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الاستثمار في السكان الريفيين

# التقرير السنوي عن نتائج وأثر عمليات الصندوق لعام 2020

**مذكرة إلى السادة ممثلي الدول الأعضاء في المجلس التنفيذي**

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روما، 8-11 سبتمبر/أيلول 2020

**للاستعراض**

# المحتويات

## شكر وامتنان

أعد التقرير السنوي عن نتائج وأثر عمليات الصندوق لعام 2020 Hansdeep Khaira، موظف التقييم في مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق، تحت إشراف Fabrizio Felloni، القائم بالأعمال المؤقت لمكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق، وSuppiramaniam Nanthikesan، موظف التقييم الرئيسي في مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق. وقد دعمهم في هذا العمل باقتدار كل من Valentina Di Marco، وGiulia Pollastri، وLaura Morgia، من مكتب التقييم المستقل، واستفاد التقرير من عملية استعراض داخلية جرت في المكتب.

ويود المكتب أن يعبّر عن امتنانه العميق لإدارة الصندوق وموظفيه على دعمهم الكامل، وعلى تعليقاتهم الثاقبة على مسودة هذا التقرير التي تم النظر فيها حسب الأصول بما يتماشى مع سياسة التقييم في الصندوق عند إعداد التقرير النهائي.

# موجز تنفيذي

## أولا - المقدمة

1- هذا هو الإصدار الثامن عشر من التقرير السنوي عن نتائج وأثر عمليات الصندوق، الذي يعده مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق. ويعرض التقرير موجزا تجميعيا عن أداء العمليات التي يدعمها الصندوق، ويسلط الضوء على القضايا الشاملة والمنتظمة، والدروس، والتحديات بغية تعزيز الفعالية الإنمائية للعمليات التي يمولها الصندوق. ومن حيث المنهجية والمضمون، يشارك التقرير في بعض أوجه التشابه مع التقارير السنوية الرائدة لمكاتب التقييم في المؤسسات المالية الدولية الرئيسية، مثل البنك الدولي، ومصرف التنمية الآسيوي، ومصرف التنمية الأفريقي.

2- **الهيكل المتطور للتقرير.** منذ إصداره لأول مرة في علم 2003، تم تنقيح تركيز وهيكل التقرير عدة مرات لتحسين ملاءمته بالنظر إلى الأولويات والمتطلبات المتغيرة. وتمشيا مع هذا التأكيد المستمر على تحسين الملاءمة، خضع تقرير عام 2020 لتغييرات من أجل معالجة ما يلي: (1) احتياجات التعلم والمساءلة المتغيرة لأصحاب المصلحة الرئيسيين في الصندوق بالنسبة لمكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق، كما تنعكس في التغذية الراجعة من الهيئات الرئاسية وإدارة الصندوق؛ (2) التوصيات النابعة عن استعراض الأقران الخارجيين لوظيفة التقييم في الصندوق لعام 2019؛ (3) عملية التأمل الداخلي لمكتب التقييم المستقل، التي دعت إلى زيادة فائدة التقرير من خلال وثيقة أكثر تبسيطا؛ (4) النُهج المتطورة لدى المؤسسات المالية الدولية الأخرى.

3- **وتقرير** عام 2020 هو الخطوة الأولى للانتقال نحو تقرير يسعى، بالإضافة إلى الوظيفة الحالية المتمثلة في تعزيز المساءلة، إلى جلب المزيد من المعرفة القابلة للتطبيق إلى المائدة. وهو يتضمن تغييرين رئيسيين. الأول هو عدم وجود فصل لموضوع التعلم. فإثر تلقي تغذية راجعة من المجلس التنفيذي، يتم اتباع نهج أكثر شمولا من خلال تقديم تحليل عبر مجموعة من التدخلات والسياقات الإنمائية التي يمكن أن تساعد المشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق على تحسين تصميمها وتنفيذها. وينصبّ التركيز على توفير نظرات ثاقبة في العوامل المتكررة التي تؤثر إيجابا أو سلبا على الفعالية الإنمائية لعمليات الصندوق واستراتيجياته. والثاني هو أن تقرير هذه السنة لا يتضمن توصيات، بما يتماشى مع ممارسات المؤسسات المالية الدولية الأخرى. ويتوقع أن تساعد نتائج تقرير عام 2020 على تحديد مواضيع للتقييمات المستقبلية، التي ستقدم بدورها توصيات أكثر تركيزا وتحديدا.

4- **المحتويات المتطورة للتقرير.** ابتداء من تقرير عام 2020، وبينما سيستمر عرض نتائج الأداء في تشكيل الأساس المتين لكل إصدار، سوف تتطور طريقة عرض مواضيع التعلم، وذلك لكي تساهم بشكل أفضل في تعزيز الفعالية الإنمائية لعمليات الصندوق. وسوف يتم تناول هذا بمزيد من التفصيل في سياق تنقيح دليل التقييم في عام 2021.

5- **المنهجية.** يستند أداء التصنيفات الحالية وطويلة الأجل التي يعرضها التقرير إلى المشروعات والبرامج التي يقيمها مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق. فالمشروعات تُقيّم وتصنَّف من خلال عشرة معايير للتقييم، وهي: الأثر على الفقر الريفي؛ والصلة؛ والفعالية؛ والكفاءة؛ واستدامة الفوائد؛ والمساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة؛ والابتكار؛ وتوسيع النطاق، وإدارة البيئة والموارد الطبيعية؛ والتأقلم مع تغير المناخ. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، يتم تقييم أداء الصندوق والحكومة كشركاء في كل مشروع. وأخيرا، يتم عرض معيارين مركبين لتقييم أداء المشروعات (متوسط الصلة، والفعالية، والكفاءة، والاستدامة)، والإنجاز الإجمالي للمشروعات (جميع المعايير العشرة) في جميع التقييمات. واتباعا لمعيار الممارسة الجيدة لفريق التعاون في مجال التقييم التابع للمصارف الإنمائية متعددة الأطراف من أجل تقييمات القطاع العام، يستخدم الصندوق سلم تصنيف مؤلف من ست نقاط لتقييم الأداء بالنسبة لكل معيار تقييم.

6- ومقاييس الأداء لا تمكّن المنظمة من فهم ما إذا كانت النتائج قد تحققت وحسب، بل تقدم تشخيصات هامة أيضا، مثل استدامة التدخلات، وملاءمتها للمجموعات المستهدفة، وكفاءتها، وتسلط الضوء بالتالي على المجالات التي تحتاج إلى تحسينات. ويتم الحصول على التصنيفات من تقييمات أداء المشروعات، وتقييمات الأثر، وتقارير التثبت من تقارير إنجاز المشروعات. ويتم الحصول على تصنيفات الأنشطة غير الإقراضية من تقييمات الاستراتيجيات والبرامج القطرية.

7- وبما يتماشى مع الممارسات الموحدة في المؤسسات المالية الدولية الأخرى، يتم شرح التوجهات الرئيسية في الأداء من خلال تحليل للنسب المئوية للأداء المرضي إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك على أساس متحرك لمدة ثلاث سنوات، لتسليط الضوء على التوجهات طويلة الأجل، وتسوية التقلبات قصيرة الأجل (تحليل التغييرات من سنة إلى أخرى قد يكون شديد الحساسية لمثل تلك التقلبات). واستمد أداء التصنيف في هذا التقرير من 259 من المشروعات التي أُنجزت بين عامي 2007 و2018.

8- **ولتحسين** ملاءمته لعمليات الصندوق الحالية، نقحّ تقرير عام 2020 منهجيته، وحدّد القضايا المتكررة الناشئة عن نتائج التقييم المتعلقة بتصميم وتنفيذ التدخلات على مستوى المشروعات والمستوى القطري. وقد تم تحديدها باستخدام نُهج كمية ونوعية (برنامج NVivo)، وتم اختيارها من أجل عمليات التثبت من تقارير إنجاز المشروعات، وتقييمات أداء المشروعات، وتقييمات الأثر التي تم استكمالها في عام 2019. وعند تحديدها، يتم إرجاعها إلى التقييمات التي أجريت في عامي 2018 و2017 (ما مجموعه 109 تقييمات). ويستند التحليل على المستوى الاستراتيجي إلى التقييمات الواردة في تقييمات الاستراتيجيات والبرامج القطرية الـ 14 التي استكملت في الأعوام 2017، و2018، و2019. وقد استمرت قضايا التصميم المتكررة في التصاميم المعتمدة في سنوات مختلفة وانتشرت عبر جميع الأقاليم الجغرافية. واستمرارها يستحق تدقيقا أوثق، ويوفر نظرات ثاقبة مفيدة للتحقق من صحة عمليات التصميم الحالية.

9- **العملية**. استند تشكيل تقرير عام 2020 إلى مبادئ الاستجابة والتعاون. وخلال إعداد التقرير، تم تقديم عروض عن النتائج الأولية للشُعب في دائرة إدارة البرامج، ودائرة الاستراتيجية والمعرفة، وللإدارة العليا، واستخلاص التغذية الراجعة. وقد تم استكمال التقرير مع الأخذ بالاعتبار التعليقات المكتوبة الواردة من الإدارة.

## ثانيا – أداء الحافظة

10- **ويظهر أحدث أداء للمشروعات (المنجزة في الفترة ما بين 2016-2018) أن تصنيفات أغلبية المعايير تقع في نطاق المرضي إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك**. ويبين الرسم البياني ألف أنه باستثناء الكفاءة، حققت أغلبية المشروعات نسبة أعلى من التصنيفات الإيجابية أو المرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك. وفي أحدث فترة (2016-2018)، كانت المعايير ذات التصنيفات الإيجابية الأعلى هي الصلة (84 في المائة)، وأداء الصندوق كشريك (83 في المائة)، وإدارة البيئة والموارد الطبيعية (83 في المائة)، والتأقلم مع تغير المناخ (77 في المائة). والابتكار (77 في المائة). وعلى الطرف الآخر من الطيف، كانت الكفاءة، والاستدامة، وأداء الحكومة، مع نسبة أقل من التصنيفات المرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك (بين 48 و58 في المائة من التصنيفات المرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك).

الرسم البياني ألف

**ترتيب جميع المعايير بحسب حصتها من التصنيفات المرضية بشكل عام**

النسبة المئوية للمشروعات الحاصلة على تصنيفات مرضية/غير مرضية بشكل عام، 2016-2018




المصدر: قاعدة بيانات التقييم في مكتب التقييم المستقل (التثبت من تقارير إنجاز المشروعات/تقييم أداء المشروعات)، أبريل/نيسان 2020.

11- **التوجه التاريخي للإنجاز الإجمالي للمشروعات تراجع بشكل طفيف على المدى المتوسط وهو متسق مع توجه تقارير إنجاز المشروعات.** وأظهر الأداء الإجمالي للمشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق، كما تم قياسه من خلال معيار الإنجاز الإجمالي للمشروعات، هبوطا طفيفا منذ الفترة 2013-2015 (الرسم البياني باء)؛ ونسبة التصنيفات المرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك في الفترة الأحدث (2016-2018) هي 72 في المائة. وتتبع التصنيفات في تقارير إنجاز المشروعات بشأن نفس المعيار توجها مشابها لتصنيفات مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق على مدى نفس الفترة.

الرسم البياني باء

**عرض عام مجمع لمعايير الأداء باستخدام تصنيفات مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق**

النسبة المئوية للمشروعات المصنفة على أنها مرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك، 2007-2018




المصدر: قاعدة بيانات التقييم في مكتب التقييم المستقل (عمليات التثبت من تقارير إنجاز المشروعات/تقييمات أداء المشروعات)، أبريل/نيسان 2020.

12- يُظهر أداء عمليات الصندوق في السنوات الخمس الماضية أربعة أنماط متميزة. يظهر تحليل لتصنيفات المشروعات المنجزة أربعة أنماط متميزة.

- أولا، توجه مستوٍ أو هابط على نحو طفيف، مع ابتداء الأخير في الفترة 2013-2015. ويظهر هذا النمط ثلاثة تصنيفات – الصلة، والفعالية، وأداء الصندوق.
- ثانيا، توجه هابط أكثر وضوحا؛ وفي هذه الحالة، كان الهبوط أكثر من 10 في المائة في الفترة ما بين 2013-2015 والفترة الأحدث، وتشمل خمسة معايير – الأثر على الفقر الريفي، والابتكار، وتوسيع النطاق، والمساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة، وأداء الحكومة. وعلى وجه الخصوص، هبطت التصنيفات المعطاة لأداء الحكومة بنسبة أكبر من نسبة أي من المعايير الأخرى، هبوط بنسبة 20 في المائة في الفترة ما بين 2013-2015 والفترة الأحدث.
- ثالثا، توجه هابط يتبعه ارتفاع طفيف في الفترة الأحدث. وشهد معياران - الاستدامة والكفاءة – تحولا إلى الأعلى في التصنيفات الإيجابية خلال الفترة الأحدث. وهذا جدير بالملاحظة لأنه يأتي في أعقاب توجه آخذ في الهبوط منذ الفترة 2012-2014. وسوف تؤكد نتائج تقرير العام القادم ما إذا كانت الزيادة الأخيرة ستستمر.
- رابعا، توجه إيجابي طويل الأجل. تصنيفات معيارين – إدارة البيئة والموارد الطبيعية، والتأقلم مع تغير المناخ، تأخذ في معظمها مسارا نحو الأعلى منذ الفترة 2010-2012.

13- متوسط التفاوت الإجمالي (أو الفارق المطلق) في الفترة 2007-2018 بين تصنيفات كل من مكتب التقييم المستقل ودائرة إدارة البرامج هو (-0.29)، وهو مماثل للتقارير السابقة، ولكنه تراجع بالنسبة لبعض المعايير. وعلى وجه الخصوص، تظهر الفعالية، والتأقلم مع تغير المناخ، وإدارة البيئة والموارد الطبيعية تفاوتا أقل من المتوسط. وأعلى تفاوت بين متوسط تصنيفات مكتب التقييم المستقل ودائرة إدارة البرامج هو بالنسبة للصلة (-0.48)، بينما الأدنى هو للأثر على الفقر الريفي (-0.16). والفرق بين متوسط تصنيفات مكتب التقييم المستقل ودائرة إدارة البرامج ذو دلالة إحصائية أيضا بالنسبة لجميع المعايير. ويقترح تحليل ارتباط أجري على تصنيفات مكتب التقييم المستقل ودائرة إدارة البرامج أن التوجهات في تصنيفات دائرة إدارة البرامج ومكتب التقييم المستقل متسقة بشكل عام. والارتباط عالٍ بشكل مخصوص بالنسبة للفعالية، والكفاءة، والأثر على الفقر الريفي، وأداء الحكومة، وأداء المشروعات، والإنجاز الإجمالي للمشروعات.

14- **أداء البلدان التي تعاني من أوضاع هشة.** يوفر التقرير أيضا تقييما لأداء البلدان التي تعاني من أوضاع هشة. ويظهر التحليل أن المشروعات في البلدان التي تعاني من أوضاع هشة حققت في المتوسط نسبة أعلى من التصنيفات المرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك في الفترة الحديثة (2016-2018) بالمقارنة مع الفترة السابقة (2015-2017). وفي الفترة الحديثة كذلك، كانت تصنيفات المشروعات في هذه الأوضاع، بالنسبة لأغلبية معايير التقييم، أعلى من أو مساوية لتصنيفات المشروعات في البلدان التي لا تعاني من أوضاع هشة.

## ثالثا – التعلم من النجاحات والتحديات المتعلقة بتصميم المشروعات

15- يقدم التقرير مجموعة مختارة من العوامل التي حددتها التقييمات على أنها تساهم في أداء المشروعات، وبالتالي في التوجهات الملاحظة في الأداء في الفترة الأخيرة. وتغطي هذه العوامل المتكررة جميع الأقاليم الخمسة. ويمكن اعتبارها نظامية لأنه وُجد أنها مستمرة في التصميم والتنفيذ.

16- وبعض العوامل أساسية من أجل تصميم ناجح، كما أبرزت ذلك نتائج التقييمات التي أجريت بين عامي 2017 و2019، وهي: (1) معالجة خصوصية السياق؛ (2) الاستهداف الاجتماعي الفعال؛ (3) تماسك مكونات وأنشطة المشروعات؛ (4) دمج الدروس المستفادة من الماضي؛ (5) الشراكات من أجل تحقيق النتائج؛ (6) تحديد المخاطر والتخفيف من آثارها؛ (7) تعزيز ملكية التدخلات من قبل أصحاب المصلحة. ويمكن لهذه

العوامل أن تعمل كعوامل تمكين وتقييد على السواء بالنسبة لتصاميم المشروعات الناجحة. وترد أدناه النتائج والدروس الرئيسية المتعلقة ببعض العوامل المختارة.

17- **معالجة خصوصية السياق. إن التحليل الكافي للسياق في التصميم والتنفيذ هام في جميع الحالات، بل وأكثر من ذلك في أوضاع الحوكمة الضعيفة، والمؤسسات الهشة، والأطر القانونية والتنظيمية غير الكافية.** ويعرض التقرير الحالي ثلاثة أنماط شائعة للنظر غير الكافي في السياق التي يمكن أن تؤدي إلى نتائج دون المرغوبة: أولا، التصاميم المفرطة في التعقيد، والتغطية الجغرافية الطموحة للغاية؛ وثانيا، عدم استيعاب قدرة الحكومة على التنفيذ والتنسيق، مما يؤدي إلى التأخيرات في التنفيذ؛ وثالثا، تصاميم المشروعات ذات التوقعات الطموحة للدخول في شراكات مع القطاع الخاص، مع عدم تصور الحوافز المناسبة والتقدير بشكل غير واقعي للنفور من المخاطر.

18- **الاستهداف الاجتماعي الفعال. تظهر التقييمات الأخيرة أن إدماج المستفيدين يتم إدخاله في التصاميم بشكل عام. غير أن المشروعات الأكثر نجاحا تضمنت نهجا أكثر تركيزا من خلال الأنشطة المكيفة لمجموعات محددة من المستفيدين.** وهكذا، وفيما يتعلق بالتمايز بين الجنسين، كانت المشروعات الناجحة هي التي: (1) حدد فيها الاستهداف المناصر للفقراء تدخلات السلع وسلاسل القيمة التي تم اختيارها؛ (2) استهدفت فيها النساء من خلال الأنشطة التي وفرت لهن مصادر دخل متنوعة؛ (3) تم فيها إيلاء الاهتمام المناسب لإدارة عبء وقت النساء، على سبيل المثال عن طريق الحد من الوقت المستغرق في جمع المياه. أما استهداف الشباب، من جهة أخرى، فندر ما تم تقييمه في عينة المشروعات التي تم استعراضها، كموضوع جديد نسبيا. ويواجه الشباب تحديين اثنين رئيسيين من حيث سبل العيش: الوصول إلى الأصول والسلع والخدمات، ونقص الفرص لاكتساب مهارات جديدة، ويؤكد التحليل في التقرير الحاجة إلى نهج أكثر تحديدا بشأن الشباب لمعالجة هذه التحديات.

19- **التعلم من المشروعات الماضية. تظهر التقييمات الأخيرة أن الدروس المستفادة من الماضي يمكن أن تكون مفيدة بشكل خاص في مجالين.** بالنظر إلى تباين السياقات التي تعمل فيها مشروعات الصندوق، تم تحديد هذين المجالين: (1) المدة المطلوبة لتعزيز قدرات منظمات المنتجين؛ (2) القدرات المؤسسية للوكالات المنفذة. وكلا المجالين حاسم في دفع نجاح المشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق. وتعزيز قدرات منظمات المنتجين هو أحد الأنشطة الرئيسية في تحقيق الفعالية الإنمائية والاستدامة. وتقييم القدرات المؤسسية مقدما، ولا سيما عندما تكون ضعيفة، يساعد المشروعات على الاستعداد بشكل أفضل للتنفيذ.

20- **إقامة الشراكات المناسبة من أجل الفعالية الإنمائية عامل متكرر هام في المشروعات التي تم تحليلها، ولا سيما في أحدث التقييمات.** واختيار الشركاء الذين لا يتمتعون بقدرات وخبرات التنفيذ الكافية، بالاقتران مع متطلبات المساهمة غير الكافية، أثرت بشكل سلبي على فعالية الأنشطة. وفي مشروعات سلاسل القيمة بوجه خاص، أعاق التركيز المفرط على الإنتاج الشراكات بين الجهات الفاعلة في الأنشطة التنفيذية، خصوصا مع وبين أصحاب المصلحة في القطاع الخاص. وفي نهاية المطاف، فقد أضعف هذا الروابط مع الأسواق. ومن جهة أخرى، فإن الشراكات الناجحة مع المؤسسات التقنية مثل معاهد البحوث الزراعية أو معاهد التكنولوجيا الزراعية مهمة لضمان الدعم للمستفيدين من المشروعات، حتى بعد إغلاق المشروعات، شرط أن تكون هذه المعاهد ممولة بشكل كاف من الحكومة بعد الإغلاق.

## رابعا – النتائج والدروس المستفادة من تنفيذ المشروعات

21- في حين أن دور مرحلة تصميم المشروع هي وضع إطار وتحديد المسار الأكثر فعالية لتحقيق المشروع لأهدافه الإنمائية، فإن دور التنفيذ هو ضمان استيفاء معايير الجودة المتوقعة، واحترام الجدول الزمني، أو تكييف التنفيذ مع السياقات المتغيرة، وتحقيق النتائج المرغوبة. وقد تم تسليط الضوء في التقييمات الأخيرة على عدة عوامل متكررة تدعم أو تعيق تنفيذ التنفيذ. وهذه العوامل هي: (1) جودة التنفيذ ودعم الإشراف؛ (2)

جودة إدارة المشروعات؛ (3) الدعم المقدم للمجموعات والمؤسسات؛ (4) التدريب من أجل تعزيز قدرات المستفيدين؛ (5) التكيف مع التغييرات في السياق الخارجي. ومن أصل هذه العوامل، نظر التحليل في ثلاثة عوامل حيث كانت نتائج التقييم مفيدة: (1) التدريب من أجل بناء قدرات المستفيدين، وهو نشاط رئيسي شائع في معظم المشروعات؛ (2) دعم مجموعات ومؤسسات المنتجين، وهما أكثر الجهات الفاعلة الشائعة في المشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق؛ (3) التكيف مع السياق الخارجي المتغير.

22- **التدريب من أجل بناء قدرات المستفيدين.** أشارت التقييمات إلى المساهمة الإيجابية للتدريب فيما يتعلق بتعزيز رأس المال البشري للمستفيدين. وقد كانت جودة التدريب ذاتها فعالة بشكل خاص عندما رافقها تقدير الاحتياجات والاستهداف الصحيحين. ووجدت التقييمات أن المدة والتوقيت المناسبين للتدريب يمكنان المستفيدين من الوصول إلى مستوى معين من النضج. وفي هذا الصدد، يتعين على تقديم التدريب أن يأخذ في الاعتبار ضرورات المستفيدين (مثل برنامج النساء اليومي لرعاية أطفالهن، وبدل النقل) من أجل تجنب التغيب والتسرب. ولا يمكن خلق الظروف المثلى لنقل المعرفة إذا تم تقديم التدريب في وقت متأخر من البرنامج أو عندما تكون هناك فجوة زمنية كبيرة بين تقديم التدريب وتطبيقه الفعلي.

23- **الدعم المقدم للمجموعات والمؤسسات. كان تركيز معظم المشروعات فيما يتعلق بمجموعات المزارعين على كل من التسويق والتمكين.** وتركز دعم مجموعات المزارعين في معظمه على زيادة التسويق مع تمكين المجموعات في الوقت ذاته. وكانت المشروعات الناجحة هي تلك التي ساعدت على تعزيز ليس إنتاجية المحاصيل وحسب، بل أيضا جودة المنتج- محفزة بذلك القطاع الخاص على المشاركة بشراء المنتج – وتلك التي قدمت الدعم اللوجيستي والتمويل المسبق لتعاونيات المزارعين. وبالإضافة إلى السعي وراء التسويق، عززت هذه المشروعات تمكين المجموعات من خلال التحديد التشاركي للأولويات وتنفيذ الاستثمارات المتفق عليها، وتحكم المجموعات بالموارد، والروابط التي أقيمت مع المؤسسات المحلية (مثل مجموعات المزارعين التي تقدم مدخلات للمؤسسات الحكومية المحلية).

24- **التكيف مع التغيرات في السياق الخارجي. واجهت مرونة الصندوق واستجابته للأحداث الخارجية خلال التنفيذ تحديات، ولكن التقييمات تسلط الضوء على عدد من الحالات الناجحة.** وأدت أحداث خارجية إلى تأخيرات في التنفيذ، وعدم إنجاز الأهداف، وفي بعض الحالات إلى تمديد المشروعات. غير أن الحالات الناجحة كانت تلك التي: (1) طورت مبادرات على أساس تجريبي للاستجابة لإطلاق خطة وطنية أو قطاعية جديدة من قبل الحكومة؛ (2) عدّلت وشحذت أنشطة المشروعات (بالحد من التركيز الجغرافي، وإشراك المؤسسات الإنمائية الزراعية المحلية بشكل أقوى في التنفيذ، وصقل آليات الرصد والتقييم والتنسيق بين الشركاء الإنمائيين)؛ (3) لها تركيز أقوى على التنمية المجتمعية (وبوجه خاص النساء والشباب) في وجه الاضطرابات الاجتماعية؛ (4) عززت دعم الهياكل الحكومية اللامركزية.

25- **بشكل عام، لكي يكون التنفيذ ناجحا، يتمثل أحد أهم العوامل المحركة في قدرة وخبرة وحدات إدارة المشروعات. ويبقى دعم الصندوق لوحدات إدارة المشروعات حاسما.** وفي حين أن العوامل التي تم فحصها أعلاه يمكن أن تكون عوامل تمكين وتقييد في إنجاز المشروعات، فإن جودة وحدات إدارة المشروعات أساسية بالنسبة للتنفيذ الناجح. ومستوى خبرات ومؤهلات الموظفين، ومعدل دوران الموظفين جوانب أساسية تدعم جودة هذه الوحدات. وفي هذا الصدد، لا يمكن المبالغة في دور الصندوق في تقديم إشراف ودعم للتنفيذ ذي جودة.

## خامسا ـ النتائج والدروس المستفادة من الأنشطة غير الإقراضية

26- **تأرجح الأداء طويل الأجل للأنشطة غير الإقراضية بين فترات من الصعود والهبوط.** فبعد زيادتها حتى عام 2011، تم تعزيز الهبوط الأخير في إجمالي الأنشطة غير الإقراضية، التي تتألف من إدارة المعرفة، والشراكات، والانخراط في السياسات، من خلال أداء إدارة المعرفة، مع كون 50 في المائة من التصنيفات

مرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك. وكان أداء بناء الشراكات جيدا في الفترة الأخيرة، مع كون 64 في المائة من التصنيفات مرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك، بينما أظهر الانخراط في السياسات على المستوى القطري زيادة طفيفة إلى 50 في المائة.

27- **لقد عمل مزيج من أدوات الاتصالات بشكل جيد بالنسبة لإدارة المعرفة، غير أن المعرفة تبقى محصورة إلى حد كبير بمستوى المشروعات، ولا تساهم بشكل كاف في العمليات المؤسسية والسياساتية الأرفع مستوى.** واستخدمت المشروعات مجموعة مختلفة من أدوات الاتصال، بما في ذلك وسائل الإعلام المطبوعة والإلكترونية لتقاسم ونشر المنتجات المعرفية والوصول إلى جماهير أوسع على الصعيد الوطني. وقد تم تبادل الزيارات بين المشروعات، وتنظيم أحداث للتعلم (إلا أن جودة نظم الرصد والتقييم كانت متباينة). وعلى الرغم من ذلك، لم تكن المنتجات المعرفية دائما مصممة خصيصا للاستخدام في مستودعات المعرفة المؤسسية أو منتديات السياسات الأرفع مستوى. إذ تتطلب مدخلات منتديات السياسات الأرفع مستوى ومستودعات المعرفة المؤسسية طبقة إضافية من الصقل التحليلي، مع تسليط الضوء على الأبعاد والتداعيات السياساتية، التي تعالج اهتمامات السلطات العليا لصنع القرار.

28- **لقد كانت الشراكات مع الحكومات مثمرة، ولكن التعاون أو التنسيق كان أوليا مع الوكالات الأخرى التي تتخذ من روما مقرا لها، ومتفاوتا مع الوكالات الإنمائية.** ارتكزت معظم المشروعات إلى وزارة الزراعة، وأدى هذا إلى إقامة علاقة قوية بين الطرفين، مع كون الصندوق الشريك المفضل، ولا سيما في البلدان منخفضة الدخل. وكان معنى هذا أن مشاركة الوزارات الرئيسية الأخرى كانت مقتصرة على مستوى المشروعات فقط. واتصف التعاون مع الوكالات الإنمائية الأخرى في عدة حالات بالعمل غير الكافي لبناء شراكات منهجية كان من شأنها أن تؤدي إلى تجميع الوكالات المختلفة لمواردها من أجل تحقيق فعالية أفضل وأكثر كفاءة للمعونة. وقد كان هناك تعاون أكبر نسبيا مع الوكالات التي تتخذ من روما مقرا لها بالمقارنة مع الشركاء الإنمائيين الآخرين، وإن يكن على مستوى تقني.

29- **إن دعم الصندوق الاستراتيجي وإجراءاته من أجل الانخراط في السياسات لا يتطابقان دائما مع أهداف الانخراط ونطاق الأنشطة المطلوبة لتحقيقها.** وفي البلدان التي كان الصندوق فيها طرفا فاعلا صغيرا نسبيا، كانت عمليات التعاون مع الشركاء الإنمائيين مفيدة بالنسبة لانخراطه مع الحكومة. ومن المجالات التي تبرز فيها مساهمة الصندوق في الانخراط في السياسات التمويل الريفي، ويستحق هذا النجاح التكرار. وفي حالات أخرى، كان هناك بعض عدم التطابق بين الأهداف التي ينبغي تحقيقها عن طريق الانخراط السياساتي في برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية والموارد (الوقت والموظفين)، والقدرات المخصصة مقابل تحدي تحقيق تغيير مناصر للفقراء في السياسات. وكانت معظم جداول أعمال برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية المتعلقة بالانخراط في السياسات ذات صلة بالسياق، ولكن كان هناك تخطيط قليل بشأن عمليات الإصلاح السياساتي التي ينبغي للصندوق الانخراط فيها، ومجموعات العمل وفرق العمل التي ينبغي للصندوق المشاركة فيها، غالبا بسبب الموارد المحدودة للمكاتب القطرية.

30- **ومن حيث مجموعات الدخل، تظهر البلدان منخفضة الدخل أداء مساويا لأداء البلدان متوسطة الدخل أو أفضل منه بالنسبة للانخراط في السياسات والشراكات.** ويظهر الانخراط في السياسات على المستوى القطري تصنيفات متوائمة بين مجموعتي البلدان. وحقق بناء الشراكات أداء أفضل بكثير في البلدان المنخفضة الدخل من البلدان المتوسطة الدخل. وتقترح هذه النتائج أنه في البلدان المنخفضة الدخل كانت هناك فرص أكثر للشراكة، بالنظر إلى العدد الأكبر للوكالات الثنائية ومتعددة الأطراف التي تعمل هناك، منظمة في مجموعات تنسيق مواضيعية، وبفضل دعم الحكومة لتنسيق الجهات المانحة. وكان الوضع مختلفا في عدة بلدان متوسطة الدخل. وعلى الرغم من ذلك، ما زالت البلدان متوسطة الدخل تظهر طلبا على التمويل والشراكات المعرفية، بالنظر إلى التقدم الذي أحرزه عدد منها في الحد من الفقر ومن أجل الحفاظ على سجل جيد في تعزيز النمو.

## سادسا - النتائج والدروس المستفادة من الاستراتيجيات والبرامج القطرية

31- **كان التوجه الاستراتيجي للبرامج القطرية متوائما بشكل عام مع سياسات وأولويات الصندوق والحكومات وتكيف مع السياق المتغير**. كانت برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية متوائمة بشكل جيد مع السياسات الإنمائية والقطاعية الرئيسية للحكومات، ووفرت فرصا لتنفيذ بعضها. ويتمثل أحد أسباب هذه المواءمة في العملية الاستشارية التي جرت في وضع برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية الجديدة، بما في ذلك المشاورات المنتظمة مع الحكومات والشركاء الإنمائيين، وحلقات العمل التثبيتية لأصحاب المصلحة التي ضمنت أن برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية تعكس الأولويات الوطنية في الزراعة والتنمية الريفية. وفي حين كان الوصول المستدام والمربح إلى الأسواق الموضوع المهيمن في المجموعة الأحدث من برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية المقيّمة، كان هناك تأكيد واضح على مواضيع مثل نظم الإنتاج المستدامة الفعالة والذكية مناخيا، مما حسّن إدارة الموارد الطبيعية وبناء صمود أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة.

32- **كانت تدابير التخفيف المقترحة لإدارة المخاطر المحددة في البرامج القطرية أحيانا أقل تحديدا وأقل تناسبا مع الوسائل التي يمكن للصندوق نشرها**. غطّت معظم برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية بشكل كاف المخاطر المتعلقة بسياسات محددة للقطاع، والجوانب والمخاطر الائتمانية المتعلقة بالممارسات المؤسسية. ومن جهة أخرى، كانت بعض تدابير التخفيف واسعة جدا، مما وضع تنفيذها الفعلي أو فعاليتها موضع تساؤل. على سبيل المثال، كانت بعض التدابير المقترحة – مثل دعم منظمات المنتجين لتقديم مساهمة مفيدة في تنمية السياسات الزراعية، أو خلق مناخ من الثقة بينها وبين الحكومة من خلال الاجتماعات المنتظمة والمشاورات المفتوحة – عامة إلى حد ما.

33- **من منظور استراتيجي، ما زالت الروابط بين الأنشطة الإقراضية وغير الإقراضية تتطلب التعزيز**. وما زالت برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية تعتمد إلى حد كبير على حافظة الاستثمارات، مع إيلاء اهتمام أقل للأنشطة غير الإقراضية. وبرامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية الأكثر فعالية هي التي تضع جدول أعمال واضح وقابل للتطبيق من أجل الأنشطة غير الإقراضية، وتوفر مؤشرا للموارد الإدارية المقدرة والدعم التقني المقدم من المقر والمراكز الإقليمية. ولكن هذا لم يحدث في حال أغلبية الاستراتيجيات القطرية التي تم تقييمها.

## سابعا - النتائج والدروس المستفادة من مجالات الأولويات المؤسسية

34- يعرض تقرير عام 2020 النتائج والدروس المستفادة في المجالات الأربعة للتمايز بين الجنسين، والتغذية، والشباب، والمناخ التي أعطيت الأولوية في ظل التجديد الحادي عشر لموارد الصندوق. وكانت الاستراتيجيات القطرية والمشروعات المقيمة التي تشكل جزءا من التحليل قد صممت قبل إضفاء الطابع المؤسسي على تعميم هذه المجالات الأربعة. لذلك، فإن الغرض هنا ليس تحليل أدائها بقدر ما هو عرض نتائجها وتقديم دروس محتملة قد تكون ذات صلة ومفيدة للجهود الجارية لتعميم هذه المجالات. وتُعرض أدناه النتائج والدروس الرئيسية في كل من المجالات الأربعة.

**التمايز بين الجنسين**

(1) تطور تركيز الصندوق على التمايز بين الجنسين من توفير مبادئ توجيهية عامة بشأن دمج التمايز بين الجنسين في المشروعات إلى استراتيجيات تنفيذ وخطط عمل أفضل تحديدا بشأن التمايز بين الجنسين.

(2) وقد كانت أنشطة تمكين المرأة الأقوى في التدريب، والتمويل الصغري، وأنشطة محددة لتوليد الدخل.

(3) ولكن ما يزال يلزم توسيع جهود الحد من عدم المساواة بين الجنسين بشكل كامل من مستوى المشروعات إلى المستوى الاستراتيجي، على سبيل المثال من خلال الاستخدام الأكبر للانخراط السياساتي.

**التغذية**

(1) لم تكن النتائج المتعلقة بالتغذية جزءا صريحا من الأهداف الاستراتيجية على مستوى البرامج.

(2) كان من المتوقع تحقيق الأهداف المتعلقة بالتغذية من خلال زيادة الإنتاج والدخول.

(3) كان دور النساء هاما بشكل خاص في تحقيق نتائج تغذوية إيجابية.

(4) التوفر المحدود للنتائج التغذوية أعاق تقييم التغذية في التقييمات التي نظر فيها هذا التقرير.

**الشباب**

(1) التطور الاستراتيجي للصندوق من حيث انخراط الشباب أصبح أكثر وضوحا في الآونة الأخيرة، بما يتماشى مع زيادة التركيز على تعميم قضايا الشباب.

(2) وتقبل الشباب لتدخلات الصندوق في الزراعة يقوم على إشراك الشباب في مرحلة مبكرة من تصميم المشروعات.

(3) وعمل الصندوق مع الشباب الريفي يتطلب توجها استراتيجيا، يشمل استخدام الأنشطة غير الإقراضية.

(4) يجب أن تشمل نُهج تعميم قضايا الشباب الاعتبار الكامل لملاءمة الأنشطة والمنتجات لتطلعاتهم.

**المناخ**

(1) معظم برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية المقيمة التي وضعت بعد عام 2010 تتضمن عناصر متعلقة بتغير المناخ كجزء من أهدافها الاستراتيجية.

(2) في حين تم مواءمة الأهداف المتعلقة بالمناخ في برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية مع السياسات والأولويات الوطنية ذات الصلة، وجدت التقييمات أدلة محدودة على توجيه المعرفة والتعلم من مستوى المشروعات إلى مستوى السياسات والاستراتيجيات الوطنية كي تستنير بها.

(3) يتم إيلاء اهتمام متزايد للطبيعة المترابطة للتكيف مع تغير المناخ في المشروعات.

(4) محاولة الموازنة بين الفوائد الأطول أجلا المستمدة من التدابير الخاصة بتغير المناخ والاعتبارات الاقتصادية الأقصر أجلا أمر يمثل تحديا.

## ثامنا - الاستنتاجات

35- **تظهر السلسلة الزمنية لتقرير عام 2020 المتعلقة بمعايير الأداء أن أغلبية التصنيفات تبقى في فئة المرضية إلى حد ما أو أفضل من ذلك. وقد كان هناك توجه إجمالي هابط في تصنيفات المشروعات المنجزة منذ الفترة 2013-2015، وإن يكن مع بعض التباينات والاستثناءات**. وكانت هناك أنماط أداء مختلفة عبر معايير التقييم، في كل من الأداء الأخير والتوجهات طويلة الأجل. وتظهر ثلاثة معايير – الصلة، والفعالية، وأداء الصندوق – توجهات متقلبة، مع بعض الاستواء أو الهبوط في الآونة الأخيرة.

36- **وهناك توجه هابط أكثر وضوحا في حالة خمسة معايير: الأثر على الفقر الريفي، والمساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة، والابتكار، وتوسيع النطاق، وأداء الحكومة**. وقد شهد أداء الحكومة بشكل خاص أحدّ هبوط. ولكن اثنين من المعايير، هما إدارة البيئة والموارد الطبيعية، والتأقلم مع تغير المناخ، شهدا مسارا صاعدا. وعلاوة على ذلك، اتخذت كل من الكفاءة والاستدامة مسارا هابطا، ولكنهما شهدتا ارتفاعا طفيفا في الفترة الأخيرة. وتظهر مقارنة بين التصنيفات الذاتية والمستقلة أن التوجه في تصنيفات تقارير إنجاز المشروعات (التقييم الذاتي) مشابه لما لوحظ في تصنيفات مكتب التقييم المستقل (التقييم المستقل) على مدى الفترة 2013-2018.

37- **وبشكل عام، لقد تكيف التركيز الاستراتيجي للبرامج القطرية للصندوق بشكل جيد مع السياق المتغير، ولكن أوجه التآزر بين الأنشطة الإقراضية وغير الإقراضية يحتاج لأن يُستغل بشكل أفضل**. والبرامج القطرية للصندوق متوائمة بشكل عام مع سياسات وأولويات كل من الصندوق والحكومات. وفي هذا الصدد، فقد صقلت

تركيزها على الأولويات الناشئة. غير أن الروابط بين الأنشطة الإقراضية وغير الإقراضية لم يتم استغلالها بالكامل بعد. وقد لاحظت التقييمات اثنين من القيود. أولا، تبقى المعرفة التي تولدها المشروعات والشراكات المقامة مع الجهات الفاعلة في المشروعات مقتصرة على مستوى المشروعات فقط، وغالبا ما لا تغذي الأنشطة غير الإقراضية على المستوى الاستراتيجي. وثانيا، طموحات برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية من حيث نطاق الأنشطة غير الإقراضية لا تتطابق مع الموارد والقدرات المتاحة لتحقيقها.

38- **يمكن ربط أداء المشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق بأربعة عوامل في وقت التصميم: (1) التطرق للسياق المحدد؛ (2) استراتيجيات الاستهداف المتباينة؛ (3) الشراكات من أجل تحقيق النتائج؛ (4) التعلم من خبرة الماضي.** يسلط التحليل المستعرض في التقرير الضوء على عدد من العوامل ذات الأهمية في مرحلة تصميم المشروعات، والتي لها تأثير قوي على أداء المشروعات. على سبيل المثال، التصاميم المعقدة والمبالغة في الطموح لجهة التغطية الجغرافية والأهداف قوضت الفعالية الإنمائية للمشروعات. وبالمثل، عدم التحديد بدقة للمخاطر المحتملة على تحقيق نتائج المشروعات في مرحلة مبكرة من التصميم أثّر على الأداء. وأخيرا، اختيار الشركاء الذين لا يمتلكون قدرات وخبرات التنفيذ المناسبة لتنفيذ المشروعات أثّر سلبيا على فعالية الأنشطة التي يدعمها الصندوق.

39- **تتعلق تحديات التنفيذ الرئيسية بما يلي: (1) ضمان تنفيذ الأهداف المتعلقة بوقت وجودة الإنجاز؛ (2) التكيف مع التغييرات في المشهد الاجتماعي، والسياسي، والطبيعي، والإنمائي، ولا سيما في البلدان التي تعاني من أوضاع هشة.** وأوضح التحليل أن الانتقال من التصميم إلى التنفيذ يشكل تحديا. وتشمل التحديات الداخلية ضمان أن الأهداف المتعلقة بوقت وجودة أنشطة المشروعات التي وضعت مفاهيمها في مرحلة التصميم يتم تنفيذها. وتتعلق التحديات الخارجية بضمان أن التنفيذ يجري كما هو مخطط له في وجه التحولات في المشهد الاجتماعي، والسياسي، والطبيعي، والإنمائي. ويعتمد التنفيذ الناجح إلى حد كبير على قدرات وخبرات وحدات إدارة المشروعات. وأداء وحدات إدارة المشروعات مجال يشكل تحديا، كما انعكس ذلك في الهبوط طويل الأجل للتصنيفات المتعلقة بأداء الحكومة. وفي نفس الوقت، تعتبر جودة الإشراف ودعم التنفيذ في الصندوق ذات أهمية لتعزيز وإصلاح الأداء.

40- **جهود الصندوق المتعلقة بالتمايز بين الجنسين والمناخ توفر دروسا هامة من أجل تعميم قضايا الشباب والتغذية.** وتظهر النتائج المستقاة من التقييمات أن المشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق أحرزت تقدما فيما يتعلق بالتمايز بين الجنسين والمناخ. ومن حيث التمايز بين الجنسين، هناك حالات انتقلت فيها مشاركة النساء من مجرد الإدماج من خلال الحصص إلى أنشطة محددة تتناسب بشكل أفضل مع احتياجاتهن. وفي عدة حالات، تم رفع المناخ من مجرد نشاط على مستوى المشروعات ليصبح أحد الأهداف الاستراتيجية في البرامج القطرية. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، وفي كلا هذين المجالين، هناك تحديد أوضح للأهداف والنتائج المطلوبة لتحقيق هذه الأهداف، مع إطار للرصد لتتبع التقدم المحرز. ومن جهة أخرى، واجهت التقييمات صعوبة في إيجاد صلات واضحة أو صريحة بين أنشطة ومخرجات المشروعات والنواتج المتعلقة بالتغذية. وما زالت النتائج المتعلقة بالشباب شحيحة نظرا إلى أن هذا مجال هام ولكنه مجال تركيز حديث نسبيا. وبالمضي قدما، يمكن الاقتداء بالجهود سابقة الذكر المتعلقة بالتمايز بين الجنسين والمناخ لتعميم قضايا الشباب والتغذية بصورة ناجحة.

41- **تستدعي مجالات الأداء الهابط التي تم تحديدها في تقرير عام 2020 المزيد من الفحص.** وتدل توجهات الأداء على أن الهبوط الملحوظ في مجالات الأثر على الفقر الريفي، والمساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة، والابتكار، وتوسيع النطاق، وأداء الحكومة يتطلب الاهتمام. وأداء الحكومة بوجه خاص مجال شهد هبوطا حادا في التصنيفات. ونظرا إلى أن أداء الحكومة يؤثر على المعايير الأخرى مثل الكفاءة، والاستدامة، وأداء الصندوق، على سبيل المثال لا الحصر، ويتأثر بدوره بها، ينبغي أيضا إجراء المزيد من الفحص على هذه

المجالات. ويقدم تقرير عام 2020 أيضا تحليلا للعوامل المتكررة، التي تغطي طيفا من التدخلات والسياقات، وصلاتها المحتملة بتحسين البرامج.

42- وبالمضي قدما، يتطلب هذا العمل من قبل كل من الإدارة ومكتب التقييم المستقل. وفي حالة الإدارة، يمكن لهذا النقاش أن يؤدي إلى فحص العوامل الكامنة وراء التوجهات الأخيرة، وعملية داخلية من التأمل الذاتي والتعلم ضمن الأجزاء المختلفة للصندوق لصياغة حلول مؤطرة تتناسب مع مجالاتها وأوضاعها، ويمكن أن تساعد على تعزيز الفعالية الإنمائية لبرامج الصندوق.

43- وبالمثل، يمكن لنتائج تقرير عام 2020 أن تساعد مكتب التقييم المستقل في تحديد المواضيع لمنتجات التقييم الأخرى، مثل التقييمات المؤسسية، والتقييمات المواضيعية، والتوليفات التقييمية. وبدورها، يمكن لهذه التقييمات المساهمة في تقديم توضيح أفضل للتوجهات في التصنيفات ونتائج التقرير الأخرى. وعلاوة على ذلك، وبما يتماشى مع الطبيعة المتطورة للتقرير، يمكن للإصدارات المستقبلية – بالإضافة إلى تحليل توجهات التصنيفات على مستوى المشروعات – تكريس المزيد من الانتباه لتعزيز النتائج من تقييمات المستوى الأعلى والاستراتيجي لمكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق، بما في ذلك تقييمات الاستراتيجيات القطرية والبرامج القطرية. ومن شأن هذا أن يقدم إضافة إلى المحتوى الاستراتيجي والاستشرافي للتقرير.

44- وأخيرا، يمكن في المستقبل، وبالتشاور مع الإدارة، تخصيص أقسام من التقرير لاستعراض لاحق لمتابعة توصيات تقييمات مختارة لمكتب التقييم المستقل، وأي فجوات متبقية. وهذه هي الممارسة الحالية في المؤسسات المالية الدولية الأخرى.

# 2020 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (Main report)

## Contents

# Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AsDB | Asian Development Bank |
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| APR | Asia and the Pacific Division (IFAD) |
| ARRI | Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations |
| CLE | corporate-level evaluation |
| COSOP | country strategic opportunities programme |
| CPM | country programme manager |
| CSPE | country strategy and programme evaluation |
| ENRM | Environment and natural resources management |
| ESA | East and Southern Africa Division of IFAD |
| ESR | Evaluation synthesis report |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| GEWE | Gender equality and women's empowerment |
| IE | Impact evaluation |
| IFI | International financial institution |
| IOE | Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD |
| LAC | Latin America and the Caribbean Division (IFAD) |
| M&E | monitoring and evaluation |
| NEN | Near East, North Africa and Europe Division (IFAD) |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| PCR | Project completion report |
| PCRV | Project completion report validation |
| PMD | Programme Management Department (IFAD) |
| PPE | project performance evaluation |
| WCA | West and Central Africa Division (IFAD) |

# 2020 Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (Main report)

# I. Overview

## A. Background

1. **Purpose of ARRI**. This is the 18th edition of the Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI), the report of the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE). The ARRI presents a synthesis of the performance of IFAD-supported operations and highlights systemic and cross-cutting issues, lessons and challenges to enhance the development effectiveness of IFAD-funded operations. In presenting an overview of results and impact of IFAD's operation as well as recent trend based on evaluations completed by IOE each year, the ARRI is key in ensuring accountability for results. Similarly, by presenting evidence-based performance and trends in performance it seeks to promote self-reflection and learning within IFAD, particularly, at all levels of management. To assist this process, it offers an analysis of select areas of work to present what works (or not) and why. This is the only vehicle that provides an independent assessment of the aggregate performance of IFAD operations through a review of independent evaluations, and as such is critical to the Fund and for its evaluation function.

2. The ARRI is similar, in methodology and content, to the annual evaluation reports of major international financial institutions (IFI) such as the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The evaluation functions, in addition to their own annual reviews and reports, also provide - to different extent - inputs to management results reporting in the form of independent evaluation ratings. In the case of the WB, independently validated ratings are the cornerstone of development effectiveness /results reporting by the management. In addition, annual evaluation (or other) reports often present an analysis of follow-up to evaluation recommendations (similar to the PRISMA in IFAD) and also highlight how they intend to improve collaboration with operational departments to strengthen the use and feedback loops of evaluative knowledge and evaluation findings (Annex X provides more details on reporting in IFIs).

3. **Evolving structure of the Report.** Since its inception in 2003, the focus and structure of the ARRI have been revised several times to improve its relevance to changing priorities and demands of the Fund. In keeping with this continued emphasis on improving relevance, this 2020 ARRI has undergone changes to address the needs of IFAD's Governing Bodies and IFAD management. The changes are aligned to at least four dimensions: (i) IOE's internal reflection that called for increased utility of ARRI through a more streamlined and condensed document; (ii) the changing learning and accountability needs of IOE's key IFAD stakeholders; (iii) the feedback received from the External Peer Review of IFAD's Evaluation Function, the Governing Bodies and IFAD management regarding the scope of ARRI; and, (iv) the evolution of approaches of other IFIs.

4. The 2020 ARRI is a pilot of the transition to an ARRI which, along with assisting the accountability function as in the past, seeks to bring more actionable knowledge and a better balance between: (i) rating analysis; (ii) substantive evidence from projects on what works and what does not; and (iii) consolidating findings from more country and corporate level evaluations. In view of this, the 2020 ARRI introduces significant changes related to the structure of the report and the analysis. It retains some of the features of the past ARRIs, importantly, the presentation of performance ratings of IFAD operations as mandated by IFAD's Executive Board. At the same time, in order to deepen learning from the Report, the focus is on offering insights into recurring issues that positively or negatively contribute to the development effectiveness of IFAD's operations and strategies, and that also contribute to the recent results and long-term trends of

performance. To this end, it summarises the findings of the past three years of independent evaluations. By increasing the cohort of evaluations, the analysis now relies on a more robust (expanded) evaluation base to distil the lessons learned. It is envisioned that while the presentation of performance results will continue to be the bedrock of every ARRI, the approach taken to presenting learning can change in future annual editions. This will ensure that ARRI progressively imbibes new and more effective forms of learning for enhancing development effectiveness of IFAD's operations.

5. In a departure from the past, there are two notable changes in terms of the content and structure of the 2020 ARRI report: one, there is no learning theme chapter, and two, there are no recommendations. The objective of the learning theme has been to delve deep into a theme and identify and present good practices in different scenarios related to that theme. Following feedback from the Executive Board, in the 2020 ARRI, a more comprehensive approach is taken by presenting analysis across a range of interventions and development contexts that can help IFAD-supported projects improve their design and implementation.

6. Also, this year's ARRI does not include recommendations. This is better in line with practices in other IFIs. The ARRI presents recurring findings in recent evaluations related to the strengths and opportunities in the design and implementation of IFAD operations. Thereby, it points to possible areas that merit reflection and learning. The findings of the 2020 ARRI are expected to help identify topics for future evaluations, and these evaluations will provide recommendations that are more focused and specific.

7. Another development associated with the ARRI is the creation of "ARRI Live", a dashboard system that will present IOE ratings and show rating trends in real-time. It will allow quick access to IOE ratings through a visual dashboard that internal and external users can use to interactively navigate through charts and tables. It will contribute to a more effective and efficient knowledge management within IOE and IFAD.

8. The structure of the report has been modified to mirror the new features of the 2020 ARRI. **Chapter I** provides an overview of the context and the new features of the 2020 ARRI as well as the new methodology and limitations. **Chapter II** provides graphics of recent performance and long-term trends of ratings for aggregate and individual IOE evaluation criteria related to IFAD's performance in lending activities. In addition, it shows the comparison between IOE evaluations and the Programme Management Department's (PMD) ratings and between IFAD's performance and performance of other international financial institutions. There is no description of factors underpinning results for each criterion as in the past; instead the ARRI adopts a more strategic approach by highlighting factors that collectively have ramifications across all criteria and which need urgent attention. This is the focus of **Chapter III** that identifies the successful and challenging aspects of IFAD's operations, both at design and implementation stages. **Chapter IV** analyses findings related to IFAD's performance in country strategies, non-lending activities, and also includes an analysis of some selected themes which are also IFAD's corporate priorities and **Chapter V** concludes.

## B. Sources of data

9. The ARRI uses all evaluations produced by IOE since 2007.[1] These evaluation products assess IFAD's performance at the project, country and corporate levels. The Report presents the ratings, and summarises the analysis, findings, conclusions, and recommendations provided by these evaluations. The recent rating performance in the 2020 ARRI is drawn from projects completed between 2016 and 2018. Table 1 below summarizes the number of evaluations considered for both types of analysis (recent performance and long-term trend performance).

[1] Project Performance Evaluations (PPE), Project Completion Report Validations (PCRV), Impact Evaluations (IE), Country Strategy and Programme Evaluations (CSPE), Corporate Level Evaluations (CLE), Evaluation Synthesis Reports (ESR).

Table 1
**Summary of data sources of 2020 ARRI**

| | *Number and type of evaluations* | *Evaluations in the sample* |
|---|---|---|
| Recent performance<br>(projects completed between 2016 and 2018) | 63 Project-level evaluations<br>PPE, PCRV, IE | 51 PCRVs, 11 PPEs, 1 IE |
| *Long-term performance trends (projects completed between 2007 and 2018)* | 259 project-level evaluations<br>PPE, PCRV, IE | 71 PPEs, 183 PCRVs, 6 IEs |
| *CSPEs completed between 2007 and 2019* | | 54 CSPEs |

Note: The ARRI 2020 analysis also refers to findings from other high-level IOE evaluations products, such as the Evaluation Synthesis Report (ESR) on Rural Youth (2014), the ESR on IFAD's Country-level Policy Dialogue (2017), the ESR on What works for gender equality and women's empowerment ( 2017), the ESR on Building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness (2018), the ESR on IFAD's Support to Community-Driven Development (2019) and the Corporate Level Evaluation (CLE) on IFAD's engagement in pro-poor value chain development (2019).

## C. Methodology and approach

10. The performance reported in ARRI is based on projects and programmes evaluated by IOE as per the standard evaluation criteria. A measures of performance, the evaluation criteria (including the two aggregate measures) are spelled out in IFAD's evaluation manual. These are also consistent with international standards and practices viz UNEG, ECG and OECD-DAC. Further, these criteria have come to measure performance not only at project level but also at programme, country and global levels. These measures aid the organization in understanding not only whether results are achieved but also if they are sustainable, relevant to target population, achieved efficiently, while empowering women and involved innovations and scaling up, etc. Thus highlighting areas where improvements are needed to strengthen performance. The ratings are obtained, from IOE evaluations, particularly, from Project Performance Evaluations (PPE), if available. If not, the ratings are obtained from corresponding Project Completion Report Validation. Ratings for non-lending activities are obtained from Country Strategy and Programme Evaluations (CSPE). Other ratings such as those from PCR and from IFIs are used for comparison purposes. To present the trends in ratings, the ARRI uses a three-year moving average of ratings which serves to smoothen inter-annual variations.

11. The 2020 ARRI incorporates a revised methodology to facilitate the analysis at project and country-levels (chapters III and IV respectively). At the project-level, the methodology identified a set of "markers" which are features or factors that underline IFAD-supported projects at the design and implementation stages. They were identified using quantitative and qualitative approaches, and were selected for the latest cohort of project evaluations i.e. PCRVs, PPEs and IEs[2] finalised in 2019, and once identified, they were traced back to evaluations conducted in 2018 and 2017 (see Annex IV: Detailed explanation on the methodology of identifying and selecting the markers). The final selection of these factors was based on their recurrence in these three years of evaluations i.e. those factors that recurred in the past three years of evaluation were used. Recurrence is defined as an instance when the same factor was flagged in evaluations conducted in each year of the three-year period considered.[3] The support of the NVivo software facilitated the qualitative analysis. In the next stage, these factors were validated by IOE staff. It should be noted that the scope of the ARRI is to present the performance trends and recent performance; presenting a comprehensive picture of

[2] For more details related to IOE products, including process and methodologies used, refer to IOE's Evaluation Manual: https://www.ifad.org/en/web/ioe/evaluation/asset/39984268

[3] In other words, the number of projects with this marker were identified in Year 1 evaluations, Year 2 evaluations, and Year 3 evaluations, and aggregated to have the sum of projects with this marker. Recurrence is calculated as the percentage of these sum of projects in the total projects evaluated in the three-year period. Each marker can have sub-categories and each sub-category may be assessed in the same evaluation (for e.g. gender targeting and youth targeting and the social targeting marker).

the underlying causes of these trends/current performance is beyond its scope and better addressed by higher level evaluations dedicated to that task. However, by identifying recurring factors, the ARRI presents select range of persistent issues that could contribute to the observed trends/recent performance.

12. The country-level analysis in this ARRI is based on the assessments in the CSPEs (country strategy and programme evaluations). A similar approach was applied to the CSPEs as well i.e. the analysis was based on CSPEs finalised in 2017, 2018 and 2019. Findings were summarised from the performance related to the efficiency and the effectiveness of country strategies and performance of non-lending activities.

13. As mentioned above, the cohort of projects that formed the basis of the analysis was larger than in the past. A total of 109 PCRVs and PPEs (all evaluations conducted in 2017, 2018 and 2019) formed the basis for the project level analysis, while the country level analysis was drawn from 14 CSPEs.

14. **Ratings scale**: In line with the Good Practice Standard of the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks for Public Sector Evaluations, IFAD uses a six-point ratings scale to assess performance in each evaluation criterion. The ratings, an integral part of performance reporting in IOE evaluations, are used in the analysis of the ARRI for reporting on IFAD's aggregate operational performance. Therefore, in each independent evaluation, IOE ensures that the ratings assigned are based on evidence and follow a standard methodology and process. Moreover, comprehensive internal and external peer review are organized to enhance objectivity as well as finalize the assessments and ratings of each evaluation. Finally, the ratings are also shared with management prior to finalization providing an opportunity to submit evidence/argument should it wish to dispute the ratings and can be changed based on any further evidence/argument presented by the management. Table 2 presents the rating system.

Table 2
**IOE rating system**

| *Score* | *Assessment* | *Category* |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Highly satisfactory | *Satisfactory* |
| 5 | Satisfactory | |
| 4 | Moderately satisfactory | |
| 3 | Moderately unsatisfactory | *Unsatisfactory* |
| 2 | Unsatisfactory | |
| 1 | Highly unsatisfactory | |

Source: IFAD Evaluation Manual, 2015.

15. **Caveats and limitations**. There are a few caveats to be taken into consideration while interpreting the results and analysis in the report. First, the 2020 ARRI long-term performance trends reflect the changes in the evaluation criteria and definitions included in the revised harmonization agreement between Management and IOE.[4] In particular: (i) rural poverty impact domains criteria such as household income and assets, human and social and empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, institutions and policy are no longer rated separately, therefore previous years ratings have been removed in the quantitative analysis; (ii) scaling up and innovation have been rated separately in evaluations since 2017[5]; (iii) starting in evaluation year 2016, IOE rated environment and natural resources management (ENRM) separately from adaptation to climate change; (iv) inclusion of sustainability in calculation of project performance starting from 2016 in evaluations of projects which were completed from 2013 onwards.

[4] Agreement on the Harmonization of IFAD's Independent Evaluation and Self-Evaluations Methods and Systems Part I: Evaluation Criteria: https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/120/docs/EB-2017-120-INF-2.pdf
[5] At the time of the harmonization agreement, both IOE and IFAD management had agreed to change the scope of scaling up from ''potential to scaling up'" to "scaling up". However, it is likely that some projects had still been rated for potential to scaling up in the interim.

16. Second, other factors that can possibly affect the interpretation of criteria are related to the introduction of guidance and strategy notes by IFAD across different points in time. The adoption of new procedures can affect and help evolve IOE's evaluative approaches and the additional and new knowledge can influence its ratings (for example, in case of introduction of SECAP guidelines for the assessment of ENRM or the modified definition of relevance). Third, some of the changes to designs borne out of recent IFAD policies or guidelines from IFAD may not have been captured in evaluations of projects that were formulated in the past. However, it is important to acknowledge that the ARRI identifies recurrent performance factors and issues that continue to be relevant. .

# II. IFAD's lending performance

## A. Recent performance (2016-2018)

17. Chart 1 provides a snapshot of the most recent performance as estimated by a three-year moving average of ratings issued during 2016-2018, presented by individual evaluation criteria. When criteria are ranked based on the average share of moderately satisfactory ratings (ratings of 4 and above), relevance (84 per cent), IFAD performance as a partner (83 per cent), environment and natural resource management (ENRM) (83 per cent), adaptation to climate change (77 per cent) and innovation (77 per cent) perform better than the overall project achievement.

18. On the other end of the spectrum are efficiency, sustainability and government performance with lower proportion of moderately satisfactory or better ratings (between 48 and 58 per cent of moderately satisfactory or better ratings). For most criteria, the majority of ratings are moderately satisfactory or above.

Chart 1
**Ranking of all criteria by share of overall satisfactory ratings**
*Percentage of projects with overall satisfactory/unsatisfactory ratings, 2016-2018*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

19. This report also provides an assessment of the performance of countries with fragile situations. The analysis shows that, on average, projects in countries with fragile situations have better moderately satisfactory and above ratings in the recent period (2016-2018) as compared to the previous period (2015-2017). In the recent period, for the majority of criteria, their ratings are higher than, or equal to, the ratings of projects in countries with non-fragile situations. Annex IX provides the details.

## B. Performance trends (2007-2018)

20. Chart 2 provides a snapshot of the historical performance (2007-2018) for overall project achievement, IFAD performance as a partner and government performance as a partner. Overall project achievement is an overarching assessment of a project, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for all criteria except IFAD and government performance,

and thus taken together, the chart depicts all criteria used by IOE (see Annex I for the list of criteria). The trend for overall project achievement has seen some slight decrease in the last three periods.

21. IFAD's performance has started to show a slight decline since 2015 although the proportion of moderately satisfactory or better ratings is a high 83 per cent. The decline has been more marked for government performance.

Chart 2
**Combined overview of the performance criteria using IOE ratings**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, 2007-2018*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

22. These trends are comparable to PCR rating trends for the criteria, especially for overall project achievement and IFAD's performance, as the chart below shows.

Chart 3
**Combined overview of the performance criteria using PCR ratings**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, 2007-2018*




23. In Table 3 project performance is compared across IFAD's five geographical regions.[6] It is important to note that comparing performance across regions does not amount to assessing the performance of individual IFAD regional divisions per se; performance of projects is affected by a host of factors, including the context in which projects operate.

[6] Project performance is an aggregate criterion that aggregates performance for four criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

24. Between 2007 and 2018, Asia and the Pacific Division (APR) had higher proportion of projects than other regions rated both moderately satisfactory or better and satisfactory or better for project performance, rural poverty impact, overall project achievement and government performance. Government performance varies across regions; those in the APR are rated significantly higher than in other regions. For IFAD's performance, the Near East, North African and Europe Division (NEN) continues to show relatively higher proportion of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better, as was the case in the previous ARRI. The performance of IFAD operations in the West and Central Africa Division (WCA) is weaker than other regions for the five criteria, partly due to lower ratings for government performance (less than half of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better).

Table 3
**Performance across Regions**
*Comparison across the IFAD geographic regions, 2007-2018 on the basis of projects rated moderately satisfactory and better (MS+) and projects rated satisfactory or better (S+)*

| ***Project performance*** | *Asia and the Pacific* | *Latin America and the Caribbean* | *East and Southern Africa* | *Near East, North African and Europe* | *West and Central Africa* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *N=62 projects* | *N=40 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=64 projects* |
| % of projects rated MS+ | 79 | 58 | 55 | 64 | 42 |
| % of projects rated S+ | 19 | 8 | 11 | 4 | 3 |
| ***Rural poverty impact*** | *Asia and the Pacific* | *Latin America and the Caribbean* | *East and Southern Africa* | *Near East, North African and Europe* | *West and Central Africa* |
| | *N=61 projects* | *N=38 projects* | *N=45 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=62 projects* |
| % of projects rated MS+ | 92 | 71 | 87 | 89 | 68 |
| % of projects rated S+ | 38 | 21 | 29 | 30 | 18 |
| ***Overall project achievement*** | *Asia and the Pacific* | *Latin America and the Caribbean* | *East and Southern Africa* | *Near East, North African and Europe* | *West and Central Africa* |
| | *N=61 projects* | *N=38 projects* | *N=46 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=64 projects* |
| % of projects rated MS+ | 87 | 71 | 78 | 85 | 63 |
| % of projects rated S+ | 46 | 21 | 20 | 17 | 13 |
| ***IFAD performance*** | *Asia and the Pacific* | *Latin America and the Caribbean* | *East and Southern Africa* | *Near East, North African and Europe* | *West and Central Africa* |
| | *N=62 projects* | *N=40 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=60 projects* |
| % of projects rated MS+ | 89 | 85 | 87 | 91 | 77 |
| % of projects rated S+ | 35 | 33 | 38 | 30 | 27 |
| ***Government performance*** | *Asia and the Pacific* | *Latin America and the Caribbean* | *East and Southern Africa* | *Near East, North African and Europe* | *West and Central Africa* |
| | *N=62 projects* | *N=40 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=47 projects* | *N=64 projects* |
| % of projects rated MS+ | 87 | 70 | 55 | 70 | 45 |
| % of projects rated S+ | 44 | 18 | 19 | 15 | 14 |

Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

25. The following sections present a decomposition of the ratings by criterion for their long-term performance (2007-2018); similarly, for each criterion the regional performance for that criteria is also presented by way of comparison between two time periods: recent period and the period preceding it (the figures in parenthesis denote the percentage change between the two periods).

26. **Relevance**. IFAD operations remain highly relevant with an average of **84 per cent** of all projects completed between 2016 and 2018 rated as moderately satisfactory or better, albeit with some decrease since 2013-2015. Among the regions, evaluated projects in WCA and the Latin America and the Caribbean Division (LAC) performed better in comparison to the IFAD overall trend.

Chart 4
**Project relevance (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

27. **Effectiveness**. The overall trend of moderately satisfactory or above ratings in effectiveness remains nearly flat since 2012-2014 The share of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better for their effectiveness in the most recent period is **72 per cent**, with fully satisfactory ratings going down from 21 per cent in 2015-2017 to 17 in 2016-2018. In terms of regional performance in 2016-2018, projects in NEN countered the overall IFAD trend.

Chart 5
**Project effectiveness (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

28. **Efficiency**. In the latest period, performance in operational efficiency continues to be well below the overall project achievement and shows a declining trend since 2013. The share of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better declined from a high of 63 per cent in 2013 to **48 per cent** in 2016-2018. This was also a slight uptick from 46 per cent in 2017. Among the regions, the performance of NEN countered this trend, followed by WCA. The percentage of moderately satisfactory or better ratings in NEN has increased and goes from 42 per cent in 2015-2017 to 67 per cent in 2016-2018, going well above the global average of IFAD.

Chart 6
**Project efficiency (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

29. **Sustainability of benefits**. Like efficiency, sustainability of benefits has shown a decline for moderately satisfactory or better ratings since 2012-2014 (from 62 per cent to 58 per cent) though a slight uptick was observed from the previous year (moving higher from 56 per cent to the recent 58 per cent). After some decline since 2013-2015, there has been a slight increase between 2015-2017 and 2016-2018. Among the regions, the performance of projects in NEN, WCA and ESA shows an increase in moderately satisfactory or above ratings.

Chart 7
**Project sustainability (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

30. **Project Performance**. This aggregate criterion is an arithmetic average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. There has been a decline in performance, especially since 2013-2015, from 4.03 to 3.80. Sustainability has been included under project performance from completed from 2013 onwards and may have contributed to a drop in the average. Another aspect contributing to the decline is the pronounced drop in ratings for efficiency especially since 2012-2014. Further, PCR ratings of completed projects show higher average ratings for project performance overall compared to IOE ratings. However, the two rating types show similar trends; both PCR and IOE ratings have been declining in the recent past. Only in the most recent period, there is a slight change in direction of PCR ratings.

Chart 8
**Project performance (2007-2018) – average PCR ratings and average IOE ratings**
*Average rating for project performance by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE/PCR ratings, April 2020.

31. **Rural Poverty Impact**. The rural poverty impact criterion is a composite of the analysis in the following four sub-domains: household income and assets, human and social capital and empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, and institutions and policies. Analysis shows that **73 per cent** of IFAD projects were rated moderately satisfactory or above for rural poverty impact in 2016-2018, down from the 88 percent observed in 2012-2014. The period between 2014 and 2018 shows a steady decline in the ratings for this criteria, but the decreasing trend started showing signs since 2012-2014. Among the regions, only in NEN this aggregate measure of performance has shown a slight increase in the recent period.

Chart 9
**Rural poverty impact (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

32. **Innovation.** Evaluations conducted from 2017 onward have rated innovation and scaling up separately, following the harmonization agreement between IOE and management. The separate ratings begin to appear in the trend line from 2011-2013 based on the completion year of the projects. The percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better is **77 per cent** in 2016-2018, although the criterion has shown a considerable decline since 2013-2015. Among the Regions, NEN experienced a small increase in the recent period, contrary to the slight downtick in IFAD overall average.

Chart 10
**Innovation (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

33. **Scaling Up**. Performance in scaling up has steadily declined from the peak of 84 per cent in 2012-2014 to **64 per cent** in 2016-2018 based on ratings of moderately satisfactory or better.[7] The change in performance of projects in NEN and WCA in the recent period was better compared to the overall IFAD average.

Chart 11
**Scaling up (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

34. **Gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE)**. The performance rating in this area is **71 per cent** in 2016-2018, down from the peak value of 84 per cent in 2012-2014. Although this criterion has been historically among the better performing criteria, it has been trending downward, at least from the project cohorts that reached completion in 2012-2014. Projects in NEN had low percentage of moderately satisfactory or above ratings but the change in performance in the recent period was better than compared to the IFAD average.

[7] Innovation and scaling-up were grouped and rated as one criterion prior to 2017. In order to generate individual time-series data for the two criteria prior to 2017, ratings given to the group were assumed to be the same for individual criteria.

Chart 12
**GEWE (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

35. **Environment and natural resources management**. ENRM and adaptation to climate change have been rated separately for the past three years. In 2016-2018, **83 per cent** of projects completed performed moderately satisfactory or better in terms of environment and natural resources management, confirming a positive trend in performance started in 2011-2013 when only 64 per cent of the projects were able to achieve moderately satisfactory or better rating in this area. In the recent period, two regions, APR and NEN, show 100 per cent moderately satisfactory or above ratings, while WCA shows an increase in moderately satisfactory or above ratings.

Chart 13
**ENRM (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

36. **Adaptation to climate change**. In the period 2016-2018, **77 per cent** of projects report moderately satisfactory or better ratings, after performance had dropped in the previous period (2015-2017). Both moderately satisfactory and satisfactory ratings contributed to this growth. In NEN, 100 per cent of projects showed moderately satisfactory or better. The negative change in performance between the last two periods for LAC and ESA runs counter to the positive change observed for overall IFAD average.

Chart 14
**Adaptation to climate change (2007-2018)**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

37. **Overall Project Achievement**. The aggregate criterion shows **71 per cent** of moderately satisfactory ratings or better in the last time period, continuing a declining trend since 2013-2015.

Chart 15
**Overall project achievement (2007-2018) – IOE ratings**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

38. **IFAD's performance as a partner**. IFAD's performance as a partner was evaluated by IOE as moderately satisfactory or better in **83 per cent** of projects in 2016-2018, slightly lower than the previous period. ESA showed a better performance as compared to the previous period and better than the overall IFAD average.

Chart 16
**IFAD performance as a partner (2007-2018) – IOE ratings**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

39. **Government performance**. IOE ratings of the performance of government as a partner have seen a steady decline since 2012-2014. Proportion of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better went down to **53 per cent** in 2016-2018 from a high of 75 per cent in 2012-2014. After efficiency, this criterion is the one with the lowest proportion of positive ratings and showing a declining trend in evaluations (with the exception of WCA). The average ratings in the past two periods have been the lowest since the beginning of the trend analysis.

Chart 17
**Government performance as a partner (2007-2018) – IOE ratings**
*Percentage of projects rated moderately satisfactory or better by three-year moving period*




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

40. **Section conclusion**. Overall, ratings continue to be predominantly in the moderately satisfactory and above ratings. However, there are signs of a multi-year downward trend and for some criteria such as government performance and rural poverty impact this is marked. There are also exceptions to this: (i) the increasing trend for environment and natural resource management and adaptation to climate change; and (ii) some recent rebound for efficiency and sustainability.

## C. Performance of key IFIs

41. The ARRI situates the performance of IFAD operations in reference to performance of the agriculture-sector operations of other IFIs and regional development banks i.e. the African and Asian Development Banks and the World Bank.[8] Although each organization is different in its size of operations, scope of the portfolio, project approaches and geographic focus, their operating models are similar to IFAD as, unlike the United Nations specialized agencies, programmes and funds, the African and Asian Development Banks and the World Bank also provide loans for investment operations with sovereign guarantees. As members of the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks, their independent evaluation offices use similar methodologies and maintain independent evaluation databases.

42. In Table 4, IFAD's project performance is shown along with other IFIs on a similar criterion for two different time periods i.e. 2007-2012 and 2013-2018. Data on overall project achievement criterion is a more comprehensive aggregate indicator for IFAD, although not strictly comparable with other IFIs, and is also presented in the table. The period from 2013 coincides with some changes that were introduced in measuring aggregate performance such as inclusion of sustainability in IFAD's project performance. This could explain in part the change in IFAD's performance between the two periods. Another reason could be the decline in ratings for efficiency, especially since 2013. However, an important caveat to be noted is that results of the IFIs may not be comparable: the method of aggregation of project performance is not uniform across the IFIs both in terms of the criteria used in aggregation (for example, the World Bank does

[8] The Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are not included in the benchmarking analysis because the former does not use a rating system, while the nature of focus and coverage of the latter is significantly different from IFAD. Therefore, World Bank's performance is used to benchmark performance in the LAC and NEN regions as per Management's 2018 request.

not include sustainability in aggregate performance but IFAD, AsDB and AfDB do) and how calculation of the final value of the rating is done (see Annex X for more details). Thus, the results need to be interpreted with caution.

Table 4
**Project performance**
*Percentage of completed agriculture and rural development projects rated moderately satisfactory or better (MS+) by the independent evaluation offices, 2007-2012 and 2013-2018 (year of completion)*[9]

| Projects completed between 2007 and 2012 | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Overall Project Achievement* [10] | *Project performance*[11] | | | | | | | | | |
| | World | *World* | | *Africa* | | *Asia-Pacific* | | *Latin America-Caribbean* | | *Near East-North Africa-Europe* | |
| | IFAD | *IFAD* | *WB* | *IFAD*[12] | *AfDB* | *IFAD* | *AsDB* | *IFAD* | *WB* | *IFAD* | *WB* |
| % of projects rated MS+ | **80%** | **71%** | **69%** | **62%** | **41%** | **87%** | **65%** | **68%** | **69%** | **73%** | **76%** |
| No. of agriculture projects evaluated | 119 | 122 | 234 | 55 | 79 | 31 | 69 | 22 | 32 | 22 | 70 |
| **Projects completed between 2013 and 2018** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | *Overall Project Achievement* | *Project performance* | | | | | | | | | |
| | World | *World* | | *Africa* | | *Asia-Pacific* | | *Latin America-Caribbean* | | *Near East-North Africa-Europe* | |
| | IFAD | *IFAD* | *WB* | *IFAD* | *AfDB* | *IFAD* | *AsDB* | *IFAD* | *WB* | *IFAD* | *WB* |
| % of projects rated MS+ | **77%** | **56%** | **80%** | **46%** | **68%** | **79%** | **59%** | **61%** | **85%** | **55%** | **81%** |
| No. of agriculture projects evaluated | 174 | 177 | 205 | 92 | 85 | 42 | 32 | 23 | 33 | 31 | 42 |

WB: World Bank: AfDB: African Development Bank; AsDB: Asian Development Bank.
Source: AfDB Independent Development Evaluation Unit, AsDB Independent Evaluation Department, World Bank Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank and IOE evaluation database (all evaluation).
Note: Data for AfDB are based on the year of evaluation, as the year of project completion is not available in the data provided by the IFI. Projects evaluated in 2019 are included as they refer to projects completed in 2018.

43. **Performance ratings of PCRs**. This section assesses the "net disconnect" between PMD and IOE ratings for each criterion included in PCRs and PCRVs/PPEs to get a better understanding of where differences lie in reporting on performance. The PMD ratings were higher on average for all criteria among the 254 projects assessed in the analysis presented in Table 5. The difference between the mean ratings of IOE and PMD is also statistically significant for all criteria. The overall average disconnect between IOE and PMD ratings is -0.29, similar to past ARRIs, but for some criteria it has diminished. In particular, adaptation to climate change, ENRM and effectiveness show disconnect lower than the average, as an indication that the ratings are closer to following a common trend.

[9] Data from the World Bank has been adjusted since 2018 ARRI and the same methodology has been followed in 2019 and 2020 ARRI. In the past years the analysis was based on the "number of evaluations", including projects that were rated more than once in the time period considered. In this year's ARRI, the World Bank data has been aligned with AsDB and AfDB data and it only refers to the "number of projects" carried out in the time period considered for the analysis.
[10] Overall project achievement is the overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.
[11] Project performance is a simple arithmetic average of ratings given for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.
[12] To make the comparison with AfDB more consistent in term of countries included, the total Africa for IFAD includes the regions of ESA and WCA, plus some African placed under NEN in IFAD (Djibouti, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia). .

44. The average disconnect with PCR ratings is highest in NEN (-0.37) and WCA (-0.30), followed by APR (-0.29). The highest disconnect by criterion/region is registered in NEN for relevance (-0.79) and WCA for scaling-up (-0.66). A more detailed regional analysis is presented in Annex VI.

45. Based on a correlation analysis conducted on IOE and PMD ratings, correlation is statistically significant for all ratings and particularly high for the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, government performance, project performance and overall project achievement are highly positively and statistically significantly correlated, which indicates the trends in PMD and IOE ratings are very similar. In Annex V, a more detailed comparison between IOE and PCR ratings for all criteria across time shows similar declining trends, albeit with larger or smaller disconnects for some criteria.

Table 5
**Comparison of IOE's PCRV/PPE ratings and PMD's PCR ratings for all evaluation criteria in projects completed in 2007-2018 (N=254) – Criteria listed based on ranking by disconnect**

| *Criteria* | *Mean ratings* | | *Disconnect* | *T-test (comparison of means)* | *Correlation (IOE and PCR)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *IOE* | *PMD* | | *p-value* | |
| Relevance | 4.25 | 4.81 | -0.48 | 0.00* | 0.48 |
| Scaling-up | 4.03 | 4.47 | -0.43 | 0.00* | 0.61 |
| Project performance | 3.90 | 4.24 | -0.34 | 0.00* | 0.73 |
| Government performance | 3.83 | 4.14 | -0.31 | 0.00* | 0.76 |
| Efficiency | 3.59 | 3.90 | -0.30 | 0.00* | 0.81 |
| Sustainability | 3.65 | 3.96 | -0.31 | 0.00* | 0.65 |
| IFAD performance | 4.18 | 4.49 | -0.31 | 0.00* | 0.69 |
| GEWE | 4.13 | 4.43 | -0.30 | 0.00* | 0.65 |
| Overall project achievement | 3.97 | 4.27 | -0.30 | 0.00* | 0.74 |
| Effectiveness | 3.94 | 4.19 | -0.25 | 0.00* | 0.74 |
| Innovation | 4.18 | 4.39 | -0.21 | 0.01* | 0.67 |
| Adaptation to climate change | 3.83 | 4.03 | -0.20 | 0.02* | 0.49 |
| ENRM | 3.98 | 4.13 | -0.15 | 0.01* | 0.58 |
| Rural Poverty Impact | 4.06 | 4.22 | -0.16 | 0.02* | 0.70 |

Source: IOE/PCR Ratings, April 2020
Note: * Indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. In interpreting the correlation coefficients, one must consider that a strong correlation between IOE and PMD ratings only means that IOE and PMD ratings follow the same trend.

# III. Improving IFAD performance at project level: learning from successes and challenges (2017-2019)

46. This chapter in the 2020 ARRI presents the diagnostics emerging from recent evaluations. IFAD has put in place strategies, policies and manuals that have successfully guided work related to country programmes and operations. However, despite these guidelines, and the success resulting therefrom, some challenges continue to confront IFAD's operations. That said, these successes and challenges, which are also key to achieving IFAD's development effectiveness, are within the Fund's influence and can be emulated and overcome, respectively.

47. The analysis in this chapter helps identify and understand the factors that may underpin the performance trends observed in the previous chapter. The objective of this chapter therefore is to analyse what worked, what did not and why, across a range of interventions and development contexts. It also sets out to answer the question: what

common lessons can evaluations provide across a range of contexts and activities that can make the design and implementation of the projects supported by IFAD perform better? ARRI recognizes that its scope of analysis pertains to projects that were designed nearly a decade ago, and that IFAD has introduced number of measures to improve the quality of designs and implementation of IFAD operations. To improve its relevance to IFAD's current operations, this ARRI has adopted the following two measures: i) ARRI identifies recurring issues, issues that recur in a number of projects approved in different years and spanned across all five regions. Hence, these issues can be considered systemic in that they were persisted despite the quality checks and standards at that time. As such, they signal a potential risk that a few of the current projects may have similar issues despite the modifications and upgrade to the system, and ii) ARRI presents recurring issues with implementation that were identified in recently evaluated projects (in 2017, 2018 and 2019).

## A. Findings and lessons from project designs

48. The design of a project is crucial in identifying underlying causes constraining development and in articulating solutions. It lays out the framework and the pathway for realistic, unambiguous and practical action for IFAD to improve its development effectiveness. Certain aspects are key to a successful design and IOE evaluation findings have repeatedly pointed to these. Following are these factors which were found to be the most recurring in the last three years of IOE project-level evaluations: (i) addressing specificity of the context (found in 73 per cent of evaluated projects); (ii) effective social targeting (69 per cent); (iii) coherence of project components and activities (31 per cent); (iv) incorporating lessons learned from past (23 per cent); (v) partnerships for results (21 per cent); (vi) identifying and mitigating risks (12 per cent); and (vii) enhancing ownership of interventions by stakeholders (13 per cent). IFAD's Quality Assurance Group in its recent paper considers these same aspects as important and highlights that these require additional attention moving forward.[13]

49. **Addressing the context specificities**. **Adequate context analysis in design and implementation are important in all cases but even more in situations of weak governance, fragile institutions and inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks.** Analysis of the findings in the cohort of evaluations considered in this Report presents three common typologies of inadequate context consideration that resulted in less than desirable outcomes: first, excessively complex designs and over-ambitious geographical coverage and targets (Lao, SSSJ; Cameroon PADFA, Grenada MAREP). Second, lack of assessment of the government's implementation and coordination capacity that results in implementation delays (Mali, PAPAM; Nepal, WUPAP). Third, project designs with ambitious expectations of entering into private sector partnerships while not envisioning appropriate incentives to attract the sector and unrealistically estimating its risk-averseness (Liberia, STRP; Ghana, NRGP; Maldives, FADIP).

50. On the other hand, analysis shows that successful projects in this regard used the following approaches. First, decentralizing the implementation modalities to ensure that the needs of beneficiaries in a given territory/area, and the solutions proposed, are consistent and compatible with the socio-political reality of that territory (Argentina, PRODEAR; Ghana, RGPRP). Second, in countries with fragile situations, building the capacity of farmer organizations in implementing projects by involving them as partners of public institutions (Guinea, PNAAFA). Third, appropriate context analysis is especially critical in value chain relevant projects given the inherent complexity of their design. For instance, the Corporate Level Evaluation on IFAD's engagement in pro-poor value chain development (CLE Value Chain) found that economic and financial sustainability was higher where value chains had been selected through sound market analysis specific to the context.

[13] Quality at entry of the 2019 project portfolio: Learning from results for improving design quality, April 2020.

51. **Social targeting**. Agenda 2030 calls for eradicating all forms of poverty, together with combating inequality, fostering inclusive and sustainable development and cultivating social inclusion. IFAD's focus on poor rural people and their agriculture-based livelihoods positions the Fund to contribute to poverty reduction, and targeting is central to this mandate. Evidence suggests that strengthening targeting strategies is important for raising the overall performance of IFAD's portfolio (ARRI 2018). Effective targeting requires differentiated analyses of beneficiaries at the design stage particularly for those with potential risk of exclusion (e.g. women, indigenous peoples, pastoralists, youth, landless people, migrants and other vulnerable groups). The recent evaluations show that beneficiary inclusion is happening in general, although, the focus has been more on ensuring participation through quotas (on the principle that equal opportunities will reduce economic inequalities), and less on transformative approaches. The following analysis shows the findings with respect to targeting of women and youth.[14]

52. **Addressing gender inequalities is central to addressing IFAD's mandate as women are among the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in rural areas.** The evaluations show that without full understanding of the local gender norms and cultural constraints i.e. understanding why these exist, it is a challenge to arrive at gender-appropriate interventions and target women. Successful projects with better targeting of women included the following three types: (i) where pro-poor targeting and gender issues influenced which commodities and value chain interventions were selected (Zambia, SAPP; Nicaragua, NICARIBE); (ii) where women were targeted through activities that provided them diversified sources of income (Sudan, SUSTAIN; India MPOWER); and (iii) where proper attention was paid to managing the time burden of women, through for instance, reduced time for water collection (Chad, PADERG).

53. On the other hand, there are common shortcomings found in targeting women which can lead to mixed outcomes. First, when targets set for women are unrealistic about the lack of pre-conditions (e.g. targeting women farmers in cocoa activities where access to land for women is low (STRP, Liberia). Second, when training targeted at women treats them as a homogenous group, without sensitivity to their characteristics (e.g. age, education, caste) and varying capacity or diversity of culture (Lao, SSSJ). Third, when self-selection approach to targeting is applied without specific incentives for the marginalised groups such as women to participate (Seychelles, CLISSA).

54. **IFAD has been increasing its focus on rural young people especially since its Strategic Framework (2007-2011) introduced "... the creation of viable opportunities for rural youth and enhancing rural youth organizations" as a principle of engagement.** However, targeting for youth has been a rare topic in the evaluated sample of projects, given that it is still seen as incipient. Livelihoods of youth face two main challenges: access to assets, goods and services and a lack of opportunity to acquire new skills (IFAD's Rural Youth Action Plan 2019-2021). The findings in the 2020 ARRI analysis confirm the need for a more focussed approach on youth with regards to these two challenges. Where targeting overlooks the challenges faced by youth (access to assets such as land for some youth), it can lead to disconnect between targets set and actual inclusion (Liberia, STCRSP). Similarly, where a holistic approach to targeting youth is lacking, for instance, where technical skills training is provided without accompanying training in business development or entrepreneurship, or mentoring, it can lead to limited and unsustainable outcomes (Sierra Leone, RCPRP; Sri Lanka, NADeP). On the other hand, involving youth in specific activities more suited to their aspirations, such as tasking them with providing logistical support in marketing or involving them in administrative tasks, has resulted in more active engagement from youth (Argentina, PRODEAR).

55. **Learning from other projects**. Another recurrent feature arising from the analysis relates to the importance of learning from other/previous projects at the design phase. IFAD's Knowledge Management Strategy (2019) has referred to the consideration of

[14] These themes are analysed in more detail in chapter 4 of this Report.

"challenges of setting processes, tools and behaviours that connect and motivate people to generate and share good practices, learning and expertise to improve IFAD's efficiency, credibility and development effectiveness". Building projects on the basis of lessons learned from previous IFAD-supported projects is an appropriate basis for sound project planning, and for an increased understanding of the risks involved.

56. **Recent evaluations show that lessons learned from the past can be used across a variety of contexts but are particularly instructive in two areas.** For instance, capitalizing on the experience of previous projects facilitates cross-learning especially related to grassroots institutional building, women's empowerment and technology (India, MPOWER; Haiti PPI-2). Use of learning helps introduce innovations and identify and make use of emerging opportunities (Ghana, NGRP). Building on past knowledge of the area, specific commodities and target groups to design a value chain approach has improved the success of projects (CLE Value chain). On the other hand, two areas where lessons from the past can be particularly instructive, especially given the variety of development contexts in which IFAD projects operate, are the duration required for strengthening the capacities of producer organizations (Cameroon, PADFA) and the institutional capacity of implementing agencies (Laos, SSSJ). In the case of the latter where experience shows capacities to be weak, one solution was to involve provincial or local agriculture offices in the implementation.

57. **The right partnerships for development effectiveness results is a recurring factor in the projects analysed, especially in the latest evaluations.** The Evaluation Synthesis Report on "Building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness" (2017) mentions that "IFAD's current partnership strategy is not sufficient to guide country-level partnerships; it lacks specificity as to how to develop partnerships in a strategic manner and within a country context." In addition to the strategic level, the importance of partnerships is equally important at the operational level. The ARRI analysis also found that selecting partners without the right implementation capacities and experience to implement the project, often combined with the insufficient contribution requirements, has negatively affected the effectiveness of activities (Central Africa Republic, PREVES). In value chain projects in particular, the excessive focus on production increases the possibility of inadequate partnerships being formed between actors in downstream activities, which ultimately weakens market linkages (SAPP, Zambia).

58. On the other hand, successful partnerships with technical institutions are particularly key to ensuring support to project beneficiaries even after project closure (Argentina, PRODEAR). Similarly, when aiming for social inclusion in projects, selection of appropriate partners such as authorities or institutions directly involved with specific marginalised groups (ex-combatants) can ensure their proper inclusion (Cote d'Ivoire, PROPACOM). At the design stage, when projects work with different partners and at different levels (national/local), insufficient attention to facilitating coordination among them at the implementation stage can lead to building ownership and achieving integration of project activities.

## B. Findings and lessons from project implementation

59. While the role of the project design stage is to develop the framework and lay out the most effective pathway for the project to achieve its development objectives, the role of the implementation stage is to ensure that the design is executed as planned, or it is timely adapted, and desired outcomes are achieved. Since ground realities during implementation can be vastly different than those envisaged at the design stage, the challenge in effectively converting design into implementation is two-fold: one, ensuring that proposed activities are completed within the designated time with the desired quality and available budget, and two, allowing for adequate flexibility in the face of a changing external context (changes in the development, political and administrative contexts). The capacity of the project management unit is crucial to successfully manage both these challenges, and IFAD's role of overseeing and supporting implementation is pertinent.

60. These above factors were also identified as the most frequently recurring topics across the IOE project-level evaluations considered (109 projects). Specifically, the factors and their recurrence are as follows: (i) quality of implementation and supervision support (94 per cent of projects); (ii) quality of project management (88 per cent); (iii) support provided to groups and institutions (88 per cent); (iv) training for strengthening capacities of beneficiaries (73 per cent); and (v) adapting to changes in external context (25 per cent).

61. Of the factors presented above, the analysis looks in detail at three where the evaluation findings are instructive: (i) training for capacity building of beneficiaries, a key activity common to most projects; (ii) producer groups and institutions supported, two common actors in IFAD-supported projects; (iii) adapting to a changing external context. In what follows, these are explored in greater detail.

62. **Training for capacity building of beneficiaries**. Capacity building of beneficiaries and government officials is a key activity in IFAD-supported projects given its catalytic role in human empowerment - both economic and social and its contribution to achieving project development results. The 2020 ARRI analysis shows the topic of training for strengthening capacities is recurrent (76 per cent of evaluations). The evaluations have particularly pointed out the positive contribution of training (49 per cent of assessments of training are favourable) with regard to the significant changes in human capital in beneficiaries. Projects to be more effective in the area of capacity development begin with careful preparatory work, including the identification of capacity gaps and at least a modest capacity assessment. When successful, efforts for community development through trainings in business, adult literacy, gender awareness, and animal and agricultural production have contributed to building local knowledge in different fields and increased opportunities for income generating activities and improving nutrition.

63. The quality of training itself has been found to be particularly effective in the cohort of evaluations (71 per cent of observations related to quality of training showed a favourable assessment), often linked to its intensity and right targeting, allowing significant improvements in the strengthening of human capital in beneficiaries including young people and women, producer organizations, as well as institutions. In general, training related to the following topics was assessed to be useful: (i) training in conflict management that allowed beneficiaries to act cohesively; (ii) training on best agricultural practices, which contributed to increased agricultural productivity; (iii) training on road infrastructures, that helped communities manage road tolls and maintenance contracts; and (iv) training on natural resource management.

64. A frequent topic mentioned in the recent evaluations is related to the importance of training modules on business records and financial services for smallholder farmers, women and young entrepreneurs in particular. **Successful cases of financial literacy training are those that went beyond just support to basic services** (for e.g. opening savings accounts) to also introducing household savings as a risk management tool (e.g. for natural disasters and illness) and as a way to accumulate capital for future investments. And where training was combined with linkages to micro-financial institutions, the interaction boosted the confidence of the beneficiaries (Cambodia, PADEE).

65. Other features affecting the uptake of training, although less recurrent, are related to its duration and timing. **Appropriate duration and timing of the training enables beneficiaries to reach a certain level of maturity** that allows them to develop management capacities and negotiation skills, and to mobilize both human and financial resources for their activities. The delivery of the training has to take into account the exigencies of the beneficiaries (e.g. women's daily schedule to tend to their children, transport allowance) in order to avoid cases of absenteeism and drop-outs (Grenada, MAREP). Another issue is related to the timing of the training; optimal conditions for knowledge transfer cannot be created if training is delivered late in the program or when

there is a considerable time gap between delivery of training and its actual application (Gabon, PDAR).

66. **Producer groups and institutions supported.** Working with producer groups and institutions is an important activity in IFAD-supported projects and the implementation of this is often an area of challenge due to ground realities being different from what was assumed or expected at design stage, or because the implementation was not carried out as per plan. Importantly, in both these areas, projects deal with people who have different capacities but also different aspirations and perspectives, and this increases the challenge for projects that deal with a large number of people.

67. In regard to producer groups, where assessed, 56 per cent of project assessments were positive. **The focus of most projects with regard to groups was on the twin objectives of commercialization and empowerment.** Where there was a greater direct participation by producer groups in commercial processes, it led to stronger group coordination in terms of collective selling and use of post-harvest infrastructure and consequently, increased sales (Argentina, PRODEAR). In terms of better price incentives for producer groups, two approaches worked well: one, by giving equal importance to enhancing the quality of produce as to increasing the productivity, the private sector was incentivised to participate in buying of produce, and two, when projects provided logistical support and pre-financing to farmer cooperatives, these were able to attract producer groups by offering better price and services (and in the process eliminating middlemen) (Liberia, STCRSP). In terms of empowerment, where there was participatory identification of priorities and implementation of the agreed investments, control of groups over resources, and linkages established with local institutions (e.g. groups providing input to local government institutions), it led to improved social cohesion, resilience and self-help capacity, and thereby greater group empowerment (Lao, SSSJ; Indonesia, CCDP).

68. One of the main strengths of functioning as a group is the increased negotiating power acquired by the group. However, this has often not occurred where groups lacked cohesion. Among the reasons for this were lack of training aligned to organizations' needs, inadequate assessment of their performance and weak capacities of local development partners and service providers working with the groups (Seychelles, CLISSA; Zambia, SAPP). However, it is pertinent to note that where groups were newly formed under the project, especially on the marketing side, the limited project duration of IFAD's projects has often been the reason for cohesion to be under-developed. An important objective of IFAD-supported projects is ensuring the sustainability of groups after the project-end. In this regard, two challenges were observed in the evaluations. One, where linkages between local, regional, and national levels amongst farmers and their national representative body were weak (Chad, PADER G), and two, where autonomous farmer organisations were created but without a clear strategy to mobilise their own financial resources (Central African Republic, PREVES; Guinea, PNAAFA).

69. Strengthening of institutions encompasses both the organizational set-up of the institutions involved and the capacity building of those institutions by means of training. Some 79 per cent of the evaluations highlighted this topic, with the majority displaying a favourable assessment of institutions when they were supported by IFAD projects. Institutions providing extension services are usually the most common of IFAD's partners. Successful provision of high-quality extension services was found in instances where extension agents were well-equipped thanks to the projects or where projects helped formation of a grassroots-level extension network through engagement with a variety of external service providers (Cambodia, PADEE). The involvement of key national actors (i.e. research institutes and universities, district and provincial offices) in project activities promoted good institutional collaboration and coordination of implementation and also allowed flexibility in introducing new development approaches (Mozambique, PRONEA).

70. The value of institutional analysis has been pointed out by the quality assurance group in their 2019 projects review: it is a necessary requirement to ascertain whether the indispensable capacities are in place within government institutions and in-country partners in order to ensure that project outcomes are obtained. Forging effective partnerships between key players in the sector at various levels has led to lasting policy and institutional impacts, and the opposite is equally true (Sudan, RAP). Also, lack of a holistic approach to capacity-building can affect the sustainability of benefits accruing from the project. For instance, where capacity building was only undertaken for grassroots organizations and not for local institutions involved in implementing /supervising project activities and some key national institutions (Cote d'Ivoire, PROPACOM; Liberia, STCRSP).

71. **Adapting to changes in external context**. **IFAD's capability to be flexible and responsive was challenged at times in the presence of external events that occurred during implementation**, such as unanticipated change in government's policy direction, conflict and social and political unrest that would have compromised projects' effectiveness (26 per cent of evaluations assessed this topic). In some cases, this led to a delay in implementation and non-achievement of targets, and in some cases, project extension. On the other hand, some of the projects successfully addressed external context by one of these measures: (i) launching initiatives on a piloting basis to respond to the launch of a new national or sector plan by the government (Laos, SSSJ); (ii) adjusting and sharpening project activities in the face of armed conflicts (reducing geographical focus, more strongly involving local agricultural development institutions in the implementation, refining M&E and coordination mechanisms among development partners) (Mali, PAPAM); (iii) a stronger focus on community development (especially women and youth) in the face of social unrest (Nepal, WUPAP); and, (iv) reinforcing support to decentralised government structures (Sierra Leone, RCPRP).

72. The analysis of three years of evaluations showed that regions with a high number of countries with fragile situations (WCA) have displayed a good response to external context challenges (Sierra Leone, Liberia). It is also noted that the positive performance over time has continued to improve in the most recent evaluations, suggesting that IFAD's responsiveness and flexibility has improved.

# IV. Improving IFAD performance at strategic level: learning from country strategies, non-lending activities and priority corporate areas

73. This chapter presents the main findings and lessons learned with regard to the relevance of IFAD's country strategies, its non-lending activities and some important corporate priorities. The focus is on aspects that are more strategic in nature (as opposed to operation-level aspects discussed in chapter 3). The analysis presented here is based on findings and lessons distilled from the CSPEs that were conducted between 2017 and 2019 (14 CSPEs). Therefore, although some of the country programmes that were evaluated date back to the recent past, the recurring nature of the findings (as in the case of Chapter 3) reflects their relevance and value.

74. Findings and lessons related to some corporate priorities are also summarised, namely, gender, climate change, nutrition and youth. In addition to being priorities, they reflect operational implications that have been repeatedly emphasized in strategy documents. Admittedly, areas like nutrition and youth have relatively more recently found prominence as IFAD's priorities, but they have been part of IFAD-supported activities and therefore there are sufficient and relevant lessons to consider.

## A. Main findings and lessons from country strategies and programmes

75. Country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs) are fundamental instruments to determine IFAD's strategic positioning in the country and to articulate the mix of

interventions that will contribute to the goal of rural poverty reduction. This section of the chapter analyses and reports on the performance related to COSOPs. It analyses the design and coherence of IFAD's country strategies including the relevance and effectiveness of the strategic objectives designed to achieve those strategies through lending and non-lending interventions.

76. The evaluations show that the **strategic orientation of country programmes was generally aligned with policies and priorities of IFAD and governments.** All 14 evaluations considered the COSOPs to be well aligned with the key development and sectoral policies of the Government and have offered an opportunity to implement some of these. One reason for the alignment is the consultative process carried out in developing new COSOPs, including regular consultations with governments and development partners and stakeholder validation workshops that have ensured that COSOPs reflect national priorities in agriculture and rural development (Nepal, Burkina Faso, Cameroon). The evaluated COSOPs took due cognizance of IFAD's strategic priorities as mentioned in the Strategic Frameworks at the time of their creation (strategic frameworks of 2007-2010 and 2011-2015).

77. **The strategic focus of COSOPs adapted to the changing context and was evidence-based.** While sustainable and profitable access to markets has been the most dominant theme in the more recent cohort of COSOPs evaluated (in seven out of the eight COSOPs that were developed in 2010 and thereafter), there has been a clear emphasis on topics that have dominated the global discourse: efficient and climate-smart sustainable production systems, improving the management of natural resources and building resilience of smallholders (in six of the eight COSOPs referred to above). Another notable aspect is the shift in the orientation of strategic objectives (SOs) between successive COSOPs; SOs have become more specific and strategic as opposed to in the past where they were broader (e.g. increase the access to economic opportunities), and articulated as goals instead of objectives (e.g. increase the incomes and food security of the poor).

78. In general, IFAD's country strategies that were evaluated were informed by recommendations of CSPEs (8 out of 14). These include areas such as specific sectors, climate change and developing commercial agriculture and profitable small and medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, past recommendations particularly related to synergies between lending and non-lending portfolio (Kenya) and strengthening the capacity of IFAD in the country were not followed in some cases (Mexico). **The targeting focus in COSOPs was mixed in terms of coverage and reflective of context and priority interventions.** With regard to geographic focus, where this was mentioned in broad terms in the COSOP, without guidance on areas and suitability of types of interventions therein, the geographical coverage in the portfolio too was broad and dispersed. Another drawback of the absence of strategic guidance on geographic focus is that there is lesser reflection on the issue of geographical disparities which can be crucial for designing more relevant interventions. In some instances, the target group was described in general with less consideration of the differences between geographic areas. For example, land holding size varies greatly between different areas, and in sparsely populated areas, a poor household may have more than two hectares of land (Cambodia).

79. Instead, in Burkina Faso there was a clearer identification of the target group and evolution of the targeting strategy, in part reflecting better diagnostic analysis and more strategic thinking, and in part reflecting the changing country context (Burkina Faso). There was recognition of the need to support those who may be above the poverty line but are vulnerable to shocks, in addition to those below the poverty line and devise distinct interventions for different groups. It is important that groups are well characterized (level and causes of poverty, strategies adopted, priority needs), and the responses provided are adequate to the needs and in accordance with the objectives and means proposed in the strategy and with geographic targeting.

80. **The logical articulation of the results management framework in the COSOP is an important pre-requisite for realizing the theory of change for the country programme**. One of the main features of a COSOP is the results management framework which is to be monitored closely in order to ensure the attainment of strategic objectives. A number of weaknesses were observed in the results management frameworks of some COSOPs. Two such examples are: (i) unclear linkages between the strategic objectives and indicators that would not provide, or mislead, progress on achievements; (ii) indicators too closely tied to investment projects with the result that progress at the country programme level is difficult to measure. The lack of logical articulation between objectives, means and goals prevents the realization of the theory of change of the program. This, along with the lack of allocation of specific resources for implementation and monitoring, can seriously limit the coherence of the programs (Peru).

81. Another shortcoming was where the target group also included specific groups of beneficiaries, their inclusion in the strategic objectives or in the results management framework was not always clear (a general focus on "smallholders"). Instead, some of the better articulated logical frameworks were those that linked the global, strategic and politico-institutional objectives of the country's strategy with the development objectives of the country (Madagascar). They showed links between the strategic objectives and the intermediate results, making it possible to judge the progress made in achieving them, and defined quantitative indicators for each of the global and strategic objectives indicating benchmark and target values.

82. **The mitigation measures proposed to manage the risks identified in the country programmes were at times less specific and relevant, and less commensurate with the means that IFAD can deploy.** Most COSOPs adequately covered risks related to sector specific policies, fiduciary aspects and risks related to institutional practices. Select areas of risk that could have been more adequately identified were the Government's difficulties in providing the necessary counterpart funds (Sierra Leone) and the withdrawal of the co-financing partners (Madagascar). The risk of poor financial management of projects was well-managed through a results-based management approach applied by all projects as well as by the internal control systems for projects (Cameroon).

83. On the other hand, some mitigation measures were broad or not comprehensive enough, thus putting into question their actual execution or its efficacy. For example, support to producer organizations to make a useful contribution to the development of agricultural policies, or the establishment of a climate of trust between them and the Government through regular meetings and open consultations, was broad (Burkina Faso). Similarly, risks linked to the profitability and sustainability of (micro) projects managed by the rural poor could not be mitigated solely by drawing sustainable activity plans.

84. **From a strategic perspective, the pertinent linkages between lending and non-lending activities still require strengthening.** The COSOPs continue to be largely hinged upon the investment portfolio with less attention to non-lending activities: the items under policy engagement, partnerships and knowledge management mostly relate to activities envisaged in the investment projects (Kenya, Sierra Leone). As outlined in the ARRI 2015, and which is still relevant, more effective COSOPs are those that lay out a clear and actionable agenda for non-lending activities and provide an indication of the estimated administrative resources. The linkages between the two are important for creating an environment that can help attainment of the SOs by, for instance, engendering a shift in the policies towards consideration and inclusion of the poor.

## B. Findings and lessons from non-lending activities

85. Chart 21 shows the trends for positive ratings for the three non-lending activities (knowledge management, policy engagement and partnerships) and overall non-lending during every three-year period since 2006-2008 (based on the year of the evaluation). The maximum percentage of positive ratings for overall non-lending (100 per cent) was

achieved in 2009-2011, when the percentage of positive ratings was above the 70 percent for every non-lending activity and partnership building, in particular, at 91 per cent. Since then, the overall performance of all non-lending activities has followed a decreasing trend, reaching 42.9 per cent in 2017-2019.

86. The more recent decline in overall non-lending activities has been driven by performance for knowledge management, reaching its lowest in 2017-2019 (50 per cent). Partnership building remains the best performing criterion at 64.3 per cent, while country-level policy engagement shows a slight increase from 43 per cent in 2016-2018 to 50 per cent in 2017-2019. A further decomposition of IFAD's non-lending performance by income classification of countries shows that while the performance of lower income countries (LICs) and middle income countries (MICs) is comparable for policy engagement and knowledge management, when it comes to partnership building, LICs have a far higher proportion of moderately satisfactory or above ratings (Annex VIII provides the details).

Chart 18
**Performance of non-lending activities**
*Percentage of evaluations rated moderately satisfactory or better in 2006-2019 (year of evaluation)*




Source: IOE CSPE database (50 evaluations), March 2019.
Note: totals may not add up due to rounding.

## Knowledge Management

87. IFAD's strategic framework 2016-2025 clearly recognizes the importance of knowledge management as a key activity for strengthening the organization's development effectiveness. Knowledge generated by IFAD programmes is a key resource to further the organization's mandate of sustainable and inclusive rural transformation. Knowledge management performance has remained quite stable from 2010-2011 to 2012-2014. Starting 2013-2015, the ratings have considerably improved, although ratings of satisfactory and above continue to elude knowledge management. Since 2015-2017, the trend has started declining, reaching 50 per cent in 2017-2019 (as shown in Chart 21). The following are some key findings from the evaluations.

88. **When knowledge management remains confined to the project level alone it diminishes its strategic relevance to the country programme.** At a strategic level, COSOP knowledge management initiatives at country level are expected to contribute and add value to IFAD's corporate knowledge repository. However, knowledge products were not always customized for use in corporate knowledge repositories or higher-level policy forums (Nepal). They principally catered to frontline beneficiaries and working-level counterparts, and even here the evaluations found a variation amongst projects within the same portfolio on the scope and use of knowledge management. Inputs for higher policy fora and corporate knowledge repositories require an added layer of analytical refinement and sophistication, highlighting policy dimensions and ramifications, which are attractive to higher policy- and decision-makers.

89. **Country-specific grants can prove useful for pursuing knowledge management-related objectives.** Among the factors favourable to knowledge management are effective partnerships which have been forged with research institutes and have generated a great mass of knowledge and several technical and technological innovations. However, when it came to global and regional grants, the links with individual country programmes were weak, and the results and learning from such grants were not adequately benefiting IFAD country programmes. Given that most country programmes evaluated had a larger proportion of global and regional grants meant that the avenue of grants could not be leveraged to drive knowledge management.

90. **A combination of communication tools has worked well in the portfolios evaluated but M&E systems have led to mixed results on knowledge management.** Print media and publications were the main vehicles for knowledge- and information-sharing used by projects. Projects used electronic media (websites, videos, uploading articles and how-to-do notes) for sharing and disseminating knowledge products and reaching out to larger audiences nationally. Exchange visits between projects took place and learning events were held in addition to workshop/seminars and meetings (Kenya). On the other hand, one reason for the underperformance of knowledge management has been the quality of M&E systems at the project level. In some instances, the systems have helped create, capture and distil knowledge but in others, they have focussed only on gathering of data for project use (Angola). Another reason is that the lack of funding to undertake activities because activities were planned but not budgeted (Burkina Faso).

## Partnership building

91. Effective partnership building for results depends on a number of factors, but IFAD country presence and government capacity are among the most important. Where IFAD established country presence, the frequency and quality of interactions with national government counterparts improved and enabled IFAD's participation in sectoral donor and other partner coordination groups. That said, partnership building performance has been uneven across the different time periods with higher performances between 2009-2011 and 2012-2014. Starting 2013-2015, the trend has been declining, reaching a low 58 per cent in 2014-2016 (as shown in Chart 21 earlier). However, it is notable that the share of satisfactory ratings has been increasing, in the last three time periods, as a sign of improved strategies in implementing partnerships. The key findings from evaluations are summarised below.

92. **In terms of the mix of partnerships, those with government were the most fruitful of all, but these were limited to a few ministries.** Most projects were anchored to the Ministry of Agriculture, and this produced a strong relationship between the two parties, with IFAD being the partner of choice especially in low income countries. On the other hand, this also meant that the involvement of other line ministries was limited to project-level only, and within that in implementation mostly, with limited participation in the design of projects, thus limiting a sense of ownership on their part (Sierra Leone). There have been limited instances of partnerships with Ministry of gender, Ministry of youth and Ministry of environment, and this is especially significant given that the focus of IFAD's country strategies has been on these particular areas. Instead, where IFAD was actively involved with different government line agencies (for instance, in Sri Lanka), the partnerships were restricted to project level alone. However, there have also been challenges at the government end, for instance, implementation slow-downs due to lack of clear delineation of authorities among the tiers of the government leading to higher transaction costs for IFAD (Nepal).

93. **Collaboration or coordination has been incipient with RBAs and uneven with development agencies.** In most COSOPs evaluated, there is little mention of IFAD in the United Nations Assistance Development Framework (2013-2017) or the United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (2018-2022). In some instances, the collaboration has been limited to mapping of projects to avoid overlaps and ensure the

coverage of the entire territory, with little or no action to build systematic collaboration resulting in pooling resources, for better aid effectiveness (Burkina Faso). There has been relatively more collaboration with the RBAs though at a technical level. For instance, participation of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in design, appraisal, formulation and supervision missions for specific interventions such as farmer field schools (Sierra Leone) and for specific sub-sectors (e.g. aquaculture) (Kenya). There are clear opportunities for IFAD to work with other Rome-based agencies to provide advisory support on issues such as food production and food security, GEWE in agriculture and rural development.

94. **Partnerships with other actors such as private sector and non-governmental organizations leaves room for deepening.** Most projects tend to see NGOs as service providers to help in implementing the project. Thus, partnerships have been limited to contractual obligations and their full potential has not been harnessed (Sri Lanka). Depending on the country context, NGOs can positively contribute to project design through their local experience and assist in better targeting and more effectively mobilising communities. Partnerships with the private sector have evolved in value chain projects and in contract farming/outgrower model. The private sector could be involved much more as an active partner rather than just as a service provider or target for leveraging. For example, private sector actors can play a greater role on project design and on supervision missions, take part in the CPMT, and bring in their experiences in major IFAD reviews, workshops and training fora. As per the ESR on Partnership, some of the challenges have been with regard to risk and cost sharing mechanisms with private enterprises, the absence of which limited its involvement in IFAD-supported projects. In this regard, and as pointed out by ARRI 2018, government commitment to and support for private-sector development is key and IFAD should use its partnership with government to promote private sector involvement.

## Country-level policy engagement

95. IFAD uses a broad concept of country-level policy engagement, including a notion of collaboration and consideration of a range of approaches that IFAD adopts to engage in the policy process. The criterion has shown a steady performance aligned at 50 per cent of positive ratings since 2010-2012, with a slight increase in the latest time period driven by moderately satisfactory ratings (as shown in Chart 21 earlier).

96. **An area where IFAD's contribution to Policy Engagement stands out is rural finance and this success merits replication**. A number of evaluations have provided notable examples in this area. For instance, in Sri Lanka, the programme upgraded the support for policy and institutional issues around inclusive rural finance, including the operationalization of the Microfinance Act 2016. . In Sierra Leone, the development of a new Agricultural Finance Policy and Strategy for the Rural Finance Network was a good example of engagement. IFAD's rural finance initiative in Kenya has been influencing on policy thinking in the sector, with other partners and government. While there has as yet been no contribution to the formulation of a broad rural finance policy, a Kenya Credit Guarantee Policy and Bill has been drafted.

97. **Collaborations with development partners were instrumental in policy engagement when there was low government commitment and where IFAD was a relatively small player.** In several countries, other relatively big development partners such as WB or those with a specific mandate closer to policy-making, such as FAO with technical assistance, have had a more influential role in policy engagement. However, collaborations have been a successful route to policy engagement. For instance, in Burkina Faso, IFAD, FAO, WFP and Swiss Cooperation presented the Government with a policy brief on improving the management of post-harvest losses in cereals and pulses which was echoed in the new National Rural Sector Program. The partnership between FAO, IFAD and the WB led to the adoption of the Farmer Field School as the national extension methodology in Angola. In Madagascar, IFAD contributed to the development of the Agriculture Livestock Fisheries Policy Letter and the Agriculture Livestock Fisheries Sector Program with other partners. In Nepal, IFAD

and ADB provided financing to the development of the Agricultural Development Strategy, joined by another 11 development partners at a later stage.

98. **IFAD's strategic and structured support and actions for policy engagement may not always match the scope of the objectives and the scale of their activities**. Largely, there was a mismatch between the objectives to be achieved via policy engagement in the COSOPs and the resources (time and staff) and the capacity allocated vis-à-vis the challenge of achieving pro-poor policy change. Most COSOPs' agendas for policy engagement were relevant to the context but there was some lack of planning and partnerships on which policy reform processes IFAD should engage in and which working groups and task forces IFAD would participate in. As the ESR on policy dialogue had noted in 2017, and this is still relevant, most of the work on country-level policy dialogue and engagement has been informal, reacting to opportunities, unrecorded, un-resourced, with neither indicators nor incentives, with non-lending as an add-on, and without specified deliverables. Where policy engagement has occurred, it has been mainly in indirect form, for instance, support to the participation of farmer organizations in the technical working groups on agriculture and through the involvement of decision makers in supervision and implementation support activities (Egypt). At the level of farmers' organizations, IFAD has provided constant support to enable them to defend their interests in the public-private dialogue spaces that are being set up at all levels and this enabled it to consolidate its internal governance and its capacity for policy dialogue with the government (Burkina Faso).

99. **The role of grants in policy engagement can be enhanced through better M&E systems and a more systematic use of evidence.** Lack of adequate analytical work hampered progress in the policy engagement. But even where grants have supported the engagement with different studies, and that has allowed the systematization and dissemination of experiences, this has not culminated into systematic dialogue with the government (Peru). Another issue with the grants was the difficulty in linking directly grant interventions at regional or global levels to policy engagement, since to a large extent, such changes result from a multitude of stakeholders and different country contexts. However, it can be argued that grants were able to indirectly influence the policy environment by building the capacity of their members through seminars, workshops, exchange tours and focused studies, thus enhancing the capacity of the members to lobby from an informed point of view (Kenya).

100. *To conclude this section on non-lending*, there are some perceptible constraints in IFAD's engagement in policy processes and dialogues in the country and in forging or sustaining partnerships. These two non-lending activities are relatively longer-term processes, which need regular dialogue and interactions at various levels of the government and with the donor partners. IFAD Country Directors (CD) have a pivotal role to play in bringing proven project successes to the Government's attention and advocating to government policymakers for their scaling up. However, frequent CD rotations, the CD location being out of the country, and single-person Country Offices have created a void in engagement with national authorities and development partners. The decentralization of IFAD offers new opportunities for IFAD to be more involved in country-level policy processes. However, unless issues related to limited resources, complex projects, wide geographical distribution of activities and specific skillsets of IFAD country offices are not tackled in a holistic way, IFAD's non-lending performance will continue to confront some challenges.

## C. Findings and lessons learned in selected areas of corporate priorities

101. This section of the chapter presents findings and lessons learned in the four areas of gender, nutrition, youth and climate which have also been prioritised under IFAD Eleventh Replenishment period. The common characteristic of these themes is that they are cross-cutting; they cannot be addressed in isolation from the overall context and they apply across the board to all or most country conditions and programmes,

irrespective of the thematic focus of any specific project. Some of these have more recent priorities than others and hence are still evolving. The evaluated projects that form part of the analysis in this edition of ARRI were designed well before mainstreaming in these four areas was institutionalized. Therefore, the purpose of this section is not as much to analyse their performance, but rather it is to present findings and offer possible lessons that can be relevant and useful to the ongoing efforts for mainstreaming these areas.

## Gender

102. **IFAD's gender focus has evolved from providing general guidelines on gender inclusion in projects to better defined gender implementation strategies and action plans**. The country programmes contain a number of common elements including: (i) setting out gender-specific targets, quotas and indicators; (ii) gender sensitization, awareness-raising and training (for beneficiaries and their groups and project staff); (iii) gender sensitive implementation modalities and considerations (e.g. suitable timing of meetings and training for women participants); (iv) composition of boards, committees and project teams; (v) women's engagement in entrepreneurial activities and access to savings and credits; and (vi) training/capacity building for women in leadership positions. Projects that used gender-based diagnoses, for example by quantitatively and qualitatively assessing the gender gap (Peru) were more successful while those that did not recognise that gender relations can be very different in different religion-ethnic groups across the project areas (Sri Lanka), were less successful in this regard. The presence of gender and social inclusion specialists within projects has helped take forward inclusion initiatives (Nepal), although several country programmes did not have such specialists (Angola, Georgia). All this has also helped cross-fertilization of successful ideas and practices amongst projects in a country portfolio. Similarly, the gender action learning system (GALS)[15] has been a positive approach that has raised intra-household gender awareness and challenged families on the traditional roles of man and woman (Sierra Leone, Madagascar).

103. **Activities for empowerment of women have been the strongest in training, microfinance and specific income generating activities**. Across the projects, support in this area has been common and effective to increase women's participation and benefits. Participatory approaches and capacity-building, including group formation and functional skills training, had a clear impact on women's self-esteem, status and recognition, and in a number of cases challenged gender roles and power relations, as also reported by the ESR. In projects that included a financial services component, women normally comprised the majority of beneficiaries. Women have also been prominent among matching grant recipients (Sri Lanka). However, while rural finance has generally been beneficial for women, some activities have faced problems in taking advantage of this. For instance, where loans have been for livestock-related activities, these have worked well where the income flow is regular (such as selling milk and eggs) (Egypt) but for other activities such as raising animals for sale which requires a longer gestation period, the terms of loans (e.g. the repayment period) have not worked (Sierra Leone).

104. **Efforts to reduce gender inequality have yet to fully expand from project level to strategic level.** The projects' implementation was largely limited to meeting the practical needs of women, without delving into transformational changes at the community or household levels (Cameroon). Country programmes should also aim for a strategic orientation, using non-lending activities to explore opportunities to influence land ownership laws, policies and customs that discriminate against women. In this regard, collaboration with other institutions, such as NGOs, which may be in a position to

[15] GALS is a community-led empowerment methodology that uses principles of inclusion to improve income, and the food and nutrition security of vulnerable people in a gender-equitable way. It positions poor women and men as drivers of their own development, identifying and dismantling obstacles in their environment, and challenging service providers and private actors. It uses inclusive and participatory processes and simple mapping and diagram tools.

advise on gender issues, for example, to share knowledge and lessons learned or seek complementarities, needs to be fostered.

### Nutrition

105. **Nutrition outcomes were not an explicit part of strategic objectives at the programme level.** The country strategies that were evaluated did not make explicit reference to nutrition, although food security was part of the goal in some of them. They did not define a pathway through which they were to maximize their contribution to improving nutrition and nutrition outcomes were not part of their results management framework.

106. **The lack of evaluability of nutritional outcomes has therefore hampered the assessment of nutrition in the evaluations considered in this Report.** Most evaluations could not analyse the attribution of the projects to improved nutrition since there is a general lack of strong rigour in the available studies and impact surveys. The most frequent indicators used for assessing food security are dietary diversity, length and frequency of hungry season, number of meals per days and in some cases, child malnutrition. These indicators are internationally recognised, however, there are certain conditions to be met: they require regular monitoring (or, at least at the time of conducting baseline and endline studies), and M&E is an area where some of the programmes have not performed well and measurement of child malnutrition (height, weight and body mass index) requires special instruments and trained staff.

107. **Nutrition related objectives were expected to be achieved through increased production and incomes.** Most evaluations have assessed the implicit pathways to achieving nutrition in the absence of explicit objectives and activities related to nutrition. However, the caveat here is that increased income can lead to better food security, and better nutrition from increased access to healthy food, if part of the additional income is used for purchasing more or higher-quality food. In terms of diversification especially, backyard gardening was found to be one of the more effective ways of promoting nutrition (Kenya). Food security improved thanks to the increased availability of food from the backyard gardens and the additional food purchased (Sierra Leone). Some projects reported improvement in household nutrition through eating more protein-rich food as well as more diverse fruit and vegetables grown in the backyard gardens and tree nurseries (Madagascar). The irrigation water from the water tanks also supported the year-round production of vegetables to improve the stability of the improved food and nutrition security.

108. The Nutrition Action Plan 2019-2025 suggests integrating nutrition considerations into stages of the food value chain beyond production (storage, processing, distribution, and marketing). In this regard, the corporate level evaluation on value chain informs that projects that developed value chains for staple crops and for fisheries products for local and national markets led to nutritional improvements, either through income increase, or through production and productivity improvements, and/or by reducing harvest-related and post-harvest losses.

109. **The role of women was especially important in achieving positive nutritional outcomes.** The income generating activities (including through backyard gardening) and training provided to women (including on household nutrition) contributed to their empowerment, and as found by the ESR on gender, empowered women contribute more and better to the health, nutrition and productivity of whole families and communities. Training on GALS - a community- led empowerment methodology that uses principles of inclusion to improve income, and the food and nutrition security of vulnerable people in a gender-equitable way – was also deemed to have contributed to improved nutrition in beneficiaries of IFAD-supported projects (Sierra Leone).

### Youth

110. **IFAD's strategic evolution in terms of youth engagement has recently been more pronounced** in line with the Fund's greater emphasis on youth mainstreaming.

Projects are moving to increased quotas and including specific activities for youth. Projects have used a variety of means to include youth aimed at their economic empowerment with varying degree of success. These have primarily included enabling access to financial services, supporting entrepreneurship development, employment and training (business, technical and vocational) and promotion of value chains that young people were engaged in, or interested in

111. **The buy-in from youth in regard to IFAD's interventions in agriculture is premised on involving youth early in the project design phase**, choosing the appropriate sequencing of activities and establishing a well-functioning project support before project commencement. This should be supported by context/needs analysis, including fairly detailed and documented diagnoses of the regions of intervention which explain in detail the major constraints preventing the empowerment of young men and women, captures their talent and aspirations, and propose strategies to promote benefits that are rooted in the analysis of these contexts. A related finding therefore is to treat youth as a unique group, different from other vulnerable strata of society. The ESR on youth for instance pointed out that the practice of grouping the youth with other vulnerable groups such as indigenous peoples or women and implementing self-targeting approaches solely is not effective.

112. **The Fund's work with the rural youth requires a strategic orientation.** There is a potential for Government and IFAD to strengthen their strategic partnerships to promote policy engagement for the young (e.g. in the area of access to land and assets, improving literacy). Interventions have been more successful where youth features prominently on the strategic priorities of the government and where government ministries and departments related to youth are capacitated with adequate skills and resources. Grants can also be successful as a strategic vehicle and to foster innovation (Cameroon). However, the grants have to be scaled up and increase linkages with the IFAD country portfolio. In addition, country programmes should increase budget allocation for activities targeting the young and improve their M&E systems to collect age-disaggregated data.

113. **Approaches for mainstreaming youth require a strong consideration of relevance of activities and products.** Opportunities for rural youth employment are likely to occur in processing or service industries closely affiliated with agriculture, and hence the choice of sectors in value chains for involving youth becomes important (Kenya). There is a need to balance the tension between reaching the poorest groups and having a feasible and sustainable value chain development intervention. An effective strategy in this regard, according to the CLE on value chain, is to select value chains in which youth were already engaged and mainstream youth inclusion across all project activities. There may also be a need to adopt innovative approaches for involving youth in programmes. For instance, the CLE on value chain makes a case for providing specific training to youth, for instance, vocational training focused on agri-food industry needs.

### Climate

114. **A majority of the evaluated COSOPs developed after 2010 have elements of climate change as part of their strategic objectives.** The evaluated country strategies have moved from "do no harm" to a proactive orientation of activities related to building resilience to climate change and sustainable use of natural resources (Madagascar, Kenya). The most common activities have been training (including farmer field schools), provision of resilient and organic inputs, climate-resilient infrastructure, awareness-raising and including climate risk and resilience assessment in the protocols for screening and evaluation of business proposals. On the other hand, at the project-level, most have not had an explicit climate change strategy, on how to mainstream climate change adaptation in all project components and detailing the budget for climate adaptation activities (Cameroon, Egypt).

115. **While the climate-related objectives of COSOPs were aligned with related national policies and priorities, at the project level, evidence of influence on**

**policies and strategies of governments was limited.** Similarly, capacities of government staff were found to be weak in several countries, calling for a need to incorporate training as an integral part of projects if the goal of sustainability of benefits is to be achieved (Sierra Leone).

116. **There is increasing attention to the inter-dependent nature of climate change adaptation in projects**. A comprehensive approach to climate change adaptation is needed because environment, natural resource and climate are overly complex, with intersected economic, political, social and cultural issues and vested interest of many actors. In designing climate adaptation initiatives care is being taken to restore or improve natural eco-systems. For example, in order to avoid over-exploitation of water due to irrigation (seen as an important means to improve productivity), some projects have made provision of water-saving equipment. Similarly, some projects have combined diversification activities for income generation with climate-resilient practices. For example, promoting late season crops and early fruit-growing (peaches), activities whose peak water requirements fall outside of the driest summer period (Tunisia).

117. **The balance between climate focus and economic considerations has been delicate.** Enhancing climate resilience and restoring or improving the ecosystem would be economically beneficial to everyone, including the smallholders in the long term. However, in the short term, the benefits may not be always clear cut, and hence economic considerations can take precedence over the longer-term benefits. Thus, although diversified farming systems are generally more resilient to adverse climate developments (and adverse market conditions), the focus has generally been on one or two products with the highest market potential. For instance, in the case of Sierra Leone while the focus put on a few primary commodities was justified from a development perspective, it limited the degree of production diversification as an avenue for economic and climate-related resilience. On the other hand, it has been possible to balance local economic needs with positive environmental impacts. The creation and strengthening of microenterprises in the case of Mexico for instance helped reduce pressure on natural forests by generating income alternatives for communities involved in gathering forest products or deforestation to expand land for agriculture.

# V. Conclusions

118. After a careful analysis of independent evaluations, the 2020 ARRI provides the following conclusions, considering the findings and lessons from the previous sections.

119. **The 2020 ARRI time series related to performance criteria show that the majority of ratings remain in the moderately satisfactory or above zone. There has been an overall declining trend in the ratings of project completed since 2013-2015, albeit with some variations and exceptions.** There has been uneven performance across the different criteria both in the recent performance and long term trends. Three criteria, relevance, effectiveness and IFAD performance, show fluctuating trends, with some flattening or decline more recently. There is a perceptible decline in the cases of five criteria: rural poverty impact, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up and government performance. These five criteria have declined by over 10 per cent between 2013-2015 and 2016-2018. Government performance in particular has witnessed the sharpest drop. Overall, the performance of the portfolio is also of concern in light of the relative weakening of IFAD performance compared to major IFIs.

120. However, there are positive aspects that deserve attention. One, environment and natural resource management continues with its upward trajectory, and adaptation to climate change has recovered from a blip in the previous period. Two, both efficiency and sustainability have shown positive shifts in the recent period, different from their long-term declining trend. Three, the proportion of moderately satisfactory and above ratings remains high for all criteria (except for efficiency). A comparison of self and independent ratings shows that the trend in PCR ratings (self-assessment) is similar to the one observed in IOE (independent evaluation) ratings in the period 2013-2018.

121. **The performance of IFAD-supported projects can be linked to four factors at the time of design: i) addressing the specific context, ii) differentiated targeting strategies, iii) partnerships for results and iv) learning from past experience.** The analysis in the ARRI put the spotlight on a number of factors important at the project design stage that have a strong bearing on the performance of projects. For example, complex designs and over-ambitious geographical coverage and targets have undermined the developmental effectiveness of projects. Similarly, the lack of careful identification of the likely risks to attaining project outcomes early at the design stage has also affected performance. Finally, selecting partners without the right implementation capacities and experience to implement the project has negatively affected the effectiveness of IFAD-supported activities. These factors are obvious and generally within IFAD's influence, however, the fact that they are repeatedly referred to in the evaluations implies that insufficient attention has been paid to them. The ARRI has also presented learning from cases where these have been well-addressed. Moving forward, these can be relevant to country programme teams engaged in designing projects and to IFAD's quality assurance processes.

122. **Key implementation challenges relate to: (i) ensuring that targets of time and quality are met; and (ii) adapting to changes in the social, political, natural and developmental landscape, especially in countries with fragile situations.** The analysis has highlighted that moving from design to implementation poses certain challenges related to adapting the implementation to internal and external contextual changes. Internal challenges relate to ensuring that targets of time and quality related to project activities that were conceptualised at design are successfully met and external changes are related to ensuring that implementation is carried out as planned in the face of shifts to the social, political, natural and developmental landscape. While to an extent, the likely risks can be identified and mitigation measures put in place at the design stage, successful implementation relies largely on the capacity and expertise of the project management units. This continues to be an area of challenge, as demonstrated by the evidence presented in this report on the long-term decline in ratings for government performance, under which performance of project management units is evaluated.

45. **Overall, the strategic focus of IFAD's country programmes has adapted well to the changing context but to enhance the Fund's development effectiveness synergies between lending and non-lending need to better exploited.** IFAD's country programmes are generally aligned with policies and priorities of both IFAD and governments. In this regard, they have tuned their focus with emerging priorities. Thus, relevant themes such as efficient and climate-smart sustainable production systems, management of natural resources and resilience of smallholders are increasingly being mainstreamed in country strategies through their inclusion in strategic objectives. However, linkages between the lending and non-lending activities are yet to be fully exploited. These in tandem are important for creating an environment that can help attainment of a country programme's strategic objectives. Evaluations have observed two constraints. First, knowledge generated from projects and partnerships formed with project actors remain relegated at the project level only and often do not feed into the strategic level non-lending activities. Second, COSOPs ambitions in terms of the scope of non-lending activities are not matched with the resources and the capacity available to attain them.

123. The COSOPs continue to be largely hinged upon the investment portfolio with less attention to non-lending activities. While there is ambition in terms of the scope of non-lending activities, this is not matched with the resources and the capacity at disposal, as compared to the lending activities. As outlined in the ARRI 2015, and which is still relevant, more effective COSOPs are those that lay out a clear and actionable agenda for non-lending activities and provide an indication of the estimated administrative resources**.**

124. **IFAD's efforts related to gender and climate have important lessons to offer for mainstreaming youth and nutrition.** Findings from evaluations show that IFAD-supported projects have made progress with regards to gender and climate. In the case of gender, there are cases where participation of women has moved from mere inclusion through quotas to specific activities better suited to their needs. In several cases, climate has been elevated from just a project-level activity to becoming part of the strategic objectives in the country programmes. Further, in both these areas, there is clearer specification of targets, and results needed to achieve these targets with a monitoring framework to track progress. Instead, evaluations struggled to find clear or explicit links between project activities and outputs, and outcomes related to nutrition. Findings related to youth are still scarce given that this an important but relatively recent area of emphasis. Moving forward, the aforementioned efforts related to gender and climate can be emulated in successfully mainstreaming nutrition and youth.

125. **The areas of declining performance identified in the 2020 ARRI warrant further examination**. The performance trends signify that the perceptible decline in areas of rural poverty impact, efficiency, sustainability, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up and government performance requires urgent attention and strengthening. One clear topic is government performance, an area that has been witnessing a sharp drop in ratings. Given that government performance influences, and is in turn influenced by, other criteria such as efficiency, sustainability and IFAD's performance to name a few, these areas should also be further examined. The report also provided an analysis of the recurring factors, which span a range of interventions and contexts, and their likely links to improving programming. Moving forward, this calls for action on the part of management and IOE. In the case of management, this discussion could trigger an examination of the factors underlying the recent trends and an internal self-reflection and learning within different parts of IFAD to craft solutions that are contextualised to their own areas and situations, and will help strengthen the development effectiveness of IFAD's programmes.

126. **Moving forward**, ARRI findings may assist IOE in identifying topics for other evaluation products, such as corporate-level evaluations, thematic evaluations and evaluation syntheses. In turn, these evaluations may contribute to better explain trends in ratings and other ARRI findings.

127. Keeping in line with the evolving nature of the ARRI, future editions, in addition to analysing project-level rating trends, could give further attention to consolidating findings from corporate-level, thematic evaluations and country strategy and programme evaluations. This would add to the strategic and forward-looking content of the ARRI.

128. Finally, in the future, in consultation with the Management, sections of the ARRI may be dedicated to reviewing *ex post* the follow-up to the recommendations of selected IOE evaluations and any remaining gaps. This is the current practice in other IFIs.

# Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

| *Criteria* | *Definition* * |
|---|---|
| **Rural poverty impact** | The changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions. |
| | **Four impact domains**<br>• Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.<br>• Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.<br>• Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.<br>• Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor. |
| **Project performance** | Average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. |
| Relevance | The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies.<br>It also entails an assessment of project design, coherence in achieving its objectives, and relevance of targeting strategies adopted.<br>. |
| Effectiveness | The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. |
| Efficiency | A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results. |
| Sustainability of benefits | The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life. |
| **Other performance criteria** | |
| Gender equality and women's empowerment | The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods. |
| Innovation | The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction. |
| Scaling up | The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies. |
| Environment and natural resources management | The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide. |
| Adaptation to climate change | The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures. |
| ***Overall project achievement*** | Overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change. |

| **Performance of partners** | |
|---|---|
| IFAD<br><br>Government | This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle. |

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

# List of country strategy and programme evaluations completed and published by IOE (1992-2020)

| *Country programme evaluation* | *Division* | *Publication year(s)* |
|---|---|---|
| Angola | ESA | 2018 |
| Argentina | LAC | 2010 |
| Bangladesh | APR | 1994, 2006, 2016 |
| Benin | WCA | 2005 |
| Burkina Faso | WCA | 2019 |
| Plurinational State of Bolivia | LAC | 2005, 2014 |
| Brazil | LAC | 2008, 2016 |
| Cambodia | APR | 2018 |
| Cameroon | WCA | 2018 |
| China | APR | 2014 |
| Congo | WCA | 2017 |
| Ecuador | LAC | 2014 |
| Egypt | NEN | 2005, 2017 |
| Ethiopia | ESA | 2009, 2016 |
| Gambia (The) | WCA | 2016 |
| Georgia | NEN | 2018 |
| Ghana | WCA | 1996, 2012 |
| Honduras | LAC | 1996 |
| India | APR | 2010, 2016 |
| Indonesia | APR | 2004, 2014 |
| Jordan | NEN | 2014 |
| Kenya | ESA | 2011, 2019 |
| Madagascar | ESA | 2013, 2020* |
| Mali | WCA | 2007, 2013 |
| Mauritania | WCA | 1998 |
| Mexico | LAC | 2006, 2020 |
| Morocco | NEN | 2008 |

| *Country programme evaluation* | *Division* | *Publication year(s)* |
|---|---|---|
| Republic of Moldova | NEN | 2014 |
| Mozambique | ESA | 2010, 2017 |
| Nepal | APR | 1999, 2013, 2020 |
| Nicaragua | LAC | 2017 |
| Niger | WCA | 2011 |
| Nigeria | WCA | 2009, 2016 |
| Pakistan | APR | 1995, 2008 |
| Papua New Guinea | APR | 2002 |
| Peru | LAC | 2018 |
| Philippines | APR | 2017 |
| Rwanda | ESA | 2006, 2012 |
| Senegal | WCA | 2004, 2014 |
| Sierra Leone | WCA | 2020* |
| Sri Lanka | APR | 2002, 2019 |
| Sudan | NEN | 1994, 2009 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | NEN | 2001 |
| United Republic of Tanzania | ESA | 2003, 2015 |
| Tunisia | NEN | 2003, 2019 |
| Turkey | NEN | 2016 |
| Uganda | ESA | 2013 |
| Viet Nam | APR | 2001, 2012 |
| Yemen | NEN | 1992, 2012 |
| Zambia | ESA | 2014 |

Note: APR= Asia and the Pacific; ESA= East and Southern Africa; LAC= Latin America and the Caribbean; NEN= Near East North Africa and Europe; WCA= West and Central Africa

# Evaluations Completed by IOE in 2019

| *Country/Region* | *Title* | *Project ID* | *Executive Board approval date* | *Effectiveness date* | *Project completion date* | *Project duration (years)* | *Total project financing (US$ million)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ***Corporate-level Evaluation*** | | | | | | |
| All | IFAD's Engagement in Pro-poor Value Chain Development | | | | | | |
| | ***Evaluation Synthesis Report*** | | | | | | |
| All | Community-driven Development in IFAD-supported Projects | | | | | | |
| | ***Country Strategy and Programme Evaluations*** | | | | | | |
| Madagascar | Project to Support Development in the Menabe and Melaky Regions (AD2M) | 1318 | 20/04/2006 | 13/11/2006 | 31/12/2015 | 9 | 23,484,313 |
| | Project to Support Development in the Menabe and Melaky Regions – Phase II (AD2M-II) | 850 | 15/09/2015 | 30/12/2015 | 31/12/2022 | 7 | 56,700,000 |
| | Support to Farmers' Professional Organizations and Agricultural Services Project (AROPA) | 1429 | 11/09/2008 | 13/01/2009 | 31/03/2019 | 10 | 71,343,696 |
| | Support Programme for Rural Microenterprise Poles and Regional Economies (PROSPERER) | 1401 | 13/12/2007 | 28/04/2008 | 31/12/2021 | 13 | 67,829,490 |
| | Vocational Training and Agricultural Productivity Improvement Programme (FORMAPROD) | 1516 | 03/07/2012 | 08/05/2013 | 30/06/2023 | 10 | 89,453,232 |
| | Inclusive Agricultural Value Chains Development Programme (DEFIS) | 1492 | 11/12/2017 | 05/03/2018 | 31/03/2024 | 6 | 235,000,001 |
| Mexico | Rural Development Project for Rubber-Producing Regions of Mexico (PDRRH) | 1141 | 03/05/2000 | 21/12/2001 | 31/12/2009 | 8 | 55,000,000 |
| | Strengthening Project for the National Micro-watershed Programme (PNM) | 1268 | 18/12/2003 | 18/06/2005 | 21/12/2010 | 5 | 28,000,000 |
| | Sustainable Development Project for Rural and Indigenous Communities of the Semi-Arid North-West (PRODESNOS) | 1349 | 08/09/2005 | 01/09/2006 | 31/12/2013 | 7 | 32,958,000 |
| | Community-based Forestry Development Project in Southern States (Campeche, Chiapas and Oaxaca) (DECOFOS) | 1412 | 15/09/2009 | 23/03/2011 | 31/03/2016 | 5 | 18,528,823 |
| | Sustainable Development Project for Communities in Semiarid Areas (PRODEZSA) | 1597 | 03/04/2012 | 29/11/2012 | 31/12/2020 | 8 | 42,017,074 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rural Productive Inclusion Project (PROINPRO) | 973 | 28/11/2015 | 21/06/2016 | 11/07/2018 | 2 | 19,526,000 |
| Nepal | Western Uplands Poverty Alleviation Project (WUPAP) | 1119 | 06/12/2001 | 01/01/2003 | 30/09/2016 | 13 | 32,564,628 |
| | Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Programme (LFLP) | 1285 | 02/12/2004 | 07/09/2005 | 31/12/2014 | 9 | 15,973,904 |
| | Poverty Alleviation Fund Project II (PAFP II) | 1450 | 13/12/2007 | 31/07/2008 | 31/12/2018 | 10 | 213,508,839 |
| | High Value Agricultural Project in Hill and Mountain Areas (HVAP) | 1471 | 17/12/2009 | 05/07/2010 | 30/09/2018 | 8 | 18,872,483 |
| | Improved Seeds for Farmers Programme (Kisankalagi Unnat Biu-Bijan Karyakram) (ISFP/KUBK) | 1602 | 21/09/2012 | 02/12/2012 | 31/12/2019 | 7 | 55,402,190 |
| | Adaptation of Smallholders in Hilly Areas Project (ASHA) | 1723 | 13/09/2014 | 26/02/2015 | 31/03/2021 | 6 | 37,617,300 |
| | Samriddhi-Rural Enterprises and Remittances Programme (SRERP) | 1724 | 22/04/2015 | 10/12/2015 | 31/12/2022 | 7 | 49,323,472 |
| | Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) | 1418 | 11/12/2017 | 04/06/2018 | 30/06/2024 | 6 | 68,089,000 |
| Sierra Leone | Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction Project (RCPRP) | 1054 | 18/12/2003 | 02/03/2006 | 31/03/2017 | 11 | 52,834,236 |
| | Rural Finance and Community Improvement Programme (RFCIP) | 1310 | 18/04/2007 | 30/05/2008 | 30/06/2014 | 6 | 13,056,617 |
| | Smallholder Commercialization Programme (SCP) | 1599 | 11/05/2011 | 29/07/2011 | 30/09/2019 | 8 | 56,400,000 |
| | Rural Finance and Community Improvement Programme II (RFCIP II) | 1710 | 03/04/2013 | 26/06/2013 | 30/06/2022 | 9 | 47,147,499 |
| | Agricultural Value chain Development Project (AVDP) | 1544 | 08/12/2018 | 16/07/2019 | 30/06/2024 | 5 | 92,018,715 |
| | ***Impact evaluation*** | | | | | | |
| Niger | Food Security and Development Support Project in the Maradi Region | 1625 | 13/12/2011 | 12/03/2012 | 31/03/2018 | 6 | 31,706,599 |
| | ***Project Performance Evaluations*** | | | | | | |
| Haiti | Small-scale Irrigation Development Project (PPI-2) | 1275 | 14/12/2006 | 05/11/2008 | 30/06/2016 | 8 | 34,070,720 |
| Liberia | Smallholder Tree Crop Revitalization Support project (STCRSP) | 1616 | 13/12/2011 | 13/07/2012 | 30/09/2017 | 5 | 24,963,058 |
| Nepal | Western Uplands Poverty Alleviation Project (WUPAP) | 1119 | 06/12/2001 | 01/01/2003 | 30/09/2016 | 13 | 32,564,628 |
| Sierra Leone | Rehabilitation and Community-Based Poverty Reduction Project (RCPRP) | 1054 | 18/12/2003 | 02/03/2006 | 31/03/2017 | 11 | 52,834,236 |
| | ***Project Completion Report Validations*** | | | | | | |
| Argentina | Rural Areas Development Programme (PRODEAR) | 1364 | 14/12/2006 | 16/12/2009 | 31/12/2015 | 6 | 44,820,816 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bangladesh | Participatory Small-scale Water Resources Sector Project (PSSWRSP) | 1466 | 15/09/2009 | 06/11/2009 | 30/06/2018 | 9 | 119,797,515 |
| Cambodia | Project for Agricultural Development and Economic Empowerment (PADEE) | 1559 | 03/04/2012 | 08/06/2012 | 30/06/2018 | 6 | 47,285,972 |
| Cameroon | Commodity Value Chain Development Support Project (PADFA) | 1439 | 22/04/2010 | 18/10/2010 | 31/12/2017 | 7 | 24,290,175 |
| Central African Republic | Project for Reviving Food Crops and Small Livestock Production in the Savannah (PREVES) | 1579 | 30/04/2011 | 12/05/2011 | 31/12/2017 | 6 | 13,166,531 |
| Chad | Rural Development Support Programme in Guera (PADER G) | 1582 | 15/12/2010 | 18/10/2011 | 31/12/2016 | 5 | 20,118,089 |
| China | Guangxi Integrated Agricultural Development Project (GIADP) | 1555 | 13/12/2011 | 20/01/2012 | 31/03/2017 | 5 | 96,862,014 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Support to Agricultural Development and Marketing Project (PROPACOM) | 1589 | 13/12/2011 | 16/03/2012 | 30/06/2018 | 6 | 28,965,642 |
| Gabon | Agricultural and Rural Development Project (PDAR) | 1313 | 12/09/2007 | 20/03/2008 | 31/03/2017 | 9 | 14,029,254 |
| Ghana | Rural and Agriculture Finance Programme (RAFIP) | 1428 | 17/12/2008 | 30/04/2010 | 30/06/2016 | 6 | 29,781,020 |
| Ghana | Northern Rural Growth Project (NRGP) | 1390 | 13/12/2007 | 24/10/2008 | 31/12/2016 | 8 | 103,553,046 |
| Grenada | Market Access and Rural Enterprise Development Programme (MAREP) | 1569 | 05/12/2010 | 30/03/2011 | 31/03/2018 | 7 | 7,499,157 |
| Guinea | National Programme to Support Agriculture Value Chain Actors (PNAAFA) | 1206 | 05/09/2002 | 05/08/2004 | 30/03/2017 | 13 | 37,230,912 |
| India | Mitigating Poverty in Western Rajasthan (MPOWER) | 1418 | 24/04/2008 | 11/12/2008 | 31/12/2017 | 9 | 62,335,803 |
| Indonesia | Coastal Community Development Project (CCDP) | 1621 | 21/09/2012 | 23/10/2012 | 31/12/2017 | 5 | 43,241,914 |
| Lao | Soum Son Seun Jai – Community-based Food Security and Economic Opportunities Programme (SSSJ) | 1608 | 13/12/2011 | 22/12/2011 | 30/09/2017 | 6 | 19,333,798 |
| Maldives | Fisheries and Agriculture Diversification Programme (FADIP) | 1377 | 12/09/2007 | 15/09/2009 | 31/03/2018 | 9 | 6,871,017 |
| Mali | Fostering Agricultural Productivity project (PAPAM) | 1444 | 16/09/2010 | 13/10/2011 | 31/07/2018 | 7 | 174,550,111 |
| Mozambique | PRONEA Support Project | 1326 | 20/04/2006 | 25/11/2007 | 31/12/2017 | 10 | 25,242,000 |
| Nicaragua | Agricultural, Fishery and Forestry Productive Systems Development Programme in RAAN and RAAS Indigenous Territories (NICARIBE) | 1505 | 15/12/2010 | 11/01/2012 | 30/09/2017 | 5 | 14,954,158 |
| Niger | Ruwanmu Small-Scale Irrigation Project (PPI Ruwanmu) | 1646 | 21/09/2012 | 19/02/2013 | 30/06/2018 | 5 | 25,652,306 |
| Seychelles | Competitive local Innovations for Small-scale Agriculture Project (CLISSA) | 1560 | 07/04/2013 | 14/11/2013 | 31/12/2018 | 5 | 3,741,141 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sri Lanka | National Agribusiness Development Project (NADeP) | 1457 | 17/12/2009 | 23/02/2010 | 31/12/2017 | 7 | 32,963,333 |
| Sudan | Rural Access Project (RAP) | 1503 | 17/12/2009 | 04/04/2010 | 31/12/2015 | 5 | 14,963,546 |
| Sudan | Supporting Traditional Rainfed Small-scale Producers in Sinnar State (SUSTAIN) | 1524 | 15/12/2010 | 26/04/2011 | 30/06/2018 | 7 | 21,192,956 |
| Togo | Support to Agricultural Developmet Project (PADAT) | 1558 | 15/12/2010 | 22/12/2010 | 31/12/2016 | 6 | 81,996,240 |
| Zambia | Smallholder Agribusiness Promotion Programme (SAPP) | 1474 | 15/09/2009 | 20/01/2010 | 31/03/2017 | 7 | 24,638,533 |

# 2020 ARRI methodology and analysis

## Part 1. Methodology

1. The ARRI 2020 introduces a new methodology for the preparation of the report to facilitate the analysis at project and country-levels.

### Project-Level Analysis

2. The project-level analysis focuses on the individual project evaluations that IOE has conducted through the years. In this year's ARRI, the **common features** with the previous editions are the following:

   a) The qualitative analysis is based on the evaluations completed by IOE in 2017, 2018 and 2019.
   b) All numerical and statistical data is based on projects' completion date.
   c) Only completed (and not ongoing) projects are subject to qualitative analysis.

3. The **new features** introduced with ARRI 2020 for the project-level analysis are related to two main aspects: (i) **the analytical process**; and (ii) **the sample of projects used for the analysis**.

4. **Analytical process**: The 2020 ARRI focuses on recurring evaluation findings related to the design and implementation of IFAD operations and country strategies. Addressing and learning from recurring performance issues (positive or negative) is an important pathway towards improving IFAD's development effectiveness. As the first step, this analysis distilled recurring design and implementation issues from all evaluations completed by IOE in 2017, 2018 and 2019. These issues or determinants of performance of IFAD's operations are referred in this report as markers. The "**analysis by markers**" is an innovative aspect introduced in this report.

5. The process to identify the markers were:

   a) **All evaluations completed during the period 2017-2019 are the main drivers for the qualitative analysis**. The evaluations have been scanned and analyzed with the support of the NVivo software in order to assess the key features within each project with regard to project design and implementation. The goal of this exercise has been to avoid any "gaps" in the analysis and to make the analysis comprehensive of all aspects related to design and implementation.

   b) The **discussion and findings related to performance assessment** in IOE evaluations completed during 2017-2019 was the main source of information.

   c) Several internal **IOE consultations and review of management assessments and other documents highlighted the main aspects/topics** that are considered decisive to assess the performance of evaluated projects, both in positive and negative terms.

   d) All topics identified in steps a), b) and c) were compiled to determine **a final list of "markers".**

   e) A final list of markers are categorized into two main groups: **markers for design and markers for implementation**. Each marker is shown in a **ranking** sequence based on the recurrent frequency in the evaluations completed during 2017-2019.

6. **Sample of projects used for the analysis:** The 2020 ARRI extended the qualitative analysis to the evaluations conducted in 2017 and 2018. The purpose of such an expansion is threefold: (i) **Provides a more realistic values of ratings and is consistent with the practice of other IFIs** - the three year average of ratings irons out spurious variations in annual ratings stemming from low sample size; ii) **increases the number of sampled projects** to make it more robust compared to the limited sample size when considering only evaluations completed in2019; and (iii) **Helps**

**identify recurrent issues/markers** and thus provides a quantitative basis for the analysis.

7. The results of the project-level analysis are presented in **Chapter 3** of the ARRI.

Chart 1
**Project-level analysis process for ARRI 2020**




### Country-Level Analysis

8. The country-level analysis is based on the assessment and ratings in the CSPEs (Country strategy and programme evaluations), which are: i) overall project portfolio achievement (based on the ten criteria); ii) performance of partners (IFAD and government); iii) non-lending activities; and iv) country strategy and programme performance (its relevance and effectiveness).

9. As outlined earlier, the analysis is based on the **14 CSPEs completed during the period 2017-2019**. The main emphasis is placed on strategic-level issues in order to better understand IFAD's performance at the country level. To this end, **Chapter 4** of the ARRI focuses on the relevance of IFAD's country strategies in terms of their suitability to the context and whether, and how, they have evolved over the past few years.

## Part 2. Project-level Analysis

### Age of portfolio for ARRI 2020 project analysis

10. The **average project duration** of all projects (109) (all evaluations completed during 2017-2019) is presented in the chart below:

Chart 2
**Average project duration (2017, 2018, 2019 evaluations)**



11. The projects included in the analysis are distributed **by approval and completion** year as shown in the chart below. Between 2006 and 2010, 69 per cent of the approved projects is concentrated, while 68 per cent of the projects was completed between 2014 and 2017.

Chart 3
**Number of projects by year of approval and completion in 2017, 2018 and 2019 evaluations**




12. When comparing the distribution by entry-into-force and completion years, the distance between the years narrows down, with 84 per cent of the projects becoming effective between 2007 and 2013.

Chart 4
**Number of projects by year of effectiveness and completion in 2017, 2018 and 2019 evaluations**




13. The regional distribution of the 109 projects evaluated and included in the sample is indicated in the graph below: 57 per cent is in APR and WCA, while the remaining 43 per cent is distributed amongst the other regions.

Chart 5
**Regional distribution of projects in the analysis**



## Projects sample

14. The full sample of completed and evaluated projects for the ARRI 2020 analysis is composed by:

    a) 36 evaluations completed in 2017 (1 IE, 26 PCRVs, 9 PPEs);
    b) 41 evaluations completed in 2018 (1 IE, 27 PCRVs, 13 PPEs);
    c) 32 evaluations completed in 2019 (1 IE, 27 PCRVs, 4 PPEs);

    For a total of **109 evaluations**.

15. The markers used for the analysis are divided in two main groups: **design** (7 markers) and **implementation** (5 markers), for a total of **12 markers**.

16. The **total number of frequencies** (number of times a marker is observed in an evaluation and mapped under a marker taking into account the full analytical context of the document) is equal to **310** frequencies in design and **565** frequencies in implementation in the last three ARRIs. Based on the number of frequencies, the markers have been ranked to determine the most recurring markers.

17. **Each marker is "mapped" in a project only once**, even if it occurs more than once; hence the number of instances/frequencies in/by which each marker is mapped shows the percentage of projects displaying the identified marker (for example: *"selection of partners at design"* is a marker captured ten times in the 2019 evaluations, which means that 10 projects out of 41 evaluations in 2019 ARRI – 24% of projects- show the marker). However, some markers have more than one level of observation and a project can be mapped more than once (for example in "Social Targeting").

18. Each marker has been assigned an **"attribute"** in terms of more or less successful practices as well as those with mixed results. When a marker is defined "**more successful**", it means that the evaluation has emphasized that it is favourable and decisive for the project's results. In case of a "**less successful**" attribute, the evaluation has pointed out that because of a specific shortcoming, the project has not fully or partially been able to achieve its objectives. "**Mixed results"** are usually referred to descriptions that highlight both positive and negative aspects under a specific marker.

19. The analysis has identified two main set of shares: (i) share of projects within each marker (how many projects out of the 109 show the marker); and (ii) share of frequencies for each marker, to determine the recurrence of each one of them.

## Markers in Design

20. The definitions of markers in design are indicated in the table below. The description is based on the 2019 evaluations and how these topics are mirrored the analysis that IOE has conducted for each project.

Table1
**Metadata for Design Markers in 2020 ARRI analysis**

| *Design Markers Level 1* | *Level 2* | *Metadata Description based on 2020 ARRI project sample* |
|---|---|---|
| Quality of Design | Addressing Specificity of context | Relevance and coherence of project design to guarantee consistency and compatibility with political, economic, social context of the country. Beneficiaries' demands and needs identified in a timely manner. In-depth analysis of country political context. |
| | Scope of Design | Scope of project too broad/ambitious in terms of number of activities, geographical spread, complexity of activities and products, taking into account the budget. |
| | Coherence of components and activities | Coherence and synergy amongst components (and activities) of the project design. Complementarity between project goals and activities. Relevance of components in meeting project objectives. |
| | Partnerships for results | Identification at design of partners with the needed capacities to implement the project and reach all target groups. Strengthening of existing partnerships to provide technical and financial support to beneficiaries. |
| | Risk Mitigation Strategies | Strategy included in the design based on the process of identifying, evaluating, prioritising risks and steps to minimize the impact of these anticipated risks. In particular, with regard to emerging environmental climatic risks, market risks (accessibility to financial resource, lack of knowledge of client demand), infrastructure design, appropriateness to country context. |
| Social Targeting | Women | Focus on women coherent with the country local context. Inclusion of gender strategy at design (including necessary gender capacities in implementation units) , in line with country's policy documents referring to women's empowerment. Promotion of women's participation in decision-making roles in the different productive and investment processes conducted by the programme. |
| | Rural Poor, Farmers, Vulnerable | Balanced approach to support the rural poorest and most vulnerable through project's activities. Targeting poor people in remote locations. Assessment in design of the heterogeneity of targeted producers' and farmers' organisations in terms of institutional arrangements as well as internal capabilities. Monitoring mechanisms to track the status of this group throughout implementation to be included in the design. Social mobilisation and participatory decision-making approaches in design to reach out to marginalised groups. It includes all references to elite capture. |
| | Youth | Design to include a strategy to involve youth in production, organization, management and marketing. Inclusion of mechanisms to include youth in decision-making processes. Ensuring design relevance to youth and include elements to address the needs and demands of the youth. Assessment of youth capabilities (i.e. land ownership) in the country. Training on business skills and access to financial services. |
| | Indigenous | Targeting strategy relevant for indigenous communities' needs, participation and organization |
| Learning from Other Projects | | Capitalizing on experience and lessons from other IFAD projects through knowledge sharing and peer-to-peer learning. |
| Participatory Planning and Direct Participation (i.e. ownership of stakeholders) | | Strengthening of producers' organizations decision making process by promoting direct participation and inclusion. Supporting sharing of knowledge and experience to fortify rural participatory development. |

21. The markers for design have been mapped in all project evaluations completed in 2017, 2018 and 2019 (total sample: 109 project evaluations). The graph below indicates the percentage of projects mapped under each main marker.

Chart 6

**Percentage of projects mapped under Design markers (N=109)**




**Chart 7: Distribution of projects across 2017, 2018 and 2019 evaluations**




Note: All percentages in Chart 1 do not add up to 100%, because they indicate what percentage of projects is mapped under each marker.

22. The graph above shows that **73 per cent** of the projects have been classified under addressing specificity of context within quality of design and, within this percentage, the projects have been equally distributed across the three years of evaluations. "Social targeting" is the second most represented marker and shows a lower presence in the 2019 evaluations. "Coherence of components and activities" is the third most mapped marker and equally distributed across the three years, followed by "learning from other projects", which seemed more recurrent in the 2018 and 2019 evaluations. The latest two markers, "participatory planning and direct participation" and "risk mitigation strategies", appeared in 13 per cent and 12 per cent of projects respectively.

23. In terms of **frequencies** of markers, the percentages might change because some markers are including "level 2" mapping (see Table 1). In this case, a project may be mapped more than once; for example, a project evaluation that has shown features and issues related "social targeting", may be mapped both under "women" and "youth", if these are topics analyzed and mentioned in the document. The chart below represents the percentages of the frequencies within each marker in the 2017, 2018 and 2019 sample of evaluated projects. Social Targeting is the marker with the highest number of frequencies (40 per cent), followed by addressing specificity of context (26 per cent), coherence of components and activities (11 per cent), learning from other projects (8 per cent), partnerships for results (7 per cent) and, finally, participatory planning and direct participation (5 per cent) and risk mitigation strategies (4 per cent). The markers with more evident asymmetrical distribution across the the three years of evaluations are learning from other projects, partnerships for results and risk mitigation strategies.

Chart 7

**Percentage of frequencies mapped under (N=310) Design markers**




Chart 8

**Distribution of projects across 2017, 2018 and 2019 evaluations**




Note: All percentages in Chart 3 add up to 100%, because they indicate how the total 100 per cent of frequencies is distributed amongst all markers.

24. Finally, each design marker identified has been given an attribute (see para 18). The chart below indicates the distribution by attribute within each marker.

Chart 9

**Percentage of projects mapped under Design markers (N=310)**




25. The analysis showed that social targeting, learning from other projects and participatory planning and direct participation have the highest frequency of positive attributes. The most problematic findings are referred to addressing specificity of context, coherence of components and activities in project design and the lack of risk mitigation strategies. Partnerships for results at design has shown a balanced distribution of attributes.

## Markers in Implementation

26. The definitions of markers in implementation are shown in the table below. The description is based on the 2019 evaluations and how these topics are mirrored the analysis that IOE has conducted for each project.

Table 2
**Metadata for Implementation Markers in 2020 ARRI analysis**

| *Implementation Markers Level 1* | *Level 2* | *Metadata Description based on 2020 ARRI project sample* |
|---|---|---|
| Project Management | Staffing | Assessment of staff capacities, turnover, timely replacement, delays in recruitment in order to establish impact on project effectiveness and capacity building |
| | Expertise | Presence/absence of expertise (technical, gender/climate/environment related) and effects on project implementation |
| | M&E and Data availability | Assessment of M&E systems (transparent, qualified, cost-effective, innovative) to monitor outputs and share knowledge |
| | Financial Management | Performance of financial control mechanisms with regard to audit reports, procurement, disbursements, outsourcing processes, record-keeping |
| Training for strengthening capacities of beneficiaries | Quality | Type of trainings conducted and their capabilities to result in human capital improvement. |
| | Timing | Timing of training execution to assess outcomes and sustainable results |
| | Duration | Duration of training in relation to its capability to reach the right target/number of people and to guarantee long-term results |
| | Women | Success level of training for women as a vehicle to mainstream women's empowerment |
| Implementation and Supervision Support | | Assessment of : 1. how IFAD's supervision missions have been successful or not in improving project implementation, adjusting design, providing technical support, reallocating funds, reviewing targeting strategies; and 2. If and how IFAD's recommendation have been implemented and have contributed to effectiveness development |
| Groups and institutions supported | Producer Organizations | Involvement of producers' organizations in decision-making processes. Strengthening of grassroots organizations to achieve beneficial results for the target communities and effectiveness in building community cohesion and empowerment. |
| | Institutions | Ownership of institutional capacity (key institutional partners, organizational arrangements, capacity-building efforts needed during implementation) within government institutions and in-country partners |
| Adapting to changes in external context | | Adjustments during project implementation to the project design to respond to context changes linked to social and political unrest or climate related events |

27. The markers for implementation have been mapped in all project evaluations conducted by IOE in 2017, 2018 and 2019 (109 project evaluations). The graph below indicates the percentage of projects mapped under each main marker:

Chart 10
**Percentage of projects mapped under implementation markers (N=109)**




Chart 11
**Distribution of projects across 2017, 2018 and 2019 evaluations**




28. The graph above shows that **94 per cent** of the projects have been classified under the marker implementation and supervision support and, within this percentage, the projects have been distributed in large percentages across the three years of evaluations, with a smaller share in documents completed in 2018. The markers "groups and institutions

supported" and "project management" (both at **88 per cent**) are the second most represented in the cohort of projects. Groups and institutions supported includes two level of analysis: (i) producers' organizations and (ii) institutions (see Table 2 above). Project management includes three different level 2 of analysis: (i) M&E data; (ii) staffing and expertise; and (iii) financial management. With regard to "adapting to changes in external context" (mapped in **25 per cent** of the large cohort of projects in the sample), the marker reflects context changes linked to social and political unrest or climate related events. The percentage of projects mapped under this marker is higher in 2017 evaluations, because 50 per cent of the projects evaluated that year were all in **fragile countries**, where external context inevitably interfered with IFAD's operations.

29. In terms of frequencies of markers, the share within each marker may change as some markers are including "level 2" mapping (see Table 2). In this case, a project may be mapped more than once; for example, within project management, a project evaluations may be classified both under M&E and Staffing and expertise. That is also why the sample is equal to 565 observations, which is higher than the 109 evaluations considered.

Chart 13
**Percentage of frequencies mapped under implementation Markers (N=565)**




Chart 14
**Distribution of projects across 2017, 2018 and 2019 evaluations**




30. The chart above represents the percentages of the frequencies within each implementation marker in the 2018, 2019 and 2020 ARRI sample of projects. Project management is the marker with the highest number of frequencies with **34 per** cent, followed by groups and institutions with **26 per cent**, training for strengthening capacities with **16 per cent**, implementation and supervision support with **18 per cent** and external context with **5 per cent**.

31. The most frequent marker, project management, shows also the highest percentage of negative attributes (chart 9).

Chart 15
**Percentage of projects mapped under implementation** markers (N=565)



# Part 3. Project-level analysis: list of projects under each marker and examples of successful/unsuccessful practices

This section includes: 1) a table summary of the main findings in the markers analysis; and 2) a list of projects under each marker and based on attributes assigned, for both quality of design and project implementation.

## Design

Table 3
**List of markers for analysis on project design**

| *Level 1 Markers* | *% of frequencies of markers in the analysis (N=310)* | *% of projects (2018, 2019, 2020 samples) mapped under each marker (N=109 evaluations)* |
|---|---|---|
| Addressing specificity of context (N=80) | 26% | 73% |
| Social Targeting (N=124) | 40% | 69% |
| Coherence of components and activities (N=33) | 11% | 31% |
| Learning from Other Projects (N=25) | 8% | 23% |
| Partnerships for results (N=23) | 7% | 21% |
| Participatory planning/direct participation (N=14) | 5% | 13% |
| Risk Mitigation Strategies (N=11) | 4% | 12% |

Table 4
**Markers levels and results by attributes**

| *Level 1 Markers* | *Level 2 Markers* | *Positive* | *Negative* | *Mixed* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Addressing specificity of context | No level 2 | 38% | 60% | 3% |
| Social Targeting | 100% | 53% | 44% | 3% |
| *Women* | *42%* | *64%* | *36%* | - |
| *Farmers/Vulnerable* | *31%* | *49%* | *48%* | *3%* |
| *Youth/Indigenous* | *27%* | *45%* | *45%* | *9%* |
| Coherence of components and activities | No level 2 | 21% | 73% | 6% |
| Learning from Other Projects | No level 2 | 68% | 28% | 4% |
| Partnerships for results | No level 2 | 39% | 43% | 17% |
| Participatory planning/direct participation | No level 2 | 93% | 7% | - |
| Risk Mitigation Strategies | No level 2 | - | 91% | 9% |

Table 5
**List of projects under design markers**

| Marker Description | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***Addressing specificity of context*** | *Projects mapped* | *Selected successful examples- Approaches associated with favourable ratings* | *Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings* |
| **Relevance and coherence of project design to guarantee consistency and compatibility with political, economic, social context of the country. Beneficiaries' demands and needs identified in a timely manner. In-depth analysis of country political context.** | Argentina PRODEAR<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>China GADP<br>Cambodia PADEE<br>Guinee PNAFAA<br>Nicaragua NICARIBE<br>India MPOWER<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Indonesia CCDP<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Liberia STRP<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Mali PAPAM<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Seychelles CLISSA<br>Cote d'Ivoire PROPRACOM<br>Gabon PDAR<br>Ghana NRGP<br>Haiti PPI-2<br>Chad PADER-G<br>Sri Lanka NADeP<br>Sudan RAP<br>Niger PPI<br>Mozambique. PRONEA | • Relevance of design to the IFAD's strategic priorities in the country<br>• Changes in approach in post-war context<br>• Modular design to introduce pilot and innovative measures for poverty reduction<br>• Realistic targets | • Lack of regulatory framework to provide incentives to attract private sector<br>• Insufficient analysis of financial capabilities of beneficiaries<br>• Underestimation of low producers' capabilities and institution weaknesses<br>• Inadequate assumptions on national implementation capacity for a market-oriented approach |
| **Scope of Design** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Scope of project too broad/ambitious in terms of number of activities, geographical spread, complexity of activities and products, taking into account the budget.** | Cameroon PADFA<br>Cent. Afr Rep PREVES<br>Grenada MAREP<br>Guinee PNAAFA<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Sri Lanka NADeP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Togo PADAT | | • Ambitious expectations for the capabilities of beneficiaries<br>• Overestimation of targets<br>• Range of activities ambitious and complex to undertake<br>• High expectations in terms of scope of private sector involvement<br>• Optimistic assumptions on likelihood of scaling up |
| **Coherence of components and activities** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Coherence and synergy amongst components (and activities) of the project. design. Complementarity between project goals and activities. Relevance of components in meeting project objectives.** | Haiti PPI-2<br>Niger PPI<br>Seychelles CLISSA<br>Cambodia PADEE<br>Chad PADER G<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Mali PAPAM<br>Mozambique PRONEA | • Complementarity between project goals and activities of other national and international organizations<br>• Coherence of components to address challenges in terms of access to market | • "Add-on" activities with weak internal coherence and coordination challenges<br>• Lack of clarity in design about catogories of expenditure causing overspending and reallocation of funds<br>• Unclear linkages between PMU and other departments creating confusion on roles and responsibilities |
| **Partnerships for results** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Identification at design of partners with the needed capacities to implement the project and reach all target groups. Strengthening of existing partnerships to provide technical and financial support to beneficiaries.** | Argentina PRODEAR<br>Cote d'Ivoire. PROPRACOM<br>Centr. Afr Rep PREVES<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Sri Lanka NADeP<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Ghana NGRP<br>Gabon PDAR | • Selection of relevant partners to ensure proper social inclusiveness of specific marginalised groups | • Exclusion of partners with relevant expertise<br>• Support to pre-existing partnerships leaving little space for project to alter the market power and use pro-poor approaches |
| **Risk Mitigation Strategies** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Strategy included in the design based on the process of identifying, evaluating, prioritising risks and steps to minimize the impact of these anticipated risks. In particular, with regard to emerging environmental climatic risks, market risks (accessibility to financial resource, lack of knowledge of client demand), infrastructure design, appropriateness to country context.** | Gabon PDAR<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Sudan RAP<br>India MPOWER<br>Sri Lanka NADeP | | • Need for risk mitigation strategies with regard to climatic risks (resistant crops, diversification of incomes, soil fertility management)<br>• Need of risk mitigation strategies in 4P model, in particular with regard to risk sharing mechanisms as a way of engaging private sector |
| **Social Targeting (Women)** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Focus on women coherent with the country local context. Inclusion of gender strategy at design (including necessary gender capacities in implementation units), in line with country's policy documents referring to women's empowerment. Promotion of women's participation in decision-making roles in the different productive and investment processes conducted by the programme.** | Centr. Afr Rep PREVES<br>Chad PADER G<br>India MPOWER<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Nicaragua NICARIBE<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Ghana NGRP<br>Cote d'Ivoire. PROPRACOM<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Indonesia CCDP | • Women's empowerment through direct participation in income generating activities<br>• Consideration of women's comparative advantage in the design of commodity selection and value chain analysis<br>• Women's empowerment through leadership positions<br>• Access to credit and control over assets<br>• Bridging gender gaps in food intake | • Inappropriate effective communication to women beneficiaries (Language barriers)<br>• Lack of acknowledgment of women limited access to land |
| **Social Targeting (Farmers/Vulnerable/Poor)** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Balanced approach to support the rural poorest and most vulnerable through project's activities. Targeting poor people in remote locations. Assessment in design of the heterogeneity of targeted producers' and farmers' organisations in terms of institutional arrangements as well as internal capabilities. Monitoring mechanisms to track the status of this group through out implementation to be included in the design. Social mobilisation and participatory decision-making approaches in design to reach out to marginalised groups. It** | Cambodia PADEE<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Sri Lanka NADeP<br>Cameroon PADFA<br>Chad PADER<br>Gabon PDAR<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Seychelles CLISSA<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Liberia STCRSP | • Adjusting targeting poor with non-farm interventions and non-land based activities<br>• CIP (Community Investment Plans) approach effective to target the very poor in remote geographical locations<br>• Targeting farmers with experience and knowledge local resources | • Inadequate analysis of FOs capabilities and organisational structures<br>• Self-selection mechanisms for beneficiaries' participation<br>• Selection of cooperatives with no managerial, strategic and financial capabilities |

**includes all references to elite capture.**

| Social Targeting (Youth/Indigenous) | Projects mapped | Approaches associated with favourable ratings | Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Design to include a strategy to involve youth in production, organization, management and marketing. Inclusion of mechanisms to include youth in decision-making processes. Ensuring design relevance to youth and include elements to address the needs and demands of the youth. Assessment of youth capabilities (i.e. land ownership) in the country. Training on business skills and access to financial services. Targeting strategy relevant for indigenous communities' needs, participation and organization.** | Argentina PRODEAR<br>Nicaragua NICARIBE<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Sri Lanka NADeP<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP | • Appropriate training, didactic and technical materials<br>• Specific indicators for including youth and indigenous<br>• Involvement of youth in production, organization, management<br>• Youth involved in administrative tasks<br>• Youth providing logistical support in marketing<br>• Negotiation of long term leases for land to favour youth | • Lack of training for youth on business skills<br>• Targeting on income generating activities and self-employment not attractive for youth<br>• Youth not included in value chain |
| **Learning from Other Projects** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Capitalizing on experience and lessons from other IFAD projects through knowledge sharing and peer-to-peer learning.** | Bangladesh PSSWRS<br>China GIADP<br>Ghana NGRP<br>Haiti PPI-2<br>India MPOWER<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Cambodia PADEE<br>Cameroon PADFA<br>Cote d'Ivoire. PROPRACOM<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Niger PPI | • Building on innovations and emerging opportunities from earlier project phases<br>• Wider application and adoption of management Techniques already pilot tested<br>• Learning route for stakeholders to facilitate cross learning with other IFAD projects in the region on value chain | • Inadequate training on synergies between two projects with regards to a joint project unit and shared M&E system<br>• Lack of clarity amongst project partners |
| **participatory planning and direct participation i.e. ownership of stakeholders** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Strengthening of producers' organizations decision making process by promoting direct participation and inclusion. Supporting sharing of knowledge and experience to fortify rural participatory development.** | Argentina PRODEAR<br>Bangladesh PSSWRS<br>China GIADP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Chad PADER G | • Direct participation through rural development roundtables for development strategy<br>• Beneficiaries' involvement in sub-projects planning phase, O&M, training<br>• VIGs (Village Implementation Groups) taking decision on project activities<br>• Social cohesion improved through training, VDCs (villages development communities) and CIGs (common interest groups) | |

# Implementation

Table 6
**List of markers for analysis on project implementation**

| *Level 1 Markers* | *% of frequencies of markers in the analysis (N=565)* | *% of projects (2018, 2019, 2020 samples) mapped under each marker (N=109 evaluations)* |
|---|---|---|
| Project management (N=194) | 34% | 88% |
| Groups and Institutions supported (N=149) | 26% | 88% |
| Implementation and supervision support (N=102) | 18% | 94% |
| Training for strengthening capacities of beneficiaries (N=93) | 16% | 73% |
| Adapting to changes in external context (N=27) | 5% | 25% |

Table 7
**Markers levels and results by attributes**

| *Level 1 Markers* | *Level 2 Markers* | *Positive* | *Negative* | *Mixed* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project Management | 100% | 14% | 80% | 6% |
| *Staffing and Expertise* | *35%* | *9%* | *87%* | *4%* |
| *M&E data* | *32%* | *25%* | *71%* | *3%* |
| *Financial Management* | *32%* | *8%* | *83%* | *10%* |
| Groups and institutions supported | 100% | 55% | 29% | 16% |
| *Producers' organisations* | *42%* | *57%* | *27%* | *16%* |
| *Institutions* | *58%* | *53%* | *30%* | *16%* |
| Implementation and supervision support (N=102) | No level 2 | 51% | 34% | 15% |
| Training for strengthening capacities of beneficiaries | 100% | 55% | 28% | 17% |
| *Quality of training* | *70%* | *66%* | *15%* | *18%* |
| *Timing and duration of training* | *15%* | - | *86%* | *14%* |
| *Training for women* | *15%* | *57%* | *29%* | *14%* |
| Adapting to changes in external context | No level 2 | 26% | 70% | 4% |

Table 8
**List of projects under implementation markers**

| **Marker Description** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***Project Management (Staffing and Expertise*** | *Projects mapped* | *Approaches associated with favourable ratings* | *Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings* |
| **Assessment of staff capacities, turnover, timely replacement, delays in recruitment in order to establish impact on project effectiveness and capacity building. Presence/absence of expertise (technical, gender / climate/ environment related) and effects on project implementation** | Cambodia PADEE<br>Indonesia CCDP<br>Bangladesh PSSWRS<br>Cameroon PADFA<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>China GIADP<br>Gabon PDAR<br>Grenada MAREP<br>India MPOWER<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Mali PAPAM | • Experienced staff establishing effective financial management systems<br>• Staff performance assessments leading successful output delivery | • Slow recruitment process leading to delays in loan utilization and overall achievements<br>• High staff turnover leading to low physical execution rate (increased time for orientation by new staff)<br>• Lack of replacement of staff in time (due to lack of availability of staff) and long procurement procedures<br>• Insufficient attribution of roles and responsibilities<br>• High turnover of CPMs, causing inconsistencies in management styles and limited policy engagement |
| **Project Management (M&E / Data Availability)** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Assessment of M&E systems** | Indonesia CCDP<br>Argentina PRODEAR | • M&E plan developed from the start | • Weak and inadequate M&E System |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **(transparent, qualified, cost-effective, innovative) to monitor outputs and share knowledge** | Cambodia PADEE<br>Cameroon PADFA<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>Cote d'Ivoire PROPRACOM<br>Gabon PDAR<br>Grenada MAREP<br>Guinee PNAAFA<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Mali PAPAM<br>Mozambique PRONEA<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Nicaragua NICARIBE<br>Seychelles CLISSA<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Zambia SAPP | • Data collected cascading upwards from districts to national levels with adequate verification mechanisms.<br>• Web-based MIS to allow real-time information<br>• Innovative, simple, cost-effective system strengthening project management capacity<br>• Allowing expeditious corrective actions | • Monitoring tools not articulated despite IFAD's recommendation<br>• Lack of incentives to collect data properly<br>• Inadequate staff and resource and skills to collect data at the decentralised levels (districts)<br>• No automation<br>• Inadequate effort by IFAD to support staff more with training and technical assistance |
| **Project Management (Financial Management)** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Performance of financial control mechanisms with regard to audit reports, procurement, disbursements, outsourcing processes, record-keeping** | Cambodia PADEE<br>China GIADP<br>Seychelles CLISSA<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>Gabon PDAR<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Mozambique PRONEA<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Sri Lanka NADeP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Togo PADAT<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Grenada MAREP | • Knowledgeable and experience staff<br>• Timely audit reports<br>• Financial control discipline (vehicle log movements sheets, operational cost controls, etc.) | • Missing accounts reconciliation<br>• Limited financial reports prepared<br>• High turnover of financial managers<br>• Delay in submitting documents<br>• Inefficiencies in outsourcing processes<br>• Insufficient quality of record keeping<br>• Lack of manual for accounting and financial reporting<br>• Disproportionate disbursements (overhead costs at the expense of project activities) |
| **Training for strengthening capacities of beneficiaries (Quality)** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Type of trainings conducted and their capabilities to result in human capital improvement** | Argentina PRODEAR<br>Chad PADER G<br>Haiti PPI-2<br>India MPOWER<br>Niger PPI<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Sudan RAP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Ghana NRGP<br>Cote d'Ivoire PROPRACOM<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Togo PADAT<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>Gabon PDAR<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>China GIADP | • Training contributing to significant changes of human capital in beneficiaries<br>• Improved literacy contributing to land management and increased productivity<br>• Agricultural technical training contributing to good agricultural practices<br>• Training of cooperatives improving business management<br>• Off farm training leading to new production technology and diversification of income | • Training not effective because of lack of uptake by participant producers<br>• Inadequate training on climate change<br>• Strengthening of APEX structures through training, but not enough to represent interested of beneficiaries and coordinate actions at grassroots level<br>• Variable quality of training depending on commitment of trainers and lead farmers<br>• Training for POs' at grassroot level, but not adequate to create unions to facilitate marketing |
| **Training for strengthening capacities of beneficiaries (Women)** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Success level of training for women as a vehicle to mainstream women's empowerment** | Bangladesh PSSWRS<br>Guinee PNAAFA<br>Mozambique PRONEA<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Cote D'Iv. PROPRACOM<br>Niger PPI | • Training women in income-generating activities<br>• Functional literacy training targeting women | • Training designed for women in leadership roles but lack of strategy |

| Training for strengthening capacities of beneficiaries (Timing and Duration) | Projects mapped | Approaches associated with favourable ratings | Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Timing of training execution to assess outcomes and sustainable results. Duration of training in relation to its capability to reach the right target/number of people and to guarantee long-term results.** | Cambodia PADEE<br>Grenada MAREP<br>Mali PAPAM<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Cameroon PADFA<br>Gabon PDAR | | • High drop-out because of inadequate consideration of local conditions (lengthy curricula and timing of training i.e. overlapping with cropping season)<br>• Training provided but lack of financing at completion to implement plans of action |
| **Implementation and Supervision Support** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Assessment of : 1. how IFAD's supervision missions have been successful or not in improving project implementation, adjusting design, providing technical support, reallocating funds, reviewing targeting strategies; and 2. If and how IFAD's recommendation have been implemented and have contributed to effectiveness development** | Bangladesh PSSWRS<br>Argentina PRODEAR<br>Cambodia PADEE<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>Chad PADER G<br>Grenada MAREP<br>Guinee PNAAFA<br>India MPOWER<br>Indonesia CCDP<br>Mali PAPAM<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Nicaragua NICARIBE<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Sudan RAP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Cote D'Iv. PROPRACOM<br>Gabon PDAR<br>Ghana NGRP<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Mozambique PRONEA<br>Niger PPI<br>Seychelles CLISSA<br>Sri Lanka NADeP<br>Togo PADAT<br>China GIADP<br>Maldives FADIP | • Relevant recommendations at fiduciary and technical level<br>• Consistency of implementation support<br>• Follow up on issues to ensure solutions are adopted<br>• Flexibility and responsiveness to evolving contexts<br>• Implementation support with regular supervision missions<br>• Proactivity in dealing with implementations issues during supervision<br>• Design adjustment /Resources shifting<br>• Decentralization of programme coordination unit proposed during MTR helped reach target population better<br>• Narrowing of scale and variety of activities helped achieve better focus<br>• Adjustment of targets during implementation to take into account the context<br>• An accelerated plan of action prepared at MTR to help improve progress (introduction of competitive salaries for the PCU staff; increased mobility to reach remote communities, etc.) | • Adjustments recommended to procurement procedures but not implemented<br>• Separate mission form co-financier creating more work for PMU<br>• Conflicting suggestions from different missions<br>• Changes in team composition in supervision missions<br>• Inconsistencies in leadership and technical substance<br>• Insufficient support to increase funding<br>• Lack of an early decision (after several missions) to carry out a major strategic re-alignment and restructuring of the project |
| **Producers' Organizations** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Involvement of producers' organisations in decision-making processes. Strengthening of grassroots organisations to achieve beneficial results for the target communities and effectiveness in building community cohesion and empowerment.** | Argentina PRODEAR<br>Indonesia CCDP<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Sudan RAP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Nicaragua NICARIBE<br>Cote D'Ivoire PROPRACOM<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Chad PADER G<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Seychelles CLISSA<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>Guinee PNAAFA<br>Haiti PPI-2<br>India MPOWER<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP | • Direct participation of POs in commercial process<br>• Better coordination of sales<br>• Better use of post-harvest infrastructure<br>• Acquisition of legal status by organizations<br>• Control over resources generating a new model for rural development, increasing community cohesion and empowerment<br>• Push approach building farmers capacity to improve productivity and quality<br>• Pull approach to incentivise the private sector company<br>• Logistical support and pre-financing to cooperatives | • Weak linkages between local, regional and national levels among producers' organizations and their national representative body<br>• Lack of training aligned to organizations' needs and lack of adequate assessment of their performance led to weak negotiating power<br>• Revision of design during implementation for IFAD to fully meet the setting up and operational costs of producer cooperative organizations threatened the taking up of ownership by these organizations |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | encouraging farmers to sell directly to them and not the middlemen<br>• Adjusting amount of local development plans to achieve better focus and avoid territorial dispersion | • Autonomous Professional Agricultural Organisations (PAOs) created but no strategy provided to mobilise their own financial resources |
| **Institutions** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Ownership of institutional capacity (key institutional partners, organizational arrangements, capacity-building efforts needed during implementation) within government institutions and in-country partners.** | Argentina PRODEAR<br>Bangladesh PSSWRS<br>Cambodia PADEE<br>Indonesia CCDP<br>Nicaragua NICARIBE<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Niger PPI<br>Cote D'Ivoire. PROPRACOM<br>Guinee PNAAFA<br>Liberia STCRSP<br>Maldives FADIP<br>Sudan RAP<br>Sudan SUSTAIN<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>India MPOWER<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Mali PAPAM<br>Mozambique PRONEA<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Seychelles CLISSA | • The project also contributed to formation of a grassroots-level extension network through engagement with various external service providers<br>• Development of territorial plans to implement activities, investments and a monitoring and evaluation system coupled with active support from central govt helped achieve targets by territorial bodies<br>• Building of infrastructure for decentralized institutions helped them in overcoming lack of central govt funding and strengthened their decision-making ability<br>• Well-equipped extension agents providing higher-quality extension services<br>• Inclusion of relevant and key national actors helped promote good institutional collaboration and coordination in the implementation of project activities<br>• Project developed capacities of local government agencies through capacity building, better equipment and institutional support | • Lack of involvement of key actors in strategic activities<br>• Lack of expertise of institutions and service providers<br>• Limited institutional capacity not including all levels (only undertaken for grassroots not for local institutions involved in implementing /supervising project activities and some key national institutions, thus affecting sustainability<br>• The lack of ownership and institutional capacity prevented forging effective partnerships between key players in the sector at various levels and lasting policy and institutional impacts.<br>• Weak project coordination<br>• Inadequate financial management<br>• Insufficient internal control<br>• Institutional arrangements resulting in numerous cost centres that could not be serviced by the limited project staff but later streamlined. |
| **Adapting to changes in external context** | **Projects mapped** | **Approaches associated with favourable ratings** | **Approaches associated with unfavourable ratings** |
| **Adjustments during project implementation to the project design to respond to context changes linked to social and political unrest or climate related events** | Indonesia CCDP<br>Laos SSSJ<br>Mali PAPAM<br>Nepal WUPAP<br>Sierra Leone RCPRP<br>Centr Afr Rep PREVES<br>Guinee PNAAFA<br>China GIADP<br>Zambia SAPP<br>Chad PADER G | • Design adjust because of government sharpening focus on eco-tourism during implementation<br>• IFAD was flexible and responsive to the required design changes resulting from the implementation context on the ground (design adjusted because of government's new strategy on food security and nutrition) and to reallocate grant budget to support a successful outcome of the project (financing viallge investment plans)<br>• Design adjusted because of conflict<br>• How: financing the right infrastructures, reducing geographical focus, involving local agricultural institutions, refining M&E and coordination mechanisms among partners<br>• Social and political unrest<br>• Design adjusted based on previous experience in the region, focusing on the poorest, women and youth to mitigate the risk (targeting the same people as the rebels) | • Ebola crisis and social unrest causing slow implementation |

# Part 4. Country-level Analysis: examples of CSPEs per topic identified in the analysis

This section defines some of the CSPE narrative that have guided the analysis in CHAPTER IV of the 2020 ARRI. The evaluations samples included 14 CSPEs conducted between 2018 and 2020.

Table 9
**Findings from Chapter IV and corresponding evaluation document**

| *Findings* | *Examples* |
|---|---|
| 1) The strategic orientation of country programmes was generally aligned with policies and priorities of IFAD and governments | **Cameroon**. As reported in the CSPE conducted in the country, "the preparation of the COSOP 2007-2012 followed a long consultation process, which spanned almost three years, including a consultation mission in late 2004, written exchanges with the Government on the project COSOP during 2005, a validation workshop at the end of May 2006, and, finally, the approval of the strategy by the IFAD Executive Board in August 2007. The preparation of the 2015-2019 Portfolio Strategy, with the support of experts from the FAO Investment Center, included consultations at the level of the Government, TFPs and representatives of POs. The document was validated during a participatory stakeholder workshop in early 2015."<br>The strategic objectives of IFAD's overall strategic frameworks over the period, however, have evolved. The objectives of improving the management of natural resources, agricultural techniques and services, financial services, market access, off-farm employment opportunities and the participation of the rural poor in policy making , were added the promotion of agro-pastoral entrepreneurship and the improvement of the institutional and political context in favor of agriculture. The 2011-2015 Strategic Framework also adds rural youth as IFAD's priority target, and highlights the importance of promoting producer-public-private partnerships enabling the rural poor to integrate the agricultural value chains. The design of the PEA-J and the 2015-2019 Portfolio Strategy clearly integrate all of these new aspects.<br><br>**Burkina Faso**. As highlighted in the CSPE conducted in the country, the COSOP 2007-2012 was developed in a participatory manner with all the stakeholders between January 2005 and June 2007. During this period, a series of consultations was organized both at the level of the capital and in the field. A participatory survey on perceptions of poverty and an inventory of best practices in small-scale irrigation were carried out during the consultative process with farmers and pastoralists. A national final validation consultation completed the process. The country strategy note was formulated by the country office in November 2016, then discussed with the Government and approved by IFAD in January 2017.<br><br>**Nepal**: COSOP 2013 was formulated following a consultative process with the Government, led by the Ministry of Agriculture and with participation of a wide cross-section of stakeholders, which ensured that the COSOP was aligned with national development policies. |
| 2) The strategic focus of COSOPs adapted to the changing context and was evidence-based | **Sierra Leone**: COSOPs in this country show a good adaptation to the changing context. The 2003 COSOP clearly indicates a strategic focus on development-oriented recovery assistance. In the short-term, the strategic thrust for IFAD was to provide rapid assistance to the communities as part of the reintegration and regeneration process, and the aim was to restore basic services and revive economic activities. The 2010 COSOP aligned with the shift in government's focus from reconstruction and rehabilitation of the agricultural sector debilitated by the civil war towards to economic development<br><br>**Madagascar** is an example of how previous recommendations have been taken into account in the development of IFAD country`s strategy. The 2012 ESPP gave rise to recommendations which were taken into account by the COSOP 2015-2019, either in the formulation of strategic objectives such as resilience to climate change (SO1) and the sector approach (SO2), or in defined implementation approaches and actions such as support for deconcentration and decentralization in the context of anchoring interventions at regional and local levels, or the dissemination of agricultural techniques well stated in the activities to be developed for reach OS1.<br><br>**Mexico**: as it was observed in this country, not all previous recommendations have been followed. For instance, COSOP 2007-2012 benefited from IOE's 2006 country program assessment and followed most of the recommendations of that evaluation, except the one of establishing a stronger project monitoring and evaluation system and the one of IFAD being physically present in the country |
| 3) The targeting focus in COSOPs was mixed in terms of coverage and reflective of context and priority interventions | **Cambodia:** here, the COSOPs have not exhibited a clear direction in terms of geographical focus. The 1998 and 2008 COSOPs have both referred to the selection of geographical areas (with provinces being the first level of entry) with high poverty rate. The poverty rates would have been one of the considerations, but in reality, other considerations (as also noted in the 2008 COSOP) were understandably the prime driver for geographical area selection, such as the presence of partners and their already existing or planned initiatives and apparently the RGC's preference to distribute donor-funded agricultural sector projects in different areas.<br><br>The targeting strategy in the 1998 and 2008 COSOPs is basically centered around the multiple-stage identification of geographical areas with high poverty rates (provinces, districts, communes and then villages) and then the identification of the poor households within the selected villages (using wealth ranking exercise, later also combined with the IDPoor list). The target group was categorized as very poor and poor, with the very poor comprising "most vulnerable households", |

| *Findings* | *Examples* |
|---|---|
| | the landless or those with little lands, women and women-headed households and indigenous and ethnic minority households. But they were described in general with little consideration of the differences between geographic areas. For example, land holding size varies greatly between different areas, and in sparsely populated areas, “a poor household" may have, say, more than two hectares of land. The target group and the targeting strategy described remained largely static between the 1998 and 2008 COSOPs.<br><br>**Sri Lanka:** Both COSOPs in this country indicate the intention of going to geographic areas where poverty level is high. The 2003 COSOP was more specific in noting dry zones, estate communities and coastal areas, but as indicated earlier, they were seen as independent operations in different locations in different sectors with different sets of target groups. The 2015 COSOP left it broad, only stating "districts and areas with higher incidences of poverty, and localities that are conflict-affected and face specific development challenges because of their geographic locations". In reality, the geographical coverage in the portfolio has been broad and dispersed. In addition to limited guidance in this aspect in the COSOPs, other factors also contributed. First, the post-tsunami operations covered long-stretched coastlines, part of which would not have been included by IFAD interventions. Second, the end of the war in 2009 brought IFAD to a new area in the north, where the poverty rate is indeed high. Third, geographic areas for NADeP support was basically driven by the interest of the private sector, which led to rather dispersed areas with more concentration in some areas than less.<br><br>**Egypt:** represent a case in which targeting is fairly well studied based on a survey of the determinants of poverty and the different types of IFAD targets. These targets are well characterized (level and causes of poverty, strategies adopted, priority needs), and the responses provided are adequate to the needs and in accordance with the objectives and means proposed in the strategy and with geographic targeting. |
| 4) The logical articulation of the results management framework in the COSOP is an important pre-requisite for realizing the theory of change for the country programme | **Peru:** as reported in the CSPE conducted in the country, by not incorporating instruments (credit and non-credit) into the results management matrix, it is not possible to identify a coherent logic for the implementation of the strategy in achieving the objectives. Together, the lack of logical articulation between objectives, means and goals prevented the generation of an explicit theory of change for the program. This, together with the lack of allocation of specific resources for implementation and monitoring, limited the coherence of the program.<br><br>**Cambodia**: among a number of weaknesses that were observed in the results management frameworks in the 2008 and 2013 COSOPs, there is an example of how linkages between the strategic objectives and indicators are not clear in many cases (e.g. indicator on child malnutrition for the strategic objective on resilience to climate and other shocks in the 2013 COSOP); and how most of the indicators in the 2013 COSOP results management framework are closely tied to each investment project and do not serve to reflect on the progress at the country programme level. These weaknesses have been gradually self-identified in the course of COSOP/country programme reviews.<br><br>**Burkina**: The COSOP 2007-2012 logical framework includes quantitative results indicators and quantitative and qualitative stage indicators. No analysis has been made showing the articulation of the stage indicators with the outcome indicators, and the latter, sometimes irrelevant, do not present a baseline situation. The links between the stage indicators and the outcome indicators are not clear and are not explained. Monitoring and evaluation is approached in a very general way in four lines, without mentioning an existing baseline situation or one to be implemented in 2007 and without reflecting on the approach to be followed so that the monitoring and evaluation indicators of projects can be consolidated so as to provide details for the COSOP result indicators.<br><br>**Madagascar:** The COSOP Logical Framework links the global, strategic and politico-institutional objectives of the country's strategy with the development objectives of Madagascar; it also makes the link between the strategic objectives and the intermediate results making it possible to judge the progress made in achieving them. It defines quantitative indicators for each of the global and strategic objectives with, for the most part (56%), benchmarks and target values. |
| 5) The mitigation measures proposed to manage the risks identified in the country programmes were at times less specific and relevant, and less commensurate with the means that IFAD can deploy to do so | **Madagascar**: The COSOP does not foresee the risks of withdrawal of the co-financing partners, risks which arose during the previous COSOP, and does not specify the procedure to follow in this case to avoid an unbalanced start of projects and the anachronistic realization of activities (actions of training and capacity building for example before productive structuring actions or opening up).<br><br>**Burkina Faso**: The risks identified in the COSOP and the country strategy note are relevant to the realities of the rural sector in Burkina Faso. The COSOP has identified many risks. However, the proposed mitigation measures appear weak. Indeed, the risks linked to the profitability and sustainability of micro projects managed by the rural poor cannot be mitigated solely by sustainable activity plans. The COSOP also provides, to remedy this, "targeting the poorest who, thanks to the projects, will be able to manage a microenterprise for their own account", which is not true in reality. The mitigation of other risks is mainly planned through negotiation, selection of activities, information and consultation on policies; so many actions that are necessary but insufficient.<br><br>**Cameroon**: For the majority, the mitigation measures proposed seem appropriate, such as support to POs to make a useful contribution to the development of agricultural policies and the establishment of a climate of trust between the Government and POs through regular meetings and open consultations with other influential TFPs or the improvement storage infrastructure for agricultural products and facilitation of warrant age. Certain mitigation measures have not yet been |

| *Findings* | *Examples* |
|---|---|
| | put into practice within the country program, in particular the geographic concentration of projects to avoid dusting (7 of the 10 regions of Cameroon are covered by current projects) or integration of adaptation measures to climate change. The measures proposed to improve governance and project management seem insufficient and poorly implemented and monitored, in particular the application of results-based management, and the strengthening of PMUs in matters of internal control, targeting, prioritization of activities, and procurement. Furthermore, the risk identified in the 2007-2012 COSOP concerning the Government's difficulties in providing the necessary counterpart funds no longer appears in the 2015-2019 Portfolio Strategy, probably because the payments were beyond forecasts (well always delayed) in the few years preceding this strategy. |
| 6) Country programmes can only better achieve their universal goal of improving incomes and food security if they exploit the synergies between lending and non-lending activities | **Madagascar**: for non-lending activities, the COSOP has explicitly defined: i) the themes and means of the policy dialogues in relation to the projects in the portfolio in progress, and of the sector program being identified; ii) the types of partnership to strengthen or initiate based on clearly identified areas likely to support its country program; iii) knowledge management objectives and themes, as well as mechanisms for the dissemination of information and knowledge useful to target populations; iv) the priorities of the donation window in relation to the objectives of resilience to climate change, knowledge management and networking in Madagascar at regional and international platforms and the promotion of South-South cooperation.<br><br>**Kenya and Sierra Leone**: are both examples of how the mix of instruments deployed during the COSOPs implementation period has not been so optimal. The synergies between lending and non-lending could have been stronger. In both countries this is largely due to the weaker performance of policy engagement and knowledge management and the often distinct and separate role of grants. |

# Comparison of IOE's PPE/IE ratings and PMD's PCR ratings ranked by disconnect

Table 1
**All evaluation criteria, only PPE/IE evaluations completed between 2007-2018 (N=77)**

| *Criteria* | *Mean ratings* | | *Disconnect* | *Mode* | | *Obs.* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *IOE* | *PMD* | | *IOE* | *PMD* | *IOE* | *PMD* |
| Relevance | 4.12 | 4.91 | -0.79 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 76 |
| Scaling-up | 4.10 | 4.67 | -0.56 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 75 |
| Project performance | 4.00 | 4.46 | -0.46 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 76 |
| Adaptation to climate change | 3.85 | 4.29 | -0.43 | 4 | 4 | 61 | 21 |
| IFAD performance | 4.18 | 4.59 | -0.40 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 75 |
| Efficiency | 3.79 | 4.18 | -0.39 | 4 | 4 | 77 | 77 |
| Effectiveness | 4.09 | 4.45 | -0.36 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 77 |
| Sustainability | 3.82 | 4.16 | -0.34 | 4 | 4 | 77 | 77 |
| GEWE | 4.22 | 4.56 | -0.34 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 77 |
| Overall project achievement | 4.12 | 4.45 | -0.33 | 4 | 5 | 75 | 75 |
| Government performance | 4.04 | 4.34 | -0.30 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 77 |
| ENRM | 3.96 | 4.24 | -0.28 | 4 | 4 | 68 | 67 |
| Innovation | 4.19 | 4.47 | -0.28 | 4 | 5 | 77 | 76 |
| Rural Poverty Impact | 4.20 | 4.34 | -0.14 | 4 | 5 | 76 | 77 |

Source: IOE evaluation rating database and PMD project completion report rating database.

Table 2
**All evaluation criteria, only PPE/IE evaluations completed between 2016-2018 (N=12)**

| *Criteria* | *Mean ratings* | | *Disconnect* | *Mode* | | *Obs.* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *IOE* | *PMD* | | *IOE* | *PMD* | *IOE* | *PMD* |
| Relevance | 3.92 | 4.91 | -0.99 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 11 |
| Scaling-up | 3.92 | 4.83 | -0.92 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 12 |
| IFAD performance | 4.08 | 4.83 | -0.75 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 12 |
| GEWE | 3.92 | 4.58 | -0.67 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 12 |
| Project performance | 3.90 | 4.50 | -0.60 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 11 |
| Efficiency | 3.75 | 4.33 | -0.58 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 12 |
| Effectiveness | 4.00 | 4.58 | -0.58 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 12 |
| Government performance | 4.08 | 4.58 | -0.50 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 12 |
| Innovation | 4.17 | 4.67 | -0.50 | 5 | 5 | 12 | 12 |
| Overall project achievement | 3.91 | 4.27 | -0.36 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 11 |
| Sustainability | 3.83 | 4.08 | -0.25 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 12 |
| ENRM | 4.45 | 4.64 | -0.18 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 11 |
| Rural Poverty Impact | 4.00 | 4.17 | -0.17 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 12 |
| Adaptation to climate change | 4.33 | 4.40 | -0.07 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 10 |

Source: IOE evaluation rating database and PMD project completion report rating database.

# Analysis of disconnect between PCR and IOE ratings

## *PCRV/PPE data series*

## I. Analysis of disconnect by evaluation criteria

1. Within the 2007-2018 PCRV/PPE projects analysed in ARRI 2020, the largest disconnect is registered in relevance (-0.55), followed by scaling up (-0.43). Rural poverty Impact and ENRM show the lowest disconnect (-0.16 and -0.15).

Chart 1
**Ranking of Disconnect between IOE and PCR ratings (2007-2018)**




2. The charts below show the trend for each criteria based on the average rating per completion year for IOE and PMD (PCRV/PPE/IE database 2007-2018) using the three yar moving average technique. When looking at average ratings, an overall aligned trend can be noticed between IOE and PCR ratings.

3. **Relevance** shows a declining trend for both IOE and PMD since 2012-2014 and the difference between IOE and PCR average ratings is the highest in comparison with the other criteria. **Effectiveness** shows a consistent aligned trend between IOE and PCR average ratings, with exception of a slightly larger gap in the most recent time period.

Chart 2
**Relevance**




Chart 3
**Effectiveness**




4. **Efficiency** ratings by IOE and PMD show aligned and stable trends from 2011-2013, after a consistent increase started in 2008-2010. **Sustainability**, which shows a flat trend in average rating for IOE, is more variable for PMD ratings. Between 2009-2011 PMD ratings increase until 2011-2013, causing a higher disconnect with IOE ratings. From 2013-2015, PMD ratings start declining as well, reducing the gap with IOE.

Chart 4
**Efficiency**




Chart 5
**Sustainability**




5. Noticeably, the gap between IOE and PMD ratings for **GEWE** has increased over time. As for **Rural Poverty Impact**, more consistency and alignment is noticed overall.

Chart 6
**GEWE**




Chart 7
**Rural Poverty Impact**




6. **Innovation** shows aligned and stable trends in average ratings between PMD and IOE, with a higher disconnect in 2016-2018. Also for **Scaling Up** it is possible to observe an alignment in the trends, yet with an increasing gap between PCR and IOE average ratings starting from 2010-2012. IOE 2017 evaluations are the first ones to rate the criteria separately.

Chart 8
**Innovation**




Chart 9
**Scaling up**




7. **ENRM and Adaptation to climate change** show a very low disconnect starting 2014-2016. The two criteria have started to be rated separately since 2016.

Chart 10
**ENRM**




Chart 11
**Adaptation to climate change**




8. As for **IFAD performance as a partner**, IOE and PMD ratings follow a parallel trend and, starting from 2013-2015, they both show a decline. **Government performance as a partner** shows aligned trend in ratings and a relatively stable distance between the two averages since 2011-2013. This criterion is on the border of the satisfactory zone: since 2010-2012 it has been in the satisfactory zone for PMD (4 and above) and the unsatisfactory zone for IOE (3 and below).

Chart 12
**IFAD performance**




Chart 13
**Government performance**




9. **Project performance** shows a slight disconnect and aligned trends across time. Starting 2013-2015, IOE average rating has always been in the unsatisfactory zone. **Overall project achievement** has a particularly flat trend for IOE ratings, and the difference with PCR ratings was slightly higher between 2011-2013 and 2014-2016.

Chart 14:
**Project performance**




Chart 15:
**Overall project achievement**




10. The majority of IOE ratings from project evaluations in the period 2007-2018 (47.7 per cent) are moderately satisfactory (4), as shown in the distribution analysis of independent ratings displayed in chart 16. In terms of the tails of the distribution, out of the total 2,887 ratings across 12 evaluation criteria, only 0.3 per cent are ratings of 1

and 0.9 per cent are 6. The bulk of the ratings in the evaluations i.e. 94 per cent are 3, 4 and 5. The distribution is mostly aligned with the previous one in 2019 ARRI, except for a slight shift in the rating of 3 (an increase of one per cent from the 2019 ARRI) and the rating of 6 (a minor decrease of 0.2 per cent from 2019 ARRI).

11. A comparison between the distribution IOE ratings and **PCR ratings** shows that ratings 3, 4 and 5 are those where most disconnect occurs. PCRs ratings indicate a high concentration in favour of ratings 4 and 5, with 3.9 per cent of rating 6.

Chart 16
**Distribution of IOE (N=3009) and PCR ratings (N=2887) between 2007 and 2018**




Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE) and PCR database, April 2020.

12. **In summary**, the disconnect between IOE and PCR ratings is confirmed in the ARRI 2020 and it shows that IOE and management are in agreement on the trends, even when actual ratings differ. Overall project achievement ratings are more flat and stable for IOE, while PMD ratings show more fluctuations. Relevance has the highest disconnect in the long-term (-0.55) and a smaller gap in the most recent period (-0.44). Effectiveness and efficiency indicated a consistent disconnect across time, both in the long-term and the most recent period. Sustainability, like relevance, decreases its disconnect in the recent period (-0.31 in the long-term and -0.24 in the most recent period). As for the other criteria, rural poverty impact, adaptation to climate change and ENRM show the lowest disconnect both in the long-term and the most recent period. IFAD and government performance as partners indicate the same disconnect (-0.31) in the lon-term comparison; however, while IFAD performance improves in the last time period (-0.29), government performance increases the gap up to -0.40.

# II. Analysis of performance by Region

13. The regional average disconnect between IOE and PMD ratings is shown in the table below:

Table 1
**Regional average disconnects**
*PCRV/PPE data series, 2007-2018*

| | *Regions (PCRV/PPE 2007-2018)* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *APR* | *ESA* | *LAC* | *NEN* | *WCA* | *All regions* |
| Average disconnect | -0.27 | -0.28 | -0.28 | -0.34 | -0.30 | -0.29 |

14. The average disconnect shown in the table above was calculated through two steps. First, average disconnect between IOE and PMD ratings were obtained for each evaluation criteria within each region. Second, the average disconnect of each criteria were averaged within each region. For instance, the average disconnect shown for APR is the average of the mean disconnect between IOE and PMD ratings regarding relevance, effectiveness, etc. in all APR evaluations. This method was also applied to determine the overall average disconnect which includes all regions.

15. The graph below (PCRV/PPE data 2007-2018) shows some differences in disconnect amongst regions for the different criteria as show below:

- Relevance: aligned disconnect amongst regions
- Effectiveness: lowest disconnect in WCA/highest in NEN
- Efficiency: lowest disconnect in APR/highest in NEN and LAC
- Sustainability: lowest disconnect in LAC/highest in WCA and ESA
- Project performance: highest disconnect in NEN and aligned disconnect amongst the other regions
- Rural Poverty Impact: aligned disconnect amongst regions, between 0.1 and 0.2
- GEWE: lowest disconnect in LAC with not significant difference with the other regions
- Innovation: no disconnect in APR/highest in WCA
- Scaling up: lowest disconnect in ESA/highest in WCA
- ENRM: lowest disconnect in ESA/highest in LAC
- Adaptation to climate change: positive disconnect in NEN/highest APR and WCA
- IFAD performance as a partner: lowest in APR/highest disconnect in NEN and ESA
- Government performance as a partner: lowest disconnect in APR/highest in ESA and NEN
- Overall project achievement: lowest disconnect in APR/highest in NEN

Chart 17
**IOE/PCR ratings disconnect by Regions**




16. The tables below indicate the performance of every region within each criteria analysed in the most recent periods presented in the ARRI 2020. Table 3 presents the percentage of moderately satisfactory and better ratings (PCRV/PPE data series) by region in 2016-2018. Dark cells indicate a negative trend compared to the previous three-year period of 2015-2017. Table 4 indicates the magnitude of the decline or increase between 2016-2018 and 2015-2017.

17. The tables can be summarized with the following findings:

- LAC shows declining ratings across all criteria but relevance and shows double digits decreases in 6 out of the 14 criteria considered.
- NEN performance, as opposed to LAC, improves across all criteria except relevance. The most substantial improvements can be noticed in adaptation to climate change, efficiency, and project performance.

- APR presents declining trends for all criteria but efficiency and adaptation to climate chance, remaining constant for ENRM. However, all the declines are very low in magnitude. IFAD performance represents the highest decline with -7.
- ESA performance decreased for 10 out of the 14 criteria, with GEWE and government performance presenting the most severe drops. At the same time, innovation remains at the highest percentage of positive ratings
- WCA presents mixed results with performance improving for half of the criteria and declining the other half. However, none of the criteria which has changed in positive shows a significant increase, as well as none of the negative trends is particularly alarming.

Table 2
**Percentage of moderately satisfactory+ ratings by Region, 2016-2018**

| Criteria | APR (18 projects) | ESA (10 projects) | LAC (8 projects) | NEN (6 projects) | WCA (22 projects) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance | 83 | 80 | 88 | 67 | 91 |
| Effectiveness | 94 | 70 | 50 | 83 | 59 |
| Efficiency | 72 | 30 | 50 | 67 | 32 |
| Sustainability | 83 | 70 | 38 | 83 | 32 |
| Project performance | 72 | 20 | 38 | 67 | 32 |
| Rural poverty impact | 94 | 70 | 50 | 83 | 64 |
| Innovation | 83 | 100 | 75 | 67 | 64 |
| Scaling-up | 72 | 80 | 75 | 67 | 45 |
| GEWE | 83 | 60 | 71 | 50 | 73 |
| ENRM | 100 | 67 | 71 | 100 | 75 |
| Adaptation to climate change | 83 | 78 | 33 | 100 | 79 |
| IFAD performance | 83 | 80 | 88 | 83 | 82 |
| Government performance | 78 | 30 | 63 | 50 | 41 |
| Overall project achievement | 88 | 70 | 43 | 83 | 64 |

**Negative Trend** **Positive Trend**

Table 3
**Percentage point increase/decrease between 2016-2018 and 2015-2017 period**

| Criteria | APR | ESA | LAC | NEN | WCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance | -2 | -5 | 3 | -17 | 4 |
| Effectiveness | -1 | 1 | -19 | 17 | -6 |
| Efficiency | 2 | -1 | -12 | 25 | 6 |
| Sustainability | -2 | 1 | -1 | 17 | 6 |
| Project performance | -3 | -18 | -16 | 25 | -7 |
| Rural poverty impact | -1 | -15 | -12 | 8 | -6 |
| Innovation | -2 | 0 | -2 | 8 | -6 |
| Scaling-up | -3 | -5 | -2 | 8 | 2 |
| GEWE | -2 | -17 | -5 | 8 | -6 |
| ENRM | 0 | -6 | -4 | 17 | 4 |
| Adaptation to climate change | 4 | -4 | -21 | 27 | 5 |
| IFAD performance | -7 | 3 | -5 | 0 | -1 |
| Government performance | -2 | -16 | -7 | 0 | 2 |
| Overall project achievement | -1 | -5 | -24 | 17 | -2 |

**Negative Trend** **Positive Trend**

# IOE ratings for Project Completion Reports

1. **Project completion reports (PCRs)**. In PCRVs, IOE assesses and rates PCRs using four evaluation criteria. These are: (i) scope (e.g. whether the PCR has adhered to IFAD guidelines for PCRs); (ii) quality (e.g. report preparation process and robustness of the evidence base); (iii) lessons (e.g. whether the PCR includes lessons on the proximate causes of satisfactory or less than satisfactory performance); and (iv) candour (e.g. in terms of objectivity in the narrative, and whether ratings in the PCR are supported by evidence included in the document). Ratings for each of these criteria are aggregated in the PCRVs to provide an overall rating of the PCR document.

2. As seen in the below table, the overall assessment of PCRs of project completed between2016 and 2018 has been stable compared to the projects completed in the previous time period. Eighty-nine per cent of the PCRs validated by IOE rated moderately satisfactory or better. The 2020 ARRI finds an improvement in satisfactory or better ratings for candour and overall evaluation of the PCR. Slight decrease in quality of the PCR is noticed in 2016-2018 vs 2015-2017.

Table 1
**Quality of PCR documents**
*Percentage of satisfactory ratings by evaluation criteria, PCRV/PPE data series, 2014-2018*

| *Evaluation criteria* | *Percentage of moderately satisfactory or better* | | | *Percentage of satisfactory or better* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *2014-2016* | *2015-2017* | *2016-2018* | *2014-2016* | *2015-2017* | *2016-2018* |
| Scope | 91 | 91 | 87 | 42 | 52 | 51 |
| Quality | 76 | 74 | 67 | 24 | 20 | 17 |
| Lessons | 94 | 93 | 92 | 59 | 64 | 62 |
| Candour | 89 | 89 | 89 | 43 | 53 | 60 |
| Overall rating | 91 | 92 | 89 | 31 | 35 | 38 |

Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

# Performance in non-lending activities by income groups (LICs and MICs)

1. Thirty-four of the total 54 CSPEs were conducted in middle-income countries (MICs) and twenty in low-income countries (LICs). Of the new CSPEs included in the 2020 ARRI, three were done in LICs (Sierra Leone, Nepal, and Madagascar) and one in MIC (Mexico). In addition, two out of four 2020 ARRI's CSPEs have been done in the country for the first time (Sierra Leone and Mexico). Analysis was conducted comparing the proportion of satisfactory and unsatisfactory ratings for LICs and MICs across the four non-lending evaluation criteria and for all the CSPEs completed by IOE since 2006. It is notable that LICs show a better performance for every non-lending activities except for knowledge management, although ratings are still mostly positive. Country-level policy engagement shows aligned ratings between the two groups of countries. Partnership building has a significantly better performance in LICs then MICs. All average ratings are below the satisfactory line (below 4), except for partnership building in LICs (4.2). These results prove the presence of more opportunity for partnership in LICs where a greater number of bilateral and multilateral agencies operate and given that some MICs do not promote international co-financing. Nonetheless, MICs continue to have a high demand for financing and knowledge partnerships to not risk their poverty-reduction gains and to maintain their track record for promoting growth and addressing IFAD's four mainstreaming areas.

Chart 1
**Performance of non-lending activities in LICs and MICs**
*Percentage of satisfactory/unsatisfactory evaluations, 2006-2019 (year of evaluation)*




Source: IOE CSPE database (54 evaluations), April 2020.

# Current performance of projects in countries with fragile situations

The table below shows the most recent performance of projects in countries with fragile situations compared to projects in countries with non-fragile situations.[16]

Table 1
**Percentage of projects with moderately satisfactory ratings or above (MS+) in countries with non-fragile and fragile situations**
2016-2018 (non-fragile: N=50; fragile: N=13) vs. 2015-2017 (non-fragile: N=62; fragile: N=18)

| Criteria | % MS+ ratings in countries with non-fragile situations (2016-2018) | % MS+ ratings in countries with fragile situations (2016-2018) | Change in countries in non-fragile situations 16-18/15-17 | | Change in countries in fragile situations 16-18/15-17 | | Difference in countries with non-fragile and fragile situations (2016-2018 %MS+ ratings only) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relevance | 82 | 92 | ▼ | -2 | ▲ | 3 | ▼ | -10 |
| Effectiveness | 76 | 62 | ▼ | -5 | ▲ | 6 | ▲ | 14 |
| Efficiency | 50 | 46 | ▲ | 2 | ▲ | 7 | ▲ | 4 |
| Sustainability | 62 | 46 | ▲ | 1 | ▲ | 7 | ▲ | 16 |
| Project performance | 46 | 46 | ▼ | -7 | ▲ | 2 | ▬ | 0 |
| Rural Poverty Impact | 78 | 62 | ▼ | -4 | ▼ | -5 | ▲ | 16 |
| Innovation | 78 | 77 | ▼ | -3 | ▲ | 5 | ▲ | 1 |
| Scaling-up | 66 | 62 | ▼ | -3 | ▲ | 6 | ▲ | 4 |
| GEWE | 85 | 85 | ▲ | 12 | ▲ | 8 | ▬ | 0 |
| ENRM | 78 | 75 | ▼ | -6 | ▲ | 8 | ▲ | 3 |
| Adaptation to climate ch | 82 | 85 | ▲ | 7 | ▲ | 1 | ▼ | -3 |
| IFAD performance | 54 | 54 | ▼ | -31 | ▲ | 4 | ▬ | 0 |
| Government performan | 73 | 69 | ▲ | 13 | ▲ | 8 | ▲ | 4 |
| Overall project achieven | 86 | 92 | ▲ | 8 | ▼ | -2 | ▼ | -6 |

Source: IOE evaluation database (PCRV/PPE), April 2020.

[16] Definition of countries with fragile situations is aligned with the World Bank "Harmonized List of Fragile Situations FY 19" in consistency with the ARRIs from the previous years.

# Reporting of results for development effectiveness in comparator organizations

## A. Summary

1. This Note briefly examines two issues:

   - How evaluation offices of IFAD's peers *calculate and present* aggregate organizational results and performance on an annual basis; and
   - How independent evaluation ratings are *used* in results reporting.

2. The Note examines three comparator organizations: the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). These organizations produce different types of corporate level reports focusing on results and development impact or effectiveness, prepared by the management and the evaluation offices.

3. Most have at least two reports:

   i) An Annual Report from the evaluation function, which contains analysis of aggregated independent evaluation rating and analysis of corporate performance, as well as presentation of the activities and findings from the year's evaluations, and
   ii) A Results or Development Effectiveness Report produced by management reporting on the RMF, in which some data, validated by the evaluation function, are included.

4. The evaluation functions, in addition to their own annual reviews and reports, also provide - to different extent - inputs to management results reporting in the form of independent evaluation ratings. The WB has the closest collaboration between Evaluation Offices and Management, with a very significant use of independently validated ratings used in the development effectiveness /results reporting. Annual (or other) reports of the evaluation functions also often present an analysis of follow-up to evaluation recommendations (similar to the PRISMA in IFAD). Also, all highlight how they intend to improve collaboration with operational departments to strengthen the use and feedback loops of evaluative knowledge and evaluation findings. Improving the way the IFIs deal with and track evaluation recommendations is an issue in all peers.

## B. World Bank Group

5. The **Results and Performance of the World Bank Group report (RAP)**[17] is the Independent Evaluation Group's (IEG) annual review of the development effectiveness of the World Bank Group. The report, which has changed format over the years and is due for yet another change, provides a retrospective assessment, and synthesizes trends in independent IEG ratings and identifies explanatory factors behind portfolio performance. Its focus is on project outcome ratings and Bank performance ratings. It covers IBRD/IDA, IFC and MIGA, is 26 pages and has more than 100 pages of detailed appendix, including some that are only available online and contain additional background data and methodological explanations inter alia.

6. The RAP includes sections with explanatory factors for Bank performance, both external and internal to the Bank. It has no recommendations, but the report includes a section on "Follow-up on Major Evaluations by World Bank Group Management" containing an analysis of the Management Action Records (MAR). It also presents a management response.

7. **Reform of RAP**. One commitment of the management is to reform MAR in close collaboration with IEG to "enhance the strategic relevance and impact of IEG recommendations and of management actions to improve the Bank Group's development effectiveness." The current approach is judged to be overly focused on individual actions

[17] https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Evaluation/files/rap2018.pdf

and targets, is not conducive to learning and adaptation during implementation and does not allow a comprehensive view across the IEG reports that are often interrelated.

8. **Use of IEG ratings in Results reporting.** In addition to informing the RAP, IEG ratings and validations are a cornerstone of the Bank's results measurement system for IDA as well as its corporate balanced scorecard - the apex of the corporate results reports of the institution. The Annual scorecard is a snapshot of results, organized in a three-tier framework: Development Context, Client Results, and Performance.[18] While operational outcome and output indicators in tier two are management data, some in tier 3 – performance - are IEG validated ratings. The IDA Results Measurement System uses the same framework.[19] It has 84 indicators to track results of IDA countries at an aggregate level. Of these several indicators in Tier 3 are IEG validated ratings, relating to development outcomes and portfolio performance.

## C. Asian Development Bank

9. The ADB's Annual Evaluation Review (AER) presents a synthesis of the performance of the ADB and highlights results and systemic issues from independent evaluations conducted each year.[20] The Board-required report of the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) is produced to promote accountability and learning. It focuses on the operational performance and results of ADB and provides a synthesis of the evaluations prepared by IED in the preceding year and an in-depth analysis of performance trends of completed operations. It includes a special topic to strengthen results, and reports on Management's acceptance and implementation of IED recommendations.

10. The AER includes a special thematic chapter, different from year to year. In the latest year, 2019, it focused on a review of ADB's corporate results framework (CRF) and the Development Effectiveness Review (DER). The AER also provides an annual update on the implementation status of recommendations from Independent Evaluation Department high-level evaluations. The report is 70 pages, with 30 pages annex and a more than 10 page executive summary. Performance is discussed in terms of lending modality, sector, country, and regional perspectives. The AER includes recommendations. The report, similar to the WB RAP, includes a chapter analyzing how recommendations to IED evaluations have been followed-up.

11. **Issues of interest.** ADB has, similar to the World Bank, a focus on evaluation recommendations and how to improve the uptake and tracking. The introduction in 2017 of a technical meeting before the finalization of an evaluation report, between IED and management, has improved acceptance ratings. The AER states that: "Continued efforts to improve the management action record system (MARS) and to change it from a basic tracking and reporting system to a more dynamic learning tool that provides information on the outcomes of evaluation recommendations are also discussed." The report furthermore advocates more systematic learning from the thematic and sector evaluations produced by IED, particularly from the implementation of the recommendations of these reports. This learning process is suggested to be done jointly by ADB Management and IED through various learning sessions.

12. **Use of IEO ratings and data in management results reporting.** The ADB's Development Effectiveness Review (DER) is an annual report by ADB Management, which assesses ADB's progress in implementing its long-term strategic framework, Strategy 2020. It builds on the corporate Result Framework.[21] The review is Management's flagship report on ADB's performance in achieving the priorities of its corporate strategy, using indicators in the corporate results framework as the yardstick. Focusing on operations financed by ADB, it assesses ADB's development effectiveness, highlights actions ADB has taken to improve, and identifies areas where ADB's performance needs to be strengthened. The review covers all operations financed by

[18] http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/388081580918341342/World-Bank-Group-Scorecard-2019-data.pdf
[19] https://ida.worldbank.org/results/rms
[20] https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/467896/files/aer-2019.pdf
[21] https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/602911/defr-2019-secm420.pdf

ADB's ordinary capital resources and the ADF. It presents emerging trends and identifies actions for improving corporate performance. In the 4-tier RMF scorecard, IED validated ratings are used for country assistance programmes, both sovereign and non-sovereign success ratings and success ratings for policy based lending.

## D. African Development Bank

13. The independent evaluation office of the AfDB (IDEV) produces an annual evaluation report which presents the work of the office and major insights derived from the year's evaluations, inter alia.[22] In 2019 IDEV also produced two Validation Synthesis Reports of the PCRs for 2016 and 2017, respectively to provide the Bank's Board, Management, and operational staff with credible evidence on the quality of the PCRs, and the performance of Bank projects that exited the Bank's portfolio in 2016 and 2017. The annual report includes a short reference to these two reports.[23]

14. **Issues of interest.** The 2019 annual evaluation report includes a review of the status of implementation of recommendations from the Management Action Records System (MARS). While Management reports regularly to the Board on the status of *actions*,as a new initiative IDEV is due to assess and report to CODE on the level of adoption of evaluation *recommendations* once a year. The objective of this report is to examine the extent to which Management has adopted the agreed recommendations by assessing i) the alignment of the actions to their respective recommendations and ii) the degree of implementation of the actions. Pursuant to this provision, IDEV is currently working on its first MARS report which will be available in early 2020 and will be presented in the 2020 Annual Report. It will cover the recommendations for which all actions were due by December 2018.

15. IDEV works quite closely with the Bank's operations departments, aiming to raise the impact of evaluations on the Bank's work and raise awareness within the Bank of the formative value of IDEV's work, and highlighting the evaluation process as a joint learning exercise. In 2018, IDEV enhanced its engagement with Bank operations departments, through closer cooperation in the design and conduct of evaluations, including through reference groups. It also launched a series of capitalization workshops, a platform for IDEV and Bank operations staff to discuss findings, lessons and recommendations from evaluations and foster improved project designs and strategies.

16. **Use of IDEV ratings and data in management results reporting.** The Bank's flagship results report, the Annual Development Effectiveness Review (ADER) is structured around its 4-tier RMF and includes only one data set from IDEV relating to **"**operations independently rated as satisfactory or above at completion". The RMF explains it as follows: "At project completion, the Bank's task managers assess how well the project delivered its intended development outcomes. The task manager's assessment is complemented with an assessment by the Bank's Independent Development Evaluation".[24]

## E. Aggregation of project performance

17. This sub-section presents the methods used by the evaluation offices of the three IFIs to aggregate the performance of their operations.

18. **World Bank**. The performance of the World Bank operations is based on the Overall Bank Performance. Bank performance is based on two criteria: i) quality at entry (the extent to which the Bank identified, facilitated preparation of, and appraised the operation such that it was most likely to achieve planned development outcomes and was consistent with the Bank's fiduciary role) and, ii) the quality of bank supervision (refers to the extent to which the Bank proactively identified and resolved threats to the achievement of relevant development outcomes and the Bank's fiduciary role). The

[22] http://idev.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/IDEV-Annual_Report_2019_%28En%29_WEB.pdf
[23] https://idev.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PCR%202017-Synthesis%20report%20ENG.pdf and https://idev.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PCR-2016-Synthesis%20report%20ENG.pdf
[24] https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Development_Effectiveness_Review_2019/ADER_2019__EN.pdf

overall Bank performance is highly satisfactory (HS) if both these criteria are highly satisfactory. However, if these are different, then it uses the lower of the two values. For example, if quality at Entry is HS but quality of supervision is satisfactory, the Bank performance is termed as satisfactory.

19. **Asian Development Bank**. The core project evaluation criteria are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. Each of these leads to specific assessments, and the ratings are aggregated to arrive at a rating for the overall performance of a project—either highly successful (weighted average greater or equal to 2.7), successful (overall weighted average is greater than or equal to 1.6 and less than 2.7), less than successful (overall weighted average is greater than or equal to 0.8 and less than 1.6), or unsuccessful (overall weighted average is less than 0.8).

20. **African Development Bank.** Overall project rating is an arithmetic mean of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The performance on the rating is then determined based on the value of the mean, and using the following rule: a mean value of 1.00-1.49 is Highly Unsatisfactory, 1.50-2.49 is Unsatisfactory, 2.50-3.49 is Satisfactory, 3.50-4.00 is Highly Satisfactory.