des EvPP), février 2021.


6. **L'évaluation de la performance des projets au regard des différents critères d'évaluation depuis 2007 fait apparaître des tendances et des schémas inégaux.** La figure B ci-après montre la part des projets jugés plutôt satisfaisants ou mieux depuis 2007 au regard des critères suivants: évaluation globale du projet, performance du FIDA et performance des pouvoirs publics. La figure montre une fluctuation de la performance des pouvoirs publics, avec toutefois quelques signes d'amélioration au cours de la dernière période, rompant ainsi la tendance à la baisse observée depuis la période 2012-2014. En revanche, les performances du FIDA affichent une tendance à la baisse après avoir atteint un pic entre 2014 et 2016, lorsque 90% des projets achevés au cours de cette période avaient été jugés plutôt satisfaisants ou mieux. La note relative aux résultats globaux des projets a peu évolué au cours de la période.
7. Les figures C à E présentent les données relatives aux autres critères d'évaluation, regroupées par tendances à long terme depuis 2007. Deux critères (environnement et gestion des ressources naturelles; adaptation aux changements climatiques) affichent une évolution positive, qui est statistiquement significative mais enregistre un faible niveau de confiance (figure C). Quatre critères ont enregistré

une amélioration continue au cours des trois dernières périodes consécutives (2015-2017, 2016-2018 et 2017-2019): efficacité, durabilité des bénéficiaires, innovation et reproduction à plus grande échelle (figure D). Certains autres critères ne montrent aucune amélioration sensible des performances ou accusent un léger recul sur le long terme [pertinence, efficacité, impact sur la pauvreté rurale et égalité femmes-hommes et autonomisation des femmes (figure E)].


Figures B-E

Pourcentage de projets ayant obtenu une note supérieure à 4 (plutôt satisfaisant ou mieux) sur une échelle de 1 à 6, entre 2007 et 2019 (année d'achèvement du projet), par critère


B. Résultats globaux des projets et performance des partenaires




C. Critères affichant une tendance positive à long terme



D. Critères présentant une amélioration au cours des périodes les plus récentes



E. Critères ne présentant pas d'évolution positive observable ou enregistrant un léger déclin



Source: base de données sur l'évaluation fournie par IOE (données des VRAP et des EvPP)

8. **Les écarts de notation entre les évaluations indépendantes et les autoévaluations se sont réduits.** Le pourcentage de projets affichant un écart moyen (net) négatif (c'est-à-dire dont la note issue de l'autoévaluation est supérieure à celle d'IOE) a diminué, passant de 89% sur la période précédente (2014-2016) à 79% sur la période actuelle (2017-2019). En outre, l'écart moyen par critère d'évaluation entre les projets a diminué au cours de la dernière période (2017-2019) par rapport à la période précédente (2014-2016) pour 9 des 12 critères, sauf ceux liés à l'efficacité, à l'impact sur la pauvreté rurale et à l'égalité femmes-hommes et l'autonomisation des femmes. S'agissant de ce dernier, l'écart négatif s'est progressivement creusé au fil du temps.


C. **Performance des activités hors prêts**

9. **Les notes de performance moyennes dans tous les domaines d'activité hors prêts font apparaître une amélioration (ESPP de 2018 à 2020).** La figure F montre la part des ESPP ayant abouti à des notes plutôt satisfaisantes ou supérieures pour trois domaines d'activité hors prêts (gestion des connaissances,

participation à l'élaboration des politiques au niveau national et création de partenariats) et pour l'évaluation globale des activités hors prêts.

Figure F

Part des ESPP ayant abouti à une note plutôt satisfaisante ou supérieure (supérieure à 4 sur une échelle de 1 à 6) pour les activités hors prêts, entre 2006 et 2020 (année d'évaluation)



Source: Base de données sur les ESPP fournie par IOE

10. **Les stratégies et activités de gestion des connaissances étaient plus visibles au niveau des projets qu'au niveau des programmes de pays.** Le Soudan a fait figure d'exception, puisque des efforts concertés ont été déployés au niveau du programme de pays (par exemple, élaboration d'une stratégie de gestion des connaissances, création d'un groupe central de gestion des connaissances en collaboration avec le FIDA, les équipes de projet et les organismes publics de contrepartie). Les ESPP relatives au Soudan et à l'Ouganda ont révélé que les activités de gestion des connaissances soutenues par des ressources humaines bien qualifiées et motivées produisaient de bons résultats, mais que les progrès stagnaient lorsque les capacités appropriées n'étaient plus disponibles.
11. **L'évaluation de la création de partenariats a mis en évidence des variations, mais également des occasions manquées.** Les partenariats entre le FIDA et les ministères compétents étaient généralement bons et efficaces, mais des occasions n'ont pas été saisies en matière de collaboration avec des organismes publics autres que ceux chargés de la gestion des projets (par exemple, les principaux ministères chargés des femmes ou des jeunes au Niger ou encore la cellule chargée des questions de genre au sein du Ministère de l'agriculture du Soudan). Les performances des partenariats conclus avec les organismes internationaux de développement ont été mitigées en termes de complémentarité des financements et de synergie des actions menées. La collaboration avec divers partenaires du secteur privé s'intensifie (par exemple, les chambres régionales d'agriculture au Niger, les entreprises de semences ou encore les négociants en produits agricoles au Soudan).
12. **Les ESPP ont révélé que c'était principalement au niveau des projets que l'on abordait les questions de politique générale et que le FIDA pouvait potentiellement jouer un rôle plus important en s'engageant directement dans le domaine des politiques.** Les ESPP concernant l'Ouganda et le Maroc ont

mis en évidence le faible recours à la gestion des connaissances pour influencer et mobiliser les parties prenantes dans des domaines autres que les projets financés par le FIDA, en raison de l'absence de ressources financières et humaines suffisantes au niveau national pour réaliser des études et organiser de vastes forums de parties prenantes en vue de partager les enseignements tirés et les expériences acquises. L'ESPP relative au Soudan a également fait état de partenariats limités avec les partenaires de développement aux fins de la gestion des connaissances et des actions de plaidoyer.

13. Dans un contexte de ressources limitées, les dons ont parfois joué un certain rôle dans la contribution à l'élaboration des politiques au niveau national. À titre d'exemple, un don en faveur de partenariats public-privé-producteur a contribué à l'élaboration d'une politique en matière de palmiers à huile en Ouganda, et deux dons ont aidé le Maroc à établir un dialogue et des échanges substantiels avec plusieurs pays africains sur les politiques et techniques agricoles, facilitant ainsi la coopération Sud-Sud.

D. Facteurs d'influence de l'efficacité des projets

14. Le critère d'évaluation intitulé « efficacité » est défini dans le Manuel de l'évaluation d'IOE comme « mesure dans laquelle la conversion des ressources (fonds, compétences spécialisées, temps, etc.) en résultats est économique ». Dans le but de mieux comprendre les facteurs influençant l'efficacité, IOE a réalisé une analyse qualitative des EPP/EvPP portant sur 46 projets achevés entre 2013 et 2015 pour lesquels le critère d'efficacité a été jugé plutôt insuffisant ou inférieur et 37 projets achevés entre 2017 et 2019 pour lesquels le critère d'efficacité a été jugé plutôt satisfaisant ou supérieur. Les facteurs récurrents ci-après, qui affectent l'efficacité des projets (positivement ou négativement), ont été identifiés: i) retard en matière d'efficacité; ii) rythme d'exécution et de décaissement; iii) problèmes de personnel; iv) problèmes liés aux coûts. Ces considérations ne s'excluent pas mutuellement et peuvent se chevaucher.
15. **Le rôle du gouvernement bénéficiaire a constitué un facteur commun qui s'est traduit par un retard d'efficacité plus important (c'est-à-dire des retards dans l'exécution) après l'approbation d'un projet.** Ces retards sont dus, par exemple, aux longs délais d'examen et de ratification des accords par le gouvernement et aux changements opérés au sein du principal organisme d'exécution.
16. **Dans les cas où l'efficacité des projets a été jugée plutôt insuffisante ou moins bonne (note inférieure à 3 sur 6), le facteur clé résidait dans la lenteur de l'exécution (85% des projets examinés).** Les faiblesses et les retards affectant les processus de passation de marchés figurent parmi les principales raisons des retards d'exécution des projets. Par exemple, le personnel du projet a quelquefois eu du mal à articuler les processus de passation de marchés selon les exigences du FIDA, et ce dernier a parfois été lent à répondre aux demandes de non-objection. Les retards sont dus en grande partie à la lourdeur des procédures de passation de marchés et de gestion des contrats, ainsi qu'au manque de maîtrise de ces procédures par le personnel de projet. Les retards dans la passation des marchés ont eu une incidence négative sur la qualité des produits et des résultats (par exemple, une exécution précipitée a compromis le rapport qualité-prix et la durabilité des bénéfices).
17. **Les missions de supervision et le soutien à l'exécution ont joué un rôle essentiel dans l'amélioration de l'efficacité opérationnelle.** Des recommandations pertinentes et un suivi adéquat par les équipes de projet ont permis de résoudre les problèmes d'exécution et de garantir, entre autres, la

réalisation des objectifs physiques, la préparation en temps voulu des demandes de retrait et les transferts de fonds en temps voulu au niveau décentralisé.

18. **Les problèmes de dotation en personnel des projets ont fortement nui à l'efficacité de ces derniers.** Cet aspect a été mentionné dans trois quarts des projets examinés dont l'efficacité a été jugée plutôt insuffisante ou moins bonne. L'expertise insuffisante du personnel de projet, tant sur le plan de la gestion que sur le plan technique, a entraîné des retards dans l'exécution (par exemple, la préparation inadéquate de l'unité de coordination du programme a ralenti le démarrage des projets). Les retards de mise en place des unités de projet, imputables à la lenteur du recrutement du personnel y relatif, ont freiné le rythme d'exécution. Bien souvent, l'isolement géographique des zones où se déroulent les projets, associé à des contraintes de recrutement (telles que des salaires peu attractifs), a créé des difficultés pour embaucher et retenir un personnel compétent. Le taux élevé de rotation du personnel a nui à l'efficacité de l'exécution et à la gestion des programmes. En effet, les coûts de gestion se sont accrus, car il a fallu faire appel à des prestataires de services externes plus onéreux, et les recommandations formulées par la mission de supervision n'ont pas été suivies d'effet en raison d'un transfert des responsabilités inadéquat. Dans les projets ayant obtenu de bons résultats, les évaluations soulignaient que la présence d'un personnel compétent et expérimenté dès le début du programme était essentielle à la mise en place de systèmes efficaces et efficaces (par exemple, pour la gestion financière). Si la coordination et la communication ont souvent été problématiques dans les projets cofinancés, dans certains cas, le fait que différents cofinanciers financent différents postes s'est avéré bénéfique, car cela a permis à l'unité de projet de disposer d'un personnel spécialisé (au Bangladesh, par exemple).
19. **Le manque de prise en compte des questions liées à la situation du pays en question au stade de la conception des projets a abouti à des coûts administratifs réels plus élevés que prévu, une situation qui a été exacerbée par des problèmes de personnel.** Les estimations relatives à quelques projets (par exemple au Congo, aux Maldives, au Mali et au Nigéria) ont dû être révisées au cours de l'exécution parce que les difficultés liées au contexte national n'avaient pas été suffisamment prises en compte lors de la conception des projets, notamment les coûts de desserte de la vaste zone géographique d'intervention (ce qui a entraîné une augmentation des frais de transport). Autre facteur clé, le coût plus élevé que prévu du personnel affecté aux projets (par exemple, pour le recrutement de personnel supplémentaire) et des prestataires de services externes. La pénurie de personnel qualifié dans le pays en question pour assurer certaines fonctions clés, telles que la passation de marchés et la gestion financière, fait partie des facteurs qui contribuent à l'augmentation des frais liés au personnel.
20. **Le coût élevé de gestion des projets nuit à l'efficacité de ces derniers.** Parmi les projets ayant obtenu une note inférieure à 3 sur 6 (plutôt insuffisant ou inférieur) en matière d'efficacité, la gestion de projet représentait plus de 25% du coût total du projet dans environ 40% des cas (soit 18 des 46 projets examinés). Dans quatre de ces dix-huit projets, la part des coûts de gestion du projet a dépassé 40% du total (en Gambie, en Guinée-Bissau, au Panama et en République arabe syrienne). Trois de ces quatre projets affichaient un niveau d'exécution budgétaire très faible (entre 24% et 55%), et la part des coûts de gestion du projet par rapport au coût total était donc encore plus disproportionnée.
21. **L'augmentation du ratio du coût des intrants par rapport aux résultats réduit l'efficacité opérationnelle.** Dans certains cas, les coûts des intrants et des activités ont augmenté au cours de l'exécution parce que des besoins ont été négligés ou que les coûts ont été sous-estimés au stade de la conception des projets. Compte tenu du budget limité, les dépassements de coûts ont conduit à

l'annulation ou à la rationalisation de certaines activités. L'ESPP du Niger a relevé des problèmes structurels, tels que le fait qu'un nombre limité de soumissionnaires potentiels du pays ont tendance à agir comme des « fixateurs de prix », ce qui a gonflé les prix. En outre, des facteurs exogènes, tels que les fluctuations soudaines des prix des intrants ou la dépréciation/l'appréciation des devises, peuvent également affecter les coûts des intrants.

E. Examen des opérations menées dans les pays en situation de fragilité et de conflit

22. **Quel que soit le critère, les notes moyennes attribuées aux projets réalisés au cours de la période 2007-2019 dans les pays en situation de fragilité sont inférieures aux notes attribuées aux projets réalisés dans les pays qui n'étaient pas en situation de fragilité³, les différences en matière d'efficacité, de performance des pouvoirs publics, de résultats globaux des projets, de reproduction à plus grande échelle et de durabilité des résultats étant statistiquement significatives.** Ce phénomène n'est pas vraiment inattendu, compte tenu de la multitude de défis liés au travail qui se présentent dans des contextes fragiles, tels que la faiblesse des capacités institutionnelles et les éventuelles perturbations de l'exécution des projets dues à des crises sociopolitiques.
23. **Au cours de la période 2017-2019, la performance des projets s'est améliorée dans les pays en situation de fragilité.** Ainsi qu'il ressort du tableau A, la performance globale des projets, telle que mesurée par les résultats globaux de ces derniers, est légèrement meilleure dans le cas des pays en situation de fragilité (79% de résultats plutôt satisfaisants ou supérieurs, contre 75% au cours de la même période pour les pays ne se trouvant pas en situation de fragilité). Alors que les performances relatives à certains critères tels que l'efficacité, l'impact sur la pauvreté rurale, la reproduction à plus grande échelle et la durabilité des résultats étaient nettement inférieures pour les projets dans les pays en situation de fragilité, les performances relatives à certains critères tels que la pertinence, l'égalité femmes-hommes et l'autonomisation des femmes et l'adaptation aux changements climatiques étaient nettement meilleures que dans les pays ne se trouvant pas en situation de fragilité. Le tableau A montre également que, par rapport à 2014-2016, la performance des projets dans les pays en situation de fragilité s'est améliorée pour tous les critères, à l'exception de l'impact sur la pauvreté rurale, qui est resté identique.

³ Aux fins de l'analyse quantitative des notes de performance, les projets ont été répertoriés et catégorisés comme ayant été menés dans des pays en situation de fragilité si: i) le pays figurait sur les listes annuelles des pays en situation de fragilité de la Banque mondiale pendant plus de la moitié de la période de mise en œuvre du projet; ou ii) le pays figurait sur la liste de 2020 des pays en situation de fragilité et de conflit de la Banque mondiale et spécifiquement dans la catégorie « pays touchés par un conflit violent ». Cet exercice a permis de recenser 102 projets dans des pays en situation de fragilité et 196 dans des pays ne se trouvant pas en situation de fragilité.

Tableau A

Pourcentage de notes plutôt satisfaisantes ou supérieures pour les projets réalisés dans des pays en situation de fragilité et dans d'autres pays, par année d'achèvement du projet (2017-2019 par rapport à 2014-2016).

	Pays en situation de fragilité			Pays hors situation de fragilité		
	2014-2016 (N=30)	2017-2019 (N=24)	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016	2014-2016 (N=52)	2017-2019 (N=44)	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016
Efficiences	40	58	▲ 18	60	55	▼ -5
Performance des pouvoirs publics	47	63	▲ 16	65	64	▼ -2
Adaptation aux changements climatiques	72	86	▲ 14	78	80	▲ 3
Innovation	73	83	▲ 10	85	89	▲ 4
Résultats globaux des projets	70	79	▲ 9	76	75	▼ -1
Durabilité	50	58	▲ 8	67	70	▲ 3
Efficacité	63	71	▲ 8	85	82	▼ -3
Égalité femmes-hommes et autonomisation des femmes	80	88	▲ 8	70	69	▼ -1
Environnement et gestion des ressources naturelles	76	83	▲ 7	84	88	▲ 4
Performance du FIDA	80	83	▲ 3	85	80	▼ -5
Pertinence	93	96	▲ 3	79	80	▲ 1
Reproduction à plus grande échelle	60	63	▲ 3	73	75	▲ 2
Impact sur la pauvreté rurale	70	70	— 0	83	83	— 0

Source: Base de données d'IOE.

*Les critères d'IOE sont classés en fonction de l'évolution du pourcentage entre les périodes pour les pays en situation de fragilité.

24. Une analyse qualitative a été menée dans les VRAP et les EPP de 23 projets exécutés dans des pays qui, à leur achèvement, étaient classés par la Banque mondiale comme se trouvant en situation de fragilité, et dans les ESPP récents de cinq pays en situation de fragilité (Burundi, Madagascar, Niger, Sierra Leone et Soudan). Les principaux domaines d'enquête retenus pour l'analyse qualitative des résultats de l'évaluation étaient notamment les suivants: i) dans quelle mesure le contexte propre aux pays en situation de fragilité et aux projets qui y sont menés a été analysé et pris en compte dans la conception desdits projets; ii) dans quelle mesure et comment les projets ont cherché à s'attaquer aux moteurs/facteurs de fragilité; iii) dans quelle mesure et comment les projets se sont attaqués aux conséquences de la fragilité; iv) quelle a été la performance des projets en termes d'inclusion sociale.
25. **Un problème récurrent relevé dans les évaluations de projets réside dans l'absence ou l'insuffisance d'analyse de la fragilité et des contextes institutionnels lors de la conception des projets**, ce qui a conduit à des interventions et des modalités d'exécution inefficaces, ainsi qu'à des projets trop complexes au regard des capacités des institutions en place. Bien souvent, lors de la conception des projets, il était envisagé de recourir à des prestataires de services (par exemple, des organisations non gouvernementales), mais les capacités et les compétences des prestataires potentiels n'étaient pas suffisamment analysées et vérifiées à ce stade. Le soutien aux projets visant à former, redynamiser et renforcer les capacités des organisations de producteurs dans les situations de sortie de conflit était pertinent en général, mais les concepteurs des projets n'ont pas toujours identifié les problèmes et les faiblesses critiques affectant la plupart des organisations de producteurs dans un tel contexte de sortie de crise.
26. **La réussite des projets a été influencée par la précision de leur ciblage, les types d'interventions prévus et le contexte**. On a constaté que des projets conçus de manière simple, avec un ciblage clair et une série d'objectifs simples, étaient des facteurs clés pour garantir une exécution efficace dans les contextes de

fragilité. Le soutien au redressement, à la réhabilitation et à la recapitalisation des capacités productives dans les situations de sortie de conflit a généralement donné de bons résultats. Toutefois, les interventions visant à améliorer l'accès au marché et à passer à un développement à plus long terme ont été freinées par des problèmes tels que la faiblesse des capacités institutionnelles et les lacunes du cadre réglementaire.

27. **Dans les situations de fragilité et de conflit, l'investissement dans les infrastructures de base, qui permet de réduire l'isolement, d'améliorer la productivité, de réduire les coûts et d'accéder aux marchés et aux services, était une activité typiquement associée aux projets.** Il s'est avéré que, dans les régions difficiles d'accès en situation de conflit ou de sortie de conflit, le développement communautaire était plus efficace que les autres approches pour ce qui est du développement des infrastructures. Dans de telles situations, il convient également de relever un certain nombre de défis, tels que les lacunes en matière de capacité et de gouvernance en ce qui concerne la passation de marchés et la nécessité d'un soutien prolongé au niveau local.
28. **Rares sont les projets qui comportent une analyse complète des risques assortie de mesures d'atténuation intégrées liées à la fragilité.** Néanmoins, un grand nombre de projets subissent des perturbations importantes et, dans certains cas, il faut faire preuve de souplesse pour préserver leur pertinence, par exemple en réduisant la portée des projets pour certaines activités et certains domaines ou en modifiant les modalités d'exécution. Certaines évaluations ont souligné que la conception avait peut-être été trop optimiste en tablant sur une stabilité continue ou améliorée dans un contexte de sortie de conflit.
29. **La fragilité et les conflits peuvent souvent être liés à la marginalisation de certains segments de la population; certains projets ont réussi à atteindre ces segments, d'autres moins.** Le soutien à la gouvernance inclusive des ressources naturelles et à la gestion durable des ressources naturelles est un point fort du FIDA, en particulier lorsqu'il s'agit de résoudre les conflits entre différents utilisateurs (par exemple, les agriculteurs sédentaires et les pasteurs nomades) concernant l'accès aux ressources naturelles et leur utilisation. Grâce à ce soutien, des projets menés au Tchad et au Soudan ont permis d'atteindre et de faire bénéficier les communautés pastorales nomades. Un projet réalisé en Côte d'Ivoire a intégré des groupes de jeunes ex-combattants tout au long de son exécution. Bien que les résultats globaux de ce projet aient été jugés plutôt insuffisants, la contribution du projet à l'intégration sociale des groupes d'ex-combattants par le biais du développement des compétences a été considérée comme positive. Dans le même temps, si d'autres projets mentionnaient explicitement les ex-combattants et les victimes de conflits comme faisant partie du groupe cible (par exemple au Liberia et en Sierra Leone), aucune donnée n'a permis de conclure à un ciblage efficace.
30. Le FIDA se concentre sur l'inclusion sociale en général, mais le ciblage efficace des femmes et des jeunes est important dans les contextes de fragilité, car ces groupes de population sont susceptibles de figurer parmi les plus sévèrement touchés par la fragilité et les conflits. L'intégration des jeunes dans les programmes d'autonomisation sociale et économique est également essentielle pour atténuer les facteurs potentiels susceptibles de contribuer à l'émergence de nouveaux conflits. Des efforts notables visant à favoriser l'inclusion et l'autonomisation des femmes et/ou des jeunes ont été constatés (par exemple, des activités axées sur les femmes, telles que l'élevage de petits animaux, la formation de groupes de femmes et des interventions visant à permettre aux jeunes de devenir des prestataires de services et des entrepreneurs), bien que la corrélation entre ces efforts et les causes ou les conséquences de la fragilité ne soit pas toujours claire. Lorsqu'une stratégie de ciblage n'est pas élaborée et/ou ne repose pas sur une

analyse solide de la situation, les résultats sont moins satisfaisants en termes de portée et de bénéfices pour les femmes et/ou les jeunes.

31. **Au niveau des pays, les analyses des conflits et de la fragilité effectuées afin d'élaborer une approche stratégique destinée à lutter contre la fragilité et à gérer les risques dans les stratégies nationales sont souvent limitées.** Si les stratégies nationales analysent efficacement les différents aspects de la pauvreté, dans la plupart des cas, elles n'explorent pas les facteurs de fragilité. Les questions telles que la gouvernance des ressources naturelles, l'inclusion et l'autonomisation des jeunes et des femmes, ainsi que le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles sont traitées dans les stratégies et les projets nationaux, mais elles ne font pas l'objet d'une stratégie de lutte contre la fragilité.
32. **Une mobilisation continue et à long terme et l'adoption d'approches locales sont autant d'éléments essentiels d'une stratégie de lutte contre la fragilité.** Les ESPP relatives au Burundi et au Soudan ont relevé que l'investissement soutenu dans le renforcement des institutions locales, dans le cadre d'approches participatives et ascendantes, a abouti à des résultats positifs (par exemple, amélioration des moyens d'existence, sécurité alimentaire, capital social, autonomisation). Le soutien apporté par les équipes de projet actives sur le terrain a également joué un rôle prépondérant.
33. **Les ESPP n'ont relevé que peu d'exemples de partenariats stratégiques portant sur des aspects de la fragilité.** Un exemple intéressant a été observé au Niger, où le FIDA a travaillé aux côtés de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture et du Programme alimentaire mondial à l'élaboration d'un cadre opérationnel à l'intention des pays du bassin du lac Tchad, afin de répondre aux besoins humanitaires et de développement de ces derniers. L'ESPP relative à la Sierra Leone a souligné que, si le portefeuille du FIDA était très pertinent au regard de la fragilité de la situation, le Fonds n'a pas su collaborer avec d'autres partenaires de développement possédant des compétences complémentaires. Dans les situations de fragilité et de conflit, il peut être particulièrement important de travailler en étroite collaboration avec les partenaires afin de mutualiser les connaissances et de s'attaquer aux causes plus vastes de la fragilité que le FIDA ne peut résoudre seul. Les projets permettent de tirer des enseignements sur la manière de travailler dans des situations de fragilité, mais les stratégies du FIDA ne prévoient pas de ressources opérationnelles pour rassembler ces connaissances en vue de contribuer à l'orientation des questions de politique générale en dehors des projets.

F. Conclusions

34. **La majorité des notes de performance des projets obtenues au cours de la période la plus récente (projets achevés entre 2017 et 2019) continuent d'être plutôt satisfaisantes ou plus élevées pour l'ensemble des critères d'évaluation, allant de 56% en ce qui concerne l'efficacité à 87% pour l'innovation.** On observe également certains signes d'amélioration, un certain nombre de critères d'évaluation affichant de meilleures performances au cours des deux dernières périodes consécutives (c'est-à-dire 2016-2018 et 2017-2019), notamment en ce qui concerne l'adaptation aux changements climatiques, l'efficacité, la durabilité des résultats, l'innovation et la reproduction à plus grande échelle (classés par ordre de progression sur les deux périodes).
35. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne la performance du FIDA, la part des projets jugés plutôt satisfaisants ou mieux a légèrement diminué par rapport à la période précédente. Seuls deux critères, à savoir l'environnement et la gestion des ressources naturelles, d'une part, et l'adaptation aux changements climatiques, d'autre part, ont enregistré des améliorations statistiquement significatives sur le long terme (pour les projets achevés entre 2007 et 2016).
36. **Le FIDA et les pouvoirs publics doivent agir au stade de la conception et de l'exécution des projets pour en améliorer l'efficacité.** Le critère d'efficacité a toujours obtenu les plus mauvais résultats parmi l'ensemble des critères d'évaluation, même si les deux dernières périodes triennales consécutives montrent une certaine amélioration. L'amélioration de l'efficacité, afin de renforcer les performances du FIDA en matière de développement, est considérée comme une priorité au titre de FIDA12. Le présent RARI identifie les principaux facteurs contribuant à l'amélioration de l'efficacité, notamment ceux qui influent sur le rythme de l'exécution (par exemple, les processus de passation de marchés, les effectifs et les capacités du personnel) et les questions liées aux coûts. Le suivi des progrès accomplis et des problèmes d'exécution, la mise en place de mesures et d'ajustements en temps utile et les activités de suivi sont essentiels pour assurer l'efficacité des projets en cours. Il est également essentiel de procéder à une analyse plus approfondie et de tirer des enseignements de l'expérience acquise dans le cadre des projets, de prendre conscience des enjeux contextuels et d'intégrer des mesures visant à améliorer l'efficacité dans les nouveaux projets.
37. **La performance des projets dans les pays en situation de fragilité s'est améliorée.** Si l'analyse à long terme (2007-2019) montre que les performances des pays en situation de fragilité sont moins bonnes que celles des autres pays, les performances enregistrées au cours des périodes récentes montrent une amélioration au regard de plusieurs critères.
38. Le FIDA dispose d'une expérience opérationnelle précieuse en matière de travaux dans des contextes de fragilité. Les opérations soutenues par le FIDA contribuent souvent à remédier aux conséquences de la fragilité, notamment dans les contextes de sortie de crise, par exemple en soutenant la reconstitution des capacités de production. Il existe également un certain nombre de bonnes pratiques en matière de gestion des facteurs de fragilité, notamment ceux qui sont liés aux conflits relatifs aux ressources naturelles, un domaine dans lequel le FIDA excelle. L'inclusion sociale est également essentielle pour atténuer les facteurs potentiels de fragilité et/ou pour répondre aux besoins des personnes en situation de fragilité. Il existe quelques exemples intéressants d'activités visant à promouvoir l'inclusion sociale (par exemple, de jeunes ex-combattants et d'éleveurs pastoraux), mais dans certains cas, même si des groupes tels que les ex-combattants ou les mutilés de guerre étaient mentionnés comme faisant partie du groupe cible lors de la conception du projet, aucune donnée ne permettait d'attester d'un tel ciblage ni d'un suivi efficace. En outre, même lorsque les

opérations menées dans le cadre d'un projet comportaient certains éléments pertinents, ceux-ci n'étaient pas clairement étayés par une analyse solide et le développement d'une stratégie tenant compte de la fragilité.

39. **À l'avenir, et en tirant parti de son expérience, le FIDA devra se doter de stratégies solides, fondées sur une analyse spécifique des conflits et de la fragilité, afin de s'attaquer à la fois aux facteurs et aux conséquences de la fragilité.** Les opérations du FIDA dans les pays en situation de fragilité devraient se multiplier dans les années à venir. En effet, FIDA12 s'est engagé à mettre davantage l'accent sur les facteurs de fragilité. Il importera de renforcer la qualité de l'analyse de la fragilité et des risques et d'intégrer des mesures de flexibilité et d'atténuation des risques, assorties d'un suivi et de mises à jour permanentes, tant au niveau des pays que des projets. Le FIDA a tout à gagner à apprendre plus généralement des interventions réussies qui étaient fondées sur un engagement et des stratégies à long terme et adaptées au contexte, de manière renforcer les activités de prêt et autres.
40. **Comme il est encore difficile d'obtenir des résultats positifs dans les activités hors prêts, il convient de prendre des mesures stratégiques et de mobiliser des ressources.** S'il existe des exemples de réussite au niveau des projets, la gestion des connaissances au niveau des programmes de pays était incohérente et dépourvue de cadre et de stratégie d'ensemble pour exploiter l'expérience, les connaissances et les enseignements tirés dudit programme. L'expérience des projets devrait permettre d'éclairer les discussions sur les questions de politique générale, mais le FIDA doit être présent et trouver des moyens efficaces de participer aux débats sur la formulation des politiques, plutôt que de compter sur les projets et les équipes de projet comme principal vecteur de cet engagement. Il est essentiel de multiplier les partenariats en dehors des principaux ministères de tutelle et de forger des partenariats stratégiques avec d'autres organismes de développement et parties prenantes, car ces mesures sont également liées à la gestion des connaissances et à la mobilisation en faveur de la mise en place de politiques. Dans le contexte de FIDA12, on s'attend à ce que le FIDA intensifie la mobilisation des ressources financières pour améliorer ses performances dans les activités hors prêts, mais il faut également répondre au besoin en ressources humaines dotées des compétences adéquates.
41. **La mobilisation d'IOE et de la direction est nécessaire pour forger une compréhension commune à l'appui de l'évaluation de certains critères d'évaluation pour lesquels des écarts plus importants ou croissants ont été constatés entre les notes d'IOE et celles des rapports d'achèvement de projets.** L'un des critères concernés par de tels écarts est la pertinence. Bien que l'écart moyen se réduise, ce critère enregistre toujours le deuxième écart moyen le plus important concernant les projets achevés au cours de la période 2017-2019. Les autres critères nécessitant une attention particulière sont l'égalité femmes-hommes et l'autonomisation des femmes, qui ont affiché le plus grand écart moyen dans les projets achevés en 2017-2019, et la reproduction à plus grande échelle, qui a enregistré le troisième écart moyen le plus important. Ces questions doivent être prises en compte dans la révision en cours du Manuel de l'évaluation et, à l'avenir, il faudra que la direction examine de plus près les notes attribuées par les rapports d'achèvement de projets dans ces domaines.

2021 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (Main report)

Table of Contents

I.	Background	3
	A. Introduction.....	3
	B. Scope and sources of data	3
	C. Methodology and approach	4
	D. Methodological notes and caveats.....	5
II.	Project portfolio performance	5
	A. Recent performance (projects completed during 2017-2019)	5
	B. Longer-term project performance trends	6
	C. Comparison of IOE and PCR ratings, PCR quality assessment	16
III.	Performance of non-lending activities.....	18
	A. Analysis of performance ratings on non-lending activities	18
	B. Qualitative analysis summary from latest CSPEs	19
IV.	Factors influencing project efficiency.....	23
V.	Review of operations in countries with fragile situations.....	28
	A. Background and context.....	28
	B. Performance ratings – projects in countries with fragile situations	29
	C. Findings from project-level evaluations	30
	D. Findings and lessons from CSPEs on fragility.....	35
VI.	Conclusions	37

Annexes

I.	Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE	40
II.	Evaluations completed by IOE in 2020	41
III.	List of country strategy and programme evaluations completed and published by IOE (1992-2020)	46
IV.	List of all projects covered in quantitative analysis on performance ratings	48
V.	Methodology and analysis for Chapter III (factors influencing project performance on efficiency)	57
VI.	Non-parametric data analysis of IOE ratings	62
VII.	Analysis of project performance ratings in countries with fragile situations	71
VIII.	Performance by region and comparison of IOE PPE/PCR ratings	81
IX.	Comparison of IFAD-funded project performance with operations supported by other international financial institutions	84

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABC	Agri-Business Capital Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
AKADP	Ardahan-Kars-Artvin Development Project (Turkey)
APR	Asia and the Pacific Division (IFAD)
ARRI	Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations
ASRP	Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation Project (Liberia)
BIRDp	Butana Integrated Rural Development Project (Sudan)
CLE	Corporate-level evaluation
COSOP	Country strategic opportunities programme
CSPE	Country strategy and programme evaluation
ENRM	Environment and natural resources management
ESA	East and Southern Africa Division (IFAD)
GEWE	Gender equality and women's empowerment
ICO	IFAD Country Office
IE	Impact evaluation
IFI	International financial institution
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
KM	Knowledge management
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean Division (IFAD)
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NEN	Near East, North Africa and Europe Division (IFAD)
PADAT	Support to Agricultural Development Project (Togo)
PAPAM	Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project (Mali)
PCR	Project completion report
PCRv	Project completion report validation
PMD	Programme Management Department (IFAD)
PMU	Project management unit
PPE	Project performance evaluation
PRAREP	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project (Cote d'Ivoire)
PREVES	Project to Revitalize Crop and Livestock Production in the Savannah (Central Africa Republic)
PROHYPA	Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas (Chad)
PROPACOM	Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (Cote d'Ivoire)
RCPRP	Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction Project (Sierra Leone)
RFP	Rural Finance Project (The Gambia)
STCRSP	Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Support Project (Liberia)
WCA	West and Central Africa Division (IFAD)
WSRMP	Western Sudan Resources Management Programme (Sudan)

2021 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (Main report)

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. This is the 19th edition of the Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI) prepared by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE). The ARRI presents a synthesis of the performance of IFAD-supported operations based on evaluations conducted by IOE since 2007 with a focus on the most recent ones, and highlights cross-cutting issues and lessons to enhance IFAD's development effectiveness. In presenting an overview of results and impact of IFAD's operation as well as recent trends, the ARRI is key in ensuring accountability for results. In addition, the ARRI also seeks to promote self-reflection and learning within IFAD by offering an analysis of evaluative evidence. ARRI is the only vehicle that provides an aggregated report on the overall performance of IFAD operations based on independent evaluations, and as such is critical to the Fund and for its evaluation function.
2. This report contains a standard section presenting an analysis of performance ratings in project evaluations and another section on findings from the country strategy and programme evaluations (CSPEs). In addition, the report presents learning-oriented discussions informed by independent evaluations, with a focus on selected themes/ topics. In this edition of ARRI, two themes are featured. One is project performance in the evaluation criterion of efficiency. As evidenced from chart 1 in chapter II, latest project performance on the efficiency criterion showed the lowest share of projects with moderately satisfactory or better rating, although improving (see chart 6, chapter II). The other theme is performance in countries with fragile situations. This choice reflects the interest of the IFAD Executive Board, by IFAD Management as well as the focus given in IFAD12.⁴

B. Scope and sources of data

3. The main sources of data for ARRI's analysis are: (i) project-level evaluations (project performance evaluations, PPEs; impact evaluations, IEs; and project completion report validations, PCRVs) conducted by IOE for the projects completed between 2007 and 2019; and (ii) CSPEs conducted between 2007 and 2020. The project-level ratings by evaluation criteria for aggregation are drawn from PPEs, IEs and PCRVs. The performance ratings for non-lending activities are obtained from CSPEs. Table 1 below presents the main data sources for the quantitative and qualitative analyses in different chapters of this report.

Table 1
Summary of data sources of 2021 ARRI

Chapter	Types of analysis	Total number of evaluations
Chapter II portfolio performance	Recent performance (performance ratings of projects completed between 2017 and 2019)	68 project-level evaluations (55 PCRVs, 11 PPEs, 2 IEs)
Chapter II portfolio performance	Long-term performance trends (performance ratings of projects completed between 2007 and 2019)	298 project-level evaluations (209 PCRVs, 82 PPEs, 7 IEs)
Chapter III non-lending activities	Ratings analysis based on CSPEs completed between 2007 and 2020	58 CSPEs
Chapter III non-lending activities	Summary of most recent CSPEs	4 CSPEs (Morocco, Niger, Sudan and Uganda)

⁴ IFAD12 agenda, which includes a commitment to improve IFAD's focus on addressing the drivers of fragility and dedicating at least 25 per cent of core resources to fragile situations.

Chapter IV efficiency	Qualitative analysis of factors positively or negatively affecting the efficiency assessment (two periods 2013-2015 and 2017-2019 were selected as they showed contrasting movements, deteriorating in 2013-2015 and improving 2017-2019)	46 project-level evaluations: projects completed between 2013-2015 with the efficiency criterion rated moderately unsatisfactory or worse 37 project-level evaluations: projects completed between 2017-2019 with the efficiency criterion rated moderately satisfactory or better
Chapter V fragility	Quantitative analysis (project performance rating)	102 projects classified as being in countries with fragile situations, 196 projects in others
Chapter V fragility	Qualitative analysis	23 purposefully selected project evaluations (among those conducted in 2018-2020) and five CSPEs

Source: IOE database.

C. Methodology and approach

- The performance reported in ARRI is based on the evaluations of projects and programmes conducted by IOE. Quantitative analyses are based on: (i) project performance ratings along all evaluation criteria listed in the IOE Evaluation Manual (second edition, 2015; see also table 2 below) (chapters II and V); (ii) disconnect between performance ratings in the self-evaluations in project completion reports (PCRs) and in the independent evaluation ratings by IOE (chapter II); (iii) IOE assessment of PCR quality (chapter II); and (iv) performance ratings of non-lending activities assessed in the CSPEs (chapter III).
- Table 2 below presents the evaluation criteria and the two aggregate measures (i.e. project performance and overall project achievement) used for project performance assessment. The core criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact) are consistent with international standards and practices.⁵ In line with the Good Practice Standard of the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks for Public Sector Evaluations, IFAD uses a six-point ratings scale to assess performance in each evaluation criterion.

Table 2

Evaluation criteria used in assessment of project performance

Evaluation criteria
Relevance
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Sustainability of benefits
Project performance* (arithmetic average of the ratings in the above four criteria)
Rural poverty impact
Innovation
Scaling-up
Gender equality and women's empowerment
Environment and natural resource management
Adaptation to climate change
Overall project performance taking into consideration the performance in all criteria above
Performance of IFAD
Performance of Government

Note: All criteria rated on a scale of 1-6 (see table 3) except for project performance*.

Source: IOE Evaluation Manual.

- As in the past ARRIs, the analysis of project performance ratings is presented by year of project completion. To observe the changes in performance ratings, a three-year moving average of ratings is used as a way to smoothen inter-annual variations. This approach is line with the practice in comparator organizations such

⁵ Notably, the definition on the evaluation criteria set out by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

as the Asian Development Bank and the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank. Accordingly, the performance during the latest period is based on the performance ratings for the projects completed between 2017 and 2019.

7. A mix of descriptive and inferential statistics were used where relevant. A number of non-parametric tests were conducted to analyse some aspects such as the rating disconnects between self-evaluation and independent evaluations, and the PCR quality assessment (see chapter II and annex VI).
8. As for the qualitative analysis in chapter IV (project performance on efficiency), a set of features or common recurring factors ("markers") were identified based on a review of the sampled evaluations, then relevant findings in those evaluations (positively or negatively influencing the efficiency) were extracted and put together (see also annex V). For the qualitative analysis of the project performance in countries with fragile situations, a set of guiding questions were used (see chapter V).

D. Methodological notes and caveats

9. There were some changes in the evaluation criteria and definitions during the period covered. Based on the revision of the IOE evaluation manual (2015),⁶ since 2016: (i) the rating on sustainability of benefits is included in the calculation of project performance⁷; (ii) environment and natural resources management (ENRM) and climate change adaptation are rated separately; and (iii) rural poverty impact domains such as household income and assets, human and social empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, institutions and policy are no longer rated separately. Furthermore, as per the revised harmonization agreement between IFAD Management and IOE, scaling up and innovation have been rated separately since 2017. These changes should be taken into consideration in relation to the long-term trend analysis. Another point to be noted for the long-term trend analysis is that prior to 2015, the coverage of completed projects by PPEs/PCRVs by IOE was not 100 per cent.
10. The ARRI does not cover ongoing operations: presenting a comprehensive picture of the underlying causes of these trends/current performance is beyond its scope and is addressed by higher level evaluations dedicated to that task. However, by using recurring evaluation findings, the ARRI presents a set of issues that could plausibly contribute to the observed trends/recent performance.
11. For the analysis of project performance in countries with fragile situations, it was challenging to understand the influence of the conditions of fragility on project performance or to understand the specific fragility contexts in which projects were designed and implemented.

II. Project portfolio performance

A. Recent performance (projects completed during 2017-2019)

12. Chart 1 provides a snapshot of the performance by evaluation criteria based on the IOE ratings for projects completed between 2017 and 2019. For all criteria, the majority of projects are rated moderately satisfactory or above. When the evaluation criteria are ranked based on the percentage of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better (ratings of 4 and above), innovation (87 per cent), ENRM (86 per cent), relevance (85 per cent), adaptation to climate change (83 per cent) and IFAD performance (81 per cent) reported better performance.
13. On the other end of the spectrum of recent performance are efficiency, sustainability of benefits and government performance with a lower proportion of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or

⁶ <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/ioe/-/2015-evaluation-manual-second-edition>. The first edition was issued in 2009.


⁷ Prior to this, the project performance was an arithmetic average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

better (between 56 and 66 per cent). For instance, over four out of ten projects were found to be moderately unsatisfactory or worse in terms of their efficiency.

Chart 1

Ranking of all criteria by share of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings

Percentage of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings, 2017-2019 (by year of project completion)



Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.


B. Longer-term project performance trends

14. Chart 2 provides a snapshot of the historical three-year rating average for the projects completed between 2007 and 2019 for the selected criteria: overall project achievement; IFAD performance as a partner; and government performance as a partner. Overall project achievement is an overarching assessment of a project on a scale of 1-6, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for all criteria except for IFAD and government performance (see annex I for the list of criteria).
15. The result shows a fluctuation in the government performance with some signs of improvement during the latest period, breaking the declining trend since the 2012-2014 period. On the other hand, IFAD performance has been declining from the peak when 90 per cent of the projects completed between 2014 and 2016 were rated moderately satisfactory or better. There is little movement in overall project achievement over the period.

Chart 2

Combined overview of the performance criteria using IOE ratings

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, 2007-2019 (by year of project completion)




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), March 2021.

16. When comparing these IOE rating trends with the PCR ratings (by Government and IFAD) for the same criteria, government performance shows a similar trend but not the slight increase during the recent last period. While the trends are nearly similar, for all these three criteria, the PCRs show a higher share of moderately satisfactory or better ratings than IOE.

Chart 3

Combined overview of the performance criteria using PCR ratings

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, 2007-2019 (by year of project completion)



Source: PCRs.

17. Table 3 presents project performance on selected criteria by regions over ten years, for the projects completed between 2010 and 2019. It is important to underline that this should not be considered as an assessment of the performance of individual IFAD regional divisions *per se*, as project performance is affected by a host of factors, including the context in which projects operate.
18. In the projects completed between 2010 and 2019, the Asia and the Pacific region (APR) had higher proportion of projects than other regions rated moderately satisfactory or better for three of the four criteria (rural poverty impact, overall

project achievement and government performance). Government performance varies across regions; those in APR are rated considerably higher than in other regions, with 41 per cent of the projects rated satisfactory or better. For IFAD's performance, the Latin America and the Caribbean region (LAC) shows relatively higher proportion of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, followed by APR and the Near East, North Africa and Europe region (NEN). The performance of IFAD operations in the West and Central Africa (WCA) region is weaker than other regions for the four criteria.

Table 3

Project performance by regions


Ratings on selected criteria by IFAD regional divisions, 2010-2019 (by year of project completion) – percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory and better (MS+) and projects rated satisfactory or better (S+)

	Asia and the Pacific N= 67 projects	Latin America and the Caribbean N= 39 projects	East and Southern Africa N= 51 projects	Near East, North African and Europe N= 50 projects	West and Central Africa N=65 projects
Rural poverty impact					
% of projects rated MS+	92	76	84	88	71
% of projects rated S+	35	24	27	28	21
Overall project achievement					
% of projects rated MS+	88	73	76	84	62
% of projects rated S+	45	24	16	20	14
IFAD performance					
% of projects rated MS+	90	92	82	90	74
% of projects rated S+	36	46	37	36	25
Government performance					
% of projects rated MS+	85	72	57	72	45
% of projects rated S+	41	23	16	18	11

Source: IOE evaluation database (PPEs/PCRVs).

19. The following section presents a breakdown of the ratings by criterion for their long-term performance (2007-2019).
20. **Relevance.** This criterion continues to have a relatively high percentage of projects (**85 per cent** of the projects completed between 2017 and 2019) rated as moderately satisfactory or better. The overall percentage of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better is almost constant since the 2015-2017 period, but chart below shows a slight increase in "satisfactory (5)" and "highly satisfactory (6)" ratings.


Chart 4

Relevance (2007-2019, by year of project completion)*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*

Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

21. **Effectiveness.** Overall, the percentage of the projects with moderately satisfactory or above ratings in effectiveness has been largely constant with a slight increase in a long-term, with least fluctuations among all criteria. In the latest 2017-2019 period, **78 per cent** of the projects were rated moderately satisfactory or better.

Chart 5

Effectiveness (2007-2019, by year of project completion)*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*


Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

22. **Efficiency.** The criterion of efficiency has shown an uptick in the two last consecutive periods, 2016-2018 and 2017-2019. **Fifty-six (56) per cent** of the projects completed between 2017 and 2019 were rated moderately satisfactory or better. This is the criterion with the lowest share of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings among all the criteria, and the current share is still below the high of 63 per cent reached in 2011-2013. The performance in this criterion also shows considerable fluctuations.

Chart 6

Efficiency (2007-2019, by year of project completion)

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

23. **Sustainability of benefits.** Analogous to the efficiency criterion, sustainability of benefits now shows some upward movements in the last two consecutive three-year periods. The most recent share of **66 per cent** is higher than any previous three-year period.

Chart 7

Sustainability of benefits (2007-2019, by year of project completion)

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period



Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

24. **Project performance.** This aggregate criterion is an arithmetic average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of benefits.⁸ The slight decline that started in 2012-2014 was partially arrested in the most recent period with a marginal increase for this aggregate criterion, most likely reflecting the positive changes in sustainability of benefits and efficiency (see charts 6 and 7). The PCR ratings (self-evaluation ratings) show higher project performance ratings compared to IOE, but the trend changes for the two sets of ratings are similar.

⁸ This is the practice since 2015. Before, it was the arithmetic average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, without sustainability of benefits.


Chart 8
Project performance (2007-2019, by year of project completion)
Average PCR and IOE ratings for project performance by three-year moving period



Source: IOE/PCR ratings, March 2021.

25. **Rural poverty impact.** The rural poverty impact criterion is a composite of the analysis in the following four domains: household income and assets, human and social capital and empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, and institutions and policies. Analysis shows that **77 per cent** of the projects completed between 2017 and 2019 were rated moderately satisfactory or above for rural poverty impact. The chart below shows a marginal plateauing of the ratings in the most recent period, after an observable decline since 2012.

Chart 9
Rural poverty impact (2007-2019, by year of project completion)
Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/PPE), February 2021.

26. **Innovation.** Evaluations conducted from 2017 onward have rated innovation and scaling up separately, following the harmonization agreement between IOE and IFAD management. The separate ratings begin to appear in the trend line from 2011-2013 based on the completion year of the projects. Following a decline since 2013-2015, the percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better rose to **87 per cent** in 2017-2019, a 6 percentage-point increase compared to the period 2016-2018.

Chart 10

Innovation (2007-2019, by year of project completion)

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

27. **Scaling up.** Based on ratings of moderately satisfactory or better,⁹ performance in scaling up has steadily declined from the peak of 84 per cent in 2012-2014 to the lowest performance in 2015-2017 (66 per cent). The performance on this criterion had experienced some positive change in the most recent period.

Chart 11

Scaling up (2007-2019, by year of project completion)

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period



Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

28. **Gender equality and women's empowerment.** Although this criterion has been historically among the better performing criteria, it was showing some downward movements from the cohort of projects completed in 2014-2016, 2015-2017 and 2016-2018. However, the proportion of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better in this area increased slightly to reach **76 per cent** in 2017-2019. At the same time, the share of project rated satisfactory or highly satisfactory slightly decreased (from 28 to 26 per cent). The overall decline since the 2014-2016 cohort, despite the slight increase in the latest period, may be, at least in part, explained by the introduction by IFAD of more detailed guidance both for project design and performance assessment, such as the 2012 policy on gender equality and women's empowerment, and its reflection in the portfolio review. Majority of the projects completed between 2014 and 2019 covered in this year's ARRI's


⁹ Innovation and scaling-up were grouped and rated as one criterion prior to 2017. In order to generate individual time-series data for the two criteria prior to 2017, ratings given to the group were assumed to be the same for individual criteria.

analysis (96 per cent) was approved before 2012. It is recognized that the yardstick used for assessment on any criteria is not static and is also influenced by the evolution of the understanding of the subject, conceptual and analytical frameworks.

Chart 12

Gender equality and women's empowerment (2007-2019, by year of project completion)

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

29. **Environment and natural resources management.** ENRM and adaptation to climate change have been rated separately since 2016. In 2017-2019, the percentage of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better for ENRM was the highest since 2007 (**86 per cent**), with a continued upward change since 2011-2013.

Chart 13

Environment and natural resource management (2007-2019, by year of project completion)

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

30. **Adaptation to climate change.** The performance of this criterion in the latest period was the highest by far since the 2007-2009 period, **83 per cent** of projects report moderately satisfactory or better ratings, after performance had dropped in the period 2015-2017. An increase in both moderately satisfactory and satisfactory ratings contributed to this increase.

Chart 14

Adaptation to climate change (2007-2019, by year of project completion)

Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

31. **Overall project achievement.** The rating for this criterion, on a scale of 1-6, is based on the performance of all criteria discussed thus far. Seventy-six (**76**) per cent of the projects completed in 2017-2019 were rated moderately satisfactory or better. This indicates a slight upward change, but overall, chart below shows that the performance in this aggregate criterion shows minimal changes over the period.

Chart 15

Overall project achievement (2007-2019, by year of project completion)


Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period



Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/V/PPE), February 2021.

32. **IFAD's performance.** IFAD's performance as a partner was evaluated by IOE as moderately satisfactory or better in **81 per cent** of projects completed in 2017-2019, decreasing since a peak of 90 per cent in the period 2014-2016.


Chart 16

IFAD performance as a partner (2007-2019, by year of project completion)*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*

Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/PPE), February 2021.

33. **Government performance.** The share of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better for government's performance has risen to 63 per cent after a steady decline since 2012-2014 till 2016-2018.

Chart 17

Government performance as a partner (2007-2019, by year of project completion)*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*

Source: IOE evaluation database (PCR/PPE), February 2021.

34. **Overall, the project performance ratings on all criteria continue to be predominantly in the moderately satisfactory and above zone, ranging from the lowest 56 per cent for efficiency to the highest 87 per cent for innovation.** Five criteria show an apparent continued improvement in the consecutive periods (2016-2018 and 2017-2019): efficiency, sustainability, innovation, scaling up and adaptation to climate change. The two criteria of ENRM and government's performance saw a clear uptick (i.e. an increase of 6 and 5 percentage points in the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, respectively) in the most recent period as compared to the results shown in the previous edition of ARRI. Four other criteria, namely relevance, effectiveness, gender equality and women's empowerment, and overall project achievement showed slight increase (i.e. 2-3 percentage points). IFAD's performance was marginally lower in the most recent period and rural poverty impact saw no change in comparison to the last period.
35. **The most recent performance (projects completed in 2017-2019) show statistically significant changes from long-term data (2007-2016) only for ENRM and adaptation to climate change,** with a low level of confidence (at the

10 per cent level).¹⁰ The share of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings for ENRM increased by ten percentage points for the recent period compared to the long term trend, while adaptation to climate change increased by nine percentage points. No other performance criteria exhibits statistically significant changes. Thus, the positive (and negative) changes in most performance criteria witnessed in the most recent period are recognised as non-statistically significant variation. This shows the importance of having multi-year data on performance to understand and assess the recent performance.

C. Comparison of IOE and PCR ratings, PCR quality assessment

36. This section assesses the disconnect between the performance ratings in the self-evaluations (PCRs) and PCRVs/PPEs by IOE in order to better understand where differences lie in reporting on performance. The disconnect could be negative or positive: negative disconnect signifies that the PCR ratings (in self-evaluations) is higher than the IOE ratings, while a positive disconnect means the opposite (i.e. IOE ratings are higher than the PCR).
37. **Overall disconnects between IOE and PCR ratings.** The average disconnect in individual projects completed between 2007 and 2019 (i.e. average of disconnect values by evaluation criteria) varies from -1.45 to 0.92. The mean is -0.28 and the median is -0.25. Eighty-three (83) per cent of the projects have negative average disconnect (i.e. the average of PCR ratings by criteria is higher than the average of PCR/PPE ratings), 8 per cent have average disconnect of zero, and 9 per cent have a positive average disconnect (i.e. the average of IOE's PCR/PPE ratings by evaluation criteria is higher than that of the PCRs). However, the percentage of projects with negative average disconnect has declined in the current period compared to the previous period, from 89 per cent in 2014-2016 to 79 per cent in 2017-2019. In terms of net disconnect in individual projects (i.e. taking into consideration the disconnects for all criteria), it is also noted that the greatest disconnects are more likely to be found for the projects evaluated in PPEs or IEs.
38. **Disconnects by evaluation criteria.** Average disconnects over different periods for individual evaluation criteria are shown in table 4. The largest disconnect in the long-term (2007-2019) is for relevance, with the value of -0.53, while the smallest disconnect is for adaptation to climate change (-0.14). The data by region on the average of average disconnect by evaluation criteria are presented in annex VIII.

Table 4

Average disconnect between PCR and IOE ratings for each evaluation criterion


<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Average disconnect Completed 2007-2019</i>	<i>Average disconnect Completed 2014-2016</i>	<i>Average disconnect Completed 2017-2019</i>
Relevance	-0.53	-0.64	-0.35
Effectiveness	-0.25	-0.20	-0.25
Efficiency	-0.31	-0.34	-0.27
Sustainability of benefits	-0.28	-0.33	-0.17
Rural poverty impact	-0.20	-0.18	-0.22
Innovation	-0.16	-0.15	-0.08
Scaling-up	-0.39	-0.54	-0.33
Gender equality and women's empowerment	-0.30	-0.33	-0.41
Environment and natural resource management	-0.16	-0.10	-0.05
Adaptation to climate change	-0.14	-0.16	-0.05
Overall project performance	-0.31	-0.36	-0.27
Performance of IFAD	-0.30	-0.29	-0.21
Performance of Government	-0.32	-0.40	-0.27

Source: IOE calculations based on PCR and PPE/PCR data.

¹⁰ When looking at the criteria scores as binary variables i.e. satisfactory or not.

39. Data on individual project ratings indicates that a disconnect of larger than two points in the ratings between IOE and PCRs is found most frequently in the criteria of relevance and scaling-up (6 per cent of the projects for each over the period 2007-2019), followed by gender equality and women's empowerment (3.7 per cent). These are also the criteria with the highest share of the PCR rating of "highly satisfactory (6)" (13 per cent for relevance, 7 per cent for (potential for) scaling-up, 6 per cent for gender equality and women's empowerment). For scaling-up, another reason for frequent and/or large disconnects was the difference or ambiguity in the definition of the criterion, which was labelled as "*potential for scaling-up*" in the previous PCR guidelines. In some cases, a follow-on project financed by IFAD is considered as an evidence of scaling-up in the PCRs and this was questioned by the independent evaluations.
40. When comparing the latest period (2017-2019) with the previous three-year period (2014-2016) and the longer-term period (2007-2019), disconnects between PCR and IOE ratings decreased for most of the criteria (see more details in annex VI). Adaptation to climate change and ENRM have the lowest disconnect. On the other hand, gender equality and women's empowerment is the only criterion with a greater gap between IOE and PCR ratings in the latest time period.
41. **PCR quality.** IOE evaluations (PCRVs and PPEs) rate the quality of PCRs in four aspects, i.e. scope, quality (e.g. methods, data), lessons and candour. Chart 18 shows the average ratings in the recent three-year period and over a longer term (2007-2016). Analysis shows that PCRs are scoring better on scope and candour in the most recent time period (projects completed in 2017-2019), compared to the longer-term period (projects completed in 2007-2016) and that the improvement in the ratings on PCR scope ($p < 0.01$) and PCR candour ($p < 0.05$) is statistically significant (more details in annex VI, section E). For the other two aspects, i.e. quality and lessons, ratings are higher in the recent period but this difference may not be statistically significant.

Chart 18

Percentage of IOE ratings for PCR documents (projects completed between 2007 and 2019)

Key points

- Overall, the project ratings on all criteria continue to be predominantly in the range of moderately satisfactory and above. Share of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings is the lowest at 56 per cent for efficiency and the highest at 87 per cent for innovation.
- Slight improvements from previous periods are observed in terms of the share of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings for a number of criteria.
- The most recent performance (projects completed in 2017-2019) show statistically significant changes from long-term trend (2007-2016) only for ENRM and adaptation to climate change (improvement), albeit with a low level of confidence.
- Disconnects between the PCR ratings and IOE ratings appear to have narrowed. However, the disconnect for the criterion on gender equality and women's empowerment is the exception, where the gap has widened.
- IOE evaluations show that the quality PCRs has improved overall, and show statistically significant improvements on the scope and candour in the most recent time period (projects completed in 2017-2019).


III. Performance of non-lending activities**A. Analysis of performance ratings on non-lending activities**

42. Chart 19 shows the share of CSPEs with ratings of moderately satisfactory or better for three areas of non-lending activities (i.e. knowledge management (KM), country-level policy engagement and partnership building) as well as for overall non-lending activities, since 2006-2008 (based on the year of evaluation). The total percentage of country programmes considered moderately satisfactory or better for overall non-lending activities in the most recent period (2018-2020) is 50 percent. This represents a 7.1 percentage-points gain after a declining pattern until 2017-2019.

Chart 19

Performance of non-lending activities

Percentage of evaluations rated moderately satisfactory or better in 2006-2020 (year of evaluation)



Source: IOE CSPE database as of December 2020 (58 evaluations between 2006 and 2020).

43. The CSPEs with KM rated moderately satisfactory or better increased from 50 per cent in 2017-2019 to 58 per cent, and the same for country-level policy engagement (increase from 50 per cent in 2017-2019 to 58 per cent in 2018-2020). Partnership building reached 67 per cent in 2018-2020 to register the best performance amongst the three areas of non-lending activities.

B. Qualitative analysis summary from latest CSPEs

44. In the following section, a synthesis of IFAD's performance in the three areas of non-lending activities is presented based on the CSPEs completed in 2020 whose ratings were reflected in the analysis in the previous sub-section (Morocco, Niger, Sudan and Uganda)¹¹.

Knowledge management

45. **In general, KM strategies and activities were seen more at project level rather than at the level of country programme, with one exception (Sudan).** In Sudan, concerted KM efforts were made at the country programme level, including: the development of a KM strategy 2017-2019, the establishment of a KM core group with IFAD, project teams and counterpart government agencies, the preparation and implementation of KM-oriented activities.¹² Good practices around natural resource management and women's empowerment in Sudan were also shared with peers in Kenya (representatives from one county government situated in similar semi-arid environment with livestock-dependent communities) through a learning route. This is seen as an example of South-South cooperation.
46. In Niger, although the 2012 country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) planned to establish knowledge management and communication, no KM strategy was developed. Collaboration between the project management unit and the network of the Chambers of Agriculture led to the preparation of technical notes that are useful but narrow in scope and cannot be used to generalize beyond individual projects. In Morocco, although the COSOP proposed some actions related to KM including an improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to document KM activities and the conduct of studies, there was no explicit and coherent strategy and approach as such.
47. There were also good examples of KM-related activities at project level. In Uganda, the KM consultant based at the IFAD country office (ICO) promoted KM in all projects, while the continuity over various project cycles also contributed to the transferring of lessons learnt. In Morocco, for instance, the Rural Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Errachidia Province developed a functional literacy manual focusing on agricultural activities which was disseminated locally as a knowledge building activity.
48. Some CSPEs found improvements in KM activities in more recent projects compared to older ones. In Niger, the performance of KM in older projects was weak, but a more recent project has done better, for example, with production of thematic studies, student dissertations or knowledge capitalization sheets. In Morocco, first generation projects (designed before 2008) generally experienced unsatisfactory M&E systems for bringing out lessons learned but this aspect improved in the second-generation projects. Since 2017, an information system has been developed that integrates and aggregates M&E data to facilitate the aggregation and sharing of lessons for the overall sub-sector of smallholder farming.
49. **Innovations in the Uganda country programmes have been adopted more broadly in IFAD.** A prominent example is the Uganda Yield Fund with supplementary grant financing from the European Union providing the model for the Agri-Business Capital (ABC) Fund, a private investment impact fund originally sponsored by IFAD in 2019 (see box 1).

¹¹ The Sudan CSPE was conducted in 2019 and completed in 2020. The other three CSPEs were conducted in 2020 and the final ratings were available at the time of the analysis for this ARRI (early 2021). Two other CSPEs conducted in 2020 (Burundi and Pakistan) are not included in this section, since the ratings were finalized in the second quarter of 2021.

¹² Including the organization of an internal learning route around the theme of natural resource management and agricultural productivity.

Box 1

The Uganda Yield Fund

The Uganda Yield Fund provides substantial knowledge and lessons learned related to rural pro-poor private sector and financial sector development. The Fund's ability to attract US\$20.4 million is 'proof of concept' for a single country, single-sector impact investment fund, given an appropriate structure. The Uganda CSPE interviews noted that the Yield Fund experience encouraged the formation of IFAD's ABC Fund and provided knowledge more generally to growing interest in IFAD of supporting non-programme financial investments, facilitated by the involvement of the previous country programme manager for Uganda who designed the Yield Fund in the design and development of the ABC Fund. The ABC Fund provides loans and equity investment adapted to the needs of rural SMEs, farmers' organizations, agripreneurs and rural financial institutions. So far, the ABC Fund has invested over Euro 3.5 billion in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda.

Source: Uganda CSPE; <http://agri-business-capital.com/ourinvestments.html>

50. **KM activities backed by well-qualified and dedicated human resources produced good results and when the right capacities were no longer available, KM performance stalled.** In Uganda, the ICO-based KM consultant pursued an approach of drawing evidence from the projects, organizing knowledge exchange among project stakeholders, and presenting the knowledge to policy makers. The KM and communications activities proved effective for instance in addressing negative media relating to environmental issues associated with oil palm production. However, after the consultant's departure in 2015, resources for KM and communications declined swiftly and consistently until 2020. The regional KM architecture also fluctuated in this period with the abolishment of the regional KM officer position in the East and Southern Africa (ESA) division at headquarters in 2013.
51. Similarly in Sudan, the country programme made good progress with the KM agenda especially with the presence of an IFAD staff member in the country office responsible for KM between 2015 and 2017, but after the departure of this staff member, systematic and coordinated KM undertakings were reduced and meetings of the KM project group became less regular.
- Partnership-building**
52. **IFAD's partnerships with main line ministries of government were generally good and effective, but there were also missed opportunities to collaborate with government agencies besides the ones in charge of project management.** In Morocco, IFAD formed strategic partnership with the Government at the central level and operational partnership with the decentralized structures. The regional development offices were actively involved in coordinating regional efforts regarding the projects. In Niger, IFAD's partnerships with different relevant ministries led to active collaboration in supervision and implementation of projects. For instance, the General Directorates of Rural Engineering and of Rural Roads and with the Office of Environmental Assessment provided technical supervision of infrastructure works and the implementation of environmental and social management plans. On the other hand, IFAD in Niger did not develop strong links with other key ministries related to women, youth and private sector. Similarly, in Sudan, there were missed opportunities to enter into more structured and strategic relationships or support capacity building for planning or other technical departments, for example, the Gender Mainstreaming Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture.
53. **Performance on partnerships with international development agencies was mixed, in terms of complementarity of funding or synergy in actions.** In Uganda, IFAD primarily engages with international donors through sector working groups such as for agriculture, but UN and bilateral partners interviewed by the CSPE had limited knowledge of IFAD's work and approaches, also due to the limited staffing in the country office. In Morocco, IFAD had consultations with

development partners, but the exchanges were not followed up with collaborations on projects, studies or joint operations. Further, although various agreements and road maps exist among Rome-based agencies, no joint action was carried out. In Sudan, there were some cases of cofinancing or additional financing mobilized (e.g. World Bank, the Global Environment Facility, European Union), but IFAD could have coordinated better with partners on strategic and policy issues and knowledge management, e.g. the United Nations Environment Programme on the issues around natural resource governance. Results are positive in the case of Niger where IFAD had cofinancing with the African Development Bank, the Italian Cooperation and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation on various projects. Further, IFAD, Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme worked together to implement an initiative aimed at resilience by strengthening food and nutrition security in targeted communities thus bringing together efforts of humanitarian and development partners.

54. **Engagement with the private sector is gaining ground, spanning a wide diversity of private actors.** In Niger, partnership with the Regional Chambers of Agriculture has helped promote the emergence of private entrepreneurship and viable management structures in various forms of community organizations, such as Economic Interest Groups that manage agricultural commodity markets. In Sudan, partnerships with the private sector have been pursued with encouraging results and further potential. Collaboration was initiated with a range of private sector companies, such as seed companies, input suppliers, agro-dealers, spraying service providers, and mechanized service providers. In some cases, such as in Uganda, grants were used to foster public private partnerships. In the oilseeds subsector, the country programme developed a strategic partnership with the Netherlands Development Organization through grants. The organization proved a productive and cooperative partner in collaborating with both the public sector and private sector.

Box 2

Using grants to foster strategic partnerships

In the oilseeds subsector and concerning value chain development, the Uganda country programme developed a strategic partnership with SNV (Netherlands Development Organization) through the grants on Uganda Oilseeds Sub-sector Platform and public-private-producer partnerships (so called 4Ps). SNV proved a productive and cooperative partner with relevant experience in the oilseeds sub-sector, inclusive agriculture value chain development, developing market-based solutions and collaborating in the framework of public-private-producer partnerships both with the public sector - to address systemic market constraints and inequities - as well as with the private sector - to successfully build sustainable smallholder supply chains. The grant work also benefitted from SNV's sharing and cross-fertilization of experiences between local and national stakeholders across the region.

Source: Uganda CSPE.

Country-level policy engagement

55. **Projects were the main vehicle for engaging in policy issues, but the projects cannot replace IFAD's potential direct role in policy engagement.** IFAD has made use of projects for advocacy, translating its indirect engagement in some instances into dialogue on rural development policies. However, policy dialogue requires engagement at a higher level than project implementation. Furthermore, it is key to work with other partners, complemented by good KM and sufficient systematization of project experiences. The Sudan CSPE found that partnerships on KM with development partners for advocacy were limited. Similarly, the Uganda and Morocco CSPEs pointed out the limited use of KM to influence and engage stakeholders beyond IFAD-financed projects, due to a lack of adequate financial and human resources at country level to conduct studies and convene wide stakeholder fora to share lessons and experiences. On the other hand, the country programme in Uganda has attempted to rationalize the use of limited staff in the ICO by working with selected sector working groups (for

example, the agriculture development partners working group and microfinance sector group).

56. **In a context of limited resources, in some cases, grants have played a role in furthering country-level policy engagement.** For instance, in Uganda, the ICO had frequent interactions with government, including informal and knowledge management exchanges through a grant on public-private-producer partnerships that helped inform the development of an oil palm policy of the government as other private sector players begin to enter the sector to grow oil palm. The role of South-South and triangular cooperation continues to emerge as a means to engage in policy discourse. IFAD's contribution to facilitate South-South cooperation in (and for) Morocco has been possible through two grants that have helped establish substantial dialogue and exchanges with some African countries on agricultural policies and techniques. In Sudan, there was an example of using a country-specific grant for a national research organization to prepare a strategy on traditional rainfed agriculture which provided inputs to the Government's Sudan National Agriculture Investment Plan (2016-2020). The above examples notwithstanding, more effort is required to explore the strategic opportunities to use grants¹³ to reinforce policy engagement - by better linking country and multi-country grants with and the country programme.

Box 3

**Fostering policy engagement with the Government - or internal conversation within the ministry?
Case of Niger**

IFAD has delegated engagement in policy dialogue to a project and country programme coordination mechanism in Niger. IFAD has entrusted the dialogue on public policies to the head of the Family Farming Development Programme, making this position a National Unit for Representation and Technical Assistance (CENRAT), located in the Ministry of Agriculture. The function of CENRAT is mainly to support the regional project management units through a pool of national technical assistants. The head of the Cell operates under the responsibility of the above Ministry. He is a national expert who has solid experience in rural development and has political networks in the country and among the government's international partners. This has made it possible to use the Family Farming Development Programme to inform rural development policy and strategy formulation processes. However, it is not clear whether this results in a dialogue between IFAD and the government or an internal conversation within the Ministry. As the CSPE Niger notes, there is a need for IFAD's stronger presence when the dialogue on public strategy reaches critical stages.

Source: Niger CSPE.

Key points

- Country-level KM strategy, robust M&E systems, adequate resources (both human and financial), technical skills, and partnerships are some of the key necessary ingredients for successful KM. Where these were missing, KM activities at country programme level were disparate and operated without an overarching framework or roadmap for guidance, although there were also good examples of KM related activities at project level.
- Expanding partnerships beyond the main counterpart line ministries, having adequate human resources at IFAD ICOs that can provide the necessary time required to develop and maintain partnerships of a more strategic nature are all necessary for forging country-level partnerships.
- Policy engagement through the medium of projects is useful but, if left to the project teams alone, it can leave IFAD on the margins of dialogue processes. IFAD needs to ensure presence and footprint at critical junctures of policy discussions. In this regard, grants (including non-regular grant resources) could help further the engagement on policy issues, and help overcome resource constraints. In turn, for effective policy

¹³ The new "Regular Grants Policy" prepared in 2021 might have some implications on the resource envelope of regular grant funding, but "grants" here can be interpreted broadly as non-lending funding, including supplementary financing.


engagement, systematization of experience and knowledge drawn from the projects, as well as partnerships with like-minded partners are also key.

IV. Factors influencing project efficiency

57. Projects are the main vehicle used by IFAD to transfer developmental resources to its clients and hence it is important to assess whether and to what extent their benefits exceed the costs, and whether they are implemented in a timely manner. According to the corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's institutional efficiency and efficiency of IFAD-funded operations (2013), efficiency appeared to be strongly correlated with rural poverty impact and overall project achievement.
58. Yet, efficiency has been the "worst-performing criterion" overall, and the three-year average IOE ratings for efficiency have tended to fluctuate more than those for other criteria. Chart 6 in Chapter II demonstrates that after sustained periods of downward movement, performance on efficiency is now showing an upward, positive shift. The improvement is seen also in the data by each year (of project completion: chart 20 below), which shows an increase in the percentage of projects with efficiency of moderately unsatisfactory and worse (ratings of 3 and below) from 2013 up to 2015, followed by a decrease from 2017 to 2019. In this context, the aim of this chapter is to identify the factors that underpin performance on efficiency of completed projects.

Chart 20

Ratings for efficiency of projects completed between 2013 and 2019 (by year of completion)



59. The IOE Evaluation manual defines efficiency¹⁴ as "a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results". The manual also provides guidance on the key elements to be looked at for assessing project performance on efficiency, such as timeliness in loan effectiveness and implementation, administrative costs, cost ratio of inputs to outputs, and economic internal rate of return, mostly by reviewing the available data, assessing their quality and triangulating them.
60. For the qualitative analysis, the portfolio of evaluated projects was selected as follows: 46 projects completed between 2013-2015 with the efficiency criterion rated moderately unsatisfactory or worse, and 37 projects completed in 2017-2019 with the criterion rated moderately satisfactory or better. Based on the review and analysis of PPEs/PCRVs, the following main factors (or "markers") affecting (positively or negatively) project efficiency were identified: (i) effectiveness lag;

¹⁴ The definition of efficiency by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development states: "the extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way."

(ii) pace of implementation and disbursement; (iii) staffing issues; and (iv) cost-related issues (project administration costs, changes in input costs). These are not mutually exclusive and they may overlap. IFAD's report on the 12th replenishment has also highlighted similar issues.¹⁵ Annex V presents a working definition of these factors as well as the frequency of their occurrence in the reviewed projects. Specific examples of positive and less positive factors are discussed for the identified parameters below.

Effectiveness lag

61. *Long effectiveness lag* was found to be the issue in 39 per cent of the 46 reviewed projects completed in 2013-2015. One common factor resulting in longer effectiveness lag was the *role of the recipient government*. Examples included: the long time for the government to review and ratify the nine financing agreements, presumably for numerous cofinanciers and IFAD,¹⁶ causing delays (Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project I, in Eswatini); change in the main implementing agency from the one originally named in the design, leading to a delay in the project's start (Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods Programme in the mid-Gangetic Plains, in India); difficulty of the government to meet the conditions of a project entering into force, such as the approval of a management manual and the nomination of key personnel (Participatory Smallholder Agriculture and Artisanal Fisheries Development Programme, in Sao Tome and Principe); and lack of local political ownership by the provinces at the beginning of the project (Patagonia Rural Development Project, in Argentina).

Pace of implementation and disbursements

62. The slow pace of implementation was observed in 85 per cent of the 46 reviewed projects completed in 2013-2015. There were several reasons for the delays in implementation, chief amongst them being *procurement*-related issues. Reasons ranged from time delays in setting up the project management unit (PMU) and recruiting the project coordinator (Ardahan-Kars-Artvin Development Project – AKADP, Turkey), project staff facing difficulties in aligning the procurement processes with IFAD's requirements (Rural Financial Intermediation Programme, Lesotho), to slow response by IFAD to no-objection requests¹⁷ (Small-Scale Irrigation and Water Management Project in Burkina Faso). In large part, cumbersome procurement and contract management procedures and the lack of mastery of these procedures by PMU staff resulted in delays (Southern Nyanza Community Development Project in Kenya); in one case, it took around eight months to give an award for civil works (Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme in the Maldives). One of the most adverse effects of delayed procurement was on the quality of activities. For instance, late procurement of service providers for training resulted in rushed delivery that caused mistakes that included training done concurrently without due reporting and at higher costs (Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services in Uganda). Similarly, the rush to achieve physical targets, caused due to procurement delay, did not leave beneficiaries with sufficient time to receive training and master the technology, which may threaten their sustainability (Rural Finance Support Programme in Mozambique). In Panama (Participative Development and Rural Modernization Project), a considerable delay in opening the special account led to a delay in the first disbursement. Lastly, weaknesses in

¹⁵ The report noted: high staff turnover, inadequate local capacity, weak disbursement, poor financial management and procurement issues. (IFAD 2021. Report of the consultation on the twelfth replenishment of IFAD resources: recovery, rebuilding, resilience).

¹⁶ The PCRV nor the PCR explain for what and with which parties were the nine financing agreements, but they show that there were at least seven cofinanciers.

¹⁷ It is noted that in 2019 IFAD introduced a "no objection tracking utility system (NOTUS)", a web-based application, with the aim to make the no objection processes more streamlined, better archived, tracked and monitored.

project design relevance to local needs could also cause delays in the project gaining traction (AKADP Turkey).

63. The 2017-2019 cohort of completed projects demonstrates the importance of *recommendations* given by supervision missions in improving implementation and disbursement, and importantly, the active response of project units to implement them. Actively following recommendations: (i) helped attain physical targets so that funds were disbursed and most activities implemented in a shorter timeframe than planned (Rural Business Development Project in Bosnia; Agriculture, Farmers and Rural Areas Support Project in Vietnam); (ii) withdrawal applications were prepared on a timely basis, and funds were transferred to implementing parties on time (Smallholder Dairy Commercialization Programme, Kenya); and (iii) agreement was reached on parallel financing to make up the shortfall of the committed matching funds of prefecture and county governments helping implementation rates soar thereafter (Yunnan Agricultural and Rural Improvement Project, China).
64. In terms of *counterpart funding*, good coordination of fund utilization of all financiers allowed for cost-efficiency, including through sharing human resources. In the case of the Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure Project in Bangladesh, IFAD used the services from the infrastructure specialist financed by ADB and increased the total financing of road and market connectivity and climate-resilient capacity building in the project area, improving the implementation efficiency which also helped in keeping costs commensurate with expected results. Unavailability of counterpart funding planned at design is not an uncommon situation facing projects but this can drive down expected benefits from the project, depending on the size of funding. Projects were successful in the face of this challenge when some counterparts increased their own contributions to compensate for the shortfall, as was done by the beneficiaries in the case of the Rural Business Development Project in Bosnia. In other cases, more efficient use of available resources led to covering the shortfall as was observed in the Rural Microfinance Programme in Mali, when a lower than expected contribution from Government had a minimal impact on project implementation due to the countermeasures taken by the project unit which used the money raised on creditor interests accrued to cover taxes on small expenses.

Staffing issues

65. Staffing issues were discussed in 74 per cent of the 46 reviewed projects completed in 2013-2015. *Insufficient expertise of project staff*, both managerial and technical, caused delays in implementation. This manifested itself in the form of *inadequate preparedness* of the programme coordination unit leading to slow project start-up (Rural Financial Intermediation Programme in Lesotho) and *poor decision-making* by the coordination unit leading to a wastage of resources (National Programme for Sustainable Human Development, Comoros). In the latter case, for instance, the intermediary organisations decided to start awareness raising in all project areas in the first year itself even though the pre-appraisal report had suggested a staged approach, leading to the project having to spend additional resources on consolidating the results. In some cases, slow implementation was also caused by *lack of induction and training of project staff* at the beginning of the programme (Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme - Niger Delta Region, Nigeria).
66. The delays in setting up project units due to *slow recruitment of project staff* also hindered the implementation pace. Inability to recruit and retain qualified staff was the main reason (e.g. M&E staff in the Rural Rehabilitation and Community Development Project in Guinea Bissau; incomplete cadre of key specialists in the Rural Enterprise and Agricultural Development Project in Guyana) but often the remoteness of the project areas (AKADP Turkey) coupled with recruitment rules

- (restricting the pool of qualified staff and non-attractive salary, Rural Development Project for the North-West, Azerbaijan) placed difficulties in hiring competent staff.
67. *High staff turnover* negatively affected the implementation efficiency and programme management of several projects. In some cases, the projects witnessed a high turnover of programme coordinators during their life cycles (Rural Enterprise and Agricultural Development Project, Guyana; Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme, Maldives; Post-Tsunami Coastal Rehabilitation and Resource Management Programme, Sri Lanka; AKADP Turkey). High staff turnover not only drove up the management costs as external service providers had to be contracted at significantly higher costs (Rural Finance Project, RFP, The Gambia) and new contracts and rates were negotiated above those expected at design, but also led to lack of follow-up on the supervision mission recommendations due to incomplete work hand-over (Root and Tuber Improvement and Marketing Programme, Ghana).
68. On the positive side, the evaluations highlighted the presence of knowledgeable and experienced staff early at programme start-up stage as the key to the establishment of effective and efficient systems, particularly for specialised tasks such as financial management (Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment, Cambodia; Rural Territorial Competitiveness Programme, El Salvador). In the case of co-financed projects, although coordination and communication were often a challenge, having different co-financiers fund different project staff positions was beneficial as it enabled the project unit to have specialised staff (Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure Project in Bangladesh). Further, having regular performance assessment of staff and providing incentives to PMU through allocation of additional funds for performance-based remuneration also led to implementation success (Coastal Community Development Project, Indonesia).

Cost-related factors

69. Inefficiency related to *project administration costs* was mainly characterised by two factors: upward deviation of actual costs from the estimates at design, and staffing-related issues. A few projects had to revise their estimates during implementation because the design had not sufficiently accounted for the *country context challenges* including costs to cover the wide geographic spread of the project areas and the resulting higher transportation and supervision costs (Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme - Niger Delta Region, Nigeria; Rural Development Project in the Likouala, Pool and Sangha Departments, Congo; Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme, Mali; Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme, Maldives). While not part of the cohort of the project evaluations reviewed for this chapter, it is worthwhile flagging an issue relating to the country context identified in the Niger CSPE. In Niger, in general, procurement of works is undertaken nationally but there is only a handful of companies that would be eligible to participate in bidding processes in donor-funded projects. They therefore act as “price setters”.
70. Another key factor was the higher cost of project staff (e.g. recruitment of additional staff) and external service providers than estimated (e.g. Participatory Integrated-Watershed Management Project, The Gambia). This could be because of the dearth of key qualified staff in the country for certain functions such as procurement and financial management (Rural Financial Intermediation Programme in Lesotho) or need for specialised skills such as for evaluation of infrastructure designs or value chain analysis (Smallholder Horticulture Marketing Programme, Kenya) or microfinance (RFP, The Gambia). In some instances, incorrect design assumptions related to source of funding increased project management costs. For example, the design assumed that the Government would provide office space and other associated facilities but the project ended up meeting all such costs (Smallholder Livestock Investment Project, Zambia).

71. Some projects reviewed had a very high share of project administration/management cost out of the total project cost. Among the 46 projects completed 2013-2015 with the ratings of moderately unsatisfactory or worse, about 40 per cent of the projects (18 projects) spent more than 25 per cent of the total project cost on project management. The project management cost exceeded 40 per cent of the total cost in four projects out of these: the RFP, The Gambia; the Rural Rehabilitation and Community Development Project, Guinea Bissau; the North-Eastern Regional Rural Development Project, Syria; and the Participative Development and Rural Modernization Project, Panama. Of these, except for RFP in The Gambia, the actual total project cost and IFAD funds disbursement was much lower than the projection (between 24 and 55 per cent of the execution level) due to implementation and disbursement issues, thus the share of the project management costs became more accentuated against the total cost.
72. In addition, the issue of *high input costs* affecting efficiency was discussed in 39 per cent of the projects reviewed (completed in 2013-2015). The ratio of input cost to output estimated at the appraisal can change when: (i) an increase in planned input costs accompanied by no changes to outputs; (ii) no change in input costs with a decrease in planned outputs; (iii) no change in input costs and an increase in planned outputs. In instances (i) and (ii), the efficiency of operations is negatively affected. Input costs of some of the evaluated projects increased during implementation because costs were overlooked or under-estimated at the design stage. In the case of the Agricultural Resource Management Project - Phase II in Jordan, additional supplementary activities needed for realising the main activities were not considered at design thereby raising the project cost, while in the case of the Smallholder Horticulture Marketing Programme in Kenya, additional works during implementation led to cost overruns. Cost overruns can have serious implications as was the case of Maize Storage Project in Timor-Leste, where underestimation of costs for an activity led to the cancellation of another planned activity to overcome the deficit. At times, exogenous factors such as sudden swings in input prices or currency depreciation/appreciation can also affect the input costs (Rural Development Project for the North-West, Azerbaijan).

Key points

- Efficiency can be managed by improvements in planning, preparation, flexibility and adjustments, and the interaction between partners, since most issues are related to implementation (e.g. staffing, pace of implementation and disbursement, procurement procedures and processes). Indeed, performance of efficiency in operations depends on the performance of both IFAD and the government. For instance, IFAD has an important role to play in ensuring sound project designs, effective supervision and implementation support, timely response to issues emerging during implementation, and adequate emphasis on M&E and support in this regard. On the other hand, Governments are well in a position to address issues related to staffing, procurement, financial management and M&E, and lack of incentives and accountabilities for expeditious decision-making.¹⁸
- Taking cognizance of the country context is crucial to improving efficiency, in terms of establishing realistic assumptions of time and costs. It is therefore important to reflect on the experience and incorporate lessons from past projects. Similarly, understanding the implications of different types of interventions on time and costs is also important. For example, infrastructure-related interventions can incur complex and lengthy procurement procedures for contracting construction companies and other service providers and this has to be factored in at the time of design. This seems to be a persisting issue, observed across different generations of projects as well as in many countries.
- There are institutional and structural issues that negatively affect procurement processes, for example, where the availability of eligible bidders (contractors, service providers, consultants) is limited. Furthermore, there can also be unexpected factors

¹⁸ Working Paper on Programme Efficiency, CLE on IFAD's institutional efficiency and efficiency of IFAD-funded operations, 2013.

(e.g. sudden swings in input prices, currency depreciation/appreciation or unavailability of expected counterpart funding) for which risk mitigation would need to be prepared.

- The assessment of efficiency requires the availability of reasonably accurate and comparable data for the amount of resources (time, costs, etc.) invested and for the benefits generated. Therefore, project M&E has a strong bearing on measuring efficiency.

V. Review of operations in countries with fragile situations

A. Background and context

73. As fragility represents a threat to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, addressing the challenges posed by fragile situations for development processes and investments has become a priority for the international community. The World Bank estimated that more than half of the world's poor lived in fragile and conflict-affected situations by the end of 2020, and that given current trends by 2030, this would increase up to two-thirds of people in extreme poverty.¹⁹
74. Fragility can have severe consequences for rural development and rural livelihoods. The most vulnerable, particularly women and youth and smallholder farmers in marginal areas are often most affected by these situations. Indeed, a corporate-level evaluation conducted by IOE in 2015²⁰ confirmed that IFAD had "a critical role to play in fragile and conflict affected states and situations in promoting sustainable inclusive development and rural transformation."
75. Following the IOE corporate-level evaluation on this subject and with the growing attention to fragile and conflict-affected situations in the replenishment processes, IFAD has been stepping up its efforts to provide strategic and operational frameworks,²¹ notably: the 'IFAD strategy for engagement in countries with fragile situations' (December 2016), followed by the 'special programme for countries with fragile situations: operationalizing IFAD's fragility strategy' (May 2019). The special programme seeks to ensure that operations in fragile situations focus on selected entry points with demonstrated effectiveness in addressing fragility and building resilience.
76. The 2016 strategy presents the definition of fragility as follows:
'Fragility is a condition of high vulnerability to natural and man-made shocks, often associated with an elevated risk of violence and conflict. Weak governance structures along with low-capacity institutions are a common driver and consequence of fragile situations. Fragile situations typically provide a weaker enabling environment for inclusive and sustainable rural transformation and are characterized by protracted and/or periodic crises, often with implications for smallholder agriculture and food security.'
77. The 2016 strategy developed an IFAD-specific list of most fragile situations based on institutional capacity and conflict, but the 2019 special programme switched to using the World Bank's annual harmonized list of fragile situations.²² Addressing

¹⁹ See: Corral, Paul, Alexander Irwin, Nandini Krishnan, Daniel Gerszon Mahler, and Tara Vishwanath. 2020. *Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight against Poverty*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1540-9. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/publication/fragility-conflict-on-the-front-lines-fight-against-poverty>

²⁰ IOE/IFAD. 2015. *Corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations*.

²¹ There was also an earlier guiding document, the IFAD's policy on conflict prevention and recovery in 2006.

²² The World Bank Group has annually released a list of fragile and conflict-affected situations since 2006. The list has gone through a series of changes, namely: the Low Income Countries Under Stress List (2006-2009); the Fragile States

fragility is high on the IFAD12 agenda, which includes a commitment to improve IFAD's focus on addressing the drivers of fragility and dedicating at least 25 per cent of core resources to fragile situations.²³

78. In the above context, this chapter presents the project performance in countries with and not with fragile situations, and also identifies key issues, good practices and lessons drawing from past evaluations.²⁴ The review here updates and builds on the relevant findings of the 2020 ARRI, which highlighted the importance of adequate context analysis in all cases but particularly where legal and institutional frameworks and governance are weak, as well as the challenge observed in adapting to changes in the social, political, natural and development landscape, especially in countries with fragile situations.

B. Performance ratings – projects in countries with fragile situations

79. For the quantitative analysis on the performance ratings, the projects were categorized as having operated in countries with fragile situations if: (i) the country was on the World Bank's annual lists of countries with fragile situations²⁵ for more than half of the project implementation period; or (ii) the country was on the World Bank's 2020 list of countries with fragile and conflict-affected situations, and specifically in the category "countries affected by violent conflict".²⁶ This exercise identified 102 projects in countries with fragile situations and 196 with non-fragile situations.²⁷
80. The long-term performance over 2007-2019 shows that average ratings for the projects in countries with fragile situation are worse for all criteria than in other countries, with the criteria on efficiency, government performance, overall project achievement, scaling up and sustainability of benefits showing statistical significance (see annex VII, table 2 and chart 1). This may not be completely unexpected given the multitude of challenges in working in fragile contexts, such as weak institutional capacity and possible disruptions in project implementation due to socio-political crises. This pattern, however, does not hold true for recent periods. For the projects completed between 2017 and 2019, the percentage of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings is higher for those in countries with fragile situations for a number of criteria: efficiency, adaptation to climate change, overall project achievement, gender equality and women's empowerment, IFAD performance, and relevance (table 5).
81. Table 5 also shows that the performance of projects in countries with fragile situations completed in 2017-2019 improved for all criteria but one, compared with the previous time period (completion in 2014-2016) - and by a notable margin for several criteria (e.g. efficiency, government performance, adaptation to climate change and innovation), while the performance in other countries remained with minimal changes between the two periods for the main evaluation criteria. A more

List (2010); the Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (2011-2019); and the List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (2020). Since fiscal year 2020, the list presents the countries by the following groups: high-intensity conflict; medium-intensity conflict; high institutional and social fragility (with a breakdown between non-small states and small states).

²³ IFAD 2021. Report of the Consultation on the Twelfth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources: Recovery, Rebuilding, Resilience (February 2021).

²⁴ PPEs, PCRVs, CSPEs, as well as the corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's engagement in fragility and conflict-affected states and situations, evaluation synthesis reports on building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness, IFAD's support to community-driven development, and infrastructure at IFAD.

²⁵ <https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/176001594407411053/FCSList-FY06toFY20.pdf>

²⁶ Most of the countries in this category have been on the list for all or most previous years, but this categorization also added some countries which were not in the list before or were in the list for less than five years between 2006 and 2020, namely: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria.

²⁷ Sometimes also referred to as "(countries with) non-fragile situations" in this report. The categorization is based on the list by the World Bank and it does not represent any judgement by IOE on whether a country is with fragile and conflict-affected situations or not.

detailed analysis on project performance ratings in countries with fragile situations and other countries is included in annex VII.

Table 5
Percentage of moderately satisfactory ratings or better – projects in countries with fragile situations and other countries (2017-2019 vs. 2014-2016, by year of project completion)

	Fragile situations			Non-Fragile situations		
	2014-2016 (N=30)	2017-2019 (N=24)	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016	2014-2016 (N=52)	2017-2019 (N=44)	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014- 2016
Efficiency	40	58	▲ 18	60	55	▼ -5
Government performance	47	63	▲ 16	65	64	▼ -2
Adaptation to climate change	72	86	▲ 14	78	80	▲ 3
Innovation	73	83	▲ 10	85	89	▲ 4
Overall project achievement	70	79	▲ 9	76	75	▼ -1
Sustainability	50	58	▲ 8	67	70	▲ 3
Effectiveness	63	71	▲ 8	85	82	▼ -3
Gender equality and Women's Empowerment	80	88	▲ 8	70	69	▼ -1
Environment and natural resources management	76	83	▲ 7	84	88	▲ 4
IFAD performance	80	83	▲ 3	85	80	▼ -5
Relevance	93	96	▲ 3	79	80	▲ 1
Scaling up	60	63	▲ 3	73	75	▲ 2
Rural Poverty Impact	70	70	■ 0	83	83	■ 0

Source: IOE database.

Note: IOE criteria are ranked by change in percentage between the periods for countries with fragile situations.

C. Findings from project-level evaluations

82. Among all project evaluations and PCRVs prepared by IOE between 2018 and 2020 (for a total of 147 projects), 23 projects were reviewed for a qualitative analysis (see table 4 in annex VII). The identification of these 23 projects was based on the country's status in the year of respective project completion according to the World Bank's harmonised list of countries with fragile situations, which has been adopted by IFAD (see also paragraph 77 and annex VII).
83. Key broad areas of inquiry for the qualitative analysis of the evaluation findings included the following: (i) to what extent the country and project contexts with fragility were analysed and reflected in the design; (ii) to what extent and how did the projects seek to address the drivers/factors of fragility (of what kind); (iii) to what extent and how did the projects address the consequences of fragility; and (iv) how well did the projects do in social inclusion.
84. **A recurring issue found in the evaluations is lack of or insufficient analyses of fragility and institutional contexts at design**, which led to ineffective interventions in fragile situations and in implementation arrangements. This also led to project designs considered to be too complex for the capacities of existing institutions. For example, for the Small Scale Irrigation Development Project Phase II in Haiti, given the difficult national socioeconomic context and the natural disasters that characterized the project implementation period, the design, while relevant, was too complex and ambitious. It failed to consider weak institutional capacity and the vulnerability of Haiti to various natural disasters which resulted in numerous setbacks and ultimately hampered the sustainability of the project. Often project design envisaged implementation arrangements involving service providers (e.g. NGOs). However, the capacity and competences of these service providers was not sufficiently verified, for example, in: Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (PROPACOM) and Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project (PRAREP), both in Cote d'Ivoire; Project to Revitalize Crop and Livestock Production in the Savannah (PREVES) in the Central African Republic; Support to Agricultural Development Project (PADAT) in Togo. Project support in post-conflict situations to train, revitalize and strengthen the capacity of producer organizations was relevant in general. However, in the

case of PROPACOM (Cote d'Ivoire) the design did not adequately identify the critical issues and weaknesses affecting most producer organizations in a post-crisis context. The heterogeneity of targeted producer organizations in terms of institutional arrangements as well as internal capabilities could have been better reflected in the design of the Rural Development Support Programme in Guéra, Chad.

85. **The simplicity of project design, ensuring that there was a clear focus and a simpler set of objectives, were highlighted in evaluations as important features to increase the likelihood of effective implementation in fragile situations.** The design of the Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas (PROHYPA) in Chad was characterized by its simplicity, focusing primarily on vulnerability of access to natural resources, i.e. the competing needs of livestock farmers and pastoralists for water for animals. In the Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction Project (RCPRP) in Sierra Leone, condensing the components from four to two introduced a stronger focus among activities and recognized the limitations on implementation capacities in a fragile situations. In addition, the focus on a few key agricultural commodities was considered a strength of the project, which helped revive one of the main sources of income for rural poor people through rice and cocoa production. On the other hand, the Agricultural Value Chains Support Development Programme in Congo, which originally planned to intervene in 13 different value chains, proved to be a challenge given the lack of both commercial expertise and rural infrastructure, and that the institutional set-up²⁸ was also complex. For PADAT Togo, the funding from the Global Environment Facility was mobilized during the implementation to mitigate the impact of climate change on vulnerable groups, but the Global Environment Facility component was too ambitious and complex, with multiple activities and intervention subsectors. The adding of a component in the middle of implementation with a short timeframe was also challenging.
86. **Support for recovery, rehabilitation and recapitalization of productive capacity in post-conflict situations mostly performed well. However interventions aimed at addressing market access and shifting to longer-term development faced more challenges.** In Liberia, the change in the country and agricultural development context resulted in the second phase of the Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) shifting to a more market-oriented approach and a focus on developing participatory extension systems, but it was less effective than the initial phase which had succeeded in quickly recapitalizing poor farming households with farming inputs and assets (i.e. livestock). This was related to a number of challenges faced by the project in Phase II (including those related to institutional capacity).²⁹ While RCPRP Sierra Leone was effective in improving cocoa and rice production, it fell short of its objective to enable the increased production to reach the market. The implementation of the Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Support Project (STCRSP) in Liberia, focused on value chain development for cocoa and coffee, was hampered by limited institutional capacity and a regulatory vacuum in the cocoa sub-sector that undermined relationships between the private sector, cooperatives and farmers.³⁰ The STCRSP evaluation found that given the post-war situation and limited in-country institutional and implementation capacity, the project could have more explicitly reflected on past challenges from Liberia and other countries in similar context. In PRAREP Cote d'Ivoire, the distribution of agricultural kits helped boost agricultural production in the post-crisis context, and subsequently farmers' incomes in some regions, but greater attention was needed in strengthening producers'

²⁸ The project team for this project also had to follow up on other IFAD-funded operations.

²⁹ The challenges in phase II noted in the PCR included: an outbreak of Ebola that affected the project area, issues with the Farmers' Union Network concerning institutional development, a shortage of the Ministry of Agriculture staff and a reduction of the Farmers' Union Network extension staff.

³⁰ For example, regulations on grading of cocoa.

organizations, looking into a sustainable input credit arrangement, and social inclusion, among other things.

87. **Support for basic infrastructure, often through community-based approaches, is a common feature in fragile or conflict-affected situations and in many cases it had important impacts** on reducing isolation, improving productivity, lowering costs of accessing markets and improving access to basic social services. A number of projects supported the development of infrastructure, such as water points, sanitation, and roads with positive impact, for example, in: Butana Integrated Rural Development Project (BIRDP), Rural Access Project, Supporting Small-scale Traditional Rainfed Producers in Sinnar State, and Western Sudan Resources Management Programme (WSRMP) in Sudan; Rural Development Support Programme in Guéra and PROHYPA in Chad; PREVES Central African Republic. Some of these project evaluations reviewed (e.g. Chad, Sudan), as well as the evaluation synthesis reports on infrastructure, indicated positive experiences in working with communities for infrastructure development and operations in fragile contexts.³¹ The evaluation synthesis report on community driven development also found that community-based/driven development was more effective for infrastructure development than other approaches in hard-to-reach conflict and post-conflict situations.
88. While confirming the importance of infrastructure in fragile contexts, the evaluation synthesis report on infrastructure also recognized a number of challenges, such as capacity and governance constraints for procurement and the need for prolonged support at community level. Investments in land and water can be also constrained by land tenure and water rights (e.g. Project to Support Development in the Menabe and Melaky Regions, Madagascar), which can themselves be the source and subject of conflict. Social infrastructure (schools and health facilities) is relatively easy to construct in fragile contexts, but the impact is highly dependent on adequate services provided in the new facility, for which institutional strengthening as well as access to the facilities are necessary.
89. The same evaluation synthesis report highlighted the importance of co-financing for infrastructure investment, given the limited resources of IFAD, but the examples reviewed for this ARRI show that it could also add an element of uncertainty, for example when the envisaged co-financing is delayed or does not materialize.³²
90. **Institutional strengthening is critical particularly in situations of fragility, but difficult to achieve.** The contexts of fragile situations vary widely, but they often share characteristics of limited implementation capacity and weak governance structures, as well as weak rural institutions. Project strategies in fragile situations have often targeted capacity building of institutions at all levels. Projects in Mali (Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project, PAPAM), Sudan (BIRDP and WSRMP), Central Africa Republic (PREVES), Liberia (ASRP) and Sierra Leone (RCPRP and Rural Finance and Community Improvement Programme) all included components on capacity building and, despite some disruptions, achieved positive results. On the other hand, interventions in Cote d'Ivoire (PROPACOM), Haiti (Small Scale Irrigation Development Project – Phase II) and Liberia (ASRP) were less successful or mixed in terms of institutional development also owing to weak analysis at design.

³¹ The evaluation synthesis report on infrastructure noted that “several projects had very positive experiences when relying on community development as the post-conflict starting point of mobilization (Burundi), working with existing community organizations to generate and operate infrastructure (Democratic Republic of Congo and The Gambia), and investing heavily into the capacities of communities and community organizations (Chad in particular)”.

³² For example, PRAREP Cote d'Ivoire where the co-financing for the infrastructure component did not materialize at all.

91. **A number of projects demonstrated flexibility in making adjustments in response to disruptions, but risk analysis and risk management strategies were not strong.** Few projects develop a comprehensive risk analysis with built-in mitigation measures associated with fragility. And yet, a significant proportion of projects face substantial disruption and some demonstrated flexibility to retain the relevance, for example, by reducing the project scope in activities and areas³³ or changes in implementation arrangements.³⁴ Some evaluations pointed out that the design may have been too optimistic or too quick in assuming the improving or continued stability in post-conflict context (e.g. PREVES Central African Republic, Agricultural Value Chains Support Development Programme, Congo).³⁵ These findings point to the importance of developing solid risk management strategies.
92. **Support to inclusive natural resources governance and sustainable natural resources management is an area of IFAD's strength, particularly when addressing conflict over access to and use of natural resources by different users.**³⁶ In WSRMP Sudan, an initial focus on settled communities with marginal involvement of pastoral communities was followed by an adequate redesign at mid-term, which was instrumental in helping the project to improve outreach to pastoral communities by introducing a number of innovative practices. The evaluation synthesis report on community driven development cited WSRMP as part of a conflict resolution strategy in the country with a participatory process that brought together the nomadic tribes and settled agro-pastoral communities. BIRDPA aimed to create a governance framework for land and water resources through a bottom-up approach and develop the capacity of community-based organizations. In Chad, PROHYPA was designed to improve natural resource management for access to water in the face of climate change and to avert conflict between farmers and transhumant pastoralists.

Box 4

Effects on conflict dynamics

Two project examples make specific reference to impact with regard to the fragility context:

Sudan WSRMP: Capacity building programmes, advocacy and other basic services, besides linking different communities and groups with supportive government institutions, contributed to reduction of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists through participatory NRM governance mechanisms and the establishment of conflict resolution centres. In the post-MTR, the project introduced mobile extension teams and pastoral field schools, among other things.

Chad PROHYPA: The design of PROHYPA adopted a development model that recognized mobility of livestock and people (transhumance) as a crucial strategy for exploiting dryland environments. The available data demonstrate that the project has had impact on the reduction of conflict situations and, consequently, on the improvement of the social and economic quality of the pastoral environment.

93. **Fragility and conflicts could often be linked to the marginalization of certain segments of the population: some projects were effective in reaching them, while others mention them as part of the target group in design but without evidence of an effective strategy.** Post mid-term review

³³ For example, the Rural Microfinance Programme and PAPAM in Mali. PAPAM, funded as part of an agricultural sector-wide approach programme and also not necessarily focused on communities in situations in conflict or emerging from conflict, experienced a resurgence in conflict that left areas of the country inaccessible so the geographical scope was reduced and the focus of financing was shifted to three value chains. In the Rural Microfinance Programme, Political crisis led to reduction in scope and some co-funders withdrew, but partnership with CIDA helped maintain services tailored to the needs of the rural poor.

³⁴ For example, more involvement of local institutions in PAPAM Mali, new partners in PREVES Central African Republic.

³⁵ PREVES Central African Republic "was based on ambitious hypothesis of stability not taking into account the risks associated with the possible resurgence of conflict" (PREVES PCRIV).

³⁶ The evaluation synthesis report on community-driven development in IFAD-supported projects (IOE 2020) also found that "conflicts between pastoralists and farmers were successfully managed in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia", although Ethiopia has not been listed among the countries with fragile situations.

WSRMP in Sudan, BIRDP Sudan, as well as PROHYPA Chad adopted adequate strategies to reach different natural resource users and including mobile pastoral communities³⁷ (see also Box 4 above). PROPACOM Cote d'Ivoire, which aimed at supporting a shift from emergency assistance to reconstruction with an emphasis on strengthening producer organizations, presents a unique experience of explicitly integrating youth in ex-combatants groups during the project implementation.³⁸ While the overall achievement of PROPACOM was rated moderately unsatisfactory, the project's contribution to the social integration of ex-combatants' groups with skills development was positively assessed. On the other hand, even though the inclusion of disabled people (along with youth, women, smallholder farmers and micro/small entrepreneurs) in RCPRP Sierra Leone design was relevant to avoid reinforcing patterns of exclusion, actual outreach (to disabled people) was limited.³⁹ Some other projects also explicitly mentioned ex-combatants and victims of conflicts as part of the target group in design,⁴⁰ but there is no evidence indicating the effectiveness of targeting.

94. **Also more broadly, the evaluations highlighted the importance of effectively targeting women and youth to help them restore livelihoods and resilience in fragile contexts.** IFAD focuses on social inclusion in general, whether in fragile situations or not. However, the significance of the inclusion of women and youth is underlined as they are likely to have been among the most severely affected by fragility and conflict. The integration of youth into social and economic empowerment programmes could also be relevant to mitigate potential factors that may contribute to conflicts in the future.
95. **Notable efforts to foster inclusion and empowerment of youth and/or women were found, even though the links with causes or consequences of fragility are not always clear.** Examples include: backyard poultry and dairy goats targeted at women,⁴¹ as well as women's self-help groups to provide access to microfinance services at the community level in Afghanistan (Rural Microfinance and Livestock Support Programme, RMLSP); income generation for women and young people in Chad (PROHYPA); literacy training for women and inclusion of young people ex-combatants in Cote d'Ivoire (PROPACOM, see also paragraph 93). WSRMP and BIRDP in Sudan also made significant contribution to social and economic empowerment of women through capacity-building, community development access to finance (savings and credit groups) and productive activities tailored to their needs. While the outreach and effectiveness was not always evident, there are examples of youth-oriented/specific interventions, notably those providing skills training for them to be hired/engaged to provide services – often in the project, or more broadly to become entrepreneurs, for example: youth contractors for the rehabilitation of inland valley swamps, roads and tree crops, though to a limited extent (RCPRP Sierra Leone); young professional programme (BIRDP Sudan; RMLSP Afghanistan; STCRSP Liberia);

³⁷ These three projects are classified by IFAD as including indigenous peoples in the target group (pastoral communities in these specific cases), even though the project documents do not use the term "indigenous peoples". Among the 23 projects reviewed for qualitative analysis, one more project is considered to have included indigenous peoples: Kuchis (pastoralists).

³⁸ The integration of groups of ex-combatants was not explicitly planned in the design stage of the project; it was introduced during implementation. Using an innovative agreement with the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, ex-combatants were assisted to begin microprojects and to develop new skills and capacities.

³⁹ No partner was engaged with a specific focus on working with people with disabilities, data were not disaggregated. (RCPRP PPE).

⁴⁰ For example, ex-combatants and sexually-abused young women/single mothers (Rural Finance and Community Improvement Programme in Sierra Leone), war-wounded and disabled people (STCRSP Liberia), youth including ex-combatants and disabled people (ASRP Liberia).

⁴¹ "In a society where few women are employed, the programme has made considerable achievements towards the inclusion of women beneficiaries, particularly through the backyard poultry and dairy goat activities". (Rural Microfinance and Livestock Support Programme, Afghanistan, PCRV). The programme also organized *mahrams* (unmarriageable kin who can act as a legal escort for women during a journey longer than a day or a night) to accompany female project staff on field visits.

support to young (potential) entrepreneurs (e.g. PADAT Togo). Lastly, the evaluation synthesis report on infrastructure (IOE 2021) found that social infrastructure had clearly contributed to rural poverty impact and enhancement for women particularly in the form of education, health, and household water supply.

96. **On the other hand, there were also less than satisfactory results on reaching and benefiting women or youth, particularly when a targeting strategy informed by sound situation analysis was not developed.** For example, in STCRSP Liberia, quotas for women and youth were not accompanied by targeting strategies to ensure meaningful integration of these groups in the project, even if some youth-specific activities were pursued (see previous paragraph).⁴² In Lebanon (Hilly Areas Sustainable Agriculture Development Project), the project failed to adequately adapt to the evolving context by better understanding and incorporating the needs of young rural population, given that the reduction of rural-urban youth migration became a priority for the Government during the project.⁴³ RCPRP (Sierra Leone) did carry out capacity and needs assessments for youth (and disabled people) to develop action plans during the project but they came in relatively late and were not fully utilized, also due to the delays with the construction of youth centres.

D. Findings and lessons from CSPEs on fragility

97. Analysis of project evaluations has brought insights into the ways in which projects were designed to take account of fragile situations and how implementation was adapted to respond to changing context and learning. This chapter presents the main findings and lessons learned with regard to the relevance of IFAD's country strategies and its non-lending activities (as opposed to operational level issues discussed earlier) based on the recent CSPEs in the countries which have been affected by fragility and conflicts, namely, Burundi, Madagascar, Niger, Sierra Leone and Sudan. They were reviewed with the following aspects in mind: (i) relevance and adaptability of the country strategy and programme; (ii) identification, management and mitigation of risks; (iii) strategic and effective working in partnership; and (iv) strategic use of non-lending activities.
98. **Conflict and fragility analyses – whether at national or sub-national level - to help develop a strategic approach to address fragility and manage risks in COSOPs are often limited, if they exist at all.** IOE's corporate level evaluation on IFAD's engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations (2015) noted that while COSOPs analyse the dimensions of poverty, in most cases they do not explore drivers of fragility. This is echoed in the CSPEs reviewed. COSOPs rarely presented an explicit focus on conflict and fragility in programme priorities and objectives. Attention to aspects such as natural resources governance, inclusion and empowerment of youth and women, and institutional capacity building all feature in projects, but they are rarely framed as a fragility strategy. For example, in Sudan COSOPs (2009 and 2013), fragility and conflict issues, especially in relation to natural resources, were generally well-recognized, but their implications on the country strategy were not clearly discussed, despite successful project experiences. In Niger, a project has designed activities that could help mitigate conflicts over natural resources, but the country programme has not developed a comprehensive approach to conflict analysis and prevention.

⁴² Cocoa farming, which was the main focus of the project, is traditionally considered a man's job and no strategies were established to integrate women into other parts of the value chain where they could play an important role (e.g. fermentation and drying). Also, the project design did not consider that in general these women and youth had limited or no access to land planted with cocoa and lacked financial resources to buy it.

⁴³ For example, studies undertaken in the project areas focused on the technical feasibility of selected sites, rather than the conditions of the youth and their needs (Hilly Areas Sustainable Agricultural Development Project, Lebanon, PCRIV).

99. In Burundi, the 2009 COSOP developed as a post-conflict agenda focused on political and institutional risks and the risk management options included the possibility of engaging with diverse actors (including UN agencies). On the other hand, although the 2016 COSOP mentioned possible risk relating to political instability and weak government capacity (among other risks⁴⁴), it did not propose clear specific risk management measures. These weaknesses are noted, although it is also recognized that the specific guidance on fragility analysis in COSOPs was available at the time of any COSOP covered in the evaluations.
100. **The Burundi and Sudan CSPEs both highlighted the importance of continued and long-term engagement, building on lessons and experiences, investment at grass-roots level institutions, as well as committed field-level project teams.** In Sudan, community development and inclusive natural resource governance and management has been a running theme in the country programme, with innovative approaches introduced, such as stock route co-management and mobile extension teams. The Burundi CSPE also highlighted that, despite Burundi facing a number of fragile situations, the IFAD country programme showed resilience, with the contributing factors including the investment and work at local and community levels improving accountability and ownership. Both the Sudan and Burundi CSPEs, along with that of Madagascar, highlighted the fact that IFAD-financed projects remained operational throughout without disruption over a long period of time. This has led to IFAD being recognized as a trusted long-standing partner.
101. **There were some examples of partnerships associated with aspects of fragility, though not many at strategic levels; weakness in strategic partnership building is a recurring issue, not only in the countries with fragile situations.** The Sierra Leone CSPE pointed out that while IFAD's portfolio was highly relevant to fragile situation, IFAD fell short in terms of its collaboration with other development partners with expertise complementary to that of IFAD. In fragile and conflict-affected situations working closely with partners is especially important to share knowledge and to address wider causes of fragility than IFAD alone can address.⁴⁵ Partnerships can be at multiple levels and vary in purposes for implementation, co-financing, knowledge sharing and more.
102. With regard to development partners, in Niger, an agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme in 2017 proposed an operational framework for the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) to address humanitarian and development needs. Also in Niger, IFAD developed a co-financing arrangement with the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, with interest and experience in working in fragile situations. The Sudan CSPE pointed out the missed opportunity to work with the United Nations Environment Programme which had done extensive research work on pastoralism and natural resource governance. In Sudan, partnership with the Native Administration (traditional authority) in relation to natural resource governance and related conflict resolutions was an important feature in some projects, even though this was not consistently sustained at the time of the CSPE. The Burundi CSPE noted that IFAD's programme relies heavily on stable strategic partnerships, with a limited number of co-financiers, state and non-state actors and civil society and that these alliances probably helped make IFAD's programme resilient against risks."

⁴⁴ Other risks identified are: fiduciary risk, slow pace of economic reform, weak capacity of microfinance institutions.

⁴⁵ The IOE's evaluation synthesis report on building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness (2018) also pointed out that "IFAD needs more non-governmental partners for project implementation, coordination and service delivery where government capacities are weak (often low income countries and most fragile situations)" and that "fragile and conflict-affected states that have many problems with government performance require special attention to alternative partnerships in order to ensure effective delivery of projects and services."

103. **There is evidence of lessons in working in fragile situations emerging from projects but IFAD's strategies lack operational resources to package the knowledge to engage in policy issues beyond the project level.** In Sudan, internal 'learning routes' facilitated exchange across projects that contributed to adaptation and replication on community networking, conflict resolution and various cropping and technology practices. There is little evidence these have been taken up with external partners or in policy discussions. On the other hand, an interesting feature in Sudan through BIRDP was a bottom up approach to tabling and deliberating on policy issues, which led to the preparation of a natural resource governance framework. In Sierra Leone and Niger, lessons were not systematically oriented to contribute to policy and decision-making despite emerging from experience with rural finance, decentralisation, land tenure and empowerment of women and youth, all of direct or indirect relevance to fragile situations.

Key points

- A recurring issue found in the evaluations is insufficient analysis of fragility context at design, which led to weaknesses in relevance, inadequate implementation arrangements and ineffective interventions.
- A number of projects demonstrated flexibility in making adjustments in response to disruptions, but in general risk analysis and risk management strategies were not strong. Similarly, conflict and fragility analyses in COSOPs are also weak.
- Effective and impactful interventions in fragile and post-conflict situations included: support to inclusive natural resource governance and sustainable natural resource management when addressing conflict over access to and use of natural resources by different user groups, as well as basic infrastructure. Support for recovery, rehabilitation and recapitalization of productive capacity in post-conflict situations mostly performed well, but interventions shifting to longer-term development and addressing market access faced more challenges.
- The project performance was mixed in targeting certain segments of population who were most affected by fragile contexts and conflicts or whose marginalization could lead to a conflict, but there are some good practices.

VI. Conclusions

104. **The majority of project performance rating in the most recent period (projects completed between 2017 and 2019) continues to be moderately satisfactory or above across the evaluation criteria, ranging from 56 per cent for efficiency to 87 per cent for innovation.** There are also some signs of improvements, with a number of evaluation criteria showing improvements in the latest two consecutive periods (i.e. 2016-2018 and 2017-2019), notably in (in the order of increase over the two periods): adaptation to climate change, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, innovation, and scaling-up.
105. However, for the criterion of IFAD's performance, the share of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better has slightly reduced compared to the previous period. Only two criteria, ENRM and adaptation to climate change, show statistically significant improvements compared to the long-term trend (projects completed in 2007-2016).
106. **IFAD and the Government need to act at design stage and during implementation to improve the project efficiency.** The efficiency criterion has scored among the lowest with a wide fluctuation, although the last two consecutive three-year periods show some upward change. Improving efficiency has been identified as a priority also in IFAD12 to enhance IFAD's development effectiveness. This ARRI identifies main factors affecting efficiency such as those that can affect the pace of implementation (e.g. effectiveness lag, procurement processes, staffing and staff capacity) or cost-related issues. Monitoring of

progress and implementation issues, timely action and adjustments and follow-up are critical to manage efficiency in ongoing projects. On the other hand, learning from the past project experience, being aware of contextual issues and integrating the measures to improve efficiency in new projects would also be key.

107. **The ARRI analysis found that the performance of projects in countries with fragile situations has improved.** While the long-term analysis (2007-2019) shows that the performance in countries with fragile situations are worse than in other countries, the performance in recent periods shows improvement for several criteria.
108. IFAD has some valuable operational experience in working in contexts affected by fragility. IFAD-supported operations often contributed to addressing the consequences of fragility, mostly in the post-crisis context, for example, through providing support to recover production capacity. There are also good practices in addressing the drivers of fragility, especially those related to natural resources related conflicts, which come out as an area of IFAD's strength. Social inclusion is also critical to mitigate the potential factors of fragility and/or to address the needs of those affected by fragility: there are some good examples (e.g. inclusion of young ex-combatants and pastoralists), but in other cases, even though the groups such as ex-combatants or war-disabled were mentioned as part of the target group in design, there was no evidence of effective targeting nor monitoring. Also, even where the operations integrated some relevant elements, these were not clearly supported by a solid analysis and strategy development with a fragility lens.
109. **Going forward, capitalizing on its experience, IFAD will need solid strategies informed by dedicated conflict and fragility analysis to address both the drivers and consequences of fragility.** IFAD's operations in the countries with fragile situations are expected to increase in the years to come and IFAD 12 indicates the commitment to enhancing its focus on addressing the drivers of fragility. It would be important to strengthen the quality of analysis of fragility and risks, and incorporate flexibility and risk mitigation measures with continuous monitoring and updating, both at country and project levels.
110. **Achieving positive performance in non-lending activities continues to be a challenge and requires strategic actions and resources.** While there are good examples at project level, KM at country programme level were disparate, without an overarching framework and strategy to harness the experience, knowledge and lessons emerging in the country programme. Project experience should provide inputs to inform policy issues, but IFAD needs to be present and find effective ways to engage in policy dialogue, rather than relying on the projects and the project teams as a main vehicle in the process. Expanding partnerships beyond the main counterpart line ministries and strategic partnerships with other development agencies and stakeholders are critical, also linked to both KM and policy engagement. In the context of IFAD12, IFAD is expected to step up the resource mobilization for enhancing the performance on non-lending activities,⁴⁶ but the need for human resources with right competencies, and not only the financial resources, should also be addressed.
111. **IOE-Management engagement is required to develop shared understanding on the basis of assessment for some evaluation criteria which have seen larger or widening disconnects between IOE and PCR ratings.** One such criterion is relevance. Although the average disconnect is reducing, it still shows the second largest average disconnect for the projects completed 2017-2019. Another criterion for attention, with the largest average disconnect in the projects completed in 2017-2019 is gender equality and women's

⁴⁶ IFAD12 report. "a refocusing of the IFAD regular grants programme will provide catalytic complementary financing for non-lending activities that create an enabling environment for scaling up, including through policy engagement, knowledge and partnerships, particularly with rural civil society organizations"

empowerment, and another one (third largest average disconnect) is scaling-up. These issues need to be reflected in the ongoing revision of the Evaluation Manual and going forward, warrant closer management scrutiny of PCR ratings in these areas.

Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition*
Rural poverty impact	<p>The changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.</p> <p>Four impact domains</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
Project performance	Average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design, coherence in achieving its objectives, and relevance of targeting strategies adopted.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
Other performance criteria	
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.
Overall project achievement	Overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.
Performance of partners	
IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.
Government	

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Evaluations completed by IOE in 2020

Country/Region	Title	Project ID	Executive Board approval date	Effectiveness date	Project completion date	Project duration (years)	Total project financing (US\$ million)
Corporate-level evaluation							
All	IFAD's support to innovations for inclusive and sustainable smallholder agriculture						
Evaluation synthesis report							
All	Infrastructure at IFAD (2001-2019)						
Country strategy and programme evaluations and projects covered in respective CSPEs							
Morocco	Rural Development Project for Taourirt – Taforalt (PDRTT)	1010	04/12/1996	16/10/1998	31/12/2009	11	49,420,000
	Rural Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Al-Haouz Province (PDRZMH)	1178	07/12/2000	22/01/2002	30/09/2010	8	30,243,310
	Livestock and Pasture Development Project in the Eastern Region (PDPEO-II)	0260	19/04/1990	27/05/1991	31/12/2001	10	45,220,000
	Rural Development Project in the Eastern Middle Atlas Mountains (PDRMO)	1338	13/12/2005	28/03/2007	31/03/2015	7	44,208,753
	Rural Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Errachidia Province (PDRZME)	1388	12/09/2007	16/09/2008	30/09/2014	6	27,044,294
	Agricultural Value Chain Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Al-Haouz Province (PDFAZMH)	1526	13/12/2011	21/09/2012	30/09/2019	7	9,129,128
	Agricultural Value Chain Development Programme in the Mountain Zones of Taza Province (PDFAZMT)	1525	15/12/2010	13/09/2011	31/12/2020	9	39,246,609
	Rural Development Programme in the Mountain Zones - Phase I (PDRZM 1)	1727	17/09/2014	23/02/2015	31/03/2020	5	45,111,800
	Atlas Mountains Rural Development Project (PDRMA)	1403	22/09/2016	19/06/2017	30/06/2024	7	61,251,000
	Taza Mountain Integrated Rural Development Project for the pre-Rif Region (PDRZMT)	2073	09/09/2019	22/05/2020	30/06/2026	6	93,541,227
Niger	Project for the Promotion of Local Initiative for Development in Aguié (PPILDA)	1221	11/12/2002	05/05/2005	30/06/2013	8	17,760,969

	Agricultural and Rural Rehabilitation and Development Initiative Project - Institutional Strengthening Component (IRDAR-RCI)	1443	17/12/2008	22/09/2009	30/09/2013	4	61,538,774
	Emergency Food Security and Rural Development Programme (PUSADER)	1591	15/12/2010	07/02/2011	31/03/2014	3	35,709,404
	Food Security and Development Support Project in the Maradi Region (PASADEM)	1625	13/12/2011	12/03/2012	31/03/2018	6	31,706,599
	Family Farming Development Programme in Maradi, Tahoua and Zinder Regions (ProDAF)	1688	22/04/2015	21/09/2015	30/09/2023	8	206,036,312
	Ruwanmu Small-Scale Irrigation Project (PPI Ruwanmu)	1646	21/09/2012	19/02/2013	30/06/2018	5	25,652,306
	Family Farming Development Programme in the Diffa Region (ProDAF-Diffa)	1810	29/09/2018	21/03/2019	31/03/2025	6	25,482,800
	Project to Strengthen Resilience of Rural Communities to Food and Nutrition Insecurity (PRECIS)	2678	12/09/2019	05/08/2020	30/09/2026	6	195,863,100
Sudan	Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project (GASH)	1263	18/12/2003	12/08/2004	30/09/2012	8	39,033,657
	Western Sudan Resources Management Programme (WSRMP)	1277	02/12/2004	15/12/2005	31/12/2016	11	53,368,063
	Butana Integrated Rural Development Project (BIRDP)	1332	14/12/2006	07/07/2008	30/09/2019	11	46,689,222
	Revitalizing the Sudan Gum Arabic Production and Marketing Project (GAPM)	1476	15/09/2009	03/11/2009	31/12/2014	5	10,880,000
	Rural Access Project (RAP)	1503	17/12/2009	04/04/2010	31/12/2015	5	14,963,546
	Supporting Small-scale Traditional Rainfed Producers in Sinnar State (SUSTAIN)	1524	15/12/2010	26/04/2011	30/06/2018	7	21,192,956
	Seed Development Project (SDP)	1612	13/12/2011	24/02/2012	31/03/2018	6	17,463,567
	Livestock Marketing and Resilience Programme (LMRP)	1732	16/12/2014	31/03/2015	31/03/2022	7	128,696,000
	Integrated Agriculture and Marketing Development Project (IAMDP)	1517	11/12/2017	15/02/2018	31/03/2024	6	49,174,784
Uganda	Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP)	1197	05/09/2002	18/02/2004	30/06/2013	9	24,958,427
	District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP)	1369	14/12/2006	24/10/2007	31/12/2014	7	50,880,108
	Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme (CAIIP1)	1419	12/09/2007	09/01/2008	31/03/2013	5	81,938,526
	Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS)	1465	16/09/2010	09/11/2011	31/12/2018	7	638,493,893

Vegetable Oil Development Project 2 (VODP2)	1468	22/04/2010	21/10/2010	31/12/2019	9	146,175,000
Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas (PROFIRA)	1630	19/09/2013	24/11/2014	31/12/2021	7	36,386,901
Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR)	1681	16/12/2014	05/08/2015	30/09/2022	7	70,984,000
National Oil Palm Project (NOPP)	1484	16/04/2018	01/03/2019	31/03/2029	10	210,442,000
National Oilseeds Project (NOSP)	2260	17/12/2019	N/A	31/12/2027	-	160,686,000

Impact evaluation

Ethiopia	Community-based Integrated Natural Resources Management Project	1424	30/04/2009	17/03/2010	30/09/2018	8	25,425,009
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Project performance evaluations

Bangladesh	Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure Project (CCRIP)	1647	2013	2013	2019	6	150,053,320
Botswana	Agricultural Services Support Project	1546	2010	2012	2018	6	25,021,390
China	Hunan Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project (HARIIP)	1627	2012	2012	2017	5	93,198,556
Dominican	Rural Economic Development Project in the Central and Eastern Provinces	1533	2010	2012	2018	6	48,457,685
India	Tejaswini Rural Women's Empowerment Programme	1314	2005	2007	2018	11	228,160,100
Malawi	Rural Livelihoods and Economic Enhancement Programme	1365	2007	2009	2017	8	29,241,489
Senegal	Support to Agricultural Development and Rural Entrepreneurship Programme (PADAER)	1614	2011	2011	2019	8	59,122,692
Tajikistan	Khatlon Livelihoods Support Project	1408	2008	2009	2015	6	12,303,048
Turkey	Ardahan-Kars-Artvin Development Project (AKADP)	1492	2009	2010	2017	7	26,414,951
Uganda	Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS)	1465	2010	2011	2018	7	638,493,893
Bosnia	Rural Business Development Project (RBDP)	1593	2011	2014	2019	5	30,222,378
Burundi	Agricultural Intensification and Value-Enhancing Support Project (PAIVA - B)	1469	2009	2009	2019	10	55,886,645

China	Yunnan Agricultural and Rural Improvement Project (YARIP)	1629	2012	2013	2018	5	93,999,349
China	Shiyan Smallholder Agribusiness Development Project (SSADeP)	1699	2013	2014	2019	5	116,899,129
Congo	Agricultural Value Chains Support Development Programme (PADEF)	1583	2011	2013	2018	5	17,349,830
El Salvador	Rural Territorial Competitiveness Programme (Amanecer Rural)	1568	2010	2012	2018	6	36,622,871
Guatemala	National Rural Development Programme: Central and Eastern Regions (PNDR ORIENTE)	1317	2004	2008	2017	9	34,000,164
Guatemala	Sustainable Rural Development Programme for the Northern Region	1473	2008	2012	2019	7	40,442,162
Honduras	Sustainable Rural Development Programme for the Southern Region (Emprende Sur)	1535	2010	2011	2019	8	37,206,966
India	Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed Districts Programme (CAIM)	1470	2009	2009	2018	9	118,645,691
Indonesia	Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia (SOLID)	1509	2011	2011	2019	8	65,001,741
Kenya	Programme for Rural Outreach of Financial Innovations and Technologies (PROFIT)	1378	2010	2010	2019	9	83,216,646
Kenya	Smallholder Dairy Commercialization Programme (SDCP)	1305	2005	2006	2019	13	40,020,000
Kyrgyzstan	Livestock and Market Development Programme (LMDP)	1626	2012	2013	2019	6	25,881,434
Lebanon	Hilly Areas Sustainable Agriculture Development Project (HASAD)	1421	2009	2012	2019	8	27,174,385
Madagascar	Support to Farmers' Professional Organizations and Agricultural Services Project (AROPA)	1429	2008	2009	2019	10	71,343,696
Maldives	Mariculture Enterprise Development Project (MEDEP)	1624	2012	2013	2019	6	7,132,170
Mali	Rural Microfinance Programme (PMR)	1441	2009	2010	2018	8	42,075,213
Mexico	Rural Productive Inclusion Project United Mexican States (PROINPRO)	0973	2015	2016	2018	2	19,526,000
Morocco	Agricultural Value Chain Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Al-Haouz Province (PDFAZMH)	1526	2011	2012	2019	7	9,129,128
Nepal	High-Value Agriculture Project in Hill and Mountain Areas (HVAP)	1471	2009	2010	2018	8	18,872,483
Nepal	Poverty Alleviation Fund Project II (PAF II)	1450	2007	2008	2018	10	213,508,839
Paraguay	Inclusion of Family Farming in Value Chains Project (Paraguay Inclusivo)	1611	2012	2013	2018	5	26,546,402

Sao Tome et Principe	Smallholder Commercial Agriculture Project (PAPAC)	1687	2014	2014	2019	5	9,790,000
Sierra Leone	Smallholder Commercialization Programme (SCP)	1599	2011	2011	2019	8	56,400,000
Sudan	Seed Development Project (SDP)	1612	2011	2012	2018	6	17,463,567
Sudan	Butana Integrated Rural Development Project (BIRDp)	1332	2006	2008	2019	11	46,689,222
Vietnam	Sustainable Rural Development for the Poor Project in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces (SRDP)	1662	2013	2013	2018	5	46,225,721

List of country strategy and programme evaluations completed and published by IOE (1992-2020)

<i>Country programme evaluation</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Publication year(s)</i>
Angola	ESA	2018
Argentina	LAC	2010
Bangladesh	APR	1994, 2006, 2016
Benin	WCA	2005
Burkina Faso	WCA	2019
Plurinational State of Bolivia	LAC	2005, 2014
Brazil	LAC	2008, 2016
Cambodia	APR	2018
Cameroon	WCA	2018
China	APR	2014
Democratic Republic of Congo	WCA	2017
Ecuador	LAC	2014, 2020
Egypt	NEN	2005, 2017
Ethiopia	ESA	2009, 2016
Gambia (The)	WCA	2016
Georgia	NEN	2018
Ghana	WCA	1996, 2012
Honduras	LAC	1996
India	APR	2010, 2016
Indonesia	APR	2004, 2014
Jordan	NEN	2014
Kenya	ESA	2011, 2019
Madagascar	ESA	2013, 2020
Mali	WCA	2007, 2013
Mauritania	WCA	1998
Mexico	LAC	2006, 2020
Morocco	NEN	2008, 2020

<i>Country programme evaluation</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Publication year(s)</i>
Republic of Moldova	NEN	2014
Mozambique	ESA	2010, 2017
Nepal	APR	1999, 2013, 2020
Nicaragua	LAC	2017
Niger	WCA	2011, 2020
Nigeria	WCA	2009, 2016
Pakistan	APR	1995, 2008, 2020
Papua New Guinea	APR	2002
Peru	LAC	2018
Philippines	APR	2017
Rwanda	ESA	2006, 2012
Senegal	WCA	2004, 2014
Sierra Leone	WCA	2020
Sri Lanka	APR	2002, 2019
Sudan	NEN	1994, 2009, 2020
Syrian Arab Republic	NEN	2001
United Republic of Tanzania	ESA	2003, 2015
Tunisia	NEN	2003, 2019
Turkey	NEN	2016
Uganda	ESA	2013, 2020
Viet Nam	APR	2001, 2012
Yemen	NEN	1992, 2012
Zambia	ESA	2014

Note: APR= Asia and the Pacific; ESA= East and Southern Africa; LAC= Latin America and the Caribbean; NEN= Near East North Africa and Europe; WCA= West and Central Africa

List of all projects covered in quantitative analysis on performance ratings

Table
List of 298 projects covered in quantitative analysis of performance ratings (chapter II.A and II.B)⁴⁷

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
APR (73)						
1460	Afghanistan	Rural Microfinance and Livestock Support Programme	PCRv	2009	2009	2016
1165	Bangladesh	Sunamganj Community-Based Resource Management Project (SCBRMP)	PCRv	2001	2003	2014
1355	Bangladesh	National Agricultural Technology Project (NATP)	PCRv	2007	2008	2014
1402	Bangladesh	Finance for Enterprise Development and Employment Creation Project (FEDEC)	PPE	2007	2008	2014
1284	Bangladesh	Microfinance for Marginal and Small Farmers Project	PPE	2004	2005	2011
1235	Bangladesh	Microfinance and Technical Support Project	PPE	2003	2003	2010
1466	Bangladesh	Participatory Small Scale Water Resources Sector Project (PSSWRSP)	PCRv	2010	2011	2018
1322	Bangladesh	Market Infrastructure Development Project in Charland Regions (MIDPCR)	PCRv	2005	2006	2013
1647	Bangladesh	Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure Project (CCRIP)	PPE	2013	2013	2019
1296	Bhutan	Agriculture, Marketing and Enterprise Promotion Programme	PPE	2005	2006	2012
1482	Bhutan	Market Access and Growth Intensification Project	PCRv	2010	2011	2016
1350	Cambodia	Rural Livelihoods Improvement Programme (RULIP)	PPE+	2007	2007	2014
1261	Cambodia	Rural Poverty Reduction Project (Prey Veng and Svay Rieng)	PPE+	2003	2004	2011
1175	Cambodia	Community-Based Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom and Kampot	PPE+	2000	2001	2009
1559	Cambodia	Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment	PCRv	2012	2012	2018
1323	China	Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Modular Rural Development Programme	PCRv	2006	2008	2014
1400	China	Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Rural Advancement Programme	PCRv	2007	2008	2014
1454	China	Dabieshan Area Poverty Reduction Programme	PCRv	2008	2009	2015
1223	China	Environment Conservation and Poverty Reduction Programme in Ningxia and Shanxi	PPE	2002	2005	2011
1227	China	Rural Finance Sector Programme	PPE	2004	2005	2010
1555	China	Guangxi Integrated Agricultural Development Project (GIADP)	PCRv	2011	2012	2017
1627	China	Hunan Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project (HARIIP)	PPE	2012	2012	2017
1629	China	Yunnan Agricultural and Rural Improvement Project (YARIP)	PCRv	2012	2013	2018
1699	China	Shiyang Smallholder Agribusiness Development Project (SSADeP)	PCRv	2013	2014	2019
1155	India	Orissa Tribal Empowerment and Livelihood Programme	PCRv	2002	2003	2016
1381	India	Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods Programme in the mid-Gangetic Plains (WELP)	PCRv	2006	2009	2015
1063	India	Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh Tribal Development Programme	IE	1999	2001	2012
1226	India	Livelihood Improvement Project for the Himalayas	PPE	2003	2004	2012
1121	India	National Microfinance Support Programme	PPE	2000	2002	2009

⁴⁷ PCRv+ or PPE+ indicate that these assessment also benefited from CSPEs.

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1470	India	Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed Districts Programme (CAIM)	PCRv	2009	2009	2018
1040	India	North Eastern Region Community Resource Management Project for Upland Areas	PCRv	2009	2010	2016
1418	India	Mitigating Poverty in Western Rajasthan Project	PCRv	2009	2010	2017
1314	India	Tejaswini Rural Women's Empowerment Programme	PPE	2005	2007	2018
1258	Indonesia	Rural Empowerment and Agricultural Development Programme in Central Sulawesi	PCRv	2004	2008	2014
1112	Indonesia	Post Crisis Programme for Participatory Integrated Development in Rainfed Areas	PCRv	2000	2001	2009
1621	Indonesia	Coastal Community Development Project	PCRv	2009	2010	2017
1509	Indonesia	Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia (SOLID)	PCRv	2011	2011	2019
1608	Lao People's Dem. Rep.	Community Based Food Security and Economic Opportunities Programme	PCRv	2012	2012	2017
1301	Laos	Rural Livelihoods Improvement Programme in Attapeu and Sayabouri	PPE	2005	2006	2014
1396	Laos	Northern Regions Sustainable Livelihoods through Livestock Development Programme (NRSLDP)	PPE	2006	2007	2013
1459	Laos	Sustainable Natural Resource Management and Productivity Enhancement Programme	PCRv	2008	2009	2015
1347	Maldives	Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme	PPE	2005	2006	2013
1377	Maldives	Fisheries and Agricultural Diversification Project	PCRv	2009	2009	2018
1624	Maldives	Mariculture Enterprise Development Project (MEDEP)	PCRv	2012	2013	2019
1205	Mongolia	Rural Poverty Reduction Programme	PPE	2002	2003	2011
1285	Nepal	Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Programme	PCRv	2004	2005	2014
1119	Nepal	Western Uplands Poverty Alleviation Project	PPE	2006	2008	2016
1450	Nepal	Poverty Alleviation Fund Project II (PAF II)	PCRv	2007	2008	2018
1471	Nepal	High-Value Agriculture Project in Hill and Mountain Areas (HVAP)	PCRv	2009	2010	2018
1245	Pakistan	Community Development Programme	PPE	2003	2004	2012
1385	Pakistan	Project for the Restoration of Earthquake-affected Communities and Households	PCRv	2006	2006	2009
1324	Pakistan	Microfinance Innovation and Outreach Programme	PCRv	2005	2006	2011
1078	Pakistan	Southern Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Project	PCRv	2000	2002	2010
1413	Pakistan	Programme for Increasing Sustainable Microfinance (PRISM)	PCRv	2007	2008	2013
1253	Philippines	Rural Microenterprise Promotion Programme (RuMEPP)	PPE	2005	2006	2013
1137	Philippines	Northern Mindanao Community Initiatives and Resource Management Project	PPE	2001	2003	2009
1565	Solomon Islands	Solomon Islands Rural Development Programme (RDP)	PCRv	2010	2011	2013
1316	Sri Lanka	Smallholder Plantations Entrepreneurship Development Programme (SPEnDP)	PPE+	2006	2007	2016
1254	Sri Lanka	Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme	IE+	2004	2005	2013
1346	Sri Lanka	Post-Tsunami Coastal Rehabilitation and Resource Management Programme (PT-CRRMP)	PPE+	2005	2006	2013
1351	Sri Lanka	Post-Tsunami Livelihoods Support and Partnership Programme	PCRv+	2005	2006	2010
1600	Sri Lanka	Iranamadu Irrigation Development Project	PCRv+	2011	2012	2017
1457	Sri Lanka	National Agribusiness Development Programme (NADeP)	PCRv	2011	2011	2017
1576	Timor Leste	Timor-Leste Maize Storage Project	PCRv	2011	2012	2015
1628	Tonga	Tonga Rural Innovation Project	PCRv	2012	2012	2017
1422	Vietnam	Developing Business for the Rural Poor Project in Cao Bang Province	PCRv	2007	2008	2014

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1477	Vietnam	Pro-Poor Partnerships for Agroforestry Development Project	PPE	2008	2009	2015
1374	Vietnam	Programme for Improving Market Participation of the Poor in Ha Tinh and Tra Vinh Provinces	PCR/V	2006	2007	2012
1272	Vietnam	Decentralized Programme for Rural Poverty Reduction in Ha Giang and Quang Binh Provinces	PCR/V	2004	2005	2011
1202	Vietnam	Rural Income Diversification Project in Tuyen Quang Province	PPE	2001	2002	2009
1483	Vietnam	Project for the Economic Empowerment of Ethnic Minorities in Poor Communes of Dak Nong Province	PCR/V	2010	2010	2016
1552	Vietnam	Agriculture, Farmers and Rural Areas Support Project TNSP	PCR/V	2010	2011	2017
1662	Vietnam	Sustainable Rural Development for the Poor Project in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces (SRDP)	PCR/V	2013	2013	2018
ESA (55)						
1391	Angola	Market-oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project	PCR/V+	2007	2009	2016
1546	Botswana	Agricultural Services Support Project	PPE	2010	2012	2018
1358	Burundi	Livestock Sector Rehabilitation Support Project	PCR/V	2007	2008	2014
1105	Burundi	Rural Recovery Programme	PPE	1999	1999	2010
1469	Burundi	Agricultural Intensification and Value-Enhancing Support Project (PAIVA - B)	PCR/V	2009	2009	2019
1291	Burundi	Transitional Programme of Post-Conflict Reconstruction	PCR/V	2004	2005	2013
1241	Comores	National programme for sustainable human development (PNDHD)	PCR/V	2007	2007	2014
1518	Eritrea	Fisheries Development Project	PCR/V	2010	2010	2016
1359	Eritrea	Post Crisis Rural Recovery and Development Programme (PCRRDP)	PCR/V	2006	2007	2013
1373	Eswatini	Rural Finance and Enterprise Development Programme	PPE	2008	2010	2016
1292	Ethiopia	Agricultural Marketing Improvement Programme (AMIP)	PCR/V	2004	2006	2013
1370	Ethiopia	Participatory Small-Scale Irrigation Development Programme	PCR/V	2007	2008	2015
1237	Ethiopia	Pastoral Community Development Project (PCDP)	PCR/V	2003	2004	2009
1424	Ethiopia	Community-based Integrated Natural Resources Management Project	IE	2009	2010	2018
1458	Ethiopia	Pastoral Community Development Project - Phase II (PCDP II)	PPE	2009	2010	2015
1305	Kenya	Smallholder Dairy Commercialization Programme (SDCP)	PCR/V	2005	2006	2019
1330	Kenya	Smallholder Horticulture Marketing Programme (SHoMaP)	IE	2007	2007	2014
1234	Kenya	Mount Kenya East Pilot Project for Natural Resource Management	PCR/V+	2002	2004	2012
1378	Kenya	Programme for Rural Outreach of Financial Innovations and Technologies (PROFIT)	PCR/V	2010	2010	2019
1114	Kenya	Central Kenya Dry Area Smallholder and Community Services Development Project	PCR/V+	2000	2001	2010
1243	Kenya	Southern Nyanza Community Development Project	PCR/V+	2003	2004	2013
1371	Lesotho	Rural Financial Intermediation Programme	PPE	2007	2008	2015
1150	Lesotho	Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Programme	PPE	2004	2005	2011
1318	Madagascar	Project to Support Development in the Menabe and Melaky Regions	PPE	2006	2006	2015
1429	Madagascar	Support to Farmers' Professional Organizations and Agricultural Services Project (AROPA)	PCR/V	2008	2009	2019
1239	Madagascar	Rural Income Promotion Programme	PCR/V	2003	2004	2013
1164	Malawi	Rural Livelihoods Support Programme (RLSP)	PPE	2001	2004	2013
1365	Malawi	Rural Livelihoods and Economic Enhancement Programme	PPE	2007	2009	2017

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1357	Mauritius	Marine and Agricultural Resources Support Programme (MARS)	PCR/V	2008	2009	2013
1093	Mauritius	Rural Diversification Programme	PPE	1999	2000	2010
1267	Mozambique	Rural Finance Support Programme (RFSP)	PCR/V	2003	2005	2013
1326	Mozambique	PRONEA Support Project	PCR/V	2006	2009	2015
1184	Mozambique	Sofala Bank Artisanal Fisheries Project	IE	2001	2002	2011
1276	Rwanda	Rural Small and Micro-Enterprise Promotion Project - Phase II (PPMER II)	PCR/V	2003	2004	2013
1431	Rwanda	Kirehe Community-based Watershed Management Project	PPE	2008	2009	2016
1149	Rwanda	Umutara Community Resource and Infrastructure Development Project	PCR/V	2000	2000	2011
1232	Rwanda	Smallholder Cash and Export Crops Development Project (PDCRE)	PCR/V	2002	2003	2011
1320	Rwanda	Support Project for the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (PAPSTA)	PPE	2005	2006	2013
1560	Seychelles	Competitive Local Innovations for Small-scale Agriculture Project (CLISSA)	PCR/V	2013	2013	2018
1453	South Sudan	South Sudan Livelihoods Development Project	PCR/V	2008	2009	2016
1159	Swaziland	Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project (LUSIP) - Phase I	PCR/V	2001	2004	2013
1363	Tanzania	Rural Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Support Programme	PCR/V	2006	2007	2016
1420	Tanzania	Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP)	PCR/V	2004	2007	2016
1369	Uganda	District Livelihoods Support Programme	PCR/V	2006	2007	2014
1197	Uganda	Rural Financial Services Programme	PCR/V	2002	2004	2013
1021	Uganda	Vegetable Oil Development Project	PCR/V	1997	1998	2011
1158	Uganda	National Agricultural Advisory Services Programme	PCR/V	2000	2001	2010
1122	Uganda	Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme	PPE	1999	2002	2008
1465	Uganda	Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS)	PPE	2010	2011	2018
1419	Uganda	Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme	PCR/V	2007	2008	2013
1474	Zambia	Smallholder Agribusiness Promotion Programme	PCR/V	2003	2006	2017
1280	Zambia	Rural Finance Programme	PCR/V	2004	2007	2013
1319	Zambia	Smallholder Livestock Investment Project	PCR/V	2005	2007	2014
1108	Zambia	Smallholder Enterprise and Marketing Programme	PCR/V	1999	2000	2008
1039	Zambia	Forestry Management Project	PPE	1999	2002	2007
LAC (46)						
1279	Argentina	Patagonia Rural Development Project (PRODERPA)	PCR/V	2004	2007	2014
1364	Argentina	Rural Areas Development Programme (PRODEAR)	PCR/V	2006	2009	2015
1098	Argentina	North Western Rural Development Project (PRODERNOA)	PCR/V	1999	2003	2011
1456	Belize	Rural Finance Programme	PPE	2008	2009	2016
1298	Bolivia	Enhancement of the Peasant Camelid Economy Support Project	PCR/V	2006	2009	2015
1145	Bolivia	Management of Natural Resources in the Chaco and High Valley Regions Project	PPE	2000	2003	2010
1031	Bolivia	Small Farmers Technical Assistance Services Project	PCR/V	1997	1998	2007
1335	Brazil	Rural Communities Development Project in the Poorest Areas of the State of Bahia	PPE	2006	2006	2012
1294	Colombia	Rural Microenterprise assets programme: capitalization, technical assistance and investment support	PCR/V	2006	2007	2013
1479	Dominican Republic	Development Project for Rural Poor Economic Organizations of the Border Region	PCR/V	2009	2010	2016
1533	Dominican Republic	Rural Economic Development Project in the Central and Eastern Provinces	PPE	2010	2012	2018

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1297	Ecuador	Development of the Central Corridor Project	PCR/V	2004	2007	2014
1416	El Salvador	Rural Development and Modernization Project (PRODERMOR CENTRAL)	PCR/V	2007	2009	2015
1215	El Salvador	Reconstruction and Rural Modernization Programme	PCR/V	2001	2002	2011
1568	El Salvador	Rural Territorial Competitiveness Programme (Amanecer Rural)	PCR/V	2010	2012	2018
1181	Grenada	Rural Enterprise Project	PCR/V	2001	2002	2009
1569	Grenada	Market Access and Rural Enterprise Development Programme	PCR/V	2011	2011	2018
1317	Guatemala	National Rural Development Programme: Central and Eastern Regions (PNDR ORIENTE)	PCR/V	2004	2008	2017
1274	Guatemala	National Rural Development Programme Phase I: the Western Region	PPE	2003	2006	2012
1085	Guatemala	Rural Development Programme for Las Verapaces (PRODEVER)	PCR/V	1999	2001	2011
1473	Guatemala	Sustainable Rural Development Programme for the Northern Region	PCR/V	2008	2012	2019
1415	Guyana	Rural Enterprise and Agricultural Development Project	PPE	2007	2009	2015
1171	Haiti	Productive Initiatives Support Programme in Rural Areas	PCR/V	2002	2002	2014
1275	Haiti	Projet de Développement de la Petite Irrigation–Phase 2 (PPI-2)	PPE	2007	2008	2016
1070	Haiti	Food Crops Intensification Project - Phase II	PCR/V	1998	2001	2010
1407	Honduras	Enhancing the Rural Economic Competitiveness of Yoro	PCR/V	2007	2008	2016
1128	Honduras	National Fund for Sustainable Rural Development Project (FONADERS)	PCR/V	1999	2000	2009
1198	Honduras	National Programme for Local Development (PRONADEL)	PCR/V	2001	2001	2009
1535	Honduras	Sustainable Rural Development Programme for the Southern Region (Emprende Sur)	PCR/V	2010	2011	2019
1349	Mexico	Sustainable Development Project for Rural and Indigenous Communities of the Semi-Arid North-West (PRODESNOS)	PCR/V	2005	2006	2013
1268	Mexico	Strengthening Project for the National Micro-Watershed Programme	PCR/V	2003	2005	2010
1141	Mexico	Rural Development Project for Rubber-Producing Regions of Mexico	PCR/V	2000	2001	2009
1412	Mexico	Community-based Forestry Development Project in Southern States (Campeche, Chiapas and Oaxaca)	PPE	2009	2011	2016
2E+09	Mexico	Rural Productive Inclusion Project United Mexican States (PROINPRO)	PCR/V	2015	2016	2018
1380	Nicaragua	Inclusion of Small-Scale Producers in Value Chains and Market Access Project	PCR/V	2007	2008	2015
1256	Nicaragua	Programme for the Economic Development of the Dry Region in Nicaragua (PRODESEC)	PCR/V+	2003	2004	2010
1505	Nicaragua	Agricultural, Fishery and Forestry Productive Systems Development Programme in RAAN and RAAS Indigenous Territories – NICARIBE	PCR/V	2010	2012	2017
1120	Nicaragua	Technical Assistance Fund Programme for the Departments of Leon, Chinandega and Managua	PPE	1999	2001	2013
1199	Panama	Sustainable Rural Development Project for the Ngobe-Buglé Territory and Adjoining Districts	PCR/V	2001	2003	2011
1389	Panama	Participative Development and Rural Modernization Project	PCR/V	2008	2010	2015
1333	Paraguay	Empowerment of Rural Poor Organizations and Harmonization of Investments Projects	PCR/V	2005	2007	2013
1611	Paraguay	Inclusion of Family Farming in Value Chains Project (Paraguay Inclusivo)	PCR/V	2012	2013	2018
1240	Peru	Market Strengthening and Livelihood Diversification in the Southern Highlands Project	PPE	2002	2005	2014
1161	Uruguay	Uruguay Rural	PPE	2000	2001	2011

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1252	Venezuela	Sustainable Rural Development Project for the Semi Arid Zones of Falcon and Lara States (PROSALFA II)	PCR/V	2003	2006	2013
1186	Venezuela	Agro-Productive Chains Development Project in the Barlovento Region	PCR/V	2000	2003	2009
NEN (55)						
1339	Albania	Programme for Sustainable Development in Rural Mountain Areas	PPE	2005	2007	2013
1452	Albania	Mountain to Markets Programme	PCR/V	2008	2009	2014
1411	Armenia	Farmer Market Access Programme (FMAP)	PCR/V	2007	2008	2013
1307	Armenia	Rural Areas Economic Development Programme	PPE	2004	2005	2009
1538	Armenia	Rural Asset Creation Programme	PCR/V	2010	2011	2016
1398	Azerbaijan	Rural Development Project for the North-West	PCR/V	2007	2009	2014
1289	Azerbaijan	North East Rural Development Project	PPE	2004	2006	2011
1148	Azerbaijan	Rural Development Programme for Mountainous and Highland Areas	PCR/V	2000	2001	2008
1451	Bosnia	Rural Livelihoods Development Project	PCR/V	2008	2010	2016
1342	Bosnia	Rural Enterprise Enhancement Project (REEP)	PCR/V	2006	2007	2012
1593	Bosnia	Rural Business Development Project (RBDP)	PCR/V	2011	2014	2019
1366	Djibouti	Programme for Mobilization of Surface Water and Sustainable Land Management (PROMES-GDT)	PCR/V	2007	2008	2014
1236	Djibouti	Microfinance and Microenterprise Development Project (MMDP)	PPE	2002	2004	2012
1204	Egypt	West Noubaria Rural Development Project	PPE+	2002	2003	2014
1376	Egypt	Upper Egypt Rural Development Project	PCR/V	2006	2007	2017
1147	Georgia	Rural Development Programme for Mountainous and Highland Areas	PPE	2000	2001	2011
1325	Georgia	Rural Development Project	PPE	2005	2006	2011
1507	Georgia	Agricultural Support Project	IE	2009	2010	2015
1295	Jordan	Agricultural Resource Management Project - Phase II	PCR/V	2004	2005	2015
1092	Jordan	Yarmouk Agricultural Resources Development Project	PPE	1999	2000	2008
1434	Kyrgyz	Agricultural Investments and Services Project (AISP)	PPE	2008	2009	2014
1626	Kyrgyzstan	Livestock and Market Development Programme (LMDP)	PCR/V	2012	2013	2019
1421	Lebanon	Hilly Areas Sustainable Agriculture Development Project (HASAD)	PCR/V	2009	2012	2019
1449	Moldova	Rural Financial Services and Marketing (RFSMP)	PCR/V	2008	2009	2014
1340	Moldova	Rural Business Development Programme	PPE	2005	2006	2011
1562	Moldova	Rural Financial Services and Agribusiness Development Project	PPE	2010	2011	2016
1338	Morocco	Rural Development Project in the Eastern Middle Atlas Mountains	PPE	2005	2007	2015
1388	Morocco	Rural Development Project Mountain zones of Errachidia Province	PCR/V	2007	2008	2014
1178	Morocco	Rural Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Al-Haouz Province (PDRZMH)	PPE	2000	2002	2010
1230	Morocco	Livestock and Rangelands Development Project in the Eastern Region - Phase II	PCR/V	2003	2004	2010
1010	Morocco	Rural Development Project for Taourirt - Taforalt (PDRTT)	PCR/V	1996	1998	2009
1526	Morocco	Agricultural Value Chain Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Al-Haouz Province	PCR/V	2011	2012	2019
1079	Palestine	Participatory Natural Resource Management Programme	PPE	1998	2000	2015
1277	Sudan	Western Sudan Resources Management Programme	PCR/V	2004	2005	2016
1263	Sudan	Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project	PPE	2003	2004	2012

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1332	Sudan	Butana Integrated Rural Development Project (BIRDP)	PCR/V	2006	2008	2019
1140	Sudan	South Kordofan Rural Development Programme (SKRDP)	PCR/V	2000	2001	2012
1476	Sudan	Revitalizing the Sudan Gum Arabic Production and Marketing Project	PCR/V	2009	2009	2014
1503	Sudan	Rural Access Project (RAP)	PCR/V	2001	2003	2016
1524	Sudan	Supporting Small-scale Traditional Rainfed Producers in Sinnar State	PCR/V	2010	2011	2018
1612	Sudan	Seed Development Project (SDP)	PCR/V	2011	2012	2018
1233	Syria	Idleb Rural Devt Prj: Idleb Rural Development Project (IRDP)	PCR/V	2002	2003	2014
1375	Syria	North-eastern Regional Rural Development Project (NERRD)	PCR/V	2007	2008	2015
1073	Syria	Badia Rangelands Development Project	PCR/V	1998	1998	2010
1408	Tajikistan	Khatlon Livelihoods Support Project	PPE	2008	2009	2015
1213	Tunisia	Programme for Agro-pastoral Development and Promotion of Local Initiatives in the South-East (PRODESUD)	PCR/V+	2002	2003	2015
1299	Tunisia	Integrated Agricultural Development Project in the Governorate of Siliana-Phase II (RAP Siliana II)	PCR/V+	2005	2007	2014
1189	Turkey	Sivas – Erzincan Development Project	PPE	2003	2005	2013
1344	Turkey	Diyabakir, Batman & Siirt Development Project (DBSDP)	PCR/V	2006	2007	2014
1492	Turkey	Ardahan-Kars-Artvin Development Project (AKADP)	PPE	2009	2010	2017
1269	Yemen	Al-Dhala Community Resource Management Development Project	PCR/V	2004	2007	2014
1403	Yemen	Rained Agriculture and Livestock Project (RALP)	PCR/V	2007	2009	2014
1195	Yemen	Dhamar Participatory Rural Development Project	PCR/V	2002	2004	2012
1095	Yemen	Al-Mahara Rural Development Project (AMRDP)	PCR/V	1999	2000	2009
1293	Yemen	Pilot Community-based Rural Infrastructure Project in Highland Areas	PCR/V	2005	2007	2013
WCA (69)						
1211	Benin	Participatory Artisanal Fisheries Development Support Programme	PCR/V	2001	2003	2011
1331	Benin	Rural Economic Growth Support Project	PCR/V	2009	2010	2016
1250	Benin	Rural Development Support Programme (PADER)	PCR/V	2005	2007	2012
1360	Burkina Faso	Agricultural Commodity Chain Support Project	PCR/V+	2006	2007	2016
1368	Burkina Faso	Small-scale irrigation and water management project (PIGEPE)	PCR/V+	2007	2008	2014
1247	Burkina Faso	Sustainable Rural Development Programme (PDRD)	PCR/V+	2004	2005	2013
1220	Burkina Faso	Community Investment Programme for Agricultural Fertility	PCR/V+	2003	2004	2012
1425	Burkina Faso	Rural Business Development Services Programme	PCR/V+	2009	2010	2016
1103	Burkina Faso	Rural Microenterprise support project	PCR/V+	1999	2000	2008
1136	Cameroon	Community Development Support Project	PCR/V	2002	2003	2009
1238	Cameroon	Roots and Tubers Market-driven Development Programme	PCR/V+	2003	2004	2012
1362	Cameroon	Rural Microfinance Development Support Project	PPE	2008	2010	2016
1439	Cameroon	Commodity Value Chain Support Project	PCR/V	2011	2011	2017
1015	Cape Verde	Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme	PCR/V	1999	2000	2013
1579	Central African Republic	Project to Revitalize Crop and Livestock Production in the Savannah	PCR/V	2011	2012	2017
1582	Chad	Rural Development Support Programme in Guéra	PCR/V	2008	2008	2017

Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1283	Chad	Batha Rural Development Project	PCR/V	2005	2006	2010
1144	Chad	Food Security Project in the northern Guéra Region - Phase II	PCR/V	2000	2001	2009
1259	Chad	Kanem Rural Development Project	PCR/V	2003	2005	2009
1446	Chad	Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas	PPE	2009	2010	2015
1216	Congo	Rural Development Project in the Plateaux, Cuvette and Western Cuvette Departments	PCR/V	2004	2004	2011
1327	Congo	Rural Development Project in the Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou Departments (PRODERSUD)	PCR/V	2006	2006	2013
1438	Congo	Rural Development Project in the Likouala, Pool and Sangha Departments	PCR/V	2008	2009	2015
1583	Congo	Agricultural Value Chains Support Development Programme (PADEF)	PCR/V	2011	2013	2018
1133	Cote d'Ivoire	Small Horticultural Producer Support	PCR/V	2000	2001	2011
1435	Cote d'Ivoire	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project	PPE	2009	2009	2014
1589	Cote d'Ivoire	Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project	PCR/V	2012	2013	2018
1244	DR Congo	Agricultural Revival programme in Equateur Province (PRAPE)	PCR/V	2004	2005	2012
1311	DR Congo	Agricultural rehabilitation programme in orientale province (PRAPO)	PPE	2005	2007	2013
1313	Gabon	Agricultural and Rural Development Project	PCR/V	2010	2010	2017
1152	Gambia	Participatory Integrated-Watershed Management Project	PCR/V	2004	2006	2014
1303	Gambia	Rural Finance Project	PCR/V	2006	2008	2014
1504	Gambia	Livestock and Horticulture Development Project	PCR/V	2009	2010	2015
1312	Ghana	Root and Tuber Improvement and Marketing Programme	PPE	2005	2006	2014
1390	Ghana	Northern Rural Growth Programme	PCR/V	2008	2010	2016
1187	Ghana	Rural Enterprise Project - Phase II	PCR/V	2002	2003	2012
1183	Ghana	Northern Region Poverty Reduction Programme	PCR/V	2001	2004	2011
1428	Ghana	Rural and Agricultural Finance Programme	PCR/V	2010	2011	2016
1134	Ghana	Rural Finance Services Project	PPE	2000	2002	2008
1135	Guinea	Programme for Participatory Rural Development in Haute Guinée	PCR/V	1999	2001	2010
1206	Guinea	National Programme to Support Agricultural Value Chain Actors (PNAFA)	PCR/V	2007	2008	2017
1282	Guinea	Support to Rural Development in North lower Guinea PADER BGN	PCR/V	2003	2005	2013
1345	Guinea	Village Communities Support Project, Phase II (PACV II)	PCR/V	2007	2008	2014
1278	Guinea Bissau	Rural Rehabilitation and Community Development Project	PCR/V	2007	2008	2013
1616	Liberia	Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Support project (STCRSP)	PPE	2007	2009	2018
1501	Liberia	Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation Project	PCR/V	2009	2009	2017
1131	Mali	Northern Regions Investment and Rural Development Programme (PIDRN)	PCR/V	2005	2006	2014
1356	Mali	Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme (PIDRK)	PCR/V	2006	2007	2014
1441	Mali	Rural Microfinance Programme (PMR)	PCR/V	2009	2010	2018
1444	Mali	Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project (FAPP)	PCR/V	2011	2012	2018
1255	Mauritania	Oasis Sustainable Development Programme	PPE	2003	2004	2014
1180	Mauritania	Maghama Improved Flood Recession Farming Project - Phase II	PCR/V	2002	2003	2010
1433	Mauritania	Value Chains Development Programme for Poverty Reduction	PCR/V	2009	2010	2016


Project ID	Country	Project	Type	Approval	Entry into force	Completion
1646	Niger	Ruwanmu Small-Scale Irrigation Project	PCR/V	2010	2010	2016
1591	Niger	Emergency Food Security and Rural Development Programme (PUSADER)	PCR/V	2010	2011	2014
1221	Niger	Project for the Promotion of Local Initiative for Development in Aguié	PCR/V	2002	2005	2013
1443	Niger	Agricultural and Rural Rehabilitation and Development Initiative Project - Institutional Strengthening Component	PCR/V	2008	2009	2013
1625	Niger	Projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement dans la région de Maradi (PASADEM)	IE	2011	2012	2018
1260	Nigeria	Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme - Niger Delta Region	PCR/V	2002	2005	2015
1212	Nigeria	Rural Finance Institutions Building Programme	PCR/V	2006	2010	2017
1196	Nigeria	Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP)	PPE	2001	2003	2013
1027	Sao Tome & Principe	Participatory Smallholder Agriculture and Artisanal Fisheries Development Programme (RAP PAPAFA)	PCR/V	2001	2003	2015
1687	Sao Tome & Principe	Smallholder Commercial Agriculture Project (PAPAC)	PCR/V	2014	2014	2019
1414	Senegal	Agricultural Value Chains Support Project	PCR/V	2008	2010	2016
1614	Senegal	Support to Agricultural Development and Rural Entrepreneurship Programme (PADAER)	PPE	2011	2011	2019
1054	Sierra Leone	Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction Project	PPE	2002	2004	2017
1310	Sierra Leone	Rural Finance and Community Improvement Programme	PCR/V	2007	2008	2014
1599	Sierra Leone	Smallholder Commercialization Programme (SCP)	PCR/V	2011	2011	2019
1558	Togo	Support to Agricultural Development Project (PADAT)	PCR/V	2006	2007	2017

Methodology and analysis for Chapter III (factors influencing project performance on efficiency)

- The 2021 ARRI includes a chapter with a focus on project performance on efficiency based on the evaluations for projects completed between 2007 and 2019. Efficiency has generally been the worst-performing criterion. In addition, the IOE ratings have tended to fluctuate more than other criteria. After a period of downward movement, performance on efficiency by rolling three-year period is now showing an upward positive shift (chart 1).

Chart 1


Share of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better for efficiency criterion (2007-2019, by year of completion)



- Chart 2 presents the ratings on efficiency by each year of project completion instead of three-year average (chart 1). This shows that projects completed in years 2013, 2014 and 2015 had an increasing share of unsatisfactory ratings, while the performance improved for projects completed between 2017 and 2019.

Chart 2

Share of projects rated moderately satisfactory or above for efficiency (projects completed between 2013 and 2019, by year)



- In the above context, the 2021 ARRI aimed at identifying the factors that underpin performance on efficiency and for this, the projects in two periods (in terms of year of project completion) of contrasting movements in performance related to efficiency were selected: 2013-2015 (deteriorating) and 2017-2019 (improving).

The number of projects in the 2013-2014-2015 sample are 46 (12 PPEs, 32 PCRVs and 2 IEs) and their year approval goes from 2001 to 2011. The number of projects in the 2017-2018-2019 sample are 37 (6 PPEs, 31 PCRVs and 1 IEs) and their year approval goes from 2005 to 2014.

4. **Efficiency markers.** IOE evaluation manual defines the efficiency criterion as “a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results”. Key elements in assessing efficiency (p128 of Evaluation Manual 2015 Second Edition) are the following:
- Effectiveness lag
 - Administrative costs
 - Economic Rate of Return
 - Cost ratio inputs to outputs
5. The qualitative analysis of the efficiency section in the projects included in the sample, has revealed a more disaggregated list of elements (herein called “markers”), as indicated in the table below.

Table 1

Metadata for efficiency markers in 2021 ARRI analysis

Main Marker (Level 1)	Sub-marker (Level 2)	Definition
Effectiveness Lag	IFAD related	Effectiveness lag is indicated by the number of months occurring between the date of “EB approval” and the date of “entry into force” as indicated in every project page of the ORMS website. As marker, effectiveness lag is flagged for a project when: (i) it is higher than the average for the region/IFAD and the evaluation highlights this discrepancy; (ii) when the evaluation clearly attributes to either IFAD or the government the reasons for a delay in starting the project.
	Government related	
Economic internal rate of return (EIRR)		Economic Internal Rate of Return (project’s profitability) This marker is flagged when the evaluation refers to the EIRR as a reason for the efficiency rating in case of: (i) EIRR at completion lower than appraisal; (ii) EIRR absent in the PCR or design report; (iii) inaccurate or missing information in the PCR that accompany the EIRR calculation in the PCR
Project management costs		Project management costs are marked when the evaluation refers to a discrepancy in costs with regard to: (i) staff costs (too high and reason for inefficiency); (ii) discrepancy of actual vs appraisal, determining an overrun of estimated project management costs in particular.
Cost ratio inputs to outputs (Adherence to planned costs)		This marker is flagged when the evaluation specifically indicates that the cost ratios is positive and costs are adhering to the plan or the expected benefits at appraisal are met
Implementation and disbursements	Setting up of the PMU	Timing for establishing the Project Management Unit, which may or not cause for delays in implementation and have an impact (positive or negative on efficiency)
	Staff capacity/competence – Staff turnover – Recruitment processes	Assessment of staff capacities, turnover, timely replacement, delays in recruitment in order to establish impact on project effectiveness and capacity building. Presence/absence of expertise (technical, gender/climate/environment related) and effects on project implementation.
	Procurement	
Financial management	Coherence between AWPB and activities	When specifically mentioned in the evaluation to have a positive impact on the assessment of efficiency
	Accounting/financial records	Same as above
Data quality / Availability		Availability of baseline data, financial data. The evaluation specifically indicates that the data quality (or missing data) has an impact on the assessment of the criterion.
Project design	Design Complexity / Assumptions	This marker is flagged when the efficiency section in the evaluation specifically refers to the project design being: (i) ambitious or complex or inadequate; (ii) flexible and allowing to respond to MTR recommendations
	Design flexibility / Response to Recommendations	
Counterpart funding	Co-financing / Partnerships	This marker refers to the funding that is lower or higher than expected at design and can be referred to partners, government or beneficiaries. The lack of funds is referred in the evaluation as one main reason for project low/high efficiency.
	Government	
	Beneficiaries	

Main Marker (Level 1)	Sub-marker (Level 2)	Definition
External context		Adjustments during project implementation to the project design to respond to context changes linked to social and political unrest or climate related events.

6. **Selection of markers on efficiency.** The analysis of markers focuses on recurring evaluation findings related to the efficiency of IFAD-supported operations. As the first step, this analysis distilled recurring efficiency constraining and enabling factors from all evaluations in the sample of projects selected. These have been quantified in terms of recurring observations and are summarized in the tables below.

Table 2

Efficiency markers in projects with moderately unsatisfactory or worse rating in efficiency (completed between 2013-2015; N=46)

Markers in efficiency	Number of observations	% of Obs.	No. of projects under each marker	% of projects
Staffing	55	25%	34	74%
Implementation/ Disbursements	54	25%	39	85%
Project management costs	21	10%	21	46%
Effectiveness lag	18	8%	18	39%
Cost ratio (adherence to planned costs)	18	8%	18	39%
Financial management	17	8%	16	35%
EIRR	16	7%	16	35%
External context	10	5%	10	22%
Data quality / Availability	7	3%	7	15%
Total number of observations	216			

Table 3

Efficiency markers in projects with moderately satisfactory or better rating in efficiency (completed between 2017-2019; N=37)

Markers in efficiency	Number of observations	% of Obs.	No. of projects under each marker	% of projects
Implementation/ Disbursements	35	40%	21	24%
EIRR	19	22%	19	22%
Staffing	9	10%	6	7%
Cost ratio (adherence to planned costs)	8	9%	8	9%
Financial management	8	9%	7	8%
Project management costs	4	5%	4	5%
Effectiveness lag	3	3%	3	3%
Data quality / Availability	1	1%	1	1%
External context	0	0%	0	0%
Total number of observations	87			

7. **List of projects included in the analysis.** The table below includes all the evaluations that have been selected for the qualitative analysis on efficiency in Chapter III of the 2021 ARRI.

Table 4

Projects included in the qualitative analysis under Chapter III of the 2021 ARRI

Project ID	Region	Countries	Projects with moderately unsatisfactory or lower ratings in efficiency	Efficiency rating
1100001350	APR	Cambodia	Rural Livelihoods Improvement Programme (RULIP)	3
1100001381	APR	India	Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods Programme in the mid-Gangetic Plains (WELP)	2
1100001347	APR	Maldives	Post-Tsunami Agricultural and Fisheries Rehabilitation Programme (PTAFRP)	3
1100001565	APR	Solomon Islands	Solomon Islands Rural Development Programme (RDP)	3
1100001346	APR	Sri Lanka	Post-Tsunami Coastal Rehabilitation and Resource Management Programme (PT-CRReMP)	3
1100001576	APR	Timor Leste	Timor-Leste Maize Storage Project	3
1100001241	ESA	Comoros	National programme for sustainable human development (PNDHD)	3
1100001159	ESA	Eswatini	Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project (LUSIP) - Phase I	2
1100001292	ESA	Ethiopia	Agricultural Marketing Improvement Programme (AMIP)	3
1100001370	ESA	Ethiopia	Participatory Small-Scale Irrigation Development Programme	3
1100001243	ESA	Kenya	Southern Nyanza Community Development Project (SNCDP)	3
1100001330	ESA	Kenya	Smallholder Horticulture Marketing Programme (SHoMaP)	3
1100001371	ESA	Lesotho	Rural Financial Intermediation Programme (RFIP)	2
1100001164	ESA	Malawi	Rural Livelihoods Support Programme (RLSP)	2
1100001357	ESA	Mauritius	Marine and Agricultural Resources Support Programme (MARS)	2
1100001267	ESA	Mozambique	Rural Finance Support Programme (RFSP)	3
1100001280	ESA	Zambia	Rural Finance Programme	3
1100001319	ESA	Zambia	Smallholder Livestock Investment Project (SLIP)	3
1100001279	LAC	Argentina	Patagonia Rural Development Project (PRODERPA)	3
1100001415	LAC	Guyana	Rural Enterprise and Agricultural Development Project (READ)	3
1100001171	LAC	Haiti	Productive Initiatives Support Programme in Rural Areas	3
1100001389	LAC	Panama	Participative Development and Rural Modernization Project	2
1100001398	NEN	Azerbaijan	Rural Development Project for the North-West	3
1100001204	NEN	Egypt	West Noubaria Rural Development Project	3
1100001507	NEN	Georgia	Agricultural Support Project	3
1100001295	NEN	Jordan	Agricultural Resource Management Project - Phase II (ARMP II)	3
1100001338	NEN	Morocco	Rural Development Project in the Eastern Middle Atlas Mountains	3
1100001503	NEN	Sudan	Rural Access Project (RAP)	3
1100001375	NEN	Syria	North-eastern Regional Rural Development Project (NERRD)	3
1100001408	NEN	Tajikistan	Khatlon Livelihoods Support Project	3
1100001293	NEN	Yemen	Pilot Community-based Rural Infrastructure Project in Highland Areas	3
1100001269	NEN	Yemen	Al-Dhala Community Resource Management Development Project	3
1100001403	NEN	Yemen	Rained Agriculture and Livestock Project (RALP)	3
1100001368	WCA	Burkina Faso	Small-scale irrigation and water management project (PIGEPE)	2
1100001327	WCA	Congo	Rural Development Project in the Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou Departments (PRODERSUD)	3
1100001438	WCA	Congo	Rural Development Project in the Likouala, Pool and Sangha Departments (RDP)	2
1100001435	WCA	Cote d'Ivoire	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project	3
1100001311	WCA	DR Congo	Agricultural rehabilitation programme in orientale province (PRAPO)	2
1100001152	WCA	Gambia	Participatory Integrated-Watershed Management Project (PIWAMP)	3
1100001303	WCA	Gambia	Rural Finance Project (RFP)	2
1100001504	WCA	Gambia	Livestock and Horticulture Development Project (LHDP)	3
1100001312	WCA	Ghana	Root and Tuber Improvement and Marketing Programme	2
1100001278	WCA	Guinea Bissau	Rural Rehabilitation and Community Development Project (RRCDP)	3
1100001356	WCA	Mali	Kidal Integrated Rural Development Programme (PIDRK)	3
1100001260	WCA	Nigeria	Community-based Natural Resource Management Programme - Niger Delta Region	3
1100001027	WCA	Sao Tome et Principe	Participatory Smallholder Agriculture and Artisanal Fisheries Development Programme (RAP PAPAFA)	3

Project ID	Region	Countries	Projects with moderately unsatisfactory or lower ratings in efficiency	Efficiency rating
1100001466	APR	Bangladesh	Participatory Small Scale Water Resources Sector Project (PSSWRSP)	5
1100001647	APR	Bangladesh	Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure Project (CCRIP)	5
1100001559	APR	Cambodia	Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment (PADEE)	5
1100001555	APR	China	Yunnan Agricultural and Rural Improvement Project (YARIP)	5
1100001627	APR	China	Guangxi Integrated Agricultural Development Project (GIADP)	5
1100001629	APR	China	Hunan Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project (HARIIP)	4
1100001418	APR	India	Mitigating Poverty in Western Rajasthan Project	4
1100001314	APR	India	Tejaswini Rural Women's Empowerment Programme	4
1100001509	APR	Indonesia	Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Eastern Indonesia (SOLID)	4
1100001621	APR	Indonesia	Coastal Community Development Project (CCDP)	5
1100001450	APR	Nepal	High-Value Agriculture Project in Hill and Mountain Areas (HVAP)	4
1100001471	APR	Nepal	Poverty Alleviation Fund Project II (PAF II)	4
1100001628	APR	Tonga	Tonga Rural Innovation Project	4
1100001552	APR	Vietnam	Sustainable Rural Development for the Poor Project in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces (SRDP)	5
1100001662	APR	Vietnam	Agriculture, Farmers and Rural Areas Support Project (TNSP)	4
1100001469	ESA	Burundi	Agricultural Intensification and Value-Enhancing Support Project (PAIVA - B)	4
1100001424	ESA	Ethiopia	Community-based Integrated Natural Resources Management Project	4
1100001305	ESA	Kenya	Smallholder Dairy Commercialization Programme (SDCP)	4
1100001429	ESA	Madagascar	Support to Farmers' Professional Organizations and Agricultural Services Project (AROPA)	5
1100001365	ESA	Malawi	Rural Livelihoods and Economic Enhancement Programme	4
1100001560	ESA	Seychelles	Competitive Local Innovations for Small-scale Agriculture Project (CLISSA)	4
1100001533	LAC	Dominican Republic	Rural Economic Development Project in the Central and Eastern Provinces	4
1100001568	LAC	El Salvador	Rural Territorial Competitiveness Programme (Amanecer Rural) (RTCP)	4
1100001535	LAC	Honduras	Sustainable Rural Development Programme for the Southern Region (Emprende Sur)	4
1100001505	LAC	Nicaragua	Agricultural, Fishery and Forestry Productive Systems Development Programme in RAAN and RAAS Indigenous Territories – NICARIBE	4
1100001593	NEN	Bosnia	Rural Business Development Project (RBDP)	4
1100001376	NEN	Egypt	Upper Egypt Rural Development Project	4
1100001626	NEN	Kyrgyzstan	Livestock and Market Development Programme (LMDP)	5
1100001526	NEN	Morocco	Agricultural Value Chain Development Project in the Mountain Zones of Al-Haouz Province	4
1100001332	NEN	Sudan	Seed Development Project (SDP)	4
1100001524	NEN	Sudan	Butana Integrated Rural Development Project (BIRDp)	5
1100001612	NEN	Sudan	Supporting Small-scale Traditional Rainfed Producers in Sinnar State (SUSTAIN)	4
1100001501	WCA	Liberia	Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Support project (STCRSP)	4
1100001616	WCA	Liberia	Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation Project	4
1100001441	WCA	Mali	Rural Microfinance Programme (PMR)	4
1100001646	WCA	Niger	Ruwanmu Small-Scale Irrigation Project	4
1100001687	WCA	Sao Tome et Principe	Smallholder Commercial Agriculture Project (PAPAC)	4

Non-parametric data analysis of IOE ratings

A. Methodology

1. This annex presents the results of the following different analyses:
 - Non-parametric analyses of most recent time period
 - Analysis of disconnects between IOE and PCR ratings by criteria
 - Correlations amongst IOE criteria
 - Trend analysis of Project Completion Report quality, lessons, scope and candour.
 - Analysis of moderately satisfactory vs. satisfactory/highly satisfactory ratings
2. To conduct the above analyses, the report makes use of a mix of descriptive and inferential statistics. The analysis uses the ARRI 2021 dataset which contains a census of IOE ratings for projects completed between 2007 and 2019. There is a total of 297 projects within the database. While the data is a census, the use of inferential statistics means that the data is treated as a simple random sample. This results in a margin of error of ± 5.97 per cent for proportions that are split 50 per cent and 50 per cent and margin of error of ± 3.41 per cent for proportions that are split at 10 per cent and 90 per cent. When the data is broken down by variables (e.g., time periods), the margin of error is substantially larger due to small sample size.
3. The data analysis generally makes use of Wilcoxon rank order tests and chi square tests. Wilcoxon is used in all cases when the data is ordinal and more than two categories. Chi square is used in cases when the independent variable has more than two categories as well as when the dependent variable is binary. In limited cases (for the project performance criteria which is continuous), a t-test is also used. All tests are two-sided. P-values are reported for any test which is significant at the 10 per cent level or lower.
4. For the correlations between criteria, spearman rank order correlations are used. For these, the correlation coefficient is presented. All correlations are statistically significant, and therefore no further information is provided on the level of significance.

B. Non-parametric analyses of most recent time period

5. Data analysis of the most recent three-year period for both the main performance criteria as well as other performance criteria suggest limited numbers of statistically significant changes. When looking at the criteria scores as binary variables coded as satisfactory or not, environment and adaption to climate change are potentially significant at the 10 per cent level. When the variables are taken in their ordinal form, environment and adaptation to climate change show significant changes at the 5 per cent level. Overall, the share of projects with satisfactory environmental management criteria scores improved by ten percentage points and the adaption to climate change indicator improved by nine percentage points. No other performance criteria exhibit statistically significant changes.


C. Analysis of disconnect between IOE and PCR ratings

6. This section provides a look at disconnects between IOE and PCR ratings. The overall distribution of the average net disconnect⁴⁸ is provided in the chart below. The average disconnect varies from -1.45 to 0.92. The mean is -0.28 and the median is -0.25. Most projects (84 per cent) have negative disconnects, meaning that the PCR rating is higher than the IOE rating, 8 per cent have no disconnect,

⁴⁸ This is calculated by dividing the value of net disconnects for different criteria by the number of evaluation criteria. For example, if there is a negative disconnect by 1 (e.g. PMD rating 5, IOE rating 4) for two criteria, a positive disconnect by 1 (e.g. PMD rating 3, IOE rating 4) for one criterion, and no disconnect for other criteria, the average net disconnect would be worked out by dividing -1 by 12 (i.e. -0.83), if all criteria were rated (aggregated criteria are not included).


and 9 per cent have a positive disconnect, meaning that there is a higher IOE rating than PCR rating.

Chart 1
Distribution of disconnect between IOE and PCR ratings (2007-2019)



- The analysis of the disconnects of the individual criteria suggests that the average disconnect for all years within the dataset hovers between negative 0.2 and 0.4, with three exceptions. Adaption to climate change (-0.14)⁴⁹, innovation and environment and natural resources management (both -0.16) have the smallest average disconnects. The largest negative disconnect was for relevance at -0.53.

Chart 2
Average disconnects between IOE and PCRs by evaluation criteria (2007-2019)



- Among the main project criteria, the disconnect has become smaller in recent years. While relevance had the largest disconnect overall in the past as well as in recent years, the average disconnect for relevance has also improved the most in absolute terms, now having an only slightly larger disconnect than other criteria. The picture is quite similar for most other project criteria, with most average

⁴⁹ The data used for adaption to climate change only consider the years 2016-2019, because adaption to climate change as a separate indicator was introduced in 2016.

disconnects approaching 0. However, there are a number of exceptions. The disconnect for gender equality and women’s empowerment has increased. Similarly, scaling up moved towards a larger average disconnect, although better in 2017-2019 compared to 2014-2016.

Table 1

Average disconnect among main project criteria by time period

	2007-2010	2011-2013	2014-2016	2017-2019
Relevance	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.64)	(0.35)
Effectiveness	(0.14)	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Efficiency	(0.14)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.27)
Sustainability	(0.05)	(0.49)	(0.33)	(0.17)
	2007-2010	2011-2013	2014-2016	2017-2019
Rural Poverty Impact	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.22)
Innovation	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.15)	(0.08)
Scaling up	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.54)	(0.33)
Gender equality and women's empowerment	(0.07)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.41)
Environment and natural resources management	(0.10)	(0.39)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Adaptation to climate change	NA	(0.80)	(0.16)	(0.05)
IFAD performance	(0.14)	(0.48)	(0.29)	(0.21)
Government performance	(0.16)	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.30)
Overall project achievement	(0.18)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.27)

9. When the data is coded to check for a negative disconnect (i.e. the PCR rating being higher than IOE’s), the data suggest that there has been some improvement in recent years in terms of the share of projects with a negative disconnect on each indicator. There was a 27 percentage points decline in the share of projects that had a negative disconnect in the relevance criterion. Similarly, there was a 24 percentage points decline for scaling up. Sustainability experienced an 18 percentage points decline in the share of projects with negative disconnects.

Table 2

Share of projects with negative disconnect by IOE criteria (projects completed between 2007 and 2019)

	2007-2010	2011-2013	2014-2016	2017-2019	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016
Relevance	41	50	60	33	(27)
Effectiveness	23	38	25	26	1
Efficiency	23	36	39	32	(7)
Sustainability	21	46	35	17	(18)
Rural Poverty Impact	17	28	24	28	4
Innovation	36	32	25	21	(4)
Scaling-up	35	36	51	27	(24)
Gender equality and women's empowerment	26	33	38	39	1
Environment and natural resources management	29	37	21	13	(8)
Adaptation to climate change		60	28	14	(15)
IFAD performance	25	48	27	21	(6)
Government performance	23	33	39	27	(12)
Overall project achievement	23	31	36	27	(9)

10. When the data on share of projects with negative disconnects is broken down by region, the data indicate a relatively similar picture to the data presented in the previous region. The APR region tends to have a lower share of projects with a disconnect on most criteria, though differences are rarely statistically significant. Gender equality and women’s empowerment is an exception in this regard, wherein different regions have similar shares of projects with a disconnect.

Table 3

Share of projects with negative disconnect by Region (projects completed between 2007 and 2019)

	APR	ESA	LAC	NEN	WCA	p
Relevance	40	51	44	51	57	
Effectiveness	25	29	31	35	25	
Efficiency	25	35	47	38	31	
Sustainability	30	42	20	31	34	
Rural Poverty Impact	25	26	30	22	22	
Innovation	22	26	21	31	37	
Scaling-up	33	32	29	46	54	p<0.1
Gender equality and women's empowerment	37	33	30	33	39	
Environment and natural resources management	26	39	21	17	17	
Adaptation to climate change	19	38	40	19	11	
IFAD performance	19	44	27	35	34	p<0.05
Government performance	14	47	36	44	29	p<0.001
Overall project achievement	19	39	26	38	35	

Note: colour-scale indicate the ranking from the highest disconnect (red) to the lowest (dark green) for each criterion across regions.

- This section has broken down the data on disconnects by each criterion. Relevance has generally had the largest disconnect when measured in average terms, showing a significant improvement in the latest time period (2017-2019). Gender equality and women's empowerment has the largest average disconnect for the most recent period. For most of the criteria, the average disconnects show improvement. Negative disconnects appear to be less common in the APR region.

D. Rating correlations

- A spearman's rank correlation was conducted to understand the inter-relations between different criteria. The results suggest that there are a number of sets of criteria that have relatively high and relatively low correlations with other indicators. Specifically, the overall project achievement, project performance, and effectiveness indicators are most strongly correlated with other indicators overall. In contrast, the gender, environment, and adaption to climate change indicators are least well correlated with other indicators.
- To provide a more intuitive sense of the strength of the correlations amongst IOE criteria, the table below provides each correlation labelled as very strong ($r= 0.9-1$), strong ($r=0.7-0.89$), moderate ($r=0.5-0.69$), low ($0.3-0.49$), and weak ($r<0.3$).

Table 4
Correlation among IOE criteria (all projects completed between 2007 and 2019)


	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Project performance	Rural Poverty Impact	Innovation	Scaling up	GEWE	ENRM	Adaptation to climate change	IFAD performance	Government performance	Overall project achievement
Relevance		Moderate	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Weak	Weak	Moderate	Low	Moderate
Effectiveness	Moderate		Moderate	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Strong
Efficiency	Low	Moderate		Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate
Sustainability	Low	Moderate	Moderate		Strong	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Weak	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate
Project performance	Moderate	Strong	Strong	Strong		Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Strong	Strong
Rural Poverty Impact	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Strong		Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Strong
Innovation	Low	Moderate	Low	Low	Moderate	Low		Moderate	Weak	Weak	Low	Low	Low	Moderate
Scaling up	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate		Low	Weak	Weak	Low	Low	Moderate
GEWE	Low	Low	Low	Weak	Low	Low	Weak	Low		Weak	Weak	Low	Low	Low
ENRM	Weak	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Weak	Weak	Weak		Strong	Weak	Low	Low
Adaptation to climate change	Weak	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Weak	Weak	Weak	Strong		Low	Low
IFAD performance	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Weak	Low		Moderate	Moderate
Government performance	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Moderate		Strong
Overall project achievement	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	Strong	
Number/type of correlations	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Project performance	Rural Poverty Impact	Innovation	Scaling up	GEWE	ENRM	Adaptation to climate change	IFAD performance	Government performance	Overall project achievement
Strong	0	2	1	1	6	2				1	1		2	4
Moderate	5	7	5	6	4	6	4	4				6	5	6
Low	6	4	7	5	3	5	7	7	9	7	9	6	6	3
Weak	2			1			2	2	4	5	3	1		

14. The above table also summarizes the counts of each score per indicator. The data indicate that project performance has the greatest number of strong correlations with other indicators. The overall project achievement comes in second for most strong correlations, being strongly correlated with four other indicators. Gender equality and women's empowerment and natural resources management have the largest number of weak correlations (4 and 5, respectively). Adaption to climate change has three weak correlations as well. These indicators again appear to be quite separate from the other criteria in this regard. Other indicators tend to have an intermediary number of strong, moderate, low, and weak correlations.
15. The above analysis suggests that while everything is correlated with everything else, some criteria are more strongly associated with one another. Unsurprisingly, overall project achievement and project performance are most strongly correlated. Gender equality and women's empowerment is the most weakly correlated with other criteria. Environment and natural resources management as well as adaption to climate change are also relatively weakly correlated with other criteria, with the exception of each other.

E. Analysis of IOE ratings for project completion reports

16. In project completion report validations (PCRVs), IOE assesses and rates PCRs using four evaluation criteria. These are: (i) scope (e.g. whether the PCR has adhered to IFAD guidelines for PCRs); (ii) quality (e.g. report preparation process and robustness of the evidence base); (iii) lessons (e.g. whether the PCR includes lessons on the proximate causes of satisfactory or less than satisfactory performance); and (iv) candour (e.g. in terms of objectivity in the narrative, and whether ratings in the PCR are supported by evidence included in the document). Ratings for each of these criteria are aggregated in the PCRVs to provide an overall rating of the PCR document.
17. With regard to the trend of the above IOE ratings, PCR scope ($p < 0.01$) and candour ($p < 0.05$) show a significantly better performance in the latest time period (2017-2019) than the past periods. PCR lessons learned and PCR quality of data and methods though have not changed significantly in the most recent project period. When the variables are coded as satisfactory or not, the data show no statistically significant changes between the most recent period and the past period.

Chart 3
Percentage of IOE ratings for PCR documents (projects completed between 2007 and 2019)



18. When a spearman rank order correlation is conducted with the above ratings, the data indicate that the correlations are in the low category (0.3-0.49). The strongest correlations are between scope and quality, candour and lessons learned, and candour and quality (0.47, 0.47, and 0.46). The other correlation levels are not substantively different at 0.39 (quality and lessons learned), 0.38 (scope and lesson learned), and candour and scope (0.33).

F. Trend of moderately satisfactory vs satisfactory and highly satisfactory ratings

19. This section aims to analyze the most recent performance of IOE moderately satisfactory ratings in comparison with satisfactory or highly satisfactory ratings for all IOE criteria, with particular regard to the changes in ratings in the latest time period (2017-2019) vs. the previous time period (2014-2016).
20. The table below indicates that, between 2017 and 2019, the highest increase in share of projects rated satisfactory and highly satisfactory has occurred for sustainability and adaptation to climate change. Gender equality and women's empowerment and rural poverty impact show the most significant decline in the highest range of satisfactory ratings. Criterion like efficiency and effectiveness show an increase only in moderately satisfactory ratings. When the data is broken down by all years of completion in the ARRI database (2007-2019), there are only two distributions with statistically significant difference – relevance at the 5 per cent level and environment and natural resources management at the 10 per cent level.

Table 5

Share of projects rated of moderately satisfactory vs satisfactory/highly satisfactory ratings: change in 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016

	Unsatisfactory	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016	Satisfactory /Highly satisfactory	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016
Relevance	15	4	49	(2)	37	(2)
Effectiveness	22	(3)	54	6	24	(3)
Efficiency	44	(4)	41	8	15	(3)
Sustainability	34	(7)	52	2	15	5
Rural Poverty Impact	21	2	57	4	22	(6)
Innovation	13	(4)	49	7	38	(3)
Scaling up	29	3	40	(4)	31	1
GEWE	24	3	50	4	26	(8)
ENRM	14	(6)	55	4	31	2
Adaptation to climate change	18	(6)	57	(1)	25	6
IFAD performance	19	10	44	(11)	37	1
Government performance	37	3	38	(3)	25	0
Overall project achievement	24	(1)	52	1	25	0

21. The analysis has also focused on the size of project funding, using the “total financing” figures in ORMS and applied to all projects included in the ARRI 2021 database. The data suggest that projects with below median funding tend to have lower shares with satisfactory/highly satisfactory ratings than projects with above median funding. This holds for all project criteria, with the exception of gender equality and women’s empowerment.
22. When the same analysis is conducted for project funding quartiles (Table 8 below), the data indicate the projects in the lowest quartile appear to drive up results to a certain extent. The average percentage point increase when going from the first to the second quartile in the share of projects in the satisfactory/highly satisfactory range is 8 percentage points. By comparison, when going from the second to the third quartile, there is an average increase of 2 percentage points. When going from the third to the fourth quartile of funding, the share of projects with higher ratings moves up by 5 percentage points on average. While the averages are relatively small, the differences are sometimes quite large.

Table 6
Share of projects rated of moderately satisfactory vs satisfactory/highly satisfactory ratings by quartiles by the project funding size (2007-2019)

IOE Criteria	Quartiles	Unsatisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Satisfactory/ Highly Satisfactory	Quartile difference in Satisfactory/ Highly Satisfactory	p
Relevance	First quartile	15	57	28		
	Second quartile	14	55	32	3	
	Third quartile	12	43	45	13	
	Fourth quartile	11	45	45	0	
Effectiveness	First quartile	34	54	12		p<0.05
	Second quartile	29	43	29	17	
	Third quartile	20	50	30	1	
	Fourth quartile	18	53	30	0	
Efficiency	First quartile	61	38	1		p<0.001
	Second quartile	49	34	16	15	
	Third quartile	32	43	26	10	
	Fourth quartile	41	37	23	-3	
Sustainability	First quartile	45	49	6		
	Second quartile	43	41	16	11	
	Third quartile	34	55	11	-6	
	Fourth quartile	34	53	14	3	
Rural Poverty Impact	First quartile	27	58	16		
	Second quartile	16	55	29	13	
	Third quartile	14	59	27	-2	
	Fourth quartile	14	52	34	7	
Innovation	First quartile	22	50	28		
	Second quartile	14	51	36	7	
	Third quartile	23	35	42	6	
	Fourth quartile	12	41	47	5	
Scaling up	First quartile	26	50	24		
	Second quartile	29	44	27	3	
	Third quartile	26	41	34	6	
	Fourth quartile	20	38	42	8	
Gender equality and women's empowerment	First quartile	25	48	27		
	Second quartile	16	51	34	6	
	Third quartile	23	43	34	0	
	Fourth quartile	19	41	40	6	
Environment and natural resources management	First quartile	17	57	27		
	Second quartile	29	52	19	-8	
	Third quartile	22	56	22	3	
	Fourth quartile	19	54	27	4	
Adaptation to climate change	First quartile	32	49	19		
	Second quartile	27	57	16	-3	
	Third quartile	27	63	10	-6	
	Fourth quartile	21	54	25	15	
IFAD performance	First quartile	22	57	22		p<0.1
	Second quartile	14	53	33	11	
	Third quartile	12	51	37	4	
	Fourth quartile	14	41	46	9	
Government performance	First quartile	47	45	8		p<0.05
	Second quartile	34	43	23	15	
	Third quartile	27	47	26	2	
	Fourth quartile	27	42	31	5	
Overall project achievement	First quartile	36	53	11		p<0.05
	Second quartile	21	51	29	18	
	Third quartile	19	58	23	-6	
	Fourth quartile	18	50	32	9	

23. This pattern is driven in part by notably large jumps between the first and second quartile. For instance, when going from the first to the second quartile, the share of projects with higher ratings for effectiveness increases by 17 percentage points. For efficiency as well as government performance, the corresponding figure is 15 percentage points. For overall project achievement there is an 18 percentage points increase between the first and second quartile in projects with higher ratings.
24. When looking into the question of what makes a project good or great, the data appear to indicate that total financing approved and being in a non-fragile context

help. With regard to how project ratings have been changing, there is relatively limited changes that meet the statistically significant standard. However, there are noticeable patterns with increases in the second time period examined for many indicators followed by slight declines in the third period.

25. Overall, the data show that there has been relatively little movement of ratings from moderately satisfactory to satisfactory/highly satisfactory in the most recent time period (2017-2019) compared to all past periods. When comparing projects by funding and fragility, the data suggests that projects with above median funding are more likely to be rated satisfactory/highly satisfactory as are projects outside of fragile contexts. When the funding is broken down by quartiles, the data indicate that there is usually a particularly large increase in the share of projects with higher ratings when moving from the first quartile to the second quartile, though the pattern is not uniform.

Analysis of project performance ratings in countries with fragile situations

1. The quantitative analysis of IOE ratings for projects in countries with fragile and conflict related situations is presented in this section. The classification of the projects as having operated in countries with fragile situations or not is based on the revised classification of fragility and conflict situations for World Bank Group Engagement⁵⁰ in 2020, and the annual harmonized list of fragile situations from 2006 to 2019. The latter was based on two criteria: a harmonized Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)⁵¹ score below 3.2, and the presence of a United Nations (UN) mission or a regional peacekeeping/peacebuilding mission. As such, it aggregated all dimensions of fragility and conflict into one broad category and did not sufficiently differentiate between various types of situations.
2. To capture the differentiated nature of fragility and conflict, the revised classification since 2020 is based on methodologies that distinguish countries in the following categories: (i) **countries with high levels of institutional and social fragility**, identified based on public indicators that measure the quality of policy and institutions as well as specific manifestations of fragility; (ii) **countries affected by violent conflict**, identified based on a threshold number of conflict-related deaths relative to the population. This category distinguishes two further subcategories based on the intensity of violence: (i) **countries in high-intensity conflict** and (ii) **countries in medium-intensity conflict**.
3. The grouping of projects for the ARRI analysis was based on the following methodology: (i) all countries in the 2021 ARRI database (completed between 2007-2019 for a total of 298 projects) have been “mapped” based on the World Bank historical list of countries with fragile and conflict-related situations⁵²; (ii) all projects falling under the list of fragile or conflict-related situations have been cross-checked based on their entire project lifecycle between approval and completion; (iii) only projects with a persistent status of fragility throughout their lifecycle and those with at least 50 per cent of the lifecycle in a status of fragility have been included in the sample. A sample of 102 projects in countries with fragile or conflict related situation has been finalized for the analysis, leaving a sample of 196 projects in non-fragile situations.
4. The countries in fragile situations includes the following regional representation: 52 per cent from WCA, 26 per cent from NEN, 12 per cent from ESA, 7 per cent from APR and 3 per cent from LAC. In terms of age of portfolio, 34 per cent of projects were completed between 2008 and 2013, 42 per cent between 2014 and 2016, and 24 per cent between 2017 and 2019.
5. **Recent performance of countries in fragile situations (projects completed in 2017-2019).** In the most recent three-year period, ratings for projects in fragile situations have been improving compared with the previous time period (2014-2016), while performance in non-fragile contexts has been consistent for the main evaluation criteria. All criteria, with the exception of rural poverty impact, show an increase in moderately satisfactory ratings or better in 2017-2019 when compared to the previous time period. Efficiency, government performance, adaptation to climate change and innovation show double digit growth. For some criteria the absolute percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings is higher in 2017-

⁵⁰ <https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/964161594254019510/Revised-Classification-of-Fragility-and-Conflict-Situations-web-FY21.pdf>

⁵¹ The World Bank list is based on the CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) up until 2019. The CPIA provides a rating of countries against a set of 16 criteria grouped into four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions. The Harmonized CPIA is calculated as the average of the World Bank CPIA and the African Development Bank or Asian Development Bank CPIA (as may apply to a given country).

⁵² <https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/176001594407411053/FCSLList-FY06toFY20.pdf>

2019 for projects in fragile situations than those in non-fragile countries, and specifically for efficiency, adaptation to climate change, overall project achievement, gender equality and women’s empowerment, IFAD performance, and relevance. However, the changes in ratings between 2017-2019 and 2014-2016 within the sample of projects in countries with fragile situations have shown no statistical significance.

Table 1

Percentage of moderately satisfactory ratings or better – fragile vs non-fragile situations (2017-2019 vs. 2014-2016). IOE criteria ranked by change in percentage for countries with fragile situations

	Fragile situations			Non-Fragile situations		
	2014-2016 (N=30)	2017-2019 (N=24)	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014-2016	2014-2016 (N=52)	2017-2019 (N=44)	Δ 2017-2019 vs 2014- 2016
Efficiency	40	58	▲ 18	60	55	▼ -5
Government performance	47	63	▲ 16	65	64	▼ -2
Adaptation to climate change	72	86	▲ 14	78	80	▲ 3
Innovation	73	83	▲ 10	85	89	▲ 4
Overall project achievement	70	79	▲ 9	76	75	▼ -1
Sustainability	50	58	▲ 8	67	70	▲ 3
Effectiveness	63	71	▲ 8	85	82	▼ -3
Gender equality and Women's Empowerment	80	88	▲ 8	70	69	▼ -1
Environment and natural resources management	76	83	▲ 7	84	88	▲ 4
IFAD performance	80	83	▲ 3	85	80	▼ -5
Relevance	93	96	▲ 3	79	80	▲ 1
Scaling up	60	63	▲ 3	73	75	▲ 2
Rural Poverty Impact	70	70	■ 0	83	83	■ 0

6. **Long term performance (2007-2019).** The table below indicates the average IOE rating per criterion and the disconnect in comparison to the respective PCR rating, for projects both in fragile and non-fragile situations. Project performance IOE criteria vary significantly based on the fragility status of the country, with the exception of relevance. The distribution of project scores for relevance are nearly identical, and significance testing suggests no difference between the two distributions ($p=0.88$). However, projects in fragile contexts show ratings significantly lower on effectiveness ($p<0.09$), efficiency ($p<0.002$), and sustainability ($p<0.03$). Overall project performance is also significantly lower, with the average project in a non-fragile context scoring 3.81 versus 4.05 in fragile contexts ($p<0.01$). Projects in fragile contexts also tend to have lower ratings on most other performance criteria. They have lower ratings for government performance ($p<0.00$), scaling up ($p<0.04$), and rural poverty impact ($p<0.02$).

Table 2

Comparison of IOE's PCR/PPE ratings for projects in countries with fragile and not with fragile situations for all evaluation criteria: projects completed in 2007-2019 (N=298 total; N=102 fragile; N=196 non-fragile).

Criteria	Mean ratings		Disconnect (fragile vs non-fragile)	T-test (comparison of means)
	Projects with fragile situations	Projects in non-fragile situations		
				p-value ⁽¹⁾
Efficiency	3.36	3.72	-0.36	0.00***
Government performance	3.62	3.95	-0.33	0.00***
Overall project achievement	3.81	4.05	-0.24	0.01***
Scaling up	3.89	4.11	-0.22	0.04**
Sustainability	3.53	3.74	-0.21	0.03**
Rural poverty impact	3.92	4.13	-0.21	0.02**
Effectiveness	3.84	4.02	-0.18	0.09*
Innovation	4.10	4.24	-0.14	0.18
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4.07	4.15	-0.08	0.39
Environment and natural resources management	3.95	4.02	-0.07	0.49
Adaptation to climate change	3.84	3.88	-0.04	0.74
IFAD performance	4.17	4.20	-0.03	0.66
Relevance	4.27	4.27	0	0.88


Note: Statistical significance: *<0.10; **<0.05; ***<0.01

Criteria listed based on ranking by gaps between the two groupings

7. When looking at the percentage of moderately satisfactory or better (satisfactory) and moderately satisfactory or worse (unsatisfactory), projects in countries with fragile situations tend to underperform in most IOE criteria.

Chart 1

Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with fragile and not with fragile situations (2007-2019): Project performance



⁽¹⁾ This p-value was calculated using a t-test, to compare average ratings within the two samples, with significance at 10 per cent level. The analysis is based on the PCR/PPE/IE data series.

8. They have lower overall project performance ($p < 0.001$), government performance ($p < 0.01$), scaling up ($p < 0.05$), innovation ($p < 0.05$), IFAD performance ($p < 0.05$), and rural poverty impact ($p < 0.01$). They also appear to have lower ratings on gender equality and women’s empowerment and environment and natural resources management ($p < 0.1$). None of these criteria showed statistically significant differences; however, there are no instances of a higher share of projects in fragile contexts having higher ratings.


Table 3
Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with fragile and not with fragile situations (2007-2019): Other IOE criteria

Other IOE Criteria	Country Status	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory
Innovation	Not fragile	16	84
	Fragile	25	76
Scaling up	Not fragile	23	78
	Fragile	35	65
Gender equality and women's empowerment	Not fragile	19	81
	Fragile	26	75
Environment and natural resources management	Not fragile	19	81
	Fragile	32	68
Adapation to climate change	Not fragile	24	76
	Fragile	33	67
Rural poverty impact	Not fragile	15	85
	Fragile	30	70
IFAD Performance	Not fragile	13	87
	Fragile	25	75
Government performance	Not fragile	30	70
	Fragile	51	49
Overall project achievement	Not fragile	19	81
	Fragile	42	58

9. The long-term performance of countries in fragile vs non-fragile situations is also analyzed through the three-year rolling average for each criteria starting with projects completed in 2007.
10. **Relevance.** In 2017-2019, fragile countries show a higher percentage of satisfactory ratings that non-fragile, with a higher share of highly satisfactory ratings as well (4 per cent vs 2 per cent in not fragile).


Chart 2

Relevance: percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




11. **Effectiveness.** In 2017-2019 fragile countries show an opposite trend (increasing) than non-fragile (decreasing). However, the percentage of MS+ ratings in the most recent time period is higher in non-fragile (82per cent vs 71 per cent).

Chart 3
Effectiveness: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




12. **Efficiency.** The projects in countries with fragile situations show a significant increase in percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings since 2016, reaching 58 per cent in 2017-2019 (non-fragile 55 per cent in the same period).

Chart 4
Efficiency: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




13. **Sustainability of benefits.** The criterion shows flat trend for the projects in countries not with fragile situations, and significant increase for those in countries with fragile situations in 2017-2019 vs previous time period (+8 percentage points).

Chart 5
Sustainability of benefits: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




14. **Rural poverty impact.** This is the only criterion with flat trend for both fragile and non-fragile contexts, the latter still at a higher percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings (83 per cent vs 70 per cent) in 2017-2019.

Chart 6
Rural poverty impact: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




15. **Innovation.** In this criterion, both groups show an increase in the share of projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings from 2016-2018 to 2017-2019: +10 percentage points for those in fragile contexts, and +4 percentage points in others. Overall, the projects in countries with fragile situations have a higher percentage of highly satisfactory ratings for fragile between 2014 and 2018.

Chart 7
Innovation: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)



16. **Scaling up.** Projects in countries not with fragile situations show a flat trend, but with a higher percentage of highly satisfactory ratings. The projects in countries with fragile situations show an increase but still at lower percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings overall.


Chart 8
Scaling-up: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)



17. **Gender equality and women's empowerment.** The criterion shows consistent decline for countries not with fragile countries since 2011. The projects in countries with fragile countries not only show an opposite trend (increasing in 2017-2019 by


8 points vs 2016-2018) but reach a higher percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings in 2017-2019 (88 per cent, compared to 69 per cent in countries not with fragile situations).

Chart 9
Gender equality and women’s empowerment: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




18. **Environment and natural resources management.** Both groupings maintain a high percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings (above 80 per cent in 2017-2019).

Chart 10
Environment and natural resource management: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




19. **Adaptation to climate change.** The projects in countries with fragile situations show a significant increase in percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings since 2016, reaching 86 per cent in 2017-2019, compared to 80 per cent in countries not with fragile situations in the same time period.

Chart 11
Adaptation to climate change: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




20. **Overall project achievement.** Unlike the projects in countries not with fragile situations that shows a decline in ratings since 2016, those in countries with fragile situations show an improved performance starting 2016 and reaching 79 per cent moderately satisfactory or better ratings in 2017-2019.

Chart 12
Overall project achievement: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)




21. **IFAD performance.** This criterion shows similar level of performance in both groups: for the projects completed in 2017-2019, 83 per cent of the projects in countries with fragile situations were rated moderately satisfactory or better (with a slight improvement from 2016-2018), compared to 80 per cent in countries not with fragile situations.

Chart 13
IFAD performance: Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)



22. **Government performance.** The projects in countries not with fragile situations show a consistent decline in percentage of the projects rated moderately satisfactory or better since 2013, reaching 64 per cent in 2017-2019. The projects in countries with fragile countries reflect the same trend, but with a notable improvement in 2017-2019 (47 per cent in 2016-2018 vs 63 per cent in 2017-2019).

Chart 14
Percentage of IOE ratings for projects in countries with and not with fragile situations (three-year rolling average, 2007-2019)



23. **Projects selected for the qualitative analysis on countries with fragile situations (Chapter IV of 2021 ARRI).** The project sample selected for the qualitative analysis on countries with fragile situations included in Chapter IV of the 2021 ARRI has been selected with the following methodology: (i) the universe from which projects have been selected is composed by all project evaluations (PPEs and

PCRVs) completed by IOE in the latest three years (2018, 2019 and 2020), equal to a total of 147 projects; (ii) within this group, all projects/countries have been mapped as related to a “fragile situation” based on the 2019 World Bank harmonized list of countries in fragile situations; (iii) based on the mapping, the projects selected for the sample are only those that were considered in a fragile situation only at their year of completion. As a result, the final sample included 23 projects, as indicated in the table below.

Table 4
List of projects in countries with fragile situations selected for qualitative analysis

Project ID	Region	Country	Project Name	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Overall project achievement
1100001460	APR	Afghanistan	Rural Microfinance and Livestock Support Programme (RMLSP)	5	5	4	4	5
1100001469	ESA	Burundi	Agricultural Intensification and Value-Enhancing Support Project (PAIVA - B)	5	4	4	4	4
1100001318	ESA	Madagascar	Project to Support Development in the Menabe and Melaky Regions (AD2M)	4	5	5	4	5
1100001275	LAC	Haiti	Small Scale Irrigation Development Project –Phase 2 (PPI-2)	5	3	3	3	3
1100001421	NEN	Lebanon	Hilly Areas Sustainable Agriculture Development Project (HASAD)	3	3	3	3	3
1100001277	NEN	Sudan	Western Sudan Resources Management Programme (WSRMP)	4	5	4	4	5
1100001503	NEN	Sudan	Rural Access Project (RAP)	5	3	3	3	3
1100001524	NEN	Sudan	Supporting Small-scale Traditional Rainfed Producers in Sinnar State (SUSTAIN)	5	4	5	4	5
1100001612	NEN	Sudan	Seed Development Project (SDP)	4	4	4	4	4
1100001332	NEN	Sudan	Butana Integrated Rural Development Project (BIRDP)	5	5	4	5	5
1100001579	WCA	Centr Afr Rep	Project to Revitalize Crop and Livestock Production in the Savannah (PREVES)	4	3	2	3	3
1100001446	WCA	Chad	Pastoral Water and Resource Management Project in Sahelian Areas (PROHYPA)	4	4	5	3	4
1100001582	WCA	Chad	Rural Development Support Programme in Guéra (PADER-G)	5	5	5	4	5
1100001583	WCA	Congo	Agricultural Value Chains Support Development Programme (PADEF)	5	3	2	3	3
1100001435	WCA	Cote d'Ivoire	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project (PRAREP)	4	4	3	3	4
1100001589	WCA	Cote d'Ivoire	Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project (PROPACOM)	4	3	3	3	3
1100001501	WCA	Liberia	Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation Project (ASRP)	5	4	4	4	4
1100001616	WCA	Liberia	Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Support project (STCRSP)	4	5	4	3	4
1100001444	WCA	Mali	Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project (PAPAM)	5	4	3	3	4
1100001441	WCA	Mali	Rural Microfinance Programme (PMR)	6	5	4	5	5
1100001310	WCA	Sierra Leone	Rural Finance and Community Improvement Programme (RFCIP)	5	4	4	4	4
1100001054	WCA	Sierra Leone	Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction Project (RCPRP)	5	5	3	4	5
1100001558	WCA	Togo	Support to Agricultural Development Project (PADAT)	3	3	3	3	3

Performance by region and comparison IOE PPE/PCR ratings

A. Performance by region

- The overall average of difference between IOE and PCR ratings per evaluation criteria is shown in the table below. This is based on the difference in the average ratings by IOE and PCRs by evaluation criteria and by region, and the difference in the average ratings by IOE and PCRs at global level.

Table 1

Overall average of IOE-PCR disconnect average by evaluation criteria: by region and global
PCR/PPE data series, 2007-2019

	Regions (PCR/PPE 2007-2019)					
	APR	ESA	LAC	NEN	WCA	All regions*
Average disconnect	-0.23	-0.32	-0.28	-0.32	-0.30	-0.29

Source: IOE evaluation rating database and IFAD project completion report rating database.

* This is the average of average disconnect for all projects by criteria, and not the average of regional average.

- The tables below indicate the performance of each region within each criterion analysed in the most recent periods presented in the ARRI 2021. Table 2 presents the percentage of moderately satisfactory and better ratings (PCR/PPE data series) by region in 2017-2019. Dark cells indicate a negative trend compared to the previous three-year period of 2016-2018. Table 3 indicates the magnitude of the decline or increase between 2017-2019 and 2016-2018.
- The following observations can be made from the data:
 - APR presents declining trends for all criteria. Efficiency represents the highest decline by 8 percentage point, followed by sustainability of benefits and project performance, both 7 percentage points.
 - ESA performance in 2017-2019 decreased slightly for two out of the 14 criteria by one percentage point compared to 2016-2018. Eight criteria had a positive double digits percentage increase, the highest being efficiency and government performance.
 - LAC shows raising ratings across all criteria except for the criteria on efficiency and government performance, with 4 and 8 percentage points decreases respectively.
 - NEN performance shows improvement across all criteria. The most substantial improvements can be noticed in gender equality and women's empowerment, relevance, efficiency, project performance and government performance.
 - In WCA, all criteria are improving except for IFAD performance, falling by 3 percentage points. Innovation increased significantly by 14 percentage points, rural poverty impact and adaptation to climate change both raised by 10 percentage points.

Table 2
Percentage of moderately satisfactory+ ratings by region, 2017-2019 (by year of completion)

Criteria	APR (22 projects)	ESA (11 projects)	LAC (8 projects)	NEN (9 projects)	WCA (17 projects)
Relevance	82	73	88	78	100
Effectiveness	91	82	63	89	59
Efficiency	68	55	38	78	35
Sustainability	77	73	50	89	41
Project performance	73	36	50	78	35
Rural poverty impact	91	64	63	89	76
Innovation	86	100	88	89	76
Scaling-up	73	82	75	78	53
GEWE	82	60	86	78	76
ENRM	95	80	57	100	81
Adaptation to climate change	86	82	50	100	79
IFAD performance	82	64	100	89	76
Government performance	77	55	50	78	47
Overall project achievement	86	73	50	89	71

 Negative Trend  Positive Trend

Table 3
Percentage point increase/decrease in the share of the projects with moderately satisfactory or better ratings, between 2017-2019 and 2016-2018 period (by year of completion)

Criteria	APR	ESA	LAC	NEN	WCA
Relevance	-6	1	4	15	8
Effectiveness	-5	10	4	1	0
Efficiency	-8	19	-4	15	2
Sustainability	-7	16	8	1	8
Project performance	-7	15	8	15	2
Rural poverty impact	-5	-1	4	1	10
Innovation	-2	0	13	14	14
Scaling-up	-3	10	8	3	3
GEWE	-6	6	13	28	1
ENRM	-1	18	3	0	9
Adaptation to climate change	-2	13	17	0	10
IFAD performance	-6	-1	8	1	-3
Government performance	-3	19	-8	15	5
Overall project achievement	-5	8	5	1	8

 Negative Trend  Positive Trend

B. Comparison of IOE's PPE/IE ratings and PCR ratings ranked by disconnect

Table 4
All evaluation criteria, only PPE/IE evaluations completed between 2007-2019 (N=88)

Criteria	Mean ratings		Disconnect	Mode		Obs.	
	IOE	PMD		IOE	PMD	IOE	PMD
Relevance	4.10	4.89	-0.73	4	5	88	87
Scaling-up	4.07	4.64	-0.47	4	4	88	88
Project performance	3.98	4.40	-0.42	4	4	88	88
Government performance	4.07	4.35	-0.28	4	4	88	88
Sustainability	3.81	4.14	-0.34	4	4	88	88
IFAD performance	4.16	4.56	-0.30	4	4	88	88
Efficiency	3.76	4.16	-0.40	4	4	88	88
GEWE	4.14	4.57	-0.48	4	4	87	87
Overall project achievement	4.09	4.45	-0.30	4	4	86	86
Effectiveness	4.08	4.44	-0.36	4	4	88	88
Innovation	4.22	4.48	-0.22	4	4	88	88
Adaptation to climate change	3.89	4.34	1.51	4	4	72	72
Rural Poverty Impact	4.15	4.32	-0.21	4	4	87	87
ENRM	3.95	4.26	-0.23	4	4	79	79

Source: IOE evaluation rating database and IFAD project completion report rating database.

Table 5
All evaluation criteria, only PPE/IE evaluations completed between 2017-2019 (N=13)

Criteria	Mean ratings		Disconnect	Mode		Obs.	
	IOE	PMD		IOE	PMD	IOE	PMD
Relevance	4.08	4.77	-0.69	4	5	13	13
Scaling-up	3.77	4.54	-0.77	4	5	13	13
Project performance	3.92	4.32	-0.39	4	4	13	13
Government performance	4.38	4.50	-0.12	5	5	13	13
Sustainability	3.69	3.96	-0.27	4	4	13	13
IFAD performance	4.00	4.46	-0.46	4	5	13	13
Efficiency	3.62	4.04	-0.42	4	4	13	13
GEWE	3.50	4.54	-1.31	4	5	12	13
Overall project achievement	4.00	4.40	-0.08	4	5	13	10
Effectiveness	4.15	4.50	-0.35	4	5	13	13
Innovation	4.46	4.69	-0.23	4	5	13	13
Adaptation to climate change	4.23	4.42	-0.17	4	4	13	12
Rural Poverty Impact	3.92	4.19	-0.27	4	4	13	13
ENRM	4.08	4.38	-0.31	4	4	13	13

Source: IOE evaluation rating database and IFAD project completion report rating database.

Comparison of IFAD-funded project performance with operations supported by other international financial institutions

1. The ARRI situates the performance of IFAD operations in reference to performance of the agriculture-sector operations of other IFIs and regional development banks i.e. the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) and the World Bank.⁵³ Although each organization is different in its size of operations, scope of the portfolio, project approaches and geographic focus, their operating models as IFIs providing loans for investment operations with sovereign guarantees are more comparable to IFAD than the United Nations specialized agencies, programmes and funds. As members of the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks, their independent evaluation offices use similar methodologies and maintain independent evaluation databases.
2. In table below, IFAD's project performance is shown along with other IFIs on a similar criterion for the period from 2013 onward, which coincides with some changes that were introduced in measuring aggregate performance such as inclusion of sustainability in IFAD's project performance. However, these figures need to be seen with caution, since they may not be necessarily comparable, since the method of aggregation of project performance is not uniform across the IFIs both in terms of the criteria used in aggregation. For example, the World Bank does not include sustainability in aggregate performance but IFAD, AsDB and AfDB do. Furthermore, at IFAD, "project performance" is an arithmetic average of the ratings on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits, whereas the similar criterion for comparison is assigned an absolute rating at WB and AsDB.⁵⁴ This could make it more challenging for projects at IFAD to have the average aggregate rating greater than 4: for example, the arithmetic average could be close to 4 but less than 4. Lastly, even if these projects are classified (by each organization) in the sector relating to agriculture and rural development, the types of interventions may be quite different (e.g. oriented to large-scale infrastructure development or community-based development).

⁵³ The Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are not included in the benchmarking analysis because the former does not use a rating system, while the nature of focus and coverage of the latter is significantly different from IFAD. Therefore, World Bank's performance is used to benchmark performance in the LAC and NEN regions as per Management's 2018 request.

⁵⁴ For example, the same 1-6 scale rating is assigned at WB (from highly unsatisfactory to highly satisfactory). AsDB has three categories, "successful" (which is considered as MS+), "less than successful" and "unsuccessful".

Table

Project performance rating at IFAD compared to similar criterion at other IFIs*Percentage of completed agriculture and rural development projects rated moderately satisfactory or better (MS+) by the independent evaluation offices, 2013-2019 (year of completion)⁵⁵*

Projects completed between 2013 and 2019											
	Overall Project Achievement	Project performance									
	World IFAD	World		Africa		Asia-Pacific		Latin America-Caribbean		Near East- North Africa-Europe	
		IFAD	WB	IFAD	AfDB ⁵⁶	IFAD	AsDB	IFAD	WB	IFAD	WB
% of projects rated MS+	76%	57%	79%	48%	87%	79%	70%	59%	87%	59%	83%
No. of agriculture projects evaluated	213	216	238	109	71	53	44	28	39	39	41

WB: World Bank; AfDB: African Development Bank; AsDB: Asian Development Bank.

Source: AfDB Independent Development Evaluation Unit, AsDB Independent Evaluation Department, World Bank Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank and IOE evaluation database (all evaluation).

Note: Data for AfDB are based on the year of evaluation, as the year of project completion is not available in the data provided by the IFI. Projects evaluated in 2019 are included as they refer to projects completed in 2018.

⁵⁵ Data from the World Bank has been adjusted since 2018 ARRI and the same methodology has been followed since 2019 ARRI. In the past years the analysis was based on the "number of evaluations", including projects that were rated more than once in the time period considered. In this year's ARRI, the World Bank data has been aligned with AsDB and AfDB data and it only refers to the "number of projects" carried out in the time period considered for the analysis.

⁵⁶ To make the comparison with the AfDB more consistent in term of countries included, the total IFAD for Africa includes ESA and WCA, plus some African countries placed under the NEN division in IFAD (Djibouti, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia). The number of projects evaluated between 2013-2019 dropped compared to last year, due to the non-review/validation of PCRs of 2018 and 2019.