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Investir dans les populations rurales

République de l'Ouganda

Évaluation de la stratégie et du programme de pays

Note à l'intention des représentants au Conseil d'administration

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Pour: **Examen**

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Remerciements

La présente évaluation de la stratégie et du programme de pays a été menée sous la direction de Chitra Deshpande, responsable principale chargée de l'évaluation au Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA (IOE), et a bénéficié des contributions de Nicholas Chapman, Jeanette Cooke (analyste de recherche), Asaph Besigye, Allen Kebba, Hope Kabuchu, Marc de Sousa Shields et Christopher Sebatta (consultants spécialisés dans l'évaluation). L'appui administratif a été assuré par Manuela Gallitto (assistante d'évaluation).

Le rapport d'évaluation a fait l'objet d'un examen par les pairs mené par IOE. IOE remercie le Département de la gestion des programmes – et en particulier la Division Afrique orientale et australe, ainsi que la Directrice de pays et le bureau du FIDA en Ouganda – pour leur collaboration constructive au cours de cette évaluation.

Nous souhaitons également exprimer notre reconnaissance au Gouvernement ougandais ainsi qu'à nos autres principaux partenaires pour leur appui et leur coopération pendant le processus d'évaluation.

Résumé

A. Contexte

1. Le Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA (IOE) a mené une évaluation de la stratégie et du programme de pays (ESPP) en République d'Ouganda. Il s'agit de la deuxième évaluation réalisée dans ce pays; la première évaluation du programme de pays (EPP) a été publiée en 2013.
2. La présente ESPP a pour objectifs principaux: i) d'évaluer les résultats et la performance du programme d'options stratégiques pour le pays (COSOP) 2013–2018; ii) de formuler des constatations et des recommandations pour le prochain COSOP et le futur partenariat entre le FIDA et le gouvernement ougandais. L'ESPP examine en outre les suites qui ont été données aux recommandations formulées à l'issue de l'EPP de 2013 et évalue la performance du programme.
3. **Contexte du pays.** L'économie ougandaise a connu pendant les 20 dernières années une forte croissance, qui s'est cependant ralentie au cours de la décennie qui vient de s'écouler pour s'établir à 5,2%, avec une croissance par habitant de seulement 1,6% en raison de l'expansion démographique soutenue. L'agriculture ne représente qu'un quart du produit intérieur brut, mais emploie 72% de la population active. Les importations d'aliments transformés, et notamment d'huile végétale, restent élevées. La pauvreté s'est aggravée ces dernières années; un cinquième des Ougandais vivent aujourd'hui au-dessous du seuil de pauvreté. Les inégalités persistent, en particulier dans les zones rurales et dans le nord du pays, et touchent les femmes, les jeunes et les réfugiés. On note une amélioration en matière d'égalité femmes-hommes, mais les normes sociales discriminatoires à l'égard des femmes restent profondément enracinées.
4. De nombreux problèmes structurels entravent la croissance agricole, comme la prédominance des petits exploitants qui pratiquent une agriculture pluviale à faible rendement, la densité de population qui augmente, l'insécurité foncière et l'insuffisance des infrastructures. Le rythme auquel l'Ouganda consomme ses ressources naturelles n'est pas viable. La superficie des forêts, qui fournissent plus de 90% de l'énergie du pays (destinée aux populations pauvres, principalement), diminue de plus de 5% par an, soit la deuxième baisse la plus rapide au monde. Les changements climatiques se traduisent par des précipitations imprévisibles, une augmentation des infestations de ravageurs et des maladies, une élévation des températures et une montée du niveau du lac Victoria.
5. Sur la période considérée, les cadres d'action des pouvoirs publics ont visé à transformer l'agriculture en un secteur viable sur le plan commercial et concentré sur un ensemble de filières clés. La politique relative aux services de vulgarisation et aux services financiers ruraux a oscillé entre une approche axée sur l'offre et une approche axée sur la demande. Malgré sa progression constante, l'aide publique au développement a diminué en proportion du produit intérieur brut, passant de 14% en moyenne sur la période 2000-2008 à 7% sur la période 2009-2017. Le soutien budgétaire a été suspendu en 2012, et l'aide a été reportée sur les interventions des projets. Les prêts non liés à l'aide publique au développement, principalement consentis par la Chine, ont considérablement augmenté en importance.
6. **FIDA.** La part de l'Ouganda dans l'enveloppe budgétaire du FIDA n'a cessé d'augmenter, au point qu'elle représente désormais 11% de l'allocation de la Division Afrique orientale et australe. Dans le tout dernier COSOP, le Fonds a défini trois objectifs stratégiques: l'augmentation de la production, l'accès aux marchés et l'accès aux services financiers ruraux. Les neuf projets évalués dans le cadre de cette ESPP¹ ont bénéficié collectivement de 1,4 milliard d'USD d'engagements de

¹ Programme relatif aux services financiers ruraux, Programme d'appui aux moyens de subsistance dans les districts, Programme d'amélioration des infrastructures agricoles communautaires – Phase I Projet de promotion des

financement, dont des prêts du FIDA à hauteur de 430 millions d'USD. Un éventail de dons régionaux et mondiaux a également été évalué.

7. Le bureau de pays du FIDA est en place depuis 2006. Le poste de Directeur de pays a été localisé dans le pays uniquement entre 2014 et 2018. Au milieu de l'année 2018, il a été transféré au pôle régional du FIDA à Nairobi. Les effectifs comme le budget du programme de pays ont diminué sur la période considérée.

B. Performance du portefeuille de projets

8. La **pertinence** du portefeuille est jugée satisfaisante. Les objectifs visés grâce au portefeuille de prêts étaient bien en phase avec les objectifs du COSOP en cours lors de l'évaluation et ceux des précédents COSOP, et avec les cadres d'action nationaux et sectoriels, notamment en ce qui concerne l'accent mis sur le caractère régional de la pauvreté dans le nord et l'est du pays et sur les approches par filière. De plus, la conception des projets allait de pair avec l'évolution des politiques institutionnelles du FIDA, notamment eu égard à la finance rurale, à la nutrition, à la gestion de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles, aux changements climatiques et aux filières. Le portefeuille laisse apparaître une tension entre la concrétisation des objectifs de réduction de la pauvreté et l'articulation d'une stratégie davantage axée sur la croissance commerciale. Cependant, l'orientation stratégique consistant à passer d'une action de large portée et plutôt dispersée à une présence plus ciblée, géographiquement contiguë, s'est révélée bénéfique.
9. L'enchaînement délibéré des projets s'est révélé extrêmement efficace, car il a permis de tenir compte des enseignements tirés des activités précédentes et de faire davantage appel à du personnel de projet expérimenté. L'accroissement des investissements du secteur privé a permis de compenser le niveau limité de cofinancements provenant des partenaires de développement. Au fil du temps, la complexité et l'échelle de plus en plus importantes des conceptions ont amplifié le risque et accru les difficultés d'exécution des projets. À cet égard, une analyse plus poussée de l'économie politique aurait été utile pour gérer les pressions latentes dans les systèmes gouvernementaux et le secteur privé.
10. Le ciblage a été bien géré, en tenant compte des disparités dans les niveaux de pauvreté et l'accès aux services selon les régions et les districts. Des approches plus ou moins efficaces ont été utilisées en matière d'inclusion sociale et d'intégration des questions liées au genre, avec des méthodes telles que l'encadrement des ménages. Toutefois, on aurait pu concevoir des interventions plus spécifiques pour les jeunes.
11. L'**efficacité** du portefeuille est jugée plutôt satisfaisante. L'accès au marché des petits exploitants a été amélioré grâce à la construction de routes d'accès communautaires, qui ont permis d'augmenter les prix à la ferme et de réduire la durée des trajets. Les normes de conception plus exigeantes ont renforcé la durabilité des routes, mais ont aussi entraîné des retards et des coûts plus élevés. Les usagers des routes construites dans le cadre de la première phase du Programme d'amélioration des infrastructures agricoles communautaires ont vu le prix de leurs produits sur le marché augmenter de 40%, tandis que les prix à la ferme progressaient de 30% et que les temps de trajet diminuaient de 7%. Le Programme d'appui aux moyens de subsistance dans les districts, quant à lui, a notamment fait baisser les coûts de transport de 60%. L'appui aux infrastructures de transformation des produits agricoles et de marché a donné des résultats mitigés, les installations n'étant pas toujours totalement opérationnelles ou pleinement utilisées. Globalement, le portefeuille a permis d'élaborer et de diffuser diverses technologies, en augmentant la capacité de recherche et en donnant aux

technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries, Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale – Phase II, Projet en faveur de l'accès aux services financiers des populations rurales qui en sont habituellement exclues, Projet de rétablissement des moyens de subsistance dans la région du Nord, Projet national d'appui à la production d'huile de palme, Projet national d'appui à la production d'oléagineux.

petits exploitants les moyens de les adopter. Par exemple, lors de la deuxième phase du Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale, l'utilisation de semences améliorées atteignait 67%, contre 17% au démarrage; un résultat malgré tout inférieur à l'objectif de 90% qui avait été fixé. Les changements institutionnels apportés au mécanisme d'approvisionnement en intrants et aux services de vulgarisation ont toutefois entraîné des perturbations, qui ont débouché sur une production insuffisante et des pertes ainsi que, dans certains cas, un accaparement par les élites.

12. Dans le domaine de la finance rurale, la microfinance a gagné en efficacité et en réactivité grâce à l'appui du FIDA, et une nouvelle législation a amélioré la réglementation du secteur. L'appui aux filières de l'huile de palme et des oléagineux a amélioré l'accès au marché et renforcé le pouvoir de négociation. Les centres de regroupement ont permis aux agriculteurs de négocier collectivement et d'obtenir des prix de vente plus élevés, mais la capacité des usines de transformation a été sous-utilisée. Enfin, la productivité des agriculteurs n'a pas été à la hauteur des attentes, malgré une production d'huile végétale supérieure aux objectifs.
13. Globalement, le nombre de bénéficiaires est conforme au niveau défini lors de la conception des projets: cinq projets ont atteint ou dépassé les objectifs révisés (Programme relatif aux services financiers ruraux, Programme d'appui aux moyens de subsistance dans les districts, Programme d'amélioration des infrastructures agricoles communautaires – Phase I, Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries et Projet en faveur de l'accès aux services financiers des populations rurales qui en sont habituellement exclues). Le fait que l'accent ait été déplacé du développement communautaire et des infrastructures rurales au profit de l'investissement dans les filières a toutefois eu une incidence sur le nombre de bénéficiaires. Le Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries, le Programme d'amélioration des infrastructures agricoles communautaires – Phase I et le Programme relatif aux services financiers ruraux ont bénéficié globalement à quelque 8 millions de personnes, tandis que les projets ultérieurs (Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale – Phase II, Projet de rétablissement des moyens de subsistance dans la région du Nord, Programme d'appui aux moyens de subsistance dans les districts et Projet en faveur de l'accès aux services financiers des populations rurales qui en sont habituellement exclues) en ont touché 4 millions.
14. Dans le Programme d'appui aux moyens de subsistance dans les districts et le Projet de rétablissement des moyens de subsistance dans la région du Nord, l'encadrement des ménages et le système d'apprentissage interactif entre femmes et hommes, associés à des dons visant à améliorer la sécurité alimentaire, ont bien ciblé les ménages les plus pauvres, notamment ceux dirigés par une femme ou par un jeune. Bien qu'extrêmement efficaces, ces approches ont vu leur couverture limitée du fait de leur intensité et de leur durée.
15. L'**efficacité** du portefeuille est jugée plutôt insuffisante. Elle a été renforcée par des niveaux de décaissement globalement bons, une gestion financière saine et des taux de rentabilité positifs. Elle a toutefois été limitée par plusieurs facteurs. Des retards d'exécution ont nécessité de prolonger des projets, et des décaissements initiaux trop faibles ont dû être compensés par des décaissements importants vers la fin. La lenteur des procédures fiduciaires, des passations de marchés et des achats ont réduit l'efficacité, tout comme les vacances périodiques de postes et le taux élevé de rotation du personnel dans plusieurs unités de gestion. Les systèmes financiers ont été jugés satisfaisants de manière générale, mais plusieurs cas de dépenses non autorisées ont été constatés, notamment pour le Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs

concernant les agro-industries, le Programme relatif aux services financiers ruraux et le Projet de rétablissement des moyens de subsistance dans la région du Nord.

16. **L'impact sur la pauvreté rurale** est jugé plutôt satisfaisant. Abstraction faite de certains doutes sur la fiabilité des études d'impact, on a constaté une augmentation des revenus et des actifs des bénéficiaires des sept projets évalués qui, dans certains cas, était bien supérieure aux objectifs fixés (Programme d'amélioration des infrastructures agricoles communautaires – Phase I, Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries et Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale – Phase II). Dans le cadre du Programme d'amélioration des infrastructures agricoles communautaires – Phase I, le revenu annuel moyen des ménages a augmenté de 44%, et, d'après les estimations, il a augmenté de 226% dans le cadre du Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries. Cette évolution est due à une utilisation plus importante de technologies améliorées et à un accès plus large aux marchés. Les communautés cibles font également état d'une amélioration de leur sécurité alimentaire et d'une diversification de leurs sources de revenu, mais la diminution des niveaux de malnutrition est plus incertaine. Dans le domaine de la finance rurale, les revenus n'ont pas été mesurés directement, mais il a été constaté que les niveaux d'épargne et de dépenses ont progressé.
17. Les observations qualitatives laissent penser que le capital humain et social a augmenté, mais une collecte systématique et continue de données faisait souvent défaut, et la portée des méthodes d'encadrement des ménages était limitée. Grâce à l'appui de volontaires dans les communautés, les capacités des ménages dans des domaines comme l'alphabétisation des adultes ou la planification et la gestion financières ont été renforcées, et la participation des habitants aux groupes d'intérêt commun a augmenté. À titre d'exemple, 94% des bénéficiaires du Programme relatif aux services financiers ruraux ont vu leur niveau d'instruction progresser et leur situation sanitaire s'améliorer. Les institutions locales, y compris les groupements de production et ceux fondés sur le crédit, ont été renforcées, et la capacité à offrir des services de meilleure qualité des autorités locales et des instituts de recherche zonaux a légèrement augmenté. Cependant, les changements à grande échelle dans la prestation de services ne sont pas si flagrants.
18. Le programme de prêts du FIDA visant l'agriculture et le développement rural intégré a eu peu d'influence, voire aucune, sur les l'élaboration des politiques. En revanche, les projets portant sur des filières ont permis d'offrir un modèle efficace de partenariat public-privé-producteurs, et on peut voir un impact potentiel sur les politiques dans l'adoption de ces approches dans le troisième Plan de développement national. Les résultats les plus importants s'agissant des politiques sont observés dans la finance rurale, avec une amélioration de la réglementation et de la gouvernance.
19. La **durabilité des avantages** est jugée plutôt satisfaisante. En ce qui concerne les institutions, les perspectives de viabilité des organisations paysannes semblent favorables, notamment dans les cas où la viabilité financière a été assurée ou dans ceux où des liens communautaires solides ont été tissés. L'autosuffisance dans le secteur de la finance rurale est difficile à atteindre du fait de l'efficacité variable des organismes d'épargne et de crédit, de la faiblesse des organisations faitières, qui ne sont pas en mesure d'apporter un appui sur le terrain, et des récents changements dans la législation. La rentabilité des filières cibles est de bon augure pour la pérennité des petites exploitations. L'entretien des routes d'accès communautaires de qualité supérieure semble plus assuré que celui des routes de moindre qualité, du fait de leur plus grande solidité et de leur admissibilité future au Fonds routier de l'Ouganda. Le Gouvernement ougandais a renforcé son engagement à soutenir les services de recherche et de vulgarisation, mais un

récent examen des dépenses indique qu'il plane encore une certaine incertitude quant au financement, tandis que le programme continu de distribution d'intrants subventionnés entrave la viabilité tant technique que financière.

20. L'**innovation** est jugée plutôt insuffisante. Le portefeuille met en avant un certain nombre d'innovations dans le contexte ougandais, mais la plupart des exemples datent du précédent COSOP. La deuxième phase du Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale s'appuie sur les caractéristiques innovantes de la première phase, tout particulièrement le développement continu de l'huile de palme en tant que culture pérenne dans le cadre d'une approche de partenariat public-privé-producteurs. Les approches d'encadrement des ménages ont été poursuivies, bien que leur introduction soit antérieure à la période couverte par l'ESPP. L'appui dédié à la recherche agronomique a débouché sur la diffusion d'une série de technologies, qui, pour certaines étaient innovantes en Ouganda. Plusieurs occasions d'innover ont par ailleurs été manquées, notamment en ce qui concerne l'avancement des processus de réforme de la vulgarisation axée sur la demande qui avaient été lancés sous l'égide des services nationaux de conseil agricole, et l'utilisation de la technologie pour élargir la portée de la finance rurale.
21. La **transposition à plus grande échelle** des projets a été jugée plutôt satisfaisante. On trouve des exemples de transposition à plus grande échelle au-delà des projets du FIDA, mais ils auraient pu être plus nombreux avec une gestion plus efficace des savoirs axée sur la transmission des résultats et des enseignements tirés de l'expérience aux partenaires du Fonds. Nous citerons trois exemples: adoption plus large du modèle de plantations-mères de palmiers à huile après les première et deuxième phases du Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale; reproduction de l'approche d'encadrement des ménages et du système d'apprentissage interactif entre les sexes par des acteurs non étatiques en Ouganda et dans le cadre de projets du FIDA dans d'autres pays; diffusion de technologies agricoles améliorées à des stations de recherche zonales, à des acteurs du secteur privé et à des groupements d'agriculteurs. Certaines activités hors prêts du FIDA ont également été à l'origine de la reproduction à plus grande échelle d'innovations. C'est le cas en particulier des dons intégrés dans des projets, tels que le Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries et le Projet de rétablissement des moyens de subsistance dans la région du Nord.
22. Les activités relatives à **l'égalité femmes-hommes et l'autonomisation des femmes, ainsi qu'à la jeunesse**, considérées collectivement, sont jugées plutôt satisfaisantes. On a constaté un engagement fort, dans l'ensemble des projets du portefeuille, à mettre en œuvre des interventions en faveur de l'égalité femme-hommes, conformément à la Politique du FIDA concernant l'égalité des sexes et l'autonomisation des femmes et aux politiques ougandaises nationales dans ce domaine. De fait, le programme en Ouganda a été à la pointe des évolutions dans les approches porteuses de transformation en matière de genre. Des résultats positifs ont été obtenus pour ce qui est de la participation et de l'accès des femmes aux actifs, à la création de revenus et à l'exercice des responsabilités. Cependant, les interventions étaient en grande partie axées sur l'augmentation du nombre de femmes prises en charge, et n'ont pas permis de s'attaquer aux obstacles systémiques liés au genre et aux rapports de force qui continuent d'entraver l'autonomisation des femmes. Certains projets ont efficacement attiré les jeunes. Toutefois, les projets les moins récents ne disposaient pas de stratégie claire pour remédier aux obstacles à la mobilisation des jeunes, homme ou femme qu'ils soient, sur les questions liées au travail et à la terre.
23. La **gestion des ressources naturelles** est jugée plutôt satisfaisante. Les activités de gestion de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles ont été largement couronnées de succès dans les projets concernés, en particulier le Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale – Phase II, le Projet de

rétablissement des moyens de subsistance dans la région du Nord et le Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries. Un appui technique et financier a été apporté aux communautés pour leur donner les moyens d'atténuer les effets de problèmes majeurs, comme la variabilité de plus en plus forte et la répartition inégale des précipitations, le déclin de la fertilité des sols, la déforestation et l'empiètement sur les terres humides. Des activités de création de terrasses et de remise en état des bassins versants dégradés ont permis d'améliorer l'accès aux ressources naturelles et de renforcer la gestion communautaire. Les données préliminaires dont on dispose sur la deuxième phase du Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale semblent indiquer que les taux de déboisement ont diminué et que les principaux acteurs se sont efforcés de rendre la production d'huile de palme durable. Cependant, des difficultés se posent pour les projets en cours qui doivent satisfaire à des obligations et des directives plus strictes en matière de gestion environnementale, fixées à la fois par le FIDA et le Gouvernement ougandais; c'est le cas notamment de projets relativement récents désignés comme des opérations de catégorie A, pour lesquelles des plans de gestion plus complets sont exigés.

24. **L'adaptation aux changements climatiques** est également jugée plutôt satisfaisante. Plusieurs projets du portefeuille du FIDA comportaient des activités ciblant, à divers degrés, l'adaptation aux changements climatiques, notamment le Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries, le Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale – Phase II, le Projet de rétablissement des moyens de subsistance dans la région du Nord, le Projet en faveur de l'accès aux services financiers des populations rurales qui en sont habituellement exclues et le Programme d'appui aux moyens de subsistance dans les districts. Un certain nombre de réalisations ont été obtenues au regard de l'adaptation aux changements climatiques, mais principalement à une échelle locale, et rarement au niveau national ou sur le plan des politiques. Le Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries a encouragé d'importantes pratiques de gestion durable des terres en vue de prévenir les risques climatiques dans la production agricole: les estimations indiquent que près de 2 millions de tonnes de carbone ont été fixées, soit une valeur de 151 millions d'USD. Les activités de recherche ont permis de mettre au point des variétés de semences résistantes à la sécheresse, et les systèmes météorologiques électroniques offrent des perspectives prometteuses en ce qui concerne la fourniture d'informations climatiques aux agriculteurs. On a renforcé la résilience et la durabilité des routes communautaires en les modifiant de manière à les rendre praticables quelles que soient les conditions météorologiques et à permettre un reboisement et une récupération de l'eau.

C. Évaluation des activités hors prêts

25. Sur la période couverte par le COSOP, la variation des effectifs du bureau de pays a entravé la capacité du FIDA à lancer des activités de gestion du portefeuille et des activités hors prêts. Le principal changement a été le transfert du poste de Directeur de pays du siège du FIDA à Kampala en 2014, puis au pôle régional de Nairobi en 2018. Les trois domaines stratégiques ont été gérés séparément par différents membres de l'équipe du FIDA. Cette répartition des tâches, au demeurant efficace, limite cependant les échanges de savoirs au sein du programme, et il manque une approche générale fondée sur le programme de pays.
26. La **gestion des savoirs** est jugée plutôt insuffisante. La stratégie de gestion des savoirs consistait à tirer des enseignements des projets en vue d'enrichir la concertation sur les politiques. Cependant, faute d'une architecture stable et de ressources suffisantes, il n'a pas été possible de la mettre en œuvre de manière systématique. Un responsable de la gestion des savoirs est resté en poste jusqu'en

2015, et des activités ont été encouragées dans ce domaine pendant cette période, principalement au niveau des projets. Les conceptions de projets de dons et de séries de projets ont permis de tirer des enseignements des projets antérieurs et d'assurer la continuité des pratiques de gestion des savoirs au sein du personnel des projets, en dépit d'une réduction considérable des ressources consacrées à ces activités.

27. Dans la plupart des projets, les activités de gestion des savoirs sont restées axées sur la communication plutôt que sur le renforcement des systèmes de suivi-évaluation et l'utilisation de ces systèmes pour la gestion des savoirs et la concertation sur les politiques menée avec les pouvoirs publics. De la même façon, la contribution des activités de gestion des savoirs financées par des dons a varié en fonction de la puissance de leurs liens avec le programme de prêts.
28. **L'établissement de partenariats** est jugé plutôt satisfaisant. Le COSOP de 2013 avait défini des objectifs ambitieux en matière d'établissement de partenariats avec les autorités publiques, le secteur privé, les partenaires de développement et les organisations rurales. Cependant, il s'est avéré difficile de nouer des partenariats au niveau national (au-delà des projets) du fait des effectifs réduits du bureau de pays. Ce manque de personnel a limité l'instauration de partenariats au fil du temps en diminuant le nombre de contacts réguliers, notamment les réunions officielles.
29. Le FIDA est un partenaire respecté dans les groupes de travail du secteur, tels que celui des partenaires pour le développement de l'agriculture. Cela étant, les organismes partenaires du système des Nations Unies et les partenaires bilatéraux n'ont qu'une connaissance très limitée du travail du FIDA, bien qu'ils considèrent son personnel comme extrêmement compétent. Le FIDA a cultivé son partenariat avec le Gouvernement ougandais principalement au moyen du portefeuille de prêts, et a également collaboré avec ses partenaires du secteur privé et de la société civile essentiellement dans le cadre de l'exécution des projets. Il a fait preuve de moins de dynamisme dans le renforcement de la collaboration avec les initiatives lancées par les donateurs dans la même zone géographique ou le même secteur, comme en témoigne le manque de cofinancements dans les projets conçus au titre du COSOP de 2013.
30. La **participation à l'élaboration de politiques au niveau du pays** est jugée plutôt satisfaisante. Dans le cadre du COSOP de 2013, le FIDA a principalement suivi une stratégie de participation à l'élaboration des politiques au moyen de son programme de prêts, et a obtenu des résultats inégaux. Sur les quatre domaines définis, un seul a donné des résultats satisfaisants (amélioration du cadre réglementaire relatif à la finance rurale inclusive), tandis que les objectifs n'ont pas été atteints dans le domaine de la vulgarisation et n'ont été réalisés qu'en partie dans ceux liés à l'appui aux institutions rurales. La participation à l'élaboration des politiques au niveau du pays, fondée sur l'exploitation des données issues des projets pour éclairer la prise de décisions, est incontestable dans les projets relatifs à la finance rurale et dans le Projet de développement de la production d'huile végétale – Phase II. Cependant, aucun élément ne montre de renforcement des capacités des organismes publics à formuler des politiques en faveur des pauvres ni de soutien aux organisations rurales pour faire progresser leur propre programme d'action.

D. Performance des partenaires

31. La performance du **FIDA** en tant que partenaire est jugée plutôt satisfaisante. Le Fonds a obtenu de bons résultats en ce qui concerne l'élaboration d'un portefeuille conforme aux objectifs du COSOP et la mise à disposition de ses compétences pour des secteurs clés tels que les filières et la finance rurale. L'approche du FIDA en matière de conception, certes consultative, aurait gagné à être appuyée par une analyse plus poussée du contexte économique et politique.

La supervision a été assurée de manière efficace, sauf dans le cas du Projet de promotion des technologies agricoles et des services consultatifs concernant les agro-industries, où le rôle du FIDA n'a pas été très influent. Les projets ont ainsi donné les résultats escomptés et ont pu être revus si nécessaire. Les ressources du bureau de pays sont axées sur le portefeuille de prêts, en particulier sur la supervision et l'appui à l'exécution. Les ressources allouées pour l'administration du programme de pays en témoignent, mais la tendance à la réduction des enveloppes budgétaires a limité la capacité d'exécution s'agissant des activités hors prêts.

32. La performance des **pouvoirs publics** est jugée plutôt insuffisante. Les pouvoirs publics ont activement soutenu l'élaboration et l'exécution des projets. Dans la plupart des cas, un personnel hautement qualifié a été affecté à la gestion des projets, notamment ceux qui ont été transférés. Les processus de passation de marchés étaient souvent lents, et la performance fiduciaire était mitigée en ce qui concerne les financements de contrepartie. Les cadres de transparence et de responsabilisation des pouvoirs publics ont certes évolué progressivement au fil du temps, mais les violations de règles financières restent relativement courantes, et les lois sont peu appliquées. Les principaux points de vulnérabilité du portefeuille du FIDA qui ont été examinés comprennent la gestion financière, les achats et la passation de marchés.
33. Les systèmes de suivi-évaluation des projets étaient de qualité inégale s'agissant de la fiabilité et de l'exhaustivité des informations produites et communiquées. Dans de nombreux cas, les équipes de projet n'ont pas réalisé les études de référence, les examens à mi-parcours ou les évaluations de fin de projet dans les délais impartis. Bien que des dons ont été ajoutés pour les services de vulgarisation et l'entretien des routes, et des agents de vulgarisation ont été recrutés, les grands engagements budgétaires pris par le Gouvernement ougandais en faveur du secteur et à l'appui de la fourniture des services par les autorités locales, par rapport aux besoins nationaux d'engagement de dépenses, n'ont pas été jugés totalement satisfaisants sur la période couverte par l'ESPP, et la performance des projets en a souffert.

E. Performance de la stratégie du programme de pays

34. La **pertinence** du COSOP est jugée plutôt satisfaisante. Les recommandations de l'EPP de 2013 n'ont pas toujours été pleinement suivies d'effets dans le programme de pays. Deux des cinq recommandations ont été entièrement prises en compte (étendre à la région Nord la couverture géographique des opérations financées par le FIDA et appuyer le développement d'une filière de produit de base.), mais des progrès limités et modestes ont été accomplis pour les trois autres (définir un programme de concertation sur les politiques, réaliste et doté de ressources adéquates, améliorer encore les résultats des projets et entreprendre une analyse fonctionnelle et une analyse de la charge de travail comme base pour la détermination des besoins en personnel et de la répartition du travail).
35. Le COSOP de 2013 cadrerait étroitement avec la politique générale du gouvernement s'agissant du secteur agricole et de la réduction de la pauvreté rurale, ainsi qu'avec les objectifs généraux du FIDA. La recherche d'un juste équilibre entre les activités de prêt et les activités hors prêts dans le COSOP était moins satisfaisante, tout comme le recensement et l'atténuation des risques. La volonté d'apporter les ressources nécessaires au bureau de pays pour veiller à la création de synergies au sein du programme était initialement pertinente, mais ne s'est pas concrétisée sur l'ensemble de la période.
36. L'**efficacité** est jugée plutôt satisfaisante. S'agissant du premier objectif stratégique, à savoir augmenter la production, la productivité et la résilience climatique des petites exploitations agricoles, les données dont on dispose indiquent une progression des superficies plantées et des rendements, due en

partie à une amélioration des conditions de croissance et à l'héritage des investissements réalisés avant la période couverte par le présent COSOP. Les activités de prêt et hors prêts du FIDA ont permis de renforcer la résilience face aux changements climatiques, mais l'impact reste modeste dans le contexte national. Les réformes des régimes fonciers ont donné peu de résultats.

37. Concernant le deuxième objectif stratégique – l'intégration des petits exploitants au marché –, les liens avec les entreprises de transformation de produits agricoles et les marchés ont été renforcés pour des filières spécifiques. Cependant, la plupart du temps, ces activités ont profité aux seuls agriculteurs qui étaient en mesure d'améliorer leurs activités commerciales. Les 7 246 km de routes d'accès communautaires construites dans le cadre de quatre projets sont des résultats positifs s'agissant de l'amélioration de l'accès. Les projets relatifs aux filières sont complexes et, malgré l'augmentation de la production et des revenus, des problèmes ont été constatés dans l'octroi de crédits, les activités de transformation et la commercialisation.
38. Dans le cadre du troisième objectif stratégique, une augmentation du nombre de bénéficiaires des services financiers et un accès durable à ceux-ci, en particulier au niveau des communautés, ont été obtenus malgré un cadre directif peu favorable. Quelque 1,1 million de ménages font état d'une augmentation de leur épargne et d'un meilleur accès au crédit, notamment au niveau des communautés.
39. En dépit de ces résultats, l'approche fondée sur le programme de pays a été moins efficace que prévu. On s'attendait à de fortes synergies et à de grandes complémentarités entre les projets du COSOP, ainsi qu'entre les activités de prêt et hors prêts. L'amélioration de la cohérence sur le plan géographique n'a pas débouché sur des liens opérationnels forts. Un bon enchaînement des projets a été défini en vue de réaliser les trois objectifs stratégiques du COSOP, mais les projets ont été exécutés la plupart du temps de manière cloisonnée dans le cadre de chaque objectif, ce qui n'a guère favorisé les échanges d'enseignements. Au-delà des projets, une meilleure coordination entre les activités de prêt et hors prêts et le bureau de pays du FIDA aurait pu être mise en place.

F. Conclusions

40. Le portefeuille du FIDA a été organisé de manière efficace autour d'un ensemble cohérent d'objectifs, de manière que les nouvelles interventions puissent s'appuyer sur les anciens projets. **Le renforcement de la cohérence sur le plan géographique dans le nord et dans l'est du pays a également permis de réduire les problèmes liés à un manque d'efficacité tout en améliorant le ciblage de la pauvreté.**
41. **Un enchaînement délibéré des projets a été préféré à une approche programmatique pour réaliser les objectifs stratégiques du COSOP, ce qui a limité les interactions et la communication des savoirs.** Cette situation est due en partie à l'adoption d'une approche de portefeuille, qui suppose de réaliser chaque objectif dans un volet distinct. Cette approche s'est toutefois révélée nécessaire pour permettre à la petite équipe de pays de prendre en charge un portefeuille de prêts de plus en plus étoffé avec un budget administratif en baisse.
42. **La réflexion stratégique a privilégié les approches par filière plutôt que le développement global des communautés.** Cette évolution a débouché sur une augmentation notable des co-investissements du secteur privé et une hausse des revenus des agriculteurs, mais a réduit le nombre de bénéficiaires. Cette réduction a été en partie compensée par la construction régulière de routes d'accès, la portée des investissements dans la finance rurale et le nombre de bénéficiaires indirects des activités relatives aux filières. Par ailleurs, le FIDA a pu protéger ses investissements contre les répercussions d'événements politiques ou de processus électoraux inattendus, et des capacités insuffisantes des autorités locales en matière de prestation de services.

43. L'approche intégrée par filière adoptée par le FIDA a renforcé les liens avec les entreprises de transformation de produits agricoles et le marché pour les produits de base sélectionnés. Le coût du transport a diminué et les prix du marché ont grimpé du fait de l'amélioration des accès routiers tandis que les installations de regroupement et les activités de transformation ont permis d'augmenter la valeur ajoutée, ce qui a contribué à la hausse des revenus des ménages. En dépit de retards dans l'exécution, **le renforcement des infrastructures et des services d'appui à partir de la demande du marché, établie de manière certaine, s'est avéré être une approche efficace, qui est venue s'ajouter à l'appui prolongé que l'on a pu assurer en enchaînant les projets selon un ordre précis.**
44. On dispose de suffisamment d'éléments pour indiquer que **les programmes financés par le FIDA ont contribué, parallèlement à d'autres facteurs, à augmenter la productivité et les revenus**, même si certains de ces résultats découlent d'investissements efficaces antérieurs et de l'amélioration des conditions météorologiques ces dernières années. Les investissements du FIDA dans la finance rurale ont donné de bons résultats en ce qui concerne le nombre de bénéficiaires, l'établissement de liens entre les groupes locaux d'épargne et de crédit et les prestataires de services, et les réformes de la réglementation. La décision du FIDA de se retirer de ce secteur est en phase avec la politique gouvernementale. Cela étant, la durabilité dépendra maintenant de la capacité des groupes à faire face aux frais des services, alors que les organisations faitièrès sont encore en proie à des difficultés.
45. La résilience des communautés bénéficiaires s'est renforcée, mais les progrès restent modestes lorsqu'on les envisage à la lumière des problèmes liés aux changements climatiques auxquels l'Ouganda est confronté. **La variabilité du climat augmente, et il faudra mieux prendre en compte ses effets dans les temps à venir si l'on ne veut pas risquer de les voir annihiler les résultats obtenus par le FIDA s'agissant de l'amélioration des moyens d'existence des populations rurales pauvres.**
46. La performance des activités hors prêts n'a pas été à la hauteur des ambitions affichées dans le COSOP de 2013. L'absence de stratégie définissant précisément comment les activités hors prêts seraient menées à bien a nui à l'orientation du travail. D'autre part, les ressources affectées à ces activités étaient insuffisantes. **La volonté d'influer sur les politiques et de nouer des partenariats s'est heurtée au manque de ressources dans le bureau de pays et a pâti du transfert du chef du bureau au pôle régional de Nairobi.** Le FIDA est considéré comme un partenaire actif et compétent, mais l'expérience acquise grâce au portefeuille de projets n'a pas donné lieu à la production de supports de connaissances exploitables.
47. Les pouvoirs publics se sont acquittés de leurs obligations en matière de financement et d'effectifs, mais ont fait preuve de moins d'efficacité dans la passation des marchés, la gestion financière et le suivi-évaluation. Le financement global destiné à l'agriculture est tombé sous le niveau des engagements internationaux pris par le gouvernement, et l'appui aux services des collectivités locales a principalement consisté à soutenir la croissance des effectifs des services publics de vulgarisation. **Les projets du FIDA ont dû faire face à des problèmes liés à la gouvernance et à la corruption, qui ont été exacerbés par des défaillances dans la tenue des dossiers et le suivi-évaluation.** On constate des progrès dans l'utilisation de la technologie dans les systèmes de suivi-évaluation, mais la mesure de l'impact continue de pâtir de retards dans la réalisation des études et de problèmes de méthode.

G. Recommandations

48. **Recommandation 1. Élargir l'approche par filière efficace du FIDA à d'autres filières de produits de base qui pourraient permettre de toucher un plus grand nombre de bénéficiaires.** Il est possible d'élargir le modèle des centres de commercialisation au pays tout entier et dans la région, en s'appuyant sur les produits essentiels recensés dans le troisième Plan de développement national, par exemple ceux de l'élevage (en particulier de la filière laitière), de l'horticulture et de la pêche. Le FIDA doit: i) déterminer comment les petits producteurs peuvent renforcer la diversité de leurs revenus entre production et transformation; ii) améliorer l'accès à des marchés fiables et augmenter la qualité des produits; iii) développer les mécanismes tels que le Yield Fund pour contribuer au renforcement des capacités du secteur privé; iv) renforcer les synergies entre les programmes, lorsque cela est pertinent et réalisable en pratique.
49. **Recommandation 2. Compte tenu de l'urgence croissante de la situation en Ouganda, intégrer plus largement dans le nouveau COSOP les questions liées aux changements climatiques, au moyen d'approches directes.** Les changements climatiques ont été traités de manière indirecte dans les COSOP précédents. Le portefeuille à venir du FIDA contient davantage de projets de catégorie A que précédemment. Le FIDA doit de ce fait: i) prévoir dans le prochain COSOP d'appuyer plus fortement les mesures prises au titre des Procédures d'évaluation sociale, environnementale et climatique, notamment les mesures de protection sociale et environnementale, ainsi que les compétences techniques nécessaires pour superviser les projets de catégorie A; ii) collaborer avec les entités publiques (Ministère de l'eau et de l'environnement, Ministère des travaux et des transports), les partenaires non gouvernementaux et les donateurs les plus appropriés pour appliquer de manière plus directe des mesures d'adaptation aux changements climatiques et d'atténuation de leurs effets dans les filières bénéficiant d'un soutien.
50. **Recommandation 3. Concevoir des approches davantage porteuses de transformation et des interventions adaptées aux besoins spécifiques des femmes et des jeunes.** On peut à cet effet: i) introduire des stratégies et des objectifs sur ces aspects dans le nouveau COSOP; ii) intégrer et transposer à plus grande échelle des méthodes éprouvées comme le système d'apprentissage interactif entre les sexes et l'encadrement des ménages; iii) permettre un meilleur partage de l'apprentissage entre les différents projets et utiliser les services de partenaires spécialisés pour définir comment surmonter les obstacles liés aux régimes fonciers et aux règles en matière de propriété; iv) renforcer les effectifs de l'unité de gestion de projet en vue d'appuyer et de suivre les activités des prestataires de services; v) veiller à ce que le FIDA, et en particulier la Division environnement, climat, genre et inclusion sociale, assure une supervision technique plus efficace et plus cohérente des questions relatives au genre et aux jeunes.
51. **Recommandation 4. Mettre au point une stratégie pour les activités hors prêts qui normalise la gestion des savoirs, les partenariats et la contribution à l'élaboration des politiques et établit les ressources nécessaires à sa mise en œuvre.** Afin de favoriser l'innovation et la transposition à plus grande échelle des projets en Ouganda, le FIDA doit avoir en place un système de gestion des savoirs qui recueille les expériences et les innovations des projets en vue de leur mise à disposition des partenaires et de leur utilisation comme éléments probants dans le cadre de l'élaboration des politiques. Il faut pour cela une stratégie documentée et une présence renforcée dans le pays, avec un directeur ou une directrice de pays en Ouganda. Le modèle décentralisé du FIDA nécessite par ailleurs une coordination plus étroite au sein de l'institution. Partant, il faut que les divisions concernées (Division environnement, climat, genre et inclusion sociale, Division recherche et évaluation de l'impact et Division production durable, marchés et institutions) s'impliquent davantage dans le

processus de gestion des savoirs et appuient les objectifs relatifs aux activités hors prêts en mobilisant des ressources humaines et financières au siège du FIDA et dans le pôle régional de Nairobi.

52. **Recommandation 5. Renforcer le suivi-évaluation, la communication de l'information et la gestion financière pour appuyer les mesures de gouvernance et de lutte contre la corruption et améliorer l'évaluation des résultats, notamment en ce qui concerne l'impact.** Les divisions concernées du FIDA doivent veiller à atténuer les risques liés aux passations de marchés, aux avances au personnel et aux domaines connexes de la gestion financière. Afin de suivre une approche programmatique et de tirer pleinement parti des capacités et des ressources du FIDA, le bureau de pays a besoin d'un responsable de la gestion des savoirs et du suivi-évaluation qui puisse: i) renforcer les systèmes de suivi-évaluation des projets afin de garantir une communication d'informations en temps voulu et des documents de meilleure qualité qui viendront étayer des mesures plus efficaces en matière de gouvernance et de lutte contre la corruption; ii) regrouper les résultats pour l'ensemble du portefeuille (prêts et activités hors prêts) et les communiquer aux autorités publiques et aux autres partenaires; iii) mobiliser des ressources aux niveaux régional et mondial (dons, par exemple) en vue de renforcer les capacités; iv) favoriser une conception et une analyse plus rigoureuses des études d'impact afin de renforcer leur exactitude statistique et d'obtenir des résultats plus pertinents, et d'y inclure l'impact en matière de réduction de la malnutrition; v) favoriser l'adoption des nouvelles méthodes de suivi en améliorant l'utilisation des systèmes en ligne, de la surveillance par drone, etc.

Main Report

Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation

Republic of Uganda

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Currency equivalent, weights and measures

Currency equivalents

Currency unit = Uganda Shilling
US\$1.0 = 3,840 Uganda shilling

Weights and measures

1 kilogram (kg) = 2.204 pounds (lb)
1 000 kg = 1 metric tonne (t)
1 kilometre (km) = 0.62 miles
1 metre (m) = 1.09 yards
1 square metre (m²) = 10.76 square feet(ft.)
1 acre (ac) = 0.405 ha
1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres

Abbreviations and acronyms

AAMP	Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme
ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRACA	African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association
ASSP	Agriculture Sector Strategic Plan
ATAAS	Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services
AUO	Office of Audit and Oversight
CABI	Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International's
CAIIP1	Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme, Project 1
CAR	Community access road
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CCA	Canadian Credit Association
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
CGS	Competitive Grants Scheme
COSOP	Country strategic opportunities programme
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease 2019
CPE	Country programme evaluation
CPM	Country programme manager
CPMT	Country Programme Management Team
CPO	Country programme officer
CREAM	Community Organisation for Rural Enterprise Activity Management
CSCG	Community Saving and Credit Group
CSPE	Country strategy and programme evaluation
DCO	District Commercial Officer
DCDO	District Community Development Officer
DLG	District local government
DLSP	District Livelihoods Support Programme
DPMO	District Production and Marketing Officer
EAC	East African Community
ENRM	Environment and Natural Resources Management
ERR	Economic rate of return
ESA	East and Southern Africa division of IFAD
ESS	Environment and Social Safeguards
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFR	Financing Facility for Remittances

FGD	Focus group discussions
FOs	Famers' Organizations
4Ps	Public-private-producer partnerships
FTE	Full time equivalents
GALS	Gender Action Learning Systems
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEWE	Gender equality and women's empowerment
HHM	Household Methodologies
ICO	IFAD's country office
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILC	International Land Coalition
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
IPAF	Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
KM	Knowledge management
Km	Kilometer
KOPGA	Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association
KOPGT	Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFI	Microfinance Institution
MOLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Platform
MTIC	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
MTR	Mid-term Review
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NARO	National Agricultural Research Organisation
NDP	National Development Plan
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NOPP	National Oil Palm Project
NOSP	National Oilseeds Project
ODA	Overseas development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OSSUP	Uganda Oilseeds Subsector Platform
OWC	Operation wealth creation
PCR	Project completion report
PCRv	Project completion report validation
PDR	Project Design Report
PMI	Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division of IFAD
PRELNOR	Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region
PROCASUR	Regional organisation to scale up innovations
PROFIRA	Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPP	Public-private partnerships
PSPs	Private sector providers
REACTS	Regional East African Community Trade in Staples
RETs	Renewable energy technologies
RFSP	Rural Financial Services Programme
RIA	Research and Impact Assessment Division of IFAD
RIMS	Results Impact and Measuring System
SACCOs	Savings and Credit Cooperatives
SECAP	Social environmental and climate assessment procedures
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SMADF	Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SOs	Strategic objectives
SSE	Single Spine Extension
UCA	Uganda Co-operative Alliance
UCSCU	Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union
ULN	Uganda Land care Network
UMRA	Uganda Microfinance Regulatory Authority
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFFE	Uganda National Farmers Federation
USAID	US Agency for international development
VHH	Vulnerable Household
VODP2	Vegetable Oil Development Project 2
VSLAs	Village Savings and Loans Associations
WOCAT	World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies
WOCCU	World Council of Credit Unions
ZARDI	Zonal Agricultural Research Development Institute

Map 1. IFAD ongoing projects²

Republic of Uganda

IFAD-funded ongoing projects

Country strategy and programme evaluation



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.
Map compiled by IFAD | 05-02-2020

² NOSP was approved by the IFAD Executive Board in December 2019, but has not yet been approved by Parliament. Therefore, it is technically not an ongoing project. It will be assessed only for Relevance based on the project design.

Republic of Uganda

Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. In line with the Evaluation Policy of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)³ and as approved by the 128th Session of the IFAD Executive Board in December 2019, the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) has undertaken a Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation (CSPE) in the Republic of Uganda.⁴ This is the second such evaluation in Uganda. The first country programme evaluation (CPE) was published in 2013. The CSPE follows the IFAD Evaluation Manual (second edition, 2015).

B. Objectives, methodology and processes

2. The main objectives of this CSPE are to: (i) assess the results and performance of the COSOP 2013–2018 (country strategic opportunities programme) and IFAD-financed programme in Uganda; and (ii) to generate findings and recommendations for the next COSOP and the future partnership between IFAD and the Government of Uganda for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication. The findings, lessons and recommendations from this CSPE will inform the preparation of a new COSOP in 2021. This CSPE also provides an opportunity to: (i) review the extent to which the recommendations of the 2013 CPE have been followed up, and (ii) assess the extent to which programme performance has improved.
3. **Scope.** The CSPE assesses the results and performance of the activities conducted since 2013 following the conclusion of the previous CPE and approval of the 2013 COSOP. The CSPE covers the full range of IFAD support to Uganda, including: (i) the lending portfolio; (ii) non-lending activities; (iii) the performance of the main partners (the Government and IFAD); and (iv) COSOP.
4. In terms of **lending operations**, the projects reviewed are presented in table 1. The nine projects include: (i) three that are closed and were assessed by IOE through Project Completion Report Validations (PCRVs) so that the CSPE drew on the existing evaluation findings; (ii) two that are completed, one of which was evaluated in 2020 through a co-terminus Project Performance Evaluation (PPE); (iii) three are ongoing; and (iv) one has just recently been approved by the IFAD Executive Board in December 2019.
5. The evaluability of the lending operations depends on their stage of implementation. Seven projects are assessed according to the entire set of evaluation criteria (table 1). One project, the National Oilseeds Project (NOSP) was evaluated in terms of 'relevance' alone given it was approved, but not yet effective. Whereas another project, the National Oil Palm Project (NOPP) was evaluated in terms of only 'relevance' and 'efficiency' as it is still in the early stages of implementation.

³ IFAD. 2011. Evaluation policy.

⁴ Hereafter referred to as Uganda.

Table 1
Evaluation criteria covered for IFAD-supported projects

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Project acronym</i>	<i>Project status</i>	<i>Disbursement level IFAD loan</i>	<i>Evaluation criteria current CSPE</i>
				All criteria
Rural Financial Services Programme	RFSP	Evaluated	100%	PCRVR Available
				All criteria
District Livelihoods Support Programme	DLSP	Evaluated	100%	PCRVR Available
				All criteria
Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme	CAIIP1	Evaluated	98%	PCRVR Available
				All criteria
Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services	ATAAS	Completed	97%	PPE ongoing
				All criteria
Vegetable Oil Development Project 2	VODP2	Completed	100%	All criteria
				All criteria
Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas	PROFIRA	Ongoing	79%	All criteria
				All criteria
Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region	PRELNOR	Ongoing	64%	All criteria
				Relevance
National Oil Palm Project	NOPP	Ongoing	8%	Efficiency
				Relevance
National Oilseeds Project	NOSP	Approved	N/A	Relevance

Source: IOE elaboration on data from Oracle Business Intelligence (Apr 2020).

6. **Criteria for loan portfolio analysis.** For the performance of the lending portfolio, the CSPE adopts internationally-recognized criteria (relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; impact on rural poverty; sustainability of benefits) as well as IFAD-specific ones (gender equality and women's empowerment; innovation; scaling up; environment and natural resources management; and adaptation to climate change). Definitions of these criteria are presented in Annex I.
7. The CSPE also assesses the performance of **non-lending activities:** (i) knowledge management; (ii) partnership building and (iii) policy engagement. The analysis of non-lending activities focuses on goals set by the 2013 COSOP as well as achievements not initially foreseen in the COSOP.
8. During the evaluated period, IFAD approved and/or supervised 50 grants, of which 38 were funded by IFAD and 12 funded by various partners including, *inter alia*, the Financing Facility for Remittances (FFR), the International Land Coalition (ILC), the Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility (IPAF), the European Commission (EC), Canada, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the American Jewish World Service and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) (Annex IV). Among the IFAD-funded grants, two were country specific to Uganda and 35 were global and regional. Taking into account their diverse themes⁵ and coverage of all grant functions (knowledge management, partnership building, policy engagement, innovation and impact evaluations) a sample of seven grants were selected for review, see Annex V. The CSPE also reviews the Uganda Yield Fund, a social impact investment fund, implemented by IFAD in 2017 with supplementary funding from the European Union (EU).

⁵ Value chain development, public-private-producer partnerships, inclusive rural finance, remittances, extension services, apex organizations, farmers' organizations, agricultural productivity, genetic breeding and diversity, climate change adaptation, sustainable land management, land, gender, youth, nutrition and livestock.

9. **Assessment of partners' performance.** This relates to the performance of IFAD and the Government at project level and overall country programme management level. It assesses the implementation of their respective responsibilities in design, implementation support, monitoring and evaluation, as well as partnership and policy engagement, taking into account the specific context of Uganda. Fiduciary aspects of Government performance are also reviewed, drawing from findings from supervision reports, supplemented by interviews with IFAD staff, project staff and other stakeholders.
10. Building on the analysis of the above-mentioned three dimensions, the CSPE assesses **the relevance and effectiveness at the country strategy level**, i.e. how IFAD has defined and implemented its strategies to contribute to rural poverty reduction in partnership with the Government and in coherence with governmental strategies (relevance) and what results it has achieved and how (effectiveness).
11. Performance in each of the above areas is rated on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest). While the ratings for the above topics and criteria are viewed individually, the synergies between the components are considered as well.
12. **Evaluation Process.** The evaluation began with an approach paper and a desk review of available documentation listed in Annex X. A self-assessment was conducted by the country office of IFAD in Uganda and by project management teams, based on guidelines elaborated by IOE. A list of potential interviewees was assembled and interviewed remotely. Through snowballing further contacts were identified and interviewed leading to a total of 60 remote respondent interviews. A field mission was undertaken by a team of four national consultants from 12 to 30 July 2020 (Annex VII). The team used a standard interview guide and collected data using pro formas from selected project sites. Key informant interviews and focus groups included Government representatives at national and local levels, IFAD staff and consultants, NGOs, research institutions and private entrepreneurs and beneficiaries. At the end of the mission, a virtual wrap up meeting was held on 30 July with Government officials to discuss the emerging findings. Thereafter, the report was drafted and peer reviewed in IOE in November 2020. It was shared with the Government and IFAD Management in November 2020, revised taking into account the comments received and finalized in December 2020. A virtual national stakeholder workshop was held on 29 January 2021 to discuss the CSPE findings and recommendations, to agree on key points to be included in the Agreement at Completion Point (ACP) and to reflect on strategic issues that will inform the forthcoming Uganda COSOP.
13. **Limitations.** Due to the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), a preparatory mission was not undertaken and all key stakeholders were interviewed via video conference or telephone. Travel restrictions to Uganda also meant that international members of the evaluation team could not join the main field mission in July. This restriction limited the ability of the whole team to engage in a flexible and fully interactive manner. The national team also faced challenges in their availability given curfews and other movement restrictions⁶ as well as the variable quality of their internet connections.
14. During the field mission, certain districts considered on the border were also not accessible due to Government travel restrictions. Telephone interviews were conducted in these border districts to ensure coverage. Due to COVID restrictions, field interviews were conducted at safe distances and group numbers were limited. Nevertheless, some 43 IFAD investments (such as roads, vehicles and processing centres) were visited and meetings held with over 80 farmers, farmer groups, co-operatives and district staff. To compensate for the limitations on field

⁶ At times only key government personnel could obtain passes to allow movement to offices during the COVID restrictions put in place by Government and the national team could not therefore interact as fully as needed.

investigation, the team also arranged further remote meetings by videoconference with a wide range of interlocutors including farmer and savings groups, local government officials, development partners, project management units (PMUs), service providers, international donors and Government staff (see Annex VIII).

15. Overall, while the above measures helped to obtain a broad range of views and empirical evidence under difficult circumstances, the process of triangulating findings through team discussion and validation was less effective than it would have been under normal circumstances. This may have left some unresolved biases in the CSPE team's interpretation of the findings. Follow up efforts were nevertheless made to review the quality of evidence through email exchange, team video meetings and through careful analysis of the quality of secondary data (see online Appendix III).⁷

Key points

- The CSPE assesses performance of IFAD's activities since 2013, after the conclusion of the previous CPE, and since 2013 COSOP.
- The CSPE covers the full range of IFAD support to Uganda, including: (i) the lending portfolio (nine projects); (ii) non-lending activities (including 50 grants); (iii) the performance of the main partners (the Government and IFAD); and (iv) COSOP.
- A wide source of information was used, drawing desk review, self-assessment, impact studies, interviews and field visits.
- COVID-19 placed considerable restrictions on the evaluation process, reducing the missions to Uganda to one main field mission led by national consultants, but this was compensated for by an unusually extensive list of interviews conducted remotely.

⁷ Appendices to the report are available online at (<https://bit.ly/3nA6pAE>)

II. Country context and IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

A. Country context


16. The Republic of Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa, bordered by Kenya to the east, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, South Sudan in the north, and both Rwanda and Tanzania in the south. It contains significant bodies of water that make-up almost one-fifth of the country, most notably Lake Victoria as well as others located along the River Nile. It is a low-income country with a population of 42.7 million people, of whom 76 per cent live in rural areas.⁸

A.1. Economy

17. Since gaining power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement introduced a number of structural and pro-market reforms and investments. This resulted in macroeconomic stability generating a sustained period of growth from 1987 to 2010 of 6.7 per cent average annual real gross domestic product (GDP). This declined over the period from 2011 to 2018 to 5.2 per cent and was estimated at 5.9 per cent in 2019. Meanwhile, real GDP per capita growth declined from an average of 3.6 per cent (1987 – 2010) to 2.2 per cent and 1.6 per cent in 2015 and 2016, respectively, mainly driven by a high population growth rate.⁹
18. The main sources of economic growth have come from the industry and services sector (including information and communications technology, transport and financial services) and less so from agriculture (see Figure 1). Foreign direct investment (inflow) was variable from 2009 to 2019, but generally increased, albeit slowly overtime. It was at its lowest in 2010 (US\$0.5 billion) and highest in 2019 (US\$1.3 billion), with an annual average of (US\$0.9 billion).¹⁰ Newly discovered oil reserves have given the country important future growth prospects, but the pace of development has been slow and significant benefits may not emerge in the near term. Inflation has been volatile over the COSOP period but declined generally from 4.9 per cent and 5.6 per cent in 2013 and 2017, respectively, to 2.9 per cent in 2019.

Figure 1

Performance of the economy, value added by sector (annual rate of growth)



Source: World Bank, 2019a.

19. Economic growth has been uneven across the country. Progress, in terms of consumption levels, has been much faster in the western and southern regions, due to growth in the services sector and an increase in regional trade and global

⁸ In 2018. World Bank, 2019a.

⁹ African Development Bank, 2017.

¹⁰ World Bank, 2019a. Foreign direct investment net inflows (Balance of Payments, current US\$).

markets. This also has been supported by the Government's focus on physical infrastructure development. From the late-1980s until 2006, northern Uganda suffered from a twenty-year insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army. The conflict, which internally displaced up to 1.8 million people, held back the northern region economically, resulting in a slower rise in incomes and high poverty levels.¹¹

20. **Agricultural value added.** Over the past three decades, the structure of the Ugandan economy has gradually changed from agriculture to manufacturing and services. In that time, agriculture's contribution to GDP has declined from 53 per cent in 1990 to just under 25 per cent in 2018 (see Table 2). Since 2012, the sector has grown at a low average annual rate (2.6 per cent) relative to population growth (3.5 per cent) and agricultural growth in other East African Community (EAC) countries (3 to 5 per cent).¹² Yet, agriculture continues to employ 72 per cent of the country's labour force, whose earnings have been the main driver of poverty reduction over the past couple of decades. The economic gains (employment, income, and poverty reduction) from the agricultural sector have been fragile, however, due to its largely underdeveloped state and below par performance.

Table 2

Performance of the economy, value added by sector (per cent of GDP)

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Services	46.9	46.2	48.5	47.6	45.8	46.7	47.1	47.9	47.5	47.1	47.6
Agriculture	21.4	26.1	26.2	25.1	26.1	25.5	25.1	24.0	23.7	24.6	24.2
Industry	25.8	20.2	18.1	20.2	21.3	20.6	20.4	20.0	20.6	20.3	19.9

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Stat. data, accessed 5 February 2020.

21. **Agricultural trade.** Uganda is an active member of the East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The Government has adopted a common external tariff and free trade agreement within the Common Market Agreement of the East African Community (EAC). Membership in these economic communities has sharply increased Uganda's regional trade volumes resulting in both export and import benefits.
22. Agriculture's role in total exports remains high, although this is declining slowly. Over the last decade, agricultural products (primary and processed) have accounted for 54 per cent of total exports. They also represent about 20 per cent of the country's total foreign exchange earnings from exports of goods and services and transfers. Uganda is a large importer of processed foods and a growing one for fresh food. It also imports vegetable oil because its net domestic vegetable oil production can only meet half the national demand. In addition, Uganda exports and re-imports by-products of processed oilseeds, in particular, oilseed cakes used for animal feed.
23. **Private and non-farm sector.** The domestic business community is young, with most businesses (90 per cent) being micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. They operate in the informal sector and mainly in the light manufacturing and retail sectors. Enterprises are fragmented and weakly integrated into the national, regional, and global industrial value-chains and markets. They are further characterised by low and declining productivity, low levels of product, process, and organization innovation, low competitiveness, informality, weak governance standards, and limited access to finance. Over the past decades, growth in non-farm self-employment, and to a lesser extent wage employment, contributed to raising incomes of the bottom 40 per cent.

¹¹ World Bank, 2016a

¹² World Bank, 2019a.

A.2. Poverty, gender and food security

24. **Rural poverty.** Past economic growth contributed to reducing poverty at national poverty lines from 56.4 per cent in 1993 to 24.5 per cent and 19.7 per cent in 2009 and 2013, respectively.¹³ Uganda therefore met the 2015 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1 target - of halving poverty - ahead of schedule. However, progress towards other MDGs important for human development was mixed, principally due to unsatisfactory and ineffective public service delivery.¹⁴ Ugandans also remain vulnerable to slipping back into poverty – for every three Ugandans that escape poverty, two fall back.¹⁵ Poverty at national lines (approximately US\$1.00 per day) has worsened in recent years, rising once more to 21.4 per cent in 2016.¹⁶ Similarly, “extreme poverty”, the internationally recognized poverty headcount ratio at US\$1.90 per day, increased from 35.9 per cent in 2012 to 41.7 per cent in 2016.¹⁷ The 2018 Human Development Index value for Uganda was 0.528, ranking it 159 out of 189 countries and above average in the low human development group, but below the average for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁸ Poverty and vulnerability remain primarily a rural phenomenon (where 89 per cent of the poor live, compared to 11 per cent in urban areas),¹⁹ concerning large families and households relying on farming as their main source of income.
25. **Inequality.** Poverty reduction and economic growth have not improved at the same pace across the country and inequality persists. Over the last two decades, the Gini Index – measuring income inequality – has oscillated between 40 and 45 per cent.²⁰ Inequality is most pronounced in terms of area (rural versus urban), region (northern and eastern regions compared to the rest of the country), gender and age. Northern Uganda had the highest poverty level in 2012/2013 of 44 per cent. Eastern Uganda also had a poverty level of 25 per cent, higher than the average national poverty level of 20 per cent.²¹ The sub-region of Karamoja in north eastern Uganda had the highest poverty level of 60 per cent following years of instability from armed cattle rustling within the area and across the border in Kenya. It is also the driest and one of the less fertile regions.
26. The three main demographic causes of inequality are high annual population growth rates, high fertility rates among low-income households, and a burgeoning youth²² demographic with almost half its population below 15 years old²³ and 78 per cent below 30 years old.²⁴ The resultant drivers of inequality include: (i) high unemployment of women and youth; (ii) low access to basic social services and infrastructure; (iii) limited capacity to absorb the large number of youths entering the labour market every year and the gap between their skills and the market’s needs; (iv) low savings; (v) declining productivity; (vi) gender discrimination

¹³ African Development Bank, 2017. National poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty lines. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.

¹⁴ Good progress was made on access to HIV treatment, reduction in incidence of malaria and other major diseases, while progress was slow and, in some cases, reversed regarding universal primary education, gender equality, and maternal health, the spread of HIV/AIDS. World Bank, 2016.

¹⁵ World Bank, 2016a.

¹⁶ World Bank, 2019a. Referred to as the national poverty headcount ratio, which is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty lines. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys. Last data available are from 2016.

¹⁷ World Bank, 2019a. Poverty headcount ratio at US\$1.90 a day (2011 PPP). Latest data available are from 2016.

¹⁸ UNDP, 2018b.

¹⁹ Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018.

²⁰ World Bank, 2019a.

²¹ Ibid

²² Uganda defines its youth as being between 18 and 30 years old. The national Youth Policy refers to 12 to 30 year olds. The National Strategy for Youth Employment in Agriculture adopts the African Union definition of youth of 15 to 35. MAAIF, 2017.

²³ 47 per cent from 0 to 14 years old in 2018. World Bank, 2019a.

²⁴ FAO, 2017.

- (such as women’s rights to land, assets and inheritance); and (vii) lack of and/or insufficient social safety protection services.
27. Three-quarters of working youth are in vulnerable employment and most do not own bank accounts. They mainly provide unpaid family labour in households primarily practicing subsistence farming. Limited skills hinder their ability to find employment along agricultural value chains (especially in post-harvest handling, processing and agri-business).
 28. **Gender equality.** The Government has improved the institutional and legal environment to support gender equality and protect women’s human rights. The Constitution upholds an affirmative action policy that increased women’s representation to at least a third of all members of Local Government Councils and provides that every District has female members of Parliament. Over the past couple of decades women’s level of education, participation in the labour market and access to finance has increased.²⁵
 29. Yet, Uganda is ranked 159 out of 189 countries according to the 2018 gender inequality index. Deeply entrenched attitudes, beliefs and practices that discriminate against women in many parts of Uganda, have stymied progress towards gender equality in daily life. Consequently, long-standing gender issues remain for women including sexual and gender-based violence, HIV/AIDS²⁶, limited access to social services and economic opportunities; and weak representation, with limited influence in customary decision-making structures, adversely affecting their access to land, finance and property. This results in a persistent gender gap in agricultural productivity and women’s concentration in lower value activities and crops.²⁷ Women make-up more than 75 per cent of total farm labour and perform over 90 per cent of farm-level primary processing operations.²⁸ With lower levels of education and access to assets, women also have been less able than men to benefit from the growth in non-farm self-employment, and are generally in lower-earning self-employment activities.
 30. **Food security and nutrition.** Uganda joined the Scaling-Up Nutrition movement in 2011 supporting efforts towards a multi-sectoral approach to nutrition. The more recent Nutrition Advocacy and Communication Strategy 2015 to 2019 aims to create awareness among the population on approaches to adequate nutrition. Key governmental instruments to improve nutrition include the 2003 Food and Nutrition Policy, the Uganda Nutrition Action Plan (UNAP) 2011 to 2016 and the more recent Nutrition Advocacy and Communication Strategy 2015 to 2019.
 31. Although undernutrition among the under-fives has declined in recent years, rates of stunting²⁹ are still high (34 per cent in 2010 and 29 per cent in 2018), particularly in rural areas.³⁰ Diets typically lack diversity and micronutrient-rich foods. Contributory factors for inadequate diets among the poor, especially in the north and east of the country, include a fast-growing population; an underdeveloped agricultural sector; the presence of the world’s third largest refugee population; and climate change impacts. Inadequate storage facilities to protect harvested crops from pests, moisture and mould, results in losses of up to

²⁵ UNDP Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2019 Statistical Update – Uganda.

²⁶ While HIV infections and AIDS deaths have declined since 2010, 1.3 million people were HIV positive in 2017 with prevalence rates being four times higher for young women compared to young men.

²⁷ World Bank, 2016a.

²⁸ World Bank, 2018. NDP II, notes that 70% of the women engaged in Agriculture, less than 20% control their outputs. Only 27 % of the registered land in Uganda was owned by women. Female headed Households comprise 80.5 % of agriculture subsistence workers compared to Male Headed Households. NDP II also notes that plots managed by women produce 17% less per acre compared to plots managed by men (page 74).

²⁹ Low height for age. It is the result of chronic or recurrent undernutrition, usually associated with poor socioeconomic conditions, poor maternal health and nutrition, frequent illness, and/or inappropriate infant and young child feeding and care in early life. Stunting holds children back from reaching their physical and cognitive potential. WHO, 2018.

³⁰ Concern and Welthungerhilfe 2019.

30 per cent.³¹ The food security situation is compounded in the northern and eastern regions by significant land degradation and vulnerability to climate change.

A.3. Agriculture, natural resources, and climate change

32. **Agriculture.** In Uganda, there are high levels of biodiversity, rich volcanic soils, multiple freshwater lakes with irrigation potential, and two rainy seasons per year - all beneficial to agricultural production.³² Agricultural land in Uganda was reported as 144,157 km² (2016), computed as 71.9 per cent of the total land, including arable land of 69,000 km² (2016), which is 48 per cent of the estimated agricultural land and 34 per cent of the total land area. Agricultural incomes have depended on external factors, such as good weather and commodity prices as well as unsustainable expansion of acres under cultivation. The sector also has been beset with droughts and damaging diseases and pests, such as the Fall Army Worm, and more recently locusts.
33. Multiple structural challenges constrain growth including the predominance of smallholder farmers practicing rain-fed, low-yielding agriculture; growing population density on arable land; land tenure insecurity with 80 per cent of land under undocumented customary tenure; poverty; poor infrastructure, and low levels of educational attainment. Other deficiencies include: limited research and development and innovation; weak public extension services; use of low quality and inadequate inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers); low product diversification; high post-harvest losses; weak land and water resources management; and inefficient and uncompetitive farm to agro-processing and market linkages.
34. The sector is also constrained by farmers' and agri-SMEs' limited access to rural and agricultural finance. At the national level, 54 per cent of adults were financially included in formal institutions in 2013, but rural adults were twice as likely as their urban counterparts to access financial services from informal groups.³³ Reasons for this include the lack of usable collateral, high transaction costs due to the remoteness of clients, dispersed demand for financial services, the small size of farms and of individual transactions, underdeveloped communication and transportation infrastructure and high risks due to variable rainfall, market fluctuations and recurrent incidences of pests and diseases.
35. **Environment and natural resources management.** Uganda is consuming its natural resources at an unsustainable rate. Forests, which provide over 90 per cent of the country's energy, and mostly to the poor, are being reduced in size by over 5 per cent annually.³⁴ Fisheries and soils are also being depleted and degraded at alarming rates and the country is estimated to be losing from 4 to 12 per cent of GDP a year due to soil erosion.³⁵ The reasons for natural resources degradation include: (i) conversion of forests to farmland and inappropriate farming methods; (ii) high rates of urbanization, increasing charcoal and timber demand for energy, construction, and furniture use; (iii) increasing population on scarce land; and (iii) wasteful use of energy resources.
36. **Climate change.** Uganda is experiencing less predictable and more variable rainfall, more crop and animal pests and diseases and higher temperatures.³⁶ This is expected to impact seriously natural ecosystems, water resources, food security, savannah/rangelands, forests, human health, settlements and power generation. For example, increased rainfall has led to an unprecedented rise in the water levels of Lake Victoria. The resulting floods have disrupted businesses and displaced communities, ruined crops, damaged basic infrastructure and

³¹ WFP, 2020.

³² Concern & Welthungerhilfe, 2019.

³³ Bank of Uganda 2017, National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2017 – 2022.

³⁴ World Bank, 2016a.

³⁵ World Bank, 2018.

³⁶ Fall Army Worm outbreak (2017) and major locust plagues in early 2020 are recent examples.

interrupted hydro-power generation causing temporary black-outs.³⁷ The implications of rising water levels affect upstream and downstream Nile Basin countries, representing a regional issue of concern. Relative to countries along the same latitudes, Uganda has one of the least adapted agro-economic systems and is, therefore, one of the most vulnerable to climate change.³⁸ Farming households are constrained in their ability to adapt quickly enough to climate change, hindering agricultural growth. They also have very few alternatives in terms of finance and other safety nets to improve their resilience to climate-related shocks.

A.4. Governance framework

37. **Rural development policies.** The Uganda Vision 2040 outlines development pathways to transform the country from a low-income country to a competitive upper middle-income country by 2040. The National Development Plan (NDPII) from 2015/16 to 2019/20 contributes to the Vision with the goal of propelling the country towards middle-income status by 2020. It aims to strengthen the country's competitiveness for sustainable wealth creation, employment and inclusive growth by pursuing a private sector-led, export-oriented and quasi-market approach. The recently released NDPIII (2020/21 – 2024/25) places greater focus on sustainable industrial growth, through value addition, import substitution and mineral growth. It contains 18 programmes, the first of which emphasises agricultural production and processing around a set of key value chains.
38. Agriculture is recognized as critical towards achieving both the NDPII and NDPIII goals. The National Agriculture Policy (2013) guides the sector to achieve food and nutrition security and improve household incomes by focusing on enhancing sustainable agricultural productivity and value addition; providing employment opportunities; and promoting domestic and international trade. Key sectoral strategies over the results-based country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) period 2013 to 2018 were the Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP) for 2010/11 to 2014/15 and the Agriculture Sector Strategic Plan (ASSP) for 2015/16 to 2019/20.
39. The goal of the ASSP is to transform Uganda's agricultural sector from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture. The ASSP also mainstreams the crosscutting issues of gender, youth, environment and climate change adaptation, HIV/AIDS and food and nutrition security.³⁹ Thus, the transformation aims to help create employment opportunities, especially for the young and for women, and increase household incomes, while ensuring household food security along the entire commodity value chain. The overall goal is to achieve an average growth rate of 6 per cent per year over the five-year period.
40. Government policy on extension services delivery and rural financial services has alternated over the last few decades between supply-driven and demand-driven approaches. Over the COSOP period, extension services were provided through the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) - decentralised, largely farmer-owned (through the formation of farmer groups) and private sector-led but publicly funded. However, it was associated with a myriad of challenges that caused inefficiencies in extension delivery. In 2014, government policy reverted to a "single spine" publicly funded and publicly provided model of extension services delivery. The Agricultural Extension policy (2016) proposes that advisory services

³⁷ Nile Basin Initiative, 2020 <https://nilebasin.org/new-and-events/307-unprecedented-rise-in-water-levels-of-lake-victoria>.

³⁸ Ministry of Water and Environment. 2015. Uganda National Climate Change Policy.

³⁹ Gender issues are raised in NDPII and the country adopted the National Gender Policy in 1997, which was revised in 2007. In addition, the agricultural sector has a National Adaptation Plan (2018) to support the National Climate Change Policy (2015) and a National Strategy for Youth Employment in Agriculture (2017).

- should be pluralistic and involve multiple actors, but the focus is confined to how state actors will guide and coordinate services.⁴⁰
41. Since the 2006 Rural Financial Services Strategy, the Government has intervened in the rural finance sector, most notably supporting Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) in each sub-county. Presently, it is questioned whether Parliament's passing of the Tier IV⁴¹ Microfinance Institution (MFIs) and Moneylenders Act 2016, and the Government's reluctance to borrow for further capacity-building projects signals a swing back to a less interventionist approach.⁴² However, increased access to finance by poor rural households remains pivotal to reducing rural poverty by stepping up production and productivity as well as absorbing the impact of external shocks.
 42. **Government Institutions.** The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) is mandated to promote and support sustainable and market-oriented agricultural production, food security and household incomes in the country. It also has seven semi-autonomous agencies, two of which have played an important role in the IFAD country programme: the NAADS and the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO). The Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MOFPED) have also played an important role in the IFAD country programme. MOLG is responsible for supervising and supporting local governments across Uganda under the decentralisation policy, in coordination with other ministries with decentralised functions. MOFPED is responsible for mobilizing resources for public expenditure, managing and controlling public finances, overseeing the national planning and strategic development initiatives and coordinating with development partners.
 43. **Decentralisation.** The Government began decentralizing in 1993 to promote people's participation in the country's democratic process, and to improve service delivery and proximity with its citizens. Uganda's 1995 constitution and 1997 Local Government Act devolved functions, specifying five levels of local councils – district, county,⁴³ sub-county, parish and village – among which the districts and sub-counties are local government units with political authority and financial autonomy.⁴⁴ While initially service delivery had improved, decentralization and the quality of services have been weakened by the proliferation of districts from 36 in 1995 to 135 by 2020. Districts have faced underfunding (see Ch.V.B.iii) (although there is a new grant for extension), and many have limited capacities in areas such as procurement, contract management and some technical skills.⁴⁵ Throughout the COSOP period, governance issues in public institutions reportedly been adversely affecting how public policy is implemented, the provision of public services and more generally, the economic development of the country.⁴⁶ In addition, the Corruption Perceptions Index score for Uganda has shown only slight improvement, from 26 out of 100 in 2013 to 28 out of 100 in 2019.⁴⁷
 44. **Civil society.** Civil society in Uganda includes labour unions and NGOs as well as international NGOs. The last few decades have seen considerable growth in their numbers, although in 2019 the Government "validated" 2,119 NGOs out of the

⁴⁰ National Agricultural Extension Policy and National Agricultural Extension Strategy 2016.

⁴¹ Tier 1 are commercial banks; Tier 2 are credit institutions and Tier 3 are micro deposit-taking institutions. All are regulated by the BoU and the key classification parameter is the minimum capital of the FI (for purposes of licensing by BoU). Non-regulated farmers' institutions are under Tier 4 category (including SACCOs and non-deposit taking farmers' institutions).

⁴² PROFIRA mid-term review (MTR).

⁴³ Majority of counties have become districts. Counties no longer have councils or administrative structures.

⁴⁴ OECD, 2016a.

⁴⁵ CSPE interviews and see Public Expenditure Governance in Uganda's Agricultural Extension System, ACODE Centre for Budget and Economic Governance, 2018.

⁴⁶ Transparency International 2013; EIU 2019; Kjaer AM, Joughin J. 2018; World Bank 2016; AfDB 2017.

⁴⁷ Transparency International, 2019; The CPI measures perceived levels of public sector corruption, according to experts and business people. Scores range from 0 meaning "highly corrupt" to 100 which signifies "very clean".


over 14,000 NGOs registered.⁴⁸ Their role has been to plug gaps in public service provision and, with support from donors, to cultivate citizen engagement, political accountability and ultimately deepen democratic governance. While they have notably contributed to service provision, especially in poverty reduction programmes, their impact on government policies and accountability is more debatable. In addition, farmers groups, producer groups and cooperatives have proliferated and are engaged in agri-business and agro-industrial development and agro-processing and marketing. They contribute to improved food security and employment opportunities and mainstreaming environmental, HIV/AIDS and gender concerns.

A.5. International development assistance

45. **Overseas Development Assistance.** Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) totalled US\$2 billion in 2017, accounting for 7.7 per cent of GDP. Figure 2 shows that over the last couple of decades, both ODA and remittance inflows have generally increased. However, as GDP has grown, the proportion of ODA to GDP has generally declined, while the proportion of remittances received to GDP has remained relatively stable, between 4 and 5 per cent.

Figure 2

ODA and remittances to Uganda in absolute terms (current US\$ million) and proportional to GDP, between 2000 and 2017



Source: World Bank 2019a.

46. The largest commitments of development finance in the rural development and agricultural sector between 2000 and 2018 came from the United States of America (US\$1.5 billion), followed by the United Kingdom (US\$1.1 billion), the World Bank (US\$1 billion), the European Union (US\$0.5 billion), the African Development Bank (US\$0.4 billion) and IFAD (US\$0.3 billion). Agriculture and rural development ODA as a percentage of total ODA commitments varied from 11 per cent in 2000 to an average of roughly 20 per cent between 2002 and 2017, recently peaking at 38 per cent in 2018.⁴⁹ In addition, non-ODA loans (primarily from China) have become increasingly important in Uganda to finance large-scale infrastructure projects. Moving forward, non-ODA loans are expected to account for 70 per cent of new government borrowing to 2025-2026.
47. **Aid modalities.** Donors suspended general and sector-budget support in 2012 after a series of disagreements with the Government on the use of funds and some proposed changes to Government policies. Since then, donors have reverted to project interventions. The exit from budget-support led to less

⁴⁸ https://www.scribd.com/document/435119466/Validated-National-NGO-Register-VNNR-as-of-07-09-2019-Converted#from_embed.

⁴⁹ FAO Aid Monitor <http://www.fao.org/aid-monitor/en/>. ODA commitments to FAO related sectors in Uganda, at current prices.

government involvement in donors' programmes and less donor involvement in government decisions, as well as less donor harmonization. Some forums for dialogue remain including 16 sector working groups, which have shown varying degrees of effectiveness.⁵⁰

B. IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

B.1. Overview of IFAD country strategy

48. Since IFAD operations in Uganda began in 1981, it has approved 18 projects for a total financial volume of US\$562 million, financed by highly concessional loans. Taking into account counterpart funding from the Government (US\$616 million), beneficiary contributions (US\$38 million) and external co-financing from local and international partners (US\$122 million and US\$433 million, respectively), the estimated costs of these operations were US\$1,773 million (see Table 3).⁵¹

Table 3
Snapshot of IFAD operations in Uganda since 1981

First IFAD-funded project	1981
Number of approved loans	18
Ongoing projects	3
Total amount of IFAD lending	US\$562 million
Counterpart funding	US\$616 million
Beneficiary contributions	US\$38 million
Co-financing amount (local)	US\$122 million
Co-financing amount (international)	US\$433 million
Total portfolio cost	US\$1,773 million
Lending terms	Highly Concessional
Main co-financiers	World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB)
COSOPs	1998, 2004, 2013
Country Office	Country Programme Officer (CPO), SMADF ⁵² Programme Officer and SMADF Financial Officer, Administrative Assistant and driver
Country programme managers since 1998	Lakshmi Moola (Aug 2018 - present) in Nairobi hub, Alessandro Marini (2012-2018) based in Kampala, Marion Bradley (2006-2012) and Joseph Yayock (1998-2006) in Rome.
Main government partners	MAAIF, MOLG, MOFPED

Source: Oracle Business Intelligence.

49. **Historical COSOPs.** The first IFAD COSOP for Uganda produced in 1998 focused on an area-based approach to smallholder production and commercialisation issues; agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption; strengthening the rural financial system; and targeting the north and north-eastern parts of the country for community-based integrated development. The second COSOP was produced in 2004 and was supposed to cover the four-year period from 2005 to 2008, but the country strategy and programme took a different course from 2006 (see paragraph below). Its design was influenced by the Government's shift in 2003 towards a sector-wide, national programming approach and a general or sector budget-funding mechanism. Although IFAD explicitly endorsed the sector-wide approach, it also recognised the need for specific and innovative programmes to tackle unresolved issues and to allow for eventual scaling-up and replication. The 2004 COSOP focused support on

⁵⁰ German Institute for Development Evaluation, The Effects of the Exit from Budget Support in Uganda, 3/ 2018.

⁵¹ Rounding errors occur because values given to nearest million.

⁵² Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund which was later branded the Uganda Yield Investment Fund.

empowering poor rural men and women to participate in smallholder agricultural commercialization through: nationwide, multi-donor marketing and agro-processing; community-based and demand-driven integrated development in the north and east that were emerging from conflict; and, consolidation of the Uganda Women's Effort to Save Orphans Development Programme. It also specifically aimed to enhance development effectiveness and non-lending activities by establishing a presence in the country with a full-time local representative.

50. **2013 CPE.** The first CPE IOE conducted in Uganda, which was published in 2013, examined the cooperation and partnership between IFAD and the Government between 1998 and 2011 and covered both COSOPs. Key findings are outlined in Box 1. The CPE highlighted that the 2004 COSOP was not fully implemented due to changes from 2006 in the national context and IFAD's operation model (i.e. introduction of direct supervision and country presence). The Government's strategies for development reverted to more supply-driven approaches for rural financial services provision and extension service delivery. The Government also shifted away from using loans for capacity development and the integrated rural development approach. These changes along with reversals in the decentralization policy affected the IFAD-supported local government projects. IFAD's transition to direct supervision in 2007 required additional programme management resources which limited participation in policy dialogue. Finally, support programmes outlined in the COSOPs for northern Uganda also were not realized due to the prolonged insurgency.
51. The 2013 CPE concluded that the IFAD-Government partnership had been moderately satisfactory. Moving forward, the main challenges related to disagreements on government policies and strategies for agriculture and rural development together with unpredictable and sudden policy changes. In addition, country programme management was being stretched by direct supervision, combined with significant fiduciary issues.
52. **2013 COSOP.** The overall goal of the 2013 COSOP was increased incomes, improved food security and reduced vulnerability of the rural households living in poverty.
53. Table 4 outlines the main characteristics of the 2013 COSOP. Following the 2004 COSOP, there is a continued focus on improved production and market access, and a more explicit focus on improving access to rural financial services. The 2013 COSOP also puts significant emphasis on developing the resilience of rural poor people to the effects of climate change. However, there is less emphasis in the strategy on gender equality, land issues and local government development compared to the 2004 COSOP. Other major changes include a more nuanced understanding of the target group in the 2013 COSOP and the bolstering of the country office with the presence of the Country Director. A timeline of IFAD-supported projects over the past three COSOP periods, including the last CPE, is in Annex V.

Table 4.
Main features of the 2013 COSOP

COSOP 2013	
Objectives	<p>1. The production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture is sustainably increased.</p> <p><i>Support would be focused on improving access to technologies for sustainable intensification, enhancing the provision of advisory services, securing land tenure rights, supporting sustainable land and water management and generally making smallholder agriculture more climate-smart</i></p> <p>2. The integration of smallholders into the markets is enhanced.</p> <p><i>This would be achieved by investing in smallholder inclusive value chains and climate resilient economic infrastructure, promoting agro-processing and value addition and strengthening farmers' organizations.</i></p> <p>3. The access to and use of financial services by the rural population are sustainably increased.</p> <p><i>Investments would focus on community-based financial institutions through strengthening existing SACCOs, scaling-up community savings and credit groups and supporting the institutional, policy and regulatory frameworks of these financial institutions</i></p>
Geographic priority	Areas with the highest incidence of poverty (north) and/or with the greatest density of poor people (east). Geographic consistency, both within the same project and among different projects.
Subsector focus	Agricultural research and extension, sustainable land management and climate change adaptation, market access, value chain development, rural financial services, social inclusion
Main partners	World Bank and other development partners and UN agencies MOFPED, MAAIF, MOLG, NARO, NAADS, National Environmental Management Authority and Ministry of Water and Environment, rural organizations, private sector
Main target group	<p>(i) poor smallholder households who have the potential and minimal assets to expand and commercialize their economic activities, but are not yet fully integrated into the markets</p> <p>(ii) highly vulnerable households with limited assets and restricted livelihood options who are generally bypassed by development initiatives</p> <p>(iii) women and young people within these two target groups</p>
Policy dialogue	<p>Reorientation of NAADS from distribution of subsidized agricultural inputs to provision of relevant pro-poor advisory services</p> <p>Support for the establishment of smallholder oil palm growers' organizations that are financially sustainable.</p> <p>Establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for fourth-tier institutions (including SACCOs) and a conducive policy framework for savings and credit groups.</p> <p>Support to the Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union</p>
Country presence	Country office, with national and international officers and the Country programme manager (CPM)


Source: COSOP 2013.

54. A Theory of Change of the COSOP has been elaborated by this CSPE (Annex VI) to show the causal linkages between the lending and non-lending activities in collectively achieving the three Strategic Objectives (SOs). Ten assumptions are identified that could influence the delivery of outputs, intermediate and strategic outcomes and goals. At input and output level the key assumptions relate to government's willingness and capacity to fulfil the resource and/or policy commitments agreed at design, and also that political interference is minimal. These issues are discussed later in the report under Relevance, Efficiency and Effectiveness. The policy environment also affects how well the COSOP pillars reach their outcomes – how conducive these are in encouraging private sector participation, extension service delivery or profitable and equitable rural finance. The ability of the vulnerable and rural poor to access and use project opportunities will also depend on their wider circumstances such as weather events, affordable social services and lack of economic shocks.

B.2. Overview of IFAD operations

55. **Investment projects.** The total estimated cost of the nine investment projects approved between 2013 and 2019 covered in the CSPE amounts to US\$1,446 million, representing 81.6 per cent of the historical total project costs in the IFAD programme in Uganda presented in Table 2. The sources of financing were highly concessional loans amounting to US\$430 million (76 per cent of the IFAD financing to Uganda), national counterpart funding of US\$575 million (93 per cent of counterpart financing), beneficiary contributions of US\$30 million (79 per cent of beneficiary contributions), and external co-financing from local partners of US\$86 million (70 per cent of local co-financing) and from international partners of US\$325 million (75 per cent of international co-financing). In four projects, IFAD funded a smaller proportion of project costs relative to the African Development Bank (CAIIP1), the Government and the World Bank (ATAAS), local private sector organisations and other institutions (VODP2) and international private sector organisations (NOPP).
56. On the other hand, IFAD has been the leading financier for five projects in the CSPE period (Annex V, Figure 2). Discounting ATAAS, which was a World Bank and Government investment supplemented by a small IFAD loan, IFAD has funded or will fund 53 per cent of the total resources for the other eight projects. For four projects the proportion of IFAD's funding is 75 per cent or above (DLSP, RFSP, PROFIRA and PRELNOR).
57. The main common areas of interventions across the projects included in this CSPE were support for agricultural production and productivity (ATAAS); agricultural production and marketing (DLSP, PRELNOR), market access and development (VODP2, NOPP, NOSP); economic infrastructure (CAIIP1) and rural finance (RFSP, PROFIRA). Delving deeper into the financing of the various thematic areas in projects over time shows some key trends (see Annex V, Figure 3): an increasing proportion invested in rural markets; a recent return to substantial financing on rural infrastructure (focused on improving access to markets rather than providing basic infrastructure); and an increase in the proportion of financing on agronomy. All of the projects included in this CSPE build upon projects designed under the 1998 or 2004 COSOPs (see Annex V, Figure 1). Basic information on investment projects covered in the evaluation is further presented in Annex III.
58. The IFAD resource envelope for Uganda as per the performance-based allocation system is US\$99.6 million for the period 2019-2021 and was US\$77 million for 2016-2018 and US\$71.6 million in 2012-2015. The latest allocation represents 11 per cent of the East and Southern Africa Division's (ESA) total allocation in the same period, indicating a marked increase of 29 per cent over the previous period 2016-2018. In the period 2019-2021, the resource envelope for Uganda is the second largest in the region after Ethiopia (US\$129.9 million). IFAD's average project financing in Uganda has shown a steady rise (figure 3), overtaking ESA's average project financing

Figure 3.
IFAD average project financing for Uganda compared to East and Southern Africa division



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, accessed September 2020.

59. The key lead agencies at national level for the nine projects were: MOFPED as the representative of the borrower/recipient (i.e. signatory of financing agreements) and the lead implementing agency in two projects; MAAIF as the lead implementing agency in four projects; and MOLG as the lead implementing agency in four projects.⁵³ Key partner agencies at the national level have also included the NARO, an agency of MAAIF, and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC). From the District level downwards, the main supporting implementing agencies have been local governments and more recently, private sector providers.
60. **Grants.**⁵⁴ The preliminary desk review identified 50 grants approved and/or supervised between 2013 and 2019 (Annex IV). The 50 grants covered diverse themes,⁵⁵ functions⁵⁶ and went to various types of recipients.⁵⁷ Among the 38 IFAD-funded grants, two were large country-specific grants, one was a large country-specific grant in Malaysia but with links to Uganda, 11 were small global regional grants and 24 were large global regional grants, totalling US\$46.9 million in funding. See Table 5 for more information.

Table 5
Overview of IFAD-funded grants over the CSPE period (2013-2019)

Grant Sub-window	Number of grants	IFAD grant amount at approval US\$
Country specific - small	0	0
Country-specific - large	3	3,140,000
Global-Regional - small	11	3,899,913
Global-Regional - large	24	39,845,000
Total	38	46,884,913

Source: Data retrieved from: GRIPS, the Grant Status Report tool, grant design documents, the CPO, and the IFAD website.

⁵³ MAAIF and MOLG are both lead implementing agencies of NOSP, each responsible for one of the two main components.

⁵⁴ Grants described here are should be distinguished from ASAP grants and GEF grants that co-finance loan programmes.

⁵⁵ Namely, value chain development, public-private-producer partnerships, inclusive rural finance, remittances, extension services, apex organizations, farmers' organizations, agricultural productivity, genetic breeding and diversity, climate change adaptation, sustainable land management, land, gender, youth, nutrition and livestock

⁵⁶ Knowledge management, partnership building, institutional strengthening, policy engagement, innovation, scaling-up and impact evaluations.

⁵⁷ Research organizations, centres of excellence, private sector, civil society organizations, not for profit development organizations, and UN agencies.

61. IFAD also implemented and supervised 12 other grants and supplementary funds linked to Uganda from the FFR, the ILC, the IPAF, the EC, Canada, SIDA, the AJWSSID and the GAFSP (Annex IV). Financing amounts varied from US\$39,000 through a micro IPAF grant to US\$6 million from SIDA for technical assistance in climate insurance and totalled US\$21.9 million. In addition, IFAD supervises the Uganda Yield Fund that leveraged financing from the EU and the private sector amounting to EUR 20.4 million.
62. **IFAD Country Office.** IFAD has had country presence since 2006 with the establishment of a country office in Kampala, staffed by CPO and hosted by UNDP. In February 2011, IFAD and the Government signed a host country agreement and out-posted an Associate Country Programme Manager there. The country office also had an Associate Professional Officer as well as a Knowledge Management Consultant from 2011 to 2015. The CPM position was transferred from headquarters to the country office in April 2014. The CPM was given the title of Country Director and accredited as Country Representative. In July 2018, the Country Director position was transferred to the IFAD Regional Hub in Nairobi. In addition, the IFAD's country office (ICO) also benefited from two additional staff⁵⁸ to support the Uganda Yield Investment Fund from 2017.
63. Overall, in the period 2013-20 the country team consisted of seven staff. In terms of full time equivalent, there were four FTE in 2014-15 falling to 2.6 from 2018-20.⁵⁹ The budget for the country programme has shown a gradual decline over the period from US\$0.66 million to US\$0.34 million.⁶⁰

Key points

- Uganda's economy has grown strongly in the past 20 years though it has slowed to 5.2 per cent in the past decade, while per capita growth has slowed to 1.6 per cent due to high population growth.
- Agriculture provides just a quarter of national GDP but employs 70 per cent of the labour force. Imports of processed food and particularly vegetable oil remain high.
- Poverty has worsened in recent years with a fifth of Ugandans living below the poverty line, and inequality persists particularly in rural areas, the north, amongst women, youth and refugees.
- Under NDPII, NDPIII and ASSP, the Government seeks to transform agriculture into a commercially-viable sector around a set of key value chains.
- ODA has grown steadily but as a proportion of GDP it has declined to under 10 per cent compared to levels before 2007. Non-ODA loans primarily from China have increased substantially in importance.
- IFAD has operated in Uganda since 1981 lending over half a billion dollars through 18 projects. Under the recent COSOP, IFAD has focused on three strategic objectives: improved production, market access and access to rural financial services. Over the period 2013-19, nine projects have received funding commitments of US\$1.4 billion of which IFAD loans comprised US\$430 million (76 per cent).
- Uganda's share of IFAD's resource envelope has risen to a point where it now represents 11 per cent of the East and Southern Africa Division's allocation.
- IFAD's non-lending over the period comprise 50 grants, only two of which were Uganda specific while the rest were regional or global.
- The IFAD country office has been in place since 2006. The Country Director post has been in country only from 2014-18, following re-posting from Rome. In mid-2018, the post moved the regional hub in Nairobi. Staffing levels and the country programme budget have both declined over the period.

⁵⁸ The Uganda Yield Fund staff are funded mostly by supplementary-fund fees from the EU grant.

⁵⁹ FTEs based on the allocation of time spent on the Uganda country programme reported by officers

⁶⁰ Except for 2019 when the design of NOSP pushed the budget up to US\$0.63 million.

III. The project portfolio

A. Project performance and rural poverty impact

A.1. Relevance

64. Relevance considers the extent to which the objectives of development interventions are consistent with the beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It entails an assessment of project design (including quality of risk management); coherence in achieving its objectives, including the relevance of the strategies and approaches applied to achieve the objectives; as well as the relevance of targeting strategies.
- (i) Appropriateness of Objectives**
65. **Policy and strategy alignment with Government policies has been good with some divergences.** The portfolio has shown good alignment with both national and sectoral policy frameworks (DSIP, NDP2, ASSP) for DLSP, CAIIP1, VODP2, NOPP and PRELNOR. There has been consistent priority given to infrastructure (beginning with CAIIP1, DLSP then PRELNOR and now NOSP) and to sustainable agricultural growth (ATAAS through to PRELNOR). The strategic transformation to a more commercially-driven, context-sensitive value chain approach reflects the strategic emphasis in NDP2 and now NDP3 as well as Government's borrowing priorities towards investments that assist in loan repayment. It also reflects IFAD's increasing focus on linking farmers to markets and to increasing commercialisation. IFAD's shift towards value chain approaches and private sector involvement has occurred while retaining and building on community/group empowerment and mentoring approaches.
66. **However, the appetite for reform has varied between donors and Government, as well as between different ministries, leading to advances and retreats.** This is seen in changes in approach to extension services, to levels of support for local government services and towards rural finance. The demise of the NAADS private sector extension agenda before and during ATAAS has foreshadowed a growing commitment to public extension by MAAIF while IFAD and others have pursued support for a greater balance of private sector provision with local public sector services (as seen in VODP2, PRELNOR, NOSP, and NOPP).
67. **Local government has been central to delivery of IFAD's portfolio yet overall state budget flows have provided relatively fewer resources here** (see Figure 8) while multiplication of districts has affected the local capacity to deliver. The move to value chains and away from integrated community development has somewhat reduced IFAD's links to MOLG and towards MAAIF and MOFPED. However, with PRELNOR and now partially under Component 2 of NOSP there has been relevant continuation of support for local government services largely around rural roads.
68. **In rural finance, RFSP dates to a period of rapid inclusive finance growth in Uganda that was consistent with NDP1's goals and sector frameworks.**⁶¹ Later, at the time of PROFIRA design, the Department of Micro Finance in MOFPED emphasized a market-oriented approach to rural finance.⁶² As much of the required legislation and growing supply was in place for Tier I and III inclusive finance institutions by 2013, the Government began placing less priority on the sector's development, as have donors, leaving IFAD alone in funding the rural finance sector.⁶³

⁶¹ Expanding the Outreach of Sustainable Micro-Finance in Uganda and the Uganda Micro-Finance Capacity Building Framework key Government policy frameworks aiming to grow sustainable demand-driven IF sector.

⁶² Drawing on its evaluation of Rural Financial Services Strategy (2014).

⁶³ Interview with aBi Finance, and aBi Development (Uganda), and GIZ, July 20, 2020.

69. RFSP design complemented the goals of the Uganda's Micro-Finance Support Centre, Micro-Save Africa, and those of MAAIF and MOFPED and its Private Sector Development Section. On the other hand, designs could have articulated more robust sustainability planning for apex organizations and considered support for emerging mobile money and/ or other financial services beyond small-sized loans and savings. Both RFSP and PROFIRA align with IFAD's Rural Finance Policy (RFP 2005, updated in 2009) and the IFAD Rural Finance Decision-Making Tools (2010), as well as good practice donor support for microfinance reflected in Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) donor surveys.⁶⁴
70. **The nine projects associated with the portfolio show good alignment with the two COSOPs** (see Annex V, Table 1) and their SOs. As demonstrated in Annex V, the evolution of projects is well sequenced while contained within each of the three SO pillars. Thus, VODP1 was followed by VODP2 and then by NOSP and NOPP all on oil palm and oilseed value chains. RFSP was followed by PROFIRA in rural finance, while PRELNOR builds on the integrated development approaches of first DDSP and then DLSP as well as the research and extension linkages pursued under ATAAS.
71. **However, the portfolio also reflects the shifts in strategic emphasis introduced in the 2013 COSOP.** This saw a radical change in strategic direction leading away from several areas of support including land titling, local government support and integrated community development to a tighter focus on value chains as well as from broader national coverage (such as with ATAAS) to a more specific geographical concentration as recommended by the 2013 CPE (PRELNOR, NOSP, and NOPP).
72. **The portfolio reflects a tension around delivering on poverty reduction objectives while at the same time focusing on a more commercial growth strategy.** This is seen in the commodity focus on more commercial crops (VODP, NOPP, NOSP) rather than on food security, the move to value chain approaches from broader community development, and the requirement for farmers and private sector actors to partially fund services rather than relying fully on the public sector (ATAAS, VODP2, NOSP, NOPP). Under DLSP, the intention was to work in the poorest districts and parishes, and to serve the poorest households by improving local roads and building household capacity through mentoring and support land certification for the vulnerable. The approach to targeting under more recent projects (VODP2, NOSP, NOPP) moved towards working with farmers with capacity to commercialise and link to value chain opportunities (see page 29).
73. **IFAD has adopted negotiated approaches in order to target the poor and more vulnerable households while satisfying Government's desire to maintain public advisory services and cooperatives as well as spread project benefits widely.** This has seen IFAD choosing objectives that while including explicit targeting mechanisms to reach the poor at the same time have had to absorb political pressure for wider coverage so that a range of both poor and less poor and more commercially engaged households have been targeted. While groups focusing on food security were included in ATAAS,⁶⁵ they were not the main target of the commercialization process championed by ATAAS.⁶⁶ Poorer farmers were to be included by having one farmer category that prioritised food security, although these were to be supported alongside three others that were more market-oriented.⁶⁷ For RFSP, IFAD was aware of the Government policy to establish one SACCO per sub-county (despite the known poor performance of

⁶⁴ [Trends in International Funding for Financial Inclusion in 2014](#) and [Trends in International Funding for Financial Inclusion in 2016](#)

⁶⁵ World Bank PAD, p.83.

⁶⁶ IFAD President's Report, 2010, para 12.

⁶⁷ ATAAS PPE.

SACCOs, the political interference in their operation and the usually higher income of members).⁶⁸

74. The emerging importance of the objectives of the Environment and Natural Resources Management (ENRM) and climate change has required adjusting objectives to accommodate these themes, particularly in PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP. The elaboration of Government (National Environment Management Authority [NEMA]) and IFAD's (SECAP) requirements has taken place during portfolio evolution with significant effects on implementation (See Chapter III.B.5).
75. **Nutrition has been better addressed over time reflecting IFAD's evolving policy framework (Box 1), however gaps remain.** The loan programmes in Uganda included logframes with an indicator on child malnutrition to assess performance towards the project goal, but with no or few activities to address nutrition concerns. The country programme has made concerted efforts to address this, albeit only in the last few years, in the design of new, and by adjusting some ongoing, projects.⁶⁹ As a result, PRELNOR has become a nutrition-sensitive project with a comprehensive set of nutrition interventions.⁷⁰ However, the nutrition lens used in the designs of NOPP and NOSP has not resulted in nutrition-sensitive projects owing to the absence of nutrition objectives and indicators and scope for a more structured approach to improve nutrition outcomes.

Box 1

IFAD's Commitment to Nutrition

Since 2014, IFAD has committed to mainstreaming nutrition in its programmes. Its strategic framework (2016-2025) sees nutrition as fundamental for increasing poor rural people's productive capacities and rural household's resilience. IFAD10 (2016-2018) and IFAD11 (2019-2021) commitments included that 100 per cent of COSOPs will be nutrition sensitive, while 33 per cent and 50 per cent of new investment projects will be nutrition sensitive, respectively. The IFAD Nutrition Action Plans from 2015 (for 2016 to 2018)¹ and 2019 (for 2019 to 2025)² state that a nutrition-sensitive project has a comprehensive situation analysis and explicit nutrition objectives, activities, and indicators. It will also have considered the pathway – for example from food production, income generation and/or women's empowerment to consumption - through which it can maximize its contribution to improving nutrition.

¹ <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/116/docs/EB-2015-116-INF-5.pdf>

² <https://www.ifad.org/documents/38711624/41237738/IFAD+Nutrition+Action+Plan+2019+2025++web.pdf>

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

76. **NOPP and NOSP were designed with a nutrition lens, but they could be more nutrition sensitive.** NOPP mainly focuses on nutrition through the promotion of climate-smart agricultural practices that support food and nutrition security and through household mentoring. NOSP addresses nutrition through the provision of equipment and training to support greater aflatoxin control and awareness and through training on nutrition knowledge and a healthy food culture, including in the GALS approach for producer and marketing groups. However, the logframes of both projects lack nutrition objectives and indicators to measure performance and could provide a more comprehensive approach to improve nutrition outcomes.

(ii) Appropriateness of project design and approach

77. **The portfolio exhibits good examples of sequencing projects in order to continue good practices, though in different geographical areas.** Examples

⁶⁸ Interviews with IFAD consultants and staff.

⁶⁹ The relevance of the portfolio to these latest developments concerning nutrition has been evaluated for projects designed, or those that have undergone a mid-term review, since the IFAD Action Plan for Mainstreaming Nutrition in 2015 – PROFIRA, PRELNOR, NOPP and NOSP. VODP2 is also included given the attention given to the project through the supplementary funds to Bioversity International.

⁷⁰ The PRA-CBNRM exercise includes assessing food and nutrition security and setting targets for better outcomes. Household mentoring also includes limited nutrition education and awareness raising for vulnerable households.

include projects in integrated community development (DDSP, DLSP, and to a partial extent PRELNOR - though its emphasis is primarily value chain development); in rural finance (RFSP, PROFIRA); and in value chains in the vegetable oil sector (VODP1 and 2, NOPP, NOSP). These 'project series' carry lessons forward for example around road design and operation, community mobilisation, household mentoring, building value chains for specific commodities, tackling rural finance at community and apex level. They have adapted to new circumstances and priorities (such as targeting the poorer districts and regions, while building on past success and even retaining experienced PMU staff.

78. **Efforts to explicitly link or share approaches across projects operating contemporaneously in the portfolio have been few, but useful.** PRELNOR has used value chain approaches developed by VODP1 and 2, while VODP2 and PROFIRA have adopted mentoring approaches from DLSP and PRELNOR. Approaches to credit under RFSP and PROFIRA have been used by VODP2. Yet, while the COSOP intention was to see more of such inter-project linkages, in general this has been limited.
79. There have also been **some efforts to link lending and non-lending** to strengthen certain areas such as risk financing, environmental management and catalysing vegetable oil actors (NOSP and Yield Fund, ATAAS/GEF, PRELNOR, SLM⁷¹, ASAP⁷², PROFIRA and CCA/World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), NOPP and SNV⁷³ grant, DLSP too) (see Chapter IV).
80. **The shift from a broad yet scattered to a more focused, geographically-contiguous presence has been a valuable strategic thrust.** The geographical focus has improved from broad coverage in unconnected districts such as under CAIIP1 and particularly DLSP, which spread across 13 widely separated districts (see Map 2), to more contiguous districts and related 'hubs' under PRELNOR, VODP2, NOPP and NOSP) (see Map 1). This reflects the key lessons from the 2019 quality assurance design review and concerns raised in the DLSP PCR. Despite potential political challenge, NOPP and NOSP recognise the importance of investing in contiguous areas.⁷⁴
81. **Growing articulation of theories of change and well-populated logframes in designs has been improving** in the Uganda portfolio since 2013. The 2013 CPE found the RFSP logframe incomplete, and the ATAAS theory of change at design was simplistic⁷⁵, while more careful and elaborated examples are found in VODP2, PRELNOR and NOSP/NOPP, where the intervention logic is supported by sound indicators and targets.
82. **Over time there has been increasing complexity and scale of design that has brought higher risk and implementation challenges.** IFAD's contribution to projects costs rose from RFSP (2003) US\$18 million, CAIIP1 (2007) US\$32 million, DLSP (2007) US\$47 million, ATAAS (2010) US\$14 million, VODP2 (2010) US\$50 million, PROFIRA (2014) US\$29 million, to PRELNOR US\$60 million including the ASAP grant, NOPP (2018) US\$77 million, NOSP (2019) US\$99.6 million. While this reflects a broad trend in the ESA region of IFAD and may suit limited capacity in country to manage a smaller number of larger projects, there is a higher risk where a portfolio is tied to fewer operations with more complex designs. Such designs may present coordination challenges (NOSP for example is to be managed by two ministries) and financial mismanagement risks (in PRELNOR these have been poorly mitigated).⁷⁶

⁷¹ Sustainable Land Management.

⁷² Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme.

⁷³ Netherlands Development Organisation.

⁷⁴ See NOPP Project Design Report page 84, which notes the political pressure to spread benefits widely.

⁷⁵ ATAAS PPE.

⁷⁶ Issues around the sufficiency of financial management and anti-corruption measures have been raised in both NOSP and NOPP design reviews.

83. **The portfolio saw limited co-financing from other development partners but this trend has been compensated for by growing levels of private sector funding** (see Annex V, Figure 2). IFAD has been the major funder in all projects except ATAAS, VODP2 and now NOPP to which IFAD plans to contribute a third of resources. Apart from NOSP, while there are examples of other funders (AfDB in CAIIP1, OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) in NOSP), attempts to increase co-funding from multi-lateral and bilateral sources have been unsuccessful. In ATAAS, the planned co-funding from EU and Danida was unsuccessful, and in rural finance other donors have left the sector. Instead, private sector funding has been a major new element. In fact, **the growing inclusion of private sector financing has been a significant achievement in Uganda** with private sector finance providing US\$70 million for VODP2, US\$91 million for NOPP and US\$5.8 million for NOSP).
84. **Design adjustments during implementation have been of mixed quality.** IFAD had a limited role in ATAAS restructuring, due to its loan suspension over the period when a new extension policy was introduced. On the other hand, RFSP was adjusted well at mid-term to overcome unnecessary complexities in the original design and sector policy changes. The MTR of PROFIRA also limited the number of supported SACCOS to the more viable ones. DLSP redesign reduced duplication and increased focus by dropping water supply activities, switching community savings to RFSP to adapt to changes in national lending policy, and upgrade road quality.
- (iii) Relevance of targeting priorities**
85. **IFAD targeting was aligned to the Uganda NDPII which recognised regional disparities and the rural-urban divide in poverty levels.**⁷⁷ Under the 2013 COSOP, IFAD projects targeted Northern and Eastern Uganda which had the highest poverty rates in 2012/2013 at 43.7 per cent and 24.5 per cent respectively.⁷⁸ Geographic targeting was driven by poverty incidence and access to crucial services such as roads, water and sanitation and primary healthcare. Project designs also used geographical targeting of communities *within* districts based on poverty levels. Although PROFIRA coverage was national, the project design used a targeting strategy based on geographical and social inclusion considerations to select areas of concentration for Community Saving and Credit Groups (CSCGs) targeting. NOSP design includes support for a new oilseed hub in Karamoja, the driest, less fertile and poorest sub-region with an average poverty incidence of 60.2 per cent.
86. **Objectives around social inclusion and gender mainstreaming approaches have been included with varying strength.**⁷⁹ Overall, social inclusion has been a central feature for the rural finance investments as well as in some aspects of community-based projects such as functional adult literacy (FAL), household mentoring and water supply in DLSP and PRELNOR. Pursuing such approaches was less evident in ATAAS and in VODP2 initially, although after mid-term efforts improved through the adoption of household methodologies.

Box 2

Household methodologies, mentoring and GALS

⁷⁷ Uganda, Republic of, 2015 June: Second National development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16-2019/20, page 67: <http://npa.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/NDPII-Final.pdf>.

⁷⁸ Ibid: both regions have poverty higher than the national poverty average at 19.7 per cent.

⁷⁹ See Gender section in Chapter III.B.3 for fuller discussion.

Household Methodologies (HHMs) are participatory methodologies to promote gender equality and livelihoods development. They encourage the development of self-generated strategies that enable family members to work together to improve relations and decision-making, and to achieve equitable workloads. They are also implemented as a participatory planning tool in groups. In the context of IFAD's work, HHMs usually refer to two approaches, household mentoring and the GALS.

Household Mentoring promotes social inclusion. It targets vulnerable households whose members do not participate in community activities and development interventions. Mentors conduct a series of visits to mentee households to help them take basic steps towards improving their homes and livelihoods and gradually becoming more engaged in community and project activities.

GALS is centred on the vision journey in which a family develops a shared vision for their future. Families self-identify the main factors, such as inequalities, hindering the productivity and well-being of the household. Peer support from group members provides encouragement to individuals or couples when implementing their plan, especially if they are addressing challenging behavioural issues. GALS also is used for participatory planning at group and community levels, as well as along value chains.

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

87. **Most projects focused explicitly on selection criteria of beneficiaries based on rural–urban divide, vulnerabilities arising out of poverty, gender inequalities or poor access to services.** Within these communities, the projects have used participatory techniques to identify men, women, young men and young women to participate in project activities. PRELNOR, PROFIRA and VODP2 instituted affirmative action quotas in targeting which helped to meet targets for women's participation. Nevertheless, the projects inadequately articulated the targeting strategy for inclusion of people living with HIV/AIDS. While youth were among the stated target beneficiaries included at design, the projects in general lacked adequate strategies and specific youth-friendly interventions that addressed specific constraints faced by youth, in particular access to land and finance, although PROFIRA did use CSCGs as a conduit to reach youth given the difficulty of their becoming members of SACCOs.
88. **IFAD programmes have been designed to support smallholder integration in strategic value chains and improving financial services to the rural poor,** given that only 10 and 29 per cent had access during RFSP and PROFIRA design respectively. Support for sector apex organizations would serve the needs of members, including advocating on behalf of and engaging smallholders through trusted market-making activities. Sound oil seed, oil palm and inclusive financial sector policy ensured interests of rural smallholders and poor households were considered and included.
- (iv) Risk management**
89. **Risk management has been an issue in project designs under the CSPE period, even while IFAD has developed a more comprehensive risk assessment framework.** Well-staffed PMUs have tended to compensate for institutional weaknesses especially at local government level, but this approach may not lead to sustainable exit strategies.⁸⁰
90. In a country where the political environment has had a marked and turbulent influence on project operations, particularly around election periods, **stronger more explicit political economy analysis would have helped to understand underlying pressures within government systems and private sector motives.**⁸¹ IFAD's design documents notably lack any such explicit analysis that seeks to understand the political economy landscape surrounding interventions and

⁸⁰ QAG, IFAD, Quality-at-entry of the 2019 project portfolio: Learning from results for improving design quality.

⁸¹ See for example Joughin and Kjaer's analyses in (i) The politics of agricultural reform, the case of Uganda, 2010, and (ii) Send for the cavalry, Political incentives in the provision of agricultural advisory services.2017.

how the project design could mitigate them. ATAAS in particular is an example of where deep differences in donor and government appetites for extension reform eventually caused a major redesign following loan suspension.⁸² During the design of NOPP, concern was also expressed that the country team not underestimate the various socio-political considerations that affect the project.⁸³

91. **IFAD's move away from local government and extension service support to selected value chains has allowed the portfolio to be somewhat inoculated from the impacts of the retreat towards a more state-led extension service and subsidised input provision.** Focusing on selected value chains rather than providing broad support to extension and local government services (as under ATAAS) has helped protect the portfolio from political interference. This has been matched by a growing ability to achieve significant private sector investment and use of private sector service providers.
92. **Projects involving infrastructure such as roads and markets have been overambitious in implementation** (DLSP, CAIIP1, PRELNOR, and NOSP). The upgrading of roads standards to Class 3 (all weather) was a deliberate attempt to reduce risks of rapid deterioration and mitigate climate change effects, but at the same time raised design and implementation challenges as well as reduced output targets.
93. **Summary.** The lending portfolio aligned well with the two relevant COSOPs and with both national and sector policy frameworks, in particular the focus on regional poverty dimensions and on growing value chain approaches. Project designs also have aligned well with IFAD's evolving corporate policies including rural finance, nutrition, ENRM/climate change and value chains. On the other hand, the evolution of the portfolio left behind some pro-poor aspects of the earlier projects including access to land, even though it was part of the first strategic objective in the 2013 COSOP. The conscious sequencing of projects has proved highly relevant, building on lessons learnt and using experienced PMU staff. The limited levels of development partner funding have been well compensated by growing private sector investment. Targeting has been well addressed, except for youth where more specific interventions could have been conceived. Overall, **the relevance is rated as satisfactory (5).**

A.2. Effectiveness

94. Effectiveness, that is progress against project objectives, is analysed according to the four questions: (i) how effective have the IFAD supported operations been? (ii) what were the main (intended and unintended) results achieved? (iii) were the intended targeted beneficiaries reached? (iv) what external factors affected results? The analysis covers the seven completed and ongoing projects (CAIIP1, RFSP, DLSP, ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA, PRELNOR) and explores the results by four intermediate objectives: improved market access through infrastructure, increased smallholder agriculture intensification, greater access to rural finance and improved market access through support to value chains.

(v) Improved market access through provision of infrastructure

95. **Road construction was largely successfully delivered and outreach exceeded targets.** The two earlier projects DLSP and CAIIP1 focused on strengthening farmers' access to markets, improving produce prices, and increasing incomes through investments in rural infrastructure and its sustainable management by well-mobilised communities. Both projects almost met construction targets (94 per cent CAIIP1 with 4,384 km, 87 per cent for DLSP with 2,087 km), but achieved higher beneficiary outreach than planned with 1.6 million people in DLSP versus 1.2 million at appraisal, and 3.1 million for CAIIP1 matching

⁸² ATAAS PPE.

⁸³ ATAAS PPE. Final QA Review, NOPP.

appraisal estimates. Those affected by CAIIP1 roads benefited from a 40 per cent increased share of market prices while farm gate prices rose by 30 per cent (compared to appraisal target of 20 per cent), and journey times reduced by 7 per cent. For DLSP, benefits include a 60 per cent reduction in transport costs. VODP2 opened up 250km among smallholder farmers and 400km in the nucleus estate. These roads provided access for the produce to the processing plants.

96. **Higher design standards have improved road sustainability, though costs have risen and higher design standards and environmental safeguards are required.** Roads continued to have a key role in VODP2, PRELNOR and in the new NOSP/NOPP projects. Following CAIIP1, PRELNOR raised road quality to Class 3 district roads standards (all weather). These changes have led to higher costs⁸⁴, delays and reduced length compared to design (606 km built so far or 40 per cent of target). However, since Class 3 roads can access the Government's Road Fund, prospects for maintenance are better. The use of geo-mapping of agricultural potential has helped place roads in the most appropriate locations and the limit of 12 km to road length has also helped reduce excessive political interference.
97. **Market structures have been built but with limited benefit in terms of usage.** Most of the 77 built under CAIIP1 were not in use by project closure due to poor location, political interference and limited engagement with intended users. **Agri-processing facilities have been more effective** (though funded under the AfDB loan). The benefits of the 123 facilities are not captured in the project documentation, however, of the seven processing facilities visited by the CSPE field mission, five were found to still be working seven or more years since installation and all making a profit (see online Appendix III) with some having changed function (from coffee processing to rice) and moved to management by private operators instead of collective management.

(vi) Smallholder agriculture intensification

98. **The portfolio has been broadly successful in developing and disseminating a variety of technologies and building smallholder capacity to adopt them.** Quality seed is a major constraint to production in Uganda, and the promotion of seed businesses under both VODP2 and PRELNOR run by farmer groups has been an effective way to meet this constraint while building ownership and incomes. Under VODP2, between 2015 and 2019, the number of farmers purchasing improved sunflower and soybean seed increased from 2,488 to 42,325 and from 5,312 to 46,445, respectively. Farmers using improved seeds increased from 17 per cent at baseline to 67 per cent by project end, falling short of the end line target of 90 per cent (Annex IX.B, Table 1).⁸⁵
99. **Technology dissemination has integrated well with research outputs.** ATAAS was successful in disseminating nearly 200 NARO new technologies spanning yield, nutrition, climate smart adaptation as well as labour-saving technologies. Under ATAAS, the target proportion of farmers using improved crops, livestock and SLM techniques was exceeded or met, though targets for the adoption of improved fisheries were not attained (Annex IX.B, Table 1). PRELNOR too has linked with the Zonal Agricultural Research Development Institute (ZARDI) in its target area to access improved seed materials and technologies. Under DLSP, on-farm demonstrations led to increased adoption of improved farming techniques (improved seeds and animal breeds, animal traction, zero-grazing, fertilizer and manure). However, data are not presented to verify these increases in the Project completion report (PCR).

⁸⁴ 32,000 per km for PRELNOR (and as much as 80,000/km if bridges are required, compared to US\$15,000 under CAIIP1 (IFAD Infrastructure Adviser).

⁸⁵ The 3IE (2019) impact evaluation found that farmer adoption of oilseeds was most significant for groundnuts and soybeans but that there was less evidence of sunflower up take, "which is the most suitable crop for commercial farming and trade."

100. **Improved climate resilience in smallholder agriculture has been a positive feature** first in ATAAS particularly through the GEF-funded SLM component that exceeded targets, and later under PRELNOR which, with the support of ASAP grant funds, was on track to reach targets at midterm, particularly around Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) plans that have encouraged groups to plant stress tolerant varieties of staple crops.⁸⁶ The provision of climate data has been effective in reaching farmers through extension and radio shows. However, the results of this on farmer crop choices or land management is yet to be seen.

(vii) Improved access to rural finance

101. **IFAD's finance interventions have contributed towards the development of an effective and responsive rural microfinance industry** through the strengthening of institutional capacity and rural accessibility of MFIs. RFSP and PROFIRA both enhanced access to appropriate financial services (savings and credit) as well as strengthened the institutions delivering these services. Under RFSP, 148 SACCOs were formed in sub-counties where formerly none existed (against a target of 161) and the project concentrated support on 735 better performing SACCOs (41 per cent of the 1,794 operational SACCOs in Uganda). According to the PCR, there was an aggregate increase above the targeted 10 per cent per annum in share capital, savings and loans, as well as in the volume of transactions within the supported SACCOs.
102. PROFIRA supported less than a quarter of the SACCOs initially planned to be supported in RFSP, focusing on higher performing SACCOs, and still met targets. Average SACCO membership, share capital and savings have increased by 213, 256 and 209 per cent respectively from 2017 to 2019. The total share of capital mobilised has been UGX 68.6 billion, while savings mobilised has reached UGX 122.2 billion. Sixty per cent of the SACCOs are operationally self-sufficient as of June 2019. For CSCGs there has been increased levels of savings and credit and increased annual sharing out at the end of the savings cycle. By end-2019, 294,666 members were saving in 10,236 newly established CSCGs, well on the way to achieving the targets of 375,000 members in 15,000 new CSCGs. While the range of financial products and services offered has widened (covering agriculture, school fees, home improvement, transport, solar and more) and access has improved, there could have been greater use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) tools to manage credit products.
103. **Achieving changes in the structure of the industry proved more difficult under RFSP, though PROFIRA has had more success** in terms of improving the performance of Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union (UCSCU) and supporting legislation. Both RFSP and PROFIRA worked to support the development and refinement of a national financial sector strategy and reforms, leading to the passage of Tier IV legislation and establishing the Uganda Microfinance Regulatory Authority (UMRA) for SACCO regulation. The Act was passed in 2016 and UMRA is now functional and fully staffed and has so far licensed 880 moneylenders and 225 MFIs. PROFIRA also provided inputs into the financial literacy strategy under MOPED.

(viii) Improved access to markets through promotion of value chains

104. For the value chain projects, interventions have led to **improved access to markets and strengthened bargaining power**. Farmer organisations have obtained better margins, strengthened their business literacy and received extension advice. VODP2's Kalangala oil palm scheme includes 11,348 ha plantation of which 6,500 ha are under Oil Palm Uganda Ltd (100 per cent of target) and a further 4,848 ha (exceeding the target of 4,700 ha) under

⁸⁶ By MTR, 424 CBNRM plans had been completed, of which 217 had been funded against the target of 600. However, most of the plans focused on promoting tree planting, as well as water harvesting and sustainable crop production, and the MTR reports the need to further expand diversification.

smallholder production for 2,063 (versus target of 1,800) farmers. The largely successful completion of these outputs has resulted in an annual crude palm oil production of 40,005 tons by end 2019, exceeding the target of 30,000 tons. The Buvuma oil palm scheme did not take off, however, due to delays in acquiring land for the private partner, but activities have been redesigned under NOPP.

105. **Oilseed objectives have been met, expanding the Lira hub and creating new hubs** in Eastern Uganda, Northern Uganda and West Nile. The development of commercial hubs was supported by the improvement of linkages between farmer groups and millers/stockists and bulking produce to attract larger buyers. At the end of 2019, 1,790 farmer groups under VODP2 were bulk selling, surpassing the target of 1,000. Eleven private sector providers (PSPs) provided extension and marketing services to 5,311 farmer groups, just shy of the target of 5,900. Oilseed farmers (3,959) also accessed financial services from 10 financial institutions with a cumulative credit disbursement of UGX3.4 billion by August 2019 with UGX1.5 billion paid back. Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) were an alternative source of finance for 5,769 smallholder farmers unable to access loans from formal financial institutions. By August 2019, savings and loans mobilised among the oilseed groups were UGX3.6 billion and UGX2 billion respectively.
106. **Bulking has enabled farmers to negotiate as a group and receive higher prices from millers, though miller capacity was underutilized.** There is significant evidence of smallholders' inclusion in the vegetable oil value-chain through group-sales and market access.⁸⁷ An important outcome that was not achieved concerned mill capacity utilisation. From a baseline of 30 per cent, the project achieved 65 per cent at the end of 2019 compared to the target of 85 per cent.⁸⁸ VODP2's efforts in promoting new governance systems (through the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust [KOPGT]) and Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association (KOPGA) that have strengthened farmers' ownership, and the use of multi-stakeholder platforms that bring actors together, have been widely recognised as effective.⁸⁹
107. PRELNOR at mid-term had supported farmer groups in oil seed and food crop (rice, beans, maize, cassava) value chains through training, field days and commodity analyses. However, the project does not explicitly address value chains from start to finish. Rather it has selected certain bottlenecks such as access roads, processing and markets. The mapping through Geographic Information Systems has assisted in selecting road and market locations that best fit with production areas. Various marketing initiatives have occurred, including linking 3,000 farmers to processing firms to supply cassava, sesame, maize and sunflower. The adoption of post-harvest handling equipment increased from 4 to 26 per cent between the first half and second half of 2019. Similarly, there was a reduction in the percentage of households experiencing post-harvest losses from an average of 55 to 44 per cent.⁹⁰ **Overall, though, the effectiveness of the project's value chain support awaits completion of the delayed road and market infrastructure.**

(ix) Effectiveness of Targeting

108. **Outreach levels are overall in line with targets**, with five projects equalling or exceeding the revised targets for beneficiaries reached (RFSP, DLSP, CAIP1, ATAAS, PROFIRA) (Table 6). Roads, extension and rural finance interventions had the greatest level of outreach in terms of beneficiary numbers while value chain

⁸⁷ 3IE impact evaluation 2019. Knowledge Heterogeneity: Experimental Evidence on Information Barriers to Oil Seed Adoption in Uganda.

⁸⁸ Also attributed to the tangential increase in the number of milling businesses that over compete for the available raw seed material (CSPE field interview with oil seed millers).

⁸⁹ IFAD's Engagement in Pro-poor Value Chain Development, Corporate level evaluation, 2019.

⁹⁰ PRELNOR Contribution to the Uganda Economy, July 2020.

projects had the fewest.⁹¹ Given some projects may have served the same beneficiaries because they operated in the same districts and through similar modalities, there is also the possibility of double-counting. Having said this, the total outreach of the portfolio is remarkably high, covering over a quarter of the rural households in Uganda (ATAAS states this level of achievement on its own account). See online Appendix III for detailed calculations by project.

Table 6.

Estimated final outreach versus design by project

Project	Design target outreach	Revised target outreach	Final / latest* outreach	Outreach achieved against revised target	Outreach to women	
					Target	Actual
ATAAS	1.7 million households	1.58 million households	1.68 million households 10 million people	107%	Not reported	52%
CAIIP1	8.9 million people	3.1 million people	4.3 million people	139%	Not reported	51%
RFSP	200 MFIs 300,000 people	735 SACCOs	735 SACCOs 1.9 million people	100%	50%	49%
DLSP	200,000 households; 1.2 million people	-	264,500 households; 1,587 million people	132%	Not reported	56%
VODP2	139,000 farmers 834,000 people	81 500 households	89,782 households 130,359 farmers 538,692 people	110%	30%	53%
PROFIRA	750,000 members	-	*1,101,778 members	147%	70% CSCGs 30% SACCOs	72% CSCGs 27% SACCOs
PRELNOR	140,000 households	155,000 households 852 500 people	*127,890 households 703,395 people	83%	52%	52%

Source: CSPE Team elaboration based on project documents.

109. **The shift away from community development and rural infrastructure towards value chains investments has affected the level of outreach at least in terms of total numbers.** ATAAS, CAIIP1 and RFSP collectively reached 8 million people, while the later projects VODP2, PRELNOR, DLSP and PROFIRA have reached 4 million. This apparent reduction however is moderated by the multiplier effect that value chain investments have, and also that the benefits of the roads provided under VODP2 and PRELNOR to the wider rural community are not explicitly assessed in project documents.
110. **Although the beneficiaries are reportedly in line with the sub-target groups identified at design, this is not well documented,** affecting the proper monitoring of outreach and benefits to the different sub-target groups (such as the food insecure, food secure and more market-orientated households in PRELNOR).
111. However, **household mentoring has successfully targeted the poorer households including women and youth-headed households.** DLSP was notable in promoting women's empowerment through household mentoring and GALS and mentored a total of 18,172 households.⁹² DLSP instructors also trained 24,707 beneficiaries (75 per cent female) in 52 selected poorer sub counties

⁹¹ Estimates are sometimes ill-defined and inconsistently reported leading to miscounting, often in relation to households versus individual and between direct and indirect beneficiaries.

⁹² 54 per cent male headed households and 46 per cent female headed households. Case Study, Household Mentoring Uganda. 2014. Gender, Targeting and Social Inclusion. Judith Ruko/Clare Bishop-Sambrook.

improving their knowledge and social standing. Adult literacy targets were not met and land tenure outreach was disappointing (only 1,882 certificates were issued against a target of 100,000).

112. Coupled with a food security grant, in PRELNOR the targeting approach has enabled the poorer members of communities to improve food security and nutrition.⁹³ However, the sustainability of these benefits is less clear (Chapter III.A.5). Government has not yet taken up the approach, so once a family “graduates” from the mentoring scheme there is no follow-up increasing the risk that households fall back into poverty. Outreach to-date is also limited.
113. **Significant numbers of youth have benefited either directly or indirectly although there are gaps in reporting.** By 2019, PRELNOR reached 83 per cent of the young adult beneficiary target, while at farmer group level some 40 per cent who participate were aged 18-35 years. For PROFIRA, youth represented 10 per cent of members of SACCOs and 43 per cent of members of new CSCGs, and 34 per cent of mature CSCGs, against the target of 15 per cent. PROFIRA reached 194,728 young people (148 per cent of its end target). In other cases, projects poorly reported youth numbers, and did not report youth by gender. They also failed to capture the numbers of people supported that were living with HIV/AIDS.

(x) External factors

114. **The impact of COVID-19 in 2020 is inhibiting the growth of benefits and in some cases reversing them.** In PROFIRA, the volume of business for SACCOs and CSCGs has come down, with fewer deposits, repayment and disbursements levels reduced. Annual general meetings have been postponed so that while SACCOs continue to operate, there are governance issues. IFAD has responded by conducting remote missions and re-purposing project funding, and in the case of VDOP2 adding a two-month loan extension. For PRELNOR, activities were brought to a standstill in early 2020, with much of the field work halted including road designs, farmer training, demonstrations, extension and mentoring.⁹⁴
115. The second threat has been pest outbreaks including fall army worm (starting in 2016) and, in 2020, locust invasions that have arisen due to unusual weather patterns that are likely due to climate change. Though there have been significant effects on crop yields, but both threats have been well-managed and there have been reportedly good harvests in the intervening years.
116. Finally, the influence of unpredictable political events such as elections, as well as actions from the national leadership have played an important role on the course of some projects, most notably with ATAAS where initial support for NAADS was replaced by a shift to support for the operation wealth creation (OWC) and public-led extension and input delivery.⁹⁵
117. **Summary.** Outreach has been in line with targets, although over the CSPE period outreach reduced as integrated rural development projects were replaced by a more value chain approach. Where figures are available, gender and youth targets have also been met, however there are gaps in the data and some projects have not met targets including around literacy and land titling. Community roads, though affected by construction delays and higher costs, have improved services and farm-gate prices, while provision of market infrastructure has not been successful. The portfolio has been broadly effective in developing and disseminating a variety of climate-resilient crop technologies and building smallholder capacity to adopt them. Institutional changes in the mechanism for inputs and technology delivery have, however, caused disruption and led to losses

⁹³ By MTR, 200 mentors had been trained, 2000 vulnerable households had been mentored and received food security grants worth US\$120 in the form of tools, seeds and livestock.

⁹⁴ PRELNOR SM, June 2020. Activities have since resumed to a more normal level with the removal of restrictions.

⁹⁵ ATAAS PPE.

and to elite capture in some instances. In rural finance, while early support through RFSP showed modest results, the microfinance sector has become more effective and responsive through IFAD's support, and new legislation has improved regulation of the industry. Under value chains, although farmer productivity has been below expectations, production in both oil palm and oil seeds exceeded targets. **Effectiveness is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

A.3. Efficiency


118. The criterion of **efficiency** assesses how economically resources are converted into results. This section explores factors that can affect such conversion, positively or negatively, such as timeliness in start-up and implementation, management cost ratios and internal rates of return, and their proximate causes.

(xi) Project timeliness

119. The **CSPE portfolio consisted of projects with long duration lengthened by implementation delays and extensions.** Apart from CAIIP1, the project duration for all of the projects was between 7 and 10 years, averaging 7.8 years, as compared to an average of 6 years for projects completing between 2016 and 2018. All the projects in the portfolio faced delays of varying length. This affected the timing of the implementation of the project activities and thus the delivery of impact to the targeted beneficiaries (Figure 4).

Figure 4.

Portfolio Project Timelines - Years (approval to closing)



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, accessed April 2020; and Operational Results Management System, accessed September 2020.

120. **Overall, the average timeline for start-up of the Uganda portfolio is slightly longer than the ESA regional average** (See Table 7) underpinning the need for government to speed up the approval process for designed projects to enhance their efficiency.⁹⁶ The average effectiveness lag for IFAD is 12.3 months, while it is 9 months for ESA during the CSPE period. CAIIP1, VODP2 and PRELNOR had shorter gaps between approval and effectiveness (3.9 months, 6 months and 7.6 months respectively), while DLSP and NOPP had delays of 10.3 months and 10.5 months, which were better than the IFAD average but worse than ESA. ATAAS, PROFIRA and RFSP had unsatisfactory delays of 13.8 months, 14.2 months and 17.5 months. For ATAAS, the delayed start was due to extended negotiations between the World Bank and Government and then slow parliamentary approval.⁹⁷

Table 7.

⁹⁶ This was a weakness acknowledged by MOFPED during the CSPE field mission wrap-up workshop.

⁹⁷ PPE ATAAS 2020 and ICCR 2019.

Timeline between approval to disbursements (months)

	<i>Approval to signing*</i>	<i>Signing to effectiveness*</i>	<i>Approval to effectiveness</i>	<i>Effectiveness to first disbursement</i>	<i>Approval to first disbursement</i>	<i>First to second disbursement</i>
Uganda portfolio average**	7.2	3.4	10.5	8.4	18.9	5.4
ESA sub-region average***	-	-	9.0	5.6	14.6	-

* For projects approved between 2000 and 2009 (RFSP, DLSP, CAIIP1), as after 2009, financial agreements enter into force upon signature. ** Eight projects excluding NOSP. *** Average for projects approved between 2000 and 2019. Source: Analysis of the data from Oracle Business Intelligence.

121. **The overrun of project completion time reflected negatively on the efficiency of the portfolio** though additional budget was required only for ATAAS. The portfolio's average time overruns of 12 per cent compares unfavourably with the ESA average of 7.8 per cent for the same period. Of the closed and completed projects, only DLSP was completed on time. ATAAS, RFSP, VODP2 and CAIIP had extension⁹⁸ of 2 years, 27 months, 14 months and 3 months respectively after the dates set at appraisal. As outlined in Annex IX.A Table 3, project extensions were required to allow for the completion of contracts that were still ongoing at the time of original closure due to slow start-ups that reduced the implementation window as well as changes in the project design (i.e., ATAAS).

(xii) Disbursement and implementation pace

122. **Disbursement was initially lower than planned for most projects, though it improved in the final years.** The closed and completed projects were characterised by lower levels of disbursement in the early years and accelerated levels of disbursements in the final years to achieve their higher absorption of loan funds (Figure 5). All these projects showed 'S'-shaped disbursement curves, which while expected for infrastructure heavy projects such as CAIIP and DLSP, would not be for others such as ATAAS and RFSP. A similar pattern is emerging for the ongoing projects (PROFIRA and PRELNOR) with disbursements of 22 and 19 per cent respectively at the end of their second year (See Table 2 in Annex IX.A). Extensive time required for concluding memoranda of understanding with implementing partners, contracting private sector partners (for PRELNOR, PROFIRA and VODP2) and resolving land disputes affecting the roads (CAIIP1) delayed implementation of project activities and initially lowered disbursement rates.
123. **As a result, most of the project funds were absorbed in the final years of completed projects.** While CAIIP1 and DLSP experienced infrastructure delays, in the case of ATAAS, the loan funds were released for last minute vehicle procurement and training for extension services. The slow procurement of vehicles in 2018 and higher cost of training for ATAAS was also inefficient. The slow absorption of funds in the initial years for VODP2 was also due to delays (and eventual failure) in acquisition of land for oil palm expansion activities.⁹⁹ The failure to implement the planned expansion for the oil palm development in Buvuma and on the mainland caused the private partner (BIDCO) not to invest in oil palm processing for these areas, which in turn further impacted the disbursement rate prior to the MTR revision.
124. **For the ongoing projects, the skewed disbursements resulted from the project design feature to phase the implementation of project components.** The Project Design Report of PRELNOR had its infrastructure component (with the larger share of the project funding) planned for


⁹⁸ ATAAS had two extensions and VODP2 had an additional 2-month closure extension due to COVID-19 impact.

⁹⁹ PCRV report, VODP2.

implementation in the latter years of the project with a gradual rolling out of the agricultural production activities. PROFIRA's initial slow disbursement was due to prolonged delays in contracting PSPs. In addition, PSP contracting terms that required payment after service delivery, though not affecting the pace of implementation, skewed disbursement. Nonetheless, PROFIRA achieved a consistent positive trend of disbursements after the first year of implementation.

125. Overall, the final disbursement rates for the completed projects averaged 99 per cent, thus realising a satisfactory rate of absorption of loan funds. **However, the higher levels of disbursements were enabled by no cost extensions in the majority of the projects.**

Figure 5.

Disbursements/Absorption of Project Funds – Closed Projects

Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, accessed December 2020.

(xiii) Project management costs

126. **Staffing issues and project management costs, together with lengthy procurement processes and changes in implementation policies affected the efficiency of projects.** Projects generally recruited professionally competent staff for their PMUs¹⁰⁰ as well as by the implementing partners (i.e., DLG). However, cases of vacant staff positions at the PMUs, staff turnover as well as staffing weaknesses at DLGs, negatively affected the efficiency of specific projects. PRELNOR's efficiency was reduced by the sudden staff turnover of key project positions (Project Coordinator, Financial Controller and Procurement Officer, with the latter position still vacant and the first two with staff in acting capacities) raising governance issues.
127. **Transitioned projects benefited from the recruitment of skilled staff of the previous projects.** DLSP and CAIIP1 benefited from continuity in project staffing (from the District Development Support Programme (DDSP) and the Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme (AAMP) respectively) that brought familiarity with IFAD systems. VODP2 and PROFIRA benefited from the transitioned staff from VODP1 and RFSP respectively (and NOPP is benefiting from former VODP2 staff). PRELNOR has benefited from the infrastructure engineer previously contracted by CAIIP1 who replaced the one from DLSP.
128. **Lengthy procurement processes affecting timeliness and changes in the design that reduced anticipated outcome levels adversely affected**

¹⁰⁰ These are adequately guided by the project steering committees.

implementation efficiency. This was especially the case for the infrastructure activities for CAIIP1, DLSP and PRELNOR and contracting of PSPs (VODP2 and PROFIRA).¹⁰¹ The lengthy processes mainly relate to compliance with IFAD and government procurement guidelines and regulations. For example, PRELNOR's Mid-term review (MTR) indicated encountering delays in the procurement for infrastructure contracts for more than one year. The dropping of the oil palm expansion in Buvuma Island and on the main land (VODP2) reduced the level of anticipated project outcome. The restructuring of RSFP and PROFIRA at MTR to strengthen more effective, though fewer SACCOs, and away from supporting new SACCOs, reduced the scale of outcomes, but arguably prevented wasting resources on under-performing SACCOs. ATAAS showed the most serious issues for project management because of the disruptive effects of loan suspensions by World Bank and IFAD in 2013-2014 due to ineligible expenditures until funds were reimbursed. Subsequently, policy changes mid-course led to project redesign and to full IFAD loan suspension in 2016 for a year.

129. **Project management costs for closed projects (ranging from 6.5 per cent to 12.7 per cent) were below IFAD's average of 15 per cent and within the limits set at the design, yet a different trend is seen in the ongoing projects** (Annex IX.A, Table 4). For example, PRELNOR's MTR recommended that the PMU "should improve cost control" to reduce its operating costs. The operational cost overruns have largely been attributed to under budgeting at design.¹⁰²

(xiv) Economic efficiency

130. Overall, judging from the available cost-benefit analysis, the closed project portfolio had positive economic returns that exceeded those at design (Table 8). Closed projects realised varied levels of economic efficiency (though there are discrepancies in the analyses). For ATAAS, the cost-benefit showed a positive return (37.5 per cent) albeit based on impact study data with reliability issues. The Economic rate of return (ERR) of 41 per cent of CAIIP1's at completion compared favourably with the design figure. The benefits included in the calculations were the increase in farm gate prices of key staples, reduction of transport costs and time and reduced post-harvest losses. The PCR for DLSP calculated an ERR above 30 per cent though the methodology is not clear. Though no ERR figure was calculated for RFSP, the PCRV noted that the project would have exceeded the ERR at design due to the much higher level of beneficiary outreach achieved.
131. Road construction forms a major element in five projects (CAIIP1, DLSP, PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP). In the case of CAIIP1, road costs consumed 80 per cent of total project costs and costs per km rose from US\$4,300 to US\$13,000 per km by completion requiring a supplementary loan. Rural markets proved less efficient as only 50 per cent were in use by project end. In terms of rural roads, the estimated average cost per km for DLSP of US\$14,800 was within the estimated range of US\$12,835 to 15,625 per km according to World Bank estimates of 2008.

Table 8.

Project Economic Rates of Return at Design and Closing

<i>Project</i>	<i>ERR at Design (%)</i>	<i>ERR at closing/CSPE (%)</i>
RFSP	12	N/A
DLSP	16.3	> 30
CAIIP1	38	41
ATAAS	33.9	37.5

¹⁰¹ Interviews with PMUs of PROFIRA, VODP2 and PRELNOR, and SM reports.

¹⁰² Interview with PRELNOR PMU.

VODP2	19 - 25	27
PROFIRA	15	N/A
PRELNOR	12	N/A

Source: CSPE elaboration from project design and completion reports.

132. **Cost per beneficiary varied by the type of project with low costs for rural finance and rural infrastructure and high costs for value chain projects** because of the former category's appropriateness to impact many beneficiaries (Annex IX.A, Table 4). ATAAS, with 1.68 million households (10 million beneficiaries) posted a high cost per beneficiary of US\$43 largely due to the high Government contribution that was essentially used for inputs and salaries. Similarly, VODP2 has posted a high cost per beneficiary figure of US\$130 (excluding investment for development loans for oil palm farmers that are recoverable from the beneficiaries), but the costs for the oil palm component was substantially higher (US\$4,805 and US\$34 for the oil palm and oil seeds components respectively) with 80 per cent of the project financing going to oil palm with fewer households reached (1,805 as compared to 87,977 HHs for oil seeds).¹⁰³ CAIIP1's cost per beneficiary of US\$19 was due to the extensive rural road component that reached some 4.3 million people. Cost per beneficiary for RFSP is also comparatively low at US\$17 because of the high outreach compared to PROFIRA.
133. **The ongoing projects are realising good value for money.** In PROFIRA, this is demonstrated by the competitive tendering of PSPs and the cost to support new CSCGs at US\$13 per member and mature groups at US\$22 (at MTR) compared to the budgeted contract prices at design of US\$20 and US\$40 respectively. Cost per beneficiary of US\$24 is considered acceptable, but the budget spent on SACCOs pre-MTR was not very efficient with many SACCOs underperforming after training and others collapsed.¹⁰⁴
134. **Higher costs for PRELNOR relating to Community access roads (CARs) and HH mentoring were justified.** The cost per km for the CARs in PRELNOR has progressively increased (by 35 per cent at MTR and 76 per cent at CSPE field mission) due to the upgrading of the road design from class 1 to 3 to meet weather tolerance requirement. However, this has lowered the kilometres of roads to be constructed, as well as number of beneficiaries. The latest cost per beneficiary of US\$49¹⁰⁵ is high, but is projected to reduce with the implementation of the infrastructure component.
135. **The portfolio maintained sound levels of financial management for the project funds, though cases of mishandling of funds surfaced in some projects.** Supervision reports and interviews with PMUs of VODP2, PROFIRA and PRELNOR confirmed the existence of strong financial management systems within the projects. Projects have maintained satisfactory accounting and internal control systems (allowing for segregation of duties) though cases of ineligible expenditures have been cited (RFSP, ATAAS). This was severe in ATAAS and caused the World Bank and IFAD to suspend their loans. The financial management systems (SAGE-Pastel, Tally and Integrated Financial Management System) are enabling the PMUs to generate the necessary project financial records and accounts and the timely periodic audit of project expenditure and loan performance status.
136. **However, the issue of large amounts that are advanced to PMU staff for project operational activities raises concern.** This is a widespread practice in the government system and projects with other development partner and NGOs,

¹⁰³ Oil palm costs include expenditure in Buvuma. If expenditure in Buvuma is excluded from calculations (as was done in the VODP2 PCR), the oil palm cost/beneficiary in Kalangala becomes US\$2055, which is still high.

¹⁰⁴ Field interviews with DCOs (Soroti and Oyam).

¹⁰⁵ PRELNOR Supervision Report June 2020.

but a major financial management weakness.¹⁰⁶ This system is susceptible to abuse by way of diversion of project funds for use to non-project activities as well as delayed accountabilities. Government is aware of this gap and mechanisms to address it are being sought. Weaknesses are also identified in the delays in approval of payments for project expenditure by implementing DLGs due to the issues relating to the integrated financial management system of government, thus impacting the flow of project funds by the associated delays in paying service providers and staff engaging on the project activities such as for extension (PRELNOR).¹⁰⁷

(xv) External factors

137. **COVID-19 pandemic as well as heavy rains have negatively impacted the efficiency of implementation of the ongoing projects.** Most of the activities of the ongoing projects (PROFIRA, PRELNOR and NOPP) have effectively been brought to a standstill due to lock down measures. The pandemic also reduced the efficiency of service outreach to project beneficiaries (farmer groups, SACCOs and CSCGs, and VSLAs). In addition, heavy and prolonged rains experienced in 2018 and 2019 affected the pace of infrastructure activities, including the need to upgrade CARs to “all-weather” roads thereby increasing the cost per km and reducing the total km coverage for PRELNOR.
138. For PROFIRA, the pandemic reduced the efficiency of services outreach to beneficiaries (SACCO and CSCGs). Since March 2020, PSPs have not been able to continue with their activities to strengthen CSCGs as well as to finalise their mentoring activities with SACCOs. CSCGs and SACCOs also have not been able to hold their regular meetings due to limited technology access among members. In the case of PRELNOR and NOPP, field extension and other training by PSPs and DLGs and farmer group meetings have not been possible. PSPs have already asked for contract extensions to manage the impact of COVID-19 on their performance.¹⁰⁸
139. **Summary.** The CSPE portfolio’s efficiency was enhanced by the good overall disbursement levels of project funds, sound financial management and higher realised ERRs. However, efficiency was constrained by delays in implementation resulting in extensions of already long projects, lower initial disbursements necessitating large disbursements at project completion, lengthy management (fiduciary, procurement and contracting) processes, vacant positions and high staff turnover in a number of PMUs and exogenous factors such as Covid-19 and adverse weather (though outside of project control). Accordingly, the **efficiency** of the portfolio is rated **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

A.4. Rural poverty impact

140. This section assesses the impact on rural poverty of the country programme’s seven projects (RFSP, DLSP, CAIIP1, ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA and PRELNOR) that have made sufficient implementation progress. The assessment relates to the following impact domains: (i) household income and net assets; (ii) human and social capital and empowerment; (iii) food security and agricultural productivity; and (iv) institutions and policies.
141. **The impact pathways draw on the CSPE’s Theory of Change, which aligns with the three SOs of the 2013 COSOP (Annex VI):** (i) Improved production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture sustainably increased through adoption of suitable technologies, research and extension (ATAAS, PRELNOR, DLSP); (ii) smallholder integration into markets resulting in higher revenues through improved roads, markets, processing and farmer collective action (DLSP, VODP2, PRELNOR, CAIIP1); and (iii) increased access and use of financial

¹⁰⁶ Poor management of advances to staff highlighted in VODP2 SM report (September 2019).

¹⁰⁷ Field interviews.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with South Eastern Private Sector Promotion Enterprise Ltd and Acholi Private Sector Company, and also with PROFIRA PMU.

services by the rural population through strengthening of savings and credit institutions, policy reforms and community action (RFSP, PROFIRA, VODP2).

142. The content and quality of impact studies are uneven with issues around sampling strategies, limited use of statistical analysis and baseline surveys (see detailed assessment in online Appendix III). Of the 15 impact studies reviewed, only 6 used statistical tests to establish the significance of results. Baselines have been late with delays of 3-4 years or not done (Annex IX.B, Table 4). PRELNOR, chosen as a project to have the impact study from the Research and Impact Assessment Division of IFAD (RIA), was affected by IFAD's change of policy over doing ex-ante impact assessments¹⁰⁹ so that RIA no longer had a budget to follow the original design. ATAAS could not use the baseline results and the impact study used a recall method. Under PROFIRA, data submitted by SACCO service providers were found to be of low quality and hampered by lack of an on-line MIS. Overall, therefore the impact findings presented below are subject to a number of caveats that are noted in each section.

(xvi) Household income and assets

143. Despite survey limitations mentioned above, **there is broad evidence that IFAD's portfolio of completed or closed projects have contributed to improved incomes and raised the level of household assets owned** (Table 9). The ongoing projects, PROFIRA and PRELNOR, also report an increase in household incomes, but the evidence remains largely anecdotal. Increased use of improved technologies such as improved seed varieties, fertilizers and market access as a result of community access roads constructed and extension service access have been key drivers of the observed changes in incomes.¹¹⁰

Table 9.

Impact on average annual household income (UGX) by project

<i>Project</i>	<i>Before/ Baseline</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>End line</i>	<i>Percentage change</i>
DLSP ¹¹¹	265,208		422,306	59%
CAIIP1 ¹¹²	136,878	175,500	198,812	44%
ATAAS ¹¹³ (female farmers)	698,200	802,930	2,751,231	226%
ATAAS (male farmers)	975,730	1,170,786	3,600,846	205%
VODP2 ¹¹⁴ oil palm	-	-	20,040,673	-
VODP2 oilseeds	-	-	2,137,270	-

Source: CSPE Team elaboration based on project documents (see footnotes).

144. **Community roads have been an important means to increase market access and raise incomes though purchasing power may not have risen to the same degree.** DLSP and CAIIP1 increased average annual household incomes by 59 and 44 per cent, respectively. The DLSP target area also saw a fall in the proportion of households in the lowest income bracket (up to UGX 50,000) by 5 to 7 per cent and a rise in the proportion of households in the highest income brackets by 10 to 12 per cent.¹¹⁵ Both projects contributed to increased farm gate prices, improved marketing of produce and reduced post-harvest losses. In DLSP, increased yields from crops and livestock were also important driving factors, while

¹⁰⁹ As a result of policy changes from IFAD10 to IFAD11.

¹¹⁰ CSPE field surveys.

¹¹¹ DLSP impact assessment 2015.

¹¹² CAIIP1 PCR 2016.

¹¹³ ATAAS income data from the World Bank ICRR. Shows percentage change in real terms.

¹¹⁴ VODP2 income data from VODP2 PCR 2020. Annual household income data converted from US\$5326 from oil palm and US\$568 from oilseeds into UGX, based on exchange rate of 3762UGX=US\$1 (1 June 2019).

¹¹⁵ For beneficiaries of functional adult literacy and no functional adult literacy respectively.

in CAIIP1 households diversified into non-agricultural income sources, with small business enterprises playing a greater role. The resultant change in household purchasing power is however questionable, as income data were not adjusted for inflation.¹¹⁶

145. **Projects with an agricultural focus are estimated to have increased household income although the degree to which the projects contributed to these changes is unclear.**¹¹⁷ Even after adjusting for inflation, the implementation completion report (ICR) of ATAAS found that incomes doubled for men and increased by 2.3 times for women, far exceeding targets. Despite extensive re-analysis, the ICR and the ICR review¹¹⁸ do not fully examine the extent to which being an ATAAS beneficiary correlates with these positive gains compared to other characteristics of the sampled farmers, and, as mentioned below, many well-performing farmer groups had already been formed before the project timeframe (para. 154). For VODP2, the average net income per hectare of oil palm farmers at completion is relatively high at US\$1,983, exceeding the target of US\$1,500 even without a comparative figure at baseline.¹¹⁹ Although the impact on net household income of oilseed farmers was positive, the projected income per hectare of US\$350 was surpassed in soya bean cultivation (US\$438), but missed for sunflower cultivation (US\$313).
146. **For rural finance, the evidence suggests that savings have grown while income was not directly measured.** The 2014 impact assessment of RFSP found that phase II of the project led to long-term SACCO members spending more in all expense areas than the control group of new SACCO members. It also found that the long-term SACCO members had a 14 per cent higher average monthly saving than new members. The incomes of members of SACCOs and CSCGs supported by PROFIRA have not yet been measured.¹²⁰
147. **Income diversification has increased from dependency on crop farming alone into livestock rearing, trade and commerce and the services sector.** Four projects have evidence that a greater proportion of beneficiary households have become involved in diverse types of economic activities, contributing to improved household resilience (RFSP, CAIIP1, DLSP and PRELNOR).¹²¹ PRELNOR has seen a three-fold increase in the proportion of vulnerable households' earnings from livestock production (15 to 46 per cent), the service sector and trade & commerce, with a slight fall in those earning from crop farming and remittances.¹²² Similarly, the proportion of CAIIP1 beneficiary households earning from small business enterprises doubled from 20 to 40 per cent. Households in RFSP reported all round increases in those earning from agriculture, employment, trade, and the transport sector.¹²³ PRELNOR and VODP2 have also contributed to diversification within the crop sector by promoting oilseeds/oil palm production among their beneficiaries.
148. **There was also a general increase in household assets with beneficiaries accumulating farm equipment, bicycles, motor cycles, radios and mobile phones** (Table 3 in Annex IX.B). DLSP showed greater improvements in ownership of household rather than productive assets, especially phones which increase from

¹¹⁶ Inflation ranged from 3 to 15 per cent during the implementation of these projects from 2007 to 2015.

¹¹⁷ ATAAS ICR, World Bank, 2019.

¹¹⁸ ICR Review conducted by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group in 2019 also notes while the impact study was of reasonable quality, 'yield assessments were not robust' due to an absence of non-beneficiary data and poor tracking by the M&E system (ICR Review, p.8).

¹¹⁹ VODP2 PCR 2020; IDS study (2015) Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships in Agricultural Value Chains. A case study of the Oil Palm PPP in Kalangala, Uganda.

¹²⁰ However, the PROFIRA baseline (2016) provides a useful breakdown of household income distribution by wealth quintile to compare against, hopefully in the outcome study planned for 2020.

¹²¹ At the time of the CSPE, data on household involvement in economic activities at baseline and endline/to-date were insufficient/unavailable for ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA and the farmer groups in PRELNOR.

¹²² MOLG (2019) Report on the intermediate outcomes from the first cohort of vulnerable households, PRELNOR.

¹²³ RFSP impact assessment 2014.

30 to 64 per cent ownership amongst beneficiaries. Comparisons between beneficiary households and control groups in RFSP also showed that the former spent more on more costly consumer durables (such as fridges) and farming equipment (such as irrigation pumps). In ATAAS, while both beneficiary households and control groups acquired more assets (such as radio, TV, mobile phones and vehicles), the increases in assets were slightly greater among beneficiaries. Under VODP2, substantial increments in the assets of oil palm farmers occurred between 2014 and 2019. The proportion with iron-roofed main houses increased from 46 to 98 per cent while those with cement floors increased from 40 to 64 per cent. In Kalangala, however, the **sudden influx of wealth has had a negative impact on some families, including high levels of expenditure on consumption and unproductive assets**, limited financial saving to manage market fluctuations and more spending on alcohol, causing family disputes.¹²⁴ Finally, recent surveys on vulnerable-headed households show that by mid-term, PRELNOR had contributed to increases in assets, including cattle ownership although the sample sizes are small and will require further validation.

(xvii) Human and social capital and empowerment

149. **The portfolio fostered a conducive environment for promotion of human and social capital with significant gains in skills development and strengthening of existing social groups though the quality of documentary evidence is varied.** Beneficiaries met during the CSPE field mission demonstrated increased social capital because of their knowledge and skills acquired from training in areas such as financial literacy, agribusiness, and group leadership, and that these have been instrumental in their capacity to increase savings and farm productivity. However, the projects fell short in systematically collecting data at individual and household levels in order to facilitate learning about the extent of the positive changes happening among the beneficiaries.
150. **There is strong evidence of improvement in skills and capacity of beneficiaries, community volunteers and local government officials in several projects.** The DLSP achieved positive changes in poorer households resulting from FAL and household mentoring, such as improved economic activities, improved sanitation, increased participation of beneficiaries in public speaking and self-esteem.¹²⁵ RFSP also achieved improvements in education levels and health status for 94 per cent of the beneficiaries¹²⁶ as well as empowerment of beneficiaries with respect to improved social status and participation in leadership roles.¹²⁷ CSPE field mission interviews with PROFIRA beneficiaries found positive benefits such as better governance skills and increased voice and confidence from being part of a common interest group like CSCGs.
151. **Through strengthening the financial management capacity of group members, the improved business skills and the use of increased savings and credit have had valuable impacts on social capital and empowerment particularly in VODP2, PROFIRA and PRELNOR.** From CSPE field interviews, women mentioned positive changes in the households, among them increased self-esteem from families, improved clothing for children, payment of hospital bills, and through the use of group loans to boost their businesses, greater respect from their husband and men.

¹²⁴ CSPE field mission interviews.

¹²⁵ DLSP Impact Assessment 2015.

¹²⁶ RFSP PCR 2014, p16 – Reports that RFSP beneficiaries primarily used Government Health facilities, but about 30 per cent reported a higher ability to pay for private facilities, which is more than the 27 per cent reported by the control group. This also translated into improved health status for 94 per cent of beneficiaries.

¹²⁷ RFSP Impact Assessment Final Report, Page 18.

152. While some studies noted significant improvement in joint decision making between men and women¹²⁸, other studies however have noted that the evidence was less clear due to poor documentation and changes in the indicators being tracked.¹²⁹ The degree of positive changes in social capital in Kalangala are mixed. On the one hand, marked growth in earnings have improved access to schooling for children and strengthened land ownership including for women, and allowed some to take up leadership positions, however on the other hand, conflicts have risen due to increased land prices and inflow of migrants.¹³⁰

(xviii) Food security and agricultural productivity

153. **Evidence suggests that IFAD's projects have had a positive impact on agricultural production and food security although the survey data has limitations.** Agriculture-focused projects (DLSP, ATAAS, VODP2 and PRELNOR) have claimed impressive yield changes, generally meeting or exceeding baselines, although the performance of different target groups is not always documented (such as smallholder men, women and youth and nucleus workers and labourers) (Annex IX.B, Table 2). In the five tracked commodities in ATAAS, increases in yields over target were achieved in cassava, beans, maize, rice, and milk production. Oil palm and oil seeds under VODP2 have shown statistically significant increases with oil palm rising from 4.5t/ha to 12t/ha leading to 178,730 metric tons of crude palm oil (596 per cent of target). Average sunflower yields for 2018 reached 1.7 tons per hectare (91 per cent of the target), while soybean yields reached 1.4 tons per hectare (127 per cent of the target). These resulted in production of some 647,963 metric tons (220 per cent of target). Early indications after two seasons appear to be positive for PRELNOR for soya beans, maize and sesame¹³¹, and although baseline data are not yet available, the CSPE field mission found increased yields among the farmers' groups visited.
154. **For ATAAS, the productivity changes are surprising given that they occurred over a period when there was significant disruption to the extension system,** major disease outbreaks and a switch to subsidised input provision using retired military personnel known as OWC. Assessments of OWC performance in 2018 concluded that though the quantity of inputs distributed increased markedly, the productivity of farmers did not match. The causes were wrong timing of input delivery to farmers, incidences of poor quality inputs delivered, inadequate extension services to advise on their use.¹³² According to some, OWC has resulted in huge losses due to limited extension services, inadequate information with regard to farmer, soil and water profiles, and elite capture of the program.¹³³ On the other hand, there is good evidence that ATAAS built on the farmer groups formed during the NAADS period, and so was able to deliver technologies to well-established groups with receptive lead farmers who were already on the path to commercial agriculture.¹³⁴
155. **There was a significant increase in marketing of farmers' produce.** VODP2 data show that the project has had a positive impact on the bulking of agricultural production, with 2,645 Farmers' Groups involved in bulking (against a target of 1,000 groups) by the end of 2018. This has allowed farmers to negotiate and obtain higher prices from millers for bulked produce due to reduced transaction costs. The CSPE field mission found that engaging in bulk marketing had helped

¹²⁸ ATAAS, 2018. ICRR, p 39 notes that: ATAAS has had considerable influence on gender in relation to asset ownership and decision making on investment. The Process Evaluation (2017) found joint decision making to be well above 50 per cent score, except for asset ownership.

¹²⁹ ATAAS restructuring after the MTR in 2014 made significant changes to the development objective indicators, and dropped some indicators tracking farmer yields by gender and farmer satisfaction with the advisory services.

¹³⁰ Brokering Development: Enabling Factors for Public-Private-Producer Partnerships in Agricultural Value Chains, 2015, IDS, IFAD.

¹³¹ PRELNOR (2019). First vulnerable household cohort outcome report.

¹³² Implementation Review of NAADS interventions under Operation Wealth Creation, Empower Consult, 2018.

¹³³ ACODE, op.cit. 2018.

¹³⁴ ATAAS Impact Survey 2019 and see the ATAAS PPE, IFAD 2020 for fuller discussion.

VODP2 and PROFIRA households to improve their living standards and to invest in some small animals for multiplication and sharing on a revolving basis.

156. **There is some evidence that food security has improved.** There has been an improvement in household food security across projects and regions and over the years. IFAD has also directly intervened through provision of food security grants for example under DLSP and PRELNOR.¹³⁵ PRELNOR reported a reduction of 42 and 38 per cent in vulnerable households reducing the number and size of meals respectively during hunger months.¹³⁶ Under RFSP, 85 per cent of beneficiaries reported improvements in food security and nutrition of beneficiaries.¹³⁷
157. **ATAAS beneficiary farmers suffered lower periods of food deficit than non-beneficiaries,** with 35 per cent having a food surplus compared to 28 per cent (Figure 6)¹³⁸ Indeed, the CSPE field mission noted that the District Production and Marketing Officer (DPMOs) in Iganga, Lira and Masaka Districts with institutional memory of NAADS and ATAAS stated that increased food security may have been one of the few significant impacts of ATAAS.¹³⁹ Under PRELNOR the emerging picture is of supported vulnerable households increasing meals per day¹⁴⁰ and food security grants assisting 400 households, while income diversification has been introduced through enterprises such as apiary, agroforestry and water harvesting. DLSP through its food security grants and household mentoring increased food security for the vulnerable (although the PCR notes that due to the absence of reference groups these impacts cannot be fully ascribed to the project).
158. **In terms of reduced malnutrition, there is limited evidence available.** Reduced child malnutrition was indicated in VODP2 but there is no reliable data for ATAAS, CAIIP1, RFSP or DLSP in this area. The VODP2 PCR reports that chronic malnutrition or stunting in Kalangala reduced from 66.2 per cent at baseline to 32.4 per cent in 2019, compared to stunting rates of 26.5 per cent in central region and at 29 per cent nationally. Under RFSP, some positive changes in child malnutrition were recorded by measured by a Results Impact and Measuring System (RIMS) Survey.¹⁴¹

¹³⁵ PRELNOR gives VHHs Food Security Grants (worth US\$120 per HH).

¹³⁶ PRELNOR first vulnerable households batch outcome report (2019).

¹³⁷ RFSP, PCR 2014 page 15: States that 85 per cent of RFSP beneficiaries reported improvements in household food security over the previous 5 years, higher than the 72 per cent of the control group.


¹³⁸ The difference though small was found to be statistically significant, particularly in the months of Feb-May (ATAAS Impact Survey p.76).

¹³⁹ 2 DPMOs also believe that any impact (food security) was due to or built on legacy of earlier NAADS phases.

¹⁴⁰ The PRELNOR outcome report in 2019 indicated that vulnerable households now have at least 5 months of full food security in a year, and those with at least two meals per day had increased from 38 to 59 per cent.

¹⁴¹ RFSP PCR 2014, p15.

Figure 6.
Farmers' experience of food security in ATAAS



Source: ATAAS impact evaluation, 2018.

(xix) Rural Institution and Policies

159. The 2013 COSOP gave a prominent role to rural organizations - at the grassroots, district and national levels - in its strategy to empower the rural poor. It mentions support for the establishment of financially sustainable smallholder oil palm growers' organizations and for UCSCU to become a sustainable apex body for SACCOs.
160. **At grassroots level**, with farmers' groups, farmers' organizations including the KOPGT and the Kalanga Oil Palm Growers Association, CSCGs and SACCOs, there has been significant impact in terms of institutional strengthening. VODP2 further grew KOPGT from VODP1 to the point where it received over UGX10 billion (US\$3 million) in dividends, as the holder of 10 per cent shares in OPUL.¹⁴² Alongside OPUL, it provides vital extension services, credit and support in transportation for farmers.
161. **At intermediate level**, capacity building of DLG staff and District Farmers Associations tasked with supporting farmer-led extension service provision has strengthened their institutional capacity in PRELNOR and High-level Farmers' Organizations in VODP2. ZARDIs have been enhanced through support from ATAAS and then PRELNOR to increase adaptive trials and demonstrations. DLSP and VODP2 also devoted considerable resources to building district capacity, but the wider impact of this support is not recorded, and equally in CAIP1 no rating is given for this sub-criterion.
162. **At national level**, for example with Uganda Co-operative Alliance (UCA), the Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE), UCSCU and other farmers' organisations, such as the Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers' Forum that implemented the household mentoring approach in some districts. ATAAS delivered positive results as far as strengthening of NARO is concerned and a new agricultural extension policy and strategy in 2016 - though IFAD's role in the latter was minimal due to its loan suspension in this period. The grant-funded Uganda Oilseeds Subsector Platform (OSSUP) played a significant market-making role in VODP2 bringing key actors in the vegetable oil sector together, although it closed in 2017 when funding ended.
163. **IFAD's lending programme for agriculture and integrated rural development has had limited or no influence on policy.** This was either because there were no explicit policy objectives, or because of the limited level of policy engagement between IFAD and Government during the COSOP period. This

¹⁴² VODP2 PCR.

is reflected in IFAD's different engagement with MAAIF (ATAAS, VODP2), MOLG (CAIIP1, DLSP, and PRELNOR) and MOFPED (RFSP, PROFIRA). In the case of ATAAS, because the intended policy reforms stated in the design (with regard to advisory services) were not a true reflection of Government appetite for reform (see Box 3).

Box 3.

Policy influence the ATAAS experience

IFAD's decision to jointly fund ATAAS was partly premised on its wish to reinforce the extension service reforms under the earlier NAADS. The changes in government's commitment to NAADS, resulting in IFAD loan suspension in 2007 for a year, and its reorientation to more input-driven approach to agricultural advisory services, indicated the gap between IFAD's aim to support policy reform and the reality of policy turbulence under a strong presidential system and less reform-minded host ministry in MAAIF. IFAD's loan suspension under ATAAS occurred at a time when the Government promulgated a new agricultural extension policy and strategy in 2016, so IFAD had little influence on their formulation. Overall, IFAD's limited funding contribution to ATAAS (2 per cent of total at close) and its low capacity in country to engage in or respond to policy engagement opportunities led to no discernible policy influence.

Source: IOE Draft PPE of ATAAS.

164. **CAIIP and DLSP had little or no policy influence in their design or implementation.** Working with the MOLG, DLSP and CAIIP1 were designed to work within existing policy mandates and guidance and relied on a favourable policy framework. They subsequently experienced implementation issues after certain policy changes affecting local government autonomy. The exception is around CAR design where MOLG as well as other donors such as AfDB have embraced lessons. Partners supporting CARs are ensuring they are full-gravel and no longer spot-gravel as before. Ministries of Works and Transport plus Local Government have 'fully embraced this'¹⁴³, although as yet it would appear there is no specific policy change.
165. There are no explicit policy objectives in PRELNOR, however it was expected that the learning from PRELNOR's experiences will contribute to policy dialogue at national and local government levels.¹⁴⁴ These included influence on road design and agricultural marketing approaches. While the Project Policy Committee in MOLG is the intended forum intended for policy dialogue, it is too early for PRELNOR to claim any policy influence.¹⁴⁵
166. In value chains, VODP1 and 2 have provided a successful model of 4P engagement and the potential policy impact on Government thinking can be seen in the adoption of value chain and nucleus estate approaches in NDP3.¹⁴⁶
167. **The most significant policy results are in rural finance.** In supporting the development and passage of the Tier IV Act and the establishment of UMRA, PROFIRA helped strengthen and bring stability to the MFI sector. Together with RFSP, it has also facilitated UCSCU through enhancement of good governance and management capacity development; establishment of UCSCU Regional Offices; and development and implementation of the 5-Year Strategic Plan. PROFIRA has also been providing information for the formulation of the Financial Sector Development Strategy for MOFPED.
168. **Summary.** Statistical attribution of the results achieved to the support provided by IFAD is not demonstrated in most of the impact studies. Yet, the logic inherent in the theory of change elaborated for this evaluation indicates that IFAD will have *contributed* to the changes found in the impact domains assessed here. Incomes

¹⁴³ ICO self-assessment for CSPE 2020.

¹⁴⁴ PRELNOR, PDR, para 167.

¹⁴⁵ As indicated in PRELNOR's self-assessment which did not comment on this aspect.

¹⁴⁶ See for example: M Fowler and J. Rauschendorfer, Agro-industrialisation in Uganda, F-IH-UGA-006-1, IGC Working Paper, November 2019.

and assets have risen for the seven projects assessed, although income changes were not always adjusted for inflation. While human and social capital have also improved, systematic data collection was often missing and the reach of intensive household mentoring methodologies was limited. Evidence for improved food security is fair, although reductions in levels of malnutrition are less clear. Grassroots institutions including production and credit-based groups have been strengthened, while capacity for better service delivery of local governments and zonal research institutes have been somewhat improved though broad changes in service delivery are not so evident. Policy impacts have been generally limited aside from micro finance (see the discussion under non-lending). Finally, questions over the validity of the data remain and as a result **rural poverty impact** is rated **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

A.5. Sustainability of benefits¹⁴⁷

169. This criterion is discussed in terms of institutional, financial and technical aspects. In general, the sustainability of benefits from older projects such as DLSP, RFSP and ATAAS have been bolstered by the sequential project approach and continued support in districts with national coverage.

(xx) Institutional

170. **Prospects for the sustainability of farmers' organizations (FOs) appear good particularly where financial viability is established or strong community ties have been built** (such as for CBNRM in PRELNOR or many of PROFIRA's CSCGs). There are questions over the sustainability of some FOs given the withdrawal of IFAD support at project closure and the declining support from local governments that have faced budget reductions (see Ch.V.B para. 295). The sustainability of CSCGs depends on the availability of support services once PROFIRA closes. To address this, PROFIRA has followed a two-track exit strategy – forming collectives of CSCGs and establishing village agents to provide paid services to CSCGs. However, results suggest that the institutionalisation of payment for support services by CSCGs should have been started from the beginning of the project. By now, the CSCGs have had free access to support services for a few years. The viability of SACCOs remains mixed with the more viable ones supported by RFSP/PROFIRA having good prospects, while the majority remain fragile. The sustainability for apex organizations remains challenging.
171. **The sustainability of SACCOs relies on three different levels and institutions all of which face difficulties:** District Commercial Officers (DCOs) providing the ground support, Apex institutions like UCSCU providing lobbying and capacity building activities for the SACCOs and UMRA, as the regulator of the sector, instilling proper financial and risk management standards.¹⁴⁸ The DCOs/MTIC have limited resources to provide the ground support, and although much stronger, the UCSCU's operational self-sufficiency is currently only 85 per cent. UMRA's role in the sector is also questioned by the amendment to the Cooperatives Act in November 2019. Category B and C SACCOs also still require capacity building to improve their operational efficiency for which they do not have the resources. The sustainability of CSCGs is also overshadowed by the recent policy changes, which could see the external infusion of funds by government into these institutions, thus risking: a) undermining the institution's efforts to raise their own funds in terms of shares and savings, b) elite capture with richer members borrowing more funds, c) moving away from savings-led loan-driven institutions.
172. **KOPGT is now a relatively strong institution operating without project support having achieved operational self-sufficiency since the end of 2018,**

¹⁴⁷ Sustainability refers to the likely continuation of net benefits from the development intervention after project completion. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.

¹⁴⁸ UMRA will only regulate the top layer of SACCOs (based on clear criteria) and thus many SACCOs will not benefit.

in line with the design target. Although KOPGT posted an operational loss of UGX 238.5 million in the first half of 2019,¹⁴⁹ its sustainability is likely given the staff capacity, linkages with other farmer institutions (FIs), the active engagement of farmers and good levels of profitability. Nevertheless, technical as well as financial support may be required for a period. The role of OSSUP has proven effective but unsustainable, with calls for it to be funded as a public good by SNV. It is unclear how OSSUP's role will be replaced by the multi-service platform model proposed in NOSP and to what extent farmers and their organizations will have access to reliable market information and brokerage services.

173. **The security of land tenure has been noted as a concern** since IFAD's work under DLSP. While the COSOP did not aim to address land issues, questions of land rights and loss of land have been noted in VODP2 as serious challenges to project implementation due to rising land values and return of absentee land owners. Opportunities for support through advice centres have not been pursued because another Ministry is responsible (Ministry of Lands).¹⁵⁰ NOPP has taken on board the lessons from VODP2 and plans to address land security through measures including: civic education and public sensitization for communities involved in or affected by oil palm growing; local land dispute resolution and legal advice; and support for land registration.¹⁵¹

(xxi) Financial

174. **Value chain crops are proving the most profitable investments across the portfolio**, particularly in the case of oil palm.¹⁵² Despite smallholders showing lower yields than the nucleus estate and their loan repayments affecting net incomes, the annual cost of production is progressively flattening while yields are increasing and levels of rejects are diminishing due to improved harvesting and postharvest handling practices. For comparison, oil palm farmers interviewed by the field mission indicated that oil palm is much more profitable than other crops such as coffee and seasonal crops like beans, and fishing activity that were important in Kalangala prior to the project. Sunflower and soya bean production is also generating good and sustainable profit levels (averaging UGX 1.37 million per Ha per season) in the VODP2 oil seeds hubs.
175. While Government's commitment to research and extension services has shown improvement, a recent expenditure review indicates that there are still grounds for funding uncertainty.¹⁵³ Even so, grants for extension services and for district roads are now in place, and following IFAD's support for new vehicles under ATAAS, MAAIF states there is a budget of UGX 80 billion (or US\$20 million) annually for vehicle operation.¹⁵⁴ CSPE field interviews with District Production Officers confirmed predictability and consistency of disbursements through the next 5-year planning period, which they have incorporated in their 5-year District Development Plans 2020/21 to 2024/25. The District Production Officer reported regular and institutionalized vehicle maintenance buttressed by GPS disabling systems to reduce risks of misuse. Field evidence however indicated some instances of misuse of vehicles by local politicians.
176. **Nevertheless, there remain concerns over project exit strategies** in terms of farmers' willingness to pay for private services after programme closure and PSPs being able and willing to finance hub platforms, markets and advisory services.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ Supervision mission Sept 2019.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with IFAD staff.

¹⁵¹ NOPP Final QA Review, para 27, 2017.

¹⁵² Average profit level is UGX 7.1 Million per ha per year (VODP self-evaluation report).

¹⁵³ Agriculture Sector Public Expenditure Review Uganda, World Bank, 2019.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with MAAIF.

¹⁵⁵ See for example VODP2 PCR para 163 ff, RFSP PCR.

(xxii) Technical

177. **Sustainability of technical benefits are mixed and dependent on continued funding.** Unlike in the 2013 CPE, the prospects for maintenance of community access roads are better. CAR sustainability is rated as high due to the upgraded design to all weather standard, and therefore inclusion in the Road Fund for maintenance (CAIIP1, DLSP, and PRELNOR). Ninety per cent of CAIIP1 roads are reportedly still functioning and maintained.¹⁵⁶ Community satisfaction was found to be high across the seven roads visited during the CSPE field mission. Some farm roads though are less likely to endure.
178. **In rural finance, CSCG continuity depends on their affording private support services and DLG resourcing.** Technical support for CSCGs in terms of sustaining business skills have been initiated through community-based trainers, but their continued engagement, after PROFIRA ends next year, will depend on the CSCGs being able to meet the pay-for-fee services. It will also depend on DCOs and DCDOs having sufficient budget to integrate support for SACCOs and CSCGs into their annual work plans, as well as them accessing and using the high quality training modules prepared by PROFIRA's PSPs.
179. **Sustaining extension service quality will depend on continued training of field staff.** IFAD's funding of the rapid and extensive training under ATAAS of 4,000 staff was valuable in building the technical capacity of public extension agents, many of whom were newly recruited. However, the intended continuation of this training to provide continuous skills enhancement has not manifested, as it is not included in the next 5-year MTEF indicative figures.
180. **OWC's continued subsidised input distribution remains a key issue for technical as well as financial sustainability.** OWC's continued role weakens the ability of private sector actors to engage in input supply, constrains farmers' choice of inputs, and also affects NARO plans for commercialization of technology outputs. The involvement of farmers in input selection or distribution was reported in 2018 to be limited under the OWC system and so inputs like seedlings and fertilizer were given without attention to the actual needs of farmers and there has been widespread evidence of corruption in the way inputs are sourced and distributed under OWC so that the intended recipients fail to receive their allocations.¹⁵⁷
181. **Summary.** The 2013 CPE found sustainability to be the weakest performing criterion (giving this criterion a rating of 3 or moderately unsatisfactory). It found that physical infrastructure was poorly maintained by local government and that supported agribusinesses had viability problems. In rural finance, many of the supported savings and credit cooperatives had poor prospects of becoming self-reliant and sustainable. The situation now is somewhat improved. Growing profitability and productivity indicates farmers should be able to maintain their incomes especially in vegetable oil production, while better designed roads should provide longer access and many rural credit groups are diversifying and viable. Much depends on the ability of local government services to expand support as well as on farmers' willingness to pay for private advisory services in the face of subsidised input supply and changes in rural finance policy. Overall, **sustainability of benefits** is rated **moderately satisfactory (4)**.

¹⁵⁶ Interviews with AfDB IFAD staff.

¹⁵⁷ Public Expenditure Governance in Uganda's Agricultural Extension System, ACODE Centre for Budget and Economic Governance, 2018.

B. Other Performance Criteria

B.1. Innovation¹⁵⁸

182. **The portfolio features a number of innovations in the Ugandan context, although most of the examples found were inherited from the earlier COSOP period. There were also a number of missed opportunities to be innovative.**
183. **VODP2 has built on innovative VODP1 features that were new to Uganda,** including most notably the continued development of oil palm as a new perennial crop via a 4P approach, with substantial private sector investment commitments and dividend returns to the Government and KOPGT from the miller OPUL. The multi-stakeholder KOPGT created under VODP1 was innovative as it provided longer-term financing for the full cycle of smallholder plantation farming. VODP2 has also served to validate other innovations introduced earlier including the engagement of private sector agronomic services and market linkages built around farmer-miller consortia. VODP2 has also supported farmer-to-farmer seed multiplication that has improved quality seed availability. The overall success of the VODP1/2 experience has had a marked influence on Government thinking, yet much of the innovation must be attributed to the original design of VODP1 developed under the 1998 COSOP as recorded in the 2013 CPE.¹⁵⁹
184. The Small and Medium Sized Agricultural Development Fund (SMADF) or Uganda Yield Fund is an innovative example of leveraging private sector financing, however this was promoted as part of non-lending activities rather than the lending portfolio and is discussed in Chapter IV.
185. **The use of a sector development approach in IFAD's rural finance programmes was new to Uganda and also started under the 2004 COSOP.** Rather than support institutions, RFSP purposely attempted to 'fill gaps' in the existing institutional structure, including a focus on policy and apex institutional development. RFSP also pioneered the contracting out of most activities to expert providers and included a market-driven matching grant component used elsewhere in IFAD but new to Uganda. Innovative design allowed CSCG formation contractors to introduce new approaches to the mobilization of groups within IFAD guidelines.¹⁶⁰ Mentoring of SACCO Boards and exchange visits was innovative and has significantly improved governance levels of SACCO beneficiaries.
186. **Continued use of household mentoring and GALS approaches have been followed by IFAD projects though their introduction predates the CSPE period.** Household mentoring was introduced under DLSP's design (and it was given recognition in the CPE 2013 as well as an IFAD award in 2011) and has been continued under PRELNOR. Similarly, GALS was first developed in 2008 under Oxfam NOVIB's the programme¹⁶¹ for Women's Empowerment mainstreaming and Networking and has been adopted by DLSP and subsequent projects.
187. **Agricultural research in NARO under ATAAS led to a range of technologies being disseminated some of which were innovative in the Ugandan setting.**¹⁶² The Competitive Grants Scheme (CGS) was effective as a way to broaden stakeholder involvement in agricultural research and tap into private sector skills, supporting 91 collaborative public-private investment partnership that

¹⁵⁸ To be considered innovative, according to IFAD's definition, an intervention, idea, technology or process needs to be: (i) new to its context of application (with reference to the country context, scale, domain, discipline or line of business); (ii) useful and cost-effective in relation to a goal, with positive value for its users (e.g., empower the rural poor to overcome poverty better and more cost-effectively than previous approaches); (iii) able to "stick" after pilot testing.

¹⁵⁹ Some innovations have emerged under VODP2 including the use of Community Based Facilitators to support extension and farmer learning platforms.

¹⁶⁰ Integrating health training was an innovation introduced by CSCG promoters.

¹⁶¹ GALS, Practical Guide for Transforming Gender and Unequal Power Relations in Value Chains, Oxfam Novib 2014.

¹⁶² 198 technological innovations were disseminated, exceeding the project target of 110 by 80 per cent. These innovations spanned yield, nutrition and climate smart, high adaptation as well as labour saving technologies (PPE ATAAS).

expanded the scope of research and introduced competition and clearer objective setting and monitoring. While these innovations can be accorded to ATAAS, IFAD's role can be seen as minimal given that its funds were mainly spent on procuring vehicles and training for extension services (see Box 6).

188. **Mobile plant clinics have been a new approach to bringing scientific knowledge to farmers** in PRELNOR.¹⁶³ Extension staff are trained as "plant doctors" who train farmers to make correct diagnoses of pests, diseases and mineral deficiency in crop fields. The plant doctors link farmers to soil testing services and provide them with recommendations on management options.
189. **There have also been some lost opportunities for innovation.** Under ATAAS, the early plans to strengthen the NAADS legacy of demand-led extension services which had been seen as highly innovative in the 2000s were dropped in favour of more conventional public sector-led extension delivery. IFAD has begun to use GIS/satellite imagery and drones better for road planning, but this needs to be taken further under NOSP/NOPP. In rural finance product and service development, greater use of ITC for mobile money/ electronic banking could have been pursued.¹⁶⁴ Greater support for producer group-miller contracts would have enhanced the menu of project innovations and represents a missed opportunity.
190. Therefore, overall the CSPE rates **innovation** as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)** since many of the innovations noted in project reviews in fact originate prior to the CSPE period and even though some have been further adapted under the evaluation period these cases do not constitute substantive examples of innovation.

B.2. Scaling up¹⁶⁵

191. IFAD defines scaling up as the extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, private sector and other agencies. The potential for scaling up or IFAD transforming small projects into larger ones are not considered. Thus, HH mentoring in PRELNOR would not be considered the scaling up of DLSP results.
192. **There are some examples of scaling up that have occurred beyond IFAD projects.** Though not rated separately until 2017, the earlier projects such as CAIIP1, DLSP, and RFSP were not found to have produced innovations that were subsequently scaled up outside of IFAD investments according to their PCRVs. There are however four scaling up examples elaborated below.
193. Following the experiences of VODP1 and VODP2, **oil palm nucleus plantations** have been started and there has been Government discussion of employing this modality in other commodities.¹⁶⁶ The Government's new NDP3 states that 4P partnerships will be pursued under the nucleus estate model.¹⁶⁷
194. **Household mentoring and GALS methodologies** have been replicated to some extent by other actors in Uganda such as with NGOs like UCA, the Community Organisation for Rural Enterprise Activity Management (CREAM)¹⁶⁸ and PELUM¹⁶⁹, though there are obstacles in terms of the time and cost that have prevented their wider uptake. Within IFAD, there have been important lesson learning across

¹⁶³ Household mentoring and Mobile plant clinics were presented at the East and Southern Africa Knowledge and Learning Event in Kenya in October 2019 and will be selected for publication by the IFAD Strategy and Knowledge Division.

¹⁶⁴ PROFIRA had expectations that its partnership with BoU would support innovations in information technology and communications for banking (ITC) and financial literacy, but limited action to support ITC innovation.

¹⁶⁵ According to IFAD's definition, scaling up is when the Government, another donor, private sector or other stakeholders, mobilize resources to increase the results of an activity initially funded by IFAD. Instead, the term "replication" is used when a new IFAD-funded project includes approaches already tested by the Fund. There may be cases where both scaling up and replication are done.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with VODP2 PMU.

¹⁶⁷ NDP3, page 70.

¹⁶⁸ Community Organisation for Rural Enterprise Activity Management, GALS in savings and lending groups. Case Study in Uganda, 2013.

¹⁶⁹ GIZ interview.

country programmes and regions. This is because of the toolkit prepared from Uganda experiences, and learning routes that have exposed IFAD project staff from other countries to these methodologies, for example Malawi, Sudan, Rwanda, Nepal – all countries that went on to adopt household methodologies in IFAD-supported loan programmes.¹⁷⁰

195. **Improved agricultural technologies** developed through ATAAS-funded adaptive research at ZARDIs have been scaled up in Uganda and the wider region, using District Agricultural Research Support Teams and Multi Stakeholder Innovation Platforms (MSIPs).¹⁷¹ Similarly, under PRELNOR, seed multiplication has occurred through farmer groups using ZARDI foundation seed beyond the supported project groups. The CSPE field mission also found some evidence of non-supported farmers groups adopting production and processing methods that have arisen from the 4P approach in VODP2.
196. Based on field interviews with district staff, IFAD approaches to strengthen SACCOs and CSCGs have been adopted by DLG DCOs and DCDOs as well as PSPs to strengthen non-project SACCOs and groups.
197. **Non-lending activities are a key driver for scaling up of innovations and results.** Some grants that supported activities within projects have aimed at explicit scaling up of good practices (for example the GEF-funded SLM activities under ATAAS and the World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies (WOCAT) /ULN supported climate-resilient agricultural practices in PRELNOR that promoted replication of conservation technologies¹⁷²). These are discussed in Chapter IV which also highlighted the limited time available to the ICO for partnership building and policy engagement to facilitate the uptake of IFAD approaches.
198. Overall, the number of examples of scaling up beyond IFAD's projects merit a rating of **moderately satisfactory (4)**. More effective scaling could have occurred if stronger knowledge management efforts to share results and lessons learned beyond IFAD to its partners could have been achieved (see Chapter IV.A).

B.3. Gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) and youth

199. **Project gender strategies have become more comprehensive over time in line with IFAD instruments to mainstream gender and implement gender transformative approaches.** The evaluation found a high level of commitment across the portfolio to implement gender strategies in line with national policy to enhance more equitable participation of women and youth.¹⁷³ The country portfolio has also taken a significant step towards promoting gender transformative approaches through household mentoring and GALS, albeit to varying degrees. Dedicated officers or gender focal points ensured the implementation of these strategies, however, according to CSPE field mission interviews, the quality of implementation/results could have been improved through more technical implementation support on IFAD missions.
200. **The portfolio has seen participation rates of women showing an increasing trend over the years** from 30 per cent to 50 per cent targets, with some components such as PROFIRA CSCGs achieving 74 per cent women's participation. All the projects ensured that women and youth participated in the trainings, in farmer groups, community-based financial institutions, stakeholder meetings in production, marketing, and in household mentoring.

¹⁷⁰ Interview, IFAD HQ staff. The Gender team in IFAD HQ also identified household methodologies Champions from Uganda (from NGOs involved in grants and from some rural communities) and used them as a pool of experts to assist other projects (in other countries).

¹⁷¹ ATAAS PCR.

¹⁷² Overview of engagement of PRELNOR in scaling SLM activities, June 2020 by J.Tukahirwa.

¹⁷³ Aligned to the Uganda National Gender Policy 2007 on women's participation and the Local Government Act 1997 that provides for women's representation in Local Councils Uganda.

201. Gender equitable participation was enhanced by interventions that positively impacted women's lives especially choice of crops mainly grown by women, and by using quotas for female and youth participation. Value chain agriculture focused on oil seeds such as sesame and sunflower that are traditionally seen as women's crops helped to increase project outcomes for women. The strategy to mobilise groups through VSLAs, rural entities where women are already traditionally mobilized, helped PROFIRA, VODP2 and PRELNOR reach substantial numbers of women.
202. **IFAD portfolio has registered positive outcomes in ownership and access to assets by women, albeit, with limitations for decision making over land.** Women have invested in assets including ox-traction, land for production (buying or renting plots for cultivation) built or upgraded their homes, bought phones, bicycles, and motorcycles. A number of beneficiaries interviewed during the CSPE field mission had invested in animals for commercial and nutrition purposes, among them - cows, pigs, goats, and poultry. In VODP2, women and men received fertilisers and other oil palm implements and the participation criteria requiring the out-grower farmer to show evidence of ownership of the land was a driver for families to register land in women's names. The ceiling of 5 acre per member also resulted in benefits for women.¹⁷⁴ However, there is less evidence to show that women controlled the resources from oil palm sales and gaps still exist in asset ownership by women. For example, in PROFIRA, women underlined the difficulty of convincing their husbands to offer their land as collateral to facilitate access to loans from SACCOs or a commercial bank.¹⁷⁵
203. **IFAD projects addressed gender barriers with respect to access to finance but was limited in addressing constraints for women's participation in SACCOs.** The projects provided opportunities for women to save money, borrow or earn from shares in group savings and credit schemes. Projects registered increased access to income sources. VODP2 linked 6,231 individual farmers to financial institutions for credit, of which 3,528 were female, most of it used for expanding production capabilities, start-up of small business, purchase animals, seed or hire labour.¹⁷⁶ ATAAS also reduced income inequality between male and females beneficiaries. PROFIRA has seen a growth of women accessing savings services from 34 per cent at in 2014 to 51 per cent in 2018, and credit services from 34 to 58 per cent.¹⁷⁷ Yet, the numbers of women borrowers in SACCOs was at 32 per cent, slightly less than the targeted 33 per cent.¹⁷⁸ Constraints for women participation in SACCOs and SACCO leadership have not been actively addressed in PROFIRA or RFSP and gender barriers in this area remain poorly addressed.
204. **Improved access to knowledge and services created positive outcomes for women, with some limitations of decision making due to women's more limited control over assets.** Women highlighted positive benefits such as increased capacity to manage their finances, better management of their groups, record keeping, planning and visioning, use of savings and credit and managing their assets. Women's knowledge of value chain and market-oriented approaches and advisory services have improved, as well as environment protection, making fuel-saving stoves, nutrition information, and agri-business skills such as

¹⁷⁴ VODP PCR 2020.

¹⁷⁵ PROFIRA Nov 2019 supervision report,

¹⁷⁶ MAAIF/IFAD: 2020. Impact of Oil Seeds Development Activities 2012-2019 – A compendium of VODP2 Success Stories, January 2020.

¹⁷⁷ CSPE Field Mission Interview.

¹⁷⁸ The benefits for women from SACCOs nationally remain low, given that the national average for women participation in SACCOs is around 30 per cent. Bank of Uganda/GIZ FSD Programme, Agricultural Finance Year Books 2011, Coping with Economic Realities.5.2 "SACCOs and MFIs: How a Focus on Gender Can Improve SACCOs' services to their members, By Lisa Peterlechner.

manufacture of cooking oil, soap, soybean cakes, packaging soy flour, and bulk marketing (PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR, ATAAS).

205. **However, gender disparities disadvantage women compared to men**, in accessing opportunities for hosting training sites, improved seed multiplication sites or farmer learning platforms because of the preconditions which many women cannot meet.¹⁷⁹ ATAAS required a host farmer to meet 70 per cent of the value of the market oriented enterprise, while the vegetable oil sub-sector (VODP2) learning platform required the host farmer to have land, invest some resources, and also become a learning point for others. This was difficult for women who did not have decision-making power over household production resources.
206. **There is positive evidence of women holding leadership roles in project structures although concrete data on gender composition is often missing.** PRELNOR design set 40 per cent as the minimum quota for leadership of women¹⁸⁰, while women's representation in leadership of PROFIRA SACCO boards was 35 per cent, above the design target of 33 per cent. Findings from SACCOS met during the CSPE field mission indicate that women had an increasing role in SACCO leadership. However, these are limited examples amidst a general picture of insufficient monitoring of the quality of women's leadership. Some groups met in the field had passed bylaws that reduced the minimum shareholding and capped the maximum in order to prevent dominance by well-off members, and also guarantee that poorer members have a voice, a measure that would also benefit women who have lower income. The CSPE field interviews also confirmed that membership in groups had helped women build their self-esteem and confidence, acquire friends, and learn new skills.¹⁸¹
207. **While some positive changes in social norms around workload re-distribution in households have been reported, its extent is not documented, and women's workload largely remains the same.** The CSPE mission interviews with beneficiaries were able to confirm positive change happening with respect to women hiring labour, investment in labour-saving technologies and to a limited extent, reports of men taking up some farm roles previously performed by women.¹⁸² Gender equitable workloads and workload distribution have also been discussed through value chain training.¹⁸³ In Kalangala, it was reported that women reduced their workload by using income from oil palm to hire farm labour.¹⁸⁴ Field mission group discussions in Eastern Uganda also reported using credit from groups to purchase labour-saving assets like oxen and ox-ploughs which increased their cultivated land acreage. VODP2 provided some post-harvest equipment like coffee and maize mills, rice and soybean hullers/threshers that have helped reduce women's labour from laborious traditional post-harvest handling chores. Fuel-saving stoves also reduced women's time for collecting firewood. Women's access to project-supplied labour saving technology, however, has been limited because social norms disadvantaged their ability to become host farmers for demonstrations and acquire ox-drawn implements such as ox-cart, and weeders and shellers, or grain mills.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ CSPE Field Mission interviews with VODP2 staff shows that Host Farmers for VODP2 were 26 per cent females compared to men at 74 per cent, community-based trainers and lead farmers were 33 per cent women and 67 per cent male, and yet the farmer composition in VODP2 oil seed was 60 per cent women and 40 per cent men, and 39 per cent women and 61 per cent men in oil palm.

¹⁸⁰ PRELNOR PDR page 54.

¹⁸¹ See VODP2 PCR 2020.

¹⁸² PCRS & Reports – VODP2, DLSP, PRELNOR and CSPE field mission interviews.

¹⁸³ Moreover, the projects that implemented Household Methodologies were consistent in using the Gender Balanced tree from GALS methodology with individual households and with groups to address the gender disparities in workload at household level. (PRELNOR, DLSP, PROFIRA – with CREAM & IIRR, VODP2 in East & Northern Uganda, VODP2 – Oil Palm).

¹⁸⁴ VODP2 2020 PCR.

¹⁸⁵ Interviews with PRELNOR and VODP2 PMU.

208. **The Uganda programme was at the forefront of developments in gender transformative approaches** with the piloting of household mentoring and GALS in DLSP, funded by an IFAD grant to Oxfam Novib. Projects which properly incorporated household mentoring and GALS in the design (DLSP, PRELNOR), have had positive results because they also developed relevant strategies and budgeted for the activities, while those that did not have struggled with the update of GALS (PROFIRA & VODP2). PRELNOR added value to create a hybrid of household mentoring and GALS by adding the GALS methodology challenge tree to the household mentoring (situation analysis) as a way to introduce gender issues right from the start while working with vulnerable households. Cross-cutting issues namely gender, HIV/AIDS, environment and nutrition were introduced to beneficiaries through household mentoring. Cross-learning on household mentoring from PRELNOR to VODP2 occurred with PRELNOR taking the lead in training trainers from VODP2 in household mentoring¹⁸⁶, however, the implementation of this cross-project linkage started late and was affected by COVID-19 restrictions. PROFIRA on the other hand largely relied on general gender sensitisation which was part of the training areas in the VSLA methodology, except in three PROFIRA districts where the project contracted CREAM, a service provider already trained in GALS by Oxfam-Novib.
209. **Evidence suggests gender relations have generally improved, while gender roles at household level remain the same.** CSPE evaluators were informed by focus group discussions (FGDs) that in households with IFAD project group members, women were more respected by men (and husbands); that they tended to have reduced frequency of gender-based conflicts and; that decision making between men and women (husband and wife) was more mutual compared to those not in groups because of interventions such as household mentoring and joint visioning.
210. **Youth have been mobilised to participate in some of the projects and have had some benefits** (DLSP, RFSP, PROFIRA, and VODP2). PROFIRA has exceeded youth targets. From a target of 10 per cent for SACCOs and 15 per cent of CSCGs (a total of 194,728 youth), PROFIRA SACCOs achieved 10 per cent youth membership, 43 per cent of membership of new CSCGs, and 34 per cent youth membership of mature CSCGs. The youth participated in value chain training, financial literacy training and business skills development. RFSP reported that about 24 per cent of the beneficiaries were youth¹⁸⁷, while NOPP's design in contrast plans to have 50 per cent youth, with 30 per cent youth to benefit from loan financing for oil palm¹⁸⁸.
211. **Youth may offer labour in value chain production, yet the earlier projects typically had no clear strategy for addressing constraints to youth involvement around labour and land issues.** PRELNOR has been more deliberate in targeting youth.¹⁸⁹ The main gap here is that "exclusively youth groups" have not been well integrated. The CSPE field mission concluded that while projects tried to include youth, the evidence of youth access to assets and influence in IFAD projects was weak. However, in all groups visited during the CSPE mission, it was evident that the projects have adjusted to accommodate the youth within mixed groups, and although age data is collected at group level, there is limited analysis of the status of youth participation beyond the numbers, and data is not aggregated at project level. Evidence of youth influence in decision

¹⁸⁶ Interviews in Kalangala.

¹⁸⁷ RFSP PCR (2014).

¹⁸⁸ NOPP 2017 PDR.

¹⁸⁹ PRELNOR captures youth beneficiaries at three points; a) Youth as household heads for mentoring (VHH) where 21 per cent benefit, way below project targets, b) At farmer group level within mixed groups where 40 per cent participate (aged 18-35 years) and c) through innovative interventions such as the mechanisation and Post-Harvest Handling (PHH) grants where youth are engaged to manage and operate machinery that requires a lot of manpower.

making especially in mixed groups with adults is anecdotal and many of the youth do not hold leadership positions on executive committees of groups.¹⁹⁰

212. **Summary.** The evaluation found a high level of commitment across the portfolio to implement gender interventions in line with the IFAD Policy on GEWE, and relevant Ugandan national policies. Evidence shows positive results in women's access to assets, income generation and leadership roles. However, the interventions have largely concentrated on increasing the numbers of women and youth, and fell short in addressing interests of youth, and systemic gender constraints and power relations that continue to prevent empowerment and transformation of women and youth. While sex-disaggregated data have been collected, most projects fell short on aggregating age data for youth and have not collected project-wide data on gender outcomes. This is partly constrained by insufficient resources and investment in relevant gender actions and limited technical capacity for gender mainstreaming among most PMUs. **GEWE is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

B.4. Environment and Natural Resources Management

213. **ENRM has been a strong and mostly successful theme for the projects that addressed this topic at design**, but especially in VODP2, PRELNOR and ATAAS. Other projects, like PROFIRA and RSFP, were not designed to have an impact on this domain. On the other hand, CAIIP1 was required to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and develop an environmental management plan on the basis of which NEMA concluded that mitigation measures that were implemented largely responded to recommendations. Furthermore, while ENRM was not directly addressed by DLSP, it did ensure that road contractors rehabilitated gravel borrow pits and installed drainage on rehabilitated CARs, although the PCR also noted that trees planted on roadsides were cut and also inferred that the adoption of animal traction led to a reduction in soil degradation.
214. ATAAS and PRELNOR performed very well in this domain and activities have resulted in **improved access to natural resources and a growing empowerment of communities to manage these resources in a sustainable manner**. ATAAS covered 20,930 ha of land with SLM practices and structures, significantly exceeding the target of 11,000 ha. Key outputs featured highlands terracing and rehabilitation of degraded watersheds as a result of adopted practices and structures established by communities, with a final coverage of 3,391ha and 3,337ha (771 and 556 per cent of respective targets).¹⁹¹ Achievements under the SLM were significant to the extent that they impacted not only on yields, but on both beneficiary and non-beneficiary farmer groups, especially in Eastern and Western Uganda.¹⁹²
215. The ATAAS PPE reported other achievements that included the **establishment of a dedicated Environment and Social Safeguards (ESS) function in NARO** to address mainstreaming of environmental issues in all its research activities. Furthermore, MAAIF developed a draft ESS management policy, guidelines and plans for operationalizing the system. The guidelines include an ESS manual; environmental and social risk management procedures including the environmental and social grant screening checklist and risk register template; and management plans for biodiversity, hazardous waste and pests. The CSPE field mission found that DLGs had established dedicated staff to coordinate SLM issues. Furthermore, in addition to the passing of a number of ordinances and bylaws, DLGs also

¹⁹⁰ CSPE Mission Interviews with farmer group leaders indicated that in many groups, youth are represented on the executive committee as members but do not hold substantive positions of authority and their level of contribution to decision making is not clearly spelt out.

¹⁹¹ The technologies selected for promotion and scaling-up were terraces, contour and grass bunds, conservation agriculture (low-till), rehabilitation/reclamation of degraded watersheds, agroforestry woodlots, agronomic/vegetative SLM practices (mulching, intercropping, rotations, integrated nutrient management, grassland improvement, and so on), small-scale irrigation, and water harvesting.

¹⁹² Interviews with MAAIF, NARO and DLG officials during July 2020 mission.

mainstreamed SLM practices into their annual work planning and budgeting processes.

216. Major NRM issues in the PRELNOR target area included increasing variability and uneven distribution of rainfall; soil fertility declines; deforestation; encroachment on wetlands; bushfires; lack of access to inputs and tools for SLM as well as low access to water and sanitation.¹⁹³ **A number of these have been mitigated through actions that include provision of technical and financial support to empower communities to sustainably manage their natural resources.** These activities include development of CBNRM plans, the distribution of rural energy technologies (RETs), testing of SLM practices, the promotion of pit latrines and roads with reforestation and water harvesting incorporated into their designs. Achievements registered through these activities are significant¹⁹⁴ and also include partnership with WOCAT.¹⁹⁵ The project is also working through NARO and the Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International's (CABI) Plantwise programme to conduct demonstrations to farmers on the use of a Fertilizer Optimization Tool, which allows for the optimal application of fertilizers on crops to give the optimal returns within the farmer's economic means and with minimal impact on the environment.
217. Under VODP2, **while evidence on deforestation and changes in carbon stocks is incomplete, preliminary evidence suggests that deforestation rates have decreased.**¹⁹⁶ The VODP2 main actors (the PMU, KOPGT and OPUL) have made efforts to ensure sustainable production of oil palm and there is clearly willingness to ensure continual improvement.¹⁹⁷ Strong concerns from environmental groups about introduction of oil palm has led to extensive environmental assessments to examine loss of biodiversity and land acquisition issues. VODP2 has responded with a series of studies that have examined these issues and led to mitigation and protection measures, and also to an environmental compliance certificate from NEMA in 2015.¹⁹⁸ Recent studies found there to be low impact on land reserved for forest in Kalangala.¹⁹⁹ Efforts to continue the good practice into NOPP have been stated in the NOPP PDR, including compliance with the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil principles.²⁰⁰
218. **Overall ENRM is rated moderately satisfactory (4)** based on the positive achievements of ATAAS, PRELNOR and VODP2, while less evidently effective results have occurred under the other projects.

B.5. Adaptation to Climate Change

219. Significant dependence on agriculture and natural resources, coupled with high rates of poverty and environmental degradation, combined with the country's increasingly strong but still fragile DLG governance structure, leave Uganda

¹⁹³ PDR appendix 12.

¹⁹⁴ According to the MTR, the preparation of CBNRM plans has enabled over 400 communities to gain skills in better NRM practices. A total of 217 CBNRM plans had been funded by MTR and a data monitoring system has been set up to record outcomes and sustainability – although training is still required of extension staff on data collection methodologies. Beneficiaries of the RETs reported that they have led to a reduction of fuelwood use by 50 to 60 per cent thus reducing pressure on woodlots and communal tree cover.

¹⁹⁵ WOCAT complements the project's work in SLM through their local partners, Uganda Land Care, and has identified and documented 34 SLM approaches within the PRELNOR target areas for scale up. Currently, 54 pilot sites are being established to demonstrate some of those approaches (mulching; compost; energy-saving cook stoves; conservation farming basins for soil and water conservation; apiculture; aquaculture; intercropping; agroforestry; fruit growing; cover cropping; reduced tillage; and tree nurseries).

¹⁹⁶ NOPP SECAP Review Note draft for CPMT, IFAD, 2017.

¹⁹⁷ A. Inamdar – Willets (2016) Environmental and Social Audit of VODP2 on Bugala Island, Kalangala, Uganda.

¹⁹⁸ The PMU and IFAD have also piloted real time deforestation monitoring in collaboration with the European Space Agency and the firm Satelligence.

¹⁹⁹ Nangendo, G. Land use changes (1990-2015) in Kalangala and Buvuma districts, southern Uganda in Ssemmanda R. and Opige M.O. (eds.). 2018. Oil palm plantations in forest landscapes: impacts, aspirations and ways forward in Uganda. Wageningen, the Netherlands: Tropenbos International.

²⁰⁰ The Roundtable on Sustainable Oil Palm manages a scheme for Certified Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO), the largest certification scheme which currently covers 17 per cent of global palm oil production and includes 134,000 smallholders. Uganda is not yet included.

vulnerable to climate change impacts. Climate variability and change pose significant challenges in terms of the availability and quality of the country's water resources and pose significant risks to its national food and nutrition security as well as its foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports.

220. **Under the IFAD portfolio, several projects targeted climate change adaptation in varying degrees.** ATAAS which aimed at supporting Government's efforts to reduce risks arising from climate change and land degradation; VODP2 whose oil palm and oil seeds activities are based on rain-fed practices, leaving them vulnerable to climate change risk; PRELNOR whose design recognised that climate change challenges beneficiaries' livelihoods in Northern Uganda and may substantially impact food security and household income; DLSP redesigned access roads to be "all-weather" to mitigate the risk of increased flooding and heavy rains, and PROFIRA which has sensitization programmes with environment modules on protecting natural resources to combat climate change.
221. **A number of climate change adaption achievements were registered though mainly at local scale rather than at national or policy level.** The most significant could be the SLM practices promoted under ATAAS to avert climatic risks to agricultural production, with an estimated sequestration of 1,964,831 tons of carbon with a value of US\$151 million.²⁰¹ NARO also produced a number of drought-resistant varieties and supported 24 MSIPs that in part addressed climate change and adaptation. Furthermore, in collaboration with the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, the Department of Agricultural Extension Services is putting in place an E-weather information system and has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Uganda National Meteorological Agency (UNAMA) to put up 15 weather stations to provide climate information to farmers as supported currently by PRELNOR.
222. Under PRELNOR, other relevant approaches are being introduced that include the introduction of stress-tolerant crop varieties of cassava, maize, beans and rice; dissemination of agroforestry technologies as well as soil and water conservation practices; promotion of RETs such as fuel-saving stoves in households and institutions, offering both mitigation and adaptation benefits; and household income diversification through supporting enterprises such as propagation and selling of seeds. The scale and impact of these measures are yet to be measured though initial results are positive.²⁰²
223. **DLSP improved the resilience and durability of CARs by upgrading them to an all-weather design that incorporated reforestation and water harvesting with the objective of adaptation to climate change and increased resilience.** This has been followed in PRELNOR, though implementation has been affected by increased design and construction costs and challenges in adhering to NEMA guidelines as well as to IFAD's evolving SECAP. The most recent SECAP guidance introduced in 2019 requires new and more stringent compliance measures, however, there have been difficulties in applying the measures retrospectively, for example with the first batch of PRELNOR roads. There are **important issues here related to how SECAP compliance is supported and monitored, as well as how links need to be better forged with national environmental management systems.**²⁰³
224. **There is limited evidence in the rural finance sector regarding climate adaption measures** although under PROFIRA many SACCOs having special loan products for solar energy, some of which were observed during the field mission. VODP2's adaptation to climate change were largely achieved through the

²⁰¹ According to the ICCR, based on an estimated value of a ton of carbon emission (tCO₂e) for 2018 of US\$77 was applied using the Ex-Ante carbon-balance tool.

²⁰² Interviews and ASAP review mission report, June 2019.

²⁰³ Interviews with IFAD, PRELNOR MTR team and staff.

introduction of improved seed varieties that mature faster and are more drought tolerant, as well as conducting demonstrations of better soil and water management.²⁰⁴ Under oil palm, the project promoted the planting of leguminous cover crop, front stacking, implement circle weeding, zero-tillage, zero burning and forest protection through boundary roads.²⁰⁵ The July 2020 mission observed significant achievement in most of these activities and believes they will conspicuously contribute to adaptation and resilience objectives of the said projects.

225. **Overall, adaptation to climate change is rated moderately satisfactory (4)** based on the positive results achieved at local level, while acknowledging that measures with greater scale will be required, as well as stronger links to NEMA and the Ministry of Environment, if IFAD's investments are to effectively address this major concern in the future, especially given that NOSP and NOPP are Category A projects.

C. Overall portfolio achievement

226. IFAD's portfolio has been built around a highly relevant set of COSOP objectives and has been effectively sequenced such that the more recent interventions have built on earlier projects using their experience, lessons and staff. **At the same time, IFAD has moved away from broad community-based engagement towards a more focused value chain approach.** This has proved effective in bringing greater geographical coherence and private sector participation. The sustained support for vegetable oil production and rural finance have led to positive economic returns while building notable partnerships with the private sector. The limited levels of development partner funding have been well compensated by growing private sector investment. Targeting has been well addressed, except for youth where more specific interventions could have been conceived and integrated.
227. **The shift to value chain support has allowed IFAD to build private sector partnerships and raise farmer incomes substantially, however the level of beneficiary outreach has declined and the cost per beneficiary has risen** substantially as result of this shift. This has been partly offset by the continued inclusion of access roads from the start of CSPE period through to the new round of projects and also the reach of the inclusive rural finance investments.
228. **Incomes and assets have risen for project beneficiaries which is an important result in the context of an agricultural sector showing low growth over the past decade.** Rising domestic vegetable oil production in particular has been a key strategic success of the portfolio given the heavy reliance on imported oil. Improving crop production and household food security have also shown generally broad improvement although the surveys underpinning these changes have not clearly attributed the results to IFAD's investments.
229. **Efficiency has been challenged by delayed implementation, slow procurement and some financial irregularities, though positive economic returns were obtained.** Project extensions have enabled the achievement of full loan disbursement and re-designs have helped improve resource use in light of changing circumstances. Project operations have been dramatically affected in the past nine months by the COVID-19 pandemic.
230. The portfolio has supported innovations that were developed under the previous COSOP and while it has adapted some of them further, there have been **limited examples of new innovations and some opportunities missed.** Scaling up has occurred to some extent for value chains, household mentoring and technology development. **For gender and youth the focus has been on improving**

²⁰⁴ The oil palm component experienced water deficits between design and MTR of up to 350mm, caused by poor rainfall distribution in 2011. This was significant considering that in general, for every 100 mm of water deficit, there is a yield drop of 10 per cent (MTR paras 16 and 17).

²⁰⁵ Supervision Mission Report Sept 2019).

participation rather than addressing more systemic constraints.

Environment and climate change has been addressed by part of the portfolio well, especially in relation to sustainable aspects of agricultural productivity, though interventions have been mainly at local level, while these topics were less in evidence in others.

231. **Overall project achievement is rated 4 (moderately satisfactory)** which is consistent with those of individual projects except ATAAS (Annex II).

Table 10.

Assessment of Project Portfolio Achievement

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>CSPE rating</i>
Rural Poverty Impact	4
Project Performance	4
Relevance	5
Effectiveness	4
Efficiency	3
Sustainability of benefits	4
Other Performance Criteria	
Innovation	3
Scaling up	4
Gender equality and women empowerment	4
Environment and natural resources management	4
Adaption to climate change	4
Overall project portfolio achievement	4

Key points

- Project designs have been well aligned with national and IFAD policies in particular around addressing regional poverty dimensions and growing value chain approaches though pro-poor aspects like land and youth could have been better addressed.
- Outreach has been strong with good technology adoption and take up of inclusive finance. Service delivery has been affected by reforms to extension and the role of OWC and most recently the COVID pandemic.
- Efficiency has been good in terms of disbursements, project management costs, project sequencing and rates of return, but at the same time affected by unnecessary procurement delays, staffing gaps and financial mismanagement weaknesses.
- Though there are concerns over the robustness of impact survey data, beneficiaries generally show higher incomes, assets, food security and productivity. Grassroots production and credit-based groups have been strengthened. Policy impacts have been generally limited aside from micro finance.
- With growing profitability and productivity farmers should be able to sustain their incomes especially in vegetable oil, while better designed roads will provide access for longer and many credit groups are diversifying and viable. Much depends on the ability of local government to expand support as well as on farmers' willingness to pay for private advisory services.
- Efforts at innovation and scaling up have been fairly modest and mainly built on the successes of predecessor projects such as with mentoring and value chains.
- Gender and youth have been addressed through increasing numbers without addressing their underlying constraints. Mentoring and GALS have been valuable but on a relatively modest scale due to their intensive nature.
- ENRM and CC has been addressed unevenly, though positive results occurred at local level.

IV. Assessment of non-lending activities

232. The term "non-lending activities" refers to actions supported by IFAD that are not organized directly under the investment projects but are instrumental to enhance the programme's development effectiveness. The assessment covers knowledge management, partnership building and country-level policy engagement as well as a sample of grants that covered Uganda. The lines between the activities under investment financing and "non-lending activities" are not always clear-cut. Investment projects often finance activities relating to knowledge management or policy engagement with broader implications beyond the specific projects. As such, this section also discusses activities under the investment projects where appropriate.
233. According to the 2013 COSOP, non-lending activities would have the aim of enhancing the country programme coherence, including the production of evidence from projects to inform policy decision-making. The Country Director (CD) was to lead non-lending activities and play a key role in promoting synergies and complementarities among the projects with the Uganda COSOP Team serving as a forum for strategic discussion of policy issues, lessons and best practices. The Country Programme Management Team (CPMT) consisting of key project management staff would provide a forum for cross-learning and exchange among the projects.
234. **Over the COSOP period, fluctuations in the ICO staffing has had implications on IFAD's capacity to engage in portfolio management and non-lending activities.** The main changes were the move of the CD from headquarters to the ICO in Kampala in 2014 and then to the regional hub in Nairobi in 2018, and the decision to no longer fund a KM Officer from 2016. The efficient use of a small country team noted in the 2013 CPE continues with the supervision of projects divided among the CD who covers the value chain projects, the CPO who covers the community development and decentralization projects and the programme officer recruited to administer the EU grant SMADF (Uganda Yield Fund) covering rural finance. The other project officer recruited for the EU grant covers financial management across the country programme. However, **this efficient division limits the knowledge exchange across the country programme so that it is a portfolio of value chain, community development and rural finance projects that lacks an overall country programme approach or exchanges on non-lending activities.** Finally, while the 2013 CPE commended the IFAD country programme in Uganda for allocating budgetary resources for non-lending activities, these resources have declined precipitously from 2016 until 2020 without the compensatory staff time resources (see Chapter V.A.3 paras. 283-286).

A. Knowledge management

235. **The 2013 COSOP implies a knowledge management strategy that draws on project-level Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems and structures to promote learning among projects and provide inputs for policy dialogue.** Based on the 2013 COSOP, knowledge management (KM) was to be mainstreamed into the country programmes to: facilitate cross-programme and peer-to-peer learning and exchange; document lessons and good practices; and provide inputs for pro-poor policy dialogue. The instruments would be the COSOP results framework and project monitoring systems; project level KM strategies and capacities; the Uganda COSOP team and CPMT.
236. **The COSOP'S implicit KM strategy lacked a stable architecture and resources for consistent implementation.** While the 2013 CPE mentions a communications strategy since 2008, it was not apparent during this evaluation and no country-level KM strategy was prepared during the COSOP period. The

limited resources and attention to KM noted by the 2013 CPE was initially remedied in 2011 with the appointment of a consultant in the ICO as the KM Officer. However, after her departure in 2015, resources for KM and communications declined precipitously and consistently until 2020. Non-staff resources for knowledge management and communications declined from US\$38,553 in 2013, to US\$6,075 in 2017 and was zero by 2020. The regional KM architecture also fluctuated in this period with the abolishment of the P4 regional KM officer position in the ESA division at headquarters in 2013 resulting in the Uganda KM officer also covering KM regionally. After her departure, the KM Officer was not replaced in the ICO or regionally. In 2020, a KM focal point was appointed in the sub-regional office in Nairobi from the Production, Markets and Inputs division.

237. **The ICO-based KM Officer primarily promoted KM activities at the project level.** Originally working for SNV to implement a regional KM grant to promote market access, she worked with VODP1 in 2010 to improve communications by documenting results from the field. Due to the reputational risks associated with oil palm, this KM officer was initially recruited as a consultant to support communications in VODP1 to utilize project data and present results to journalists and other partners in order to address environmental issues surrounding oil palm. These KM and communications activities proved effective in addressing negative media relating to environmental issues associated to oil palm production. In 2011, as KM Officer in the ICO, she continued to pursue an approach of drawing evidence from the projects, organizing knowledge exchange among project stakeholders, and presenting the knowledge to policy makers. Through this approach, PROFIRA also provided inputs relating to the COSOP objective to promote Tier IV regulations. The officer also leveraged regional grants that offered KM opportunities for the projects and training for the project staff (e.g. learning route approach).
238. **Despite the lack of a documented KM strategy and declining resources at the country level, KM practices at project level continued.** IFAD projects developed under the 2013 COSOP were all follow-up projects and in many cases project staff also continued. From 2011 to 2015, the KM Officer promoted in all projects a KM strategy and appointment of KM Officer/focal points. In most cases, the KM focal point was also the M&E Officer. These focal points received training on KM by the officer and through the various regional grants on KM that she leveraged for the country programme. The continuity among the sequential projects meant that training done in the early 2013-2016 of project staff resulted in continued KM practices and focal points in later projects.
239. **Continuity over various project cycles also contributed to the transferral of lessons learnt, especially among the more recent projects.** The sequencing of projects provides reiterated learning opportunities and tangible evidence for adjustments if needed. Many lessons learned were transferred from VODP 1/2 to successor projects NOPP and NOSP, and between RFSP and PROFIRA, albeit few through formal KM channels. A cross-programme lesson learned from RFSP integrated into VODP 2 (and later NOSP and NOPP) was to adopt a CSCG approach to smallholder finance after its failure to establish a guarantee fund for securing loans from formal financial institutions. However, the older DLSP did not incorporate lessons learnt from other IFAD projects in matters of land tenure.
240. **While cross-programme and peer-to-peer learning and exchanges were notable, applied pro-poor policy dialogue was more limited.** The approach to strengthen M&E and use monitoring systems to derive data for communications and lessons leading to policy engagement is evident only for PROFIRA and VODP2. Lessons from VODP's 4P approach were adopted in Government's ASSP (2015/16 – 2019/20) and used as a basis for developing the agriculture sector value chains strategy under the ASSP 2020/21 – 2024/25 and the NDP3. Lessons from VODP2 were adopted in the design of the National Agriculture Extension Policy (2018) and

the draft Agriculture Finance and Insurance Policy. PROFIRA also utilized its M&E and KM to contribute to the Government national policy agenda by drafting SACCO/CSCG guidelines and strategy paper.

241. **For most projects, the focus of KM has remained on communication rather than strengthening M&E systems and drawing from them for KM and policy dialogue with government.** One of the weak areas was the failure to use KM and M&E outputs and successes to influence and engage other stakeholders such as donors beyond IFAD projects. The ICO attributed this to a lack of adequate financial and human resources at country level to conduct studies and convene wide stakeholder fora to share lessons and experiences. The time needed to develop KM products was also an issue since it requires a person with the right capabilities to harness and build the approach - another indication of low capacity.
242. **The contribution of grant-funded KM activities varied depending on the strength of their linkages with the lending programme.** The KM activities in four grants had an important influence on the country programme (Public-private-producer partnerships [4Ps], OSSUP, SLM). For example, the 4Ps grant achieved the planned knowledge development and learning activities outlined in the project KM strategies. Knowledge products comprised in-depth case studies, analysis papers and guidelines for practitioners. The OSSUP grant's KM activities helped to address information asymmetries among value chain stakeholders. The grant on scaling-up SLM practices strongly contributed to KM through the capacity building of PRELNOR staff and extension workers and the development of the national SLM database. **While evidence is limited on learning from earlier grants and projects, the mainstreaming of household methodologies provides a positive example shown in** Box 4.

Box 4

Household methodologies in Uganda country programme

DLSP benefitted from a small IFAD grant on household methodologies (Gender Justice in Pro-Poor Value Chain Development, 2009-2011) given to Oxfam Novib to develop the GALS methodology in Western Uganda. The project was already implementing household mentoring to engage with poorer households and then district-level project implementers were trained on how to blend GALS into household mentoring. After an impact assessment of the small IFAD grant, the approach was rolled out by Oxfam Novib with local partners in Uganda linked to NAADS, DLSP and VODP2 (as well as in Rwanda and Nigeria) with the support of a large IFAD grant (Community-led value chain development for gender justice and pro-poor wealth creation, 2011 to 2014). During this period, the IFAD gender team from the former Policy and Technical Advisory division organised a write shop in Uganda, which contributed to the IFAD toolkit on household methodologies, used to promote the approach throughout the Fund's wider loan portfolio. Within Uganda, cross-project learning, supported by IFAD grant-funded learning routes by the Regional organisation to scale up innovations (PROCASUR) as well as project staff now "specialised" in household methodologies, has contributed to mainstreaming household mentoring and GALS into subsequent loan programmes - PRELNOR, PROFIRA, VODP2, NOPP and NOSP.

Sources: HHM stock-take; Community-led value chain development for gender justice and pro-poor wealth creation, Grant Results Sheet, 2017.

243. **The Uganda Yield Fund provides substantial knowledge and lessons learned related to rural pro poor private sector and financial sector development.** The Fund's ability to attract US\$20.4 million is 'proof of concept' for a single country, single-sector impact investment fund in Uganda, given an appropriately structured fund.²⁰⁶ The Yield Fund experience encouraged the formation of IFAD's ABC fund and provided knowledge more generally to growing interest in IFAD of supporting non-programme financial investments. While the Yield Fund attracts considerable media attention and has participated in numerous

²⁰⁶ In particular, the first loss structure, which would have the European Union absorbing the first US\$10 million in losses before affecting other investor. Interview IFAD staff.

and important fora, it has not had an internal programme to support a systemic means of capturing and disseminating lessons learned, investee experiences and development outcomes. This would be valuable to donors and farmer institutions in Uganda, regionally, and internationally, as well as existing and potential future funds.

244. **Summary.** Knowledge management efforts have been uneven over the 2013 COSOP period. Earlier projects designed under the previous COSOP show little evidence of KM. The KM officer in the ICO strengthened the KM architecture within the projects designed under the 2013 COSOP and successfully promoted an approach of capturing data for communication. Grants linked to projects and sequential project designs has enabled learning from past projects and continued KM practices among project staff, despite a steep decline in KM resources. However, KM at the country level and in terms of non-lending was limited by the overall weak KM architecture including *inter alia* the discontinuation of a KM officer in the ICO and lack of a KM strategy. **Overall, KM is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3).**

B. Partnership-building

245. The 2013 COSOP defined government, rural organizations, the private sector and development partners as IFAD's key partners. Within government, MOFPED, MOLG and MAAIF were to continue to be principal partners while building a partnership with NEMA and the Ministry of Water and Environment. Rural organizations were to be given a more prominent role under the 2013 COSOP and their representatives would be members of the Uganda CPMT and steering groups for the design and oversight of IFAD-supported projects. Private sector partnership would continue to develop solid Public-private partnerships (PPPs) especially in vegetable oil sector and also expand in other value chains. MSPs would be supported as forums for coordination and dialogue among value chain stakeholders.
246. Limited staffing in the ICO made partnership-building at the country level (beyond projects) challenging, especially with the Country Director in Nairobi. With the CD based in Kampala from 2014-18, there was another full-time ICO-based staff resulting in more efficient management of tasks. The situation has deteriorated with the relocation of the CD to Nairobi. Partnerships are developed over time with regular interactions, including informal meetings. Often, IFAD does not participate in official events as the staff are engaged in supervision missions. The ICO also faces protocol challenges when only heads of agencies are invited. While international donors note that the CD visits when she is in Kampala, it is difficult to develop the relationship further on this ad hoc basis. For example, WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) representatives based in Kampala have engaged in strategic planning meetings and supervision missions in districts where they have complementary activities – agricultural production (FAO) and post-harvesting and marketing (WFP) – resulting in strong bilateral RBA collaboration. IFAD is not part of this strategic RBA collaboration due to its overstretched staff as well as engagement in different districts and activities.
247. **IFAD is a respected partner in the agriculture development partners group.** IFAD primarily engages with international donors through sector working groups such as the agriculture sector working group and the now defunct microfinance partners group. IFAD's participation in these groups is detailed further under country-level policy engagement. UN and bilateral partners interviewed had limited knowledge of IFAD's work and approaches though they recognized the CPO as highly knowledgeable and adding value to discussions when he is able to join.
248. **IFAD's government partnership was mainly cultivated through its lending portfolio.** IFAD's partnership with government is strongly associated with their respective investment projects: MOFPED with RFSP and PROFIRA; MOLG with CAIIP1, DSLP and PRELNOR, and NOSP; and MAAIF with ATAAS, VODP2, NOPP and

NOSP. IFAD also began developing a partnership with NEMA through PRELNOR's issue with compliance with national as well as SECAP guidelines. IFAD and government as partners in the lending portfolio is detailed under that section.

249. **Public and civil society sector partners in PRELNOR were primarily for project implementation.** These include Local Governments, District Farmers Associations (DFAs), the Uganda National Meteorological Authority and UNFFE with funding support through the large ASAP grant. While UNFFE was requested to assist FO engagement at district level, there is no evidence of their representatives sitting in steering committees or engaging in the Uganda CPMT. PRELNOR has also collaborated with WOCAT on sustainable land management. Overall, this partnership has worked well to link extension, with use of improved varieties plus enabling farmers to access weather information. The project also worked with Biodiversity International to provide training of trainers on improved family nutrition. The project has been **less proactive in developing collaboration with donor initiatives in the same geographic area or the private sector with the exception of the MSPs.** These have enabled different stakeholders including representatives of farmers, agro-input dealers, traders, transporters and local governments to work together in identification of sites for markets and discussions on management arrangements.
250. **In the oilseeds subsector and concerning value chain development, the country programme developed a strategic partnership with SNV through the grants on OSSUP and 4Ps, both closely tied to VODP2.** SNV proved a productive and cooperative partner with relevant experience in the oilseeds sub-sector, inclusive agriculture value chain development, developing market-based solutions and collaborating in PPP settings both with the public sector - to address systemic market constraints and inequities - as well as with the private sector - to successfully build sustainable smallholder supply chains.²⁰⁷ The grant work also benefitted from SNV's sharing and cross-fertilization of experiences between local and national stakeholders across the region. However, there are questions over how FOs will continue to engage now the grant has ended (see para. 172).
251. The Regional East African Community Trade in Staples (REACTS) grant through the Kilimo Trust drew on its long-term strategy and experience in improving trade in the agricultural sector and food security. It is among very few home-grown and independent regional development organizations working on agriculture for development across the EAC region. **However, its few interactions with VODP2 limited the strength of the partnership forged between Kilimo Trust and the country programme.**
252. **Oxfam Novib has proven a complementary partner for IFAD, through its direct interactions with communities and households, to implement GALS in rural communities.** Between 2009 and 2020, IFAD awarded three grants to Oxfam Novib to roll-out and scale-up GALS in Uganda and other countries in Africa and, most recently, throughout IFAD operations. . Oxfam Novib also brought significant technical expertise to the IFAD-funded grants thanks to its broader work on GALS under the Women's Empowerment Mainstreaming and Networking programme (2008 to 2020) operating in Africa and Asia.²⁰⁸ Their closeness to rural communities helps to build trust, which is essential to bring about behaviour change. However, recent projects have not fully utilised Oxfam Novib's technical expertise due to limitations in the structure of the IFAD grant and financing disconnect between the grant deliverables and gender financing of the IFAD projects.

²⁰⁷ Note that SNV Uganda was one of OSSUP's founders in 2007, alongside Makerere University and Wageningen University and Research Center.

²⁰⁸ Unpublished internal partnership story (April 2018) on IFAD and Oxfam Novib, and interviews with former Programme Manager at Oxfam Novib and former IFAD staff, Senior Technical Specialist on Gender and Social Equity and the manager of the past IFAD grants to Oxfam Novib.

253. **In the rural finance sector, the grant embedded in PROFIRA to support UCSU to become a sustainable apex institution, strengthened the country programme's partnership with the Canadian Credit Association (CCA) and the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU).** This was an appropriate choice given their internationally recognized quality of service to financial cooperatives and apex organizations, experience with grant-based technical assistance contracts, and activities in Uganda and the region. The organizations demonstrated capacity to recruit highly qualified staff to mentor UCSCU management and to provide short-term TA assignments (including some volunteer retired executives).
254. Also in the rural finance sector, grants contributed to strengthening partnerships between IFAD and African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA)²⁰⁹, PostBank Uganda and Posta Uganda. However, the limited linkages between the grants on Rural finance KM partnership III and Scaling-up remittances partnerships and the loan programmes, reduced the potential of strategic partnerships between these organizations and the country programme in Uganda. **This was a missed opportunity given the relevance of these institutions to the country programme.**
255. **The Uganda Yield Fund through the partnership with the EU has created a new network of partners for IFAD both within and beyond its traditional sovereign debt programme funder, government, and NGOs network. However, linkages with the lending portfolio have been limited.** The partnerships developed by the Yield Fund is helping IFAD learn the language of venture and equity investment, opening investment and capital leveraging opportunities in Uganda and other markets (e.g. through participation in the East Africa Venture Capital Association). Within Uganda, the Fund will start an Investee Company Networking Platform for investees to share and compare experiences, which would help the Fund in its management support to investees and importantly, better understand other potential investees. The partnership with KMPG will also expose IFAD and their partners to insights on enterprise due diligence and business development. Such information will be highly valuable particularly as IFAD's value chain development includes supporting small and medium sized enterprise and finance activities. Increasing IFAD's equity/ venture financing competency in Uganda provides a notable knowledge management opportunity supporting both investment activities in Uganda, the region and elsewhere as a means to better understand how financing can benefit smallholders and poor households through agricultural enterprise and value chain finance.²¹⁰
256. **Summary.** Partnership building is constrained by the reduced staffing in the ICO – particularly the relocation of the CD to Nairobi. At the country programme level, the CPO primarily engages international development partners through the agriculture development partners group. There were no significant partnerships among them as evidenced by the overall limited co-financing in projects designed under the 2013 COSOP. Partnership with Government, rural organization and the private sector are primarily cultivated through the projects with strong support from country-specific grants. These grants fostered partnerships between the country programme and the projects with their respective recipients including SNV, Oxfam Novib, CCA, and WOCCU. **Partnership building is rated as moderately satisfactory (4).**

C. Country-level Policy engagement

257. The 2013 COSOP aimed to engage in policy dialogue with Government to “keep pro-poor concerns high on the policy agenda” and “IFAD-supported projects were

²⁰⁹ AFRACA is a regional association of financial and non-financial institutions that promotes rural and agricultural finance in Africa through policy work and supporting members to provide sustainable quality financial services mainly to poorer communities.

²¹⁰ Interview European Union Delegation to the Republic of Uganda.

to serve as vehicles for learning and identifying key policy issues to be addressed for broad-based rural economic growth.” Engagement in policy dialogue would entail: (i) production of evidence from projects to inform policy decision-making; (ii) active participation in the relevant sector working groups; (iii) capacity-building of partner government agencies (e.g. MOPED and MAIIF) to formulate pro-poor policies; and (iv) support for rural organizations (e.g. UNFFE, UCA, and UCSCU) to effectively promote their own policy agenda.

258. **The 2013 COSOP’s policy focus provided both a *general* strategic direction for keeping pro-poor concerns high on the policy agenda, and *specific* direction** for engaging the Government on the oil palm subsector to ensure a sustainable institutional framework for smallholder growers’ organization (see Box 5) and in rural inclusive finance development. In contrast, the previous 2004 COSOP’s broad policy focus on conducive and supportive legislative frameworks for sustainable pro-poor policy development largely targeted issues important to poverty alleviation but not directly related to interventions in VODP 1, 2 or RFSP design, save for the importance of agriculture enterprise investment policy.²¹¹

Box 5

Oilseeds Subsector Platform grant

The OSSUP grant was instrumental in supporting VODP 2 oilseed sector development and was able to aggregate vegetable oil subsector interests at the national level. It also specifically supported the quality declared seed policy, which aims to increase the quality of and speed at which oil seeds for planting are brought to market. The OSSUP grant focused on activities and operations in the oil seed hubs rather than on strategy and policy issues, so the planned evidence-based documents to influence policy were largely unachieved. However, the Government was interested in the high-level issues being discussed in the annual national MSPs in Kampala, resulting in the issuance of a Seed Declaration in November 2012 that improved the timely access by oilseed farmers to quality seeds (already mentioned above). Another key issue raised at the MSPs was the need to strengthen standards and the quality of vegetable oil. This resulted in the decentralisation of laboratories for testing by the Uganda National Bureau of Standards. It now takes relatively less time to test samples, thereby making certification of unrefined vegetable oil (known as Virgin Oil) easier.

Sources: ICO self-assessment and interviews.

259. **Under the 2013 COSOP, IFAD has primarily pursued a strategy of policy engagement through the lending program with mixed results.** While institutional change and policy dialogue through the projects are assessed under rural poverty impact, impacts at the country level are presented under this criterion according to the 2013 COSOP’s four policy dialogue objectives in Table 11.

Table 11.

COSOP 2013 proposed areas for engagement

<i>Indicated areas/issues for policy engagement</i>	<i>CSPE comments linkage/dialogue</i>
Reorientation of NAADS from distribution of subsidized agricultural inputs to provision of relevant pro-poor advisory services	Not Achieved. There is little indication that NAADS has been reoriented – its main functions as stated on its website and following interviews with MAAIF staff is to procure a wide range of inputs covering crops and livestock as well as agro-processing equipment related to specified value chains. The latest newsletter (June 2020) highlights tea, coffee, pineapples, citrus and fish farming. NAADS staff have been side-lined from the development of the public extension system (under the Single Spine Extension (SSE) system). NAADS was left as a parallel system, and after the new extension policy was introduced in 2013/14, public extension delivery was moved to MAAIF under the Department of Extension.

²¹¹ Uganda Country Opportunities and Strategy Programme, 2013, paragraph 50.

Support for the establishment of smallholder oil palm growers' organizations that are financially sustainable.	Partly achieved. VODP1 established KOPGA ²¹² to represent farmers' interests and VODP2 was designed to strengthen the association and to take over some of the functions of KOPGT. Nearing the end of implementation, farmers and the management of KOPGA realised the legal framework of the association was inadequate to be a member-owned and managed organization that could carry out some of KOPGT's functions. Farmer representatives of oil palm growing blocks and units therefore established Ssesse Oil Palm Growers Cooperative (SOPGCO) and registered it as a cooperative. VODP2 engaged UCA to strengthen SOPGCO as an institution, but at completion, this was still work in progress. Demarcation of roles and responsibilities between KOPGT and SOPGCO also still needs to take place. ²¹³ However, there is evidence that SOPGCO is becoming active. ²¹⁴
Establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for fourth-tier institutions (including SACCOs) and a conducive policy framework for savings and credit groups.	Achieved. PROFIRA achieved its objectives to support the passing of Tier IV legislation and set up UMRA for SACCO regulation. The Act was passed in 2016 and UMRA is now functional and fully staffed. However, developments beyond the control of the country programme have altered the original UMRA regulatory plan. Although UMRA has started regulating moneylenders and MFIs, an amendment of the Cooperatives Act, ascended in November 2019, now includes MTIC as a 3rd regulator of SACCOs in addition to the BoU and UMRA. It is expected that BoU will regulate the 40 biggest SACCOs, UMRA about 120 SACCOs and MTIC 1700 SACCOs. IFAD, along with other donors, but principally the World Bank, has continued to engage in a stakeholder-working group finalize these regulations. ²¹⁵
Support to the Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union	Partly achieved. This loosely formulated objective was given a clear direction through the design of PROFIRA that aimed to develop a sustainable SACCO Union. PROFIRA collaborated with the CCA ²¹⁶ and the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) through a grant to bring this about. The CCA provided performance linked grants coupled with technical assistance to UCSCU to establish key policies, procedures and the strategic plan as well as to provide training and capacity building of the board and staff members. A new revitalised and streamlined board in 2018 improved the institution's operational efficiency. UCSCU was also able to improve its image in the SACCO sector in policy discussions. However, operational self-sufficiency was 79 per cent in March 2020, below the target of 100 per cent. Achievements in active membership, savings and loans are also below UCSCU's own targets. Operational self-sufficiency has dropped from 85 per cent in 2019 due to extensive yet expensive consultations and lobbying efforts that are important for the sector's development. ²¹⁷

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

260. **IFAD's ability to engage in country-level policy engagement has been constrained by limited country presence.** Government and international partners agreed that policy dialogue in Uganda requires the country presence of the Country Director. Many bilateral and multilateral development agencies have a strong presence in Uganda for policy dialogue including the World Bank, FAO, WFP, the EU, and the US Agency for international development (USAID). Policy advisers (e.g. USAID) and specialized technical staff are available often sitting in MAIFF (e.g. FAO) to provide policy advice and produce studies and the data needed to support policy decisions. Government officials indicated the importance of technical knowledge and availability for policy dialogue with international partners. However, Government as well as international partners across the board noted the limited availability of IFAD staff for the daily or impromptu engagement required for effective policy dialogue.
261. **With limited technical capacities, IFAD's country-level policy engagement is primarily through sectoral partner groups.** IFAD does not singly engage in policy dialogue with Government about specific policy issues but engages through the established systems and structures in Uganda, i.e. through sector working groups in the specific areas. At the start of the COSOP period, IFAD was an active member of the Microfinance Sector Group. However, Government's shift towards more interventionist policies in microfinance and the relative maturity of the sector, resulted in most international donors withdrawing support for the sector. As a

²¹² Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association.

²¹³ VODP2 PCR 2020.

²¹⁴ Evidence from CSPE field mission.

²¹⁵ PROFIRA supervision mission report November 2019.

²¹⁶ Now the Cooperative Development Foundation.

²¹⁷ PROFIRA Supervision mission report May 2020.

result, the groups dissipated and IFAD was left as one of the only international donors in the sector.

262. **The ICO continues to participate actively in the agricultural development partners' group that IFAD chaired in 2018.** Through this group, the ICO participates annually in reviews of the budget framework paper for the agricultural sector. The ICO also participates in sector strategic policy development and reviews (i.e. NDP and ASSP). However, the demands of direct supervision of the projects makes it challenging for IFAD to attend the meetings, particularly when the CD position was moved to Nairobi. International partners value IFAD participation in the group and the strong institutional knowledge of the IFAD Country Officer.
263. Lacking a strategy for policy dialogue, any engagement by other IFAD technical staff is dependent on the interest of the officer as well as availability of budget for such dialogue. For example, the IFAD Lead Land Tenure Specialist through supervision of VODP further engaged and developed dialogue with local NGOs. While potentially other IFAD staff from ECG or THE Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division of IFAD (PMI) could engage in policy dialogue in Uganda, they mainly come for project supervision and do not engage with the country programme as a whole or participate in meetings with government or other partners. Consequently, IFAD staff from other technical divisions have not been mobilized to engage effectively in policy dialogue. With the new sub-regional hubs this may change and the recently recruited regional offices may have a greater sense of ownership for country-level policy results.
264. **Work has commenced with the Government on the development of an oil palm policy as other private sector players begin to enter the sector to grow oil palm.** VODP2 and the ICO had frequent interactions with government, including informal and knowledge management exchanges through the 4P grant, which was notably relevant to the COSOP goals. Establishing sustainable MSPs in NOSP and the Uganda Oil Palm Growers Trust (UOPGT) in NOPP is meant to build on loan and grant based policy engagements in both subsectors as their value chains mature.
265. **During RFSP (2003 – 2013) there was a vibrant Microfinance Donors Group and numerous programmes helping to build the inclusive finance sector in which the ICO was an active participant.** Successful good practice regulatory policy and regulation was encouraged through this group, donor programmes, and other means and contributed to the 2016 passage of the Microfinance Money Laundering Act (MMLA). Regulations related to the Act were articulated for the primarily urban focused Tier I and III institutions soon after its passage. Rural inclusive finance was seen as the purview of IFAD via support for Tier IV organizations including SACCOs and CSCGs, the regulatory regime for which has yet to be passed. Through the ICO, IFAD, along with other donors, but principally the World Bank, continues to push for the finalizing of these regulations but within the context of broader financial sector reform/development. Despite IFAD's active engagement, the Government worked closely with the World Bank on financial reform issues, including microfinance.
266. **Summary.** The small size of the ICO, the current absence of a resident CD, and the attention required to manage the country programme's large, complex value chain projects, has constrained ICO staff's policy work. Cognizant of this constraint, the 2013 COSOP, envisioned policy dialogue primarily through the projects and relevant sector working groups. The policy objective related to rural finance regulation was achieved, whereas that relating to extension was not achieved and those relating to supporting rural institutions were partly achieved. Country-level policy engagement based on drawing evidence from project to inform policy decision-making was evident in the rural finance projects and VODP2. However, capacity building of government agencies to formulate pro-poor policies and

supporting rural organizations to promote their own policy agenda were not apparent. **Country-level policy engagement is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

D. Grants

267. **The 2013 COSOP did not give importance to the use of grants for the country strategy and programme.** Regarding non-lending, it implicitly refers to the use of two grants to support the 2013-2018 country programme in specific policy dialogue and partnership building activities. Concerning the lending programme, the COSOP refers to an ASAP grant of US\$10 million to co-finance PRELNOR. Reference to grants is otherwise limited to how old grants supported past activities such as CSCGs and VSLAs.
268. **In spite of this, the CSPE has identified 50 grants funded and/or supervised by IFAD that are linked to Uganda indicating an opportunistic approach.** A detailed analysis of the sample of seven grants analysed for this CSPE is found in the online Appendix IV. Although many of the thematic issues dealt with by the grants²¹⁸ broadly align with the COSOP strategic objectives, they cover a rather broad spectrum. This indicates more of a supply-driven approach to grant selection and suggests that there is scope for a more strategic approach ensuring relevance to the country programme – in line with recent findings by ESA in the draft 2019 Grants Strategy. **The ability of the country programme to link to these grants and benefit from them has been limited, except for a relatively small number of cases.** Such cases are mentioned in the relevant non-lending sections above.
269. **The extent to which these grants were embedded into loan programmes had a direct bearing on their relevance and contribution to the country programme.** At one end of the scale, the country-specific OSSUP grant and grant to develop a sustainable SACCO Union were sub-components in VODP2 and PROFIRA, respectively, and integral to project theory of changes and the expected project outcomes and impacts. The global/regional grants on 4Ps and to scale-up SLM practices were not embedded into loan programmes but focused activities on the same target areas of projects (VODP2 and PRELNOR, respectively) and worked closely with, and trained, project staff and implementing agencies/extension workers. It is also notable that IFAD supervised all four of these grants (with results presented in supervision mission reports) – reflecting the importance given to them for the performance of the loan programmes.
270. **Given the limited resources in the ICO for non-lending activities, the country programme would have benefitted from more grants putting the main emphasis on supporting non-lending activities.** The couple of grants that specifically promoted learning and supported non-lending activities²¹⁹ across projects and at country level were reported as effective.²²⁰ Most grant recipients (62 per cent) were based wholly or in part in Uganda or another developing country, and were set to benefit from a degree of institutional strengthening and/or capacity development. Yet, the potential immediate benefits gained by this for IFAD's ultimate target group are diminished by the relative lack of linkages between many of the grants and the country programme.
271. **The use of different grant instruments has largely been relevant for the country programme, providing linkages between loans and grants were made.** IFAD-funded grants predominantly consisted of global/regional grants, which enable grant projects to look beyond national boundaries and learn across

²¹⁸ Including, value chain development, public-private-producer partnerships, inclusive rural finance, remittances, extension services, apex organizations, farmers' organizations, agricultural productivity, genetic breeding and diversity, climate change adaptation, sustainable land management, land, gender, youth, nutrition and livestock.

²¹⁹ ROUTESA grant with PROCASUR on learning routes (2011 – 2014), IFAD Africa Knowledge Network phase II with PICO Knowledge Net on knowledge management and learning (2012 – 2014).

²²⁰ ICO self-assessment, 2020; Interview with IFAD staff; COSOP Results Review 2018.

countries. For example, the use of different country circumstances, different value chain arrangements and different commodities helped to inform the piloted 4P brokering approach. Four of the sample of seven grants analysed were global/regional of which two were effective (4Ps, SLM) due to their strong relevance and linkage with loans. The country-specific nature of the OSSUP grant and grant to develop a sustainable SACCO Union meant that support could focus on precise context-specific issues prevailing in priority areas identified in the COSOP.²²¹

272. In contrast, the country-specific grant on Scaling-up remittances is being implemented separately from the loan programmes and supervised by FFRs based in IFAD. The FFR sought potential synergies but grant design lacked formal linkages so interactions are largely informal and limited to informing the ICO about the progress of the project and inviting its staff on monitoring missions.²²² This grant is also representative of a subset of grants related to the country portfolio that have leveraged funds from outside IFAD to support activities highly relevant to the COSOP strategic objectives. Even though this particular grant was not linked to the loan portfolio, evidence suggests that other such IFAD-managed funds have benefitted the loan portfolio. For example, Insurance for rural resilience and economic development, funded by SIDA and managed through the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management, supported the design of insurance into NOSP, and there are plans that it will further support the development of insurance products for oilseed farmers.²²³
273. **Summary.** Although the 2013 COSOP did not give importance to the use of grants, IFAD funded or supervised 50 grants linked to Uganda over the COSOP period. This indicates an opportunistic rather than a strategic approach to grants in the country and limits the ability of the country programme to link to, and benefit from, them. However, the relatively small number of grants that were embedded into loan programmes and operations were highly relevant and effective, contributing to improved performance in multi-stakeholder platforms, brokering 4Ps, inclusive rural finance, sustainable land management, gender equality and the empowerment of vulnerable households. Given the limited resources in the ICO for non-lending activities, the country programme would have benefitted from more grants focusing on non-lending activities. More supportive grant processes and systems at regional and corporate levels, notwithstanding the good efforts already made, are also required.

E. Overall assessment

274. Non-lending activities have been negatively affected by the size of the ICO and the relocation of the CD to Nairobi, as well as by declining budgetary resources. Results at national level have been less effective when set against the COSOP aims. At project level, non-lending activities in terms of KM, support for policy development and implementation and working with partners, has been effective. Some grants have played an especially useful role, but many other grants have not been linked well to the country programme. Overall assessment of **non-lending activities is rated moderately satisfactory (4)**.

²²¹ For example, the OSSUP grant could directly contribute to addressing the weak performance of the vegetable oilseeds value chain in Uganda by strengthening the organizational and institutional capacity of value chain actors, which would also directly improve the performance of VODP2, and moreover benefit its target group of smallholder oilseed farmers.

²²² Communication with FFR on 18 May 2020.

²²³ ICO Self-assessment.

Table 12
Assessment of non-lending activities

<i>Non-lending activities</i>	<i>CSPE Rating</i>
Knowledge management	3
Partnership-building	4
Country-level policy engagement	4
Overall	4

Key points

- Knowledge management at the project level was weak initially but improved over time; a lack of strategy and declining resources at national level limited the effectiveness of KM, which in turn hampered policy dialogue.
- Partnership building has been constrained by the location and size of ICO staff. Nevertheless, IFAD is respected as a partner because of its lending operations and its engagement in sector working groups. It has used grants to build partnerships with a range of civil society and private sector actors.
- Policy engagement has been pursued through the lending program with mixed results, with strongest results in micro finance. IFAD's capacity in country has limited the depth of policy engagement to working through sector working groups.
- IFAD has administered over 50 grants in the CSPE period, but only a few have been linked effectively with the country programme. Those embedded into the lending programme played a positive support role.

V. Performance of partners

275. This section first assesses IFAD's responsibility for maintaining quality standard at design, to managing and responding to emerging changes in context, to help solving problems and implementation bottlenecks. For the Government, the CSPE assesses the degree of ownership and responsibility for implementation of operations, policy guidance, mobilization of human and material resources, implementation management, and responsiveness to supervision recommendations and fiduciary aspects.

A. IFAD

A.1. Design of Interventions

276. During the current COSOP period, IFAD has used its growing resource envelope (US\$1,446 million, representing 81.6 per cent of the historical total project costs in IFAD's programme) to work in three pillars related to smallholder production improvement, rural finance and value chains. In each of these pillars, **projects have been well sequenced and the lessons learned from earlier operations have been successfully brought forward to more recent ones.**

277. At the same, **IFAD's strategic focus has changed markedly, reflecting the move away from integrated community approaches to specific value chains particularly in the vegetable oil sector.** In rural finance, IFAD persisted with its engagement designing PROFIRA on the experience of RFSP, even while other donors and the government have moved away from using subsidised funds to support the sector.

278. **IFAD has brought its considerable global expertise in these areas and has been seen as a leader in value chain and marketing operations** in Uganda, particularly in building connections with private sector and government. On the other hand, **designs have been relatively blind to the political and economic context** and could provide deeper analysis of how projects can be subject to volatile and frequent policy shifts related to the centralised power structures under the strong presidential system and to related systems of patronage.

279. Designs have been undertaken in a detailed and consultative manner and usually in response to government requests, and with good interaction with concerned ministries and the private sector. As noted earlier, delays in approval by government have affected timely start-up of projects.

A.2. Supervision and implementation support

280. Project supervision across most of the portfolio has been seen as constructive by projects and Government. IFAD has generally undertaken two missions per year per project (Annex IX.A. Table 5), and the technical and implementation support has been generally well received. Most missions provided follow-up recommendations prepared in consultation with project staff, Government and partners. MTRs have been used to redesign projects to cope with changes in implementation circumstances and policy context (RFSP, for example, was redesigned to reflect changes in government policy) and VODP2 was moved out of a problem status to perform more effectively.

281. **For ATAAS, IFAD's involvement was deliberately more limited yet it did not achieve the influence sought through co-funding with the World Bank.** IFAD had limited involvement in supervisions until 2017,²²⁴ and did not engage strongly during the MTR or the project redesign.²²⁵ The decision to suspend IFAD's loan in 2016 was correct in terms of sending a signal to Government over the radical change in project design as well as the declining performance of NAADS.

²²⁴ IFAD participated in just one ATAAS supervision mission in Feb. 2013, when a new CPM took up post.

²²⁵ For example, the recovery of ineligible expenditures in 2014/15 was supervised by the World Bank on behalf of IFAD.

Since the World Bank continued lending, the impact of IFAD's decision was minimal. Though loan cancellation was seriously considered, IFAD chose to re-engage in 2017, a decision taken largely for strategic reasons to strengthen the relationship with Government. The allocation of remaining funds to vehicles and training allowed IFAD to demonstrate its support and was widely approved of by Government at all levels. It was a high-risk decision, however, given the known difficulties of procurement and the fact that ATAAS was closing with no prospect of continued external funding.

282. **COSOP reviews have been conducted in 2015, 2018 and 2020, and though not on a regular annual basis as intended, these have been useful in tracking progress.** They have triggered changes in the COSOP results framework, for example around ATAAS in relation to changes in extension policy (Box 3) and for VODP2 in relation to the delay in Buvuma land acquisition (para. 123).

A.3. Support from IFAD Office Architecture

283. **The Country Director's location has affected non-lending performance in terms of policy engagement and partnership building as well as the performance of the lending portfolio.** The period under review has seen the CD presence shift from Rome to in-country and then to the regional hub in Nairobi. The period of in-country presence (2014-18) has been seen by all stakeholders as the most effective period in terms of supporting lending operations, policy dialogue and partnership building. Since the CD moved to Nairobi in mid-2018 under IFAD's decentralization policy there has been an obvious decline in IFAD's influence and engagement. The absence of the CD on the ground in Kampala has affected the quality of participation in fora, donor working groups and informal interactions with partners and government.
284. **The country office programme budget and time allocation of the ICO team has shown a declining trend mainly affecting non-lending.** There has been a 10 per cent decline when comparing the average budget over the past four years (2017-20) with the first four years (2013-2016). The main driver of this decline is a lower budget for ICO administration followed by a decline in the budget for non-lending activities, and the main component to be reduced was advocacy / knowledge management.²²⁶ Conversely, the budget increased for supervision and implementation support.
285. While the number of total staff supporting the Uganda country programme has remained the same, the FTEs (full time equivalents) of officers supporting the programme has declined slightly. In 2013, there were four officers in the ICO in Kampala (the CD, a programme officer, a knowledge management officer (consultant), and an Associate Programme Officer). In 2020, there are only 1.6 FTEs in Kampala and 2.6 overall since the Programme Officer and Financial analyst mainly support the SMADF grant's Yield Fund.
286. **Overall, the resources (budget and staff time) are focused on the lending portfolio, particularly on supervision and implementation support** which occupies 50 per cent of the CD and CPO's time (Figure 7). The CD and CPO each spend 15-24 per cent of their time on policy dialogue and partnership development, and for the CPO especially much of this takes place through an active presence in the sector working group. The decline in KM budget is not compensated in time spent by the Uganda country team who spend between 1 and 6 per cent of their time on KM. Time spent on design has reduced post 2018 as there has only been one project (NOSP) under preparation during this period.²²⁷

²²⁶ The budget for the design of the new COSOP has bolstered non-lending budget from 2018 to 2020.

²²⁷ A final point to note is that the Uganda Yield Fund grant provides 1.7 FTEs to support this grant while 2.6 officer level FTEs are supporting the entire country programme. Once the grant is complete, the programme will return to just 2 FTEs officers and 5 staff overall.

Figure 7.
Time Allocation for CD and CPO Uganda



Source: Data provided by ICO staff.

287. **Support from IFAD HQ and regional hub has been generally well received particularly during supervisions and technical backstopping.** Provision of relevant expertise has been appreciated by Government and project PMUs. A notable exception has been the problems arising around conducting PRELNOR's baseline.²²⁸ The support for some issues were too narrow. For gender, support mostly focused on levels of participation with insufficient guidance on addressing gender gaps, while for M&E the advice tended to focused more on reporting issues than on the quality of evaluation studies.
288. **Summary.** IFAD has performed well in evolving the portfolio in line with COSOP aspirations, and in bringing its expertise to key sectors such as value chains and rural finance. It could have done more to place the designs within the politico-economic context. Supervision has been effective, ensuring projects deliver as expected and are re-designed when needed. The resources allocated to administer the country programme reflect this, as well as the limited capacity to deliver on the non-lending side. Overall **IFAD performance as a partner is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

B. Government

289. Government of Uganda's performance with regard to the IFAD portfolio under the 2013 COSOP is mixed and has to be viewed within the context of an evolving national policy framework.²²⁹

B.1. Project management

290. **In general, quality of PMU staff across the portfolio has been high especially for transitioned projects** as well as those that have recruited staff from previous IFAD projects (para. 127). However, high quality has not necessarily always been translated into strong project performance, especially in financial management and procurement. Delayed recruitment has affected some projects (VODP2 suffered an 18-month delay due to slow recruitment) and in instances high staff turnover has been a feature (PRELNOR). On the whole, however, the PMUs have ensured functional M&E, sound financial management (with some exceptions) and compliance with all loan covenants. The PMUs have also routinely prepared

²²⁸ An ex-ante study was earmarked as part of IFADs Research and Impact Assessment Unit (RIA) work plan, however due to changes in funding commitments between IFAD10 and IFAD11, ex-ante studies were dropped in favour of ex-post studies and, combined with delays on the ground in terms of road construction, has resulted in no substantive baseline being conducted.

²²⁹ DLG policy changes in 2007 that affected DLSP; the shift from demand to supply driven rural finance policy (for RFSP); and change in extension policy (NAADS to SSE; OWC role in input distribution) for ATAAS.

work plans, audits and monitoring reports and have also undertaken analytical work and, in the case of VODP2, even contributed to design of follow on projects like NOPP and NOSP.

291. **The downside for PMU performance has been weak procurement.** This resulted in the case of ATAAS in ineligible expenditures and slow and disrupted procurement of IFAD-funded vehicles and training (Box 6). Other PMUs registered long delays in identifying project investments which in turn caused delays in achieving project outputs. PRELNOR has struggled to implement planned infrastructure (Chapter III.A.3).
292. **PMUs have established collaborative relationships with DLG staff** and have contributed to their capacity building through training as well as experience sharing. In some instances, there was reported weak coordination between teams managing different components or with related projects to facilitate synergies. In others, the management information systems were weak and challenged by the national scale and number of reporting entities (e.g., ATAAS).

B.2. Fiduciary responsibilities, financial management and audit

293. **Government fiduciary performance with regard to counterpart funding has been mixed.** Actual funding levels exceeded appraisal for RFSP and VODP2 and with complete disbursement for DLSP and a significant shortfall for ATAAS.²³⁰ The situation is uncertain for PROFIRA with an expected shortfall of 52 per cent of expected funding²³¹ as well as for PRELNOR with 23 per cent of funds disbursed by Government with just two out of seven years to go to project completion in Sept. 2022 (see Table 13).

Table 13.

Planned and actual Government disbursements by project

<i>Project</i>	<i>Agreement US\$ million</i>	<i>Actual US\$ million</i>	<i>Disbursement Rate %</i>
RFSP	1.1	12.15	1105%
DLSP	2.4	2.4	100%
VODP2	15	25.8	172%
ATAAS	499	299	60%
CAIIP	6.3	6.3	100%
PROFIRA	4.9	1.0 ⁽¹⁾	21%
PRELNOR	9.3	2.2 ⁽²⁾	23%

Source: Project reports.

294. Adequate procurement systems and personnel have been in place to guide procurement. However, weaknesses persist especially in lengthy processes that cause delayed outcomes which in turn impacted implementation. Furthermore, all the projects use contract committees²³² that oversee all procurement-related matters including bid evaluations as well as vetting of contractors and service providers. PMUs also have had qualified procurement staff, though periodic vacancies have occurred. There were a few cases of lack of compliance with procurement processes including with the *IFAD Procurement Guidelines and National Regulations*.²³³ Weak management of contracts also led to delays in

²³⁰ Due to a policy shift that saw planned funds for ATAAS shifted to input procurement and distribution through NAADS and OWC (ATAAS PPE).

²³¹ SM May 2020.

²³² In the case of PRELNOR an additional institution was created in the PMU located in Gulu with a cap on its spending limit.

²³³ Those cited were in relation to compliance with IFAD prior review requirements; the preparation of bidding documents; weak filing systems, including lack of contract monitoring (PCR VODP2).


completing and extending contracts, as well as delays in preparation and submission of reports. There is also the case of changes in design specifications such as for road infrastructure in CAIIP1.

B.3. Government's funding for agriculture

295. **Despite commitments by Parliament, Government has not increased the share of the budget for agriculture** in line with the Maputo-Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 10 per cent target, with sector funding averaging 4.5 per cent of total public expenditure from 2013/14 to 2017/18 fiscal years.²³⁴ Much of this expenditure furthermore has been recurrent (salaries and inputs) rather than investment, and focused on central public agencies rather than local government extension services.²³⁵ The switch in recurrent expenditure support from local to central government reflects the emphasis on input provision through OWC (Figure 8).²³⁶ Nevertheless, the recruitment of 4,000 extension staff in the period from 2016-19 as well as the establishment of the agricultural extension grant for extension activities, as well as for operation and maintenance of vehicles procured under ATAAS, reflects commitment to the Single Spine Extension (SSE) approach.

Figure 8.

Public Sector Expenditure on Agriculture at Central and District Level



Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics Annual Government Finance Statistics Abstract 2018.

B.4. Governance and anti-corruption

296. While Government transparency and accountability frameworks have gradually evolved to include one of the oldest, comparatively comprehensive and progressive anti-corruption legal regimes²³⁷, they are operationalized in a context where violation of financial rules is considered widespread and enforcement weak.²³⁸ It is this legal regime that has provided the context in which the IFAD portfolio for the 2013 COSOP operated, albeit with instances where IFAD negotiated, and Government accepted, additional instruments or mechanisms to ensure more robust enforcement measures in project operations. Major areas that have been vulnerable to corruption and which have occasionally been investigated in the IFAD

²³⁴ There was a peak in the election year 2016 but a decline thereafter.

²³⁵ Agriculture Sector Public Expenditure Review Uganda, World Bank, 2019.

²³⁶ ACODE also confirm the dramatic fall in funding to local level extension provision: see ACODE 2018 op.cit.

²³⁷ Inspector general of Government (IGG) Act, 1988 which has a dual mandate; the Anti-Corruption Act, 2009 (as amended) which widened the definition of corruption, made it extra territorial, included recovery of proceeds, provided for interim orders as well as interim procedures; the Leadership Code Act, 2002 (as amended), Whistle Blower Protection Act, Anti-Money Laundering Act, Access to Information Act, Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act and Uganda is Party to UNCAC and AUPCC.

²³⁸ Assessing the Status of Implementation of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act & the Leadership Code Act (as amended), Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2019.

portfolio include *financial management, procurement and contracting* (see also para. 135). A major example is presented in Box 6.

297. Procurement issues have been an area of underperformance, as described earlier, related to lack of staff capacity and overambitious implementation time frames as well as poor preparation of bidding documents, poor record keeping and filing system (para. 128).²³⁹ This has been compounded to some extent by limited support from IFAD until a dedicated procurement consultant was engaged in 2019. Lack of capacity in contractors has also caused delays and this has been compounded by failure to obtain guarantees, lack of requests for variations, and by weak supervision.²⁴⁰
298. Poor financial record keeping has been a common feature noted in several missions and has led to difficulties in proving or disproving allegations of fund misuse due to an inadequate audit trail of transactions. The training support under ATAAS was subject to lack of records even though the costs per trainee were considered very high.

Box 6

ATAAS Vehicle Procurement

Following amendments to the financing agreement agreed to by Government and IFAD in February 2017, high level discussions between both parties concluded that support to the Single Spine Extension approach would reflect a wider strategic message of commitment. IFAD subsequently focused 60 per cent of its funding on one component that embodied the provision of equipment, including vehicles and training for extension services at district and sub-county levels. The PCU in MAAIF initiated the procurement but according to IFAD's Office of Audit and Oversight (AUO), there were issues with the procurement, including in the assessment of the bids, which created confusion and perception of unfair treatments among the bidders.

The selection of the service provider after bid closure and subsequent evaluation was challenged by a competing bidder, a situation further compounded by allegations of payoffs to unnamed staff personnel. An investigation was launched by AUO due to high materiality. However, there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations.

Due to the impending project closure, MAAIF agreed with IFAD to request UNOPS to carry out the expedited procurement of the 1,034 motorcycles, worth UGX 7.9 billion, (IFAD funded 88 per cent) and 115 double-cabin pick-up trucks, worth US\$8.4 million, to cover 83 per cent of the total of 138 districts.

Once procured, the vehicles supplied through IFAD funding appear to have been fairly distributed and reasonably well-managed at district level. Distribution of the vehicles and motorcycles was confirmed in all the districts visited during the mission.

Source: ATAAS PPE and CSPE interviews.

299. At least five projects in the CSPE portfolio have been investigated by IFAD's AUO based on whistle blower reports and news alerts. In relation to one case, an engineer who previously worked in DLSP's PMU was suddenly removed from PRELNOR's PMU causing initial implementation delays. Furthermore, the recent suspension and non-renewal of contracts of PMU staff related to the potential violation of financial rules has impacted PRELNOR activities with the result that key positions are held by acting personnel. In addition, several issues related to prohibited practices including abuse of vehicles in some of the projects have been raised.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Interview, IFAD Consultant.

²⁴⁰ Interview IFAD staff.

²⁴¹ CSPE field mission received reports of a political head completely taking over an IFAD-funded project vehicle. In Nwoya, DPMO survived interdiction when a project vehicle was forcibly taken by political head and was returned following intervention of the Department of Agricultural Extension Services of the MAAIF and threats of withdrawing it to MAAIF.

300. Anti-corruption measures have included the development of *Core Values* (VODP2) and complaint mechanisms, although the impact on operations and behaviour is as yet undetermined. IFAD itself has been slow to introduce anti-corruption safeguards in bidding documents, which have been introduced only this year. Some observers also note that the presence of the CD on the ground is an important tool to mitigate such issues.

B.5. Monitoring and evaluation at the project level

301. **Project M&E systems have been of mixed quality in terms of the reliability and completeness of information generated and shared.** There have been issues with updating logical frameworks following introduction of an Operational Results Management System, as in the case for PROFIRA, PRELNOR and NOPP.²⁴² They also had challenges associated with lack of reliable and regular processes for outcome and impact measurement across all projects.²⁴³ In others, data quality was weak due to inconsistent figures or a failure to capture important data.²⁴⁴
302. **In terms of timeliness of information, many projects failed to conduct baselines, MTRs and end of project evaluations within required timeframes** that subsequently affected project activities (see Annex IX.B and online Appendix III). Some project M&E systems failed to capture some key indicators on time even when there is or was evidence of availability of such data²⁴⁵ as in the case of VODP2 data on impact on household assets which was not reported in the logframe.²⁴⁶
303. **In general, project M&E systems tracked and reported gender-disaggregated data.** However, gender issues prominently featured more in M&E systems of newer projects than for older projects. The performance of women and youth in terms of income, assets and technology adoption gains were inadequately captured in many of the reports yet there is evidence of gender disparities between women and men in terms of access to productive assets, extension services and markets and market participation.
304. In terms of staffing, all projects had M&E specialists and while the more recent projects have more advanced M&E systems aided by inheriting experienced M&E personnel familiar with IFAD's requirements, the challenges of the **more complex value chains projects with multiple stakeholders in the public and private sector has also brought M&E challenges.**
305. **Summary.** Government has been a close partner of IFAD and has provided active and significant support in the design and implementation of its projects. It has discharged its fiduciary responsibilities reasonably and generally provided its share of planned funding consistently. PMU staff have also been of reasonably good quality. These strengths are offset by several important weaknesses however. Staffing has been affected by periodic vacant positions, turnover, and delays in procurement and poor contract management. There has been persistent (though in most cases unproven/undocumented) reports of violation of rules or misuse of funds. Performance is further offset by weak M&E systems in terms of data quality and consistency, and delays in conducting key studies such as baselines, MTRs and end of project evaluations. While grants have been introduced for extension services and road maintenance, Government's broad budgetary commitments to

²⁴² Logframes are difficult to read, too long and complex. Changes in the Operational Results Management System Logframe have reduced the clarity of project design and often some important indicators are missing (Maria Donnat Quality of M&E systems report Feb 2020).

²⁴³ Donnat M, 2020 op.cit.

²⁴⁴ Inconsistencies in data concerning performance of oilseeds component under VODP2 were cited by a supervision report in September, 2019 which recommended that data cleaning should be undertaken.

²⁴⁵ Four of the seven implemented projects have conducted impact studies DLSP (2015), ATAAS (2018), VODP2(2019), & RFSP(2014).

²⁴⁶ This was supposed to feed into the indicators to measure progress towards the goal to 'contribute to sustainable poverty reduction in the project area', with "50 per cent households with improvements in assets ownership index at project completion.

the sector and to supporting local government delivery over national spending have not been fully satisfactory and this in turn affected project performance. The weaknesses identified in these latter areas outweigh the positives noted earlier and therefore, the CSPE rates **government performance** as **moderately unsatisfactory (3)**.

Table 14.

Assessment of partners' performance

	<i>CSPE Rating</i>
IFAD	4
Government	3

Key points

- IFAD has sequenced the evolution of the portfolio in a way that has allowed lesson learning and continued use of experienced PMU staff.
- The radical shift to value chains has allowed IFAD to bring its global expertise to bear but has limited its level of outreach.
- Supervisions have been conducted regularly and are seen as constructive in helping projects overcome implementation challenges.
- Changes in the ICO capacities have affected the country programme's non-lending performance in terms of policy engagement and partnership building.
- Government has discharged its responsibilities well with regard to PMU staffing, counterpart funding but has been less effective in managing procurement, poor contract management and conducting baselines. There have also been serious incidences of misuse of project funds.
- Government has reduced overall funding for the agricultural sector over the period but it has nevertheless supported value chain approaches and encouraged private sector investment.

VI. Synthesis of the country programme and strategy performance

306. This synthesis assesses the relevance and effectiveness of the country programme and strategy performance under the 2013 COSOP from 2013 until 2020.²⁴⁷ While the initial COSOP ran from 2013 to 2018, it was then extended for a further two years. This delay in extending the preparation of the new COSOP was appropriate as it allowed IFAD's country strategy to align with the next cycle for NDPIII (released mid-2020 and ASSP2 (due end-2020)).
307. **The country programme had mixed success in following the 2013 CPE recommendations.** Table 15 assesses how well the Uganda country programme responded to the main 2013 CPE recommendations. Two out of the five recommendations were fully addressed while the remaining three show limited and moderate progress as evidenced in this report.

Table 15.

Assessment of Response to CPE 2013 Recommendations

2013 CPE recommendations	CSPE Comment	Assessment
Expand geographic coverage of IFAD-funded operations to the northern region	Successfully achieved through PRELNOR and VODP2 and in the forthcoming NOSP which operate in several northern districts	Successful
Support commodity value chain development	Effectively delivered through VODP2, PRELNOR, NOSP and NOPP	Successful
Define a realistic and appropriately resourced agenda for policy dialogue	Insufficient resources and staffing were applied and no specific agenda formulated to guide policy dialogue beyond efforts at project level	Limited
Strengthen further project results (by exploiting synergies between activities and projects, providing more resources for natural resources and environmental management as well as human and social capital and empowerment, preparing exit strategies and strengthening the capacity of key institutions, and devoting more systematic efforts to scaling-up innovations)	Achieved to a modest degree: some synergies have been created between projects such as between ATAAS and PRELNOR, and VODP2 and PRELNOR though more could have been done; ENRM has been well resourced mainly through dedicated grant funding; effective support for social capital and empowerment has been delivered in most projects; exit strategies have been uneven largely because projects followed on from each other; scaling up has been limited	Moderate
Undertake functional and workload analyses as a basis for determining staff requirements and the division of labour (to manage the Uganda country programme)	It is not evident that such analyses have been developed to guide staffing	Limited

Source: CSPE Team elaboration.

A. Relevance

A.1. Strategic alignment

308. **The 2013 COSOP showed close policy alignment with the Government's policy framework for rural poverty reduction and the agriculture sector.** It was fully aligned to the 2011/12-2014/15 NDP and the NDPII (2015/16-2019/20), as well as the ASSP (2015/16-2019/20). Specifically, the NDP Objective 1 seeks to increase sustainable production, productivity and value addition in the agricultural sector (and two other sectors). The ASSP targeted transforming the agricultural sector from subsistence farming into commercialization by increasing production and productivity, and market access. The COSOP SO1 and SO2 directly contribute towards this, and strategies of value addition and agro-processing for

²⁴⁷ The assessment of COSOP relevance covers the alignment of its strategic objectives and direction, its geographic priority and thematic focus, with the Government and IFAD's strategies, as well as with the national priorities. It also covers the coherence of the main elements in the COSOP. COSOP effectiveness looks at the progress made against the COSOP objectives and other significant achievements.

industrialization and exports, as well as private sector-led growth and strong public-private partnerships are guiding principles for the NDP, the ASSP.

309. **The COSOP SOs also aligned well with IFAD’s global strategic objectives (2016-25)** in particular with IFAD’s SO1 that supports poor rural people’s productive capacities and SO2 to increase poor rural people’s benefits from market participation (see Table 1 in Annex VI).
310. **The COSOP was broadly coherent although no explicit theory of change was prepared, yet non-lending did not fit in well.** A results framework attached to the COSOP in Appendix III provides a summary of outcomes by each SO with outcome and milestone indicators. The intended outcomes match the intention of each SO, and in turn contribute logically to the goal. However, the chosen indicators contain several gaps in terms of: (i) the correct identification of outcome versus output indicators, (ii) the absence of several outcome indicators and (iii) the absence of SMART attributes for some of the indicators to make them easily measurable.²⁴⁸ The role of non-lending though was not well captured as its aim was to fit under the overall framework to enhance coherence but no specific linkages were identified.
311. **The 2013 COSOP’s identification of risks and mitigating measures was inadequate.** Only four risks were mentioned in the COSOP document. These relate to the effects of the oil boom on the competitiveness of Uganda’s traded products, climate events, policy changes and corruption. This was not a comprehensive list, and the mitigation measures mentioned were largely deferred to being handled during project design or supervision. The Theory of Change elaborated in Annex VI provides a more comprehensive view of the risks affecting the COSOP’s causal logic. It also seeks to include the role of non-lending more explicitly, as well as a fuller set of assumptions at different levels of the intervention model.

A.2. Synergies

312. **The COSOP’s specific proposal to improve synergies between lending and non-lending and across projects was appropriate but unrealistic given the resources available.** In response to the 2013 CPE, which found limited examples of synergies, the COSOP proposed that a regional focus in the north and east was a way to achieve greater synergy, as well as close engagement with the sector working group that could bring good synergy with other development partners. The ambition to resource the ICO appropriately to ensure that synergies occurred between the lending and non-lending arms of IFAD’s programme was equally appropriate but it was not realized for the entire period. In the initial years, while the CD was located in country from 2014-2018, and a KM management officer was in place from 2011-15, synergies would have been achievable, but subsequently the declining ICO budget and staffing did not match the COSOP objective for synergy and cross-learning (see analysis in Chapter V.A and below).
313. **Summary.** While the COSOP relevance was strong on alignment, targeting and lending synergies, it was less clear on the synergies between lending and non-lending, the Theory of Change and risks. Therefore, **COSOP relevance is rated moderately satisfactory (4).**

B. Effectiveness

314. The overall goal of the COSOP was to increase incomes, improve food security and reduce the vulnerability of the rural households living in poverty. The COSOP had three SOs: (i) sustainable increase in production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture producers; (ii) integration of smallholders into the markets; and (iii) increased access to and use of financial services by the rural

²⁴⁸ Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realist and Time-bound. M. Donnat, op.cit.

- poor. The lending and non-lending parts of the programme were expected to blend together to achieve these.
315. The evidence base to judge effectiveness at COSOP level is partly based on a series of COSOP reviews.²⁴⁹ While these have allowed results to be monitored, there are gaps in the indicators especially around outcomes. The findings given below draw on these sources as well as a range of key interviews.
 316. **For SO1: the evidence indicates that planted areas and yields show positive gains, partly due to improved growing conditions and because of the legacy from earlier investments prior to this COSOP period.** Good technology development and dissemination has continued under ATAAS, DLSP, VODP2, and PRELNOR. Training and outreach targets have been met. Adoption rates are not reported widely, though it is evident that farmer groups started under the NAADS-era continued to adopt improved technologies through ATAAS and even PRELNOR, and as a result productivity and incomes have risen. IFAD's contribution is notable when placed in the wider context of slower economic growth and the agricultural sector's declining contribution to GDP over the COSOP period (para 20). The rise in vegetable oil production from VODP2 is particularly key in a situation where Uganda relies heavily on imported oil and related products.
 317. **Climate resilience has improved with IFAD lending and non-lending assistance, though impact is modest in the national context.** Adoption of SLM techniques across 20,980 ha under ATAAS and a further 92,108 ha recorded under PRELNOR has helped reduce erosion through agro-forestry, terracing and drought-tolerant crops and both grants as well as lending have contributed. These results, though important, are modest when the country's natural resources are facing immense pressures from forest degradation and pressure on productive land from a rapidly growing population. Climate change has particularly been notable around Lake Victoria, with unprecedented rising water levels,²⁵⁰ and while NOPP has incorporated extensive mitigation in its design, careful monitoring of risks factors will be critical.
 318. **Land tenure reforms have produced limited results** under DLSP and there have been issues around land acquisition under VODP2. Pilot attempts proved effective in DLSP with 1,882 households receiving certificates, but they were not expanded to have wider impact. In VODP2, insecure land tenure has been a sensitive issue in Kalangala and Buvuma²⁵¹, which is being addressed through several models including working with district land centres and the Social Tenure Domain Model. While there have been missed opportunities to use grants to support land centres in the past, NOPP includes a dedicated grant.
 319. **For SO2: Agro-processing and market linkages have been strengthened along selected value chains with some low usage.** Increased prices for farm produce due to reduced transport costs, collective marketing and better bargaining has caused farm incomes to rise for specific crops. There is some evidence of poorer households increasing market access and improving food security, but most benefits have tended to reach those farmers with the potential to increase cash crops, particularly vegetable oil, and improve their level of commercial operation.
 320. With some 7,246 kms of community access roads provided across four projects, **road outcomes have been positive in terms of improved access and use.** However, there have been delays in completion and significant design changes that have raised the quality of the access roads but also the costs. These have proved an effective means of reaching poorer areas and opening up areas of farming potential to greater production and marketing opportunities. There are good results

²⁴⁹ The performance of the COSOP has been tracked by a portfolio review in 2015, an MTR in 2015, an initial completion review in 2018 and a recent final completion review in 2020.

²⁵⁰ <https://nilebasin.org/new-and-events/307-unprecedented-rise-in-water-levels-of-lake-victoria>

²⁵¹ <http://www.ecotrendsalliance.org/assets/files/Article-Kakungula-Mayambala-Tibugwisa.pdf>

in terms of reduced travel time and cost, higher farm gate prices, and based on the CSPE field mission's limited evidence the roads have been generally maintained and kept in all year-round operation.²⁵² Under NOSP, a further 2,500 km of community roads construction is planned and the design builds on past lessons including ensuring community involvement in design and maintenance and building to higher standards to ensure access to district road maintenance funds. Delaying road construction until market demand is established makes sense, however there is a need to ensure that past delays in procurement and construction are avoided.

321. **Market linkages have been most effective under VODP2** through both the large private sector partner in Kalangala and the smaller oil seed hubs in Lira, Gulu and West Nile. Substantial income gains have occurred in the former for 2,063 farmers, and for 2,022 farmer groups in the latter, according to the most recent COSOP review. Bulking has helped farmers negotiate increased prices and realize higher earnings. A key success factor noted in the recent PCR was starting with confirmed market access for vegetable oil products, so that farmers could borrow and invest knowing demand existed.
322. **Value chain projects are complex, and while the production and incomes have risen, there have been issues around the provision of credit, processing and marketing.** Underutilized milling capacity has been an issue in VODP2 despite growing sunflower and soybean production. Financial management and outstanding credit under KOPGT remain a concern. Market infrastructures were completed, but were underused under CAIIP1, largely due to location and management issues. Under PRELNOR, more careful planning is expected to overcome these problems though it is too early to determine success.
323. The extended investment period for vegetable oil seen first under VODP from 1997 through VODP2 and now into NOSP/NOPP has fulfilled the COSOP aim of consolidating and extending, but also provides an illustration of the risks and challenges of building 4P approaches. ICO staff has invested considerable time and energy in handling environmental and social concerns raised by other development partners and NGOs in VODP2. The COSOP aim of moving into other value chains has only been partially achieved, with bulking and milling of rice and maize and cassava processing under PRELNOR, but the main thrust remains oilseeds.
324. **Under SO3: strengthened outreach and sustainable access to financial services particularly at community level has been achieved in a difficult policy environment.** Strong levels of coverage have occurred in financial services with a combined outreach of 1.1 million households (target 750,000) and group formation (410,000 members in CSCGs). SACCO membership, share capital, and savings have increased, but the number of SACCOs supported has been below target, due to a narrowing of focus to the more viable SACCOs. This was a mitigating measure in the face of a national policy to establish SACCOs in every sub-county, with the accompanying challenges of weak capacity.
325. Linkages have been strengthened between community groups and SACCOs, private banks and apex institutions leading to a broader range of financial services and better support. Under oil seeds and oil palm, similar linkage efforts in VODP2 have mobilized loans of US\$850,000 for 3,604 farmers; and KOPGT is being used as a bridging mechanism to on-lend loans to small producers.
326. At national level, IFAD played a valuable role in supporting the approval of the Tier IV Act in 2016. This was achieved by building the capacity in MOFPED and other key stakeholder institutions such as Bank of Uganda and UMRA, as well as inputs to a new Financial Sector Strategy through data sharing and review of the policy paper.

²⁵² Out of seven roads visited, six were found to be in reasonable condition.

327. **Despite the above achievements, the country programme approach has been less effective than envisaged.** The COSOP expected strong synergies and complementarities between the projects as well as between lending and non-lending. While geographic coherence has improved as anticipated, this has not led to strong operational linkages.²⁵³ While the three COSOP strategic objectives have been pursued through good project sequencing, the projects developed under each SO have been operating largely in silos with modest cross-learning. There also has been limited synergy between projects, except in specific northern districts such as Lira and Gulu where oil seeds and sustainable food production along with community access roads have been complementary through VODP2 and PRELNOR.
328. **Beyond the projects, greater interaction between the lending and non-lending elements and the ICO could have been achieved.** For example, notable partnership opportunities created under the Yield Fund (para. 255) have not been used to build linkages to the lending portfolio. Furthermore, the participation of project staff in support missions for other projects has not been a marked feature to build cross-learning. The CPMT also has not been as effective as envisaged. On the other hand, COSOP monitoring has been fairly regular with the planned reviews taking place in 2015, 2018 and 2020.
329. **Changes in the location and declining resources and capacity of the ICO staffing have affected IFAD's ability to manage both lending and non-lending aspects.** The move of the CPM to Nairobi has reduced the ICO capacity to interact quickly and flexibly with Government and other stakeholders on lending operations. In terms of policy engagement and partnership building, the change has reduced the influence IFAD should have, given its scale of operations and long history of engagement. Though the CPO has increased the proportion of his time devoted to policy engagement, a large part of this is because of IFAD's leading role in the agriculture sector working group from 2017 onwards and especially in 2018 as Chair. (See Ch. V.A).
330. Overall, the positive outcomes for the project portfolio are offset by the changes in ICO staffing and location. The **overall rating for effectiveness is moderately satisfactory (4).**

Table 16.

Country strategy and programme performance assessment

	<i>CSPE Rating</i>
Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4
Overall	4

²⁵³ Beyond PROFIRA supporting VODP2 in building capacity of the Kalangala Oil Palm Growers' SACCO, and PRELNOR supporting VODP2 in capacity building for GALS and household methodologies.

Key points

- In terms of strategic alignment, the 2013 COSOP linked well to national and sector development policies as well as IFAD's global objectives.
- The COSOP was broadly coherent even though no explicit theory of change was prepared, yet non-lending did not fit in well. Targeting was reasonable well defined, except for the means to target women and youth.
- Synergies were correctly identified between the lending and non-lending parts of the COSOP but the resources to see that this occurred were not adequate.
- Achievements have broadly reached the targets set under each Strategic Objective, especially around incomes, assets, productivity, road access, financial services; more modest gains occurred around land tenure, physical markets and improving climate resilience.
- The country programme approach was less effective because expected synergies between the different arms of the programme did not occur.
- Country programme management has been affected by declining resources and the shifting location of the CD.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

331. **The 2013 COSOP contained a highly relevant set of objectives that aligned with national and IFAD strategic frameworks and continued the direction set in the 2004 COSOP**, with its emphasis on smallholder commercialisation and community empowerment. Developed around these, IFAD's portfolio has been effectively sequenced with the recent interventions building on earlier projects, using their experience, lessons and staff. Greater geographical coherence in the north and east has reduced inefficiencies from previously scattered project locations, however interaction and exchange among projects has been insufficient.
332. **The three COSOP strategic objectives have been pursued through good project sequencing rather than a programmatic approach. As a result, the level of interplay and cross-fertilization between each strategic 'leg' has been limited.** This is partly due to the adoption of a portfolio, rather than a country programme approach, that entailed meeting each strategic objective through three separate strands: integrated agricultural/rural development, rural finance and value chains – rooted in initial projects designed at the turn of the century. Such an approach has also been necessary with a small country team with a declining administrative budget supporting an increasing lending portfolio.
333. **While the strategic shift to value chain approaches from broader community development has led to a significant rise in private sector co-investment, it has also reduced beneficiary outreach.** This changed focus has allowed IFAD to build substantial private sector partnerships and raise farmer incomes. However, the level of beneficiary outreach has declined and the cost per beneficiary has risen as result. This has been partly offset by the continued inclusion of access roads, the reach of the rural finance investments, and the higher number of indirect beneficiaries impacted by the value chain activities. Additionally, the move to value chains and private sector engagement has also helped insulate IFAD's investments from the repercussions of unexpected political events, election processes and low capacity in local government service provision.
334. **Poverty targeting has been well addressed especially by investing in northern Uganda, however efforts to meet the specific needs of youths and transform the role of women have been modest.** The greater investment made in the north and east have enabled IFAD to deliver benefits to the poorer parts of the country. The number of women and youths reached has exceeded targets, however the specific constraints faced by youths have not been diagnosed and addressed. Efforts to improve the opportunities for women while methodologically sound have not been sufficiently transformative or at sufficient scale. While the role of women in the household and in management of productive assets have seen some changes as a result of IFAD interventions, social norms still limit women's opportunities and there is immense potential to achieve more.
335. **Agro-processing and market linkages have been particularly strengthened for the selected commodities through IFAD's integrated value chain approach.** Reduced transport costs and higher market prices due to improved road access, plus added value through bulking and processing, have contributed to higher household incomes. While there have been implementation delays, building infrastructure and support services around confirmed market demand has proved a successful approach, together with the extended support made possible by sequencing projects.
336. **The results in rural finance have been significant and IFAD's decision to exit is correct, though sustainability issues remain.** IFAD's investments have been effective in terms of outreach, building linkages between local savings and credit groups and service providers, and in terms of regulatory reforms. IFAD's

decision to move out of the sector, albeit with continued focus on value chain finance, aligns with the Government's policy. However, sustainability now depends on the ability of groups to pay for services and apex organisations still face challenges.

337. **Resilience has been enhanced within the communities reached, but the achievements are modest when set against the broad climate change challenges facing Uganda.** Agricultural research and weather information services have been valuable investments and the upgrading of community roads to all-weather designs with reforestation and water harvesting measures have been important steps as well. Nevertheless, climate variability is increasing and its effects may cancel out IFAD's otherwise positive achievements on the livelihoods of rural poor people if not addressed more significantly going forward. This is all the more pertinent when IFAD's portfolio faces more stringent SECAP requirements and its designs are predominantly placed in category A.
338. **The country programme has generated a few innovations that have been scaled up within IFAD, however most of the innovations occurred prior to the current COSOP and scaling up in Uganda has been limited.** Important experiences have been shared across the region and IFAD globally from earlier innovations such as household mentoring, GALS, 4Ps within vegetable oil value chains and capital seed funding approaches from the Yield Fund. While these have helped inform project design and best practice across IFAD, there has yet to be greater scaling up outside of IFAD operations.
339. **The 2013 COSOP's ambitions to achieve policy influence and build partnerships have been limited by the lack of a strategy and resources as well as the transfer of the Country Director to the sub-regional hub.** IFAD has been seen as an active and knowledgeable partner by Government and other development partners. However, the wealth of empirical development experience arising from the project portfolio has not been effectively translated into influential and useful knowledge products as resources for this work have been insufficient and declined over the CSPE period. The lack of a documented strategy systematizing and specifying how these non-lending activities would be achieved further hampered the direction of the work. Finally, the shifting location of the CD has affected IFAD's influence, particularly in the past 3 years when the position moved to the sub-regional hub. Consequently, the role of the hub and of IFAD's divisions outside of ESA in providing their technical expertise, knowledge and policy support have become increasingly critical.
340. **Government discharged its obligations in funding and staffing but has been less effective in procurement, financial management and M&E.** Overall funding for agriculture has fallen below the Government's international commitments, and support to local government services has been mainly for recurrent expenditures related to the growth in public extension manpower. IFAD's projects have faced challenges around governance and corruption issues, which have been partly exacerbated by poor record keeping and M&E. M&E systems have advanced in use of technology, but impact measurement remains challenged by delayed studies and weak methodology.

B. Recommendations

341. **Recommendation 1. Expand IFAD's effective value chain approach to other commodities with greater beneficiary outreach potential.** There are opportunities to expand marketing hubs to the entire country and regionally, built around key commodities identified in the NDP3 (e.g., livestock - especially dairy, horticulture and fisheries). IFAD should: (i) identify opportunities for small-scale producers to improve income diversity around production and processing; (ii) enhance access to reliable markets and raise product quality; (iii) expand

mechanisms such as the Yield Fund to help build private sector capacity; and (iv) strengthen synergies between the programmes, where relevant and practical.

342. **Recommendation 2. Mainstream climate change more extensively with direct approaches in the new COSOP, given the growing urgency in Uganda.** Climate change has been indirectly addressed in the past COSOPs. IFAD's portfolio going forward contains more category A projects than before. Therefore IFAD should: (i) build into the next COSOP stronger support for SECAP measures, including social and environmental safeguards, as well as the technical expertise to supervise category A projects; (ii) partner with the most appropriate government entities (Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Works & Transport), non-government and donor partners to undertake climate mitigation and adaptation measures more directly around the supported value chains.
343. **Recommendation 3. Deliver more transformative approaches and interventions tailored to the specific needs of women and youths.** This could be pursued by: (i) including strategies and targets on these aspects in the new COSOP; (ii) mainstreaming and scaling up of proven methods such as GALS and household mentoring; (iii) greater cross-project learning and use of specialised service partners to identify opportunities around constraints such as land and ownership norms; (iv) strengthening PMU staffing to support and monitor the work of service providers; and (v) ensuring IFAD, in particular the Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division (ECG) provides better and more consistent technical oversight on gender and youths.
344. **Recommendation 4. Develop a non-lending strategy that systematizes KM, partnerships and country policy engagement and provides the necessary resources for its implementation.** In order to foster innovation and scaling up within Uganda, IFAD needs to have a KM system that captures project experiences and innovations so that they can be shared with partners and also used as evidence for policy engagement. This requires: a documented strategy, and a stronger country presence that includes the Country Director in Uganda. IFAD's decentralized model also requires greater coordination within IFAD. Therefore, relevant divisions (RIA, ECG, and PMI) should be more involved in the KM process to support non-lending aims by leveraging financial and human resources from IFAD headquarters as well as the regional hub in Nairobi.
345. **Recommendation 5. Strengthen M&E, reporting and financial management to bolster governance and anti-corruption measures and improve the assessment of results, especially at impact level.** Relevant IFAD divisions should ensure risk mitigation around procurement, staff advances and related areas of financial management. In order to take a programmatic approach and to leverage IFAD's full capacities and resources, the ICO requires a KM/M&E officer who can: i) strengthen M&E systems in projects to ensure timely reporting and better documentation that will underpin improved governance and anti-corruption measures; ii) aggregate results across the portfolio (for lending and non-lending) and share them with government and other partners; iii) capture resources at regional/global levels (e.g. grants) for capacity development; iv) support stronger design and analysis of impact studies to improve their statistical accuracy and delivery of more robust results as well as include impacts on reducing malnutrition; v) extend the use of new monitoring methods, improving use of web-based systems, drone monitoring, etc.).

Annex I: Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	Definition *	Mandatory	To be rated
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	<i>Four impact domains</i>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the individual and collective capacity of the poor, and, in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition. 		No
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. 		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of the targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision-making; workload balance; and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, private sector and other agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resource management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural	X	Yes

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition</i> *	<i>Mandatory</i>	<i>To be rated</i>
	purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity – along with the goods and services they provide.		
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resource management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Annex II: Ratings of the IFAD lending portfolio in Uganda^a

Criteria	RFSP	DLSP	CAIIP1	ATAAS	VODP2	PROFIRA	PRELNOR	NOPP	NOSP	Overall portfolio
Rural poverty impact	4	4	4	4	4	5	4			4
Project performance										
Relevance	4	4	4	3	4	4	5	4	5	5
Effectiveness	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Efficiency	4	4	5	2	4	4	3	n.a.	n.a.	3
Sustainability of benefits	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Project performance^b	4	4	4	3	4	4.3	4			4
Other performance criteria										
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4	5	5	4	4	4	5	n.a.	n.a.	4
Innovation	5	5	4	4	4	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	3
Scaling up	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Environment and natural resources management	NR	4	3	5	4	3	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Adaptation to climate change	NR	3	3	5	4	3	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Portfolio performance and results^c	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	4
Partner Performance										
IFAD	4	5	5	3	4	4	4			4
Government	4	4	5	3	5	4	3			3

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resource management and adaption to climate change.

Final ratings of the country strategy and programme in Uganda

	<i>CSPE Rating</i>
Project portfolio performance and results^a	4
Non-lending activities^b	
Knowledge management	3
Partnership-building	4
Country-level policy engagement	4
Overall non-lending activities	
Performance of partners	
IFAD ^c	4
Government ^c	3
Country strategy and programme performance (overall)^d	
Relevance	4
Effectiveness	4

^a Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings.

^b Not an arithmetic average for knowledge management, partnership-building and country-level policy engagement.

^c Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings. The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

^d This is not an arithmetic average of the ratings of relevance and effectiveness of the country and strategy programme and performance. The ratings for relevance and effectiveness take into account the assessment and ratings of portfolio results, non-lending activities and performance of partners but they are not an arithmetic average of these.

Annex III: IFAD-financed investment projects in Uganda since 1980

Project			Dates				Financing (million US\$)*					
ID	Name	Type	Approval	Effective	Completion	Closing	IFAD	IFAD total	Government	Co-financing	Beneficiary	Total cost
1100000080	Agricultural Support Programme	PGMLO	17/12/1981	18/04/1982	31/03/1986	30/06/1986	19.03 (Loan) 1 (Grant)	20.03	1.5	-	-	21.53
1100000159	Agricultural Development Project	Agricultural development	12/12/1984	14/05/1986	31/12/1992	30/09/1993	14.5 (Loan)	14.5	6.54	10.33 (World bank)	-	31.37
1100000316	Smallholders Cotton Rehabilitation Project	Agricultural development	02/12/1992	28/04/1993	31/01/1998	31/01/1998	10.04 (Loan)	10.04	0.5	-	-	10.53
1100000360	Cotton Sub-sector Development Project	Agricultural development	20/04/1994	18/11/1994	30/06/2001	31/12/2001	12.5 (Loan)	12.5	1.9 (Nat.Gov)	14 (World bank) 2.5 (Other domestic) 0.5 (Dom.Fin.Inst)	-	31.40
1100000442	Southwest Region Agricultural Rehabilitation Project	Agricultural development	03/12/1987	17/08/1988	30/08/1995	28/02/1996	12.00 (Loan)	12.00 (Loan)	5.14	10 (World bank)	-	27.14
1100001021	Vegetable Oil Development Project	Agricultural development	29/04/1997	10/07/1998	31/12/2011	30/06/2012	19.9 (Loan)	19.9	3.78 (Nat.Gov)	33.13 (Loc.Private)	3.16	59.97
1100001060	District Development Support Programme	Rural development	10/09/1998	24/05/2000	30/06/2006	31/12/2006	12.59 (Loan)	12.59	1.55	5.53 (BSF) 0 (Ireland)	0.97	20.64
1100001122	Area-based Agricultural Modernization Programme	Rural development	08/12/1999	20/05/2002	30/06/2008	31/12/2008	13.22 (Loan)	13.22	1.45	-	1.38	16.05
1100001158	National Agricultural Advisory Services Programme	Research	07/12/2000	27/11/2001	30/06/2010	31/12/2010	17.5 (Loan)	17.5	8.64 (Nat.Gov) 10.78 (Loc.Gov)	45 (World bank) 0 (Basket fund) 23.86 (TBD)	2.15	107.93
1100001197	Rural Financial Services Programme	Credit and Financial Services	05/09/2002	18/02/2004	30/06/2013	31/12/2013	18.43 (Loan)	18.43	1.1 (National)	4.63 (Dom.Fin.Inst)	0.35	24.51
1100001369	District Livelihoods Support Programme	Rural Development	14/12/2006	24/10/2007	31/12/2014	30/06/2015	27.44 (Loan) 0.4 (Grant)	47.83	2.42	-	0.62	50.88

Table 1.
Implementation period, geographical coverage and types of projects

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Duration*</i>	<i>Geographical Area</i>	<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Main focus, components**</i>
Rural Financial Services Programme - RFSP (2004-2013)	9 years	National	MOFPED	RURAL FINANCE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment, strengthening and outreach of SACCOs • Strengthening apex institutions, regional networks and financial linkages • Strengthening regulation and supervision
District Livelihoods Support Programme – DLSP (2007-2014)	7 years	Western, Eastern, Northern, Central regions (13 districts)	MOLG	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community infrastructure • Agricultural development • Community Development • District and sub-county support
Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme ²⁵⁴ - CAIPP1 (2008-2013)	5 years	Central and Eastern regions	MOLG	ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural infrastructure improvement • Community mobilisation
Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services – ATAAS (2011-2018)	7 years	National	MAAIF	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing agricultural technologies and strengthening the National Agricultural Research System • Enhancing partnerships between agricultural research and other value chain stakeholders • Strengthening agricultural support services
Vegetable Oil Development Project 2 - VODP2 (2010-2019)	9 years	Central region (Lake Victoria) Northern and Eastern regions	MAAIF	MARKET ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil palm development • Oilseeds development
Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas- PROFIRA (2014-2021)	7 years	National	MOFPED	RURAL FINANCE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SACCO strengthening and sustainability • Community based financial services • Policy and institutional support
Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region PRELNOR (2015-2022)	7 years	Northern region	MOLG	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MARKETING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural livelihoods • Market linkages and infrastructure
National Oil Palm Project – NOPP (2019–2029)	10 years (planned)	Central and Eastern regions (Lake Victoria)	MAAIF	MARKET ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scaling-up investment in smallholder oil palm development • Livelihoods diversification and resilience • Oil palm sector development framework (policy, institutions, research)
National Oilseeds Project – NOSP (2020-2027)	7 years (planned)	Northern and Eastern regions	MAAIF MOLG	MARKET ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oilseed value chain development • Market linkage infrastructure serving oilseed sector

* “Actual” project duration, unless otherwise stated | ** Latest/final component structure

Source: CSPE Team based on project documents.

²⁵⁴ CAIPP1, a co-financed project with AfDB, received an award from the US Treasury in 2013.

Annex IV: Portfolio of grants or supplementary funds approved/supervised between 2013 and 2019 and linked to Uganda

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
1000004158	Uganda Oilseeds Subsector Platform	CSPC	Uganda	02/12/2011	30/06/2017	IFAD	1,140,000	SNV Netherlands Development Organisation
2000000266	Developing a Sustainable SACCO Union under PROFIRA	CSPC	Uganda	05/02/2015	30/09/2020	IFAD	1,000,000	Canadian Cooperative Association - WOCCU
2000001741	Scaling up remittances and financial inclusion in Uganda	CSPC	Uganda	17/06/2017	31/10/2020	FFR	465,000	PostBank Uganda
	Learning routes: a knowledge management and capacity building tool for rural development in East and Southern Africa (ROUTESA)	GLRG	Rwanda Kenya Uganda Madagascar Ethiopia Tanzania Malawi Lesotho Mozambique Swaziland Burundi South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe	12/04/2011	31/12/2014	IFAD	1,500,000	PROCASUR
1000004064	Community-led chain development for gender justice and pro-poor wealth creation	GLRG	Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda	11/11/2011	30/06/2015	IFAD	1,400,000	Oxfam Novib
1000004156	Rural finance knowledge management partnership	GLRG	Angola, Burundi, Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.	07/05/2012	31/12/2015	IFAD	1,500,000	AFRACA
1000004157	IFAD Africa Regional Knowledge Network - Phase II	GLRG	ESA countries, including Uganda	28/11/2012	30/06/2016	IFAD	1,800,000	PICO Knowledge Net Ltd
1000004347	Agricultural Advisory Services	GLRG	-	12/12/2012	30/06/2015	IFAD	1,000,000	African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services (AFAAS)
1000004385	Plantwise, a country-based approach to improve farmer livelihoods through reduced crop losses and increased productivity	GLRG	Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda	20/02/2013	30/09/2016	IFAD	1,400,000	CABI

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
1000004463	Cash-on-the-bag - Scaling up a Secure, Transparent Trading Business Model for Smallholders in East Africa (COB2)	GLRG	ESA countries, including Uganda	29/07/2013	30/06/2017	IFAD	1,440,000	Trade4All Limited
2000000040	AFRACA Development Programme 2013-2015	GLRG	All Countries represented through AFRACA membership, including those in ESA and WCA.	24/09/2013	31/03/2017	IFAD	1,000,000	AFRACA
2000000095	Land and Natural Resource Tenure Security Learning Initiative for East and Southern Africa – Phase 2 (TSLI-ESA-2)	GLRG	Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia	30/10/2013	30/06/2017	IFAD	1,425,000	UN Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat)
2000000218	EAC Partner States@50	GLRG		29/11/2013	28/02/2015	IFAD	95,000	Kilimo Trust
2000000165	Country Level Support to External Validity of Project Impact Evaluations - across all IFAD Regions	GLRG	ESA: Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia. Benefitting investment projects include: Uganda CAIIP1-II Plus NEN, APR, WCA, LAC	13/12/2013	31/08/2018	IFAD	500,000	International Initiative for Impact Evaluation - 3ie
2000000275	IIASA - Impact Evaluation	GLRG	Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Gambia, India, Kenya, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Rep, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines Sudan, Senegal, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia	19/12/2013	30/06/2017	IFAD	500,000	IIASA - International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
2000000126	Intercontinental Network of Organic Farmers Organizations (INOFO)	GLRG	Main beneficiaries are Organic Farmers Organizations in Peru, India and Uganda	10/01/2014	31/12/2017	IFAD	400,000	International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM)
200000167	Understanding changing land issues for poor rural people in sub-Saharan Africa	GLRG	Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal and Uganda	01/04/2014	30/06/2017	IFAD	325,000	International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)
2000000453	REACTS – Graduating Smallholders to “Farming as Business” through Inclusive Regional Food Markets	GLRG	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi	07/11/2014	30/06/2018	IFAD	920,000	Kilimo Trust

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
	Building capacity of the Batwa Pygmies for sustainable income generating enterprises using a cultural values approach	micro	Uganda	2015		Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility	39,000	Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation (Uganda)
200000310	Her Farm Radio	GLRG	Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda	01/01/2015	30/06/2017	IFAD	199,913	Farm Radio International
200000517	Learning Alliance for Adaptation in Smallholder Agriculture	GLRG	Global with specific country work done in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda Vietnam	30/01/2015	30/09/2018	IFAD	1,000,000	Financial management by CIAT. Technical management by CGIAR-CCAFS
200000503	Partnering for Value Promoting 4Ps in IFAD funded Value Chain Development Projects	GLRG	Mozambique, El Salvador, Senegal, Vietnam and Uganda.	05/02/2015	30/09/2018	IFAD	2,300,000	SNV Netherlands
2000001044	Regional Consultation with Pastoralist and livestock breeders CSOs - Towards better policies in support of pastoralism	GLRG	ESA: Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Plus countries in WCA, NEN, LAC and APR	05/08/2015	31/12/2017	IFAD	500,000	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières VSF-Germany
2000001111	Strengthening Civil Society Support for Farmers' Organizations	GLRG	Tanzania, Uganda	16/11/2015	30/06/2018	IFAD	NA	InterAction (ACVIA)
2000001053	Promoting People-Centred Land Governance with International Land Coalition Members	GLRG	Bangladesh; Cambodia; Indonesia; India; Nepal; Philippines; Bolivia; Colombia; Ecuador; Guatemala; Nicaragua; Peru; Cameroun; DRC; Kenya; Madagascar; Malawi; Niger; South Sudan; Togo. During the project period, a similar NES approach has started in Uganda; Tanzania; Honduras and Mongolia.	10/12/2015	30/06/2018	IFAD	2,000,000	International Land Coalition
2000001103	Scaling-up Sustainable Land Management (SLM) practices by smallholder farmers: working with agricultural extension services to identify, assess and disseminate SLM practices.	GLRG	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Uganda	29/02/2016	30/09/2019	IFAD	2,000,000	Center for Development and Environment (CDE)
2000001570	Regional Network of Farmers in Africa and South Asia (RENOFASA)	GLRG	-	14/06/2016	31/12/2016	IFAD	30,000	RENOFASA

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
2000001413	Food trees for diversified diets, improved nutrition and better livelihoods for smallholders in East Africa	GLRG	Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya	19/07/2016	31/03/2020	EC	1,020,480	ICRAF
2000001315	Harnessing CABFIN knowledge	GLRG	Benin, China, Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Uganda, Zimbabwe	03/01/2017	2021	IFAD	1,000,000	FAO
2000001515	Integrating ICT Tools into Plantwise to Support More Effective Data Capture and Use	GLRG	Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique	27/02/2017	30/09/2020	IFAD	1,700,000	CABI
2000001317	RF through cooperatives	GLRG	-	14/03/2017	30/09/2021	IFAD	2,660,000	CCA_UGA
2000001373	Challenges and Opportunities for Rural Youth Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Mixed-Methods Study to Inform Policy and Programmes	GLRG	Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania.	17/03/2017	30/09/2020	IFAD	1,500,000	Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
2000001833	Strategic support on mainstreaming nutrition in IFAD's investments	GLRG	Burundi, Nepal and Uganda	31/03/2017	End 2017	Canada	400,000	Bioversity International
2000001302	Strengthening Landscape-level Baseline Assessment and Impact-Monitoring in East and Southern Africa Project	GLRG	Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda	08/05/2017	31/12/2021	IFAD	2,000,000	ICRAF
2000001737	Driving transformative financial inclusion among migrants and their families to alleviate poverty via enabling cross-border mobile virtual network operator-Equitel	GLRG	Kenya / Uganda	17/06/2017	01/12/2019	Financing Facility for Remittances	246,000	Equity Bank Kenya
2000001855	Supporting Africa-wide Agricultural Extension Week themed: scaling up climate smart agriculture, integrating youth, women and the digital revolution.	GLRG	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo-DRC, South Africa, Burundi, Egypt, Gambia, Gabon, Swaziland, Somalia, Seychelles, Namibia, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of Congo,	19/09/2017	30/06/2019	IFAD	350,000	African Forum for Agricultural Advisory Services (AFAAS)

Grant ID	Name	Grant	Countries included	Date of effectiveness	Date of closing	Financier	Amount in US\$	Recipient
			Central African Republic, Senegal, Tanzania, and Angola					
2000001352	Rural youth access to finance	GLRG	Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda	11/10/2017	2021	IFAD	1,000,000	Eastern Africa Farmers Federation
2000001624	CGAP Inclusive Rural Finance	GLRG	Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda	06/02/2018	2022	IFAD	1,800,000	CGAP
2000001628	Scaling-up empowerment through household methodologies: from thousands to millions	GLRG	Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya	07/05/2018	31/12/2022	IFAD	2,250,000	Oxfam Novib and Hivos
2000001801	e-Granary Innovative Mobile Platform to Deliver Economic Services to Farmers in East Africa	GLRG	Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda	07/05/2018	2021	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program	2,980,777	Eastern Africa Farmers Federation
2000001629	Genetic diversity and breeding	GLRG	Ethiopia, Iran, Uganda	18/05/2018	2021	IFAD	3,500,000	Biodiversity International
	INSURED – Insurance for rural resilience and economic development		Global with core activities in Cambodia, Indonesia, Uganda and Zambia	2018	2022	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	6,000,000	IFAD (programmes)
2000002380	Leveraging South-South and Triangular Cooperation to share rural development solutions for private sector engagement	GLRG	Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda + APR countries	22/01/2019	31/03/2022	IFAD	500,000	AGRA/IFPRI
2000001435	Technical Assistance and Knowledge Exchange for Sustainable Management of Peatland Ecosystems in Malaysia	CSPC	Malaysia (but also facilitates knowledge exchange within Southeast Asia, and with other peatland countries in Africa, including Uganda)	28/01/2019	30/09/2023	IFAD	1,000,000	Global Environment Centre

<i>Grant ID</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Grant</i>	<i>Countries included</i>	<i>Date of effectiveness</i>	<i>Date of closing</i>	<i>Financier</i>	<i>Amount in US\$</i>	<i>Recipient</i>
2000002981	AFAAS support CAADP programme	GLRG	-	21/06/2019	30/04/2024	European Commission	5,110,000	AFAAS
2000002982	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA) support CAADP programme	GLRG	East and Central Africa	21/06/2019	30/04/2024	European Commission	5,370,000	ASARECA
2000003141	R-YES	GLRG	-			IFAD	1,750,000	Kilimo Trust
2000000924	ILC: CBA 1506 Uganda Land Alliance (ULA)		-	05/10/2015	31/05/2016	ILC	116,096	ULA
2000002582	NES 1818 Trocaire		-	10/12/2018	30/10/2019	ILC	70,000	Trocaire
	Income, Food and nutrition Security First: The Indigenous Batwa Youth and their Households around Echuya Central Forest Reserve in Kisoro District, southwestern Uganda.	micro	Uganda	2019	2021	Indigenous Peoples Assistance Facility	50,000	Biodiversity Conservation for Rural Development Uganda


Table 1
Periodization, main thrust and key thematic areas of the projects reviewed

<i>Project</i>	<i>COSOP period and main development</i>	<i>Key thematic areas of project</i>
RFSP	COSOP 1998 – Rural financial system	Rural finance - service provision, apex institutions, regional networks, regulation
DLSP	COSOP 2004 - Community-based integrated development – decentralization – smallholder agricultural production	Community-based development, capacity building of local government, community infrastructure, agricultural production
CAIIP1	COSOP 2004 - Community-based integrated development – smallholder agricultural production – market integration	Rural infrastructure, community mobilisation
ATAAS	COSOP 2004 – Smallholder agricultural production – access to capital and technology - market integration	Agricultural research/technologies, research and extension linkages, extension services, market linkages*
VODP2	COSOP 2004 – Smallholder agricultural production – access to capital and technology - market integration	Oil palm and oilseeds development including smallholder production, farmers' organisation, market linkages, agro-processing, infrastructure
PROFIRA	COSOP 2013 – Access to and use of financial services	Rural financial services, community-based financial services, rural finance policy and institutions
PRELNOR	COSOP 2013 – Production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture - market integration	Community planning and capacity development, climate resilient crop production systems, market access skills and partnerships, market access infrastructure
NOPP	COSOP 2013 - Production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture - market integration – access to and use of financial services	Oil palm development including smallholder production, farmers' organisations, market linkages, agro-processing, infrastructure and policy, institutions and research. Livelihoods diversification and resilience including crop and livestock production, climate -smart practices, extension service delivery, community based rural financial services, land tenure security
NOSP	COSOP 2013 – Production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture - market integration – access to and use of financial services	Oilseed value chain development including supply chain cluster development, provision of financial and technical services, road infrastructure

* From original project design
Source: CSPE elaboration, 2020.


Analysis of IFAD-supported projects in the CSPE

Figure 2
Proportion of funding by project and source over the CSPE period




Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, accessed January 2020.

Figure 3
Proportion of project financing by thematic area over time



Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, Thematic dashboard, accessed November 2020. Projects divided into 5 year time periods by their first year of implementation: 2004 – 2009 includes RFSP, CAIP1 and DLSP; 2010 – 2015 includes VODP2, ATAAS, PROFIRA and PRELNOR; and 2016 – 2021 includes NOPP and NOSP.

Annex VI: CSPE’s Theory of Change for 2013-18 COSOP



Assumptions

- A1. Government has the capacity to implement relevant policy and to resource due capital and recurrent costs of projects.
- A2. Governance and anti-corruption measures in IFAD-supported projects are adequate.
- A3. Political interference is minimal
- A4. IFAD-supported projects reach and benefit the country programme target group.
- A5. Favourable policies in place to support demand led extension and climate resilient approaches.
- A6. Favourable policies for private sector participation in the agricultural sector and access to land.
- A7. There is demand for the rural financial products; savings are made; loans are well invested by clients; CSCGs and SACCOs are viable; conducive government policy and interventions for rural finance.
- A8. Apex bodies of rural organizations are sustainable and provide adequate support to their member organizations
- A9. Improvements in household income and food security are not undermined by significant shocks especially for most vulnerable.
- A10. The most vulnerable rural poor can participate effectively in commercial value chain agriculture

Table 1. Correspondence between NDPII objectives, COSOP objectives and IFAD's Strategic Framework

<i>NDPII Objectives (2014/15-2019/20)</i>	<i>COSOP objectives (2013-2018)</i>	<i>IFAD strategic objectives (2016-2025)</i>
Overall Goal: To achieve middle income status by 2020 through strengthening the country's competitiveness for sustainable wealth creation, employment and inclusive growth.	Goal: To increase the income, improve the food security and reduce the vulnerability of the rural households living in poverty.	Overarching goal: Rural people overcome poverty and achieve food security through remunerative, sustainable and resilient livelihoods.
Objective 1: Increase sustainable production, productivity and value addition in key growth opportunities. <u>Sectoral results (Priority area "Agriculture"):</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase agricultural production and productivity. - Increase access to critical farm inputs - Increase the sustainable use of environment and natural resources 	SO1: The production, productivity and climate resilience of smallholder agriculture is sustainably increased. <u>Intended outcomes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase access to and utilization of appropriate agriculture technologies and inputs. - Enhance provision of relevant advisory services - Promote sustainable land and water management practices - Enhance farmers' capacities in climate-smart agriculture 	SO1: Increase poor rural people's productive capacities. <u>Area of thematic focus:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to natural resources - Access to agricultural technologies and production services SO3: Strengthen the environmental sustainability and climate resilience of poor rural people's economic activities. <u>Area of thematic focus:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environmental sustainability - Climate change
<u>Sectoral results (Priority area Agriculture):</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve agricultural markets and value addition for the 12 prioritized commodities (para. 376) 	SO2: The integration of smallholders into the markets is enhanced. <u>Intended outcomes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Invest in strategic value chains - Develop climate resilient economic infrastructure - Promote agro-processing and value-addition - Strengthen farmers organizations - Partner with local private service providers 	SO2: Increase poor rural people's benefits from market participation Diversified rural enterprise and employment opportunities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rural investment environment - Rural producers' organizations - Rural infrastructure.
<u>Sectoral results (Priority area Agriculture):</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increasing access to agricultural finance with specific attention to women (para. 378) 	SO3: The access to and used of financial services by the rural population are sustainably increased <u>Intended outcomes:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthen SACCOs - Scale-up community savings and credit groups - Support the institutional, policy and regulatory framework 	SO1: Increase poor rural people's productive capacities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusive financial services

Source: adapted from 'Quality of M&E Results and COSOP results management', M. Donnat, 2020.

Annex VII: Mission itinerary**IFAD CSPE Uganda 2020 – In-Country Field Mission**

District	Projects	Time	Site	Activities	Team	Remarks
Kampala Sunday 12 th				• Travel to Masaka and Kalangala	• Team A & Team B	• Stay in Masaka and Kalangala
1. Masaka Monday 13 th July 2020	• ATAAS	• Morning (9.00am - 2.00pm)	• DLG • ZARDI	• Interviews: ○ DPMO ○ HR Kamenyamiggo (Part of Mukono ZARDI) ○ View ATAAS infrastructure (Offices, furniture & Laboratories) ○ SLM & Gender, Environment Focal Point & DARST member ○ View SLM infrastructure/activity	• Team B (AK+CS)	• Stay in Masaka
		• Afternoon (1.30-3.30pm)	• Field	• View Motor Cycles • View Market infrastructures under ATAAS		
2. Kalangala Monday 13 th July 2020	• VODP2 • NOPP	• Morning (8.00am - 12.30pm)	• DLG • OPUL • KOPGT	• Interview key DLG staff (Project Focal Points) • Interview KOPGT staff (Manager, Finance, extension) • Interview OPUL manager • Interview farmer group (Hope)	• Team A (AB+HK)	• Depart for Kampala at 3pm
		• Afternoon (1.30-3.00pm)	• Field	• Interview grower association key persons • Interview 1 group		
3. Kayunga Tuesday 14 th July 2020	• RFSP • PROFIRA • ATAAS • CAIIP1	• Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	• DLG • Field	• Pay Courtesy call to CAO • Interview key DLG staff-DCO, DCDO • Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA) • Interview 1 PSPs (PROFIRA) • Visit CAR and market infrastructure sites • DPMO (ATAAS) • 2 Extension Staff (ATAAS) • District Engineer (CAIIP1)	• All Teams	In Kayunga
		• Afternoon (2.00-5.30pm)		• Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) • Interview 1 VSLA • 2 Farmers Groups ATAAS (women and youth). • View M/vehicle & M/Cycles		• Proceed to Iganga Via Jinja
4. Iganga/ Bugweri Wednesday 15 th July 2020	• RFSP • PROFIRA • VODP2 • CAIIP1 • ATAAS	• Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm)	• DLG • Field	• Pay Courtesy call to CAO • Interview key DLG staff • View motorcycles (ATAAS) • Interview SLM Focal Point • Visit CAR and market infrastructure sites	• All teams	• in Iganga
		• Afternoon (2.00-5.30pm)	• Field	• Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) • Interview oil seed linked farmer group • Interview 1 PSP (VODP) • Visit CAIIP1 processing infrastructure (Coffee, maize & rice mills) • Hold an FGD with an ATAAS farmer cooperative		• Stay in Iganga

District	Projects	Time	Site	Activities	Team	Remarks
5. Mayuge Thursday 16th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RFSP NOPP PROFIRA DLSP ATAAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Day 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DLG Field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pay Courtesy call to CAO Interview key DLG staff (DPMO, DCDO, DCO) Interview SLM Focal Point Interview 2 Mixed and women groups-ATAAS View vehicle & motorcycles Interview oil palm farmer group (VODP 2) Interview oil miller Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA) Interview 1 PSP (PROFIRA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team A (AB &CS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Depart early for Mayuge Stay in Iganga
6. Bugiri Thursday 16th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RFSP NOPP PROFIRA DLSP ATAAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Day 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DLG Field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pay Courtesy call to CAO Interview key DLG staff (DPMO, DCDO) View motorcycles Interview 2 youth and women groups-ATAAS Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA) Interview 1 PSPs (PROFIRA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team B (AK&HK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Depart early for Bugiri Stay in Iganga
7. Mbale Friday 17th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RFSP VODP2 PROFIRA CAIIP1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DLG Field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview key DLG staff Interview 1 large miller Interview 1 SACCO (PROFIRA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team A (AB+HK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Depart early for Mbale
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afternoon (2.00- 5.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview 1 market-linked farmer group Interview 1 VSLA (VODP2) Interview 1 PSP (VODP) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Teams stay in Mbale
8. Mbale Friday 17th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ATAAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Buginya nya ZARDI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focal point ATAAS /Estates officer Focal point SLM and Gender View investments in infrastructure in ZARDI Hold FGDs with SLM farmer groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team B (AK&CS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If not already there depart early for Mbale
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afternoon (2.00- 5.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DLG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DPMO Extension staff View Vehicle/Motor cycles SLM Investments/Infrastructure 2 Host farmers (youth and female) 3 groups (mixed, women and youth) Visit CAIIP1 rice mill 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Teams stay in Mbale
9. Sironko Saturday 18th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RFSP VODP2 PROFIRA CAIIP1 ATAAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (8.00am - 2.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DLG Field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview DLG staff (DE, DPMO, DEO, DCO) View m/vehicle & m/cycles Interview oil seed marketing group Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) Interview 2 PSPs (PROFIRA/VODP2) Interview 2 Farmer Groups (Youth and women- VODP2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proceed to Sironko early morning Stay in Mbale
10. Sunday 19th July 2020		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10.00am 07.00pm EAT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Travel Zoom Meeting with CD, NC& MD 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team A travel to and stay in Soroti (2Hrs) & Team B proceeds straight to Lira (4Hrs) 	
11. Lira Monday 20th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRELNOR ATAAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ngetta ZARDI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pay Courtesy call to D/CAO Interview DPMO & DAO(ATAAS) Focal point ATAAS Focal point SLM and Gender View investments in infrastructure in ZARDI PRELNOR Focal point Interview DARST member 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team B (CS+AK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Team B in Lira
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afternoon (2.00-5.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DLG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> View Vehicles/Motor cycles SLM Investments/Infrastructure 1 Host farmer 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stay in Lira

District	Projects	Time	Site	Activities	Team	Remarks
12. Soroti Monday 20 th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROFIRA • RFSP • VODP2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.00am - 1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLG • Millers • PSP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview key DLG staff (DCO, DCDO) • Interview 1 oil seed miller • Interview 1 hub coordinator with SPS • Interview 1SACCO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team A (HK&AB) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team A in Soroti
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon (2.00- 5.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 1 oil seed farmer cooperative • Interview 2 CSCG (PROFIRA) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team A Travels to Lira mid+ afternoon
13. Pader Tuesday 21 st July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRELNOR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.30am- 1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field Visits • DLG Office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pay Courtesy call to LCV chairperson & CAO • Interview key DLG staff • DPMO/DCO/DEO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team B (AK&CS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team B departs early morning for Gulu & straight to Pader Via Gulu
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field Visits • DLG Office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAR 1st batch • Farmer groups. • View M/vehicles/M/cycles • Meet CBFs & AEFs • Meet Market stakeholder platform • Talk to D/Engineer on site 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stay in Gulu
14. Apac/Kwani Tuesday 21 st July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROFIRA • RFSP • VODP2 • DLSP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.30am- 1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLG • Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview key DLG staff • Interview 1 CSCG (PROFIRA) • Interview 1 Farmer or youth group (VODP2) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team A (AB+HK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Already in Lira • Travel early morning to Apac
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon (2.00- 5.30pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 1 VSLA (VODP2 or RFSP) • Interview 1 medium/small miller (in Lira or Apac) • CAR (DLSP) if location is contiguous to other activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team A (AB+HK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stay in Lira
15. Omoro Wednesday 22 nd July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRELNOR • ATAAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.00am- 12.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pay Courtesy call to LCV chairperson & CAO • Interviews with DPMO, DCO • Meet Market stakeholder platform • Meet 20 CBF & 10 AEFs • View vehicles and motor cycles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team B (CS&AK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel early morning to Omoro
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub County 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 DFA representatives • 1 RETS institution • Market linkage activities • CAR 1st batch • 1 Farmer Group • 2 Vulnerable HHs • 1CBNRM Community 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stay in Gulu
16. Oyam Wednesday 22 nd July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RFSP • NOSP • VODP2 • PROFIRA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.30am- 1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLG • Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview key DLG staff (TBD) • Interview 1 VSLA (VODP2) • Interview 1 oil seed miller 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team A (AB+HK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From Lira travel to Oyam
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon (2.00- 6.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 1 SPS (VODP2) • Interview 1 SACCO (Board and management, 2 members – M & F) • FGD with 1 farmer producer/marketing cooperative • Interviews with 1 PSP (PROFIRA) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stay in Gulu
17. Gulu Thursday 23 rd July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRELNOR • ATAAS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.00am- 12.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with DPMO, DCO, DE, DCDO • 2 CBF. • 2 Extension staff • Meet Market stakeholder platform • View M/ Vehicle & M/cycles • 1 RETS institution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team B (CS&AK) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Already in Gulu
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon (1.00- 5.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub County 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFA representatives • CAR 1st batch • 2 Farmers Groups • CBNRM Community • 1 RETS institution • Weather station • Visit one of the New bridges 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proceed to Gulu afternoon 3.30pm

District	Projects	Time	Site	Activities	Team	Remarks
18. Gulu Thursday 23 rd July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROFIRA • VODP2 • PRELNOR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.30 am-1.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLG • Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview key DLG staff (DPMO) • Interview 1 PROFIRA SACCO (initial support)–1hr • Interview 2 PSPs (PROFIRA) - 1hour • Interview PRELNOR PMU staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team (HK&AB) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Gulu and stays in Gulu
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field Visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 RFSP Farmer Group – 1 hour • Interview 1 PROFIRA CSCG (executive/mgt) • Interview 1 village agent (PROFIRA) • Visit infrastructure site (if any - VODP) • Interview 1 PSP (for VODP2) – 1 hour (late evening) 		
19. Nwoya Friday 24 th July 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROFIRA • VODP2 • PRELNOR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.00am-12.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DLG • Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pay Courtesy call to CAO • Interview key DLG staff • Interview 1 PROFIRA SACCO (initial support) • Visit CARs • Interview 1 cooperative of farmer groups (VODP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Gulu still and staying in Gulu
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afternoon (8.00am-12.00pm) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Office • after Field visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMU meeting: Key Project Staff (PC, M&ES, ECCS), interviews • DFA meeting • Vulnerable HHs • 2 Farmer Groups • 2 Extension workers • Market linkage focal points/activities • CBNRM community • 1 RETS Institution 		
20. Gulu Saturday 25 th 2020		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morning (8.00am-1.00pm) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wrap-up team meeting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Gulu
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2.00pm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • En-route 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel to Kampala 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Return to Kampala
Sunday 26 th July 2020		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10.00am-2.00pm 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparation and sharing of week 2 highlights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All Teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Kampala
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3.30pm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zoom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field Review Meeting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSPE Team 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UG, UK, IT, MX

* Field Mission National Consultants: AB – Asaph Besigye; AK – Allen Kebba; CS – Christopher Sebatta; HK – Hope Kabuchu

Annex VIII: List of key persons interviewed

Government of the Republic of Uganda

Embassy of the Republic of Uganda in Rome

HE Elizabeth Paula Napeyok	Ambassador of the Republic of Uganda to Italy
Siragi Wakaabu	Agriculture Attaché, Alternate Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to IFAD

Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF)

Beatrice Byarugaba	Director, Agriculture Extension Services
Robert Khauka	Asst. Commissioner M&E
Okaasai Opolot	Retired Director of Crops Resources
Fred Mayanja	Commissioner Agriculture Planning Dept.
Stephen Ojangole	former MAAIF ATAAS Project Coordinator
Stephen Muwaya	National Coordinator Soil and Land use Management
Patience Rwamigisa	Commissioner Agricultural Extension
Fred Mukulu	District Production and Marketing Officer, Mukono District Local Government
Innocent Mutalya	District Coordinator SLM, Mukono District Local Government
Abbey Seguya	Principal Planner NARO

Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development (MOFPED)

Maris Wanyera	Acting Director, Directorate of Debt and Cash Management Policy
Molly Opio	Legal Officer and IFAD Desk Officer, Development Assistance and Regional Cooperation
Julius Mukholi	Principal Legal Officer, Development Assistance and Regional Cooperation

Ministry of Local Government

Benjamin Kumumanya	Permanent Secretary
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Representation of the Netherlands in Uganda

Josephat Byaruhanga	Senior Policy Officer
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International and donor institutions

African Development Bank

Asaph Nuwagira	Agriculture Specialist
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Department for International Development (DfID)

David Radcliffe	Consultant, PRELNOR ASAP grant
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European Union Delegation to Uganda

Adolfo Cires Alonso	Programme Manager, European Union Delegation
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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

Antonio Querido	FAO Representative in Uganda
Priya Gujadhur	FAO Deputy Representative in Uganda

World Food Programme (WFP)

Miyuki Yamashita Head of Food Systems

GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)

Robert Ocaya Agriculture and Rural Finance Advisor/GIZ
Armin Kloeckner

US Agency for International Development (USAID)

Martin Fowler Senior Agriculture Adviser

World Bank Uganda

Rasit Pertev Former Task Manager /Ag Economist World Bank

Ashesh Prasann Agro Economist (ATAAS)

Jeehye Kim ATAAS

Joseph Oryokot Task Team Leader for ATAAS, IFAD-supported projects

David Nielsen IEG Coordinator

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

APR (Asia and the Pacific Division)

Alessandro Marini Former Country Director of Uganda

ECG (Environment, Climate, Gender and Social Inclusion Division of IFAD)

Paxina Chileshe IFAD Regional Climate and Environment Specialist

ESA (East and Southern Africa Division)

Lakshmi Moola Country Director of Uganda

Pontian Muhwezi Country Programme Officer of Uganda

Dagmawi Habte-Selassie Programme Officer SMADF²⁵⁶

Stella Okot, Finance Analyst SMADF

Henrik Franklin Lead Portfolio Advisor

Shirley Chinien Regional Economist

Bernadette Mukonyora Country Director Eritrea and South Sudan, Former Officer in charge of grants

Marion Bradley Former Country Programme Manager of Uganda

Elena Pietschmann Programme Officer

FMD (Financial Management Services Division)

Bob Creswell Chief Financial Management Officer

PMI (Sustainable Production, Markets and Institutions Division of IFAD)

Harold Liversage Lead Global Technical Specialist, Land Tenure

Robert Delve Lead Global Technical Advisor, Agronomy

Elizabeth Ssendiwala Senior Regional Technical Specialist, Institutions

RIA (Research and Impact Assessment Division)

Alessandra Garbero Senior Econometrician

Romina Cavatassi Lead Economist

SKD (Strategy and Knowledge Department)

Helen Gillman Senior Knowledge Management Specialist

²⁵⁶ EU-financed Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund (SMADF)

WCA (West and Central Africa Division)

Ann Turinayo

Country Director, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone (former KM consultant/ officer in Uganda ICO)

IFAD Consultants

Mohamed Abdul Latif

Rami Salman

Procurement Consultant
Consultant, PRELNOR MTR Co-leader and ENRM/CC

William Steele

Rural Finance Consultant

Jorma Ruotsi

Rural Finance Consultant

Davis Atugonza

IFAD consultant, Financial Management

Rose Namara

IFAD consultant, M&E and Social Inclusion

Silvia Sperandini

Knowledge Management, Communication and Capacity Building Focal Point for the Gender Team

Baptiste Renard

ESA consultant

IFAD Project StaffAgricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS)

Larry Adupa

ATAAS Consultant

Jane Baitanunga

ATAAS Chairperson NaMbale Agribusiness Cooperative

Mayega Lawrence

Task Manager ATAAS/VODP2/NOPP, DPMO

Emmanuel Mukama

ATAAS, NOPP Consultant M&E Commissioner ACDP

Fred Mukulu

District Production and Marketing Officer, Mukono District Local Government

Innocent Mutalya

District Officer

Stephen Ojangole

ATAAS Consultant Project Coordinator, ACDP

Peter Ssentengo

ATAAS Consultant MTR

Ssentengo

ATAAS Consultant

Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme (CAIIP1)

Sserunkuuma Kibuuka Bbosa

CAIIP1 Processing facility manager

Juuko Erias

CAIIP1 District Engineer

Senyonga Musa

CAIIP1 Maize and rice Mill Manager

Yasin Sendaula (2013) and

Agriculture National Project Facilitator

Abbey Iga (2012)

National Project Facilitator CAIIP1

Mutesi Zainah

CAIIP1 Maize and rice Mill Manager

District Livelihoods Support Programme (DLSP) & PRELNOR

Judith Ruko

DLSP-Project Sociologist/ PRELNOR
Community Development SpecialistProject for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR)

Ivan Ebong

Ministry Coordinator, Project for the Restoration of Livelihoods in the Northern Region (PRELNOR)

Prossy Akumu

PRELNOR Ass. Accountant

Godfrey Obura

new Project Coordinator PRELNOR, Engineer

Martin Okeny

PRELNOR Gulu District Farmers Association

James Oguta

PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR CSCG Kayunga and Iganga

Joseph Wadribo

PRELNOR GALS Service Provider

Adong Anna

PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors,
Community Based Facilitator

Owiny Alfred	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator
Ojok Dennis	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors Agriculture Extension Facilitator (AEF)
Okello Simon	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors Community Based Facilitator
Auma Christine	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator
Odongokara Christopher	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator
Nippo Geoffrey	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator
Acellam Richard	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator
Atimango Nancy	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, HH Mentor
Kinyera Dennis	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF
Okot Peter Loris	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Community Based Facilitator
Okello George Alber	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP Member Policy and Committee
Angom Stella	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP Member Law and Policy
Ouma Thomas	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF
Ongwech Peninah	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF
Okot Phillipi Ongom	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF
Abalo Hope	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors AEF
Opoka Clayton Okello	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Odong Bosco	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, AEF
Aciro Elizabeth	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Amony Jaqueline	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, HH Mentor
Along Sam	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors AEF
Akunga James	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Kidega Morish	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Abalongo Evaline	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Labute James	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Longoti Simon	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Obura Bosco	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Okema Ronald	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Okot Anthony	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Achola Concy	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Ocaka Morrish	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Komakech David	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Atim Doris	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Okwonga Charles	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Atyeronimungu Justine	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Opiyo Morish	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Opiro Simon Peter	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Tino Evaline	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Okello Justine	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Apiyo Proscovia	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, CBF
Aho Stella	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Mentors
Ocen Alfred	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, Mentors, MSP Secretary
Onencan Charles	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP Mobilizer
Ogwang Dickens	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors, MSP member
Kilama Paul	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors SAO
James Akum	PRELNOR Staff CBF, AEF & Mentors,

Chairperson MSP Satellite Market

Project for Financial Inclusion in Rural Areas (PROFIRA)/ Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP)

Lance Kashugyera	Project Coordinator
Cindrella Auma	Village Agent – PROFIRA
Davis Byabamazima	PROFIRA Finance and Admin Manager
Nagadya Gertrude	PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR Hub coordinator
Fred Kasango	PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR
Patrick Kawanguzi	MD Best Africa
Sharon Kensita	PROFIRA Community Based Financial Services Manager
Michael Mabweijano	PROFIRA Logistics and Admin Office
John Mpaata	PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR, Mid North and Acholi Private Sector
Jacqueline Naggayi Mukisa	PROFIRA M&E and KM Manager
Emanuel Ogonya	PROFIRA/VODP2 Acholi private Sector Development Co Ltd

Vegetable Oil Development Project 2 (VODP2)

Connie Magomu Masaba	MAAIF Project Coordinator for Vegetable Oil Development Project 2 (VODP2), National Oil Palm Project (NOPP)
Nancy Acan	VODP2 Project Officer, IIRR
Mulindwa Boaz	VODP/VODP2 SFO KOPGT
Saridin Daminik	OPUL and KOPGT/VODP2 GM OPUL
Bisula Dasan	VODP/VODP2 IT Officer
Susan Lakwonyero	VODP2 Project officer VODP2; NOSP
Connie Magomu Masaba	VODP2 Project Oordinator (VODP2, NOPP)
Robert Masinde	PROFIRA, VODP2, PRELNOR South Eastern private Sector Promotion Enterprise
Roger Mulinde	VODP2 M&E Officer NOPP
Balironda David Mukasa	VODP/VODP2 General Manager KOPGT
Katusabe Olive	VODP/VODP2 Accountant KOPGT
Anthony Wanyoto	VODP2 Communication and KM Officer NOPP

National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS)

Christopher Bukenya	Technical Services Director
Samuel Mugasi	NAADS Executive Director, Project staff (CAIIP1) (DLSP)

National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO)

Losira Sanya	Directorate of Research Coordination, M&E
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District Research Centers (ZARDIs)/DLG staff

Geoffrey Akena	DCDO Nwoya, ZARDI
Christine Joy Apolot	DCO Soroti, ZARDI
Nantatya Sully Bazaalaki	VODP/VODP2 DAO, ZARDI
Okumu Benon	DCO, ZARDI
Alum Dorcus	ATAAS DAO, ZARDI
Oyuru James Ebony	DCO Apac, ZARDI
Emmanuel Emaru	Agricultural Officer, ZARDI
Ham Emukule	Ag DCO Oyam, ZARDI
Masa Erisa	VODP/VODP2 Extension worker, ZARDI
Nankya Eseri	ATAAS SLM Focal Person, ZARDI
Kanyike George	CAIIP1 Road inspector, ZARDI
Richard Gimogo	ZARDI/ATAAS Estates officer, ZARDI
Otim Godfrey	PRELNOR, CROP Agronomist & PRELNOR

Okidi Godfrey	Focal Person, ZARDI
Richard Gwahaba	PRELNOR, CDO, ZARDI
Irene	ATAAS S/C EXTENSION WORKER, ZARDI
Godfrey Jomo	PRELNOR Subcounty Development officer, ZARDI
Julius Kabbera	DPMO/PSO, ZARDI
Leonard Kitavuja	CAIP/PROFIRA DCO. Bugiri, ZARDI
Luke Lokuda	Deputy CAO Mayuge, ZARDI
James Lubambo	CAO Soroti, ZARDI
Nandaula Maureen	DCO Iganga, ZARDI
Emmanuel Kawuuzi	DCDO Kayunga, ZARDI
Kitala Keneth	ATAAS Extension worker, ZARDI
Paul Kilama	DCO Nwoya, ZARDI
Paul Mbiwa	Sr. Agricultural Officer Gulu/FCO, ZARDI
Baligeya Moses	PRELNOR, ZARDI
Samuel Mugasi	VODP/VODP2 DPMO, ZARDI
Robert Mugerwa	DLSP Project Coordinator
Samuel Mukasa	VODP/VODP2 Oil seeds Miller, ZARDI
Paul Mukhooli	DCO Kayunga, ZARDI
Baker Mwanja	DLSP CDO, ZARDI
Richard Nyeko	Sr. Community Development Officer Mbale, ZARDI
Geresem Ochecho	PRELNOR HHM beneficiary, atira Parish, ZARDI
Alfred Ocen	ATAAS Consultant
Tom Ogwal	PRELNOR DCO, ZARDI
Peter Okello	Sr. veterinary Officer Oyam, ZARDI
Alfred Olal	PRELNOR LCV Chairperson, ZARDI
James Okwi	PRELNOR DCO, ZARDI
Benson Otim	DPMO Nwoya, ZARDI
Torach Quinto	Ag. CAO Kayunga, ZARDI
Opio Geoffrey Ronald	Parish Chief, ZARDI
Santa	Ass. CAO Apac, ZARDI
Ojok Santo	PSO Nwoya, ZARDI
Okot Vincent Stephen	Ag. DE, ZARDI
Justine Tabu	CDO, ZARDI
Okello Thomas	PSO Nwoya, ZARDI
Lore Tom	ATAAS DPMO
John Ken Ssemanda	Deputy RDC, ZARDI
Benon Waiswa	ZARDI HR Manager
Anthony Wanzala	Principal Commercial Officer Mayuge, ZARDI
Willy Wepukhulu	Principal Assistant Secretary Mbale DLG, ZARDI
Ssebale Willia	DCO Mbale, ZARDI
Mike Yooga	CAIIP1 Superitendant of works, ZARDI
Sam Brian	Deputy CAO Iganga, ZARDI
Omwony	Komakech, ZARDI
Isiko Paul Moses	ZARDI
Sam Nyeko	ZARDI

Non-governmental organizations and associations

Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers' Forum (ESAFF)

Margaret Masudio District Chair in Adjumani district

Food Rights Alliance Uganda

Agnes Kirabo Executive Director

Oxfam (Uganda)

Peace Chandini

Project Coordinator/ Empower@skills

Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE)

Kenneth Katungisa

Chief Executive Officer

BeneficiariesSACCOs

Colin Agabalinda	PROFIRA SACCO Development Manager
Mutuyi Joseph Godfrey	SACCOs/PROFIRA/RFSP Chairman Board
Nabirye Dorothy	SACCOs/PROFIRA/RFSP Treasurer
Edrisa Mweru	SACCOs/PROFIRA/RFSP Board Member
Mutebi Edrisa	SACCOs/PROFIRA/RFSP SACCO Manager
Kigenyi Richard	SACCOs/PROFIRA/RFSP Accounts Assistant

Kirinya Bee Masters - Bugiri

Bugadde Sacco – Mayuge

Chairman Board

Busiu Sacco - Mbale

Market Vendors SACCO – Soroti

Alutkot SACCO – Oyam

Focus Group Discussions – Farmer Groups/CSCGs/VSLAs

KOPGT, Kalangala	11 Staff (5f, 6m)
Beta Farmers Group, Kalangala Mugoye Subcountry	5 Members (2f, 3m)
Kacyanga A, Kayunga, Busana Sub-County	17 Members (11 f, 6m)
Iganga, Namungalwe Sub-County, Rural Agribusiness Marketing Group (RAMKA)	4 Members (2f, 2 m)
Bukaboli ACE – Mayuge, Mayuge	5 Members
Namwony Women Farmers Group, Mbale, Busiu Subcounty	9 Members (7f, 2m)
Aliwulira CSCG – Bugweri, Iganga (Bugweri) Igombe Subcounty	26 Members (15f, 11m)
Shiner Savings Group – Sironko, Nalusara SubCounty	14 Members (10f, 4m)
Ebumakinos Women's Group- Soroti, Soroti Sub-County	9 Members (14f, 5m)
Amina Edeke Farmer Group – Soroti Arapai Sub-County	8 Members
Apac Farmers Cooperative Society, Apac NOTE EN TEKO CSCG, Apac Municipal Council	4 Members
Par-Pdiki Youth Group –Kwania, Aduku Sub-County	8 Members (3f, 5m)
ABEKAM ACE (Group Cluster Cooperative), Oyam, Aber Sub-County	5 Members (5m)
Langala Pe Lony CSCG – Omoro	5 Members
Alero Oil Seeds Growers Association Nwoya, Nwoya	15 Members

Private Sector

Saridin Dominik	General Manager OPUL
Robert Mugerwa	Mayuge, Universal Pride Oil Seeds Miller, Mayuge
Okwenyu Steven	Soroti, Maxssom Enterprises Oil Seeds Miller, Soroti
Apollo Mbazzira	SNV Uganda
Warwick Thomson	aBi Finance

Annex IX: Supporting data and tables for CSPE assessment

A. Finance and Supervision

Table 1.
Timeline between approval to disbursements (months)

Project name	Approval to signing	Signing to effectiveness	Approval to effectiveness	Effectiveness to 1st disbursement	Approval to 1st disbursement	1st to 2nd disbursement
RFSP	13.7	3.7	17.5	7.1	24.6	11.8
DLSP	7.6	2.7	10.3	1.9	12.2	5.9
CAIIP1	0.2	3.7	3.9	17.9	21.8	5.3
ATAAS	-. ^a	0 ^a	13.8	18.3	32.1	1.8
VODP2	-. ^a	0 ^a	6.0	7.4	13.4	7.4
PROFIRA	-. ^a	0 ^a	14.2	3.3	17.5	1.4
PRELNOR	-. ^a	0 ^a	7.6	5.0	12.7	4.3
NOPP	-. ^a	0 ^a	10.5	6.4	16.9	-
Uganda average	7.2^b	3.4^b	10.5	8.4	18.9	5.4
East and Southern Africa regional average^c	-	-	9.0	5.6	14.6	-

^a Since the General Conditions for Agricultural Development Financing was amended in 2009, financing agreements between IFAD and governments enter into force upon the signature by both parties (unless the respective financing agreement states that it is subject to ratification). Prior to this, financing agreements used to contain conditions for effectiveness, upon fulfilment of which the financing agreement was declared effective. Hence, for the financing agreements signed after this change, the date of effectiveness, or now called "entry into force" is the same day as the date of the financing agreement. Since 2009, the timeline between approval and signing is therefore the same as between approval and effectiveness and data are populated in the latter column. Since 2009, the timeline between signing and effectiveness is 0. ^b In light of point "a", the average is computed without data ATAAS, VODP2, PROFIRA, PRELNOR, NOPP. ^c For projects in the East and Southern Africa region approved between 2000 and 2019.

Table 2
Disbursement schedule of project

Year	RFSP	DLSP		CAIIP1	ATAAS	VODP2	PROFIRA	PRELNOR	
		Loan	Grant					Loan	Grant
1	5%	2%	0%	0%	0%	8%	10%	12%	10%
2	6%	6%	16%	3%	21%	18%	22%	19%	10%
3	12%	14%	16%	21%	33%*	25%	42%	32%	27%
4	27%	23%	16%	35%*	35%	32%*	64%*	58%*	54%
5	34%	31%	16%	64%	35%	43%	75%	64% ^b	59% ^b
6	43%*	41%*	16%	98%	47%	52%	79% ^b	-	-
7	57%	58%	37%	98%	82%	70%	-	-	-
8	74%	81%	97%	98% ^a	97%	80%	-	-	-
9	90%	100% ^a	100% ^a	-	-	95%	-	-	-
10	100% ^a	-	-	-	-	100%	-	-	-

Source: Oracle Business Intelligence, Flexcube, accessed on 24 April 2020

Bold numbers include additional loan or grant; * Year of MTR; a) At project closing; b) Ongoing projects, disbursements up to quarter 1 (March) 2020

Table 3
Extension of project period up to the closing date

Projects	Project period extension	Comments
RFSP	9-year project including two extensions of two- years and 3 months	100 per cent disbursement at closing. Initial delays from approval to effectiveness and after effectiveness, and then the loan extension, contributed to a slow rate of implementation.
CAIIP1	5-year project with a 3-month extension to the closing date	98 per cent disbursement at closing. A three-month extension to the closing date was required after the poor performance of suppliers of agro-processing equipment. The time was used to partially terminate these contracts and to find alternative suppliers of good quality equipment.
ATAAS	7-year project including two extensions of 1.5 years and 0.5 years.	97 per cent disbursement at completion. In 2015, the project was restructured and the closing date was extended by 1.5 years to implement the new and revised activities. In 2017, the project was restructured again and the closing date was given a six-month no cost extension to address both the outbreak of Fall Army Worm and the effects of the prolonged drought of 2016/17. The slow start-up (with a year's delay due to extended negotiations between the World Bank and Government and then slow parliamentary approval) and the subsequent two loan extensions slowed implementation and in turn the delivery of benefits.
VODP2	9-year project including two extensions of 1 year and 2 months	98 per cent disbursement at completion. The completion date of the oilseeds component was extended by one year to ensure that a large per centage of the farmer groups supported did not risk collapsing once project support ended and a further extension of 2 months due to the impact of COVID 19. Support for group consolidation was also useful in preparation for NOSP.

Source: Analysis of the data from Oracle Business Intelligence (Apr 2020); project documentation; RFSP PCR; ATAAS draft PPE, VODP2 PCR.

Table 4.
Project management costs and projects costs per beneficiary

Project	Project management cost ratio			Project cost per beneficiary ^a		
	(% of project total)					
	Planned ex	Interim	Ex post	Ex ante	Interim	Ex post
RFSP	6	-	6	82	-	17
DLSP	11	-	9	42	-	32
CAIIP1	4	-	n/a	7	-	19
ATAAS	11	-	12	65 ^b	-	43 ^b
VODP2	6	-	11	175	-	152 ^c
PROFIRA	16	15	-	49	24	-
PRELNOR	9	13	-	92	49	-
NOPP	6	-	-	1389	-	-
NOSP	7	-	-	357	-	-

^a Beneficiaries in this table refers to all household members, except for RFSP and PROFIRA where it refers to members of SACCOs/CSCGs; ^b Number of beneficiaries in ATAAS calculated by multiplying design/actual outreach to households by 6 members per household. The assumption of 6 members per household is used in outreach data from PRELNOR and VODP2.

^c VODP2 covered 89,782 households and 538,692 household members (PCR 2020)

Sources: Design reports, project completion reports, PCRVs and latest supervision mission reports for PROFIRA and PRELNOR, June 2020

Table 5
Number of missions undertaken per project per year by IFAD in Uganda

Project	Project years (a)	Total number of missions (b)	Number of missions per year (b/a)
RFSP	9.4	16	1.7
DLSP	7.2	12	1.7
CAIIP1	5.2	9	1.7
ATAAS	7.1	5	0.7
VODP2	9.2	17	1.8
PROFIRA*	5.8	12	2.1
PRELNOR*	5.1	11	2.2
NOPP*	1.5	3	2.0

*For ongoing projects, data on project years and number of missions are as at September 2020.

Source: Operational Results Management System, accessed September 2020.

B. Adoption Yield and Income Data

Table 1.
Proportion of households/beneficiaries adopting improved agricultural technologies (%)

Technology type		VODP2 ^{257,258} (Oil seeds)	ATAAS ²⁵⁹
Improved seed variety/certification	Baseline	17	63
	Target	90	78
	Endline	67	95
Fertilizers	Endline	Significant positive impact	
Pesticides/Herbicides	Endline	Insignificant impact	
Improved Livestock	Baseline	-	48
	Target	-	63
	Endline	-	63
Improved fisheries	Baseline	-	6
	Target	-	21
	Endline	-	3
Sustainable Land Management (SLM)	Baseline	Insignificant impact	-
	Target		10
	Endline		32

²⁵⁷ VODP2 Oilseed baseline survey report 2015 VODP2 PCR 2020.

²⁵⁸ VODP2 PCR 2020 (logical framework).

²⁵⁹ World Bank ATAAS ICRR 2019.

Table 2.
Final average farmer yields for target crops by project against target and baseline

Project	Cereals, tubers and legumes												Oil seed crops						Palm oil						
	Maize			Rice			Cassava			Beans			Soybean			Sunflower			Groundnut			Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	
	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target	Yield (MT/ha)	% above baseline	% above target				
PRELNOR ²⁶⁰	1.9	18	-	2.1	8	-	-	-	-	1.7	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PRELNOR VHHs ²⁶¹	0.8	69	-	0.5	-11	-	0.8	-	-	0.5	31	-	0.9	164	-	-	-	-	0.6	-3	-	-	-	-	-
VODP2 ²⁶²	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	147	65	1.7	91	1	-	-	-	12	218	-20	-
ATAAS ²⁶³	2.3	77	53	2.8	180	143	4.1	141	116	0.7	40	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DLSP ²⁶⁴	0.8	35	-	0.02	-37	-	0.2	24	-	0.3	33	-	-	-	-	0.05	72	-	0.2	49	-	-	-	-	-

²⁶⁰ PRELNOR MTR (2019) with yields at household level (beans, maize, rice) and from adaptive trials and farmer demonstrations (cassava) comparing improved with local crop varieties.

²⁶¹ PRELNOR second vulnerable household (VHH) cohort outcome report, with sampling of 394 mentee households (November 2019)

²⁶² VODP2 PCR (September 2020);

²⁶³ World Bank ICR and ICRR 2019. Data rounded to nearest hundredth. Plus, milk yield of 6,600 litres/day/cow (120 per cent of baseline)

²⁶⁴ DLSP impact assessment 2015

Table 3:
Impact on the proportion of households owning assets

Asset	RFSP ²⁶⁵		CAIIP1 ²⁶⁶		DLSP ²⁶⁷		ATAAS ²⁶⁸		PRELNOR VHH ²⁶⁹		
	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Endline	Baseline	Outcome to-date	
Productive assets	Cow	43%	51%	38%	43%	-	-	-	-	5%	23%
	Sheep	10%	15%	3%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Goats	48%	62%	42%	41%	-	-	-	-	34%	52%*
	Chicken	52%	62%	64%	69%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Hoes	83%	90%	92%	98%	95%	92%	-	-	89%	94%
	Plough	7%	9%	7%	1% ²⁷⁰	-	-	-	-	6%	31%
	Cart	4%	5%	-	-	5%	6%	-	-	2%	13%
Household assets	Beds	-	-	-	-	81%	92%	-	-	26%	38%
	Fridge	11%	16%	2%	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Radio	87%	92%	77%	79%	27%	47%	56%	55%	15%	39%
	Television	32%	41%	4%	7%	4%	4%	14%	20%	-	-
	Mobile phone	77%	92%	59%	78%	30%	64%	75%	85%	22%	44%
Transport assets	Bicycle	54%	61%	51%	53%	62%	67%	-	-	21%	43%
	Motorcycle	21%	34%	13%	17%	7%	14%	10%	15%	-	-
	Car/vehicle	9%	13%	-	2%	-	-	6%	7%	-	-

Table 4:
Project baseline and completion reports

Project	Project Effectiveness Year	Baseline Report year	Gap	Project Closing Year	Project Completion Report year
RFSP	2004	2008	+4	2013	PCR (June, 2014)
DLSP	2007	2007	0	2015	PCR(December, 2015)
CAIIP1	2008	2011	+3	2013	PCR(June, 2014)
ATAAS	2011	2015 ²⁷¹	+4	2019	ICR (2019) by World Bank PCR (June, 2019)
VODP2	2010	2014	+4	2020	PCR (August, 2020)
PROFIRA	2014	2016	+2	2022	N/A
PRELNOR ²⁷²	2015	N/A	-	2023	N/A

Source: CSPE analysis from project documents.

²⁶⁵ RFSP impact assessment, comparing the assets of “borrowers” in 2008 to 2013.

²⁶⁶ CAIIP1 2014 Follow-on RIMS study, comparing assets from 2007 to 2013

²⁶⁷ DLSP 2015 impact assessment, comparing “before” and “after” situations of respondents

²⁶⁸ ATAAS 2018 impact evaluation, 2014 to 2018

²⁶⁹ PRELNOR 2019 reports on the intermediate outcomes from the first cohort (655 vulnerable households, from 2017 to 2019) and second cohort* (394 vulnerable households, from 2018 to 2019)

²⁷⁰ Animal drawn plough. There was a decrease in the proportion of households using animal drawn tools/ploughs from 7 per cent to 1 per cent, largely explained by extended periods of insurgency and loss of livestock in areas where draft animals were used for farm work.

²⁷¹ The ATAAS baseline study was done by Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS).

²⁷² PRELNOR has no project baseline study. However, in a piece-meal manner, the PMU M&E office has been collecting baseline data from the VHH batches (Source: Field Mission, 2020 interview with PRELNOR PMU).

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