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الاستثمار في السكان الريفيين

تقييم البرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية لجمهورية أنغولا

مذكرة إلى السادة ممثلي الدول الأعضاء في المجلس التنفيذي

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المجلس التنفيذي – الدورة الخامسة والعشرون بعد المائة
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الذيل الأول: الاتفاق عند نقطة الإنجاز

الذيل الثاني: التقرير الرئيسي– تقييم البرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية لجمهورية أنغولا

شكر وامتنان

أُجري تقييم البرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية هذا تحت إشراف Fabrizio Felloni، نائب مدير مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق. وتألف الفريق من Tullia Aiazzi (المستشارة الرئيسية المسؤولة عن تنسيق الفريق والقضايا الاستراتيجية والمساواة بين الجنسين)؛ و Amilcar Salumbo و Honoré Cassinda (المستشارين المعنيين بالسياق الوطني والسياسات الوطنية)؛ و Fabio Ramos (المستشار المعني بالتنمية الزراعية والقضايا البيئية)؛ و Jorge Caballo (المستشار المعني بالقضايا الائتمانية)؛ و Teresa Amador (المستشارة المعنية بمصايد الأسماك ومبادرات تربية الأحياء المائية). وتلقى الفريق الدعم من Cristina Spagnolo، مساعدة التقييم، في مكتب التقييم المستقل.

كذلك فقد استفاد هذا التقرير أيضا من استعراض النظراء في مكتب التقييم المستقل.

ويود مكتب التقييم المستقل أن يعبر عن امتنانه لـ Sana Jatta، المدير السابق لشعبة أفريقيا الشرقية والجنوبية؛ وعبلة بن هموش، المديرة القطرية لأنغولا؛ ولموظفي الصندوق الذين ساهموا بإدارة برنامج الصندوق في أنغولا. وكذلك فالتقدير موصول أيضا لحكومة جمهورية أنغولا، وبخاصة وزارة الزراعة والتنمية الريفية ومؤسساتها الخاصة بالتنمية الزراعية؛ ووزارة مصايد الأسماك والبحار؛ ووزارة المالية؛ وجميع مكاتبها في المقاطعات والمحافظات. ويرغب مكتب التقييم المستقل أيضا في التعبير عن امتنانه لوحدات إدارة المشروعات التي يمولها الصندوق في أنغولا، وعلى وجه الخصوص لمنسقي المشروعات، على تعاونهم المستمر والبناء خلال عملية التقييم بأسرها ولجميع الشركاء الذين أتاحوا الوقت اللازم للاجتماع مع فريق التقييم وتشاطروا معه وجهات نظرهم.

وأخيرا، فإن مكتب التقييم المستقل ممتن لأفراد المجتمعات المحلية في أنغولا وأعضاء الرابطات المتنوعة الذين أعطوا من وقتهم وجهدهم للالتقاء بفريق التقييم وتشاطر آرائهم ومخاوفهم ورؤيتهم بشأن المستقبل معه.

موجز تنفيذي

أولا– الخلفية

1- بناء على طلب من المجلس التنفيذي في دورته التاسعة عشر بعد المائة المنعقدة في ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2016، أجرى مكتب التقييم المستقل في الصندوق أول تقييم للبرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية للصندوق في جمهورية أنغولا عام 2017.

2- **النطاق.** يوفر هذا التقييم تقديرا للشراكة بين الصندوق وحكومة أنغولا خلال الفترة 2005–2017، وهو يتضمن تحليلا لجميع المبادرات التي يدعمها الصندوق والتي صادق عليها المجلس وغدت نافذة المفعول خلال هذه الفترة الزمنية. وقد تأطر التعاون بين الصندوق وأنغولا خلال هذه الفترة قيد الاعتبار ببرنامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية لعام 2005 حتى نهاية عام 2016، وبالمذكرة الاستراتيجية القطرية للفترة 2017–2018. وتستخدم نتائج وتوصيات هذا التقييم كي يستنير بها إعداد برنامج جديد للفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية في البلاد. وقد قدر تقييم البرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية لأنغولا ما يلي: (1) أداء وأثر الحافظة التي تتضمن مشروعا مستكملا ومشروعا جاريا ومشروعين تمت المصادقة عليهما مؤخرا؛ (2) أداء ونتائج الأنشطة غير الإقراضية التي تتضمن إدارة المعرفة وإرساء الشراكات وحوار السياسات؛ (3) أداء الاستراتيجية القطرية.

3- **الأهداف.** تتمثل أهداف هذا التقييم فيما يلي: (1) تقدير نتائج وأداء البرنامج والاستراتيجية التي يمولها الصندوق (2) توليد المخرجات والتوصيات لتعزيز فعالية التنمية والقضاء على الفقر الريفي في سياق الشراكة بين الصندوق وأنغولا. وقد أعد هذا التقييم بما يتماشى مع المنهجية المحددة في النسخة الثانية من دليل التقييم الذي أعده مكتب التقييم المستقل (2015).

4- **الصندوق في أنغولا.** بدأ الصندوق عمله مع أنغولا عام 1989. وبنهاية عام 2017، كان الصندوق قد صادق على سبعة قروض ومنح ذات علاقة بها دعما للحافظة بما قيمته الإجمالية بحدود 135.2 مليون دولار أمريكي. وتمثل قروض الصندوق 60.7 في المائة من إجمالي الحافظة، أما مساهمة الحكومة والمستفيدين فتصل إلى 11.9 في المائة و3.6 في المائة على التوالي. وبلغ التمويل المشترك من البنك الدولي وحكومة اليابان ومنظمة الأغذية والزراعة للأمم المتحدة 23.8 في المائة.

5- أدار دعم الصندوق لأنغولا مدراء للبرنامج القطري يقع مقر عملهم إما في مقر الصندوق أو في بلدان أخرى في إقليم أفريقيا الشرقية والجنوبية. وخلال الفترة 2004–2013 عزز الصندوق حضوره في أنغولا من خلال جلب مستشار وطني لدعم فريق إدارة البرنامج القطري في تصميم وتنفيذ مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى.

6- **مساهمات أنغولا في تجديد موارد الصندوق.** قدمت أنغولا أول مساهمة مالية لها في تجديد موارد الصندوق عام 1990. ومنذ عام 2005 غدت أكبر مساهم من إقليم أفريقيا الشرقية والجنوبية موفرة ما مجموعه 6.7 مليون دولار أمريكي بحلول نوفمبر/تشرين الثاني 2017.

ثانيا– النتائج الأساسية

7- **السياق.** في عام 2002، خرجت أنغولا من حرب أهلية دامت حوالي 30 عاما، مخلفة جميع بناها التحتية المادية وهيكلها المؤسسي ورأسمالها البشري بحاجة ملحة إلى إعادة الإحياء والترميم. وعلى الرغم من التحسينات الملفتة للنظر في مؤشراتها الاقتصادية الكلية التي تحققت بفضل العوائد المنبثقة عن صناعتها الاستخراجية أساسا، إلا أنه وفي السنوات الأخيرة اتضح بأن نموذج التنمية هذا عرضة لتقلبات كبيرة وغير قادر على توفير الفرص الاقتصادية المستدامة والعادلة للجميع.

8- وبتاريخ 2017، كان قطاع الزراعة الأسرية الريفية ما زال يعاني من عدم كفاية الاستثمارات في الطرق والبنى التحتية الاجتماعية، ومن البيئة السياساتية غير المواتية. وكانت الزراعة بمعظمها زراعة تعتمد على الكفاف وتتسم بمردودات متدنية وعوائد منخفضة للأراضي والعمالة. كذلك فإنها تتسم بعدم كفاية رأس المال وتتأثر سلبا بضعف الروابط بين أسواق المدخلات/المخرجات الوطنية المحلية.

9- **الصلة.** وجد التقييم أن استراتيجيات الصندوق وأهدافه تتسق مع تلك الواردة في النسخة المعدلة من استراتيجية الحكومة للحد من الفقر لعام 2005، التي تتطرق لقضايا حاسمة في أكثر المناطق ضعفا من المناطق الجبلية الوسطى. وتتواءم جميع المشروعات التي يمولها الصندوق والتي صودق عليها منذ ذلك الحين بشكل كامل مع الاستراتيجيات الوطنية التي تركز على المنتجين الفقراء على نطاق صغير. وقد اعترفت وزارة الزراعة والتنمية الريفية بصحة هذا النهج، كما أكدت البيانات الحديثة أن حوالي 90 في المائة من الإنتاج الزراعي في أنغولا يأتي من الزراعة الأسرية.

10- إلا أن تصميم المشروعات كان أقل من الأمثل في حالات مختارة. فمن بين المشروعات التي تركز على الزراعة، لم يولِ مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى اهتماما كافيا لمواجهة المعوقات الرئيسية التي يواجهها المنتجون في شراء المدخلات، أو للخدمات الضرورية لدعم المشروعات الفرعية المختلفة. أما تصميم مشروع تنمية زراعة أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة وإضفاء الطابع التجاري عليها ومشروع الإنعاش الزراعي الذي تمت المصادقة عليهما مؤخرا، ومشروع الإنعاش الزراعي من جهة أخرى فهما يعكسان اعتبارا حذرا للدروس المستفادة من التدخلات السابقة، بما في ذلك تلك ذات الصلة بإدارة الموارد الطبيعية والتأقلم مع تغير المناخ، ونتيجة لذلك يبدو أن هذين التصميمين كانا ملائمين على الرغم من أنهما اتسما بالمبالغة في الطموح.

11- وفي قطاع تربية الأحياء ومصايد الأسماك صغيرة النطاق في المياه العذبة، فقد كان مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية أول مبادرة من نوعها في أنغولا. وكان من المفترض لتعقد هذا الجهد أن يستدعي نهجا متدرجا بدءا من مشروعات صغيرة ريادية لكل من مصايد أسماك المياه العذبة وتربية الأحياء المائية. وكان من شأن مثل هذا النهج أن يوفر المدخلات والدعم المطلوب للحصول على المعلومات الرئيسية لاستخدامها في توسيع نطاق هذا المشروع في مرحلة لاحقة مع التخفيف في الوقت نفسه من المخاطر على المشاركين. إلا أنّ المشروع صُمم كتدخل إنمائي كامل النطاق، واستند إلى عدد من الافتراضات الهشة، علاوة على ذلك لم تحظ الميزانية المخصصة له بتقدير جدي، الأمر الذي شكل سببا رئيسيا لبطء وتيرة التنفيذ.

12- **الاستهداف.** اتسمت جميع قروض الصندوق خلال الفترة التي يغطيها التقييم باتساقها مع نهج الاستهداف الذي نص عليه برنامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية لعام 2005. وكان التركيز على الأسر الزراعية الفقيرة ناجحا بصورة معقولة في مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى الذي استهدف الأسر الفقيرة الضعيفة الموجودة في المجتمعات الهامشية والمنعزلة. وكانت معظم هذه الأسر تنتج على مستوى الكفاف، في حين اعتمد معظمها على المحاصيل البعلية وتمتع بوصول محدود للمدخلات والأسواق. أما مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية فهو يستهدف سكانا مشابهين على الرغم من أنه وفي هذه الحالة أيضا وجد التقييم بأن هنالك خطر كبير يتمثل في اقتناص النخبة. وعلى وجه الخصوص فإن البحيرات المخصصة لتربية الأحياء المائية التي حفرها بصورة مضنية صغار المزارعون الفقراء غدت من الأصول الجذابة للغاية. وفي غياب صكوك ملكية الأراضي التي تثبت ملكية رابطات أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة لهذه الحيازات، هنالك خطر كبير يتمثل في إمكانية استحواذ الكيانات الأكثر نفوذا عليها.

13- **الفعالية.** على الرغم من معاناة مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى من البداية البطيئة ومشاكل الإدارة في السنوات الأولى، إلا أنه أثمر عن نتائج ملموسة للمزارعين المشاركين وذلك بفضل تبنيه النشط لنموذج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية كوسيلة من وسائل الإرشاد. وقد نمت عضوية رابطات المزارعين ومجموعات مدارس المزارعين الحقلية بصورة كبيرة خلال فترة التنفيذ، وبالمجمل استفاد ما يقارب من 000 55 مزارع من أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة من التدريب على موضوعات متنوعة، وحصل حوالي نصفهم على التدريب في 726 مدرسة حقلية مختلفة للمزارعين. كذلك أدت تنمية القدرات المنتظمة لموظفي الإرشاد إلى تحسين إيصال خدمات الإرشاد الزراعي.

14- وكان المشروع أقل فعالية في مجالات أخرى، فعلى سبيل المثال، لم ينجح المشروع في توفير الحوافز للشباب للانخراط في الأنشطة الزراعية؛ ولم يصل من مدارس المزارعين الحقلية إلا القليل من المستفيدين إلى نقطة التخرج، وذلك بسبب التأخيرات في تبني المنهجية وعدم كفاية الأنشطة الهامة مثل التدريب على محو الأمية الوظيفية. إضافة إلى ذلك، فإن معدل تبني الممارسات الزراعية المحسنة المختلفة كان متفاوتا عبر الممارسات والمحاصيل، وإلى حد ما المقاطعات. ولم تتم الاستفادة من العديد من هذه الممارسات إلا في الحقول المشتركة، ولم يجر المشروع أي تحليلات معمقة تهدف إلى تحديد القضايا المتسببة بهذا النمط.

15- وفي الوقت الذي أجري فيه تقييم البرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية، كان مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية قد دخل حيز التنفيذ قبل أقل من 18 شهرا، وبالإجمال يبدو أنه يفتقر إلى التوجه الواضح. وقد شهدت بعثة التقييم بعض التقدم المحرز في مجال تنمية القدرات، فعلى سبيل المثال، فقد أجرت وحدة تنسيق المشروع دورات تدريبية لموظفي معهد مصايد الأسماك الحرفية على المستويين المركزي، وفي المحافظات، ولمجموعات الصيادين وأعضاء المجتمعات المحلية. إلا أنه وبسبب بعض العيوب في تصميم المشروع من جهة، ومحدودية توفر رأس المال البشري لإدارة مبادرة معقدة من جهة أخرى، فإن الأنشطة الميدانية إما أنها كانت لا تتقدم أو أنها عانت من أنماط متنوعة من المشاكل. فعلى سبيل المثال وفي محافظة ملانجي، عبأ المشروع مجموعات المنتجين الفقراء للانخراط في مهمة مضنية للغاية لشق البحيرات المخصصة لتربية الأحياء المائية، ولكن هؤلاء المجموعات لم تكن تمتلك الصكوك المطلوبة لملكية الأراضي التي ستنشأ هذه البحيرات، إضافة إلى ذلك فإن المشروع لم يجر تحليلا ملائما

للجدوى الاقتصادية والمالية لسلسة قيمة تربية الأحياء المائية. وربما يمثل هذا الوضع مصدر خطر على سمعة الصندوق في هذه المحافظة.

16- **الكفاءة.** عانت حافظة الصندوق من تأخيرات أعلى من المتوسط الإقليمي في إجراء الصروفات الأولية وخلال السنوات الأولى من التنفيذ. وفي نهاية المطاف، وفي الوقت الذي وصل فيه إلى مرحلة الاستكمال، أنجز مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى نتائج معتبرة، وذلك يعود جزئيا إلى تمديد يصل إلى حوالي سنتين لتاريخ إغلاق المشروع. وفي الوقت الذي كان يتم الإعداد فيه لهذا التقييم، كان من المبكر للغاية تقدير فيما لو كان المشروع قادرا على استعادة عافيته من جميع هذه التأخيرات، أو فيما لو كان تمديد فترة إغلاق المشروع أمرا ضروريا. وأما القضايا الأساسية التي تدخلت في كفاءة الحافظة بأسرها، والتي ربما ستؤدي إلى الأمر ذاته في المستقبل فهي التالية: (1) المخزون المحدود من رأس المال البشري في البلاد القادر على إدارة المشروعات وتوفير المساعدة التقنية الضرورية لها؛ (2) تخفيض قيمة العملة المحلية بحدود 45 في المائة على مدى 8 سنوات؛ (3) حقيقة أن تكاليف إدارة المشروع غدت أعلى حوالي 100 في المائة مما كان مخططا له، ويعود ذلك جزئيا إلى تأخيرات التنفيذ.

17- **أثر مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى على الفقر الريفي.** تشير الدلائل الموجودة إلى أن الحقول المشتركة التي تزرعها مجموعات مختلفة كجزء من 109 مشروعا فرعيا للميكنة قد أثمرت عن فوائض تعادل 30 إلى 50 في المائة كانت تباع عادة في الأسواق المحلية. ونمطيا قال أعضاء المجموعة بأن صافي الدخل من بيع المنتج إما يتم تقاسمه بين الأعضاء أو يعاد استثماره في الحقول المشتركة لموسم الزراعة التالي. وقد استثمرت بعض المجموعات بالفعل في الحقول المشتركة، وذلك لاستخدامها في إكثار البذار الذي يتوجب أن يأتي بأسعار أفضل من الإنتاج لأغراض الاستهلاك الغذائي.

18- **تنمية رأسمال البشري والاجتماعي والتمكين.** عثر التقييم على دلائل على العمل الكبير الذي أجري في هذا المضمار، فالالتحاق بمدارس المزارعين الحقلية كان عاليا بسبب إتاحتها الفرصة لتعلم المهارات التقنية ومناقشة القضايا المجتمعية وتطوير رأس المال الاجتماعي. إضافة إلى ذلك، فكونك عضو في مجموعة محترمة في المجتمع المدني يمثل بحد ذاته خطوة أولى نحو التمكين، وبصورة خاصة بالنسبة للعضوات من النساء. وتدرب بعض المزارعين لكي يغدوا مدربين رئيسيين أو ميسرين رئيسيين، وكلا الدوران رئيسيان في نهج الإرشاد الذي يتبع مدراس المزارعين الحقلية ويفتح الفرص للعمالة، إضافة إلى تحسين صورة هؤلاء الأشخاص في مجتمعاتهم المحلية. وفوق ذلك، فقد استفادت مدارس المزارعين الحقلية هذه من دورات لمحو الأمية الوظيفية، ومر جميع المشاركون فيها بعملية تمكين كبيرة للأفراد أدت إلى إنشاء روابط أقوى بين الأعضاء.

19- **الأمن الغذائي والإنتاجية الزراعية.** تشير بيانات الرصد إلى أن الممارسات الزراعية المحسنة التي أدخلها المشروع كانت كافية، وفي حالة الذرة "سمحت للأسر التي تتألف من خمسة أشخاص بتجاوز عتبة إنتاج الكفاف". وبالمتوسط ازداد مؤشر الإنتاج المحصولي بحدود 66 في المائة، مقارنة بقيمة خط الأساس التي قيست في الفترة 2012/2011. وأما الفرق بين مجموعة المعالجة ومجموعة المقارنة فكان كبيرا، حيث يمكن عزو القدر الأكبر من هذا الاختلاف إلى توفر المدخلات والمساعدة التقنية.

20- والأهم من ذلك، نجح المشروع في تحسين جودة الدعم والمساعدة التقنية التي تلقاها المزارعون من المنظمات الحكومية ذات الصلة، إذ حضر ما مجموعه 88 موظف حكومي من موظفي الإرشاد دورات تدريبية على تقنيات الإنتاج المحسنة، ومنهجية مدارس المزارعين الحقلية وإدارتها. وبالمقابل دعم موظفو الإرشاد العاملون مع مجموعات مدارس المزارعين الحقلية، المزارعين في تطوير معارفهم وقدراتهم الخاصة. وفي هذه العملية، ومكن نهج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية من إيجاد علاقة متينة بين نظام الإرشاد الزراعي ومجموعات المزارعين. وقال موظفو الإرشاد بأن دورهم قد تغير بصورة تدريجية من التعليم إلى التيسير.

21- وأدى هذا الأداء الناجح إلى تبني النهج كمنهجية وطنية للإرشاد الزراعي، ومثّل ذلك أثرا كبيرا على السياسات الوطنية، إضافة إلى ذلك فقد كانت الطريقة النشطة التي اتبعت لتطبيق نهج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية في المشروع جديرة بالثناء.

22- **استدامة مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى.** العامل الأساسي الذي أسهم في استدامة مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى كان التنفيذ النشط واسع النطاق لنهج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية. كذلك يبدو أن استدامة هذا المشروع كانت متينة على المستوى الاجتماعي، وهنالك ضرورة لمزيد من التحاليل بهدف ضمان أن تفي الممارسات الزراعية المحسنة المقترحة بمتطلبات الاستدامة الأساسية الاقتصادية والتقنية. إلا أنه وحيث لم يتم تبني هذه الممارسات المحسنة بمستوىً مرضٍ بصورة متساوية، الأمر الذي ينطبق على وجه الخصوص على حال الحقول التي يزرعها أفراد. وأخيرا لا بد من الإشارة إلى أن نتائج المشروع الإيجابية وأثره لجهة الإنتاجية والإنتاج لا يمكن أن يدوم طويلا في غياب البيئة السياساتية التمكينية والحوافز التي تدعم الزراعة الأسرية والتنمية الزراعية والريفية المستدامة.

23- **الابتكار وتوسيع النطاق من خلال مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى.** جلب الصندوق العديد من الابتكارات الهامة لأنغولا على شكل منهجية تشاركية للإرشاد الزراعي تقوم على مدارس المزارعين الحقلية، وعدد من الممارسات الزراعية المحسنة التي وجدها أعضاء المدارس مفيدة، واستخدموها في حقولهم المشتركة. وستعتمد إمكانية توسيع نطاق هذين النمطين من الابتكارات على التزام معهد التنمية الزراعية التابع لوزارة الزراعة والتنمية الريفية بإيجاد الموارد المالية الضرورية لتنفيذ نهج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية على المستوى الوطني، وتحديد الاختناقات التي تعيق من استخدام بعض الممارسات الزراعية المحسنة في حقول المزارعين الأفراد.

24- **المساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة.** كانت النساء مشاركات نشطات في المرحلة الأولى من مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة، نظرا لدورهن التقليدي في الزراعة الأنغولية، واستفدن من أنشطته المختلفة. وتشير بيانات المشروع إلى أن 43 في المائة من المشاركين في أنشطة المشروعات و65 في المائة من أعضاء مدارس المزارعين الحقلية كنّ من النساء. وإلى حد ما، تطرق المشروع إلى احتياجات النساء العملية من خلال إدخال (1) مطاحن الكسافا والذرة، والتي وفرت عليهن ساعات طويلة من العمل الجسدي المضني؛ (2) وكذلك فقد أدخل دورات محو الأمية وتعلم الحساب التي عززت من احترام النساء لذاتهن. إلا أنه وفي نهاية المطاف، لم تبذل أي جهود لدعم تمكين النساء على مستوى المجتمعات المحلية أو للتطرق للأدوار المختلفة للجنسين. ويبدو أن ذلك قد انبثق عن غياب خبير

مكرس لقضايا التمايز بين الجنسين في وحدة تنفيذ المشروع مما أدى بدوره إلى القبول بأن المستوى العالي لمشاركة النساء في هذا المشروع من الناحية العددية "أمر جيد بما فيه الكفاية".

25- أما مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية فينطوي على إمكانية إتاحة الفرص لأنشطة توليد الدخل والتخفيف من فقر النساء المنخرطات في تربية الأحياء المائية وتجهيز الأسماك وتسويقها. إلا أنه وما لم يتم توفير الدعم الملائم بخبرة متخصصة ومكرسة، فإن الوضع الذي انبثق عن في مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة قد يتكرر أيضا في مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية.

26- **إدارة البيئة والموارد الطبيعية في مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى.** على الرغم من أن تصميم المشروع يوفر ما يلزم من إجراءات ملائمة بهذا الصدد، إلا أن مناهج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية لم تدرج القضايا ذات الصلة بالاستدامة البيئية على الرغم من شواغل المزارعين المتعلقة بتضاؤل الموارد المائية وبالهطولات المطرية المتفاوتة وبتراجع خصوبة التربة. ويمكن عزو الإخفاق في التطرق لهذه المواضيع إلى حد كبير إلى الافتقار إلى رأس المال البشري والقدرة التقنية في هذا المجال على مستوى المحافظة. إضافة إلى ذلك، فإن المشروع لم يولي الاهتمام الملائم لحقيقة أن بعض المناطق الخاضعة للزراعة كانت عرضة لمخاطر أكبر من سواها وقد تتطلب تقنيات زراعية مختلفة (مثلا الحراثة وفق منحنيات التسوية) بهدف تجنب انجراف التربة.

27- **التأقلم مع تغير المناخ في مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى.** لم يتم التطرق لهذا الموضوع بصورة مباشرة، لأن صياغة هذا المشروع جرت في وقت لم تكن هذه القضية أولوية بالنسبة للصندوق. ومنذ ذلك الحين بدأ تغير المناخ يخلف أثرا جديا على أنماط الهطولات المطرية في المنطقة الجبلية الوسطى من أنغولا، مما كان له أثر مباشر على الإنتاج الزراعي. ونظرا لهذا الوضع فإن المشروع لم يولِ اهتماما كافيا للحاجة لتحديد الممارسات التي من شأنها أن تعزز من صمود المحاصيل والنظم الزراعية في وجه تبعات تغير المناخ.

28- **الأنشطة غير الإقراضية.** قد أدمجت في برنامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية لعام 2005 كعناصر هامة ومكملة لحافظة الصندوق في البلاد. وعلى وجه العموم وضعت الأهداف بمستويات واقعية ومنطقية، مما يعكس فهما سليما للسياق القطري والتحديات الموجودة في مجالات مثل حوار السياسات.

29- **إدارة المعرفة.** اتخذت أنشطة إدارة المعرفة في أنغولا إلى حد كبير شكل تحليل وإدماج الدروس المستفادة من المشروعات السابقة في سياق المشروعات الجديدة. وقد حدث ذلك مع برنامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية لعام 2005، الذي حدد دروسا من مشروع تنمية المحاصيل الغذائية في الإقليم الشمالي ما زال جاريا ومن برنامج النهوض بالمجتمعات الصيد المحلية في المناطق الشمالية، والمشروعات التالية له التي نفذها معهد التنمية الزراعية. إلا أن هذا التدبير لم يكن كافيا وذلك بسبب التغير المستمر لمدراء البرامج القطرية الذي أدى بدوره إلى إيلاء اهتمام محدود للغاية لتطوير الذاكرة المؤسسية.

30- تم تمويل وتنفيذ خمس منح ذات الصلة بإدارة المعرفة بين عامي 2005 و2009 بهدف اقتناص النتائج وإدراجها في المبادرات الإقراضية الجارية أو الجديدة. وقد تم تنفيذ جميع هذه المشروعات واستكمالها حسب الأصول، وربما أسهمت نتائجها في تحسين تصميم المشروعات بأسلوب غير رسمي ومبطن.

31- وضمن هذه المشروعات وعبر الحافظة بأكملها، تم إحراز تقدم محدود في تحسين نظم الرصد والتقييم. وقد وجد التقييم أيضا بأن هنالك اعتبار ضئيل لتطوير نظم خط الأساس والرصد في المشروعات الجارية. وقد يؤدي هذا الوضع إلى ترك فجوات في جمع وتحليل البيانات الضرورية لتوليد المعرفة الخاصة بالآثار لاستخدامها على المستويين السياساتي والاستراتيجي.

32- **إرساء الشراكات.** أرسى الصندوق علاقة جيدة جدا مع الحكومة الأنغولية على مر الزمان، وذلك بفضل التزام مدراء البرامج القطرية وموظفيهم، من بين جملة عوامل أخرى، ووجود ميسر مقيم للمشروعات لعدد من السنوات في البلاد. ويعد الصندوق منظمة موثوقة ومحترمة وينظر إليه على أنه شريك متعاون ومرن. وطلبت الحكومة مرارا وتكرارا وجود خبير مقيم مستقل في البلاد يعمل كجهة ربط بين المنظمات المختلفة المتعاونة مع الصندوق ومع الصندوق نفسه، وبخاصة نظرا لتوسع حافظته في البلاد.

33- كذلك فقد طور الصندوق أيضا شراكات هامة مع البنك الدولي ومع منظمة الأغذية والزراعة حول وبما يتعدى عملهما المشترك على مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى. وهنالك مثل جدير بالذكر لوجود المنظمات المكمل بعضها لبعضها الآخر حيث عملت كل منظمة من هذه المنظمات الثلاثة على أساس مهمتها وميزتها النسبية نحو تحقيق هدف استراتيجي مشترك. وقد نجم عن هذا الجهد المشترك نتائج جيدة على مستوى السياسات والمؤسسات والمجتمعات المحلية، وكان بمثابة شهادة على ضرورة الاستخدام المستمر لهذا النوع من النُهُج لكل من مشروع تنمية زراعة أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة وإضفاء الطابع التجاري عليها ومشروع الإنعاش الزراعي، وغيرهما من المبادرات في المستقبل.

34- أما الشراكة مع منظمة الأغذية والزراعة فقد انطوت على ما يلي: (1) تعاون منتظم ومشاورات مع ممثل منظمة الأغذية والزراعة في أنغولا على المستوى الاستراتيجي وخلال بعثات التصميم والتقدير والصياغة والإشراف لكل المشروعات التي تركز على الزراعة؛ (2) مساهمات منظمة الأغذية والزراعة مع مواردها المالية من خلال برنامج التعاون التقني ومساعدتها التقنية ودعمها التشغيلي لتنفيذ مشروع الإنعاش الزراعي؛ (3) انخراط منظمة الأغذية والزراعة في تنفيذ مكون مدارس المزارعين الحقلية في كل من مشروعي مشروع تنمية زراعة أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة وإضفاء الطابع التجاري عليها ومشروع الإنعاش الزراعي، وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، ومنذ عام 2016 ساعد ممثل المنظمة في البلاد جميع بعثات الصندوق إلى أنغولا من خلال كونه جهة ارتباط مع المنظمات الحكومية وغيرها من الشركاء وموفر للخدمات الاستشارية لكل من الصندوق والحكومة، كما هو مطلوب، ومزود للدعم اللوجستي.

35- وقد أعدت مسودة لمذكرة تفاهم بين الصندوق ومنظمة الأغذية والزراعة لأغراض الصياغة وتبسيط تكاليف المعاملات ذات الصلة، ونوقشت هذه المسودة إلا أنها لم توقع. ومع ذلك فإن نطاق الدور الاستشاري الاستراتيجي والدعم الذي يوفره ممثل منظمة الأغذية والزراعة قد تعدى بصورة كبيرة أية خدمة مستردة التكاليف.

36- **الانخراط السياساتي.** أجري معظم الحوار مع الحكومة ذي الصلة بصناعة السياسات خلال مراحل تصميم مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى و مشروع تنمية زراعة أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة وإضفاء الطابع التجاري عليها ومشروع الإنعاش الزراعي، وخلال تنفيذ المرحلة

الأولى من مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة. وخلال ذلك الوقت كان من المقرر اتخاذ إجراءات أساسية مثل تلك التي أدت إلى اختيار نهج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية كمنهجية إرشادية لاستخدامها في المشروع، ومع قيام منظمة الأغذية والزراعة بدور موفر الخدمات لهذا المكون. كذلك وخلال الفترة 2006–2011 استخدم تقدير أداء القطاع الريفي في نظام تخصيص الموارد على أساس الأداء كأداة لتوجيه منتظم لانتباه وزارة الزراعة والتنمية الريفية إلى احتياجات قطاع الزراعة الأسرية وإلى الميزة النسبية التي توفرها نهج مختلفة تتسم بقدر أقل من التوجه من القمة إلى القاعدة في العلاقة يتم إرساؤها بين الحكومة والمزارعين الأسريين.

37- والأهم من ذلك أن هذا النهج وفّر التوجه المستند إلى البراهين لمعهد التنمية الزراعية حول السبل الفعالة للعمل مع المزارعين على نطاق صغير، وأدى ذلك أيضا إلى تبني نهج مدارس المزارعين الحقلية كمنهجية إرشادية توفر الأدوات للحوار والمساءلة بين الحكومة ومنظمات المزارعين. كذلك توفر المشروعات الجارية والحديثة إمكانات كبيرة بهذا الصدد.

ثالثا– الاستنتاجات

38- ركز برنامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية لعام 2005 بقوة على استراتيجية الصندوق للتدخل، بغية دعم جهود فقراء الريف، بما في ذلك النساء والشباب، لتعزيز قدراتهم الإنتاجية وتحقيق الأمن الغذائي وتحسين سبل العيش. ومن بين النتائج الهامة لهذا التركيز على الفقر الريفي مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى، وقد أخذت الدروس المستفادة من تنفيذه بعين الاعتبار حسب الأصول في تصميم المبادرتين المصادق عليهما وهما مشروع تنمية زراعة أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة وإضفاء الطابع التجاري عليها ومشروع الإنعاش الزراعي.

39- وعلى مدى السنوات، كان الصندوق شريكا للحكومة يمكن الاعتماد عليه، ووفر لها الدعم كما تتطلبه الظروف والاحتياجات. وكما تم وصفه في الفقرة 32 اكتسب الصندوق ثقة واحترام كل من الحكومة وشركائها في البلاد بفضل جودة عمله. وقد تطور النموذج التي تبناه الصندوق مع وجود ميسّر مقيم للمشروعات في البلاد لضمان حوار وتنسيق سلس مع أصحاب المصلحة الرئيسيين. وقد أثبت هذا النموذج على أنه تدبير رشيق وفعال وغير مكلف ييسّر من صيغة الاتصال الجارية التي تتبع سياسة الباب المفتوح، والتي أدت إلى إنجازات أساسية لجهة إرساء الشراكات وحوار السياسات.

40- وقد ازداد حجم الحافظة النشطة للصندوق في أنغولا بصورة كبيرة، وذلك بفضل ما حدث مؤخرا من إعادة تأطير للعلاقة بين الحكومة الأنغولية والصندوق، ولاستعداد الصندوق لدعم البلاد في الوقت الذي أدت فيه أزمة اقتصادية لإعادة التفكير في النموذج الوطني للتنمية الاقتصادية. كذلك تفرض الحافظة الجديدة تحديا بسبب المصاعب المتكررة التي شهدها تنفيذ المشروعات في أنغولا، نظرا لمحدودية العرض من رأس المال البشري، وتعقد المبادرات نفسها، وبالتالي يحتاج الصندوق لتوفير توجيه أكثر كثافة لضمان أن تعمل مشروعاته بصورة أكثر كفاءة وفعالية. كذلك يتوجب عليه أيضا الاستمرار في توفير ما يلزم لحضور قطري بهدف دعم مستوى إقامة الشبكات والحوار والتنسيق المطلوب لتحقيق النتائج المرجوة.

41- تعكس استراتيجية الصندوق في أنغولا اعترافا بالحاجة لتنمية مكثفة للقدرات على جميع المستويات. وقد تمت تلبية هذه الحاجة خلال تنفيذ مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى الذي عزز من قدرات وإمكانيات ومهارات موظفي معهد التنمية الزراعية على طول المسار من المستوى المركزي إلى مكاتب الإرشاد في الخطوط الأمامية. كذلك فقد عزز أيضا من قدرات ومهارات وإمكانيات المزارعين المشاركين. ويتوجب على الصندوق أن يضمن نفس النتائج المتحققة خلال تنفيذ كل من مشروعي مشروع تنمية زراعة أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة وإضفاء الطابع التجاري عليها ومشروع الإنعاش الزراعي. ومع ذلك وجد تقييم البرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية أنه حتى تاريخه لم تتخذ إلا إجراءات ضئيلة للتطرق لضحالة الموارد البشرية في أنغولا. ويتوجب على الصندوق دعم تنمية مجمع من المهنيين الذين يتمتعون بالخبرات، وبخاصة المهنيين المزودين بالمهارات الضرورية لإدارة المبادرات الإنمائية والقضايا الائتمانية والعمل على المجالات التقنية ذات الأهمية للزراعة والتنمية الريفية. وهنالك جملة من الخيارات والنماذج المحتملة يتوجب على الصندوق أن ينظر فيها بغية تحديد أكثرها مناسبة لدعم هذا السياق القطري.

42- وبما يتماشى مع برنامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية لعام 2005، فقد تم توفير ما يلزم في جميع تصاميم المشروعات لإدماج النساء والشباب كمستفيدين ولتمكنيهم. وقد جد التقييم بأنه وبهذا الصدد أثمرت مشروعات الصندوق عن نتائج مختلطة. فالجزء الأكبر من المستفيدين المستهدفين في مشروع الزراعة الموجهة نحو السوق لأصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة المرحلة الأولى كانوا من النساء اللواتي استفدن من زيادة الإنتاج ومن جني دخول أعلى توفرت لهن من خلال الاستفادة من المطاحن، ومن خلال حضور دورات محو الأمية الوظيفية. إلا أنه لم تبذل إلا جهود ضئيلة لتمكين النساء لجهة ضمان وجود العدد الأدنى منهن في المواقع القيادية في رابطات المزارعين ولعملهن كميسّرات رئيسيات أو كعضوات في وحدات تنفيذ المشروعات في المحافظات بأدوار تقنية.

43- وأما النتائج الخاصة بمساهمة الشباب في مشروعات الصندوق فكانت أقل إيجابية، حيث كان تعداد الشباب بين أعضاء مدارس المزارعين الحقلية ضئيلا. ويميل الشباب في أنغولا إلى النظر إلى الزراعة على أنها قطاع غير جذاب لأنها لا توفر سبيل عيش معقول. وتعترف الحكومة وشركاؤها بأهمية توفير الفرص للشباب للحصول على سبل عيش مستدامة في القطاع الريفي تستند إلى أنشطة الإنتاج الأولية – وذلك في سياق الاعتبارات الأوسع للأمن الوطني جنبا إلى جنب مع عوامل أخرى. علاوة على ذلك، فإن كل من تمكين النساء وإدراج الشباب هما من بين الأركان الأساسية للأهداف الوطنية لإنشاء مجتمع يسود فيه السلام والعدالة، وهذان الركنان بحاجة للتطرق لهما والسعي لتحقيقهما في المداخلات التي يدعمها الصندوق.

44- وأخيرا، حدد تقييم البرنامج القطري والاستراتيجية القطرية العديد من نقاط الضعف في تنفيذ مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية ، ويمكن عزو هذه النواقص جزئيا إلى تصميم المشروع المبالغ في الطموح، والذي لم يأخذ بعين الاعتبار السياق الوطني لتنفيذ المشروعات بصورة كاملة، وجزئيا لحقيقة أن الصندوق لم يكرس الاهتمام الكافي للحاجة لاتخاذ الخطوات الملائمة للتطرق للمخزون الوطني المحدود من رأس المال البشري في مجالات مختلفة. وقد أدى تضافر هذه العوامل مجتمعة في الوقت الذي تم فيه إعداد هذا التقييم إلى الاستثمار غير المؤكد لوقت وجهد المستفيدين المقصودين، كما أدى إلى بروز مخاطر

تواجهها سمعة الصندوق. ومع ذلك فإن زخم مبادرة مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية يعتبر نهجا عالي الفعالية للحد من الفقر وتعزيز الأمن الغذائي في المناطق الريفية من أنغولا، ويمثل هذا المشروع فرصة هامة ينبغي عدم إضاعتها.

التوصيات

45- **التوصية الأولى. ينبغي على الصندوق الاستمرار في قيادة التنمية الزراعية والريفية المناصرة للفقراء في أنغولا والتطرق للقضايا الرئيسية ذات الصلة بالبيئة الزراعية وحيازة الأراضي من خلال استثماراته وحوار السياسات.** حتى تاريخه، كان الصندوق أحد اللاعبين الرئيسيين في تعزيز النُهُج والتدخلات الريفية المناصرة للفقراء. ولا بد من الإبقاء على هذه الميزة النسبية وتعزيزها من خلال تعاون وثيق مع الحكومة في توفير الدعم المباشر وخلق البيئة التمكينية لجهود المنتجين على نطاق صغير بغية تحسين سبل عيشهم، والخلاص من الفقر من خلال الاستفادة من فرص السوق التي ستنبثق بصورة تدريجية في البلاد.

46- **التوصية الثانية. في السياق الحالي لحافظة موسعة، ولاهتمام وطني حاسم بالتنمية الريفية والزراعية ينبغي على الصندوق تعزيز قدراته على دعم التنفيذ والانخراط السياساتي في البلاد.** لكي يتمكن الصندوق من لعب الدور المتصور في التوصية الأولى، ونظرا للدلائل التي تشير إلى الحاجة لحضور ملموس في البلاد لدعم إقامة الشبكات الفعالة والكفؤة وحوار السياسات، لا بد من تنشيط النموذج الذي ينطوي على خدمات ميسّر المشروعات بهدف توفير ما يلزم لوجوده بدوام كامل، مع بعض الإجراءات الضرورية للدعم الإداري. ومن شأن ذلك أن يشكل وسيلة فعالة وكفؤة لضمان الاتساق والتنسيق عبر حافظة الإقراض المتنامية، مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار في الوقت ذاته الرغبة في توسيع نطاق الإنجازات الناجحة.

47- **التوصية الثالثة. يتوجب على الصندوق أن يجعل من تنمية القدرات أحد الركائز الأساسية والمبادئ الشاملة في حافظته في أنغولا.** يتوجب على الصندوق أن يساعد في التطرق للنواقص في المخزون الوطني من رأس المال البشري في المجالات والقطاعات ذات الصلة بتنفيذ حافظته. وينبغي القيام بذلك من خلال تخصيص منتظم للموارد وتوفير ما يلزم للإدارة ضمن الحافظة لإتاحة الفرص لبناء القدرات على المستوى الفردي والمؤسسي باستخدام أكثر النُهُج والأساليب ملاءمة، بما في ذلك التدريب أثناء الخدمة، والرعاية والتدريب على المدى القصير والطويل، وفرص التعليم العالي، من بين جملة أمور أخرى.

48- **التوصية الرابعة. يتوجب أن تدمج المشروعات التي يدعمها الصندوق تركيزا أقوى على تمكين النساء وإشراك الشباب.** يتوجب على استراتيجية الاستهداف في الصندوق ونُهُج تنفيذها أن: (1) تدمج بصورة كاملة منظور المساواة بين الجنسين وأن تروج بنشاط للتمكين الاجتماعي والاقتصادي للنساء؛ (2) تهدف إلى خلق الفرص المستدامة والجذابة في المناطق الريفية للشباب من الفتيان والفتيات من خلال ضمان وصولهم إلى فرص تنمية القدرات والموارد المالية الريفية وسبل العيش المستدامة. كذلك لا بد من تخصيص موارد بشرية مكرسة لهذه المجالات ضمن وحدة تنسيق المشروعات، وتشاطرها عبر جميع التدخلات مما يبدو أنه أمر ضروري نظرا لمحدودية المخزون من الموارد البشرية الوطنية في هذه المجالات.

49- **التوصية الخامسة. يتوجب على الصندوق والحكومة الأنغولية إعادة تركيزهما على مشروع مصايد الأسماك الحرفية وتربية الأحياء المائية.** لا بد من إعادة صياغة هذا المشروع حيث يتم تأطيره كمبادرة

ريادية لاختبار النماذج لكل من تنمية تربية الأحياء ومصايد الأسماك الحرفية في المياه العذبة، وللقيام بالدراسات والتحاليل التي يمكن أن يستنير بها أي توسيع مستقبلي لهذه الاستثمارات، كلما كان ذلك ملائما، لتتضمن مناطق أخرى من البلاد. وفي سياق هذا الجهد، لا بد من السعي لإشراك فعال لجميع أصحاب المصلحة، ولا بد من إعادة تنقيح الميزانية على أساس خطة تنفيذ جديدة إذا ما كانت الموارد متاحة، كذلك لا بد من تمديد فترة القرض بناء على ذلك.

Agreement at Completion Point

A. Introduction

1. This is the first country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in the Republic of Angola by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE). The main objectives of the CSPE were to: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the future partnership between IFAD and Angola for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication.

2. The CSPE reviewed the evolution of the strategy, results and performance of the partnership between IFAD and the Republic of Angola since the Fund started operations in 1989, but with a focus on the period 2005-2017 particularly for the investment portfolio. The CSPE covers the investment portfolio (one completed, one on-going and two recently approved loans), non-lending activities (knowledge management, partnership-building and policy dialogue, including grants), as well as country programme strategy and management.

3. This agreement at completion point contains recommendations based on the evaluation findings and conclusions presented in the CSPE report, as well as proposed follow-up actions as agreed by IFAD and the Government. The signed agreement is an integral part of the CSPE report in which the evaluation findings are presented in detail, and will be submitted to the IFAD Executive Board as an annex to the new country strategic opportunities programme for the Republic of Angola. The implementation of the recommendations agreed upon will be tracked through the President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions, which is presented to the IFAD Executive Board on an annual basis by the Fund's Management.

B. Recommendations and proposed follow-up actions

4. Recommendation 1. IFAD in Angola should remain the champion for sustainable and pro-poor agricultural and rural development; and address through its investments and policy dialogue, key issues in relation to land tenure and agroecology. IFAD has been so far one of the key players in fostering rural pro-poor approaches and interventions. This comparative advantage should be sustained and strengthened, by closely collaborating with the Government to create an enabling environment for, and by directly supporting, small-scale producers to improve their livelihoods and rise out of poverty through the market opportunities that will progressively emerge in the country.

   Proposed follow-up: Ensure that ongoing projects and future projects promote pro-poor rural development and they are implemented by the different government authorities (IDA, IPA, etc.) to support government institutional capacity to advocate pro-poor policies and rural investments as a way of diversification of the national economy. IFAD visibility should be further enhanced and policy and investment support increased to maintain its leadership in pro-poor agricultural and rural development. Discussions on land tenure and agroecology are ongoing with the Government and in the context of the ongoing portfolio and the designs of the RB-COSOP covering 2019 to 2014 period and the new investment programme - Smallholder Resilience Enhancement Programme (SREP).

Responsible partners: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and IDA, Ministry of Fisheries and Sea and IPA & IFAD.

Timeline: Ongoing.

5. Recommendation 2. In the current context of an expanded portfolio and critical national interest for agricultural and rural development, IFAD should reinforce its capacity for implementation support and policy engagement in the country. For IFAD to play its role as envisaged in Recommendation 1, and in consideration of the evidence available about the need for a tangible presence in the country to enable efficiency and effectiveness of networking and dialogue on policy, the model of project facilitator should be re-vamped, in a full-time modality and with some administrative support. This would be an efficient and effective way to ensure coherence and coordination across the growing lending portfolio, also in view of the desirability of upscaling its successful achievements.

Proposed follow-up: To discuss with the Government the opportunity to consider and the feasibility of a project facilitator to maintain focus on IFAD's operations and policy dialogue at any time. Discussions have been initiated with the Government in relation to the forthcoming establishment of IFAD Southern Africa Sub-Regional Hub in Johannesburg that will service Angola and the Fund's portfolio and will bring IFAD closer to Angola. The hub with a grouping of a critical mass of IFAD staff is expected to increase the Fund's engagement in Angola.

Responsible partners: MINAGRI and IFAD.

Timeline: December 2019.

6. Recommendation 3. IFAD should make capacity development one of the pillars and cross-cutting principles for its portfolio in Angola. IFAD should contribute to fill the gap in the national human capital in the areas and sectors that are relevant to the implementation of its portfolio. This should be done through the systematic allocation of resources and management provisions within the portfolio, that provide opportunities for capacity development at the individual and institutional level, through the most appropriate approaches and methods, including in-service training, mentoring, short- and long-term training and higher education opportunities, among others.

Proposed follow-up: IFAD projects will collectively strengthen the capacities of government agricultural extension specialists, agricultural service providers, and NGOs supporting the development of family farmers and their cooperatives. At the national level, the portfolio will support the capacity building already foreseen under the ongoing projects which covers: (a) agricultural statistics; (b) market information systems; (c) agricultural policy analysis; and (d) irrigation-related services. This support will be fully complemented with capacity building in climate change monitoring and data analysis, vulnerability analysis and mapping, identification of adaptation measures for family farmers relevant in the different agro-ecological zones, and provision of timely climate forecasting and establishment of an early warning drought and floods system. For the provincial and local level, capacity building will be provided for extension and service provider staff in: community organization, Farmer Field School (FFS) establishment, facilitation and curriculum development; climate change awareness raising and adaptation measures relevant for family farmers and their cooperatives;

complementary irrigation and establishment of Water Users Associations (WUA); community natural resources management, water harvesting and sustainable land and water management at landscape and farmer's field level (mainly for the south); cooperative business planning and development (mainly for the north).

The IFAD portfolio will also support the rehabilitation of agricultural extension facilities at the local level, including offices and residential complexes for agricultural extension staff.

Additionally, it has been agreed with Government that IFAD will build the capacity and skills of staff and students of the middle level agricultural schools in Angola, some of whom will be absorbed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development as extension workers and livestock para-veterinarians. It is also expected that some graduates could become independent service providers and/or agribusiness entrepreneurs (agri-entrepreneurs).

Responsible partners: MINAGRI, MOFS, IFAD.

Timeline: ongoing.

7. Recommendation 4. IFAD-supported projects should include a stronger focus on women empowerment and youth inclusion. IFAD's targeting strategy and implementation approaches should: (i) fully integrate a gender equality perspective, and actively promote the social and economic empowerment of women; and (ii) aim at creating sustainable and attractive opportunities in the rural areas for youth, both men and women, by enabling their access to capacity development opportunities, rural financial resources, and sustainable livelihoods. Dedicated human resources in project coordination units, also shared across interventions, appeared necessary, given the limited national competence in this respect.

   Proposed follow-up: IFAD projects will adopt Recommendation 4 of the CSPE, and those which are ongoing will retrofit the main aspects of the recommendation and those under design and future projects will comply diligently with it. Overall, the target beneficiaries are smallholder farmers, fisher folks, with a special focus on women, youth and rural vulnerable groups. Special attention will also be given to the needs and priorities of handicapped persons and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

   Responsible partners: MINAGRI, MOFS, MOASFWE, IFAD.

   Timeline: Ongoing.

8. Recommendation 5. IFAD and the Government of Angola should refocus AFAP. The project should be re-formulated, framing it as a pilot initiative to test models for both fresh-water fisheries and aquaculture development and carry out studies and analysis that can inform as appropriate, the later expansion of the investments to other parts of the country. In doing so, an effective involvement of all stakeholders should also be pursued. The budget should be revised based on the new implementation plan and if resources will be available, the duration of the loan should also be extended accordingly.

   Proposed follow-up: Recommendation 5 of the CSPE is currently being discussed with MOFS. Agreement has been reached to bring forward the AFAP Mid Term Review (MTR), which will be an MTR-cum-Refocussing Mission. The Mission will be undertaken in May-June 2018. Proposed way

forward will be taken in its integrality by the MTR-Cum-Refocussing Mission.

Responsible partners: MOFS, IPA and IFAD.

Timeline: December 2018.

Signed by:

Mr Marcos Alexandre Nhunga
Minister of Agriculture and Forest
Ministry of Agriculture and Forests
Date:

Mr Lisandro Martin
Regional Director, Programme Management Department
International Fund for Agriculture Development
Date:
21/05/2018

Main Report

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Currency equivalent, weights and measures

Currency equivalent

Currency unit = Angola Kwanza (AOA)

Weights and measures

US$1.00 = AOA 165.00 (November 2017)

Abbreviations and acronyms

AFAP	Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project
ARP	Agriculture Recovery Project
COSOP	country strategic opportunities paper/programme
CPA	country programmable aid
CPM	country programme manager
CPMT	country programme management team
CSN	country strategy note
CSPE	country strategy and programme evaluation
ECP	Strategy to fight poverty (Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza)
EDA	Agricultural Development Office at district level (Estação de Desenvolvimento Agrário)
ENSAN	National Strategy for Food and Nutrition Security (Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Alimentaria e Nutricional)
ESA	East and Southern Africa Regional Division of IFAD
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFS	Farmer Field School
GNI	gross national income
HDI	Human Development Index
ICR	implementation completion report (World Bank)
IDA	Institute for Agricultural Development (Instituto para o Desenvolvimento Agrario)
IES	impact evaluation survey
IFP	improved farming practice
IITA	International Institute for Tropical Agriculture
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
IDPAA	Artisanal Fisheries Institute (Instituto da Pesca Artesanal e da Aquicultura)
MASFAMU	Ministry of Social Action, Family and Women's Promotion
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MOSAP I	Market-Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project
MOSAP II	Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project
MTR	mid-term review
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PBAS	Performance-Based Allocation System
PCU	project coordination unit
PDR	project design report
PESNORTE	Northern Fishing Communities Development Programme
PIU	project implementation unit
PMC	project management cost
PND	National Development Plan (Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento)

PPIU	provincial project implementation unit
PRODECA	Northern Region Food Crops Development Project
SAMAP	Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project in Cuanza Sul and Huila Provinces (SDACP-CS&H-SAMAP)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

Map of IFAD-supported operations in Angola



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

IFAD *Map compiled by IFAD* | 12-01-2018

Angola

IFAD-funded closed operations

Country strategy and programme evaluation



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

IFAD

Map compiled by IFAD | 20-04-2017

Republic of Angola
Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. At the request of the Executive Board at its 119th session in December 2016, the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertook a country strategy and programme evaluation (CSPE) in Angola in 2017. The main purpose of the CSPE was to generate an overall appreciation of the partnership between IFAD and the Government of Angola in reducing rural poverty, and through this, to contribute to accountability and learning; and to strengthening IFAD's development effectiveness.

2. This was the first evaluation conducted by IOE in Angola. The CSPE covers the period 2005-2017 and includes the analysis of all IFAD-supported initiatives that were approved by the Board and became operational during this time-span.

3. Overview of the IFAD-supported programme. IFAD started its collaboration with Angola in 1989. By the end of 2017, the Fund had approved seven loans and associated grants, in support of a portfolio with a total value of US$135.2 million. IFAD loans represented 60.7 per cent of the total portfolio; the Government and beneficiaries contributed 11.9 per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively; and external co-financing by the World Bank (WB), the Government of Japan and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), represented 23.8 per cent.

4. IFAD's support to Angola has been managed by country programme managers (CPMs) posted either in IFAD Headquarters, or in other countries in the East and Southern Africa region. Since 2005 until 2016, IFAD's support to Angola was framed by the 2005 country strategic opportunities paper (COSOP); for the period 2017-2018, a country strategy note was approved by the Fund in late 2016. During the period 2004-2013, IFAD had a strengthened presence in Angola, through a national consultant with the role of project facilitator, who supported the CPM and the Fund's missions in the design and implementation of the Market-Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project (MOSAP I)[1] on a part-time basis.

5. Angola's contributions to the Replenishment of IFAD's Resources. The Government of Angola made its first financial contribution to IFAD's replenishment process in 1990. Since 2005, it has been the largest contributor from the East and Southern Africa region, totalling US$6.7 million by November 2017.

6. Rationale for the evaluation. The collaboration between IFAD and Angola has been long, but not large in terms of number of projects. In 2016 IFAD decided that its partnership with Angola required reframing, to better contribute to the national efforts in addressing the economic and financial crisis. The CSPE was launched to be a useful building block in this process, and assessed all projects approved since the first COSOP was approved, although it took place at a time when the portfolio to be assessed was smaller than typically in CSPEs.

B. Objectives, methodology and processes

7. Objectives. As stated in the Evaluation Approach Paper, the CSPE had two main objectives: (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme; and (ii) to generate findings and recommendations for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication in the context of the partnership between IFAD and Angola.

[1] The Market-Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project was called MOSAP. Its successor, the Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project in Bié, Huambo and Malanje, is commonly referred to as MOSAP II. Hence the former project started being referred to as MOSAP I.

8. Scope. The CSPE was asked to cover the full range of IFAD's support to Angola in the period 2005-2017, and provide an assessment at programme and strategy level, based on the analysis of the three pillars described below, each to be rated on its own:

   i. Lending activities: the evaluation carried out an evaluative assessment of the closed and ongoing projects, approved in the period 2005-2017, with a focus on the respective theories of change and impact pathways, on the progress made, and the challenges ahead.
   ii. Non-lending activities: analysis of knowledge management, partnership-building and policy dialogue; this pillar should also include the self-standing national grants, a sample of regional grants benefiting the country, as well as South-South and Triangular Cooperation; and
   iii. The performance of IFAD and the Government of Angola in managing the country programme, including respective contributions to the design, implementation, supervision and monitoring and evaluation of the projects, and of the COSOP.

9. The CSPE also assessed the relevance and results achieved in the framework of the strategic objectives of the 2005 COSOP, so as to provide lessons and recommendations at the strategy level for the next COSOP formulation.

10. Methodology. The CSPE was conducted within the provisions of the IFAD Evaluation Policy and was conducted in accordance with the second edition of the IOE Evaluation Manual (2015).[2] The Approach Paper provided further and specific guidance for the exercise. The evaluation adopted a transparent and inclusive approach with respect to canvassing information and views from stakeholders, participants in IFAD-supported activities and observers.

11. Evidence for the CSPE originated from the analysis and triangulation of information and data canvassed using several tools, namely:

   (a) Extensive review of documents, including: the Angola COSOP and the Country Strategy Note; project design reports (PDRs), mid-term reviews (MTRs), supervision and technical reports, completion reports; the East and Southern Africa Division (ESA) self-assessment report; national and IFAD policies; IFAD corporate information systems for management and financial data;

   (b) In-depth desk review by a sector specialist of the IFAD-supported intervention in the fisheries and aquaculture sector under evaluation;

   (c) Semi-structured interviews with IFAD stakeholders and project participants, based on specific check-lists developed for each group of stakeholders. In total, the CSPE team met and discussed with slightly more than 100 officers from governmental organizations, IFAD supported-projects in Angola and technical staff, as well as from development partners; and with leaders and members of groups and associations that comprise in total more than 500 small-scale farmers[3] and fishers who did and do participate in IFAD projects. These interviews were complemented by data provided by the project implementation/coordination units upon CSPE request; and

   (d) Observation of a sample of project achievements at community level, including crop production fields and aquaculture ponds.

12. The CSPE also contributed to the IOE validation process of the WB Implementation Completion Report (ICR) of MOSAP I. This project had been jointly funded by the

[2] IFAD Independent Office of Evaluation, Evaluation Manual, Second Edition, December 2015, https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/bfec198c-62fd-46ff-abae-285d0e0709d6.
[3] Throughout the report, the terms 'small-scale farmers' 'smallholders' and 'family farming' are used interchangeably, despite nuanced differences in meaning, as all correspond to the Ministry of Agriculture's definition of a household that cultivates a maximum of 5 hectares and uses family work-force and non-sophisticated technology.

WB, which also was the implementing agency, IFAD and the Government of Japan. According to the arrangements, the WB prepared the ICR and carried out its own ICR Review. IFAD also rates loans in which it participated, for its own information management system and the Programme Management Department (PMD) revised and partly modified the final ratings for MOSAP I. As IOE had to validate the ICR with PMD's ratings, the CSPE offered the opportunity for direct interaction with project participants and stakeholders, and a more in-depth assessment of the achievements against several criteria.

13. Criteria. The CSPE evaluated the project portfolio based on the internationally recognized evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, and scored each on a six-point rating scale. Additional IFAD-specific criteria were: rural poverty impacts, including at the level of household incomes and assets, human and social capital empowerment, food security and agricultural productivity, and institutions and policies; as well as innovation and scaling up, gender equality and women's empowerment, natural resources and environment, adaptation to climate change (see definitions in annex I).

14. The CSPE individually assessed and rated each of the three pillars mentioned above, lending, non-lending, and partners' performance. It also examined the synergies among IFAD-supported projects, as well as the cross-cutting dimensions of the non-lending activities; and finally, accounting for the relevance and effectiveness of the COSOP, the CSPE generated a composite assessment and rating of the overall IFAD-Government partnership.

15. The standard criteria for the evaluation provided the framework for the identification of the evaluation questions. In addition, the Approach Paper identified a few issues of greater concern to most stakeholders, namely: (i) The extent to which IFAD is contributing to national efforts to fill in the current gap in national competence in development management and in some technical areas; (ii) The role of IFAD in post-crisis recovery and resilience development, in a middle-income country like Angola, with important disparities in incomes and livelihoods opportunities for urban and rural population; (iii) The level of national co-financing; and (iv) IFAD's presence in Angola in terms of continuity over time and structure, and how this affects the visibility and impact of the organization at the different levels. Of these, the CSPE could not canvass sufficient information with respect to the role of IFAD in post-crisis recovery and resilience development, given the timing of the Agriculture Recovery Project (ARP) implementation.

16. The CSPE analysed these issues more in depth, in consideration of their effects on the overall portfolio performance.

17. Selection of projects to be reviewed. The IFAD portfolio in Angola in the period under evaluation included four loans: one closed, one on-going and two approved in 2017, only one of which declared effective at the time of the CSPE main mission (November 2017). The extent of the analysis depended on the status of progress of each initiative. The closed MOSAP I project was the only loan that could be assessed against all the evaluation criteria. The Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project (AFAP) had not yet gone through an MTR. This means that only its relevance was rated, whereas efficiency and effectiveness were assessed but not rated.[4] For the newly approved projects, only relevance was assessed and rated.

18. During the period under evaluation, five national self-standing grants had also been financed. The CSPE was unable to trace and meet direct stakeholders or knowledgeable persons in the country, nor were sufficient documents available in IFAD archives to assess performance, even if indirectly. All projects reached

[4] A mid-term review is a key step in an IFAD project's implementation, as project targets may be changed up until then, provided that the MTR takes place no later than midway through the project. Thus, to avoid assessments and ratings against a potentially 'moving target', evaluations analyse projects against the whole set of criteria only after an MTR has been completed.

completion between 2006 and 2009, and their budgets were small; these factors may have contributed to the loss of institutional memory in the implementing organizations.

19. In addition, Angola was included in the same period in two regional IFAD-funded grants. The first one did not eventually comprise the Angolan organization in its activities, due to communication problems. The second was approved by IFAD Executive Board in early 2017, and by the time of the CSPE it had not started disbursing as of yet; no national stakeholder was informed about it.

20. Table 1 shows the criteria that were used to assess each loan-funded project.

Table1
Evaluability of projects

Criteria/Projects	**MOSAP I**	**AFAP**	**SAMAP**	**ARP**
Date of effectiveness	November 2009	August 2015	August 2017	Not available
IFAD Loan disbursement level (30 November 2017)	100% (Completed)	20%	0%	Not available
Criteria				
Relevance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Effectiveness	Yes	Partly**	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Efficiency	Yes	Partly**	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Sustainability	Yes	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Rural poverty impact	Yes	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Innovation, replication & scaling up		Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Natural Resources and Environment	Yes	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Adaptation to climate change	Yes	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Gender equality	Yes	Partly**	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Performance of partners	Yes	Partly**	Not yet evaluable	Not yet evaluable
Coherence with lessons learned and priorities			Yes	Yes

* Loans and grants data warehouse, IFAD.
** Assessed but not rated.

21. Process. The CSPE started with a desk review by IOE of project and non-project activities and strategic issues, and the preparation of a draft approach paper. During May-June 2017, extensive interviews were held with key stakeholders at IFAD headquarters and in Luanda, during a five-day preparatory mission to allow interaction with a range of stakeholders within the Government and with other partners. The meetings aimed at eliciting views on specific questions and issues that should be addressed in the evaluation. ESA in IFAD and the Government were also invited to conduct a self-assessment of the portfolio of current projects, non-lending activities and 2005 COSOP performance. The approach paper was finalized, including comments received from IFAD and the Government, and on this basis, additional evaluation tools were prepared.

22. The main evaluation mission was conducted from 17 October to 7 November 2017. Additional interviews were carried out in Luanda; the CSPE team also conducted field visits to four provinces (Bié, Huambo, Cuanza Norte and Malanje) and several districts, to interact with the participants/beneficiaries, and directly observe activities of the closed MOSAP I and of the on-going AFAP.

23. On 7 November, a wrap-up meeting was organized with key Government stakeholders, project staff and partners, to present and discuss the preliminary findings of the CSPE team. The meeting was well attended and the discussion constructive and helpful for the report-writing phase.

24. The advanced draft report, after peer review within IOE, was shared with IFAD divisions, the Government and the PCUs. Their comments were taken into account in finalizing the report, that was presented to national and IFAD stakeholders in a national workshop in Luanda in May 2018, which discussed the main findings and recommendations.

25. Limitations. The main challenge faced by the CSPE was the long time-span under analysis, which made it difficult to trace and meet the persons who had been involved in processes and decisions dating back more than 10 years ago. The CSPE made efforts to reach out to those who had been key stakeholders at the time. This was possible and reasonably successful for the loans, though not for the grants as mentioned above. A second challenge was the timing of the evaluation, in a year of presidential elections. The main mission started three weeks after the new President had been sworn in.[5] The change in Government led to a significant turn-over in staff in some ministries and some loss of institutional memory, even about recent dealings with IFAD. This happened with the Ministry of Environment which has an increasing relevance to IFAD. The CSPE still managed to interact with the new stakeholders, both to canvass views on future ministerial plans and to generate interest in the evaluation.

Key points

- This was the first evaluation of IFAD's projects, programme and strategy in Angola. It covered all the projects approved by the Board since 2005, when the first COSOP was signed, and other related work.
- IFAD has been managing its programme in Angola through Country Programme Managers located in headquarters or in another country in the East and Southern Africa region; in addition, from 2004 to 2013, a national consultant with the role of project facilitator, supported the CPM at the country level on a part-time basis.
- Since the first loan approved in 1989, as of November 2017 IFAD had approved 7 loans and associated grants for Angola, with variable lending terms, for a total value of US$82.1 million, which represented 60.7 per cent of the total estimated cost of the portfolio.
- The main objectives of the CSPE were to (i) assess the results and performance of the IFAD-financed strategy and programme; and (ii) to generate findings and recommendations for enhanced development effectiveness and rural poverty eradication in the context of the partnership between IFAD and Angola.
- The CSPE assessed: a closed project jointly financed with the World Bank, one on-going project, one project that had recently become effective and an approved project that had not yet been declared effective. In addition, the evaluation also analysed the non-lending activities and the performance of IFAD and the Government in the management of the country programme.

[5] The main mission could not be postponed, to ensure it could carry out the field visits before the onset of the rainy season, when farmers would not be available for meetings.

II. Country context and IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

A. Country context

26. This chapter briefly describes the key features of Angola that mostly relate to IFAD's mandate, and provides an overview of IFAD's operations and strategy in the country since 2005.

27. Geography. The Republic of Angola is one of the most resource-rich countries in Africa, ranking second among Sub-Saharan Africa's oil producers; and the world's fourth largest producer of diamonds. It also has an important natural resources base, including minerals, forests, biodiversity, fertile soils in most of the country, water and abundance of inland and marine fisheries resources. The country covers an area of 1,247,000 km^2, which makes it the seventh largest country in Africa.

28. Overall view. The country gained independence from Portugal in 1975 and sunk straight after into a civil war which lasted for 27 years. During this period, much of the country's economy collapsed, as infrastructure was destroyed, and institutions were crippled. The last decade of war was particularly devastating since for the first time, major cities and urban areas, where most people and important economical infrastructures were located, were attacked. The option for a socialist model of development after independence also contributed to the stagnation of the economy. Since the restoration of peace in 2002, the Government has made substantial progress in re-establishing the foundations needed to address the social and economic development of the country.

29. Population data. The population of Angola in 2005 was estimated at 19.5 million.[6] The latest census carried out in May 2014[7] reported a population of 25.8 million people, of whom 47 per cent were in the age-group 0 to 14, and 17.9 per cent in the age-group 36-65. The national definition of 'youth' comprises the cohorts between 15 and 35 years of age; in 2014, this group represented 32.6 per cent of the total population; and in rural areas, it comprised 28.1 per cent of the rural residents. The literacy rate was reported at 65.6 per cent of the population aged 15 years or more, ranging from 79.4 per cent in urban areas to 41.1 per cent in rural areas.

30. Urbanisation. Since independence Angola has experienced high urbanisation levels, also exacerbated by the long conflict, during which rural people moved to urban centres in search of a more secure environment and better income-generating opportunities. This process also led to a loss of knowledge across generations, about both traditional and more recently introduced agricultural practices. Since the end of the civil war, the low agricultural productivity, the limited availability of social services and infrastructures and the scarcity of job opportunities in the rural areas prevented people from returning to their areas of origin. These same factors continue to be the main drivers of the current rural–migration, which affects mainly young people.

31. The 2014 census data indicate that 37.4 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, as the share of population living in urban areas grew from 15 per cent in 1970, to 63 per cent in 2014.[8] A large part of the national urban population, slightly less than 7 million people, lived in the capital Luanda. The percentage of economically active population nation-wide was 52.7, ranging from 53.9 per cent in urban areas to 50.7 per cent in rural areas.

[6] World Bank data.
[7] Government of Angola (2016), 'Censo 2014. Resultados definitivos do recensamento geral da populaçao e de habitaçao de Angola 2014', Instituto Nacional de Estatística.
[8] According to the 2004 Land Law, or 'Lei de terras', 'rural' is defined as the land that is not delimited by an urban settlement and which is used for farming, animal breeding, forestry or mining.

32. Gender- and youth-related data and context. The 2014 census indicated that women represented 51.5 per cent of the total population, with a slightly higher share in rural areas, at 51.9 per cent, than in urban areas, at 51.3 per cent. In the youth group (15 to 35 years), 46.8 per cent were men and 53.2 per cent women; similar to the age group 36-65, with 45 per cent men and 55 per cent women. Women emerged as having a longer life expectancy, 63 years, against 57.5 years for men. The census also reported that: the fertility rate was 5.7 children per woman; 38 per cent of the households were headed by women; and the literacy rate for rural women was 13.2 per cent, against 29 per cent for men.

33. The Human Development Data (1990-2015)[9] included some information on the gender dimension in Angola, which highlighted the gender gap in the country as of 2015:

- The expected years of schooling for women was 8.7 years, against 14 years for men;
- The Labour force participation rate in 2015, as percentage of people aged 15 and older, was at 59.9 per cent for women and 77.1 per cent for men;
- The youth unemployment rate, female to male ratio, was assessed at 1.08 over several years, whereas the Unemployment rate (total), female to male ratio, was stable over time, from 1.2 per cent in 2000 to 1.22 per cent in 2015.
- Women's share in the Angolan parliament was 15.5 per cent in 2000 and reached a peak of 38.6 per cent in 2010; after the 2017 national election, women represented 26.8 per cent of parliamentarians.[10]

34. The Republic of Angola is formally committed to gender equality and the promotion of women's condition, both in its policies and programs, with the family as the centrepiece of social organization. The Ministry of Social Action, Family and Women's Promotion (MASFAMU)[11] developed the National Gender Policy and Implementation Strategy in 2013; and the 2013-2017 National Development Plan (Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento, PND) mentioned 'equal rights, duties and opportunities for men and women' among the national political objectives. The PND also listed rural women-headed households, and those affected by HIV and AIDS, among the most vulnerable and frequently included support to improving rural women's social and economic role, within both Social Sector and Rural Development Sector Policies and Priorities.[12]

35. In rural Angola, traditionally women have a strong responsibility in agriculture and in contributing with their work to the household wellbeing. The 2011 FAO State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) reported that 21.8 per cent of rural households in Angola were headed by women; and the more recent 2015 SOFA indicated a national value of 55.6 per cent, for the share of female agricultural labour force; and 79.4 per cent for the share of female labour working in agriculture. The predominance of women in the family farming sector is largely recognized at all levels; this however is not reflected in the presence of women in leadership positions at any level, from senior positions in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, through the numbers of women among extension officers, to the number of female presidents of farmers' associations.

36. The Government had also shown a good level of commitment to supporting youth; attention evolved from a stronger focus on education for youth in the Strategy to Fight Poverty (Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza, ECP) in 2005, to the more recent

[9] Human Development Data (1990-2015), at http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, accessed on 8 December.
[10] http://www.angop.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2017/8/39/Angola-Deputados-tomam-assentos-Parlamento,f6609325-25b8-449a-a0f3-4ce2407b4b41.html.
[11] As of November 2017, the name of the Ministry had become 'Ministry for Social Action, Family and Woman's Promotion'; at http://www.minfamu.gov.ao/.
[12] Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento 2013-2017, translation by the CSPE team.

PND 2013-2017, that looked at youth as an important group for economic development, for whom it was necessary to develop specific approaches and policies.

37. Political background. When the war ended in 2002, the ruling party Movimento Popular de Libertação da Angola (MPLA) stabilised the political process through a new constitution and made substantial progress in restoring security and revitalising the economy. The transition between former President José Eduardo dos Santos, who had led the party for 38 years and had decided not to run for office again in 2017, and President João Lourenço, number one of the MPLA list, was remarkably smooth. As of November 2017, the new Cabinet of President Lourenço showed continuity in the leadership of the Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea and the Ministry of Finance, the main interlocutors for IFAD in the country until this year.

38. President Lourenço's statements, upon taking office and during his first month of tenure about smallholder agriculture and rural development, have been encouraging in terms of attention and priority assigned to the sector. During the same period, some of the national public media have given large space to reports on family farming, the importance of food security and aquaculture development. All of this bodes well for a serious revamping of the Government's commitment to the areas of IFAD's mandate.

39. Economy. Between 2002 and 2014 the gross national income (GNI) per capita increased from US$2,900 to US$6,800, largely led by oil production. In 2014, the oil sector represented 35 per cent of the national GDP and accounted for 95 per cent of the country's total exports.[13] Since 2016, the dramatic decline of oil prices on the world market;[14] and a decrease of 3.3 per cent in the daily national production between 2015 and 2016,[15] have caused a slowing down in the GDP growth to 1.1 per cent in 2016, from 8.5 per cent in 2012.[16]

40. This led to important changes in the economy including: (i) the emergence of a current account deficit, the first since the financial crisis of 2008–2009; (ii) a scarcity of foreign currency; and (iii) local currency depreciation and inflationary pressures, with annual inflation reaching 40 per cent at the beginning of 2017 according to the National Bank of Angola. This situation has highlighted the need to address more forcefully the dependence from oil, by diversifying the economy and reducing vulnerabilities. In 2017 and 2018, GDP growth is projected to rise to 2.3 per cent and 3.2 per cent, respectively, mainly due to planned increases in public spending and improved terms of trade.[17]

41. The decrease of oil prices led to large cuts in expenditures, including the virtual elimination of fuel subsidies, the cancellation of capital expenditures, and a reduction in acquisitions of goods and services. Nevertheless, Angola has access to significant financial resources through bilateral agreements and loans. China pledged more than US$20 billion to finance infrastructure development and trade in the country, and already provided Angola with an estimated US$12 billion in oil-backed loans, a portion of which was directed to the development of the rural areas with roads, ports, and airports.[18] According to official sources, the government has taken on foreign debt totalling at least US$11.5 billion since November 2015, with Chinese sources predominant.[19] China is also the main source of imports for the

[13] General National Budget 2016.
[14] Between June 2014 and January 2016, the OPEC Reference Basket price fell by an unprecedented 80%. It was the largest percentage fall in five cycles of sharp price declines. OPEC Annual Report, 2016.
[15] OPEC crude oil production based on direct communication, 2012–2016 (1,000 b/d), OPEC 2016 Annual report, OPEC.
[16] General National Budget 2016.
[17] Angola 2017 – www.africaneconomicoutlook.org.
[18] USAID Country Profile Property Rights and Resource Governance Angola (USAID 2006).
[19] Economist Intelligent Unit Country Risk Service, January 2017.

country, followed by South Korea, and the main destination of exports, followed by India.[20]

42. Although the agriculture sector contributes on average only 9.9 per cent to GDP,[21] 44.2 per cent of the employed population works in the sector according to the 2014 census. Moreover, 46 per cent of households engaged in some agricultural activity and 6 per cent engaged in fishing; farming and fishing in freshwater bodies are not mutually exclusive and many rural households engage in both, to enhance their food security, whenever they have easy access to freshwater bodies.

43. Classification of Angola in international categories. The rapid evolution of the Angolan economy was reflected in the WB classification of the country based on its GDP. At the end of the civil war, and until mid-2012, Angola was in the lower income country group and until 2013, it was a 'fragile and conflict affected situation'. As of mid-2012, it was classified as an upper-middle income country. At the beginning of July 2017, the country was re-classified as a lower-middle-income country, based on the decrease in government revenues from oil, and the update in the size of the Angolan resident population that resulted from the 2014 general census of the population. In parallel, with the support of the UN, the country is focusing on its graduation from the least developed country group,[22] scheduled for 2021; while the Sustainable Development Goals have been so far low in priority in the governmental agenda.

44. It is generally agreed that the country ranks low on both human resources capacity and business environment indicators. Its overall institutional capacity has not been rehabilitated since the return of peace and bureaucratic hurdles inhibit private sector growth. One of the key challenges the country is facing still, is a weak planning of its human resources capacity development, which results in poor availability of well qualified personnel in several key areas.

45. Poverty. Poverty in 2001 was estimated at 62 per cent. The most recent available data refer to 2008, indicating a poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line, set at AOA 4,793 monthly (US$49 as per the 2009 exchange rate), of 36.6 per cent for the entire population. This ranged from 58.3 per cent in rural areas, to 18.7 per cent in urban areas.[23] The 2016 Human Development Report indicated an estimated GNI per capita, in 2011 purchasing power parity of US$5,073 for women and US$7,527 for men.

46. Poverty is greater in female-headed households, particularly in rural areas. In addition, many women are de facto heads of households because they are members of polygamous households, or because of male labour migration. Vulnerability and poverty were recorded as particularly high in the southern provinces, e.g. Cunene, where cattle breeding is predominant and frequent and severe droughts alternated with floods seriously affected livelihoods.[24]

47. Between 2000 and 2015, Angola's Human Development Index (HDI) value increased from 0.391 to 0.533 and its ranking improved by four reaching position 150 out of 188 countries and territories in 2015; nevertheless, Angola fell short of achieving the Millennium Development Goals targets in 2015 and as of 2017, it was still placed in the low human development category.[25]

48. Performance related to social indicators is mixed: good progress was made in poverty reduction, primary education, and gender equality since 2002, but other

[20] Ibid.
[21] Average calculated based on available national data from 2006 to 2012. Source: Government of Angola (2016) 'Nota de Imprensa N. 02 - Contas Nacionais Provisórias 2014 e Preliminares 2015, Instituto Nacional de Estatística'.
[22] Angola Transition and Graduation from LDC Category, UNDP Angola, at http://www.ao.undp.org/content/angola/en/home/ourwork/angola-transition-and-graduation-from-ldc-category.html. The Graduation criteria are 3: Income Criteria, Human Asset Criteria, and Economic Vulnerability Criteria, UN.
[23] Survey on population well-being/IBEP 2008-2009.
[24] Agriculture Recovery Project, Project Document Report, IFAD, 2017.
[25] The HDI target established in the PND 2013-2017 was 0.540.

social indicators remain very poor. For example, maternal mortality is 450 per 100,000 births, and malnutrition is acute with 30 per cent of children less than five years of age suffering from stunting and 16 per cent underweight. Table 2 shows the evolution of a few key HD indicators over time. Despite the doubling of the GNI per capita, the HDI ratio only grew by 36.6 per cent over the same period.

Table 2
Angola's HDI indicators

Year	*Dependency ratio, young age (0-14) (per 100 people ages 15-64)*	*Expected years of schooling*	*GNI per capita*	*HDI value*	*Natural resources depletion (% of GNI)*
2000	96.1	5.5	2,912	0.390	55.2
2005	97.0	7.9	4,148	0.449	43.2
2010	97.3	10.2	6,520	0.509	38.8
2015	95.2	11.4	6,291	0.533	24.5*

United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 2016 and Human Development Data (1990-2015).
* 2013 value.

49. Inequality. One key factor affecting the HDI ranking of Angola is the level of social inequality in the country, which has been growing over time. The WB only reports a Gini coefficient value of 42.7 in 2008.[26] The 2015 inequality-adjusted HDI value, at 0.336, was very close to the average value for Low Human Development Countries (0.337), albeit less positive when compared with the average value for Sub-Saharan Africa (0.355).[27]

50. Unemployment. Economic activity, other than oil and diamonds, is highly concentrated in Luanda and along the coastal area. Nevertheless, there remains high unemployment and underemployment also in Angolan cities and towns, with informal market mechanisms representing the only possible option for many. Almost 50 per cent of urban families, including those recently arrived, today still depend on the informal sector for an income. An additional problem for new migrants is securing shelter for their families, and data indicate that in urban areas, more than 80 per cent of the population lives without legal land tenure or access to basic services; and more than 75 per cent lives in slums.[28]

51. Food and nutrition insecurity. In 2005 Angola was not producing enough food to meet the needs of its rural population. The shortfall was being covered through food imports, a third of which were in the form of food aid, reaching over 1.4 million people. There were major deficits and low crop yields in the principal staples, including maize, millet and sorghum. The most vulnerable areas to food insecurity were the central highlands, comprising the provinces of Huambo, northern Huíla and parts of Bié, which had been at the heart of the conflict; the majority of combatants on both sides came from this region. At the time, the central highlands hosted 80 per cent of the country's food-insecure population and 68 per cent of the highly vulnerable population. It represented the area with the highest demographic and environmental pressure, with over 40 per cent of the total population and two thirds of the rural population estimated to be settled there, the vast majority living below the poverty line.[29]

52. According to FAO,[30] Angola was able to make significant progress reducing food insecurity and undernourishment in about a decade. The most recent data

[26] This value located Angola in position 54 out of 69 countries for which a 2008 value was reported. From WDI report, at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/WDI_excel.zip, accessed on 3 December 2017.
[27] http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf.
[28] Participatory Inclusive Land Readjustment in Huambo, Angola – DW Angola 2013.
[29] IFAD COSOP 2005.
[30] 2015 Regional Overview of Food Insecurity Africa, Rome, FAO.

available,[31] indicate that the prevalence of food undernourishment in the total population went from 32.1 per cent in 2004-06, to 14 per cent in 2014-2016; over the same time-span, the number of undernourished people went from 5.8 million to 3.5 million, despite the growth in population; whereas the number of obese people increased from 0.3 million to 0.7 million. Moreover, during the period 2014-16, there were no people in the country suffering from severe food insecurity; and stunting among children below 5 years old in the period 2010-2015, was assessed to be 29.2 per cent, lower than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa.[32] On the other hand, due to the prolonged drought, the levels of food insecurity in the Southern provinces of Angola had been rising, according to several assessments that culminated in the 2016 Post Disaster Needs Assessment.[33]

53. Agriculture. Angola has an estimated 58 million ha of arable land, of which less than 10 per cent was reckoned to be under cultivation as of 2017. It is generally stated that only a minimal part of land is irrigated, although no official data exist.[34] Although the country used to be a major agricultural exporter before independence,[35] as of 2017 a large share of the food consumed in the country was imported, with the exception of roots and tubers.[36] This was due in part to the destruction of the agricultural production and marketing infrastructure during the civil war, and in part to the negative terms of trade for national production against imports, that resulted from a mix of factors. In practice, the centralized governmental planning and the concentration of decision-making power in Luanda, together with the easy access to foreign currency and the control of imports by a few power-groups at the national level, have all contributed to a distortion of the food and agricultural markets, that led to imported products being cheaper and more easily accessible than domestic primary production. As a result, agriculture is still largely subsistence-based, and characterised by low yields, low prices and low returns to labour and land. Only a limited part of agricultural production reaches the market. Poorly developed infrastructure, especially roads and electricity, limited access to financial services, poor agricultural research and extension services, and limited availability of agricultural inputs, represent the major constraints to growth in the sector.[37]

54. The fall in revenues for oil exports and the consequent currency devaluation have been a natural incentive for domestic production to increase and substitute for part of the food imports. In 2015, food imports decreased by 27.6 per cent in monetary value, in parallel with a reduction in the monetary value of exports by 43.9 per cent.[38] The extent to which this driver for agricultural production will translate into increased national production will also depend on other factors. A major challenge among others is that farmers are still undercapitalised and links with local and national input/output markets are loose. Although market demand is high for most food crops and opportunities exist for expanding smallholders' production, market outlets in rural areas are insufficient and marketing systems are yet to be rehabilitated. In many cases, small-scale farmers discouraged by the weak results from crop production embark in other activities, such as the production of charcoal, using forest products from the miombo formations and negatively affecting the environment. Some of the measures required include adequate macroeconomic

[31] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2017. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017. Building resilience for peace and food security. Rome, FAO.
[32] Human Development Report 2016, UNDP.
[33] Post Disaster Needs Assessment, Government of Angola, 2016.
[34] Sources: Countrystat.org/Angola.
[35] The Angola population in 1975 was estimated at 7.6 million people, representing 29 per cent of the population in 2014; see www.countryeconomy.com, accessed on 2 December 2017.
[36] Although no figures were found about the percentage of imported foodstuff, the document 'Strategic alignment with the mid-term development plan for the agrarian sector 2018 – 2022' issued in 2016, stated that 100 per cent of wheat consumed in the country was imported. It also established production targets to meet the national market requirements for chicken and eggs in 2017, of 5 and 92 per cent respectively.
[37] Design report, SADCP-C&H. IFAD 2017.
[38] OEC Countries, Angola - https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/ago/.

framework, improvements in the business climate, construction of rural and transport infrastructures, incentives supporting agricultural and rural development, all underpinned by investments in developing capacities at all levels.

55. Freshwater fisheries are considered to represent a vast and largely untapped potential opportunity to support local economic development in terms of fighting poverty, improving food security and generating employment. According to FAO, in 2013 fish represented about 29 per cent of the total animal protein intake in the country with an estimated annual per capita consumption of 18.6 kg in 2013. This compared against an annual global average nearing 20 kg per capita, and an African average of only 9.8 kg per capita. Furthermore, the African Development Bank (AfDB) data indicated in 2012 that fisheries represented about 1.7 per cent of the GDP of Angola.

56. Aquaculture in Angola started before the Independence and was practiced in a rudimentary way at the initiative of the private sector in some State facilities. At the scientific level, some experiments were conducted before the Independence War in both freshwater and marine fish-farming.[39] The national aquaculture production remains relatively modest, with FAO 2014 fisheries statistics reporting an estimated production of 305 tonnes, mostly Nile tilapia; this partly due to the availability of poor quality fish seed and feed, and limited technical capacity in the country. Nevertheless, the 'Spatial Planning of Aquaculture Zones in the Republic of Angola', completed in March 2016, highlighted a great potential for aquaculture development in the country.[40]

57. Regardless of the source of fish, fish technology for both capture and post-harvest handling and processing, is very basic. Typically, fish are gutted in poor conditions, in the absence of shelter, clean water and waste management; then salted for drying or smoked if the fish are in good condition, in simple drum kilns. Smaller species and sizes are simply dried without salt. Only a small proportion of the catch is sold as fresh, whenever transport conditions allow it to be channelled to cities. In the best cases, some ice is produced in home freezers; and small ice plants in the city may also be used.[41]

58. Natural resources management. The country is rich in natural resources. Although the soils are generally fertile in the north and the central highlands and average rainfall exceeds 1,000 mm per year, small-scale farmers in certain provinces started reporting of decreasing soil fertility, with Huambo the most affected area. The degradation of Angola's soils is mainly due to unsustainable agricultural practices, the over-grazing of rangelands and deforestation and the unsustainable use of forest resources and deforestation.[42]

59. The limited number of soil analysis laboratories in the country,[43] and the availability on the national market of only one fertilizer formulation, and of lime from national deposits, represent a major constraint to better targeted soil fertility management practices. This represents a risk for the sustainability, environmental and financial, of family farming production.

60. Climate change. Angolan agriculture is increasingly vulnerable to climate change and extreme climatic events, such as the droughts (2015-16) and floods (2017) caused by El Niño and La Niña climate events. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates, mean annual temperatures will

[39] Namely, the inland fish farming in Huambo, Moxico, Lunda Norte, Cuuanza Sul, Uige, Malange, Kuando Kubango; marine fish farming of the *Perna perna* mussel in Lobito Bay; Angola, National Aquaculture Sector Overview. FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department. 2017.
[40] http://www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/en/c/413268/.
[41] Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project Detailed Design Report. Main Report and Appendices, 2014.
[42] Angola Country Programming Framework 2013-2017, FAO.
[43] A laboratory for soil analysis exists at the Institute of Agronomical Research, within the Agronomical Research Station of Chianga, Huambo, although it lacks capacity to respond to local needs. Additional labs exist in other IAR Research Stations, and elsewhere, e.g. at the Faculty of Agriculture, in Huambo.

increase by 1.2 - 3.2 degrees Celsius by 2060, and the total rainfall through "heavy events" is projected to increase. This is expected to increase the occurrence of devastating floods such as those in 2011 that affected 65,000 people, caused soil erosion, wide-spread cattle mortality and decimated vast areas of crop fields in the south of the country. The government thus places high importance on improving the resilience of agricultural systems to shocks and threats from climatic causes.

61. Access to land and its tenure. In Angola all land belongs to the State that determines its final use and destination. In order to preserve the rights of the rural communities, the 2004 Land Law takes into account the customary land use systems[44] that prevail in the different provinces and cultures of the country. This is expected to provide security of tenure also in the case of permanent investments in the land, e.g. small-scale irrigation, used by community-based groups and associations. In terms of State ownership, agricultural land is regulated upon a private rights basis while natural resources form part of the public right. The law foresees that land for private agricultural investment would be regulated through perpetual land use rights transfers of ownership, sold by auction from the State to private actors. Land use rights are transmissible, subject to the same conditions they were originally conceded for.[45] At the same time, the Land Law subjected those with informal rights to eviction if they fail to apply for a concession in a timely fashion.[46] No information was found on gender-based differences in access to land.

62. Although in Angola there is no straightforward competition for scarce land, due to the still very low population density,[47] the weaknesses in the land legislation framework, and in the titling processes, have resulted in conflicting interests due to occupation of large surfaces encroaching communities with low resources and capacities to defend their rights.

63. Rural finance sector. The financial sector is competitive, but also highly concentrated, with five banks holding over 75 per cent of market share. The scope of products and services offered are mostly focused on traditional mass-market banking products and loans are concentrated in a few sectors in Luanda province. A few banks have microfinance portfolios, with loans mostly extended under government or donor-supported programmes. Out of five operating micro-finance institutions, only one provided micro-credit services at the time of the Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project (SAMAP) design.[48] The share of agriculture in the loan portfolio of banks is minimal, mainly short term and mostly benefits commercial farmers, many of them associated to the political elite. The family farming sector, which among other challenges cannot present land titles as collateral, is largely excluded from these opportunities.

64. National development policies and strategies. The main policies of the Government of Angola to reduce poverty were first embodied in the 2005 ECP followed by the 2009 National Strategy for Food and Nutrition Security (ENSAN). The main goal of the ECP was to cut the country's poverty level in half by 2015 and to consolidate peace and national unity through the sustained improvement of the living standards of all Angolans; it also highlighted rural development with a focus on the improvement of food security and the revitalization of the rural economy and the reconstruction of infrastructures. The goal set out by ENSAN was to ensure that all Angolans would have at all times physical and economic access to food of

[44] These include: residential, traditional shifting agriculture and transhumant grazing, forestry, access to water and communication ways use.
[45] Securing Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management for Improved Food Security in Central Angola – DW/WV
[46] Strengthening Land Tenure and Property Rights in Angola Land Law and Policy: Overview of Legal Framework. USAID. May 31, 2007.
[47] Connor Foley - Land rights in Angola: poverty and plenty. HPG Working Paper, November 2007.
[48] Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project in Cuanza Sul and Huila Provinces (SADCP-C&HSAMAP), Final project design report, April 2017.

adequate quantities and variety to permit them to contribute to the human, economic and social development of the country.

65. In 2010, the ECP and the ENSAN were merged into the Integrated Municipal Program for Rural Development and the Fight Against Poverty (PMIDRCP), which aims: "to reduce levels of extreme poverty in Angola and in particular in rural areas, promoting access to basic public services and turn Angola into a prosperous country with social justice." This programme, implemented countrywide and led by the Secretariat of Social Issues of the Presidency, includes several social development programmes. Both ECP and ENSAN were also reflected in Angola's 2013 – 2017 PND, which established as main goals, the promotion of economic growth and increased employment. In 2012, the latter assigned between 1 to 3 per cent of public expenditure to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and less than 0.99 per cent to the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture.[49]

66. Agricultural sector policies. The 2013-2017 PND and both 2013-2017 and 2018-2022 Medium Term Development Plans for the Agricultural Sector (PMPDSA) anchored the goal for agricultural development to the sustainable use of natural resources and the improvement of competitiveness, while aiming at the achievement of food security and food self-sufficiency and taking advantage of market potentials.[50] The mid-term plans include four strategic objectives each, that address agriculture, livestock, forestry and cross-cutting issues including capacity development and services to producers. Not least, the second strategic objective, in both 2013-2017 and 2018-2022 mid-term plans, focuses on the development of family farming. With regards to agricultural research and extension, the Government acknowledged the limited resources and coverage; and in the more recent mid-term plan, referred to Farmer Field Schools as the method for technology transfer.

67. Artisanal fisheries and aquaculture sector policies. The ECP recognized the development of marine and inland fish products as a key contribution of the Strategy, with an emphasis on strengthening of production capacity of the freshwater artisanal fish production. Similarly, ENSAN recognized the significance of the fisheries sector in contributing to improved quality of life for the population through increased incomes and food security. Finally, the PND set the development of aquaculture as a priority in order to increase the availability of fish for national consumption and emphasised increased competitiveness and development of both industrial and artisanal sub-sectors on a sustainable basis.

68. In addition, the fisheries law (Lei dos Recursos Biológicos Aquáticos) adopted in 2004 and amended in 2015[51] regulates the development of aquaculture in Angola establishing inter alia the following objectives: to contribute to food safety and to increase the marketable quantities of aquaculture products; to contribute to the sustainable renewal of aquatic biological resources; to prevent unsustainable fishing; and to encourage employment and income creation, especially in rural and coastal communities. As of 2017, Angola did not have an Aquaculture Plan in force, as required by the fisheries law;[52] and despite the elaboration of a new Management Plan is foreseen in the PND.

69. Nevertheless, management measures for freshwater fisheries and aquaculture are adopted every year under the fisheries law. The 2017 measures[53] established specific requirements for freshwater fisheries regarding the mesh size and collection of data on fishing effort and catches; for aquaculture, requirements

[49] These shares are much lower than the 10 per cent agreed to by all African States, including Angola, in both the Maputo Declaration in 2003, and the Malabo Declaration in 2014.
[50] 2013-2017 PND, translation by the CSPE team.
[51] Law n. 6-A/04, of 8 October 2004 as amended by Law n. 16/05, of 27 December 2005.
[52] A Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Plan was adopted only for the period 2006-2010, *Plano de Ordenamento de Pescas e da Aquacultura,* adopted by Resolution n. 9/06, of 6 February 2006.
[53] Adopted by Presidential Decree n. 41/17, of 6 March 2017.

included monitoring for water, soil and cultivated and commercialized species and production statistics by the Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea.

70. Environment and climate change sectors policies. In more recent years, national policies also started integrating among their concerns, the sustainable management of natural resources and the need for climate change adaptation. The 2013-2017 PND included environmental management among its priorities, as one of the pillars for the national sustainable development; and adaptation to climate change through small scale irrigation development was part of the priorities for the agricultural sector. At the same time, the medium-term plans for the agricultural sector have moved from full reliance on the abundance of the national natural resources, to an incipient and more cautious attention to the need for their sustainable management. Similarly, the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2015 included national priorities for climate change adaptation in the agricultural sector.

71. Official Development Assistance. Between 2012 and 2015 Angola was the thirty-third largest recipient of official development assistance (ODA) in Sub-Saharan Africa and benefitted of support in the order of approximately 1.18 billion.[54] Over the last three years, the net ODA has been on average 0.3 per cent of the GNI (Table 3), according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistic data and the WB report published in 2015. Japan is the largest bilateral donor followed by the United States, Poland, Korea and Norway. The main development multilateral agencies are the WB, the European Union (EU) and the African Development Bank.

Table 3
Overall ODA to Angola

Receipt	*2013*	*2014*	*2015*
Net ODA (US$ million)	285.5	235.4	380.1
Net ODA/GNI (%)	0.3	0.2	0.4
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	54.2	42.8	70.4
Net Private flows (US$ million)	5,642.4	4,171.1	-2,551.8

Sources: OECD, WB.

72. In addition, Angola received ODA-like support from other countries, particularly from China. Although these flows do not strictly fall within the OECD definition of ODA, data available indicate that China supported Angola with more than 20 aid projects, for a total sum of at least US$157 million over the last 15 years under the form of grants, loans or debt forgiveness for development purposes. Angola also received from the Government of China at least US$8,197 million of other financial flows, 410 million of which were addressed to the agricultural sector.[55]

73. Between 2010 and 2014, four sectors concentrated more than half of the Country Programmable Aid (CPA)[56] to Angola: health (22 per cent), government and civil society (14 per cent), population policies and reproductive health (13 per cent), and education (9 per cent). During this period, the agricultural sector received

[54] OECD database as accessed on 2nd May 2017. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm.
[55] Source : http://china.aiddata.org/downloads.
[56] CPA is a subset of ODA outflows. It is considered closer to capturing the flows of aid that go to the partner countries than the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA). It takes as a starting point data on gross ODA disbursements by recipient but excludes spending which is: inherently unpredictable (such as humanitarian aid and debt relief); or entails no flows to the recipient country (administration, etc.); or is usually not discussed between the main donor agency and recipient governments (e.g. food aid).

US$111.6 million[57] or 8 per cent of the total CPA to Angola. In 2015, fisheries was the main subsector of ODA within the agricultural sector, followed by rural development. The main source of ODA, 85 per cent of the total, came from loans; and 15 per cent from grants.

74. IFAD's disbursements to Angola in support of agriculture and rural development over the period 2010-2016 was US$8.1 million, equivalent to an average of US$1.16 million per year. This represented a contribution by IFAD to the total ODA to agriculture in Angola in the same period, of 5.6 per cent.[58]

B. IFAD's strategy and operations for the CSPE period

75. Overview of IFAD's operations in Angola. IFAD started its collaboration with the Government of Angola in the late 1980s, and approved its first loan, the Malanje Smallholder Sector Rehabilitation Project, in support of the country in December 1989. Timing was appropriate, with significant steps made in late 1988 and 1989 towards a peace agreement between the parties involved in the civil war that had ravaged the country since the end of the Angola War of Independence from Portugal in 1975.[59] However, fighting erupted again and the project was discontinued. After the Lusaka Peace Agreement was signed in 1994, IFAD re-engaged with project design; two projects became effective in 1997 and 1999, the Northern Region Food Crops Development Project (PRODECA) to be implemented in Malanje, Cuanza Norte and Uíge; and the Northern Fishing Communities Development Programme (PESNORTE) to be implemented in the Zaire Province, respectively. Both projects had to be suspended due to new phases of the civil war; were resumed after April 2002, when the conflict came to an end; and reached completion in December 2006 and December 2007, respectively.

76. In December 2007, at PESNORTE completion, IFAD Board approved the Market-Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project (MOSAP I), jointly funded with the WB and Japan; this was followed by the approval in 2015 of AFAP, and in 2017, of both the Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project in Cuanza Sul and Huila Provinces (SAMAP) and the Agriculture Recovery Project (ARP).

77. COSOP in Angola. In 2005, three years after the end of the civil war, IFAD Executive Board approved the first COSOP in Angola. The Paper provided a reference framework for six years, equivalent to two Performance-Based Allocation System (PBAS) cycles. It also planned for an in-house review of the COSOP itself to take place in 2007, to maintain alignment with the new upcoming Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This did not happen, due to the overlapping of other important processes, including postponed national elections.

78. The 2005 COSOP addressed key and urgent issues for a country emerging from a long civil war, and was facing major food insecurity and poverty challenges and had to rehabilitate and develop everything from urban and rural infrastructure to rural organizations and services, as well as capacities across all levels. Its core focus were three main streams of interrelated actions:

(a) Reducing food insecurity and poverty of smallholder farming families, where the larger numbers of rural poor were, including women-headed households and vulnerable groups;

(b) Strengthening the capacity and competence of the governmental organizations and services at the provincial and local level, to better address the development needs of the rural poor; and

[57] http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/agriculture-relatedaiddataataglance.htm.
[58] The source of figures on total ODA originated from the OECD database "Query Wizard for International Development Statistics", accessed on 29 January 2018.
[59] Wikipedia, Angolan Civil War, accessed on 28 November 2017.

(c) Empowering rural communities and the rural poor to hold the Government accountable against its responsibility in providing services and investments for rural development.

79. For the formulation of the COSOP, IFAD engaged intensively with the Government of Angola, particularly with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Fisheries, after the Ministry of Finance had given green light with respect to the Government's intention to borrow from IFAD.[60] IFAD also consulted with and received inputs from the international partners in the country. The Paper was in line with the national ECP and was based on the UN Common Country Assessment and Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The support and inputs provided by the project facilitator, who was a well-respected national professional, in a social context where personal relationships play a paramount role in any kind of endeavour, were considered a key asset.

80. In 2011, when the COSOP reached completion time, IFAD's fund availability for Angola did not allow expanding the portfolio in the country beyond the on-going commitment to co-financing MOSAP I plus some additional financing. Reportedly, it was decided that formulating a new COSOP would not have been an efficient use of resources, nor was it considered useful to extend it formally.

81. In April 2016, a consultation between IFAD and the Government of Angola confirmed the relevance of the 2005 COSOP and recommended extending it to cover the 2016-2018 PBAS. Following internal consultations, the country programme management team (CPMT) prepared a Country Strategy Note for the period January 2017-December 2018, also to align the next COSOP with the Government's planning cycle.

82. The country strategy note (CSN). Eleven years after the 2005 COSOP had been formulated, the high relevance of its core thrust was recognized by stakeholders in IFAD and in the Government. Adjustments were only made to update IFAD's strategy in the country to address new challenges in reducing poverty and food insecurity. With this aim, the scope of IFAD's interventions was expanded to:

(a) new geographical areas, i.e. the littoral, or riverine, zones and the Southern provinces struck by drought;

(b) other target groups, i.e. pastoralists in the Southern regions, and communities deriving their livelihoods from freshwater resources, as in the meantime the ex-combatants had reintegrated the civil population;

(c) include sustainable environmental management and climate change adaptation, as well as strengthening the resilience of smallholder producers, in the thrust of new projects; and

(d) support the Government of Angola through non-lending initiatives, focused on developing institutional capacity in agricultural research in favour of innovations for smallholder farmers.

83. This report analyses more in depth the design and performance of the 2005 COSOP and the CSN, in Section VI; and a comparison of the key aspects of the 2005 COSOP and the 2017/18 CSN is shown in Annex VII.

84. The total envelope of IFAD-supported projects since 1989 until November 2017, amounted to US$135.2 million, distributed over 7 initiatives. IFAD contributed US$82.1 million, or 60.7 per cent of the total, through loans at different lending terms, following the evolution in the GDP-based classification of the country at different points in time, and associated grants. The Government committed to contribute US$16 million, corresponding to 11.9 per cent of the total

[60] The CPMT facilitated the dialogue during the process, by translating into Portuguese the draft documents, also the final COSOP document was translated.

envelope; and the estimated contribution by beneficiaries amounts to US$4.8 million, or 3.6 per cent of the grand total. The balance of US$32.2 million, representing 23.8 per cent of the total envelope, was provided through co-financing by partners, namely the International Development Association/World Bank, Japan, the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), the Belgium Survival Fund and FAO.[61] In addition, since 2005 IFAD also contributed US$559,000 in the form of five national grants.

85. The total value of the portfolio until the end of 2007 was US$39.9 million, of which IFAD contributed 69.8 per cent, or US$27.9 million, whereas the total value of the portfolio since 2008 was US$95.2 million, of which IFAD contributed 56.9 per cent, or US$54.2 million including an associated grant.

86. Until 2017, IFAD typically supported one, maximum two projects at a time in Angola, mostly located in the northern provinces of the country, and until 2007, direct supervision was entrusted to the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). As of 2018, the Fund will be engaged in supporting three loans, through direct supervision, and in a total of eight provinces, from the north to the south of the country.

87. In addition to maintaining the support to the traditional implementing partners in the Government, i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea; with the new projects, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Social Action, Women's Empowerment and the Family, will also have a significant role and responsibility, in particular at the provincial level.

88. Tables 4 and 5 synthesise these data.

Table 4
Financial resources of IFAD-supported projects

	Total cost (US$)	*IFAD's contribution (US$)*	*Co-financing (US$)*	*Government's contribution (US$)*	*Beneficiaries' contribution (US$)*
Loans approved 1989-2007, with linked grants	39 970 000	27 910 000	7 700 000	4 020 000	340 000
Percentage within the total		69.8%	19.3%	10.1%	0.9%
Loans approved 2008-2017, with linked grants	95 290 000	54 200 000	24 520 000	12 040 000	4 530 000
Percentage within the total		56.9%	25.7%	12.6%	4.7%
Total loans approved 1989-2017, loans and associated grants	135 260 000	82 110 000	32 220 000	16 060 000	4 870 000
Percentage within the grand total		60,7%	23.8%	11.9%	3.6%
National self-standing grants	559 000	559 000			

Source: IFAD corporate system.

[61] The MOSAP project, co-financed by the World Bank, IFAD and Japan, was approved at a total cost of US$ 49.4 million. Due to delays in project implementation, the World Bank's contribution was reduced by US$ 10 million. This report thus uses the revised MOSAP budget figure of US$ 37.4 million, in line with IFAD Project Completion Report Summary.

Table 5
Key information on IFAD in Angola, as of November 2017

Number of approved loans 1989-2017	*7*
Number of effective loans	2
Lending terms	Since 2015, Ordinary Terms; 2013-2014, blend terms; 1989-2013, Highly Concessional
Focus of operations	Agricultural Development, Community Development, Research and Training; Fisheries and Aquaculture
Co-financing partners	OPEC Fund for International Development, International Development Association of the World Bank, Belgian Survival Fund Japan, FAO
COSOPs	One, in 2005; a Country Strategy Note, in 2017
Country office in Angola	None
Number of CPMs since 2005	5
Main government partners	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea; Ministry of Environment

Source: IFAD corporate system.

89. IFAD's investments by sector of intervention. Since IFAD started its operations in Angola, programme funds have been allocated to four different sectors; rural development, with 43 per cent of the total resources; agricultural development, with 37 per cent; research, extension and training, with 13 per cent; and marketing, storage and processing, with 7 per cent of the total funds. At a more detailed level, nine different sub-components were supported, as follows: 'local capacity building' benefitted of most funds, 24 per cent, followed by 'project management' at 22 per cent and 'financial services and credit', with 21 per cent; the latter category also includes the predominantly grant-funded sub-projects in MOSAP I and SAMAP, which explains why this category received the third largest share of funds. The support areas 'community development' and 'technology development and transfer' received similar allocations, with 9 and 10 per cent of the total funds, respectively. Finally, 'marketing' and 'institutional support' benefitted of 5 per cent of the funds each; 'fisheries and aquaculture' of 3 per cent; and 'Land improvement' of 1 per cent. Figure 1 shows these data in graphic format.

Figure 1
IFAD-supported investment in Angola 2005-2017 by sub-component



Source: Grants and Investment Portfolio System (GRIPS) - IFAD.

90. The data confirm issues that will be discussed at length throughout the report: the focus in responding to the identified needs for capacity development; the high costs of project management caused by the protracted implementation periods; the attention to community development, necessary in a post-conflict country.

91. The performance-based allocation system. The period under evaluation covers four PBAS cycles. Average annual allocation has been US$5.49 million per year. Four loans were provided on highly concessional terms, one on blended terms, and the most recent two loans on ordinary terms. As of June 2017, Angola was classified as green according to the 2017 IFAD financing terms, hence eligible to 100 per cent loan financing on ordinary terms.

92. During the period under analysis, the allocations through the PBAS were limited, due to a combination of national indicators, strong on national economic growth and poor on the rural sector. The increase in the PBAS allocation from USD 11.14 million to USD 34.77 million between IFAD9 and IFAD10, shown in Table 6 below, was mainly due to the decrease of the GNI per capita from US$5,010 to US$4,850 and the increase in the programme of loans and grants from USD 3 billion in IFAD9 to USD 3.2 billion in IFAD10. Also, during its implementation, the score for MOSAP I as project at risk increased from 1 (the minimum score) to 6 (the maximum).

Table 6
Performance-based allocations to Angola, in millions of United States dollars

PBAS cycle	*2007 – 2009 (IFAD 7)*	*2010 – 2012 (IFAD 8)*	*2013 – 2015 (IFAD 9)*	*2016 – 2018 (IFAD 10)*
PBAS Allocation	11.64	11.27	11.14	34.77

Source: IFAD corporate system.

Loans

93. Brief profiles of the loan-supported projects analysed by this CSPE are included here below; Table 7 shows the financial contributions of each partner, or group thereof.

Table 7
Performance-based allocations to Angola, in millions of United States dollars

Project name	*Total project cost*	*IFAD approved loan financing, US$*	*IFAD approved grant financing, US$*	*Cofinancing, US$*	*Government, US$*	*Beneficiary contribution US$*
Market-oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project (MOSAP I)	37 390 000	8 200 000		24 020 000	2 140 000	3 030 000
Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project (AFAP)	12 100 000	11 100 000		0	1 000 000	
Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialisation Project in Cuanza Sul and Huila Provinces (SAMAP)	38 200 000	28 900 000		0	8 200 000	1 100 000
Agricultural Recovery Project (ARP)	7 600 000	5 000 000	1 000 000	500 000	700 000	400 000

Source: IFAD information systems.

94. The Market-Oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project (MOSAP I) was formulated by the WB and IFAD, for a total amount of US$49.5 million. Financial contributions came from: the WB, a US$30 million loan, which was later revised to US$20 million; IFAD, a loan of US$8.2 million; the Government of Japan, with US$4.02 million; the Government of Angola, with US$4.12 million; and beneficiaries, with US$3.04 million. The project was approved in December 2007, became effective in 2009 and closed in September 2016, under the administration of the WB. At completion, the total project cost was US$37.4 million of which IFAD financed US$7.1 million and the WB, US$20 million. The Implementation Completion Report was produced by the WB after completion in September 2016. IFAD's revised scoring of the ICR was issued in March 2017.

95. The Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project (AFAP) was approved by IFAD Executive Board in April 2015, for a total cost of US$12.1 million; IFAD provided a loan for US$11.1 million and the Government committed to contribute US$1 million. The project became effective in August 2015, with September 2021 as the expected completion date. The project coordination unit (PCU) became operational in mid-2016 and its staffing was completed in September 2017. The national responsibility for the projects rests with the Director of the Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA) of the Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea.

96. The Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialization Project (SADCP-C&H/SAMAP) was approved by IFAD Executive Board in April 2017, for a total budget of US$38.1 million; with IFAD providing a loan of US$28.9 million; the Government committed to allocate US$8.2 million to the project and the beneficiaries should contribute US$1.1 million. The project became effective in late August 2017 and its first disbursement was planned for end of 2017, beginning of 2018. The project builds on the previous WB and IFAD-supported project MOSAP I

and was formulated mirroring MOSAP II, fully funded by the WB. It covers two new provinces, Cuanza Sul and Huíle, also located in the central highlands of Angola but hitherto not supported by the two organizations. The national responsibility for the projects rests with the Director-General of the Institute for Agricultural Development (IDA) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

97. The Agricultural Recovery Project (ARP) was approved by IFAD Executive Board in September 2017. At the time of writing this report (December 2017), the loan agreement was pending signature by the Government and the project had not become effective yet, although all conditions for disbursement had been signed by the end of 2017. Its total cost was estimated at US$7.6 million, of which IFAD would provide a loan of US$5 million and a grant of US$1 million; FAO committed to contribute US$0.5 million, through its Technical Cooperation Programme; the Government, US$0.7 million and beneficiaries, US$0.4 million. Its objective is to restore the productive assets of households affected by recurrent droughts and/ or by prolonged droughts and provide means for recovering their production capacity It will intervene in the southern provinces of Cunene, Huila and Namibe, which are among those most affected by the recurrent droughts and floods. The national responsibility for the projects rests with the Director-General of IDA.

National self-standing grants

98. Brief profiles of the grant initiatives financed during the period assessed by this CSPE are included here below.

99. Strengthening Community Resilience and Responses to HIV/AIDS through Livelihoods. This IFAD grant, with a budget of U$160,000, was approved in December 2004, became effective in June 2005, and reached completion in June 2007. It was implemented by the NGO CARE, to develop effective models to improve community capacities to prevent and mitigate the impact of HIV and AIDS in Angola's rural communities.

100. Participatory analysis of lessons learned in community development. This IFAD grant, with a budget of US$50,000, was approved in January 2006, became effective in April of the same year and came to completion in April 2007. The implementing agency was the Angolan Non-Governmental Organizations Forum (FONGA). Its main purpose was to identify and learn lessons about successful interventions addressing poverty reduction in the central highlands. In doing so, it would also develop the capacity of the implementing NGO and assess the levels of community participation in local decision-making processes.

101. Community land mapping and conflict mitigation in the Central Highlands. This IFAD grant, with a budget of US$149,000, was approved in January 2006, became effective in April 2006 and came to completion in April 2008. It was assigned to the NGO Development Workshop. The goal was to reduce the vulnerability of rural communities in the Central Highlands through improved access to land, recognition of traditional land rights and use of improved agricultural techniques in one commune in the Katchiungo municipality.

102. Cooperative Development Project. The total budget of the grant was US$220,706 of which US$100,000 through a grant from IFAD and the rest covered by USAID and the international oil company Chevron. The grant was approved in December 2006, became effective in April 2007, and was completed in April 2009. The aim was a collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to improve the legal framework of cooperatives and assist in implementing new laws and legalizing ten cooperatives in four provinces.

103. Rural poverty studies. This IFAD grant, with a budget of US$100,000, was approved in December 2006, became effective in April 2007, and was completed in April 2009. The executing agency was the Centre for studies and scientific research (Centro de Estudos e Investigação Cientifica, CEIC). The goal was to improve

knowledge of rural poverty in Angola, through an analysis and dissemination of current and credible information, to promote a public debate on the issue.

Regional grants

104. Aquaculture Assessment and Value Chain Pilots for Improving Fish Supply. This initiative was originally developed only for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and was extended to include Angola in support of the AFAP loan. Its total project budget is US$2.9 million of which US$2.4 million through an IFAD grant; the balance US$0.5 should be in-kind co-financing from the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and WorldFish,[62] through staff time, equipment, office space and other facilities. The grant was approved on 22 December 2016, became effective in April 2017 but had not disbursed yet as of November 2017. The goal is to improve food and nutrition security and reduce poverty while managing natural resources sustainability through the increase in production from small-holders/large-scale fish farms and the improvements of the regulatory capacity of public sector in the management of aquaculture development. WorldFish and IITA's contribution should also entail supervision and technical assistance to AFAP.

Key points

- Angola emerged in 2002 from a 27 years-long civil war that destroyed infrastructures, the social and institutional fabric, uprooted the rural population, and led to the loss of human capital at all levels. The re-establishment of human and institutional capital remains a major challenge, in most sectors of interest to IFAD.
- The population is strongly urbanized, at 63 per cent, as a consequence of both the long conflict and the lack of livelihood opportunities in the rural areas that cause youth migration to towns and cities. All key socio-economic indicators show huge disparities between rural and urban areas. The rural poverty headcount in 2008 was assessed to be 58.3 per cent, against 18.7 per cent in urban areas. Women are the majority of the population and have longer life-expectancy, though they result worse-off against all other indicators.
- The international oil-price drop that started in 2015 caused a deep financial and economic crisis in Angola. As of 2017, the Government was starting to take action to diversify the economy away from the high dependency on oil exports. Agriculture, freshwater fisheries and aquaculture have a huge potential, that nevertheless need to be handled in a sustainable manner to avoid degradation of resources, already visible on soils in the most densely populated agricultural areas.
- The total envelope of IFAD-supported projects since 1989 until November 2017, amounted to US$135.2 million, distributed over 7 initiatives. IFAD contributed 60.7 per cent of the total amount; the Government committed to contribute 11.9 per cent and the estimated contribution by beneficiaries is 3.6 per cent. The remaining 23.8 per cent of the total envelope was provided through co-financing by partners. A few self-standing grants were also funded, between 2005 and 2007.
- IFAD's strategy has firmly focused on the reduction of rural food insecurity and poverty since 1989, adjusting its interventions to address the areas where actions appeared to be possible during the war. The 2005 COSOP articulated the approach to intervene in the geographic areas and targeting the social groups, where support would have been more effective since the end of the war. In 2017, the Fund expanded its portfolio, to cover different geographic areas, thematic sectors, and development phases, i.e. recovery from natural disasters, improved primary production and access to markets and value chains.

[62] The International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, IITA, and WorldFish are two CGIAR centres that carry out research and provide technical assistance on tropical agriculture and fisheries and aquaculture respectively, to reduce poverty, hunger and malnutrition.

III. The lending portfolio

A. Project performance and rural poverty impact

105. This chapter analyses the performance of the IFAD-supported loan projects and related grants, which were approved by the Executive Board since the 2005 COSOP was finalized. This includes projects that had different status at the time of the CSPE: MOSAP I, closed; AFAP, on-going, but not yet passed the mid-term review; SAMAP, effective but not yet operational; ARP, approved but not yet effective.

106. In consideration of these differences, only the criterion relevance was applied to and rated for all projects; the criteria effectiveness, efficiency and gender equality were applied to MOSAP I and AFAP, although the latter was not rated for these criteria; and the ad-hoc criterion 'coherence with lessons learned' was only applied to SAMAP and ARP.

Relevance

107. The relevance of the portfolio was analysed in terms of:(i) relevance of objectives, i.e. alignment of project objectives with the Government's strategies and policies, IFAD's strategies, the COSOP and the needs of the poor; and (ii) relevance through project design, i.e. how project conceptual set-up enabled achieving the stated objectives.

Relevance of objectives

108. Portfolio well-aligned with government policies. The IFAD-supported portfolio in the period under evaluation was found to be well-aligned with the policies and strategies of the Government of Angola and clearly consistent with the rural development priorities of the country. All projects approved since 2005 aimed at contributing to the national development goals of food and nutrition security for all, and addressed key challenges also identified by the Government in its own analyses.

109. In 2007, MOSAP I fully addressed the third specific objective of the 2005 Revised Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy (ECP) "to reduce the risk of hunger, to meet the domestic demand for food and revitalize rural economy as a vital sector for sustainable development".[63] Through its participatory approach and effort to foster associativism, the project also adequately catered for the ECP definition of poor as its target group, which added the element of social exclusion to the economic dimension of the term. Furthermore, the FFS that were the building block for MOSAP I outreach to the poor small-scale farmers, were established in coordination with the local municipal authorities, and accounted for within the Integrated Municipal Program for Rural Development and the Fight Against Poverty.

110. The three projects approved more recently - AFAP, SAMAP and ARP - also were found to be in line with several of the specific objectives of the PND 2013-2017 for the agricultural, fisheries and environmental sectors, including: linking family farming to the markets through increased production, for both import substitution and exports, and access to rural financial services; supporting associativism; achieving self-sufficiency in the production of staple food; developing small-scale irrigation; promoting sustainable management of natural resources, including freshwater aquatic resources; support to small-scale aquaculture; and employment generation. The focus on poor small-scale producers is also increasingly recognized within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development as the way forward, as recent data confirmed that almost 90 per cent of agricultural production in Angola comes from family farming.[64]

[63] ECP, 2005 revised edition, translation by the CSPE.
[64] Strategic alignment with the mid-term development plan for the agrarian sector 2018 -2022 (Alinhamento Estratégico ao Plano de Desenvolvimento de Médio Prazo do Sector Agrario 2018 -2022 (PDMPSA).

111. Portfolio relevant to rural population needs. IFAD portfolio addressed, and has the potential to continue doing so, some of the basic needs of the rural poor, starting with the provision of services and investments to improve agricultural production for enhanced food security. The adoption of FFS as a platform for capacity development, the focus on the establishment and strengthening of farmers' groups and associations, and the integration of empowering activities such as functional literacy, all did and do contribute building blocks for improving the livelihoods of small-scale farmers in rural Angola.

112. Portfolio coherent with COSOP and IFAD strategies. The portfolio was and is coherent with the 2005 COSOP, the 2017/18 CSN and IFAD's Strategic Frameworks over the period under evaluation.[65] By slowly expanding the geographical areas of intervention, IFAD-supported projects have been progressively reaching out to the "most vulnerable groups in food and nutrition-insecure areas",[66] while addressing the different specific productive patterns of the target population, from staple-food agriculture to mixed farming and livestock system, and freshwater capture fisheries and aquaculture. The recurrent focus within the portfolio on developing producers' associations and on providing opportunities for individual and group capacity development, are instrumental in pursuing the envisaged objective of empowerment of the rural poor.

113. HIV and AIDS. The COSOP had also recognized the serious health problems affecting the rural population. Among these, in consideration of the threat that the HIV and AIDS epidemics represented in Southern African countries for its potential disruptive impacts on the productive population and on rural poverty, the Paper foresaw both grant support for initiatives addressing HIV and AIDS and livelihoods, and the integration of HIV and AIDS-related measures in new projects. The Paper referred to an infection rate of 2.8 per cent in 2004, expected to grow. Fortunately, as of 2016, the country-wide prevalence rate for the adult population was estimated at 1.9 per cent, though higher for women (2.2 per cent) than for men (1.5 per cent).[67] In practice, all the IFAD-supported projects explicitly integrated this concern, typically by including awareness-raising on HIV and AIDS in the curriculum of the FFSs, in the case of MOSAP I, SAMAP and ARP, and by including the topic in the community development programme in the case of AFAP.

Relevance through design

114. The relevance of a project also depends on the quality of its design and on the analysis of the context. All IFAD-supported loans included a sound context analysis, which however did not always duly inform project design.

115. MOSAP I design firmly focused on the rural poor, and on supporting smallholder agriculture, as a result of IFAD CPMT's contribution to project design. This ensured high relevance to both the ECP and rural people' needs. On the other hand, the CSPE noted elements of design that slightly affected relevance, in terms of responding to participants' needs. One was the limited attention in the design to the key bottlenecks in the availability of inputs, namely seeds and fertilizers, which was a major challenge in improving agricultural productivity. The second were the lack of plans for supporting services around the introduction of Grinding mills and Animal traction, e.g. maintenance services for the mills and supply of veterinary care advice for the oxen.

116. AFAP was the first initiative ever to be implemented in Angola in support of freshwater artisanal fisheries and small-scale aquaculture development. Its aim was the development, by engaging with poor rural households, of a sub-sector with a good potential to contribute to diversifying the economy, enhancing

[65] The projects approved since 2005 span over three of IFAD's Strategic Frameworks, namely 2007-2010, 2010-2105, 2016-2025.
[66] Country Strategy Note, April 2017.
[67] UN AIDS, Angola 2016 country fact-sheet, UNAIDS.

food and nutrition security, reducing poverty and sustainably managing natural resources. In sum, a highly innovative endeavour in Angola, that required from the start, careful and sustained supervision and support to succeed.

117. The context and complexity of the issues at stake were well captured in the project design report (PDR) and some of the risks had been analysed and described with general safeguards and mitigation. The project was designed as a full-scale development intervention, based on a number of assumptions. Technical assistance for the aquaculture component should have been provided through FAO, considering the limited national capacity in these sectors; and several key studies about the different segments in the entire value-chain, were planned to be carried out during the initial implementation steps. This decision did not take into account the likely implementation delays this planned sequence of steps could generate while raising management costs (see Efficiency). In addition, the PDR showed several shortcomings on budget estimates, forecasts for exchange rates, and availability of inputs on the national market. This despite one-year delay to revise the initial budget, before achieving approval. Finally, the project was approved in April 2015 on the explicit assumption that an EU grant of Euro 10 million would be available as 'parallel grant financing'.

118. The novelty of the approach should have suggested a phased approach, starting with a pilot for both freshwater capture fisheries and aquaculture, in a small area, with all the inputs and support required to obtain key information for later upscaling, while minimizing risks for participants. This would have led to a reasonable degree of knowledge and understanding of the real challenges and risks - technical, economic, financial and social –attached to the development of the entire sub-sector at a small-scale, before expanding the initiative as a fully-fledged development intervention.[68] [69]

119. SAMAP design closely followed the design of the WB MOSAP II, approved in 2016 and operational since April 2017. SAMAP was planned to operate in two new provinces, Cuanza Sul and Huila, building on MOSAP I experience, by using the FFS as the core methodological approach, and providing support to farmers' organizations to access the markets, and transforming and processing products as feasible and viable. In addition, and fully in line with the Government' policies, SAMAP is also expected to provide rural finance services to participants, thus meeting what is emerging as a strong request from small-scale producers who want to access the markets. The project is highly complex and will require significant managerial capacity to achieve all that is expected.

120. ARP was initially conceived as a recovery and resilience intervention in the drought- and flood-affected southern provinces of the country. Eventually, an IFAD's decision led to focusing on recovery only, although the final PDR still maintain a reasonable degree of attention to strengthening resilience. This would be of great importance, considering the vulnerability of the areas and populations where it will operate.

121. Both SAMAP and ARP design reports included detailed Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures Review Notes (SECAP) and should mainstream across all capacity development efforts, attention to sustainable natural resources management, environmental issues and adaptation to climate change. ARP design also pays strong attention to the promotion of agroecology. Finally, FAO is expected to implement the respective FFS components; the MOSAP I experience with FAO in

[68] Although up-scaling an intervention based only on a pilot experience is also a complex endeavour, the CSPE considers that this option would have exposed small scale producers – and IFAD - to fewer risks, as discussed later in the report.

[69] IFAD recently adopted a step-by-step approach for the implementation of a loan approved in 2015 in support of the Projet de développement de la pêche et de l'aquaculture continentales (PD-PAC) in the Republic of Congo. The initiative in Congo has goals and objectives similar to AFAP, and also represents an innovative intervention in the country.

this regard was very successful and should be a guarantee of the rigour in the capacity development approach and follow-up at all levels.

122. Limited attention to coordination with other actors to address social development issues. Finally, the CSPE canvassed views from participants, which showed the acute lack of social infrastructures and services, only marginally addressed by the past and on-going projects. IFAD correctly did not allocate its limited resources to this type of activity and concentrated on 'softer' areas of work where its comparative advantage and added value were stronger. Nevertheless, projects missed planning for more collaboration and coordination with other partners at all levels, including municipalities and communities, which would have been useful to address those basic needs that if unmet, may jeopardize other positive achievements.

123. Relevance assessment - summary. Overall, IFAD's strategies and objectives were well aligned with the Government's by targeting crucial issues in the most vulnerable areas in the central highlands. IFAD's portfolio was also highly relevant to the needs of the rural poor farming families and in line with the Fund's strategies. The recent expansion of the portfolio to other provinces through SAMAP and ARP, the inclusion in these projects of resources to address access to markets, rural finance, recovery from droughts and solid provisions for sustainable environmental management and climate change adaptation, contribute to strengthen the relevance of the portfolio to the national context and needs. Designs however were less than optimal for AFAP and for some components of MOSAP I. In consideration of the above, the CSPE assesses the relevance of the portfolio as satisfactory (5).

Effectiveness

124. The assessment of the portfolio effectiveness focuses on the extent to which expected results (outcomes) were achieved or are likely to be achieved by the end of the projects. In addition to an overview of targeting and outreach, this section also reports on some of the outputs produced by AFAP, and results achieved by MOSAP I.

125. All IFAD loans approved since 2005 were consistent with the 2005 COSOP targeting approach and with the available information and analysis. Starting with MOSAP I, and in the subsequent projects, the IFAD CPMT played a key role in ensuring that the portfolio targeted the most vulnerable and food-insecure, who were identified in the poor farming families and in the households who engage, exclusively or partly, in freshwater fishing, and who had no or limited access to extension services, investments and capacity development opportunities. Among these, rural farming women and rural youth were mentioned in all design reports as groups deserving specific attention. Similarly, all loans approved since 2010 have included extensive attention to youth, as one of the key target groups to be reached out. The legitimate concern of the 2005 COSOP with demobilized soldiers was also appropriately taken into account in the MOSAP I PDR; though not in later interventions as over time, this group had settled back among the rest of the population.

126. With regards to actual outreach, MOSAP I final report indicated that a total of 54,982 small-scale farmers, who represented 110 per cent of the revised target,[70] were trained during implementation; further, 43 per cent of participants in project activities were women, who at the same time represented 56 per cent of FFS members.[71][72] No baseline or monitoring data exist on the poverty level of

[70] MOSAP I PDR established a target of 126,000 farmers; this was reduced to 50,000 when the project was downsized by US$ 10 million.
[71] How projects addressed gender equality and women's empowerment, is analysed in detail in a dedicated section of this report.
[72] MOSAP I Implementation Completion Report.

participants, nor on their age-group; nevertheless, the CSPE direct observations, albeit limited, confirmed that the targeting focus on poor farming families had been reasonably successful, but much less so with regards to young male farmers. There is no doubt that FFS leaders and some of the members were among the better-off in their communities; and some associations engaged in FFS were reported to own assets, such as cattle. Still: MOSAP I operated also in isolated communities, and those closer to the main roads, comprised the most marginal neighbourhoods; FFS members tended to be vulnerable to climate vagaries because largely dependent on rain-fed crop, and to have limited access to inputs and markets, due to isolation; and deep poverty was visible.

127. Risk of elite capture. Conversely, and with the strong caveat that the evaluation was carried out in the early days of AFAP's work at community level, in the visited communities the CSPE team noted a risk of elite capturing of project's support and results for both cage- and pond aquaculture. Differently from MOSAP I, wherein technical advisory services were public goods and investments for the sub-projects were typically granted only to relatively solid groups; both the aquaculture cages and ponds could easily be appropriated by more powerful members in the community[73] or even from outside. Several aquaculture ponds opened in a plot through the heavy work of poor small-scale farmers, are a very attractive asset; in the absence of land titles stating the association's ownership of the plot, the risk of its occupation by third parties is a concrete risk in rural Angola. And cages can be handled and managed separately, thus facilitating the drift towards individual control and appropriation, even if an association had been the intended beneficiary. These potential risks stemming from less than careful targeting, should be seriously assessed and managed throughout implementation.

128. Results of MOSAP I. The project had several indicators for results, each with a quantitative target, though not all with a baseline data. These were:[74]

(a) Number of smallholder farmers who benefitted from training. These were in total 54,982; 41 per cent had access to training through FFS; 23 per cent, though sub-projects; and the remaining 36 per cent, through general training and extension support;[75]

(b) Participating smallholder farmers in the project areas who belong to farm organizations. At completion, all farming families in the areas of intervention were members of a farmers' organization; the control group figure reported by the impact evaluation survey (IES), was 35 per cent in 2015.[76]

(c) Number of smallholder farmers in associations that benefit from grants and completed their activities under the project's agricultural investment component. The number of participants in sub-projects was 12,344;

(d) Ratio of smallholder farmers' organizations to an extension officer. At completion, this was 12 associations/officer; the ratio was still high, despite IDA's efforts to increase by 50 per cent, the number of extension officers assigned to the district level Agricultural Development Offices (EDAs) in the areas of intervention;

(e) Rate of adoption of farming practices by participating smallholder farmers. Crops concerned were maize, cassava, beans and Irish potato and increases were to be achieved through a number of improved farming practices (IFPs). These included for maize, bean and Irish potato: the selection of seed; the

[73] In one of the visited associations, the leadership was firmly in the hand of one single extended family; and in a second group, the leadership was challenged by members in front of the CSPE team.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Reports by MOSAP I state that there was no double-counting of participants, although in the communities, clearly some FFS members were also participating in the sub-projects.
[76] The result was reported as 200 per cent of achievement, as the target had been established at 50 per cent of the farming families.

number of seeds and the spacing of plants. For cassava, additional practices were the size of cuttings, the number of nodes, and the humidity check. Figure 2 shows the rates of adoption of each practice, in each crop.[77]

Figure 2
Rates of adoption of improved farming practices in MOSAP I by crop (percentage)



Source: IES, re-arranged by the CSPE team.

129. Lack of analysis of reasons behind uneven adoption rates. The graphs show how the adoption of the improved practices differed at the level of individual farmers, also as a factor of crop and province. Seed selection was the most adopted technique, which bode well for its long-lasting universal adoption in these provinces. The IES concluded that factors influencing the rates of adoption included the quality of the leadership of the farmers' organizations; the previous knowledge of a practice; the participation in a FFS; the importance of a given crop for the farmer. Nevertheless, the project did not carry out any in-depth analysis of the reasons behind the lack of adoption of certain practices, as discussed later in the report more in detail.

130. All indicators were assessed as having achieved or exceeded the revised respective targets. Arguably, the targets had been set at a cautious level.[78] Nevertheless, MOSAP I met plans, mostly through the establishment of FFSs and the funding of sub-projects: participants learned useful IFPs and through these, the yields of three widely cultivated staple-food crops increased; producers' organizations increased in numbers and membership; and agricultural extension services and inputs for productive activities were provided to participants, albeit farmers complained that inputs had been made available only for the sub-projects.[79]

[77] See IES for detailed methodology for data gathering and analysis.
[78] IES, 2015.
[79] This had been the commitment of the project; as mentioned earlier, it was a failure of design.

131. At completion, MOSAP I had established 726 FFS though only a minority had achieved graduation, i.e. completed the third cycle of training, due to the late introduction of the approach in the project's life. The end of project impact evaluation survey (IES) showed that the FFS methodology was instrumental in establishing groups and associations on a participatory basis.

132. The CSPE agreed with most stakeholders, that the capacity development efforts on the FFS methodology within IDA at the different institutional levels had been crucial to achieving results. An additional factor for success, in the view of the CSPE, was the close compliance of the applied model with the original FFS concept.[80] This in turn led to the adoption of the methodology as the national extension system, a major unexpected result of the intervention.

133. In addition, the project financed 257 investment sub-projects, to support: Animal traction (118 or 46 per cent), which entailed distribution of ploughing oxen; mechanization and seeds (109, or 42 per cent), which entailed financial assistance for mechanized land preparation and seed supply; and grinding mills (30, or 12 per cent) for cassava and maize. Of these, at completion, 51 per cent were operating normally, 37 per cent with some deficiencies, 9 per cent were still under execution and 2 per cent were non-operational or abandoned; no information was available about which sub-projects were facing problems. The IES indicated that animal traction and grinding mills sub-projects suffered from poor design, including under-estimation of technical and organizational challenges, and lack of adequate support and follow-up; for example, no veterinary assistance was provided to farmers who received oxen.

134. Finally, capacity development and training in MOSAP I was broader than IFPs. Among small-scale farmers: approximately 2,252 benefitted from literacy courses, women mostly, and agribusiness; 1,497 farmers graduated as FFS facilitators and 96 as community leaders. At IDA level, 210 Government technicians attended trainings in community leadership, agronomy and extension methods. MOSAP I also provided means of transport for extension officers and contributed to building EDA offices and residences for EDA staff.

135. AFAP's overambitious project design. The project had been operational for less than 18 months by the time of the CSPE and had been classified as 'problem project' for approximately four months by then, largely due to the limited progress on field activities. Delays and problems partly originated in the design, and partly in the limited human capital available to manage a complex initiative like this.

136. In the view of the CSPE, the main challenge is the discrepancy between project ambitions, i.e. launching very innovative artisanal freshwater fisheries and aquaculture production models on a large scale, with only very limited knowledge of the technical, environmental, economic and financial challenges; and the limited implementation capacity in the country, which had been acknowledged in the PDR and was confirmed by the delays in recruiting the PCU technical experts.

137. A telling example was the disconnect between the available information on the profitability of aquaculture and on-going work at the community level. The market analysis was one of the pillars for the entire project endeavour, as it should identify current and future demand for inland water fish (mainly tilapia) at local and national level; and assess the economic and financial sustainability of the envisaged value chain for both capture and aquaculture products. As of November 2017, the procurement of the Service Provider for the market analysis had to be launched yet and the report might possibly be available towards the end of the second year of implementation, and third year since effectiveness.

[80] The concept of FFS was first developed by FAO in Indonesia in 1989, to promote Integrated Pest Management in rice fields; Wikipedia, accessed on 12 December 2017.

138. Notwithstanding the lack of reliable information on the real market potential for aquaculture, the pressure to deliver led to the decision to establish ten groups of small-scale aquaculture growers by the end of 2017. To do so, the PCU was entering informal agreements with the selected communities, for them to open seven or more aquaculture ponds each, in return for fingerlings and feed for one productive cycle; and technical support from the project for a longer time-span. Opening aquaculture ponds by hoe and spade, as was happening on the sites visited by the CSPE team, is a highly demanding job; hundreds of person/hours are necessary to dig seven or more ponds, create the banks, develop water diversions from nearby rivers, etc. AFAP was not providing any support, in kind or cash, due to its procurement difficulties; reportedly, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea was going to step in with some financial resources to fill the gap. Furthermore, in at least two cases, the groups that had engaged in opening the ponds, only had customary access to the land thus occupied. As already mentioned, in the current legal framework for land tenure in the country, this is known not to be sufficient to protect the poor from potential take-over of the land by others.

139. At the same time, although the project was in the process of identifying a national source of fingerlings, it had not made any progress yet to find a national or an international source of feed for the first cycle of production of tilapia in the newly opened ponds, which were expected to enter in production in two to three months' time.

140. Investment risk for producers and credibility risk for IFAD. The situation described above indicate that AFAP was mobilizing poor producers to dedicate their time and energy to engage in an activity for which there was not yet sufficient guarantee of technical and economic success and which should have been conducted only in the framework of a pilot test, with all the necessary guarantees for the communities and no request for unpaid work. The situation witnessed by the CSPE in Malanje, indicated a limited understanding of the risks entailed in the initiative, and represented a potential loss of credibility for IFAD in the province.

141. Limited management and technical experience on various fronts. Although blame for low delivery was mostly attributed to procurement and staff recruitment difficulties,[81] the CSPE noted weaknesses in the PCU capacity at various levels, including technical competence on issues such as community dynamics; fisheries management; and project management. Planning was also noted as being short of expectations, as for example there was lack of consistency between the PDR, the approved annual work plan and budget (AWPB) 2016-2017 and the activities that were reported by the PCU as on-going in November 2017. The latter included activities that had not been foreseen and were under implementation; while planned activities had not started yet; this despite the market study was of the highest importance for the entire progress of the project. Another important limitation was the quality and periodicity of project reports to IFAD, which mostly provided incomplete and unclear information, that did not allow for an assessment of what had been achieved, what was incipient and what had not started yet.

142. The PDR had hinted at two potential sources of technical assistance and capacity development in freshwater fisheries and aquaculture, and investment as well, that would have strengthened AFAP. First, FAO was supposed to implement the aquaculture component, but this did not materialize due to lack of agreement between the parties on the scope and type of expected services. Second, the EU grant foreseen in the PDR did not, and will not materialize, according to the information canvassed by the CSPE in November 2017. A third option that had emerged was the AfDB-supported Fisheries Sector Support (FSS) project, which focuses on marine fisheries. Although AFAP had a good level of exchange and

[81] The AFAP supervision mission in November 2017 greatly contributed, as mentioned later in the report, to solve the procurement issues.

informal collaboration with the FSS management team, the technical context and challenges at stake differed to a significant extent, and no closer partnership could be envisaged at a more substantive level.

143. At the time of the CSPE, another potential opportunity for technical assistance to AFAP was the regional IFAD grant to IITA and WorldFish, with title 'Aquaculture Assessment and Value Chain Pilots for Improving Fish Supply'. The grant had not started disbursing yet. However, due to some internal IFAD's bottleneck, none of the key stakeholders had any information about its approval and time-schedule for implementation. This situation risks leading to a missed opportunity, unless the gap in information is rapidly amended.

144. Steps had also been taken under the umbrella of the South-South and Triangular Cooperation with other lusophone countries: (i) with Brazil, contacts were only at a very incipient stage; (ii) with Mozambique, in July 2017 an IDPAA and AFAP delegation visited some of the PROAQUA and ProPesca activities in the country. Overall, the visit was considered useful, but did not lead to any plan of further exchange or collaboration.

145. Finally, the governance and supervision arrangements of the project also appeared to be weak. The Steering Committee had not yet engaged as the real decision-maker and oversight body of the intervention, and there was neither formal nor informal engagement at the central level, of all the national ministries that should support the community development initiatives complementary to investments in the fisheries and aquaculture domain. Both elements risked jeopardizing the effectiveness of the entire initiative.

146. Some progress on capacity development. A positive achievement was that the PCU had conducted some training sessions for IDPAA staff at central and provincial level, for community members and for fishers' groups, which had been appreciated by participants; also, the NGO responsible for the community development had been contracted and was carrying out the community baseline studies.[82] These activities provided the opportunity for the project to start engaging with stakeholders at the different levels and identifying the most active and motivated groups and communities. For the community development component to succeed, however, the effective collaboration of a range of national ministries and organizations will be necessary; these had not been included by design in the Project Steering Committee, and no structured plan existed yet for their involvement.

147. Overall, the project seemed to operate without a clear pathway. The Steering Committee did not appear to be engaged in fulfilling its role. The CPMT had provided over time support on management, fiduciary and technical issues, as confirmed by some staff in the AFAP PCU. However, stronger supporting measures were warranted early on, considering the risks identified in this respect in the PDR; and the difficulties in recruiting competent staff for the PCU. For example, three supervision missions were carried out to AFAP between June 2016 and May 2017, but only in November 2017, the IFAD fisheries and aquaculture expert who had nevertheless been in correspondence with AFAP PCU on several issues, was part of the team.

148. Effectiveness - summary. MOSAP I suffered from a slow start and management problems in its early years. Its revised targets were all over-achieved, although it was argued that these had been set at a cautious level. Results were visible and tangible in the communities and at the institutional level, even though only a low number of FFS achieved graduation and the outreach of important activities such as functional literacy was insufficient. With regards to AFAP, delays in start-up and

[82] The contract was awarded to the NGO Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo-Angola, which has a solid reputation and experience in capacity and community development initiatives, also with riverine communities.

weaknesses in project management, have led to less than satisfactory results so far. Based on these considerations, the CSPE decided to rate Effectiveness of the portfolio as moderately satisfactory (4).

Efficiency

149. The Efficiency criterion provides a measure of how economically resources (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results. Some of the parameters and proxy indicators discussed in this section are: (i) lapses between key milestones; (ii) disbursement performance; (iii) project implementation and management; (iv) management costs; and (v) cost per beneficiary. Loans assessed against all or some of these parameters were: MOSAP, already completed; AFAP, on-going at the time of the CSPE; and SAMAP, effective as of August 2017.

150. The Angola portfolio experienced mixed scenarios in terms of time-lapses between approval and first disbursement. Table 8 shows the time-lags between the milestones in the initial phases of MOSAP I, AFAP and SAMAP.[83] Reasons for delays mainly originated at the national level.

Table 8
Timeline between approval to first disbursement (months)

	IFAD EB approval to national signature	*National signature to effectiveness*	*IFAD EB approval to effectiveness*	*Effectiveness to first disbursement*	*IFAD EB approval to first disbursement*
MOSAP I	4.2	18.9	23.1	3.2	26.3
AFAP	4.6	coincidental	4.6	10.8	15.4
SAMAP	4.0	coincidental	4.0	n/a	n/a
ESA average*	3.9	3.0	6.9	6.2	13.1

Source: Business Intelligence/IFAD investment portfolio.
*The average was calculated based on ESA projects in the same evaluation period.

151. The MOSAP loan, once approved by IFAD Executive Board, was signed by the Government of Angola within a reasonable time. Afterward, it took approximately 19 months for the loan to become effective; main reasons for delay were specific country requirements, including a lengthy process to obtain Cabinet's approval of the loan agreement and the latter's publication in the Government's official bulletin. Another cause for delays was the negotiation process about the lending terms between the WB, the leading co-financer of the project, and the Government. In addition, legislative elections, held in September 2008 for the first time since 1992, also affected the availability of key Government counterparts during the final steps of the process.

152. In the cases of AFAP and SAMAP, the time-span between the EB's approval of the loan and effectiveness was significantly shortened, well below the regional average for the ESA region during the same time-span. This, thanks to the lessons learned from the previous experiences and the existence of a more stable government in place. However, AFAP suffered of almost 11 months delay between effectiveness and first disbursement, due to two main reasons: the general conditions for withdrawals, as stated in the AFAP Financing Agreement, had not been met; and key staff for the project coordination unit could not be identified and recruited in shorter time.

153. With regards to SAMAP, by the time of writing this report (December 2017), the authorization for the first disbursement had just been granted. The major obstacle in this case was the absence of sufficiently competent professionals for the position of finance officer, available for recruitment in the country.

[83] Since the IFAD's Executive Board's decision at the corporate level in May 2010, the date of the signature of the loan agreement coincides with the 'entry-into-force' or 'effectiveness' date.

154. Disbursements have been systematically lower than average. MOSAP I disbursed 87 per cent (US$7.1 million) of the IFAD loan. Implementation and delivery under the Agricultural investment support component were affected by delays in meeting disbursement conditions, including the establishment of baseline values for key performance indicators and finalizing the data collection needed to guide sub-project investments. One year before closure, the project had only spent 62 per cent of IFAD funds. During the last year of implementation, the project implementation unit (PIU) managed to disburse 17 per cent of IFAD total funds, thanks to an intensive effort to establish and support the FFS.

155. Figure 3 below shows the actual disbursement rates of MOSAP I and AFAP, compared against the average disbursement rates of IFAD projects in the same sectors. In the case of MOSAP I, the rate was less steady and at a systematically lower level than planned. In the case of AFAP, the graph shows that delivery has been so far at a lower level than planned. Despite the low rate, the overall quality of AFAP withdrawal applications improved over time, which allowed the project to reach a delivery of almost 20 per cent of the total IFAD funds at the end of November 2017; this is discussed in more detail later in the section.

Figure 3
Disbursement rates of IFAD loans per project



Source: Business Intelligence/IFAD investment portfolio; IFAD Guidance Note for Supervision Aide-Memoire.

156. Limited human capital in Angola has affected project implementation. One of the main constraints regarding the implementation of IFAD-supported loans in Angola has been the limited human capital in the country to efficiently and effectively manage development initiatives. Both MOSAP I and AFAP struggled to recruit qualified management, administrative and technical staff, who would also have experience in donor-funded projects. Reportedly, in some cases the selection processes were limited to very narrow pools of Government officers, who already cumulated various roles and responsibilities.

157. As a case in point, delays in MOSAP I delivery during the first two years of implementation, were a result of weak leadership of the project. A third project coordinator was eventually recruited, and significant results were achieved by completion date; still, both loans from the WB and IFAD had to be extended for about 18 months and the entire marketing component was deleted.

158. AFAP, in turn, was the first loan to be fully managed by IFAD in the country in many years, as PESNORTE had come to a close eight years earlier. This added to the complexities of recruiting someone who had knowledge of the Fund's

management and administrative procedures. Furthermore, the selection process of all staff in the PCU was rather lengthy, also due to the limited national capacity in freshwater fisheries and aquaculture. The PCU was eventually fully staffed only by September 2017, two years after 'entry-into-force'. Finally, the PCU was struggling with the procurement of international consultancy services and goods and was not making progress with activities that did not require procurement.

159. Project management costs higher than planned. The project management cost (PMC) of MOSAP I was higher than expected. At design, PMC was estimated at 18.8 per cent of the total cost; at completion, it had absorbed 35.1 per cent of the total financial resources spent. This was mainly due to the higher costs of service providers than planned; and the time-extension that demanded more funds for project coordination and management.

160. With regards to AFAP, the PDR allocated 16 per cent of the total project cost to PMC. However, the November 2017 Supervision mission found that 64 per cent of the total funds disbursed until then, had been spent on the project management component; this while field-level delivery had seriously lagged behind, as discussed earlier. The situation was acknowledged by the CPMT, which was discussing possible mitigating measures in December 2017.

161. Cost per beneficiary higher than planned. At design, MOSAP I estimated a cost per beneficiary of US$392. At completion, after the project's revision of targets and budget, the initiative had a cost per beneficiary of US$627, i.e. 60 per cent higher than estimated. This was a direct consequence of the time extension by 1.8 years and the significant reduction in the planned number of beneficiaries, from 126,000 to 50,000. The same analysis could not be done for AFAP at the time of the CSPE, given the early days in its implementation.

162. Macro-economic factors. The devaluation of the Angolan Kwanza against the international currencies had and will have a negative impact on the costs of both MOSAP I and AFAP.[84] In the case of AFAP, the fluctuating inflation rate of the national currency since 2014, may also affect the overall purchasing power of the project budget.[85] Furthermore, the high prices of goods and services on the national markets were forcing AFAP to meet more of its procurement needs on the international market, at a higher cost than initially estimated.

163. In summary, despite some improvements over time in some of the key implementation milestones, the IFAD portfolio suffered from delays above the regional average, in achieving first disbursement and during the first year/s of implementation. MOSAP I eventually managed to achieve significant results by its completion, also thanks to an extension of almost two years. At the time of the CSPE, it was too early to assess whether AFAP will be able to recover the delays and an extension might become necessary. Key issues that did affect the efficiency of the entire portfolio, and still risk doing so in future, were the limited human capital in the country to manage the projects, the devaluation of the national currency, and over-expenditure for project management costs also due to implementation delays. Consequently, efficiency is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3).

[84] The kwanza depreciated approximately 45 per cent in relation to the US dollars since 2008; from AOA 74 in January 2008 to AOA 166 on 26 December 2017; source: http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=AOA&view=10Y. accessed on 6 January 2018. In addition, n early January 2018, Reuters, Bloomberg and the CNBC reported that the AOA might no longer be pegged on to the US$. This will likely lead to further devaluation of the national currency.
[85] From a relatively stable rate between 12 and 15 per cent from 2008 to early 2016, the inflation rate reached 40 per cent at the end of 2016 and decreased to 26 per cent in 2017. Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/angola/inflation-cpi, accessed on 6 January 2018.

Rural poverty impact

164. This section analyses the impacts resulting from MOSAP I across four rural poverty impact domains,[86] based on three sources of evidence: the interviews with representatives of FFS and farmers' associations held by the CSPE during its work; the IES carried out in 2015 by a service provider contracted by the project itself; and the IOE project completion report validation.

165. A limitation in the analysis of this criterion was that MOSAP I did not collect any data on household incomes, assets and food security, at baseline or during monitoring. This entails that both the IOE project completion report validation and this report had to base their analysis and conclusions on limited and anecdotal evidence.

166. Anecdotal information suggests an increase in household incomes and assets. Anecdotal information provided by FFS members to the CSPE indicated that in most groups, with a few exceptions for Huambo Province, part of the additional production obtained through the new cropping techniques and the mechanization sub-projects, was sold in the local markets and allowed broadening households' assets.

167. Figures mentioned of the share of the additional marketed production varied between a third and a half, though these should be taken only as indicative. In some groups, FFS members reported having used the additional income to improve their houses, including purchase of cooking gas stoves; and typically for health purposes and school for children.

168. The main source for the increased incomes were the collective fields that groups could afford cultivating through the mechanization sub-projects. The physical effort required for opening up new fields is a major challenge if done manually, also considering availability of household labour and competition for it at moments of peak requirements in the individual fields. The support provided by MOSAP I by renting mechanization services solved this major bottleneck and allowed the groups to manage the collective fields along with the individual plots throughout the cropping season. Typically, group members stated that the net income from the sale of the produce was partly shared among members, and partly re-invested in the collective field for the following cropping season. Some groups had already invested in collective fields for seed multiplication, which should sell at better prices than production for food consumption.

169. Significant human and social capital and empowerment. MOSAP I final reports on membership of farmers' associations, strongly suggested that the decision to operate exclusively through already existing and newly established associations and FFS groups, led to the perception among small-scale farmers that there were advantages in joining a group/association. This could however simply be an opportunistic strategy to get access to goods and services, as had happened in earlier projects.

170. Anecdotal evidence from the CSPE interviews, supported by information on sustainability of associations and FFS groups, indicated nevertheless a good degree of commitment to the associations, as membership offered an opportunity to learn technical issues, discuss community issues and develop social capital. Being a member of a respected group in the community was by itself, a first step towards empowerment, particularly for women members. Some farmers were trained to become Master trainers, or Master facilitators; both are key roles in the FFS extension approach that open up opportunities for employment, in addition to strengthening the incumbents' profiles in the respective communities. Furthermore, in those FFS that benefitted of functional literacy courses, all participants went

[86] At IFAD, impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor, whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended.

through a significant individual empowerment process that also led to stronger ties among members.[87]

171. Major factors influencing membership of small-scale farmers were the usefulness, feasibility and acceptability from the technical, economic and social perspective, of the IFPs and other trainings. The relatively low presence of young farming men among FFS members appeared to reflect both the exodus of male youth towards urban centres in search of easier forms of making a living, as well as the perception that agriculture, and learning about it, was not a profitable use of their time. These are issues that individual interventions cannot solve on their own; nevertheless, a project could test different approaches and offer different services and opportunities, creating incentives for young people to engage with. So far, however, the concern with youth in the implementation of the IFAD-supported projects in Angola was somewhat side-lined.

172. Enhanced food security and agricultural productivity. MOSAP I final reports state that the level of productivity captured in the baseline survey indicated that before the project many participants were producing mostly at subsistence levels. According to the IES, yield improvements were sufficient for maize, for example, "to allow a household of five, to cross the threshold for subsistence production". The IES data also showed that yields increased among both participants and non-participants, though the increase for the latter group was very low.

173. The Crop Production Index showed a progressive increase in the production of the four targeted crops. This was MOSAP I impact indicator and provided an aggregated measure of the increase in crop production in real terms. The Index was measured over three years, with 2011/12 production used as the base year.[88] At completion in 2015, the overall CPI was calculated at 166, or 66 per cent increase over the baseline value. The difference with the comparison group was found to be significant, largely due to availability of inputs and of technical assistance. Figure 4 from the IES, shows the evolution of the index over time.

Figure 4
MOSAP I Impact Indicator 'Overall increase of crop production'



Source: MOSAP End of Project Impact Evaluation Survey Report, 2015.

[87] IES, 2015.
[88] The denominator value of the index.

174. The CSPE heard from virtually all the FFS members met, that agricultural productivity and production had increased, through the adoption of at least some of the improved techniques and the participation in the mechanization and seeds sub-projects. Improvements in production however were far from being uniform across all areas of intervention; with FFS in some districts struggling to achieve improved yields due to drought and to the gradual deterioration of soils and seeds. Increased production was used both for household consumption, thus directly and positively impacting the level of food security, and for the market, as already discussed.

175. The CSPE however noted that the focus of MOSAP I on four crops only led to disregarding locally important cash-crops, e.g. pineapple in some localities, which could also benefit from a FFS approach for yield improvements.

176. Positive impacts on institutions and policies through the successful experience of MOSAP I with the FFS. This was reported as the main factor leading to the adoption of the approach as the national agricultural extension method. The FFS had been applied by FAO in Angola through the Special Programme for Food Security in the early 2000s, and possibly by other organizations as well. However, it was only with MOSAP I that the methodology was scaled up to a level that tangibly showed its robustness in developing farmers' capacities for increased food security and agricultural production, and in supporting the establishment and strengthening of small-scale producers' associations. These being all key objectives of the Government of Angola, the IDA's decision to adopt FFS nationwide appeared very relevant and coherent. Furthermore, the rigour in the application of the FFS approach through MOSAP I has been noteworthy and deserves praise.[89]

177. With the FFS approach, MOSAP I also aimed at improving the quality of the support and technical assistance that farmers would receive from the relevant Government organizations. The spear-head of the system were to be the Agricultural Development Offices at the municipal level (district) (IDA/EDAs), which would see an increase in the front level staff, i.e. extension supervisors and officers who would interact directly with farmers. A total of 88 government extension officers attended trainings on improved production techniques, FFS methodology, management, etc. In turn, the extension officers working with FFS groups, supported farmers in developing their own knowledge and capacity. In the process, the FFS approach enabled the establishment of a solid relationship between the extension system and farmers' groups and extension officers stated that their role had gradually changed from teaching to facilitation.

178. Rural poverty impact – summary. Anecdotal information indicates that members of FFS benefitted of an increase in their households' income and assets, mainly through the increase in crop productivity and production and the mechanization and seeds sub-projects. Indeed, MOSAP I over performed the productivity targets set for the four selected crops. However, the absence of baseline data on incomes, assets and food security induces caution in drawing conclusions on impacts on rural poverty. Membership in farmers' associations and in FFS groups grew exponentially during implementation, and participants developed their skills and capacities on several themes. At the same time, the FFS approach in MOSAP I lacked in its outreach capacity to include young people in the farmers' associations and to empower women within the associations. Finally, the capacity development efforts through the FFS approach of extension staff also contributed to improve the capacity of EDAs in delivering better extension services. Based on the mixed evidence found, and on the absence of robust data with regards to some impact domains, the CSPE rated rural poverty impact as moderately satisfactory (4).

[89] For example, the adoption of the three cycles approach to graduation of FFS, as envisaged in the original design of FFS, is undoubtedly costly but is also a basic feature of the methodology, to achieve sustainable benefits.

Sustainability of benefits

179. Sustainability relates to the likelihood that the stream of benefits generated by the project would continue after closure. The CSPE analysed the following critical aspects of sustainability: (i) institutional; (ii) economic and technical; and (iii) social.

180. Capacity development efforts on the FFS methodology as one of the major factors of sustainability of results at both community and institutional levels. Staff in IDA benefitted of in-depth trainings in FFS, and this led to sustainable results at the different levels. The adoption of the methodology as the national agricultural extension approach also bodes well for the future of FFS in Angola. What remains to be seen, is the capacity and commitment of IDA to secure sufficient financial resources for sustained implementation of the approach, even in the absence of financial support from partners.

181. Policies supporting small scale farmers are required for sustained improvements in production. The long-term economical sustainability of achievements in productivity and production will largely rely on the opportunities that farmers will have to access markets for their production, raw or transformed; engage in value chains; and whether this will generate sufficient profits to justify the additional efforts required to produce a surplus. In this, national policies contributing to make agriculture an attractive sector of employment would be a must, addressing issues that go from the availability of inputs, infrastructures and services in rural areas, to the actual urban-rural terms of trade, through security of tenure and the national discourse on agriculture and family farming. As of 2017, the country's weak supply chains and distortions at the retail level, still favoured food imports, discouraging production by small-scale farmers for the market. In such an environment, yield and production increases may not always result in improved incomes for small scale producers.

182. The CSPE also canvassed views of farmers and project staff with regards to the sustainability of the sub-projects. In general, participants considered that the mechanization plus seeds sub-projects were generating sufficient returns to the groups to be sustainable if the group decided to continue, but that sustainability for the other categories of sub-projects was very mixed.

183. The technical sustainability of the innovations introduced through the FFS was uneven. The IES indicated that 61.5 per cent of participants had adopted some of the proposed IFPs. The range varied from 100 per cent adoption of the seed selection procedure for all four crops, to rates around 30 per cent or less for plant spacing, in particular in the individual household plots. The IES provided various social and economic issues as a possible explanation, including prevailing land tenure patterns. Undoubtedly these could affect adoption, but there could be others, such as scarcity of labour at peak times, risk-aversion or lack of inputs. The CSPE found that the reasons for these differences have not been adequately analysed. This undermined the efforts of MOSAP I; and neglecting these aspects would be a missed opportunity, for IDA and the new projects, for learning lessons that can pave the way to better and more sustainable impacts.

184. Finally, the social sustainability of FFS appeared to be strong. Information available indicated that FFS established by MOSAP I, continued to function supported by the local extension officer, also when it came to a close in March 2016 and before MOSAP II was launched in April 2017. Reportedly, FFS were also established in provinces outside the project area, by extension officers who had been trained by MOSAP I and had been transferred since. The IES also found that the Farmer to Farmer extension mechanism was instrumental in diffusing information on IFPs within and across communities.

185. Sustainability of benefits – summary. The main factor of sustainability within MOSAP I was the rigorous and large-scale implementation of the FFS approach,

which led to the adoption of the method as the national agricultural extension methodology. Sustainability also appeared strong at the social level. More analysis will be necessary to ensure that the proposed IFPs meet the basic requirements for technical and economical sustainability, as not all of them have been adopted at the same satisfactory level, in particular in the individual fields. Finally, the positive results and impact in terms of productivity and production will not last long, in the absence of an enabling policy environment and incentives that support family farming and sustainable agricultural and rural development. Altogether, the three dimensions of sustainability for MOSAP I are assessed as moderately satisfactory (4).

B. Other performance criteria

Innovation

186. This criterion focuses on the introduction of innovative approaches for rural poverty reduction. The concept of innovation is context-specific; what is common practice in a country or region, can be highly innovative in another.

187. MOSAP I design report did not specifically refer to innovative practices but stressed that it aimed at the introduction of 'participatory processes' in support of implementation and decentralization, at the level of governmental organizations; and of 'new knowledge and skills' for farmers.

188. MOSAP I was a highly innovative project in the view of IDA, as it introduced and led to the adoption of new agricultural technologies among farmers participating in the FFS. This was possible thanks to the FFS methodology itself, which although not new in the country, had not been previously introduced at such a large scale, and with the same rigour as within MOSAP I. The FFS methodology also led to a radical change in the perception of extension officers of their own role, shifting from 'teacher' to 'facilitator'.

189. This was confirmed by the IES and through the CSPE's own observations during its interactions with FFS representatives. Small-scale farmers who joined in the FFS, could adapt and integrate their previous skills and knowledge with the positive innovations proposed by the project, and improve their production, and productivity as well to some extent, of the four targeted crops.

190. Innovation – summary. MOSAP I contributed important innovations to Angola, the FFS as a participatory agricultural extension method, and a number of IFPs that members of the FFS found beneficial and decided to adopt in the collective fields. The CSPE thus decided to rate innovation as satisfactory (5).

Scaling up

191. Scaling up refers to how project results were or will be scaled up by governmental organizations with their own resources, donors, the private sector and other agencies.

192. MOSAP I was the main vehicle for the adoption of the FFS as the national extension system. As of late 2017, the methodology had been adopted by a number of on-going initiatives by the WB (MOSAP II) and FAO. The recently approved IFAD's loans SAMAP and ARP in the southern provinces of the country will also contribute to its diffusion, together with the EU funded Strengthening Resilience and Food and Nutrition Security in Angola to be implemented in the southern provinces of the country. Furthermore, it was mentioned that an upcoming AfDB-supported large project aimed at rural development in Cabinda, shall adopt the FFS approach for the agricultural development component.

193. IDA also stated its commitment to replicate FFS across the whole country and had already made steps in this direction, by transferring extension officers trained through MOSAP I on the FFS methodology, to provinces not currently supported by projects, to expand coverage. Furthermore, IDA was posting additional extension

officers to the EDAs where all WB- and IFAD-funded interventions were going to operate.

194. It was not clear however whether the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and IDA had already allocated sufficient financial resources to ensure the rigorous implementation of FFS to the non-project areas. This is a critical issue; for FFS to be effective, like any other extension method, adequate financial and human resources are necessary. If these are not made available, results will be shorter than expectations.

195. Scaling up – summary. The FFS methodology was being scaled up by several interventions as of late 2017, thanks to decision by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and IDA to make it the official national extension system. This notwithstanding, at the time of the CSPE the capacity and commitment of IDA and MINAGRI to systematically invest its own resources for implementing the FFS approach across the entire country, were not granted yet. The CSPE thus decided to rate scaling up as moderately satisfactory (4).

Gender equality and women's empowerment

196. This section analyses the extent to which the 2005 COSOP, the Country Strategy Note, MOSAP I and AFAP incipient steps so far, all contributed to improve gender equality and women's empowerment, and to achieve the strategic objectives of IFAD Gender Policy, copied here:[90]

- Strategic objective 1: Promote economic empowerment to enable rural women and men to have equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, profitable economic activities;
- Strategic objective 2: Enable women and men to have equal voice and influence in rural institutions and organizations;
- Strategic objective 3: Achieve a more equitable balance in workloads and in the sharing of economic and social benefits between women and men.

197. The 2005 COSOP and the CSN made good reference to women as a priority group for IFAD. The 2005 COSOP also referred to the need to enhance women's access to agricultural extension and land, among other services and assets. Rural women and women-headed households were identified among the most vulnerable groups and first in line for targeting in IFAD's projects; and gender-sensitive baselines and livelihoods studies were foreseen as building blocks for all interventions to ensure adequate targeting. The COSOP Logical Framework also included the indicator 'number of groups with women leaders' and several indicators were expected to be disaggregated by gender. The CSN did not elaborate further on the issues of women's participation and gender equality, thus endorsing the COSOP's focus.

198. But neither document referred to women's empowerment among the objectives to be pursued, although references to women's access to land entail an element of empowerment as well. Most probably, no IFAD COSOP formulated in 2005 did include women's empowerment as an objective; nevertheless, the CSN missed the opportunity to address this gap and highlight the importance of gender equality in IFAD's strategic focus since 2012.

199. A strong female participation in MOSAP I. Project completion data indicated that 56 per cent of FFS members were women, and that 43 per cent of the farmers who "adopted an improved agricultural technology promoted by project" were also women. The same report suggested that the high level of female membership in FFS was triggered by both the specific efforts of community leaders to involve women-headed households, and the possibility to register in a FFS group, more than one member from the same household. Another major reason was that in the

[90] IFAD Gender equality and women's empowerment policy, 2012.

traditional gender division of labour in rural Angola, women have a strong responsibility in agricultural production and have to be involved when the objective is enhancing the competences and skills of small-scale farmers.

200. Although the PDR had quite firmly stated the need for a gender-sensitive approach to capacity development, and that gender-training and awareness raising would be part of the curriculum at institutional and community levels, the project did not develop a different approach or activities to address the specific challenges or problems faced by women farmers and members of FFS.

201. A possible reason for the shortcomings of MOSAP I in this important area of work, was the lack of a gender specialist in the PIU and PPIUs. The presence of community development specialists, all of them male, was not conducive to dedicate sufficient attention to gender equality issues, and to specific efforts towards women's empowerment. In general, the fact that the simple majority in the groups were women, was taken as good enough. In this respect, the fact that none of the assessed projects include such a professional profile in the respective PCU/PIUs, raises some doubts about the future capacity of these projects to properly address gender equality and women's empowerment.

202. Incipient steps in AFAP. The PDR stated that all indicators and data in the baselines should be gender-disaggregated and established targets of 30 per cent of women among participants. The document also analysed to some extent the role of women in freshwater fisheries, mostly in the processing and marketing phases. The foreseen activities, aimed at improving post-harvest practices and techniques also through enhanced fish landing and market infrastructures, should benefit women by enhancing the quality of the produce they directly control. Furthermore, the community development component should benefit women, for example through awareness raising on gender issues, nutrition education, and functional literacy. In this respect, linkages should be created as relevant with the MASFAMU and the Angola women's organizations (Organização da Mulher Angola, OMA) at the local level. The PDR also foresaw that all project training materials should be reviewed by a gender specialist to ensure they are gender-neutral; and that PCU staffing should be gender-balanced.

203. AFAP has indeed the potential to open up opportunities for income-generation and poverty alleviation for women involved in aquaculture, fish processing and marketing. At the time of the CSPE, no outputs or results could be expected, though the share of women members in the already established groups appeared to be around 20 per cent. The planned study on 'Understanding the situation of vulnerable women-headed households in inland fishing communities', was close to finalization; it should provide information on the livelihood strategies of this social group and contribute to identifying the most effective activities to address their specific needs.[91]

204. Some positive results in improving women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services. There is no doubt that MOSAP I greatly enhanced the access of participating rural women to improved agricultural extension service, through the rigorous implementation of the FFS approach. Moreover, by fostering the adoption of the methodology by IDA as the national extension approach, this paved the way to the possibility that also women farmers beyond the project areas of intervention might eventually benefit in terms of improved access to better agricultural extension services. Participating women farmers also benefitted of higher incomes through increased production and productivity triggered by the adoption of IFPs; and this led in some cases, to improved family assets such as housing improvements and small animals.

[91] The CSPE did not have access to the draft report of the study.

205. Limited results in improving participation in decision-making. The limited attention to gender issues per se in MOSAP I, led to gender imbalances in the leadership of farmers' associations. On average across the three provinces, and despite women were most of the members, only 10.5 per cent of associations' leaders were women, including treasurers. The female leaders tended to be heads-of-households; the IES noted that "the spouses, or women in conventional marriages, may have little chance of ascribing to leadership positions".

206. A positive note in this regard was that women took, or were given, seats in the selection and approval committees of sub-projects and that in some cases, female members influenced their group in the choice of the sub-project. The CSPE nevertheless found mixed evidence in terms of the capacity of FFS female members to make their voices heard in the groups; and this was likely to be the same at the level of the selection committees.

207. The functional literacy and numeracy trainings were a positive step towards women empowerment, as women tend to have lower levels of literacy than men; still, this also was planned as a gender-neutral activity and in any case, only few FFS groups benefitted of it under MOSAP I. Project staff mentioned access to literacy as one of the key changes in participants' lives, in particular for women, through the self-confidence and empowerment that literacy generates in the persons, and in the groups as well. It is important to note that also AFAP, and the recently approved SAMAP and ARP, all include literacy courses among the planned activities.

208. Some positive results in improving workload balance and access to benefits between men and women. The activity in MOSAP I that fully addressed a typical women's practical need were the Grinding mills sub-projects, thanks to which women can save time and energy otherwise dedicated to the highly laborious cassava processing. In total, 30 grinding mills sub-projects were funded, out of 257 sub-projects, although not all were still operational at project completion time. The functioning Grinding mills did have a direct positive result by freeing up women's time, which could be used for other activities, or simply shorter working hours. Reportedly, some associations had chosen these sub-projects exactly because they were aware of the positive impacts on women's lives.

209. Variable gender balance in project staffing. Both MOSAP I and AFAP had and have women in the roles of project coordinators, which suggest that in Angola, there are professional women at the required level of competence to lead IFAD-supported interventions. In addition, the AFAP PCU included as female members the fisheries technology specialist, the accountant, and the administrative assistant. Among the 11 extension officers recruited by the project, two were women. With regards to MOSAP I, no detailed figures were available but the CSPE noted that in the three PPIUs no women had been recruited in technical or coordinating roles. The CSPE acknowledges that the already mentioned difficulties in recruiting competent staff for the PCU and for the positions of fisheries extensionist, should not be further complicated by a target of gender-balanced staff; and a prevalence of male professionals in the agricultural and fisheries sectors is very common across the world.

210. Gender equality and women's empowerment -summary. The traditional gender division of labour in rural Angola in small-scale farming households appears to be the main factor defining the high rate of female project participants. The lower numbers of women members in AFAP's groups so far, partly confirmed this. Nevertheless, the adoption of a rigorous approach to FFS as the national agricultural extension system in Angola paves the way to better access for women, and men, to improved services in this regard. On the other hand, in addition to some specific initiatives aimed at addressing the practical needs of women farmers, such as the grinding mill sub-projects, and to some extent the functional literacy

courses, IFAD-supported interventions have not systematically addressed women's specific or strategic needs, nor have promoted the participation and inclusion of women in leadership position within their farmers' associations. The absence of dedicated gender specialist in the PIU/PCU teams may have contributed to the weak performance in supporting women to improve at least their role in decision making. The CSPE rates gender equality and women's empowerment as moderately satisfactory (4).

Environment and natural resources management

211. Reasonable level of integration in project design. The first design of MOSAP I included an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF). This was updated in July 2012 to add new mitigation measures including, among others, provisions for keeping a certain number of trees when opening up forest land for agricultural use, prohibition of the use of pesticides and herbicides, protection of water sources. The approval of sub-projects followed established procedures, based on the verification of potential environmental impacts; mitigating measures or actions had to be included in case of adverse and significant impacts. Moreover, sub-projects with a positive impact on the environment, such as erosion control and reforestation, were considered as having high public value and were granted a funding ratio set at 90 per cent of project contribution and 10 per cent of beneficiaries' contribution.

212. Limited implementation and results. In practice, environmental management in MOSAP I suffered from the lack of human capital and technical capacity as the project had only one environmental assistant at the provincial level. Consequently, sustainable natural resources management practices were not well incorporated in the planned activities and in the FFS curriculum. The CSPE noted a limited and scattered awareness and knowledge among FFS members on these issues. This, despite farmers typically raised concerns about dwindling water resources, erratic rainfalls, and decreasing soil fertility. Although in one province one extension officer was encouraging environmentally sustainable practices such as the use of leguminous crops and compost to improve soil fertility, the local production and use of organic pesticides, and was raising awareness on the environmental benefits of these techniques; this was the result of a personal initiative, rather than a project-wide approach. Also, MOSAP I was not adequately taking into account that certain areas under cultivation are more vulnerable than others and may require different cropping measures to avoid soil erosion, e.g. contour lines.

213. Environment and natural resources management – summary. The environmental risks linked to project implementation were assumed to be generally limited, in consideration of the small scale of the proposed cropping techniques at the local level, which would not create cumulative negative impacts. However, the increased use of mechanisation and fertilisers might induce soil degradation in tropical soils even on a small scale; and if this is the technological model proposed across the country, negative impacts will not take long before emerging. Also, the project had limited human resources and technical capacity to address environmental issues and did not properly address significant problems such as water scarcity, soil fertility and variety of the proposed fertilizers formulas. Based on the above, the CSPE decided to rate this criterion as moderately unsatisfactory (3).

Adaptation to climate change

214. Adaptation to climate change was not directly addressed by MOSAP I, as formulation was at a time when the issue had not become a priority yet. Since then, however, climate change started to seriously affect rainfall patterns also in the central highlands of Angola, with a direct impact on agricultural production. There was no evidence that the project had dedicated any attention to identifying

practices that could enhance the resilience of crops and farming systems to the consequences of climate change.

215. Conversely, AFAP's PDR included under Output 1.1, the 'Strengthening of institutional capacity to address climate change issues' and made reference to 'climate change vulnerability and risk assessment to be conducted in all target communities.' However, the activity was not mentioned in the AWPB 2016/17, nor in the update on project's progress made available to the CSPE, due to difficulties in identifying a suitable Service provider.

216. Climate change – summary. The same weaknesses identified with respect to environmental and natural resources management affected the potential integration of adaptation measures to climate change. Based on the above, the CSPE decided to rate this criterion as moderately unsatisfactory (3).

Coherence with lessons learned

217. This is an ad-hoc analysis, used in this CSPE to respond to the evaluation question, about how lessons learned from the implementation of MOSAP I were integrated in the designs of the two recently approved projects, SAMAP and ARP.

218. The various stakeholders of MOSAP I, including the WB, the Government and IFAD, identified a number of lessons-learned, many of which were integrated in the new initiatives. The following paragraphs discuss how the key issues were taken into account.

219. Both SAMAP and ARP will adopt the FFS methodology, and FFS will remain the main platform of interaction between farmers and project/extension service, through which capacity development and investments will be channelled; FAO will continue to be the service provider on the FFS methodology, for SAMAP, ARP and MOSAP II; this will ensure that improvements, innovations and lessons learned, will easily be shared across the projects. This is fully in line with the lesson learned that the FFS had proved to be "an effective platform for farmer organization and empowerment" and membership in FFS provides access to farmers, to social and technical support; and capacity development of small-scale farmers is key for increased sustainability.

220. More attention to women's empowerment. The weaknesses in women's participation in leadership positions had been noted as a lesson learned, and accordingly both SAMAP and ARP propose that the Gender Action Learning System (GALS) be introduced to support addressing gender equality concerns and contribute to women's empowerment. This is a positive step that will require sufficient resources and commitment to be taken forward.

221. Integration of value chain development. IFAD stakeholders found that marketing and value-chain development should be integrated in the new loans. Accordingly, SAMAP, similarly to MOSAP II, will have an important component on value chain development and an international service provider should be recruited to implement it. It is to be hoped that SAMAP will also take into account that financing of sub-projects should be demand-driven to ensure their sustainability, as the experience in MOSAP I strongly suggests.

222. Sustainable management of natural resources and adaptation to climate change well integrated in new projects. Based on its interviews and observations, the CSPE had also identified as a main lesson, the need to fully integrate in the FFS curriculum, the sustainable management of natural resources and adaptation to climate change. Indeed, both SAMAP and ARP integrated to a good extent, the need to mainstream across all capacity development and investment activities, strong attention to environmental issues, sustainable natural resources management and adaptation to climate change.

223. Limited attention to project management issues. On the other hand, some of the lessons learned concerned project management. These ranged from the need to ensure early recruitment of staff responsible for; procurement, fiduciary management, and monitoring; to the observation that effective implementation requires good management and intensive supervision, including functioning and sound monitoring systems.

224. The CSPE analysis did not find strong evidence that these issues, together with others concerning the importance of participatory approaches to ensure long-term sustainability, had been sufficiently taken into account in the PDRs, although lessons learning in SAMAP and ARP will be facilitated by the following factors:

(a) The WB-funded MOSAP II was largely formulated with the inputs of the PIU of MOSAP I and a significant number of MOSAP I staff were retained in the PIU/PPIUs of MOSAP II, including and most importantly, the project coordinator. Thus, a huge amount of knowledge passed on seamlessly from one project to the next;

(b) SAMAP was designed to be deployed in parallel, although in different provinces, with MOSAP II;

(c) IDA will be the director and responsible national organization for MOSAP II, SAMAP and ARP; and IDA and IFAD agreed that SAMAP and ARP will have one central PIU only, supported by Provincial PIUs in each province. This will enable close interactions and coordination across the three interventions on technical, managerial and administrative issues. Moreover, coordination and collaboration will be further strengthened through the practical arrangement agreed among IDA, the WB and IFAD, that the PCU and PIU will sit in the same premises in Luanda.

C. Overall project portfolio

225. The assessment of the loan-funded project portfolio under evaluation showed a number of positive features and achievements: a good level of alignment with the Government's priorities, with the needs of the rural poor and with IFAD's strategies at the global and national level; consistent targeting across the portfolio, of the rural poor small-scale farmers and fishers, with a particular attention to including women among beneficiaries; in one project so far, good results and proven impacts on agricultural production and probably food security, and on institutions and policies; and incipient impacts on participants' incomes and empowerment, at least to some extent; sustainability of a number of results at the institutional level; and to a more limited extent, for farming families as well; a high degree of innovation through two interventions, and good prospects in the case of FFS, for scaling up through partner-supported initiatives; a good degree of lessons learning flowing from one project into the next.

226. At the same time, performance was hampered by a number of key factors: less than optimal project design, which affected sustainability of some investments in MOSAP I and risks jeopardizing AFAP achievements; initial delays at start-up, largely due to the limited human capital in the country; limited efforts and capacity to integrate a gender equality approach in implementation; and limited attention in MOSAP I, to sustainable environment and natural resources management, and virtually none to climate change adaptation. The main underlying cause of most of the weaknesses in the portfolio implementation has been the dearth of experienced professionals at the national level, in development management and in some key technical areas.

227. Taking into consideration the above and the assessment of all the evaluation criteria, the overall project portfolio achievement is rated as moderately satisfactory (4). Table 9 provides a summary of portfolio ratings, while details by project are presented in annex II.

Table 9
Assessment of project portfolio achievement

Criteria	*CSPE rating*
Rural poverty impact	4
Project performance	
Relevance	5
Effectiveness	4
Efficiency	3
Sustainability of benefits	4
Other performance criteria	
Gender equality and women's empowerment	4
Innovation	5
Scaling up	4
Environment and NRM	3
Adaptation to climate change	3
Overall project portfolio achievement	**4**

Key points

- IFAD's strategies and objectives were aligned with the Government's by targeting crucial issues in the most vulnerable areas in the central highlands. IFAD's portfolio was also highly relevant to the needs of the rural poor farming families and in line with the Fund's strategies. Projects' designs were less than optimal, in particular for AFAP and for some components of MOSAP I. In both cases, design weaknesses did, and probably will, affect project results.
- MOSAP I produced tangible results for participating farmers, also through the rigorous adoption of the Farmer Field School model as extension method. Poor farmers who joined FFS benefitted from incipient increases in households' income and assets, through improved crop productivity and production; and the mechanization and seeds sub-projects. Membership in farmers' associations and FFS groups grew exponentially during implementation, and members developed skills and capacities on several themes. Capacity development efforts of extension staff led to improved delivery of agricultural extension services. MOSAP I was however less effective in providing incentives for young men to engage in farming.
- MOSAP I's positive results in the application of the FFS approach led to the adoption of the method as the national agricultural extension methodology. Sustainability of the approach also appeared strong at the social level. Technical, economic and social sustainability of some IFPs was not fully satisfactory, in particular in farmers' individual fields. The positive results and impacts in terms of productivity and production are however at risk, in the absence of an enabling policy environment and incentives that support family farming and sustainable agricultural and rural development.
- IFAD portfolio suffered from delays above the regional average, in achieving first disbursement and during the first year/s of implementation. Projects so far also over-spent on project management costs. Key causes were the limited human capital in the country to manage the interventions, implementation delays and weaknesses in initial budget preparation. The devaluation of the national currency, and high levels of inflation, also curtailed the initial budget allocations.
- At the time of the CSPE, AFAP was late in delivery a community level; the initiatives that had been recently launched entailed an investment risk for participants and a reputational risk for IFAD.
- MOSAP I contributed important innovations to Angola, the FFS as a participatory agricultural extension method, and a number of IFPs that members of the FFS found beneficial and adopted in the collective fields. Scaling up of both will depend on IDA's commitment to finding financial resources for implementing the FFS approach at the national level; and on the identification of the bottle-necks that prevent the adoption of some IFPs in farmers' individual fields.
- Women were active participants in MOSAP I, because of the Angola traditional gender roles in agriculture, and benefitted of various activities. The absence of a dedicated gender expert in the PIU probably prevented dedicated efforts to address women's needs and to pursue a strategy for women's empowerment. A similar situation may occur in the on-going and new projects.
- MOSAP I did not adequately integrate sustainable natural resources and environmental management in the FFS curriculum and implementation; nor did it take any measure to adapt cropping patterns to changing climate patterns.
- Many of the lessons learned through MOSAP I were duly taken into account in the designs of SAMAP and ARP.

IV. Non-lending activities

228. This section assesses IFAD's performance in Angola in carrying out non-lending activities, namely knowledge management, partnership-building and country-level policy dialogue. In the context of knowledge management, also the monitoring systems of both programme and projects are discussed. Each area was analysed and rated separately, and a final consolidated rating was also provided. In addition, an overview is presented of IFAD's national grants implemented in Angola during the period 2005-2017.

A. Knowledge management

229. Knowledge management requires a good understanding of how knowledge can be produced, what a knowledge product looks like and how it differs from a communication product; and specific skills, competences and dedicated resources. It also requires sufficient and appropriate data generated by relevant and reliable monitoring systems.

230. Lessons learned from a project to the next. The 2005 COSOP identified lessons from the still on-going PRODECA and PESNORTE, to be taken into account in the design of new loans; and envisaged project-based monitoring systems for the new initiatives. This mechanism of implicit lessons-learning appeared reasonable, when one project at a time was being implemented and lessons could be generated in time for a new design. The mechanism however, was not highly efficient in a context of high-turnover of Country Programme Managers and limited attention given to developing an institutional memory.

231. The COSOP also included provisions for a number of small self-standing grants, through which studies or action-research small initiatives would be carried out and contribute to building a knowledge-base about various aspects of rural development. The CSPE found no reference to the outcomes of these grants in the MOSAP I PDR; this however does not exclude the possibility that this happened in an informal manner.

232. MOSAP I developed its system, with common indicators and specific annual targets at the provincial level; data were collected, analysed and then consolidated by the central PIU. Nevertheless, as the former project coordinator candidly recognized, the data thus generated was not systematically used as a management tool and for knowledge management, which handicapped the learning of lessons while experience was gained. Also, MOSAP I established its goal at the level of increased production and did not foresee measuring at any point in time, higher impact-level indicators such as income levels and increased availability of food in the participating households. This prevented having any evidence on, for example, poverty reduction and food security.

233. MOSAP I however generated several lessons, and the CSPE noted a good degree of implicit knowledge management, through their integration in the design of SAMAP and ARP. Both PDRs also made detailed reference to monitoring and knowledge management. However, lessons learned from MOSAP on slow project start-up and challenges in this phase were not adequately applied to AFAP, missing an opportunity to trigger a stronger IFAD's role in providing intensive management and technical support.

234. At the time of the CSPE, AFAP monitoring system was still incipient; and the contracted NGO for community development activities was collecting baseline data in the selected communities. The CSPE did not have the opportunity to verify whether the two systems were going to be aligned with each other and include data that will be useful later on, including for knowledge management and policy dialogue purposes.

235. Upcoming challenges with an expanded portfolio. In this respect, the currently expanded IFAD-supported portfolio in Angola will require specific efforts across the different interventions, in terms of: exchange of experiences and lessons learned; harmonization of monitoring indicators, definitions and methods for data collection; coordination in planning communication and knowledge management milestones, products and events. These should be agreed and integrated in the baseline studies and monitoring systems of all the ongoing projects since inception; the CSPE did not find evidence that this was planned, or happening.

236. Knowledge management assessment-summary. The evidence above indicates limited progress in the past, and limited provisions in current planning, with regards to the establishment of adequate monitoring systems contributing to both project and programme knowledge management, in a harmonized and coordinated manner across the IFAD-supported interventions. Thus, the CSPE assessed knowledge management as moderately unsatisfactory (3).

B. Partnership-building

237. The 2005 COSOP identified “strategic links with partner agencies” as a central element of its support to agricultural and rural development in the central highlands, and in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of social infrastructures. Close collaboration with the UN agencies, and FAO in particular, was also envisaged. This section discusses the actual achievements with each group of potential partners.

238. With respect to partnerships, one of the evaluation questions referred to IFAD’s collaboration with other partners in national-level coordination mechanism, typically sectoral or on cross-cutting issues. However, no such arrangements existed in Angola during the period under evaluation.

239. IFAD valued by the Government. The CSPE found solid evidence that the partnership between IFAD and the Government was valued across all ministries concerned, and that the Fund was considered an important and trustworthy partner, that listened and had been open, to adjust to the varying circumstances, both during and after the civil war. IFAD’s flexibility and willingness to find solutions were mentioned several times by many stakeholders. Examples of this included: extending projects that had suffered delays during implementation (PRODECA and PESNORTE); agreement to support SAMAP as a separate loan from MOSAP II, in new provinces; and with ARP, extending to the southern provinces, in the recovery context which is unusual for IFAD. Also, IFAD’s commitment to the rural poor was well recognized and appreciated. MOSAP I was a very well-known intervention at provincial and district level, and IFAD’s role in it was clearly acknowledged at all administrative levels.

240. MOSAP I was a highly successful partnership among the World Bank, IFAD and FAO. During the period under evaluation, the main partnership entered by IFAD with other development partners has been with the WB and FAO in the context of MOSAP I. Roles were as follows: the WB and IFAD were co-financers, with the WB’s Mozambique Country Office leading on project management and supervision; FAO was a Service Provider, with the technical and methodological expertise for the implementation of the FFS approach. The endeavour proved to be highly successful in the view of all stakeholders, including the Government of Angola. IFAD was recognized by the WB as having provided crucial strategic inputs in design, by focusing the main thrust and targeting of the initiative on the rural poor,[92] as well as key technical and management support during implementation.

[92] The joint World Bank, IFAD and FAO Investment Centre team that designed MOSAP I, received in 2007 a World Bank ‘Team Spot Award’.

241. Close collaboration with the WB also took place for the design of SAMAP, which was prepared by the same team that had formulated MOSAP II; and is expected to be intensive during the implementation of SAMAP, as discussed earlier in the report.

242. Collaboration between FAO and IFAD in the country has been much broader and at different levels,[93] as follows:

(a) IFAD has included staff from the FAO Investment Centre, to lead or be part of design, appraisal, formulation and supervision missions for MOSAP I, AFAP and SAMAP;

(b) Since 2015, the FAO Representation has systematically contributed to discussions and consultations at the strategic level, with SAMAP and ARP design teams, and IFAD supervision missions on MOSAP I and AFAP;[94]

(c) FAO will contribute with its own financial resources, through the Technical Cooperation Programme, technical assistance and operational support to the implementation of ARP;[95]

(d) FAO will implement the FFS component for both SAMAP and ARP;[96]

(e) Since 2016, the FAO Representation has been supporting all IFAD missions to Angola, providing liaison with governmental organizations and other partners, acting as advisor to both IFAD and the Government whenever required, as well as with logistics.

243. Several of the services provided by the FAO Representation to IFAD's mission, including the present CSPE, could be reimbursed, and obviously were, based on staff-time and real costs incurred into. A draft memorandum of understanding between IFAD and FAO to formalize and simplify the related transaction costs was prepare and discussed, but not signed. At the same time, the strategic advisory role and support provided by the FAO Representation went well beyond any reimbursable service.

244. In the view of the CSPE, the excellent relationship between IFAD and FAO in Angola over the years, and between FAO, IFAD and the WB around MOSAP I, were an interesting example of the complementarity between the three organizations, wherein each has been operating according to its mandate and comparative advantage for a common strategic goal.

245. IFAD less engaged with the UN system. Over the period under evaluation, the UN system in Angola signed three frameworks with the Government, the most recent being the 'Partnership Framework between the Government of Angola and the United Nations system (UNPAF)', for the period 2015-2019. IFAD did not sign any of the three, but its contribution through MOSAP I to secure food needs, was accounted for in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Angola for the period 2009-2013. Recently, also, UNDP took part in the SAMAP preparation process and will implement a small component in ARP. In this respect, UNDP considered that more intensive engagement at project level would be beneficial to all parties. In the view of the CSPE, this lack of collaboration could also stem from the absence of a more intensive IFAD's presence in the country.

246. Contracts with non-governmental organizations and the private sector. The relationships between MOSAP I and AFAP and national and international NGOs,

[93] In Angola, the three Rome-Based Agencies, namely FAO, IFAD and the World Food Programme, worked all together only once, in the framework of the Italian-funded grant 'Uíge Province Food Security Project', operational during the war in the late 1990s, and completed in 2003.
[94] As already mentioned, FAO was also expected to provide technical assistance to the implementation of AFAP, as stated in both the PDR and the AWPB 2016-2017, but this did not materialize.
[95] Operational support will comprise cars, related Operations & Maintenance, salary of one driver and office equipment in one of the provinces of intervention.
[96] This will become operational through an addendum to the already existing contract between the World Bank and FAO for the MOSAP II component for FFS implementation.

have largely been so far of a contractual nature, with the NGOs in the position of service providers to implement specific activities or the small national grants discussed later in the report. During MOSAP, contracts were established with a few NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to implement components such as literacy courses for FFS members, and other capacity development activities. Recently, AFAP contracted ADPP to implement the community development component. In general, these collaborations have been positive and have brought added value, when the competences and expertise exist among these organizations meet the project's requirements. Similar contractual arrangements have been established with the private sector for the provision of goods, e.g. the upcoming provision of fingerlings from a private tilapia hatchery. Whether room exists for other types of collaboration, e.g. in the framework of the value chain development planned by SAMAP, remains to be ascertained.

247. Slow progress in South-South and Triangular Cooperation. As already mentioned, some steps were made by AFAP towards other lusophone countries, which had not produced any significant result by November 2017. In the view of the CSPE, there could be opportunities to be explored in future with Brazil and its agricultural research organization, EMBRAPA, in the context of SAMAP and ARP, on themes such as agroecology, water-harvesting, soil fertility conservation and restoration, in tropical edaphic and climatic conditions.

248. Partnerships assessment-summary. IFAD is a respected partner of the Government of Angola. It also developed important partnerships during the period under evaluation, with the WB and FAO. These have led to good results at policy, institutional and community level, and should be sustained for SAMAP and ARP and other relevant projects in future. Thus, the CSPE assessed partnership building as satisfactory (5).

C. Country-level policy engagement

249. IFAD's commitment to evidence-based policy dialogue, based on its experience at country, regional and international level, has been a recurring element in the Strategic Frameworks for the period under evaluation.[97]

250. The 2005 COSOP acknowledged that IFAD had had limited leverage in Angola through policy dialogue; and committed to engage in it focusing on pro-poor agricultural development policies, in partnership with the UN and other agencies in the country. The project facilitator based in Luanda was to be a key element in this process.

251. Dialogue on policies through project design and implementation. Evidence available to the CSPE suggested that most of the dialogue with the Government, that would be relevant for policy-making, was carried out during the design processes of MOSAP I, SAMAP and ARP; and during MOSAP I implementation, when key decisions had to be made, such as the selection of the FFS approach as the extension methodology to be adopted by the project, with FAO as a service provider for this component. In addition, during the period 2006-2011, the Rural Sector Assessment of the PBAS was used as a tool for systematically raising the attention of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to the needs of the family farming sector and to the comparative advantage of different, less top-down, approaches to be followed in the relationship between the Government and farming families.

252. The CSPE considered the approach to be eminently sensible and well suited to the Angolan context. National high-level policies and plans for agricultural and rural development did and do exist, but there were and are gaps at the level of policy implementation, with respect to both institutional capacity and ground-validated knowledge about what would work better to achieve the established goals. Projects

[97] IFAD Strategic Frameworks 2007-210, 2011-2015, 2016-2025.

are thus opportunities to test different implementation options and learn lessons that can feed into strategic decision making and eventually inform new, better-tuned policies.

253. The design and implementation of MOSAP I was quite a successful example of this model. IFAD CPMT steered the thrust of MOSAP I design towards the rural poor, thanks to its solid rapport with the Government, developed with the project facilitator and through the joint monitoring of the PBAS indicators; and with the WB. This was a major breakthrough in terms of policy-making 'in the field', fully in line with the acknowledged priorities for the country but not fully interiorized yet in the implementation approach of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. During implementation, the strong partnership between FAO, IFAD and the WB already discussed, eventually led to the adoption of the FFS as the national extension methodology, another key achievement in terms of impact on national strategies.

254. The design processes for SAMAP, and even more for ARP, have offered the opportunity to integrate several practices about sustainable water and soil management, agroecology and adaptation to climate change, and rural finance, into the technical support provided by IDA to the farmers. These are fully in line with the national environmental policies and the interventions will serve as validation ground; hopefully, the lessons that will emerge from the projects will feed back into the policy development cycle in this case as well.

255. With regards to AFAP, its work and results - validating productive models, addressing issues identified as risks and properly documenting and drawing lessons about how to develop small scale freshwater fisheries and aquaculture in rural Angola - can potentially contribute to policy dialogue and inform the normative and institutional framework for the sub-sectors.[98] For this to succeed, however, the monitoring and knowledge management systems must generate reliable and useful information that can also contribute to the elaboration of the national Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Plan, foreseen in the PND.

256. Country-level policy engagement - assessment summary. The baseline for IFAD's performance on policy engagement at the time of the 2005 COSOP was low. Over time, through a very pragmatic approach, and in collaboration with other partners, important results were achieved in terms of increased focus by IDA on the rural poor and of adoption of an extension methodology that provides tools for dialogue and accountability between the Government and farmers' organizations. In this context, CSPE assessed country-level policy engagement as moderately satisfactory (4).

D. Grants

257. As mentioned earlier in the report, and as foreseen in the 2005 COSOP, IFAD provided funds for five national self-standing grants that were operational in the period 2005-2009. The list and some features for each initiative are shown in Table 10.

[98] The CSPE did not find any similar evidence with respect to AFAP, during the design of the project.

Table 10
Self-standing national grants funded by IFAD, operational in the period 2005-2009

Project name	*Grant amount, US$*	*Grant recipient name*	*Approval date*	*Effectiveness date*	*Completion date*	*Type of organization*
Strengthening Community Resilience and Responses to HIV/AIDS through Livelihoods	160 000	CARE Angola	21/12/2004	07/06/2005	31/12/2006	International NGO
Community land mapping and conflict mitigation in the Central Highlands	149 000	Development workshop	12/01/2006	10/04/2006	10/04/2008	International NGO
Participatory analysis of lessons learned in community development initiatives in the Central Highlands	50 000	Angolan Non-Governmental Organizations Forum (FONGA)	12/01/2006	10/04/2006	10/04/2007	National NGO
Rural poverty studies	100 000	Centro Estudos e Investigação Científica (CEIC)	08/12/2006	10/04/2007	10/10/2008	Research institute in a private university
Cooperative development project	100 000	Cooperative League of the USA/ National Cooperative Business Association (CLUSA/ NCBA)	08/12/2006	07/04/2007	31/12/2009	International NGO

Source: IFAD corporate system.

258. Conducting analysis and identifying lessons about rural development issues in Angola that could feed into the following round of loans formulation were the shared objectives of the grants. Approaches ranged from community-level action-research initiatives, to the preparation of publications on rural poverty to generate public debate.

259. Limited information available on results. Reportedly, all grants were completed in due time and produced final reports. No informed persons could be identified in Angola about any of them, due to the length of time elapsed since their completion. And only the final report for the CARE grant was found in IFAD repository system.

260. The CARE grant aimed at strengthening community level organizations to address HIV and AIDS related issues in their work in Bié Province and, based on this experience, develop multi-stakeholder networks that would coordinate work on HIV and AIDS at provincial and national level. CARE contributed some of its own resources to complete several planned micro/infrastructure projects. The grant supported: capacity development of leaders and opinion-makers on HIV and AIDS related topics, at community-level; workshops within CARE and partners on how to mainstream these issues and nutrition in their work; micro-projects including a saving and credit component to enable women to be independent and have a better control on their sexual life; and financing group-managed social and productive activities, from schools to seed multiplication. Scaling up the provincial network was not achieved, due to time and resources constraints. The final report stated as an impact, the mainstreaming of an HIV and AIDS perspective in all the work by CARE, which should have long-term effects.

261. Grants assessment-summary. The 2005 COSOP commitment to support grants for learning lessons about rural development in Angola was met. The evidence generated by these studies may have been mainstreamed into larger programmes,

as was the case with HIV and AIDS in CARE Angola, but no direct link was identified between any of the studies and MOSAP I.

E. Overall assessment

262. The 2005 COSOP had integrated the non-lending activities as important and complementary elements of the main lending operations of the Fund in the country. Targets had been mostly set at a reasonable and realistic level, reflecting a good understanding of the country context and the existing challenges on issues such as policy dialogue. The interesting approach of developing a knowledge base through research-oriented grants that could be harnessed into on-going or new lending initiatives, did not appear to produce expected results. A similar risk of low achievements was perceived, with regards to the absence of coordination in the development of baselines and monitoring systems across the different projects, that may not collect and measure the necessary data to create knowledge about impacts that would also be used at the policy and strategic level.

263. Thus, in consideration of the achievements so far, but also of the existing gaps, the overall rating of this area of work is scored as moderately satisfactory (4). Table 11 shows the scoring for each component.

Table 11
Assessment of non-lending activities

Non-lending activities	*Rating*
Knowledge management	3
Partnership-building	5
Country-level policy engagement	4
Overall	***4***

Key points

- Projects implemented under the responsibility of IDA show a good degree of implicit knowledge management of lessons learned; weaknesses emerged with respect to the establishment and use of monitoring systems that can generate harmonized and coherent information across interventions and can contribute to future policy-dialogue.
- In addition to a very good rapport with the Government, IFAD developed important partnerships in Angola with the WB and FAO, which have led to good results at policy, institutional and community level, and should be sustained for SAMAP and ARP and other relevant initiatives in future.
- IFAD in Angola engaged with the Government on policy dialogue through project design and implementation, which led to the important result of providing evidence to IDA about how to work with small-scale farmers. It also led to the adoption of the FFS as extension methodology that provides tools for dialogue and accountability between the Government and farmers' organizations. Ongoing and new projects also bear an interesting potential in this sense.
- A number of grants aimed at developing knowledge on rural poverty were funded and implemented, though there was no evidence that their results contributed to improved loan design.

V. Performance of partners

264. This section assesses the performance of IFAD and the Government of Angola during the period under evaluation. With respect to IFAD, the analysis included the organizational set-up for the management of the Angola portfolio, supervision and monitoring of the portfolio. Government performance was assessed in the areas of contributions to IFAD and mobilization of counterpart funds, fiduciary aspects, and commitment to the management and oversight responsibility.

A. IFAD

265. High turnover of country directors. During the period under evaluation, IFAD assigned the responsibility for the management of the country programme to five successive country programme managers (CPMs). Table 12 below shows the duration of each tenure.

Table 12
CPM assignments of responsibility for Angola, since 2005

CPM	*Start-end assignment*	*Duration*
Ms Carla Ferreira	Mid 2005 to mid-2011	6 years
Mr Claus Reiner	January 2012 to June 2013	18 months
Mr Carlo Bravi	July 2013 to January 2014	7 months
Mr Robson Mutandi	February 2014 to March 2016	26 months
Ms Abla Benhammouche[99]	April 2016 - on-going	20 months as of December 2017

Source: IFAD corporate system.

266. The first CPM in the list was in charge of Angola for six years, a long time-span by IFAD standards. This enabled the incumbent to develop a relationship of trust and collaboration with the Government and the WB that significantly helped in raising the profile of the Fund in the country, and its leverage with partners. Two additional factors contributed: the collaboration and support provided by the project facilitator, who through his own personal credibility and network of contacts, could reach out to the various parties in the Government; and the CPM's command of Portuguese.

267. The three CPMs who followed adequately managed the portfolio and contributed to expanding it to other sectors, for example with the design of AFAP over the period 2013-2015. However, the length of each assignment was insufficient to develop a stronger rapport with national stakeholders.

268. Challenges of the current set-up for the expanded country programme. Since 2016, the CSPE found evidence of a revamped IFAD's attention towards Angola, as shown by the discussions held in April 2016 on the COSOP, the preparation of the CSN for the period 2017-2018, and most importantly, the design and approval of two new loans, SAMAP and ARP. As of late 2017, IFAD was handling in Angola a portfolio of loans and associated grants that by number of interventions, financial contribution, geographical scope and range of subsectors, was larger than the entire Fund's portfolio in the country until 2015.

269. To support the management of the portfolio, the current CPMT comprised: the Country Director, a procurement specialist, a programme assistant, a finance expert, a legal expert and an environment expert, plus additional management and technical expertise as required for each project.[100] IFAD however could not count on any dedicated person resident in the country to supervise and coordinate projects, besides an informal agreement with the FAO Representation. This

[99] Ms Abla Benhamouche has the title of Country Director.
[100] All staff, specialists and experts operate on a part-time basis on Angola.

entailed, for example, that this CSPE had to rely on the latter, including the time of the FAO Representative and his Assistant (deputy) for Programme, to organize most of its interactions with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.[101]

270. In the view of the CSPE, with a portfolio of the current size, such a set-up would represent a challenge in any country. In consideration of the still persistent weak human capital in Angola on several technical and managerial issues, this represents a risk. Furthermore, the newly approved loans will require a significant level of coordination across ministries; this will only work with intensive networking efforts that may jeopardize what will be a busy agenda of project coordinators.

271. In addition, the CSPE could directly witness during its work, how the functioning of professional networks in Angola strongly mirrors pre-existing social and personal relationships. This entails that external actors can reach out and have access to decision-makers, either through a well-accepted national intermediary, or through a long-time rapport that allows trust to progressively develop. In such a context, the project facilitator, who was a respected professional at the national level in his own right, brought a precious added value to the relationship between IFAD and the Government and contributed to pave the way to the focus of MOSAP I on poor small-scale farmers, and to the adoption of the FFs as the national approach for agricultural extension.

272. Satisfactory supervision and technical support. Despite the weaknesses that have been pointed out earlier in the report with regards to AFAP, in general the contribution by IFAD CPMT and technical experts to the management and supervision of the portfolio in Angola has been satisfactory. Although AFAP design was protracted due to various reasons, the designs of SAMAP and ARP were completed according to tight schedules and supervision missions have been carried out as planned.

273. There is evidence that IFAD CPMTs systematically provided support to the PIU/PCUs, on managerial, administrative and fiduciary issues. These undoubtedly helped to solve the daily challenges faced by staff in dealing with IFAD procedures and complying with rules and regulations. The focus on one project at a time, however, was not an incentive to develop a more systematic approach to capacity development in these areas that could benefit in the long run, the country and IFAD itself.

274. Effective solution for portfolio monitoring and integration of lessons learned. During the period under evaluation, the development of a portfolio-level monitoring system would not have been justified in a country where the perspectives were for one project at a time. At the same time, once the COSOP was approved, it was no longer used as a reference in the management of the programme.[102] The decision by the CPMT to engage on a yearly basis with the Government in the joint updating of the PBAS Rural Sector Assessment, proved to be a useful approach to: jointly monitor progress on key issues for IFAD at the national level; identify areas for IFAD's focus, and inform the design and implementation of MOSAP I.

275. The COSOP had included a detailed analysis of the lessons learned from the earlier projects, which were taken into some consideration in the design of MOSAP I. And as already discussed, the lessons learned through the latter were taken into good account in the design of SAMAP and ARP. Overall, these measures represented so far, a reasonable approach to manage and build the programme based on evidence from the field. The CSPE, however, did not find evidence that the results and

[101] The contacts established with key stakeholders during the CSPE preparatory mission led to IDA taking over some organizational responsibility, within the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea.
[102] During the CSPE, neither the COSOP nor the much more recent CSN, were ever referred to spontaneously in meetings with the Government and the projects.

knowledge generated by the five national self-standing grants were ever used by IFAD and its partners.

276. Overall, IFAD's commitment to Angola has been consistent and coherent over time, thanks to the commitment and engagement of the CPMTs. This despite the high rotation rate of CPMs since 2012, and the absence of a person resident in the country since 2013 who would act as 'IFAD's direct contact point'; both led to some loss of momentum in the engagement with the national stakeholders. In the light of the above, the CSPE rates IFAD's overall performance as moderately satisfactory (4).

B. Government

277. The Government of Angola is a regular contributor to IFAD. One of the CSPE evaluation questions concerned the level of Angolan contributions to IFAD (contribution to replenishment). Since 1990, starting with IFAD's Third Replenishment, the Government of Angola systematically contributed to the Fund's financial resources, as shown in Table 13. Angolan contributions also grew over time: in IFAD 05 and IFAD 06, Angola was among the top contributors in the ESA region; with IFAD 07, the country became the top contributor in the region, with a significant increase in the amounts provided since IFAD 08. This was also a positive side-effect, reportedly, of the close rapport developed by the CPMT with the Government at the time. Angola maintained its significant contribution over the whole period analysed by the CSPE, and pledges for the 2019-2021 Replenishment confirmed the trend at the time of writing this report.

Table 13
Contributions by Angola to IFAD replenishments

Replenishment	*Negotiations completed in*	*Time-span covered*	*Contribution by Angola, in US$*
IFAD 03	1990	Variable	20.000
IFAD 04	1997	Variable	40.000
IFAD 05	2001	Variable	100.000
IFAD 06	2003	2004-2006	100.000
IFAD 07	2005	2007-2009	200.000
IFAD 08	2008	2010-2012	1.900.000
IFAD 09	2011	2013-2015	1.900.000
IFAD 10	2014	2016-2018	2.000.000
IFAD 11	2017	2019-2021	2.000.000

Source: IFAD corporate system.

278. The Government also complied in general with the loan covenants and disbursed funds in a timely manner. In at least two cases, the Government contributed additional funds either to complement project activities (PESNORTE) or to bypass procurement difficulties (AFAP). MOSAP I also benefitted of additional extension officers posted in the targeted provinces and districts (municípios), and the same is expected for SAMAP and ARP.

279. Less than satisfactory performance on fiduciary aspects. The IFAD supervision missions of MOSAP I and ASAP assessed the fiduciary performance of the projects against several criteria, including: (i) quality and timeliness of audits, (ii) compliance with procurement, (iii) compliance with financing covenants, (iv) availability of counterpart funds, (v) disbursement rates, and (vi) quality of financial management. Figure 5 below shows the average ratings for each criterion, for both MOSAP I and AFAP.

Figure 5
Average rating of fiduciary aspects - MOSAP (2010-2015) and AFAP (2016-2017)



Source: PSR online/IFAD.

280. The best performing criterion for MOSAP I was the availability of counterpart funds, which achieved a score of 4.5, or moderately satisfactory. However, and as already discussed earlier in the report, the fiduciary performance was at its lowest with regards to the disbursement rates, which was the only criterion rated as unsatisfactory.

281. AFAP, on the other hand, was assessed as 'moderately satisfactory' (4) with regards to the rate of disbursement; the quality and timeliness of audits was also rated at level 4, because the first audit of the project will start in 2018, covering the first 18 months of implementation as per IFAD's rules.

282. The average assessment of all other criteria was moderately unsatisfactory (3). Both projects initially faced challenges regarding the quality of financial management, and compliance with financing covenants. The limited human capital in the country contributed to both delays in recruitment and initial weak performance in these areas.

283. In AFAP, for example, well into the second year of implementation, a major need was still noted for intensive support and training on financial management. Although IFAD had provided support, including the recruitment of a new finance manager and the capacity building of the project accountant, some areas of work still required improvement. The quality of recordkeeping was not yet fully satisfactory, especially records of expenditures and budget. A case in point was that salary payments had been processed without deduction of the mandatory social security contribution for employees, or of the mandatory income tax contribution: and these amounts had not been levied because the project had not been granted yet legal status, which is necessary to obtain taxpayer identification.[103] An additional issue was the replenishment of the special accounts. Another option being explored at the time of writing this report was the establishment of a more formal collaboration on fiduciary issues with the AfDB marine fisheries project.

284. The 'moderately unsatisfactory' rating of the criterion 'Compliance with procurement' for AFAP deserves a specific discussion. Although initially only few international procurement activities had been planned, the high cost and non-availability of several goods and services on the domestic market required more international procurement actions, also for relatively small amounts. However, the 2016/2017 economic and financial crisis in the country triggered severe restrictions

[103] The aide-memoire of the Supervision mission of AFAP in late November 2017 confirmed several of the preliminary conclusions of the CSPE in this respect.

in the availability of foreign currency. As a consequence, AFAP management has been facing difficulties in the transfer of funds to accounts outside of Angola to pay for the internationally procured goods and services. This complex situation could seriously impact the effectiveness and efficiency of the intervention. After careful assessment of the possible options, the IFAD supervision mission in November 2017 agreed that IDPAA would open a second designated account in US dollars in an offshore bank to make payments to international consultants and suppliers. In addition, AFAP will also benefit from an agreement signed with UNOPS, for the procurement of vehicles, motorcycles and boats.

285. Governmental oversight of IFAD's programme is delegated to the single responsible institute or ministry. The ultimate responsibility for IFAD's programme in the country rests with the Ministry of Finance, which has shown commitment to partnering with IFAD, particularly since the Government recognized the need to diversify the national economic base. The Ministry is formally party to the project steering committees, but there was no evidence of any substantive role in the design or management of the interventions. These tasks were typically the responsibility of different ministries and institutes, namely: IDA within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development for MOSAP I, SAMAP and ARP; and IDPAA within the Ministry of Fisheries and the Sea, for AFAP.

286. Current portfolio engages more ministries. Other ministries had and have different roles in IFAD-supported portfolio, including the MASFAMU and the Ministry of Health, for project activities cutting across mandates, e.g. women's empowerment, nutrition, awareness raising on HIV and AIDS. In addition, the PDRs for SAMAP and ARP foresaw a significant role for the Ministry of Environment, to support environmental education and other capacity development activities at different levels, as well as climate change related issues. The design documents for the two projects differed with regards to the clarity of detail about the roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of Environment, including at the level in the oversight body, the Project Coordination Committee.

287. IFAD has no experience of inter-ministerial collaboration in the projects it supported so far. During the period under evaluation, there have been no opportunities to test collaboration among teams of IFAD-funded interventions in different sectors.[104] However, similar to what happens in many other countries, the tradition of collaboration across ministries at central and local level was said by partners of the Government, not to be strong in Angola. This means that SAMAP and ARP may face significant challenges to ensure a reasonable level of coordination in the planning and implementation of field-level activities. In this respect, the view of the government, explicitly stated during the CSPE wrap-up meeting once more, was that IFAD should take adequate measures in terms of its presence in the country, to also enable and facilitate collaboration across ministries and organizations at the different levels.

288. Good level of governmental participation in projects. The level of ownership within the governmental organizations concerned for the IFAD-supported interventions was stated to be "reasonable to strong" by all parties concerned and confirmed by the CSPE's own observations. This includes the Ministry of Environment that has become a significant partner for IFAD with the recent formulations of SAMAP and ARP, as well as senior officers who have actively participated in projects' design, implementation and oversight.

289. Overall, the Government of Angola has made efforts to effectively contribute to IFAD in general, and to the implementation of the portfolio in the country. Causes for delays in fund disbursements typically rested at the programme implementation level, rather than in governmental policies or procedures, despite the recent

[104] MOSAP I had already come to an end when AFAP received its first disbursement; and SAMAP had not become operational by the time of the CSPE.

exception of the availability of international currency. In light of all the above, the Government's performance was rated as moderately satisfactory (4).

Key points

- IFAD has been a long-standing and reliable partner of the Government of Angola. Through projects' design and supervision, the Fund provided sustained key support to address rural poverty. A slight loss of momentum in the collaboration due to the relatively high rotation of Country Programme Managers was compensated by more recent engagement that led to the largest ever portfolio for the Fund in the country, at the time of the CSPE.
- The Government of Angola has contributed for many years to IFAD's replenishment process and has provided financial support to project implementation whenever necessary.
- Main challenges in implementation stemmed from the dearth of human resources in the country in the agriculture, fisheries and rural development domains, as well as in management and fiduciary aspects.
- This, together with the national approach to collaboration based on pre-existing networks, and the weak institutional capacity; are all elements that can jeopardize the efficiency and effectiveness of IFAD's support in the absence of adequate mitigating measures.

VI. Synthesis of the country programme strategy performance

290. This section synthesizes the analysis by relevance and effectiveness, of the lending portfolio, non-lending activities and performance of partners, as discussed in the previous sections, and provides a consolidated assessment of the country strategy and programme.

A. Relevance

The Strategy

291. The 2005 COSOP clearly stated that IFAD should pursue the empowerment of the rural poor and enable them to make the Government accountable with respect to the delivery of services, investments and policies favourable to developing sustainable livelihoods in the rural areas. To do so, a goal was established, and the principles identified, that should inform the lending and non-lending portfolios and activities.[105]

292. The strategy was highly relevant to the needs of the small-scale farming families who lived far away from the urban centres, largely invisible and abandoned to themselves, and who struggled against food insecurity and sheer lack of infrastructures and services, after nearly 30 years of dramatic civil conflict. It also included provisions for improving land tenure rights of small-scale farmers.

293. The geographic focus of the COSOP and MOSAP I on the central highlands was justified by both its potential for agricultural production, and by the high concentration there of poor and food-insecure people, and the ensuing pressure on the natural resource base. As of 2017/2018, the Country Strategy Note envisages the expansion of the portfolio to other provinces, agro-ecological zones and sectors of intervention, while maintaining the focus on meeting the needs of the rural poor.

294. In the view of the CSPE, this expansion is highly appropriate, as it allows IFAD to contribute to address more of the many challenges that Angola struggles with, including the long-lasting consequences of the war, deep economic inequalities, and institutions and human capital in acute need of support and strengthening.

295. The strategy was well aligned with the governmental policies. The 2005 COSOP and the portfolio have been well aligned with the key development and sectoral policies of the Government and have offered an opportunity to implement some of these, creating institutional capacity and generating ground-validated knowledge about what worked better to achieve the established goals. A similar good alignment was found with IFAD's strategic objectives over the period under evaluation, and with the IFAD strategy for the ESA region.

296. Appropriate targeting on the most vulnerable. The COSOP, in line with the situation of the country in 2005, correctly identified IFAD's target in the most vulnerable: women and woman-headed households, youth, demobilized soldiers and returnees. The projects designed since, followed the same lines and identified their target population in the poor, among which also the poorer, farming and fishing households; women, also as household heads; and youth. Over time, the need to address demobilized soldiers and returnees disappeared as people progressively settled down.

297. Emphasis on the need for partnerships. The COSOP correctly identified partnerships with other development actors, as a key element of IFAD's work in Angola, in consideration of the need to join forces at the financial level and to achieve significant results through policy dialogue. This was particularly important in a country where coordination among development partners only happens

[105] IOE developed a simplified mapping of the logical chain of the 2005 COSOP, included in annex VIII.

through their own initiative; and where the limited human capital does not allow multiplication of projects and initiatives.

298. Portfolio design broadly in line with the COSOP. Through the efforts of the CPMTs over time, the design of the portfolio adequately complied with the strategy and addressed most of the thrusts identified in the 2005 COSOP, i.e. focus on food production, social empowerment, institution building at different levels, HIV and AIDS. However, the 'securing access to land' element was only addressed in MOSAP I design, and in a limited way moreover, by planning training workshops for Municipal-level governmental staff. Furthermore, the PDRs for MOSAP I, SAMAP and ARP did and do give attention to empowerment, including for women and youth, both as an objective and approach, but mostly focused on empowering the rural poor to participate in the project's activities, thus a self-serving purpose.

299. Relevance assessment-summary. The analysis of the evidence available found a high degree of coherence between the 2005 COSOP and the loan portfolio approved, a good level of alignment between these and the national policies, as well as a high degree of relevance of IFAD support to the needs of the Angolan rural poor. Thus, the CSPE assessed the relevance of the strategy proposed in the 2005 COSOP and underpinning the country portfolio in the period 2005-2017, as satisfactory (5).

B. Effectiveness

300. Partial results achieved against the COSOP indicators. Table 14 shows the strategic objectives, outcome-level indicators and results achieved by the time of the CSPE, as per the available information. The table also includes evidence available in the reports generated by PRODECA and PESNORTE that had reached completion within two years from the 2005 COSOP approval.

Table 14
Results against the COSOP results framework indicators

Strategic objectives	*Outcome indicators*	*Results over the COSOP period*
SO1: Increased family-based production of basic food crops among food insecure groups in the Central Highlands.	Number of households that have improved food security	No information available
	Number of farmers adopting technology recommended by the project (by gender)	MOSAP I: 32,300 smallholder farmers participants, 42.7 per cent of whom were women
	Number of farmers reporting production/yield increases	MOSAP I: 40 per cent of the participants adopted a set of improved agricultural technologies that led to an average increase of 10 per cent of agricultural production by smallholders in the target areas
	Number of households provided with long-term security of tenure of natural resources, including land and water	The issue was only addressed in the design of MOSAP I, but not during implementation. Recent projects do not engage on the issue.
	Ha of common property resources (under improved management practices)	ARP may address it, though no progress made yet.
SO2: Empowered rural organisations and vulnerable groups demand appropriate services and infrastructures in municípios, including schools, health centres and wells	Number/amount of functioning infrastructure, schools, health centres	PRODECA: rehabilitation of 300 schools, 300 health posts; 3 IDA offices and 18 Agricultural Development Office at district level (EDAs); 75 wells equipped with motor-pumps PESNORTE rehabilitated 11 schools, 9 professors' houses and 11 health centres. MOSAP I contributed to the construction of 7 houses for extension officers and 2 Agricultural Development Office at district level (EDAs)
	Number of households served by wells	The issue was not addressed in MOSAP I; AFAP and ARP may address it, though no progress made yet.
	Number of farmers with secure access to water	The issue was not addressed in MOSAP I; AFAP and ARP may address it, though no progress made yet.
	Number of groups with women leaders	MOSAP I: women represented 10.5 per cent of the leaders of the established associations.
	Number of groups operational/functional, by type	PESNORTE: 145 Savings and Credit groups, 18 fishers' cooperatives; 15 groups for social infrastructure management. MOSAP I: 726 Farmer Field Schools were established; all farming households in the project areas became members of an association.
SO3: Informed pro-poor policies based on improved knowledge of rural poverty	Number of projects where new/changed pro-poor legislation or regulations are enforced at the local or national levels	Three: MOSAP I, SAMAP and ARP use the FFS as the methodological approach for agricultural extension.
	Number of community action plans included in local government plans	None so far; AFAP should in future, support the development of Community Action Plans

301. The table shows how the COSOP logical framework, to some extent, used the output-level indicators of the on-going projects at the time, PRODECA and PESNORTE, as outcome indicators. Thus, had data been available, it would have been mostly useful in terms of delivery, rather than results. Moreover, even if more accurate outcome level indicators had been identified, it is uncertain that the baselines and the monitoring system of MOSAP I, would have allowed capturing those in a systematic manner.

302. The effectiveness of IFAD's work in Angola could thus only partially be measured against the COSOP's indicators, partly because of the weakness of the monitoring system. In addition, MOSAP I did not include activities relevant to some indicators, namely the security of tenure, improved management of natural resources on common land, and domestic water supply. The on-going and upcoming interventions may address improved management of natural resources, e.g. ARP in communal grazing areas; and domestic and livestock water supply, through AFAP with community development work; and through ARP in the drought-stricken areas.

303. Mixed progress towards the strategic objectives. Overall, the data available about progress by MOSAP I towards the strategic objectives defined by the COSOP, namely on adoption rates of IFPs, membership of farmers' organization, of women in leadership positions, reflect well the strengths and weaknesses of the portfolio so far. More specifically, the CSPE found evidence that progress was made as discussed below.

304. SO1: Family-based production of food-crops increased, both in productivity and in volumes, as a consequence of both IFPs and larger plots cultivated by groups, thanks to MOSAP I support for mechanized ploughing. Yield improvements were significant, also due to the low level of baseline data in this respect; but there were no data indicating how many households were definitely pulled out of food-insecurity, and for how many the improvement was only temporary. Some key gaps in analysis also existed, with regards to the reasons for the uneven adoption of some IFPs, in particular in the individual fields.

305. SO1 included 'security of access to land' among its indicators, although no actions were implemented in this sense. The CSPE identified some shortcomings in the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of MOSAP I and AFAP, as a consequence of land tenure insecurity. This was and remained a major challenge which will represent a threat to the sustainability of most interventions in rural areas, including on natural resources management and adaptation to climate change, unless adequately addressed.

306. SO2: empowerment through FFS. The three agriculture-focused initiatives, MOSAP I, SAMAP and AP, by upscaling the FFS and by supporting functional literacy, did and can pave the way to a real empowerment process of farmers' associations and their members, as initially intended in the 2005 COSOP. AFAP PDR, in turn, embraced a definition of empowerment that should lead to communities, able to make decisions and demand accountability on behalf of their members.

307. SO3: impact on policy implementation. The decision in MOSAP I to use the FFS as the main extension method in the project, led to its adoption as the national agricultural extension methodology. The FFS will be further scaled up in new provinces through SAMAP and ARP. The impact at the policy level was un-planned in MOSAP I, though it was envisaged in the COSOP strategy and logical framework.

308. Capacity development insufficient. One recurrent challenge mentioned in the COSOP and across the portfolio, has been the recognition that Angola, due to its recent history, shows a dramatic dearth of human resources in the sectors of IFAD's mandate, including on management and fiduciary issues. This

notwithstanding, and despite provisions for capacity development and institutional strengthening in AFAP and SAMAP PDRs, no measures were taken by IFAD to make available technical assistance that could support the development of these competences through in-service training, mentoring, or very close supervision. Despite the efforts of CPMTs members to provide guidance by email, telephone and during the supervision mission, this has not been sufficient to avoid delays in project implementation and less than efficient use of financial resources, which in turn has affected effectiveness.

309. Effectiveness assessment – summary. In view of the above, the effectiveness of the strategy underpinning the 2005 COSOP and the country portfolio in the period 2005-2017, was assessed as moderately satisfactory (4).

C. Overall assessment of the country strategy and programme performance

310. IFAD strategy in Angola, as designed in the 2005 COSOP and implemented through the portfolio, was and still is highly relevant to support the country in addressing the huge challenge of reconstruction after almost thirty years of civil conflict. This led to widespread poverty and food insecurity, drop of agricultural production and productivity, loss of knowledge about agriculture, loss of human capital and institutional capacity.

311. During the period under evaluation the effectiveness of the portfolio was mixed. The main obstacle to better results emerged to be the shortcomings in IFAD's support to implementation, which should have been more intensive and closer to the country, to tackle the acknowledged dearth of human capital in the country.

312. The CSPE, taking into account the evidence available and the discussions above about relevance and effectiveness, assessed the overall performance of the country strategy and programme performance as moderately satisfactory (4). Table 15 shows the scoring for each component.

Table 15
Country strategy and programme performance assessment

Relevance	5
Effectiveness	4
Overall	4

Key points

- The 2005 COSOP, and the 2016 CSN, adequately defined IFAD's role in Angola and provided a solid frame of reference for all projects designed and approved since then.
- In line with national policies, the COSOP strategy addressed key issues affecting rural poverty, in the regions where action appeared to be most urgent. The current portfolio allowed IFAD to reach out to other geographical and sectoral areas of poverty, in close collaboration with partners and meeting the needs of the Government and of the rural people.
- Some progress was made towards the initial objectives; although weaknesses in the monitoring systems did not allow capturing better the changes in livelihoods of the rural poor.
- However, the implementation of the strategy was hampered by the dearth of national human capital; a key gap that was not adequately addressed in IFAD's implementation approach.

VII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

313. In 2002, Angola emerged from almost thirty years of civil war. The entire physical infrastructure, as well as its institutional and human capital, had to be completely reconstructed. Impressive improvements in the macro-economic indicators were achieved thanks to the revenues from the extractive industry, which however in more recent years proved highly volatile and not sufficient to guarantee sustainable and equitable economic opportunities for all.

314. In particular, the rural family farming sector still suffers from insufficient investments in road and social infrastructures, and from an unfavourable policy environment that has depressed prices for domestic agricultural production for long years. As a result, agriculture is still: largely subsistence-based, with low yields and low returns to labour and land; undercapitalised; and affected by weak links with local and national input/output markets. For the sector to effectively contribute to the national economic development according to its potential, and to be attractive for young people, measures required include adjustments in the macroeconomic framework, improvements in the business climate, construction of rural and transport infrastructures, and investments in developing labour skills. In addition, the initial visible consequences of climate change effects on agriculture must also be addressed.

315. A first initial positive step towards a more enabling environment for small-scale producers has been the Government's recognition that the recovery of the agricultural and rural sectors has lagged behind. Two other game-changing elements have recently emerged: the interest of the Government elected in August 2017 in revamping the family farming sector; and the acknowledgment by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the key role that the family farming sector can have in sustainably addressing the current national economic and financial crisis and in meeting the national food requirements. Both represent at the same time, important reasons and opportunities, for IFAD to be more visible and active in country, through both lending and non-lending initiatives, in support of pro-poor agricultural and rural development.

316. The 2005 COSOP firmly focused the intervention strategy of the Fund on supporting the rural poor, including women and youth, to re-establish their productive capacity and to progress towards food security and better livelihoods. One of the positive results of the focus on rural poverty was MOSAP I. Supported by the Fund with other partners, the project effectively contributed to achieve the COSOP's objectives, by enhancing production and productivity, establishing and strengthening producers' organizations and developing the capacity of both institutions and producers. An empowering methodology that facilitates the dialogue between poor small-scale producers and the institutions, the Farmer Field School, was implemented at a large scale, and adopted as the national method of agricultural extension.

317. Over the decades, IFAD has been a reliable partner of the Government of Angola, and has provided its support as circumstances and needs required, . As described in chapter V, the Fund has gained the trust and respect of both the Government and its partners in the country through the quality of its work. The model adopted of a project facilitator resident in the country, who would ensure smooth dialogue and communication with key stakeholders, proved to be very efficient and effective during the first part of the period under evaluation. With this set-up, the CPM and supporting staff resident in headquarters could easily reach out to the Government as frequently as required, and vice-versa. This was a light and inexpensive arrangement that enabled a continuous, open-door modality of communication with all key stakeholders and led to key achievements in terms of partnerships and dialogue on policies.

318. In line with the 2016 Country Strategy Note, the ongoing IFAD portfolio increased considerably its size due to the recently revamped relationship between the Government and IFAD, and to the Fund's willingness to support the country at a special juncture of economic crisis and rethinking of the national economic development model. It builds on the lessons learned so far, and expands the geographic and sectoral areas of intervention, to support small-scale producers in eight provinces, and improve the production of small-scale agriculture, sustainably manage fresh-water fisheries and aquaculture, develop value chains, and recover from extreme climate events.

319. The new portfolio is also a challenge, considering the recurrent difficulties in project implementation in Angola due to the limited human capital, and the complexity of the initiatives themselves. Other identified factors that had and will still have a bearing on the future performance of IFAD-supported interventions are: the pattern of communication and collaboration with national institutions; and the importance of solid partnerships with other stakeholders to achieve and upscale results. All these factors point to the need for more intensive and closer guidance for projects to operate efficiently and effectively in the country, and for continued presence in the country to ensure the level of networking, dialogue, and coordination required to achieve the ambitious expected results.

320. The IFAD strategy in Angola recognized the need for intensive capacity development at all levels. Such need was adequately met during the implementation of MOSAP I, whereby the capacity, competences and skills of staff in IDA - from the central to the front-line extension office level and of participating farmers were strengthened. IFAD should ensure that the same results are achieved through the implementation of SAMAP and ARP. Nevertheless, the CSPE noted that, to date, limited action has been carried out to address the dearth of human resources in Angola. IFAD should support the development of a pool of experienced professionals in particular those equipped with skills concerning the management of development initiatives and fiduciary issues, as well as technical areas of key importance in agricultural and rural development. The range of possible options and models to adopt is broad, and different circumstances may require different approaches. Among many others, the CSPE identified a few possible modalities that might be suitable to the specific circumstances of IFAD in Angola:

- establishing formal agreements with project management units of projects funded by other IFIs, provided they have relevant and experienced fiduciary professionals that can initially support IFAD funded projects;
- supporting young educated staff to gain experience, through in-service training, mentoring and close supervision from staff in headquarters or international consultants, at a distance;
- posting experienced staff or consultants in the PCUs for several months, full- or part-time;
- outsourcing fiduciary issues to external service providers;
- organizing trainings of few weeks in headquarters, for management, administration and finance staff from PCUs;
- medium- and long-term training abroad for those skills and competences for which there is virtually no expertise in the country, e.g. agroecology, dryland agriculture, food safety and quality;
- collaboration with national universities, to engage with both professors and students in project design and implementation and to contribute to curriculum development; and
- South-South and triangular cooperation on technical themes.

321. In line with the 2005 COSOP, adequate provisions were made in all project designs towards the inclusion of women and youth as beneficiaries, and for their empowerment. The CSPE noted that, in this respect, IFAD projects yielded mixed results. A large part of the beneficiaries targeted by MOSAP I were women, who benefitted of increased production and incomes, of the grinding mills, and of the functional literacy. Along the way, however, efforts towards women's empowerment were few, if any at all, which led to a minimal share of women in leadership roles in farmers' associations and to no women in the role of Master facilitators; or as members of PPIUs in a technical role.

322. With regards to the participation of youth in IFAD's projects, results have been even less positive. Admittedly, this concern has emerged only recently in the international and national discourse; and agriculture in Angola is still not an attractive sector for young people. All however recognize the importance, also in terms of broader national security, of offering to young people, opportunities to live sustainable livelihoods in rural areas based on primary production. Moreover, both women's empowerment and inclusion of youth are among the fundamental pillars of the national goals of an equitable and peaceful society; and both need to be adequately addressed and pursued in IFAD-supported interventions.

323. One of the evaluation questions for the CSPE was to provide recommendations for areas of focus in the next COSOP, to be prepared in 2018. Overall, the thrusts and approaches of AFAP, SAMAP and ARP are highly relevant to reaching out to different types of producers, and steer their productions towards the national markets, with the adequate attention to sustainable natural resources management and strengthening resilience against climate change and other shocks. The integration of value chain development in SAMAP will be an important opportunity to field test in the country of the approach, and could also possibly lead to integrate additional crops to the FFS curriculum, to better seize market and value addition opportunities. Nevertheless, the key issues listed below appear to have been side-lined in the current portfolio, although they deserve more attention and should be addressed, to contribute to the development of an enabling environment that allows sustained poverty reduction:

    (a) land tenure and titling for small-scale producers;

    (b) in line with the principles of agroecology, productive models adapted to climate change, which strengthen the natural resource base and use low-environmental impact technologies.

324. In addition, two main areas of work are likely to gain increasing importance in Angola in the near future, namely: safety and quality of agricultural, fisheries and aquaculture productions; agricultural development around urban centres specialized in fresh produce; and along main national/international transport axis, oriented to transportable and long shelf-life products. Although these may not be domain where IFAD has a strong comparative advantage, it could effectively contribute to these in close partnership with other stakeholders.

325. Finally, at a more operational level, the CSPE identified several weaknesses in AFAP implementation. These are partly due to an over-ambitious design that did not fully address the national context in which the project would be implemented, and partly to in-sufficient attention by IFAD to the need for adequate measures addressing the limited national human capital on various themes. The synergy between these factors was leading, at the time of the CSPE, to an inefficient and ineffective use of time and energy by intended beneficiaries, and to a reputational risk for IFAD. At the same time, AFAP's thrust is highly relevant for reducing poverty and enhancing food security in rural Angola and the project is an important opportunity that should not be missed.

B. Recommendations

326. The CSPE, building on the conclusions discussed above, formulated five key recommendations for consideration by IFAD and the Government of Angola that should be discussed and agreed upon by the two parties in the Agreement at Completion Point, to feed into the preparation of the future COSOP.

327. Recommendation 1. IFAD in Angola should remain the champion for sustainable and pro-poor agricultural and rural development; and address through its investments and policy dialogue, key issues in relation to land tenure and agroecology. IFAD has been so far one of the key players in fostering rural pro-poor approaches and interventions. This comparative advantage should be sustained and strengthened, by closely collaborating with the Government to create an enabling environment for, and by directly supporting small-scale producers to improve their livelihoods and rise out of poverty, through the market opportunities that progressively will emerge in the country.

328. Recommendation 2. In the current context of expanded portfolio and critical national interest for agricultural and rural development, IFAD should reinforce its capacity for implementation support and policy engagement in the country. For IFAD to play its role as envisaged in Recommendation 1, and in consideration of the evidence available about the need for a tangible presence in the country to enable efficiency and effectiveness of networking and dialogue on policy, the model of project facilitator should be re-vamped, in a full-time modality and with some administrative support. This would be an efficient and effective factor to ensure coherence and coordination across the growing lending portfolio, also in view of the desirability of upscaling its successful achievements.

329. Recommendation 3. IFAD should make Capacity development one of the pillars and cross-cutting principles for its portfolio in Angola. IFAD should contribute to fill the gap in the national human capital in the areas and sectors that are relevant to the implementation of its portfolio. This should be done through the systematic allocation of resources and management provisions within the portfolio, that provide opportunities for capacity development at the individual and institutional level, through the most appropriate approaches and method, including in-service trainings, mentoring, short- and long-term trainings and higher education opportunities, among others.

330. Recommendation 4. IFAD-supported projects should include a stronger focus on women empowerment and youth inclusion. IFAD's targeting strategy and implementation approaches should: (i) fully integrate a gender equality perspective, and actively promote the social and economic empowerment of women; and (ii) aim at creating sustainable and attractive opportunities in the rural areas for youth, both men and women, by enabling their access to capacity development opportunities, rural financial resources, and sustainable livelihoods. Dedicated human resources in project coordination units, also shared across interventions, appeared necessary, given the limited national competence in this respect.

331. Recommendation 5. IFAD and the Government of Angola should refocus AFAP. The project should be re-formulated, framing it as a pilot initiative to test models for both fresh-water fisheries and aquaculture development and carry out studies and analysis that can inform as appropriate, the later expansion of the investments to other parts of the country. In doing so, an effective involvement of all stakeholders should also be pursued. The budget should be revised based on the new implementation plan and if resources will be available, the duration of the loan should also be extended accordingly.

Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

Criteria	*Definition* *	*Mandatory*	*To be rated*
Rural poverty impact	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.	X	Yes
	Four impact domains		
	• Household income and net assets: Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.		No
	• Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor's individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.		No
	• Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.		No
	• Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.		No
Project performance	Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.	X	Yes
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.	X	Yes
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	X	Yes
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.	X	Yes
Sustainability of benefits	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.	X	Yes
Other performance criteria			
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women's empowerment, for example, in terms of women's access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women's incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.	X	Yes
Innovation	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.	X	Yes
Scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and other agencies.	X	Yes
Environment and natural resources management	The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.	X	Yes
Adaptation to climate change	The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.	X	Yes

Criteria	*Definition* *	*Mandatory*	*To be rated*
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women's empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.	X	Yes
Performance of partners			
• IFAD	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.	X	Yes
• Government		X	Yes

* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE's evaluation criteria and key questions.

Ratings of IFAD lending portfolio in the Republic of Angola[a]

Criteria	*MOSAP*	*AFAP*	*SAMAP*	*ARP*	*Overall portfolio*
Rural poverty impact	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
Project performance					
Relevance	5	4	5	5	5
Effectiveness	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
Efficiency	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3
Sustainability of benefits	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
Project performance[b]	**4**	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	**4**
Other performance criteria					
Gender equality and women's empowerment	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
Innovation	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5
Scaling up	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
Environment and natural resources management	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3
Adaptation to climate change	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3
Portfolio performance and results[c]	**4**	**n.a.**	**n.a.**	**n.a.**	**4**

[a] Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

[b] Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits.

[c] This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management and adaption to climate change.

Final ratings of the country strategy and programme in the Republic of Angola

	Rating
Project portfolio performance and results[a]	**4**
Non-lending activities[b]	
Country-level policy engagement	4
Knowledge management	3
Partnership-building	5
Overall non-lending activities	4
Performance of partners	
IFAD[c]	4
Government[c]	4
Country strategy and programme performance (overall)[d]	
Relevance	5
Effectiveness	4
Overall	4

[a] Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings.

[b] Not an arithmetic average for knowledge management, partnership-building and country-level policy engagement.

[c] Not an arithmetic average of individual project ratings. The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

[d] This is not an arithmetic average of the ratings of relevance and effectiveness of the country and strategy programme and performance. The ratings for relevance and effectiveness take into account the assessment and ratings of portfolio results, non-lending activities and performance of partners but they are not an arithmetic average of these.

IFAD-supported loans in the Republic of Angola since 1989[a]

Project name	*Project type*	*Total project cost* US$ million	*IFAD approved financing* US$ million	*Co-financing* US$ million	*Counterpart* US$ million	*Beneficiary contribution* US$ million	*Executive Board approval*	*Loan effectiveness*	*Project completion date*	*Cooperating institution*	*Project status*
Malanje Smallholder Sector Rehabilitation Project	Agricultural Development	11.9	7.2	3.1	1.6	0	05/12/1989	30/05/1991	30/06/1995	OPEC Fund	Closed
Northern Region Food-crops Development Project (PRODECA)	Research/ Extension/ training	18.8	13.4	3.6	1.8	0	07/12/1995	02/01/1997	31/12/2006	Belgian Survival Fund	Closed
Northern Fishing Communities Development Programme (PESNORTE)	Marketing/ Storage/ Processes	9.2	7.3	1.0	0.6	0.3	04/12/1997	15/02/1999	31/12/2007	Belgian Survival Fund	Closed
Market-oriented Smallholder Agriculture Project (MOSAP I)	Agricultural Development	49.4	8.2	30.1 4.0	4.1	3.0	13/12/2007	05/11/2009	31/03/2016	WB/IDA, Japan Technical Assistance Programme	Closed
Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project (AFAP)	Rural Development	12.1	11.1	0	1.0	0	10/04/2015	26/08/2015	30/09/2021	None	Ongoing
Smallholder Agriculture Development and Commercialisation Project in Cuanza Sul and Huila Provinces (SAMAP)	Rural Development	38.2	28.9	0	8.2	1.1	10/04/2017	09/08/2017	30/09/2024	None	Ongoing
Agricultural Recovery Project (ARP)	Rural Development	7.6	5.0 1.0[b]	0.5	0.7	0.4	08/09/2017			FAO	Pending loan effectiveness
Total		147.3	82	42.3	17.9	4.8					
Total CSPE		**107.3**	**54.2**	**34.6**	**14.0**	**4.5**					

a. As of 30 November 2017
b. Grant component of the loan

IFAD-funded grants in, or involving, the Republic of Angola since 2005

Project/grant name	*Grant number*	*Grant amount US$*	*Grant recipient*	*Approval date*	*Effective date*	*Completion date*	*Country*
Strengthening Community Resilience and Responses to HIV/AIDS through Livelihoods	G-I-R-743	160.000	CARE	21/12/2004	07/06/2005	31/12/2006	Angola
Community land mapping and conflict mitigation in the Central Highlands	G-I-R-846	149.000	Development workshop	12/01/2006	10/04/2006	10/04/2008	Angola
Participatory analysis of lessons learned in community development initiatives in the Central Highlands	G-I-R-847	50.000	Angolan Non- Governmental Organizations Forum (FONGA)	12/01/2006	10/04/2006	10/04/2007	Angola
Rural poverty studies	G-I-R-908	100.000	CEIC	08/12/2006	10/04/2007	10/10/2008	Angola
Cooperative development project	Grant 909-CLUSA	100.000	Cooperative League of the USA/National Cooperative Business Association (CLUSA/NCBA)	08/12/2006	07/04/2007	31/12/2009	Angola
Aquaculture Assessment and Value Chain Pilots for Improving Fish Supply	2000001203	2.900.000*	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), World Fish	22/12/2016	03/04/2017	31/04/2020	Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo

*: IFAD will provide US$ 2.4 million; the balance will be provided by World Fish and IITA as in-kind contribution through staff-time

List of key persons met

Government

Name	Role	Organization
H.E. Victória Cristóvão de Barros Neto	Minister	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea
H.E. José Amaro Tati	Secretary of State for Agriculture	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Mr Abias João Fernandes	Chief, Agriculture Development District Office	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr Alfredo Junior Alexandre	Head, Agricultural Statistics Unit, Provincial Agricultural Department	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr Altemiro Jorge De Ceita Diogo	Director, Studies, Planning and Statistics Division	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Mr Amadeu Cambium	Deputy District Administrator	Provincial Administration
Mr Anderson Geronimo	Officer, Studies, Planning and Statistics Division	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Mr Angelo do Rosario Rafael	Counsellor, Alternate Permanent Representative of the Republic of Angola to FAO, WFP and IFAD	Permanent Representation of Angola to FAO, WFP and IFAD
Mr António Manoel Teixeira	Director, Provincial Agricultural Department	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
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Mr Carlos Assis Diogo Neto	Director, Fisheries Sector Support Project	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea, Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA)
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Mr Carlos Lichony	Accountant and Administrator, MOSAP II Provincial Project Implementation Unit	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
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Name		Role	Organization
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Mr	Dias Domingos Zoa	Coordinator, Provincial Agricultural Development Office	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
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Mr	Guilherme Chicala Chivambo	Coordinator, MOSAP II Provincial Project Implementation Unit	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Helder J. F. Golombole	Procurement assistant, MOSAP II Provincial Project Implementation Unit	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Henrique	Technical Assistant, Agriculture Development District Office	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Hermenegildo Keane dos Santos	Director, National Direction for Agricultural Hydraulics and Rural Engineering	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Mr	João Hamel José	Officer, Studies, Planning and Statistics Division	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Mr	Jorge Pina	Technical Specialist	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	José Adalberto	Communication Officer, MOSAP II Provincial Project Implementation Unit	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Joy Nelito Sousa	Aquaculture extension officer, Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea, Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA)
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Mr	Manoel Domingues	Chief, Provincial Agriculture Development Office	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Manoel Gicula	Chief Department of Public Investment	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea
Mr	Manoel Pedro	Chief, Department for International Relations and Cooperation	Ministry of Finance

Name		Role	Organization
Mr	Mário Jamba Tchipilica	Provincial Supervisor and Farmer Field School Focal Point	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Mauricio Santos	District Supervisor	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Miguel da Cruz	Monitoring and Evaluation specialist, Project Coordination Unit, Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea, Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA)
Mr	Moisés Samoali	Officer, Studies and Planning Unit	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea
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Mr	Victor Barreto	Fisheries Specialist, Fisheries Sector Support Project	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea, Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA)
Mr	Victorino Chonguela	Chief, Provincial Agriculture Development Office	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Mr	Victorino de Alexandre Moua	Deputy District Administrator	Provincial Administration

Name		Role	Organization
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Ms	Joana Garcia Cesar	Aquaculture extension officer, Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea, Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA)
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Ms	Maria Dombaxe	Project Coordinator, Project Coordination Unit, Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea, Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA)
Ms	Maria Julia Vaz Grave	Project Coordinator, MOSAP II	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Development Institute (IDA)
Ms	Nvula Camacho	Chief, Department for Internal and External Funding	Ministry of Finance
Ms	Ruth Mixinge	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Social Action, , Women Promotion and Family
Ms	Silvia Chipenda	Accountant, Project Coordination Unit, Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture Project	Ministry of Fisheries and Sea, Institute for Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IDPAA)
Ms	Teresa Bumba	Officer, Studies and Planning Unit	Ministry of Environment

International and donor institutions

Name		Role	Organization
Mr	Joel Daniel Muzima	Chief country economist, Angola office, Southern Africa Regional Development Business Delivery Office	African Development Bank
Ms	Marta Brites	Deputy Head of Cooperation	Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Angola
Mr	Anastacio Roque Gonçalves	Assistant FAO Representative, Programme	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

Name		Role	Organization
Ms	Lisa Angeli	Project Assistant	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Mr	Mamoudou Diallo	FAO Representative in Angola	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Mr	Matteo Tonini	Project Officer	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Mr	Simon Rietbergen	Senior Forestry Officer	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Ms	Sophia Lyamouri	Nutrition Economist	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Ms	Abla Benhammouche	Country Director	IFAD
Mr	Claus Reiner	Country Programme Manager, Latin America and the Caribbean Division	IFAD
Mr	Jonathan N. Agwe	Senior Technical Specialist, Inclusive Rural Financial Services, Policy and Technical Advisory Division	IFAD
Mr	Malu Muia Ndavi	Lead Technical Specialist, Programme Management Department (EC-CGIAR)	IFAD
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Mr	Michael Hamp	Lead Technical Specialist, Inclusive Rural Financial Services, Policy and Technical Advisory Division	IFAD
Mr	Périn de Saint-Ange	Associate Vice-President, Programme Management Department	IFAD
Mr	Richard Abila	Senior Technical Specialist, Fisheries and Aquaculture Service	IFAD
Mr	Robert Creswell	Financial Management Specialist	IFAD
Mr	Sana Jatta	Director, East and Southern Africa Division	IFAD
Ms	Shirley Chinien	Regional Economist, East and Southern Africa Division	IFAD
Mr	Waseem Shahzad	Procurement Specialist, East and Southern Africa Division	IFAD
Ms	Paxina Chileshe	Climate Change Adaptation Specialist, Policy and Technical Advisory Division	IFAD
Mr	Robson Mutandi	Country Programme Director	IFAD
Ms	Carla Ferreira	Former IFAD Country Programme Manager in Angola	International Atomic Energy Agency
Mr	Pier Paolo Balladelli	Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative	UN/UNDP
Mr	José Novais Félix	Programme Specialist, Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	UNDP
Mr	Henrik Fredborg Larsen	Country Director	United Nations Development Programme
Mr	Aniceto Bila	MOSAP I and II Task Manager	World Bank
Ms	Clara de Sousa	Country Manager, Angola & São Tomé and Príncipe	World Bank

Non-governmental organizations and associations

Name	Role	Organization
Mr Evaristo Waya	Partnership coordinator	ADPP
Mr Rikke Viholm	Country coordinator	ADPP

Private sector

Name	Role	Organization
Mr Fernando Pacheco	Former IFAD Project Facilitator in Angola	Independent consultant

Beneficiaries

Name	Role	Organization	Location
Aquaculture groups	Coordinator, and 90 members	Sanguela community	Malanje Province
Chinene Farmer Field School	President, Treasurer, Farmer Field School coordinator, 35 members	Chinene community	Bailundo, Huambo Province
Cooperativa 24 de março	President, Treasurer, Members and Farmer Field School coordinator, 82 members	Cacuso Community	Malanje Province
Deolinda Rodrigues Farmer Field School	President, Treasurer, Members and Farmer Field School coordinator, and 18 members	Manyako community	Calussinga, Bié Province
Essanjo Farmer Field School Association	President, Treasurer, Farmer Field School coordinator, 35 members	Caiti community	Bailundo, Huambo Province
Fishers' organization Nzala Nzoji Yeto	Coordinator and Members, 76 persons	Massangano Community	Dondo, Cuanza Norte Province
Kasanga Farmer Field School	President, Treasurer, Members and Farmer Field School coordinator, 21 members	Kasanga community	Malanje Province
Lombe community Farmer Field School	President, Treasurer, Members and Farmer Field School coordinator, 50 members	Lombe community	Malanje Province
Ncuso Kitadi Association and Farmer Field School	President, Treasurer, Members and Farmer Field School coordinator, 39 members	Muquixi Community	Malanje Province
Tchimoni Farmer Field School Association	President, Treasurer, Farmer Field School coordinator, 35 members	Bailundo community	Bailundo, Huambo Province
Chindonga Farmer Field School	President, Treasurer, Members and Farmer Field School coordinator, and 23 members	Chindonga community	Calussinga, Bié Province
Lagoa de Kazanga Aquaculture Group	Coordinator, members, 20 persons		Dondo, Cuanza Norte Province

Main elements of the 2005 COSOP and of the 2017/18 Country Strategy Note logical/management frameworks for comparison

Issue	*2005 COSOP*	*2017/18 CSN*
Strategic niche	To promote demand-driven local-level approaches that ensure that policy development and programmes to rebuild the livelihoods of the rural poor are based on the actual constraints and aspirations of the rural poor.	
Cross-cutting principles	a. careful targeting that focuses on areas of medium to high potential where the greatest number of people live and farm; b. the empowerment of the rural poor, including access to material goods and organization in order to assert influence collectively; and c. ensuring democratic accountability by supporting the rural poor in exercising greater influence over local and national public institutions.	
Overarching goal	To ensure food security and increase incomes, particularly among the most vulnerable groups in food-insecure areas of the central highlands.	To ensure food security and increase incomes, particularly among the most vulnerable groups in food and nutrition-insecure areas of the central highlands and littoral zones
Strategic objectives	SO1: Increased family-based production of basic food crops among food insecure groups in the Central Highlands. SO 2: Empowered rural organizations and vulnerable groups demand appropriate services and infrastructures in municípios, including schools, health centres and wells SO 3: Informed pro-poor policies based on improved knowledge of rural poverty	Increased family-based production of basic food crops among food and nutrition-insecure groups in selected parts of the country
Indicators (from CPI, simplified if compared to COSOP)	Increased incomes Improved food security Empowerment Aid effectiveness agenda	
Geographic priorities	Central Highlands, the most vulnerable for food insecurity. Northern coast and northern provinces in general	Central highlands and littoral zones

Issue	*2005 COSOP*	*2017/18 CSN*
Thrusts	Food production: support to poor rural households in the production and diversification of food crops income-generating schemes to meet their income and nutritional needs. Possible free distribution of seeds and inputs for some communities and vulnerable groups. Local selection, production and distribution systems for planting material and seeds. Livestock for traction.	Empower rural organizations and vulnerable groups demanding appropriate services and infrastructure for productive activities and wellbeing. It will also focus on enhancing the resilience of rural communities to climate shocks, where relevant.
	Secure access to productive land in the context of the 2004 land legislation, with a focus on vulnerable groups such as women. Approaches that involve rural organizations and local authorities in participatory mapping processes and information collection for the identification of community areas under cultivation or fallow and areas of cultural importance. The aim is to mitigate possible conflicts over land reclamation and ownership, particularly in the light of the return of displaced people and former combatants, as well as to promote investment in land through greater security of tenure	Supporting increased smallholder agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture productivity and production while building on lessons learned from earlier projects
	Social empowerment of the rural poor and strengthening of rural organizations, by articulating needs, building strategies to communicate the demand to meet such needs and forging partnerships with existing service providers, including município administrations. Consultation and planning mechanisms will have to be established and promoted, whereby local governments can meet with rural organizations to discuss rural development issues at the município level so as to boost the dialogue between and accountability of local authorities and the communities they serve. Advocacy for a policy framework conducive to the establishment and autonomous operation of rural organizations	Helping farmers and pastoralists in Southern Angola to recover from a five-year drought through a re-capitalisation of agricultural production and resilience building.
	Capacity-building among municípios to move towards participatory methodologies in identifying and responding to the needs of the rural poor, especially the needs of vulnerable groups. This includes advocating for the devolution of human and financial resources to rural areas to enable these areas to respond to locally identified needs, including improving the access of farmers to research and extension services. The knowledge and experience gained in rural areas will be shared with the central government in Luanda in order to support a shift from top-down to locally led approaches and the decentralization of resources and decision-making.	Non-project engagement: supporting the Government of Angola (GoA) to strengthen its institutional capacity in agricultural research to enhance smallholder access to agricultural innovations and technologies that address emerging issues in the productivity, production, and value chains of priority crops.
	Given the potentially severe impacts of HIV/AIDS on rural areas, the challenge for IFAD is to serve as a catalyst for a more effective sector response to the pandemic through grant support for HIV/AIDS and livelihoods initiatives and through the integration of HIV/AIDS into the health and education components of future projects.	
Tools	Loans integrated by grants; grants to ensure rapid response; policy dialogue. Ongoing and considered grants: 'Linking Financial Services to Farmer Associations in Angola' and 'Strengthening Community Resilience and Responses to HIV/AIDS through Livelihoods'; 'Promote Human Rights through Resolving Land Use and other Conflicts in Bié Province' and 'Participatory Analysis of the Lessons Learned in Community Development Initiatives in the Central Highlands'.	

Issue	*2005 COSOP*	*2017/18 CSN*
Opportunities for innovation	1. Building a knowledge base on rural population needs, constraints and solutions: a) Identifying target areas and groups; b) Learning as a basis for development in project design and implementation (M&E); 2. Shift away from a top-down culture: promote demand-driven local-level approaches to ensure that needs and opportunities are identified by the rural poor themselves and that the Government is supported in restoring basic services meeting locally expressed priorities.	
Target groups and targeting approach	Focus on the most vulnerable: women and woman-headed households, youth, demobilized soldiers and returnees.	
Partners	NGOs. Currently working with the Cooperative League of the United States of America and CARE. Others very active: Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (Action for Rural Development and the Environment), World Vision, OIKOS-Cooperação e Desenvolvimento, Caritas, and Save the Children. EU, USAID, World Bank; FAO and the UN, Belgian Survival Fund; OPEC.	
Policy Dialogue	Coordination with partners to increase the effectiveness of pro-poor policy dialogue by creating mechanisms for systematically analysing and sharing information on rural poverty so as to inform government policies and strategies	
Gender	Mention throughout that women are among the most vulnerable, the need for gender-disaggregated information, including gender-sensitive baselines. No specific gender goal, although targeting of women.	
Country Programme Management	Enhanced project supervision and implementation to be achieved through a combination of increased technical assistance and the support of the in-country project facilitator in order to coordinate activities and engage in dialogue with government units in Luanda and the provinces; Monitoring and Evaluation	

Source: COSOP 2005, Country Strategy Note 2017-2018

Simplified mapping of the logical chain of the 2005 Angola COSOP

C. Angola 2005 COSOP strategic objectives
Overarching goal: ensure food security and increase incomes, particularly among the most vulnerable groups in food-insecure areas of the central highlands
(a) increased family-based production of basic food crops among food-insecure groups in the central highlands;
(b) empowered rural organizations and vulnerable groups demanding appropriate services and infrastructure in *municípios*, including schools, health centres and wells; and
(c) informed pro-poor policies based on improved knowledge of rural poverty

↑

B. Main actions to achieve strategic objectives
Local level and demand driven approaches, addressing actual constraints and aspirations of the rural poor;
Targeting medium to high potential areas in the central highlands
Partnerships with NGO, multi- and bilateral development partners; leveraging co-financing; developing links between rural organizations and banks;

↑

Strategic focus for portfolio investments
Increase food production, including free distribution of inputs and seeds and livestock;
Enhance access to land, through participatory mapping processes;
Social empowerment of rural organizations
Strengthening of and capacity development within municipal institutions
Integration of HIV/AIDS concerns in IFAD-supported interventions

Source: IOE Elaboration, based on the 2005 Angola COSOP document.

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