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Invertir en la población rural

## **Evaluación a nivel institucional de la estructura financiera del FIDA**

### **Nota para los representantes en la Junta Ejecutiva**

Funcionarios de contacto:

Preguntas técnicas:

Envío de documentación:

**Oscar A. Garcia**

Director  
Oficina de Evaluación Independiente del FIDA  
Tel.: (+39) 06 5459 2274  
Correo electrónico: o.garcia@ifad.org

**Deirdre McGrenra**

Jefa  
Unidad de los Órganos Rectores  
Tel.: (+39) 06 5459 2374  
Correo electrónico: gb@ifad.org

**Fabrizio Felloni**

Director Adjunto  
Tel.: (+39) 06 5459 2361  
Correo electrónico: f.felloni@ifad.org

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**Para examen**

## Índice

<b>Agradecimientos</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>I. Generalidades</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II. Fuentes de financiación</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>III. Utilización de los fondos e instrumentos financieros</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>IV. Demanda de otros productos financieros</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>V. Gobernanza financiera, supervisión financiera y gestión del riesgo</b>	<b>7</b>
A. El papel de las consultas sobre la reposición	7
B. Supervisión y gestión financiera	7
<b>VI. Sostenibilidad financiera</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>VII. Conclusiones</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>VIII. Recomendaciones</b>	<b>11</b>

## Apéndice

I. Main report Corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's financial architecture [Informe principal Evaluación a nivel institucional de la estructura financiera del FIDA]	1
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## **Acrónimos y siglas**

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AIF	Asociación Internacional de Fomento
AOD	asistencia oficial para el desarrollo
BAfD	Banco Africano de Desarrollo
BAsD	Banco Asiático de Desarrollo
BIRF	Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento
FAfD	Fondo Africano de Desarrollo
IFD	institución de financiación del desarrollo
IOE	Oficina de Evaluación Independiente
KfW	Banco Alemán de Desarrollo
MSD	Marco de Sostenibilidad de la Deuda
PBAS	Sistema de Asignación de Recursos basado en los Resultados
SIF	Fondo de Inversiones para las PYME y los Pequeños Agricultores

# Evaluación a nivel institucional de la estructura financiera del FIDA

## I. Generalidades

1. **Antecedentes.** En diciembre de 2016 la Junta Ejecutiva aprobó la realización de una evaluación a nivel institucional de la estructura financiera del FIDA por la Oficina de Evaluación Independiente del FIDA (IOE). Es la primera evaluación exhaustiva e independiente de la estructura financiera de una institución de financiación del desarrollo (IFD). Su resultados se utilizarán para apoyar las decisiones que se adopten respecto de la estructura financiera del FIDA, su sostenibilidad financiera a largo plazo y su contribución financiera al logro de la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible (en lo sucesivo, Agenda 2030).
2. A los efectos de esta evaluación, se entiende por "estructura financiera" las políticas y los sistemas adoptados para movilizar, gestionar, asignar y desembolsar recursos financieros con vistas a facilitar el cumplimiento del mandato del Fondo de ayudar a reducir la pobreza rural. Una estructura financiera está formada por una serie de elementos esenciales, a saber: i) las fuentes de los fondos; ii) los instrumentos de apoyo financiero; iii) los sistemas de asignación, y iv) la gestión, la supervisión y la gobernanza.
3. El FIDA es un fondo y un organismo especializado de las Naciones Unidas creado en 1977 y es la única institución financiera internacional que centra su labor exclusivamente en la agricultura y el desarrollo rural. La estructura del estado contable del FIDA difiere de la de los bancos multilaterales de desarrollo, ya que estos últimos reciben calificaciones crediticias y emiten deuda en los mercados financieros para potenciar sus actividades crediticias. A instancias del Grupo de los 20, los bancos multilaterales de desarrollo están buscando formas de aumentar su apoyo financiero a la Agenda 2030 por medio de un apalancamiento más eficiente del capital propio, manteniendo a la vez una calificación crediticia AAA.
4. **Los objetivos de la evaluación** son los siguientes: i) evaluar la importancia que reviste la estructura financiera en la movilización de recursos; ii) examinar el valor agregado de los instrumentos financieros del FIDA para los Estados Miembros; iii) analizar la eficiencia de la estructura financiera; iv) evaluar la contribución de las estrategias de inversión y financiación a la sostenibilidad financiera del FIDA, y v) recomendar y definir alternativas y opciones que permitan fortalecer la estructura financiera y la capacidad del FIDA para financiar programas de reducción de la pobreza rural.
5. La evaluación se centró en el período comprendido entre 2007 y 2017; se recurrió a una combinación de métodos y se analizaron datos provenientes de diversas fuentes, a saber: i) el sistema de tesorería del FIDA; ii) las políticas financieras y la documentación financiera oficial; iii) los sistemas de información institucionales como el Sistema de Proyectos de Inversión y Donaciones, FlexCube y PeopleSoft; iv) entrevistas semiestructuradas con representantes de los órganos rectores, el equipo directivo superior y el personal del FIDA, los gobiernos de países prestatarios y otras IFD; v) intercambios con 17 países; vi) modelos financieros; vii) una encuesta electrónica de partes interesadas, y viii) un examen de organizaciones utilizadas como referencia.

## II. Fuentes de financiación

6. La estructura financiera tradicional del FIDA se basa en las contribuciones a las reposiciones y otras fuentes de financiación no reembolsables (p. ej., los reflujos de los préstamos, los ingresos procedentes de las inversiones de tesorería y los fondos complementarios y suplementarios). A primera vista, parecería una estructura apropiada para una institución que proporciona principalmente préstamos soberanos en condiciones favorables. El supuesto implícito ha sido que, en el largo

plazo, los Estados Miembros del FIDA estarían en condiciones y dispuestos a continuar proporcionando apoyo financiero en forma de donaciones en un nivel que permitiera al Fondo mantener o incrementar su programa de préstamos y donaciones.

7. Este supuesto depende en gran medida del entorno más amplio de la financiación para el desarrollo. En los últimos 10 años se han registrado tendencias favorables en lo que concierne a la asistencia oficial para el desarrollo (AOD). A precios constantes, la suma total de AOD aportada por los donantes de la Organización de Cooperación y Desarrollo Económicos pasó de USD 133 600 millones en 2006 a USD 195 400 millones en 2016, y la AOD destinada a la agricultura aumentó de USD 4 900 millones a USD 9 700 millones en el mismo período. No obstante, en las últimas reposiciones de la Asociación Internacional de Fomento (AIF) y el Fondo Africano de Desarrollo (FAfD) se ha registrado una disminución de las contribuciones de donantes tradicionales, aunque se debe señalar que la AIF ha incorporado la toma de empréstitos de mercado.
8. **Tras un aumento pronunciado del total de promesas de contribución a los recursos básicos entre la Séptima Reposición de los Recursos del FIDA (FIDA7) y la FIDA8, se considera que el volumen de las promesas en gran medida se ha estabilizado.** A precios constantes de 2015, las promesas pasaron de USD 687 millones en la FIDA7 a USD 1 075 millones en la FIDA8, y a USD 1 118 millones en la FIDA9, pero experimentaron un leve descenso en la FIDA10 (USD 1 014 millones).
9. **Las contribuciones complementarias y los fondos suplementarios** son recursos importantes. Su volumen combinado durante el período comprendido entre 2007 y 2016 representó algo más que la mitad del volumen de las contribuciones a las reposiciones. Pese a que desde el punto de vista jurídico son instrumentos distintos, en la práctica esta evaluación halló pocas diferencias entre la utilización de las contribuciones complementarias y la de los fondos suplementarios, excepto que las contribuciones complementarias no se aplican a sufragar los gastos administrativos. Los fondos suplementarios sí permiten sufragar los gastos administrativos, pero en un porcentaje inferior que en las organizaciones de referencia y generalmente necesitan la aprobación de la Junta incluso en caso de montos pequeños.
10. **La cofinanciación y la financiación de contrapartida nacional** movilizan recursos de asociados nacionales y organizaciones internacionales y son esenciales para apoyar la ampliación de escala. Entre 2007 y 2016, el coeficiente medio entre la financiación de contrapartida nacional y la financiación del FIDA fue de cerca de 0,7:1, mientras que el de la cofinanciación internacional fue de 0,52:1. Estos valores son compatibles con la meta general del coeficiente de cofinanciación fijada para la FIDA9 y la FIDA10 (1,2:1), si bien para la FIDA11 la meta se elevará a 1,4:1. Desde 2007 se ha registrado un leve descenso de la cofinanciación internacional, pero un aumento en la financiación de contrapartida nacional. Todavía queda margen para aumentar más la porción de cofinanciación internacional de las IFD multilaterales; específicamente, podrían surgir oportunidades en la esfera de la financiación para cuestiones relacionadas con el clima.
11. **Desde la FIDA9, las fuentes de financiación tradicionales** (las contribuciones a las reposiciones, los reflujos de los préstamos y los ingresos de tesorería) **no han sido suficientes para financiar el nivel deseado del programa de préstamos y donaciones.** Es por ello que el FIDA ha comenzado a recurrir al endeudamiento para apalancar su capital y reducir la brecha. En 2010 la Junta Ejecutiva aprobó el Fondo Fiduciario de España para el Mecanismo de Cofinanciación de la Seguridad Alimentaria (en lo sucesivo, Fondo Fiduciario de España), que ha sido un precursor de los préstamos soberanos. Posteriormente, en

septiembre de 2014, se obtuvo un préstamo soberano del Banco Alemán de Desarrollo (KfW) por un monto de EUR 400 millones. En 2015 la Junta aprobó un Marco para la Obtención de Empréstitos Soberanos y en 2017 se concluyeron las negociaciones con la Agence Française de Développement (AFD) por un préstamo de EUR 200 millones. Las condiciones de los préstamos del KfW y la AFD solo permiten los préstamos en condiciones ordinarias y en euros para evitar las pérdidas y mitigar los riesgos cambiarios.

12. En octubre de 2017 la Junta Ejecutiva aprobó la introducción de préstamos de asociados en condiciones favorables durante el período de la FIDA11. Estos préstamos deberán proporcionarse a tipos de interés muy por debajo de los niveles de mercado, con vencimientos a largo plazo y períodos de gracia prolongados, y sin preasignación a un país o un tema determinado. No sustituirán a las contribuciones a los recursos básicos, sino que las complementarán. Por medio de los préstamos de asociados en condiciones favorables se podrán financiar préstamos en condiciones muy favorables siempre que sea posible negociar tipos de interés muy bajos.
13. En 2007 se introdujo el **Marco de Sostenibilidad de la Deuda (MSD)** como instrumento para apoyar el alivio de la deuda de los países más pobres. Existen diferencias entre la aplicación del MSD en el FIDA y la de instrumentos similares en otras IFD. Por ejemplo, en la AIF y el FAfD, la suma que se presta o concede como donación al país sobre la base del Sistema de Asignación de Recursos basado en los Resultados (PBAS) se reduce en un 20 % mientras que en el FIDA se aplica un 5 %. La AIF y el FAfD reciben las compensaciones antes que el FIDA: 10 años en la AIF y el FAfD en comparación con 40 años en el FIDA. En el FIDA, los montos aprobados con arreglo al MSD hasta el término de 2016 generarán reflujos del principal no percibidos de aproximadamente USD 1 695 millones hasta el término de 2056. Se prevé que la compensación se realice a través del proceso de reposición. A menos que se produzcan aumentos importantes en las promesas de contribuciones a lo largo de los años, la financiación del FIDA se verá erosionada.

### III. Utilización de los fondos e instrumentos financieros

14. En general, las entrevistas y la encuesta electrónica realizadas para la evaluación sugieren que para muchos países (aunque no todos), la demanda de financiación del FIDA es superior al tamaño de su programa de préstamos y donaciones. También se percibió el interés de ciertos países por obtener préstamos en condiciones más gravosas fuera de su asignación del PBAS.
15. Una evaluación a nivel institucional del PBAS del FIDA realizada por la IOE en 2016 constató que, si bien había algunas cuestiones que requerían atención, en general la aplicación del PBAS había redundado en un sistema de asignación de recursos más sistemático, transparente, flexible y previsible y contribuido a una mayor equidad a la hora de asignar los recursos del FIDA entre los Estados Miembros prestatarios. El FIDA revisó el PBAS en 2017, sobre la base de la orientación brindada por la Junta Ejecutiva y de las recomendaciones de la evaluación a nivel institucional del PBAS de 2016.
16. El FIDA es la única IFD que asigna todos sus préstamos utilizando el PBAS. Las IFD multilaterales con ventanillas de préstamos en condiciones favorables solo utilizan el PBAS para asignar fondos en estas condiciones. Para asignar préstamos en condiciones ordinarias y apoyo al sector privado tienen en cuenta la demanda de proyectos, principios de gestión del riesgo y sus estrategias de gestión del activo y el pasivo.
17. **La mayor parte de los países (el 68 %) utilizan al menos el 90 % de su asignación del PBAS.** En conjunto, los países de bajos ingresos (PBI) han logrado absorber sus asignaciones del PBAS mejor que los países de ingresos medianos bajos (PIMB) o los países de ingresos medianos altos (PIMA). En efecto, entre la

FIDA7 y la FIDA9 los PBI utilizaron el 107 % de sus asignaciones del PBAS originales, mientras que los PIMB utilizaron el 90 % y los PIMA, el 75 %. Entre los factores que han contribuido a una infrautilización de las asignaciones del PBAS se encuentran tanto las situaciones en los países (p. ej., de fragilidad y de paz y orden; los cambios de gobiernos o en las prioridades de estos) como cuestiones internas del FIDA (p. ej., la rotación del personal).

18. De conformidad con el Convenio Constitutivo del FIDA, la estructura financiera del Fondo supuso que durante el período evaluado la gran mayoría de los fondos se proporcionarían en condiciones particularmente favorables: el 21% como donaciones con arreglo al MSD y el 50 % en forma de préstamos en condiciones muy favorables. El 11 % de los fondos se otorgaron en condiciones combinadas y el 18 % en condiciones ordinarias. Sin embargo, entre la FIDA7 y la FIDA9 aumentó el volumen de préstamos en condiciones ordinarias, en una proporción que pasó del 11 % al 18 %.
19. **Las prioridades de los gobiernos y la evolución del contexto de los países han sido determinantes más importantes de la naturaleza de los proyectos que las condiciones de financiación del FIDA.** Así lo confirman un análisis de 20 proyectos en 10 países cuya clasificación ha cambiado, así como las conclusiones de la encuesta electrónica y los estudios de caso de países. No se registró una vinculación sistemática entre los cambios en las clasificaciones de los países y el consecuente endurecimiento de los precios y las condiciones de los préstamos por un lado, y el tipo de diseño de proyecto por el otro. Aunque los ministerios de finanzas de los países están preocupados por las condiciones del FIDA, en la mayoría de ellos los fondos provenientes de los préstamos se transfieren a las entidades de ejecución en forma de donaciones.
20. **Los tipos de interés del FIDA para préstamos ordinarios son generalmente competitivos respecto de los que imponen otras IFD a préstamos similares** (véase el cuadro 1 a continuación). Mientras que el Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento (BIRF), la AIF, el Banco Africano de Desarrollo (BAfD), el BAsD y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) cobran otras comisiones (p. ej., comisión de apertura del crédito y comisión inicial), el FIDA no impone ninguna. Para la mayor parte de los Estados Miembros, los precios de los préstamos en condiciones ordinarias del FIDA los hacen más atractivos que los préstamos del mercado. Los diferenciales medios de los bonos que pagan las entidades soberanas son considerablemente superiores al diferencial del FIDA.

Cuadro 1

**Comparación de los tipos de interés del FIDA para préstamos en condiciones ordinarias (a junio de 2017)**

Banco multilateral de desarrollo	Instrumento de préstamo	Porcentaje		
		LIBOR	Diferencial (%)	Tipo de interés
FIDA	Condiciones ordinarias	1,32	0,94	2,26
BIRF	Préstamos flexibles con tipos de interés variables	1,32	0,94	2,26
AIF	Créditos en condiciones ordinarias (tipo de interés ajustable)	1,32	0,31	1,63
BAfD	Totalmente flexibles	1,32	0,97	2,29
Banco Asiático de Desarrollo (BAsD)	Préstamos basados en el tipo LIBOR	1,32	0,63	1,95

21. **Los períodos de gracia y de vencimiento del FIDA** para todas las clases de préstamos **son poco flexibles**. Comparadas con el FIDA, otras IFD cuentan con enfoques más diferenciados de los períodos de vencimiento de sus préstamos en condiciones favorables. Otras tienen también períodos de gracia diferenciados para los préstamos en condiciones muy favorables, dependiendo de la clasificación del país. En el caso de la AIF, los períodos de gracia de los préstamos varían entre cinco años (para países que pueden recibir financiación en condiciones combinadas y préstamos de la AIF en condiciones ordinarias), seis años (para países que solo pueden recibir financiación de la AIF) y hasta ocho y nueve años (para algunos mecanismos para promover la ampliación de escala). El BASD y el BAFD también tienen períodos de gracia basados en la clasificación de los países.
22. En los convenios de crédito de la AIF se viene incluyendo desde 1987 una cláusula de aceleración. Esta cláusula se aplica a prestatarios que registran durante tres años consecutivos un ingreso nacional bruto per cápita superior al límite operacional de la AIF y que cuentan con solvencia crediticia según los parámetros del BIRF. La cláusula estipula la duplicación de los reembolsos del principal sobre los créditos pendientes, siempre y cuando haya transcurrido un período de gracia de cinco años. El FAFD introdujo una cláusula de aceleración similar durante su decimotercera reposición (FAFD13), que abarca el período comprendido entre 2014 y 2016.
23. Desde hace más de dos decenios, otras IFD han ofrecido a sus clientes la opción de elegir la moneda de cambio para sus préstamos comerciales, si bien la financiación en condiciones favorables continúa denominándose en derechos especiales de giro (DEG). Durante la FIDA10 el Fondo comenzó a ofrecer préstamos en condiciones ordinarias denominados en una sola moneda (el euro o el dólar de los Estados Unidos) como una alternativa a los DEG. Durante los intercambios con los países que se realizaron en el marco de esta evaluación se volvió a mencionar la fuerte demanda que existe de instrumentos en dólares de los Estados Unidos. Algunos países expresaron también un interés en los préstamos en monedas nacionales.

#### **IV. Demanda de otros productos financieros**

24. **En general, el FIDA ofrece una gama más limitada de productos que las otras IFD.** La opinión generalizada que se constató en las visitas a los países, las entrevistas en la Sede y la encuesta electrónica es que ofrecer más productos permitiría a los países prestatarios seleccionar los que se adecuen mejor a sus necesidades.
25. **El FIDA es la única IFD que cuenta con un marco formal para apoyar la ampliación de escala pero que no tiene un producto específico para facilitarla.** En lo que respecta a opciones para apoyar un producto de ampliación de escala específicamente diseñado con ese fin, las experiencias de las otras IFD incluyen: i) los préstamos basados en resultados; ii) los mecanismos de financiación de varios tramos, y iii) el Mecanismo de Ampliación del Financiamiento de la AIF. En los préstamos basados en resultados, los desembolsos están vinculados a que se alcancen determinados indicadores de resultados y no a contratos o gastos específicos. El Banco Mundial, el BASD y el BID han introducido este producto. El BASD introdujo en 2005 un mecanismo de financiación de varios tramos para facilitar la programación de una secuencia de préstamos individuales: la junta del banco aprueba la financiación para el programa completo y el primer subproyecto, pero no aprueba los tramos subsiguientes. El Mecanismo de Ampliación del Financiamiento de la AIF fue desarrollado en 2016 a fin de proporcionar financiación en condiciones no favorables.

26. **El FIDA no cuenta con un producto que permita ofrecer rápidamente financiación destinada a paliar el impacto de los desastres naturales y los conflictos.** A modo de comparación, el BAsD tiene una política integrada para gestionar la asistencia para casos de desastre y emergencia que se vincula a las fases del ciclo de la gestión de desastres, desde las fases de prevención y mitigación, pasando por las de preparación y recuperación.
27. **Financiación del apoyo a la preejecución de proyectos.** Muchas evaluaciones de la IOE han constatado retrasos en el inicio de los proyectos que pudo atribuirse, en muchos casos, a deficiencias en la preparación para la ejecución. Una manera de acortar el tiempo necesario para el comienzo efectivo de la ejecución y reducir los retrasos iniciales es invertir en más recursos en la fase de preparación para de esta manera garantizar un fuerte sentido de apropiación, una mayor capacidad de ejecución y una mejor preparación del país. Al respecto, el BAsD reformó recientemente su asistencia técnica para incorporar donaciones de asistencia técnica para transacciones que pueden utilizarse para financiar la preparación de proyectos y el apoyo a la capacidad de ejecución.
28. **Productos para apoyar al sector privado.** El FIDA no está autorizado a prestar directamente a entidades no soberanas, lo cual limita su capacidad de trabajar con operadores del sector privado. Mediante el Fondo de Inversiones para las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (PYME) y los Pequeños Agricultores (SIF), el FIDA está comenzando a experimentar con el apoyo indirecto al sector privado. La propuesta del SIF aborda una deficiencia real en la financiación disponible, pero deja aún preguntas sin responder en lo que se refiere a: i) el nivel de gastos generales de la iniciativa, que probablemente serán altos, en especial, para la financiación mediante endeudamiento directo, y ii) las posibilidades de recuperar los costos: las entrevistas con una muestra de inversores de impacto que participan en actividades similares han evidenciado problemas con préstamos en estado de incumplimiento y pérdidas.

#### **Instrumentos financieros no reembolsables**

29. La financiación mediante **donaciones** tiene por objeto: i) promover enfoques y tecnologías innovadores en favor de las personas pobres que se puedan aplicar a mayor escala; ii) reforzar la capacidad institucional y en materia de políticas; iii) favorecer las actividades de promoción y la actuación normativa, y iv) generar e intercambiar conocimientos. La financiación destinada a donaciones se ha estipulado en un 6,5 % del programa de préstamos y donaciones.
30. En la revisión de la Política del FIDA relativa a la Financiación mediante Donaciones de 2015 se tuvo en cuenta la correspondiente evaluación a nivel institucional realizada en 2014. Esta evaluación constató que las donaciones habían permitido al FIDA colaborar con una gama más amplia de organizaciones, por ejemplo, organizaciones no gubernamentales, federaciones de agricultores, organizaciones de pueblos indígenas e instituciones internacionales dedicadas a la investigación agrícola. No obstante, el FIDA había perdido oportunidades para aprovechar estratégicamente su programa de donaciones debido a la escasa vinculación con las prioridades institucionales y a nivel de los países. Se recomendaba por tanto reequilibrar la asignación en favor de las donaciones a los países para que estas pudieran destinarse a apoyar, entre otros, el diálogo sobre políticas, la gestión de los conocimientos y la creación de capacidad institucional. Esta recomendación no fue objeto de seguimiento durante la revisión de la política en 2015.
31. En 2012 el FIDA introdujo la **asistencia técnica reembolsable** como instrumento para ofrecer apoyo analítico a los países de ingresos medianos (PIM), incluidos los que ya no son prestatarios del FIDA. Se prevé que los clientes reembolsen al FIDA el total de los costos, más un margen de beneficio del 15 %. Hasta la fecha se han aprobado tan solo dos convenios de asistencia técnica reembolsable, por lo que la cuestión que se plantea es si realmente existe la demanda suficiente de este

producto y la capacidad para ofrecerlo. Otras organizaciones internacionales, en particular los organismos de las Naciones Unidas y las IFD, cuentan con una gran cantidad de personal dedicado a tareas analíticas y gozan de reconocimiento como líderes en la creación de productos de conocimiento, en algunos casos en condiciones no reembolsables.

## **V. Gobernanza financiera, supervisión financiera y gestión del riesgo**

### **A. El papel de las consultas sobre la reposición**

32. Las deliberaciones que tienen lugar durante las reposiciones son fundamentales para definir la estrategia del FIDA y determinar el nivel general de recursos básicos. Por consiguiente, la representación y el objetivo en el que centra el proceso de reposición son aspectos que revisten la mayor importancia. Aunque las conclusiones de la evaluación a nivel institucional sobre las reposiciones del FIDA, realizada en 2013, se tuvieron en cuenta en las decisiones relativas a la FIDA10, su seguimiento concreto no tuvo lugar hasta la FIDA11, como resultado de las deliberaciones del Grupo de Trabajo Especial sobre Gobernanza. El Grupo de Trabajo concluyó que no debía realizarse ningún cambio en el sistema de listas, pero que las definiciones debían ser más precisas. La Lista A y la Lista B ofrecieron dos puestos cada una en la Consulta sobre la FIDA11, que se distribuirían asignando un puesto a cada una de las tres Sublistas regionales de la Lista C, más un puesto rotatorio. Con esta medida ha aumentado a 22 el número de puestos disponibles para la Lista C (siete puestos por sublista, más uno rotatorio). Sin embargo, **la Lista C todavía se enfrenta al desafío de garantizar una representación equilibrada de los países prestatarios más pobres y abordar el número creciente de países donantes en la lista.**

### **B. Supervisión y gestión financiera**


33. **El nivel de supervisión financiera que prestan los órganos rectores es adecuado en función del nivel actual de operaciones y riesgos.** La Junta Ejecutiva y el Comité de Auditoría reciben regularmente informes que contienen coeficientes financieros, indicadores de resultados y parámetros de riesgo. La documentación contiene suficiente información como para realizar la supervisión y adoptar decisiones en el marco actual y con la estructura de riesgos presente. Sin embargo, se presenta fragmentada en varios documentos.
34. Durante las entrevistas con los representantes en la Junta Ejecutiva y el personal del FIDA, se mencionó en repetidas ocasiones que los representantes de muchos países no están muy versados en temas financieros. De cara al futuro, a medida que la estructura financiera del FIDA se vuelva más compleja y dependiente del endeudamiento, con una mayor exposición al riesgo, las exigencias impuestas al Comité de Auditoría y la Junta serán mayores.
35. **Sistemas internos.** No existe en el Departamento de Operaciones Financieras del FIDA una dependencia separada con responsabilidad de la gestión del riesgo. Con la baja disposición a tomar riesgos financieros que existe actualmente, quizás no se juzgue necesario contar con una función independiente de gestión del riesgo. Sin embargo, **si el FIDA decide reforzar su estado contable mediante el apalancamiento y ampliar su base de recursos y clientela, sería necesario volver a examinar esta configuración.**
36. El FIDA no tiene un comité a cargo de la gestión del activo y del pasivo. Las instituciones financieras, incluidas las IFD, tienen comités que se encargan de cuestiones relacionadas, por ejemplo, con la formulación y aplicación de políticas financieras, de liquidez y del riesgo, las fuentes de financiación, la gestión del activo y el pasivo y otras actividades de tesorería. Las políticas del FIDA que rigen la inversión de los activos de tesorería se definen en menor detalle que en otras

IFD. Especialmente, en lo que concierne al nivel permitido de riesgo de mercado y riesgo crediticio, los documentos dejan cierto margen de maniobra. Una comparación de los rendimientos de las inversiones en el período comprendido entre 2012 y 2016 reveló que los resultados del FIDA eran superiores a los de otras instituciones homólogas, pero mostraron también un alto nivel de volatilidad en materia de pérdidas y ganancias.

37. La gestión del activo y del pasivo involucra la gestión de los riesgos generados por las discrepancias entre el activo y el pasivo. **La gestión del activo y del pasivo es una esfera de trabajo en la que las políticas, las directrices y los instrumentos del FIDA se encuentran en una fase incipiente.** Otras IFD utilizan activamente instrumentos financieros derivados para gestionar la exposición financiera para, entre otros: i) canjear empréstitos en la moneda deseada; ii) gestionar los riesgos de tipo de interés de los empréstitos y préstamos; iii) poder ofrecer una gama más amplia de productos de inversión; iv) proteger las futuras contribuciones de capital, y v) proteger determinados aspectos del presupuesto.
38. Desde su creación el FIDA ha recibido pagos de capital en una serie de monedas. Las contribuciones en monedas distintas del dólar de los Estados Unidos plantean un riesgo cambiario ya que el FIDA no cuenta con una base clara de cálculo del capital propio en el futuro. Otras IFD, o bien solicitan a sus donantes que realicen los pagos de capital en la moneda de la institución, o bien disponen una cobertura de los pagos hechos en la moneda nacional del donante.
39. **Apalancamiento.** Históricamente, el FIDA se ha financiado por medio de aportes de capital (reposiciones) y los reflujos de los préstamos. El Fondo no utilizó el apalancamiento hasta contraer su primer empréstito con el KfW. No obstante, operar solamente utilizando el capital propio limita el tamaño de su programa de préstamos y donaciones (véase el gráfico 1). Se podría apalancar el capital a un coeficiente que podría ser del 1:1, el 2:1 e incluso más. A modo de comparación, la AIF ya ha obtenido una calificación crediticia y se prepara para tomar empréstitos en los mercados internacionales de capital a fin de aumentar su capacidad operacional y su contribución a los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible.

Gráfico 1

**Apalancamiento: coeficiente de endeudamiento**



Fuente: gráfico elaborado para la evaluación a nivel institucional con datos disponibles en los sitios web y la documentación de las IFD analizadas (2017)

Nota: BERD: Banco Europeo de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo; FMO: Banco Holandés de Desarrollo; CFI: Corporación Financiera Internacional

40. Los **mercados de capital** proporcionan los volúmenes, la liquidez, la variedad de monedas y los tipos de interés de referencia necesarios para que las IFD consoliden sus estados contables. Instituciones como el Banco Mundial han tomado empréstitos de miles de millones desde su creación y continúan recurriendo a los mercados con regularidad. Un prerrequisito fundamental de la emisión de bonos es obtener una calificación crediticia: la ideal sería una AAA/AAa; en su defecto, una

AA, como mínimo. Las entidades de calificación crediticia realizan estudios de diligencia debida muy detallados de las instituciones donde se analizan, entre otros, el apoyo de los accionistas, la utilización de los fondos, las políticas, el estado de pérdidas y ganancias y la elaboración del estado contable. La certidumbre y la previsibilidad son factores determinantes de las calificaciones y cualquier asunto que cree incertidumbre podría repercutir negativamente en la futura calificación del FIDA. La cuestión más obvia a este respecto es la sostenibilidad financiera del FIDA y la imprevisibilidad de los montos futuros de las reposiciones y las salidas de fondos en forma de donaciones y como resultado de la aplicación del MSD.


## VI. Sostenibilidad financiera

41. A los efectos de esta evaluación, se entiende por "sostenibilidad financiera" la medida en que una institución cuenta con los recursos financieros para operar sin recurrir regularmente a donantes o accionistas, proteger su capital y generar suficientes ingresos para sufragar los costos operacionales y acumular fondos para cubrir posibles pérdidas vinculadas a los préstamos. Es una definición más estricta que la que utiliza la dirección del FIDA, que se basa en la noción de liquidez y la capacidad para cumplir los compromisos de desembolso de los préstamos, los cuales dependen en gran medida de las reposiciones futuras.
42. **El actual modus operandi del FIDA no permite cumplir las condiciones necesarias para la sostenibilidad financiera.** Desde 2010, el FIDA ha sufrido considerables pérdidas financieras —excepto en 2017, debido a fluctuaciones favorables de los tipos de cambio, de las que no se puede depender en el futuro (véase el gráfico 2)—, con ganancias no distribuidas negativas acumuladas de alrededor de USD 1 360 millones. Los ingresos procedentes de los intereses de los préstamos son demasiado bajos para cubrir los gastos operacionales: en las condiciones actuales, el FIDA tendría que cobrar una tasa media de alrededor del 3 %, muy por encima de los niveles actuales (alrededor del 1 %). Los gastos operacionales en relación con el total de activos y el programa de préstamos y donaciones anual se sitúan en el extremo superior de las IFD de referencia, ya que el FIDA no se beneficia de las economías de escala y opera en zonas remotas y difíciles a las que resulta costoso prestar servicios.

Gráfico 2

### Ingresos netos y pérdidas netas del FIDA entre 2003 y 2017

(en millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos)



Fuente: datos elaborados para esta evaluación a partir de los estados financieros del FIDA.

43. **Tanto la financiación como las donaciones con arreglo al MSD son una parte importante de la gama de instrumentos operacionales del FIDA, pero constituyen también una fuente de incertidumbre** para la sostenibilidad financiera de la institución, lo cual supone un riesgo para la evaluación de la solvencia crediticia del FIDA. Los donantes que han accedido a compensar al FIDA por la aplicación del MSD solo lo harán en los próximos años. Además, aunque

estos compromisos puedan considerarse vinculantes desde el punto de vista moral, no lo son desde el punto de vista jurídico y por tanto los gobiernos pueden optar por cambiar de decisión.

44. Una alternativa sería mantener las donaciones y los fondos del MSD en cuentas separadas, parecidas a las cuentas de fondos fiduciarios, en lugar de financiarlos por medio del estado contable y la cuenta de pérdidas y ganancias del FIDA. De esta manera, solo los fondos mantenidos en esas cuentas separadas podrían utilizarse para el MSD o las donaciones. Una segunda opción sería que las compensaciones futuras por la aplicación del MSD sean vinculantes desde el punto de vista jurídico.
45. Como complemento de lo anterior, otra alternativa sería cambiar las disposiciones que rigen para los préstamos futuros. Mientras el país esté clasificado como receptor del MSD, se le eximiría de efectuar reembolsos de intereses y del principal. En el caso de una reclasificación, podrían introducirse nuevamente dichos reembolsos a fin de asegurar la compatibilidad con las condiciones de préstamo que se apliquen normalmente a ese grupo de países.
46. Las **hipótesis financieras barajadas para la presente evaluación** muestran que para acercarse a una situación de recuperación total de los costos, el FIDA necesitaría adoptar dos medidas principales. En primer lugar, podría excluir al MSD y las donaciones del estado contable y crear una cuenta separada para financiarlos ex ante. Eliminar esta situación de incertidumbre contribuiría a mejorar las evaluaciones de la calificación crediticia. Además, para alcanzar el punto de equilibrio, el FIDA tendría que aumentar el rendimiento de su cartera de préstamos elevando los márgenes de los préstamos ordinarios.

## VII. Conclusiones

47. **La estructura financiera del FIDA ha estado sometida a grandes presiones desde la FIDA9 y no ha podido apoyar la ampliación del programa de préstamos y donaciones.** El FIDA comenzó a introducir montos moderados de endeudamiento a través de la toma de empréstitos soberanos del Fondo Fiduciario de España, el KfW y, más recientemente, la AFD. Sin embargo, incluso con los empréstitos soberanos, la oferta de préstamos parece ser inferior a la demanda. Para la FIDA12 la dirección está estudiando la posibilidad de tomar empréstitos en los mercados internacionales de capital, lo cual conlleva el desafío de obtener una calificación crediticia elevada.
48. **El sistema actual de asignación de recursos financieros sobre la base de los resultados (PBAS) tiene sus ventajas desde el punto de vista de la transparencia, pero plantea desafíos en cuanto a su futura aplicación general.** En el caso de aumentar considerablemente los empréstitos, ya sea de fuentes soberanas o de los mercados internacionales de capital (si así lo decidiera el FIDA), solo los préstamos en condiciones ordinarias podrían estar sujetos a tasas de interés cuyo margen permitiría afrontar los costos de los empréstitos tomados. No obstante, la utilización del PBAS limita la capacidad del FIDA de aumentar los préstamos en condiciones ordinarias en relación con otros tipos de préstamos.
49. En general, los países prestatarios acogen favorablemente la modalidad de financiación de proyectos del FIDA. Sin embargo, **en comparación con otras IFD, el Fondo ofrece una gama limitada de productos financieros** con condiciones de préstamo poco flexibles, por ejemplo, en lo que concierne a los tipos de vencimiento, el período de gracia, la moneda de cambio, el plan de amortización y la inclusión de cláusulas de anticipación de reembolsos.
50. **Aunque las consultas sobre la reposición constituyen procesos bien establecidos, quedan aspectos por mejorar en lo que respecta a la representación de los miembros seleccionados.** En el momento actual, la Lista C experimenta dificultades para garantizar una representación equilibrada de

los países prestatarios más pobres y el número creciente de donantes de PIM; en el caso de la Lista A, podría llegar a estar sobrerrepresentada si todos los miembros que reúnen los requisitos para formar parte de ella ocuparan sus puestos.

51. **Los actuales sistemas internos y externos de supervisión financiera están configurados para un entorno donde el riesgo es bajo** y el nivel de endeudamiento es relativamente pequeño. Sin embargo, si el FIDA decidiera optar por un mayor apalancamiento e instrumentos de tesorería más complejos, estos sistemas no serían suficientes. Los órganos rectores tienen una capacidad de supervisión financiera limitada, principalmente en razón de la falta de conocimientos financieros especializados de muchos de los representantes en la Junta Ejecutiva y los miembros del Comité de Auditoría.
52. El FIDA ha hecho un uso limitado de los instrumentos de cobertura hasta hace poco tiempo y está expuesto a las fluctuaciones y riesgos cambiarios. Otras IFD recurren a productos financieros derivados para la gestión del riesgo, administran los riesgos vinculados a los tipos de interés de los empréstitos y los préstamos, protegen las futuras contribuciones de capital y ofrecen la opción de contraer préstamos en algunas monedas nacionales.
53. **La estructura financiera actual no satisface los requisitos de sostenibilidad financiera.** Las pérdidas erosionan gradualmente el capital y necesitan compensarse con nuevas inyecciones a las reposiciones. Sin embargo, se pueden adoptar medidas para aumentar el tamaño del programa de préstamos y donaciones (por medio de un mayor apalancamiento) y mejorar la sostenibilidad financiera del FIDA. Las disposiciones actuales sobre el MSD y, hasta cierto punto, las donaciones corrientes, contribuyen tanto al deterioro de la situación del FIDA en materia de pérdidas y ganancias como a su falta de sostenibilidad financiera. Lo anterior es motivo de preocupación, particularmente si el FIDA pretende obtener una calificación crediticia alta. Aunque los miembros del Fondo se han comprometido a reembolsar los montos del principal no percibidos y han reafirmado su compromiso de hacerlo, este no es vinculante desde el punto de vista jurídico y está sujeto a cambios de política en el futuro.

## VIII. Recomendaciones

### Recomendación 1

54. **Mejorar la sostenibilidad financiera.** La principal prioridad que el FIDA debe abordar es la incertidumbre respecto de las futuras compensaciones por la aplicación del MSD. El FIDA podría adoptar un sistema de pago anticipado según el cual el MSD se transferiría a un fondo con fines especiales, no consolidado en el estado contable del FIDA. En cada reposición, la aprobación de nueva financiación del MSD estaría sujeta a que se reponga el fondo.
55. En segundo lugar, el FIDA necesita tomar medidas con respecto a sus ingresos y gastos a fin de reducir el actual déficit estructural. Por el lado de los ingresos, el FIDA podría aumentar el rendimiento de la cartera, concretamente, aumentando los márgenes del tipo de interés que aplica a sus préstamos en condiciones ordinarias. En lo que concierne a los gastos, el FIDA debe elaborar estrategias para contener los gastos al tiempo que aumenta su programa de préstamos y donaciones, mejorando de esta manera las economías de escala.

### Recomendación 2

56. **Aumentar la flexibilidad de los productos financieros que ofrece actualmente y estudiar la posibilidad de introducir productos nuevos.** Los productos que ofrecen flexibilidad se adecuan mejor a las preferencias y necesidades de los prestatarios. De la misma forma que lo hacen otras IFD, el FIDA debería proporcionar una gama más amplia de opciones en los que concierne a los períodos

de gracia y de vencimiento, las monedas de los instrumentos y el plan de amortización. También podría introducir una opción de anticipación de los reembolsos.

57. Habida cuenta de que el período de reembolso es muy largo y que la clasificación de los países puede cambiar considerablemente, en los préstamos y la financiación del MSD que ofrezca en el futuro, el FIDA podría contemplar la posibilidad de hacer ajustes a las condiciones de los préstamos después de la aprobación a fin de reflejar cambios en la clasificación de los países. Por ejemplo, si un país ya no reúne los requisitos para recibir financiación con arreglo al MSD, se podrían ajustar las condiciones de la financiación del MSD vigentes en ese momento para hacerlas más gravosas.
58. Para cumplir su mandato y responder a las necesidades de los países prestatarios el FIDA podría también incorporar nuevos instrumentos financieros que: i) faciliten la ampliación de escala de los resultados; ii) ayuden a responder a casos de desastre y situaciones de fragilidad, y iii) sirvan para prefinanciar la preparación para la ejecución de un proyecto y la creación de capacidad.
59. El FIDA no cuenta con instrumentos financieros que le permitan colaborar con empresas del sector privado. Pese a que el SIF propuesto recientemente intenta subsanar esta deficiencia, el FIDA necesita elaborar una estrategia de viabilidad clara para reducir el riesgo de tener que afrontar gastos generales elevados y préstamos en estado de incumplimiento. Tal estrategia podría centrarse en la participación de intermediarios para evitar tener que administrar muchos préstamos de pequeña cuantía en el nivel cuasi-minorista.

### **Recomendación 3**

60. **Revisar el sistema de asignación financiera.** Si el FIDA aumenta sustancialmente su apalancamiento por medio de la toma de empréstitos, necesitará reпреstar los fondos en condiciones ordinarias para evitar incurrir en pérdidas. El PBAS actual limita la capacidad del FIDA de aumentar su préstamos en condiciones ordinarias en relación con otros tipos de préstamos. Por consiguiente, el FIDA necesitaría crear una segunda ventanilla para este tipo de préstamos, que podrían asignarse por medio de un sistema basado en el riesgo.

### **Recomendación 4**

61. **Realizar tareas preparatorias para un posible acceso a los mercados de capital.** El FIDA debe examinar los requisitos para obtener una calificación crediticia alta, entre los cuales seguramente se encuentra la reducción de la incertidumbre vinculada a las compensaciones por la aplicación del MSD futuras.

### **Recomendación 5**

62. **Utilizar instrumentos de cobertura para gestionar los riesgos cambiarios.** El FIDA está expuesto a riesgos cambiarios por los siguientes motivos: i) la mayor parte de sus préstamos son en DEG; ii) algunas promesas de contribución se denominan en monedas distintas del dólar de los Estados Unidos, y iii) algunos gastos operacionales se efectúan en monedas distintas del dólar de los Estados Unidos. Otras IFD utilizan instrumentos de cobertura y el FIDA podría aprender de sus experiencias.

### **Recomendación 6**

63. **Reforzar la gobernanza financiera.** Si el FIDA aumenta significativamente su endeudamiento, estará expuesto a mayores riesgos. La experiencia de otras IFD muestra que esto se puede controlar, pero será importante mejorar la capacidad de supervisión financiera de los órganos rectores, por ejemplo, ampliando el mandato del Comité de Auditoría y estableciendo requisitos mínimos para ser miembro del mismo. Además, se necesitarán políticas más detalladas en materia de gestión del activo y del pasivo y reforzar la función de gestión del riesgo.

**Recomendación 7**

64. **Reforzar la eficiencia de las reposiciones.** En las consultas sobre la reposición resulta necesario mejorar el equilibrio de representación entre los países de las listas A y B, los países prestatarios más pobres y el número creciente de donantes de la Lista C.
65. Las contribuciones complementarias y los fondos suplementarios deberían tratarse de la misma manera. Ambos instrumentos podrían anunciarse como parte de las cifras principales de las reposiciones, pero deberían estar sujetos a cargos por servicios a fin de cubrir los gastos administrativos conexos que actualmente se subsidian con el presupuesto administrativo ordinario. La dirección necesita también contar con la flexibilidad de aceptar fondos suplementarios por montos menores en consonancia con la estrategia y los criterios acordados, en particular fondos provenientes de fuentes privadas.
66. En suma, cuatro decenios después de su establecimiento, la estructura financiera del FIDA necesita importantes reformas. El éxito de estas reformas será fundamental para que el FIDA pueda continuar cumpliendo su mandato singular de reducir la pobreza rural y contribuir a alcanzar los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible.

# Corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's financial architecture

## Contents

<b>Abbreviations and acronyms</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>I. Introduction and context</b>	<b>4</b>
A. Overview of IFAD's financial architecture	4
B. Key policies and arrangements shaping the financial architecture	6
C. Recent ODA trends	8
D. Steps taken by the Multilateral Development Banks to reform their financial architecture	10
E. Structure of the report	12
<b>II. Evaluation objectives, approach and methodology</b>	<b>14</b>
A. Purpose and objectives of the evaluation	14
B. Scope of the evaluation	14
C. Approach and methodology	14
D. Data collection and information sources	18
<b>III. IFAD's Funding sources</b>	<b>22</b>
A. Core replenishment resources and loan reflows	23
B. Overview of funds additional to core replenishment resources	26
C. Complementary contributions and supplementary funds	27
D. Cofinancing and counterpart financing	29
E. Potential for financing cooperation by foundations	31
F. Extending the IFAD programme through borrowing	33
G. Implications of the HIPC initiative and DSF for IFAD resources	35
<b>IV. Use of funds and financial instruments</b>	<b>38</b>
A. The PoLG and potential demand from borrowing countries	38
B. Allocation of financial resources	39
C. Terms of financing, project design content and project performance	44
D. Current terms and pricing of IFAD's loans and the demand from borrowing countries for more flexible options	48
E. Demand for additional financial products	53
F. Grants	62
G. Reimbursable Technical Assistance	63
<b>V. Financial governance, financial oversight and risk management</b>	<b>65</b>
A. Role of the Replenishment Consultation	65
B. Length of the Replenishment Cycle	66
C. Financial oversight and management	67
D. Adequacy of the policies, procedures and organizational structure for IFAD's financial architecture	71
E. Leveraging	76
<b>VI. Key aspects of IFAD's financial performance and sustainability</b>	<b>84</b>
A. Definition and current situation	84
B. Main factors related to financial sustainability	86
C. IFAD's future financial sustainability under various scenarios	91
<b>VII. Conclusions and recommendations</b>	<b>97</b>
A. Conclusions	97
B. Recommendations	101

**Annexes**

I	Evaluation framework	104
II	Glossary of technical terms	108
III	Detailed outputs from financial scenario modelling (Graphs)	110
IV	Loans and DSF grants by type	114
V	Key policies supporting IFAD's financial architecture	116
VI	Financial architecture reforms in MDBs	120
VII	Note on Credit Rating Treatment of MDBs	124
VIII	E-Survey results	126
IX	Use of PBAS Allocations, maps of IFAD Country Classification (2007, 2012, 2017) and Comparative Tables	148
X	Overview of MDB financial products	164
XI	Statistical analysis tables related to country classification and Projects with grant financed components	167
XII	Data on government counterpart funding and cofinancing	186
XIII	Report of the Senior Independent Advisors: Frederik Korfker and Zenda Ofir	189
XIV	Key persons met	192
XV	Selected references	201

**List of figures – main report**

1.	A conceptual scheme for the financial architecture	15
2.	Changes in the composition of non-reimbursable resources to IFAD (IFAD7-IFAD9)	22
3.	Pledges of core contributions, US\$ million (2015 constant prices)	23
4.	IFAD received replenishment contributions (US\$ million - 2015 constant US\$)	24
5.	Trend in ratio of international cofinancing and counterpart funding to IFAD investment	30
6.	Trend in the Programme of Loans and Grants	38
7.	IOE ratings by quintile of IFAD loan size amount of funding (project closed in 2010-15)	47
8.	IOE ratings by quintile of IFAD loan size amount of funding (project closed in 2010-15)	47
9.	Coffee price US\$/MT (using a 60-day moving average)	59
10.	Returns and Sharpe Ratio (2012-16)	73
11.	Liquidity ratio (liquid assets/total assets)	73
12.	Leveraging - debt-to-equity (usable capital) ratio	77
13.	Capital market borrowings and funding team staff	80
14.	IFAD's net income/Loss 2003 – 2017 (US\$ million)	85
15.	Proportion of IFAD operating expenses recovered by loan and investment income	85
16.	Return on equity, comparison across DFIs	86
17.	IFFIm issues bonds based on long-term pledges	89
18.	A hypothetical comparison of IFIs with and without leveraging (US\$ billion)	91
19.	Modelled total lending and additional cumulative losses in 2028 (US\$ billion)	96

## Abbreviations and acronyms

ACA	Advanced Commitment Authority
ASDB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	African Development Fund
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
ADF	African Development Fund
ALM	Asset and Liability Management
APR	Asia and the Pacific
ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
CLE	Corporate level evaluation
COSOP	Country strategic opportunities programme
CPE	Country programme evaluation
CPL	Concessional Partner Loan
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DSF	Debt Sustainability Framework
EB	Executive Board
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ESA	East and Southern Africa
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FMO	Netherlands Development Finance Company
FOD	Finance Operations Department
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation
G20	Group of Twenty
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFI	International Financial Institution
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MIC	Middle Income Country
NEN	Near East and North Africa
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—Development Assistance Committee
PMD	Programme Management Department
PoLG	Programme of Loans and Grants
P/L	Profit and loss
PRM	Partnership and Resource Mobilization Office
RBL	Result-based Lending
RMF	Results Management Framework
SBF	Sovereign Borrowing Framework
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SIF	Smallholder and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Investment Finance Fund
SMADF	Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund in Uganda
WCA	West and Central Africa
WFP	World Food Programme

## Corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's financial architecture

### I. Introduction and context

1. The Executive Board (EB) approved the conducting of a corporate level evaluation (CLE) on IFAD's financial architecture by the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) as part of its 2017 work programme.<sup>1</sup> The evaluation report will be presented to the Executive Board in September 2018. IOE is not aware of any comprehensive, independent evaluation of financial architecture conducted in other MDBs. However, this evaluation builds upon the findings of previous CLEs, such as those on Efficiency (2013), Replenishment (2014), Policy for grant financing (2014) and Performance-based Allocation System (2016).
2. The evaluation is opportune as it will inform decisions related to IFAD's financial architecture, long-term financial sustainability and IFAD's financial contribution to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. More specifically, the evaluation is timely because: (i) elements of the financial architecture were key topics of discussion during the IFAD11 replenishment consultation; (ii) in 2016 and 2017 Management presented various proposals to the Executive Board, which will affect IFAD's financial architecture, and further changes are contemplated under IFAD12 and will be discussed with the EB in the coming years; and (iii) other Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)<sup>2</sup> are working on changes in their financial architecture.
3. For the purpose of this evaluation, "financial architecture"<sup>3</sup> is defined as the policies and systems adopted to mobilize, manage, allocate and disburse financial resources to fulfil IFAD's mandate of helping to reduce rural poverty. Key elements of the financial architecture can be summarized under four broad headings: (i) sources of funds; (ii) financial support instruments; (iii) allocation system; and (iv) management, oversight and governance.
4. The financial architecture of IFAD is not a discrete "programme" or a "policy" underpinned by a dedicated logical framework. It is rather the result of the stratification of a number of policies and decisions made by the governing bodies and IFAD management over forty years. Table 1 sets out key dates in the evolution of the financial architecture.

### A. Overview of IFAD's financial architecture

5. **IFAD was established as a Fund and Specialised UN Agency and is the only international financial institution focusing exclusively on agriculture and rural development.**<sup>4</sup> The agreement establishing IFAD (1974) stipulates that IFAD's financial resources would consist of: (i) initial contributions; (ii) additional contributions; (iii) special contributions from non-Member States and from other sources; and (iv) funds derived from operations or otherwise accruing. When necessary, the Governing Council may invite Members to make additional contributions or authorize Members to increase their contributions.
6. The agreement also mandates that IFAD financing will take the form of loans, grants and a debt sustainability mechanism to developing States that are members

<sup>1</sup> <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/119/docs/EB-2016-119-R-2-Rev-1.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Development Finance Institutions include bilateral and multilateral ones. Generally, the acronym IFI (International Financial Institution) is applied to the multilateral ones. Therefore, IFIs are a sub-category of DFIs.

<sup>3</sup> A glossary of technical terms used in this evaluation is provided in Annex II.

<sup>4</sup> According to article 2: "The objective of the Fund shall be to mobilize additional resources to be made available on concessional terms for agricultural development in developing Member States. In fulfilling this objective the Fund shall provide financing primarily for projects and programmes specifically designed to introduce, expand or improve food production systems and to strengthen related policies and institutions within the framework of national priorities and strategies, taking into consideration: the need to increase food production in the poorest food-deficit countries; the potential for increasing food production in other developing countries; and the importance of improving the nutritional level of the poorest populations in developing countries and the conditions of their lives."

of the Fund or to intergovernmental organizations in which such members participate. The agreement states that contributions will be made in freely convertible currencies without restriction on use, special contributions may be made by non-Member States or other sources and that the Special Drawing Right (SDR) will be IFAD's unit of account.

7. IFAD applies universality principles: (i) each borrowing country is eligible for IFAD's services to help eradicate poverty and eliminate hunger, wherever they exist; and (ii) strategies and operational policies apply to all borrowing countries irrespective of their income level, geography or degree of fragility.

Table 1

**Key events in the evolution of IFAD's financial architecture**

<i>Timeline</i>	<i>Key events</i>
1976	Agreement Establishing IFAD Adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of an International Fund for Agricultural Development.
1978	The Governing Council adopted the Lending Policies and Criteria.
1982	The Audit Committee, a sub-committee of the Executive Board, was established.
1986	The concept of complementary contributions was introduced.
1993	Lending terms changed, including from fixed to variable interest rates on ordinary and intermediate loans and reduced the service charge for highly concessional loans from 1 to 0.75 per cent with a shortened repayment period from 50 to 40 years. IFAD uses IBRD's spread for its ordinary loans.
1994-1998	Lending Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing revised 5 times.
2000-2004	Governing Council decided that IFAD would participate in the Debt Initiative for HIPC's.
2004	PBAS introduced and the policy for grant financing was approved. IFAD's ALM system reviewed. Treasury model adopted.
2006	Lending Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing revised.
2007	Debt Sustainability Framework adopted.
2008	Enterprise Risk Management Committee established and a risk management policy formulated.
2009	Grant policy revised.
2010	Approval of agreement for Spanish Trust Fund.
2012	The Additional Resource Mobilization Initiative launched. Lending policies and criteria reviewed. New blend terms approved. Reimbursable technical assistance product established.
2013	The Governing Council adopted a revised version of the Lending Policies and Criteria and renamed it Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing.
2014	The Financial Framework for IFAD10 adopted. Financing options for IFAD beyond 2015 considered. KfW and IFAD sign the framework agreement a euro 400 million loan.
2015	Sovereign Borrowing Framework adopted. Grant policy revised.
2016	The report of the Corporate Working Group on IFAD's Financial Policies presented to Management's Finance and Investment Committee and the Audit Committee. The Sovereign Borrowing Framework reviewed. Treasury model enhanced. euro 200 million sovereign loan negotiated with AFD. Launch of single-currency loans.
2017	During the IFAD11 replenishment, adopted a roadmap for a comprehensive reform of IFAD's financial architecture to increase financial leverage. PBAS revised for IFAD11 and the framework for Concessional Partner Loans adopted. DSF reviewed.

Source: Elaborated by IOE

**Inflows/sources of funds**

8. **Periodic replenishments are at the heart of the financial architecture and are IFAD's most important source of funding.** In addition to Members' replenishment contributions, IFAD's sources of funding have included loan reflows, interest on loans and Treasury investment income. Sources of funding also include compensations for foregone debt forgiveness in the context of the Heavily Indebted

Poor Countries initiative (HIPC); and loan repayments associated with project grants provided under the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF). Beyond these core resources, IFAD also receives complementary contributions and supplementary funds as grants (Box 1).

9. During the IFAD9 replenishment period, sovereign borrowing was introduced as an additional source of financing. As a first step, IFAD began sovereign borrowing from Spain. Since then, IFAD has borrowed sovereign loans from KfW and AFD and adopted the Sovereign Borrowing Framework (SBF) in 2015. During IFAD10, options were examined for: (a) expanding the PoLG through other sources of financing; (b) borrowing sovereign loans; and (c) exploring the scope for borrowing from the financial markets.
10. In 2017 IFAD adopted the Concessional Partner Loan (CPL) framework that will introduce another source of debt into the financial architecture. During IFAD11, IFAD expects to borrow up to the equivalent of 50 per cent of core contributions using the SBF and the CPL frameworks.

### Outflows/uses of funds

11. IFAD's major use of funds is to finance loans for projects. Other uses of funds include regular grants, uncompensated HIPC debt forgiveness and DSF grants, IFAD's own operating expenses and repayment of sovereign loans. IFAD's main products include: (i) loans and DSF grants to support development initiatives in borrowing member countries; (ii) grants to support innovation, research, policy engagement and capacity-building and to finance some loan components at the country level (Box 1). Resources for grant-funded activities (excluding DSF grants), are capped at 6.5 per cent of the annual PoLG.<sup>5</sup>

Box 1.

#### An overview of the main inflow and outflow of IFAD's financial resources

Inflow	Outflow/utilisation of funds
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Non-reimbursable</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Replenishment contributions</li> <li>• Loan reflows</li> <li>• Interest paid on loans</li> <li>• Income from treasury investments</li> <li>• Complementary contributions</li> <li>• Supplementary Funds</li> <li>• Compensation for HIPC initiative</li> <li>• Compensation for DSF</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <i>Reimbursable</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Sovereign borrowing</li> <li>▪ Concessional partner loans</li> <li>▪ Spanish Trust Fund</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Loans and DSF Grants</li> <li>▪ Regular grants</li> <li>▪ Other grant funding</li> <li>▪ IFAD's own operating expenses</li> <li>▪ Repayment of sovereign loans</li> </ul>

Source: CLE (2017)

## B. Key policies and arrangements shaping the financial architecture

12. Many IFAD policies have contributed to shaping the financial architecture, but eight deserve special attention:
  - (i) **Highly Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative (HIPC)**: Adopted in 1996, this policy implied that IFAD would receive compensation payments from members in return for an agreed reduction of loan repayments by selected highly indebted countries.
  - (ii) **Performance-Based Allocation System (PBAS)**. IFAD adopted the PBAS in 2003 to allocate financial resources among borrowing member countries in

<sup>5</sup> IFAD 2015. Policy for Grant Financing

a transparent manner.<sup>6</sup> The PBAS is designed to ensure that: (i) resources flow to countries where the need is greatest; and (ii) countries show a commitment to use the funds effectively. The PBAS was evaluated by IOE in 2016. IFAD revised the PBAS in 2017, with guidance provided by the Executive Board, and drawing on operational experience and the PBAS CLE findings and recommendations. The new PBAs will be applied during IFAD11.

- (iii) **Debt sustainability framework (DSF)**, introduced in 2007. IFAD provides financial support for countries with: (i) low debt sustainability (“red”): 100 per cent DSF grant; (ii) medium debt sustainability (“yellow”): 50 per cent DSF grant and 50 per cent highly concessional loan; and (iii) high debt sustainability (“green”): 100 per cent loan. DSF approvals up to the end of 2016 will result in an estimated foregone reflow of principal of US\$1.695 billion up to the end of 2056. The compensation is expected to take place through the replenishment process.
- (iv) **Single currency lending.** For most of the evaluation period IFAD’s financing was denominated in SDRs. Loans financed from the proceeds of sovereign loans were initially denominated in the currency of the sovereign loan (i.e., euro). During IFAD10, IFAD began offering single currency loans, either in euro or the US\$. The pilot phase had a US\$200 million ceiling that was reached in early 2016.
- (v) **Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing:**<sup>7</sup> This policy and the DSF policy set out the terms and conditions for DSF grants and highly concessional, blend and ordinary loans. The current types of IFAD financing are: (a) DSF grants; (b) highly concessional loans: free of interest; 0.75 per cent per annum service charge; 40-year maturity, including a 10-year grace period; (c) blended loans: 1.25 per cent annual interest rate on the principal amount outstanding; 0.75 per cent per annum service charge; 25-year maturity, including a 5-year grace period;<sup>8</sup> and (d) ordinary loans: variable interest rate based on the six-month Libor rate for the five SDR currencies plus a spread (for euro-denominated loans, a spread on Euribor is applied). IFAD’s spread equals IBRD’s variable spread for loans with an average maturity greater than 18 to 20 years. The repayment period is 15 to 18 years, including a 3-year grace period.
- (vi) **Policy for grant financing:** IFAD adopted and revised policies for grant financing in 2003, 2009 and 2015, the latter drawing on the CLE on the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing.
- (vii) **Sovereign borrowing framework (SBF).** The SBF, adopted in 2015, allows IFAD to mobilize additional resources to increase the PoLG. IFAD uses prudential norms and risk mitigation measures to manage the effects of sovereign borrowing on liabilities.
- (viii) **Concessional partner loans (CPLs).** In October 2017, the Executive Board approved the CPL Framework as a new debt element of the financial architecture. Key elements of the CPL framework include additionality (i.e., CPLs are not a substitute for contributions to core resources), unrestricted use, allocation through the PBAS, pricing substantially below market terms and with long maturities and grace periods, denominated in SDR or any SDR

<sup>6</sup> Prior to the PBAS, IFAD’s funding was allocated by region, based on country needs. With the adoption of the PBAS, IFAD abandoned the provision in Para 21 of the Lending Policies and Criteria that IFAD “will not seek to develop a pattern of country allocations; it will, instead, designate a number of priority countries for programming purposes.”

<sup>7</sup> These were first introduced in 1978 and revised several times, the latest in 2013. IFAD approved policies for grant financing in 2003, 2009, 2015 and February 2018.

<sup>8</sup> Previously, IFAD also had: *loans on intermediate terms* with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to 50% of the variable reference interest rate, and a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of 5 years; and *loans on hardened terms* bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of 10 years.

basket currency (United States dollar, euro, Japanese yen, British pound sterling and Chinese renminbi) and voting rights based on the grant element of the loan. CPLs are expected to have a lower cost for IFAD than sovereign loans.

13. **Arrangements for risk management:** When IFAD's sources of financing were limited to replenishments and loan reflows and IFAD only made sovereign loans financed by its equity, it faced financial risks related to: (i) its treasury investments; and (ii) foreign exchange risks (lending is denominated in SDRs);<sup>9</sup> and (iii) erosion of its capital base in a high inflation environment (the largest part of IFAD's lending is at concessional fixed interest rates). As the financial architecture broadened, with the introduction of the SBF, IFAD faced additional potential risks (e.g., interest and maturity risks). As a prudential measure the Framework for Sovereign Borrowing established thresholds for equity ratio, debt/equity ratio, liquidity and debt coverage ratio.
14. In 2012, the Fund created the Financial Operations Department (FOD), headed by an Associate Vice President/Chief Financial Officer/Chief Controller which has three divisions: (i) Financial Management Services; (ii) Treasury; and (iii) Accounting and Controller's Division. Since 2015, IFAD has reformed the finance and treasury infrastructure. This has involved inter alia: (i) making changes to the investment guidelines (December 2015); (ii) concluding negotiations on IFAD's first International Swaps and Derivatives Association Master Agreement and building in-house capacity to engage in cross-currency swaps; (iii) improving the treasury model to bring it closer to what is used in MDBs; (iv) more sophisticated reporting on financial ratios (i.e., debt/equity; liquidity; debt coverage); (v) creating a high-level task force on borrowing.

### C. Recent ODA trends

15. **Total allocated ODA from donors reporting to OECD as well as ODA for the agricultural sector rose from 2006 to 2016 in real terms.** Total ODA both from OECD donors, and donors as a whole, increased in constant 2015 prices from US\$133.6 billion in 2006 to US\$195.4 billion in 2016 (Table 2).<sup>10,11</sup> The agriculture sector ODA also increased since the 2007-08 food crisis in real terms from US\$4.9 billion (4.1 per cent of total allocated ODA) in 2006, to US\$9.8 billion (5.8 per cent) in 2012, reached US\$10.3 billion in 2015 (6.0 per cent) and slightly reduced to US\$9.7 billion in 2016 (5.7 per cent; Table 2).

Table 2

**Total ODA and agriculture ODA (constant 2015 US\$ billion) by all donors**

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Total ODA (for purpose specified)</b>	133.6	129.4	145.2	145.8	152.0	151.0	159.4	171.0	164.0	194.1	195.4
<b>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing</b>	4.9	6.6	6.9	8.6	8.0	9.1	9.8	9.2	9.2	10.3	9.7
<b>Agriculture as % ODA for purpose specified</b>	4.1%	5.5%	5.2%	6.5%	5.7%	6.6%	6.7%	5.8%	6.2%	6.0%	5.7%

Source: OECD Stat

<sup>9</sup> An additional foreign exchange risk was inherent in the fact that capital pledges were multi-year and, unless the amounts were fixed in US dollars or hedged back into dollars, were subject to foreign exchange movements.

<sup>10</sup> All data from OECD Development Database except where elsewhere stated

<sup>11</sup> Donors not reporting to the OECD are responsible for some 5-6 per cent of ODA, according to estimates from the Hudson Institute and much of the flows from major MICs to developing countries are not on ODA terms. The Hudson Institute estimated in 2014 that the total ODA from donors not reporting to the OECD was around US\$9.7 Billion or 6% of the total (This includes Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and South Africa).

16. **Climate-related ODA.** OECD data<sup>12</sup> on climate conflates ODA and concessional development loan financing. The bilateral total reached US\$30.2 billion in commitments made in 2016. The total rose from 14 per cent of development financing committed (concessional and ODA) in 2010-11 to 30.2 per cent in 2016. The total of Bilateral and Multilateral commitments in 2014 was US\$47 billion of which multilateral was 55 per cent. In term of sector breakdown of commitments in 2014-15, agriculture received 11 per cent of the total as compared with 29 per cent for energy, transport and storage 16 per cent and water and sanitation 9 per cent.
17. **Regional distribution of total ODA has not changed greatly over the ten-year period 2006-2015.** Africa South of the Sahara accounts for around 34 per cent of total ODA. The Far East and South Asia account for almost 23 per cent, of which South Asia is 15 per cent. There has been a decline in ODA for China from 2.8 per cent of the total in the three years 2006-08 to only 0.1 in the three years 2013-15. Europe has seen a slight decline and has averaged 8 per cent, while Latin America and the Caribbean saw a rise from 7.3 per cent in the three years 2006-08 to 12.0 in the three years 2013-15. Of disbursements classified as ODA by multilaterals over the period 2006-15, IDA and the EU were the largest single sources at 22 and 37 per cent respectively.
18. **Long-term credits and loans advanced each year to developing countries, not classified as ODA or export credits and grants, have increased in real terms (2015 constant US\$) over the ten-year period 2006-2015 but not as fast as ODA, with considerable fluctuation year to year.** The overall increase was from US\$45,502 million in 2006 to US\$54,065 million in 2014 and to US\$71,154 in 2015 with highs also in 2009 and 2010 (excluding China). Multilaterals, in particular the IBRD and regional development banks, accounted for 76 per cent of the total over the period. As might be expected, Asia and the Americas dominate the picture for loans on more commercial terms with 38 and 33 per cent respectively of the total. The African total of 13 per cent includes North Africa. The picture for multilateral funders in terms of regional balance is not significantly different from that for funders as a whole, with slightly more emphasis on Asia and Europe.
- ODA Contributions to Concessional Windows of the MDBs and Sector Funds**
19. **Notwithstanding the above positive ODA trends, both the IDA and ADF saw declines in the Donor ODA contributions to their most recent Replenishments expressed in US dollars.** In the case of IDA 17, the grand total increase masks important internal differences, notably a decrease in the traditional partner resources, and the introduction of a large market borrowing plan (Table 3). As of February 2017, ADF required 19 per cent more resources to fulfil its proposed programme of work for ADF 14. The donor commitments were some US\$5.2 billion net of loans compared with the headline figures published for ADF 13 of US\$5.8 billion.<sup>13</sup> The Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations is not separately funded and comparisons between the Asian Development Fund and Bank Replenishments 11 and 12 (2017-20) are not possible as, since 2017, concessional lending was taken onto the AsDB's ordinary balance sheet.
20. Among the Sector funds, the Global Fund saw a fractional increase in its most recent Replenishment pledges (2017-19). The GEF saw a very minor increase (2 per cent) at current terms between the 5<sup>th</sup> Replenishment (2010/11 and 2013/14) and the 6<sup>th</sup> (2014/15-2017/18). The 7<sup>th</sup> GEF Replenishment was under discussion in 2017. This occurs at a time when multilateral contributions overall have been increasing and US\$10.1 billion has been announced for the new Green Climate Fund but, at the same time, the Global Agriculture and Food Security

<sup>12</sup> Climate Related Development Finance in 2016 OECD-DAC December 2017

<sup>13</sup> The situation for the AfDF is less evident as detailed donor commitments are not easily publicly available.

Program (GAFSP), launched in 2009, received pledges of US\$1.6 billion following the global food crisis but has received no recent pledges.<sup>14</sup>

Table 3  
IDA 17 Summary data

	IDA 17 Agreed <sup>1/</sup> (SDR billion)	IDA 18 (SDR billion)	Change over IDA 17
TOTAL PARTNER RESOURCES	20.3	19.4	-4%
Total New Partner Contributions	17.3	16.5	-5%
Partner Compensation for MDRI Debt Forgiveness	4.0	2.9	-3%
TOTAL INTERNAL RESOURCES	11.9	15.5 <sup>2/</sup>	+29%
DEBT FINANCING	2.3	18.6	+713%
Concessional partner loan (net of grant element)	2.3	2.8	+21%
Market debt		15.9	
TOTAL	34.6	53.5	+55%

1/ IDA17 Scale-up Facility approved by IDA's Executive Directors in 2016 is not included.

2/ Internal resources include: (i) Reflows: SDR 14.2b (US\$19.9b); (ii) Carry forward of arrears clearance: SDR 0.8b (US\$1.1b); (iii) IBRD transfers expected: SDR 0.3b (US\$0.43b)\* (iv) IFC transfers expected: SDR 0.1b (US\$0.2b)\*. IBRD and IFC transfers include additional investment income that IDA can potentially generate from a three-year encashment schedule.

Source: WB Data

## D. Steps taken by the Multilateral Development Banks to reform their financial architecture

21. **The Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are reforming their financial architectures to increase leverage.** The MDBs were established as banks that are guaranteed by their shareholders. They have leveraged their equity by issuing bonds on the international capital markets since their inception. IFAD has not yet issued bonds. Other DFIs have established separate lending windows (or institutions) for the ordinary and concessional loans respectively. This distinction does not exist at IFAD.
22. The G20, which represents the world's largest economies, is a major driver of consensus on issues of financial architecture for development, including adjustments in the principal global financial institutions. The G20 Action Plan for taking forward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda was approved in Hangzhou in 2016<sup>15</sup> and was reaffirmed<sup>16</sup> in Hamburg in July 2017,<sup>17</sup> when the collective actions decided upon, placed renewed emphasis on Africa and the achievement of an enabling environment for the business sectors to contribute to development.

<sup>14</sup> The objective of GAFSP is to improve incomes and food and nutrition security in low-income countries by increasing agricultural productivity through technical assistance and by investing to raise agricultural productivity, link farmers to markets, reduce risk and vulnerability and improve non-farm rural livelihoods. GAFSP works in partnership with AfDB, AsDB, FAO, IADB, IFAD, the World Bank Group and WFP. GAFSP includes both public and private sector financing windows: (i) the public-sector window assists strategic country-led priorities; (ii) the private sector window provides long and short-term loans, credit guarantees and equity to support private sector activities for improving agricultural development and food security. By the end of 2015 GAFSP had financed \$1.02 billion in public sector projects and \$223 million in private sector projects. In 2017 two major donors announced that they would withdraw from GAFSP.

<sup>15</sup> [https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/\\_Anlagen/G7\\_G20/2016-09-08-g20-agenda-action-plan.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=1](https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2016-09-08-g20-agenda-action-plan.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1)

<sup>16</sup> The USA is reviewing both the Hangzhou and Hamburg G20 Action plans on the 2030 SDGs and cannot be considered a full party to the text.

<sup>17</sup> Annex to G20 Leaders Declaration Hamburg Update: Taking forward the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 - Agenda for Sustainable Development Hamburg Germany 2017 [https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/\\_Anlagen/G7\\_G20/2017-g20-hamburg-upade-en.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=6](https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2017-g20-hamburg-upade-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6)

23. Encouraged by the G20, the MDBs are exploring ways to change their financial architectures to more efficiently leverage the equity in their balance sheets, while maintaining their AAA credit ratings. This is expected to increase their financial support to help achieve Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).<sup>18</sup> It is estimated that achieving Agenda 2030 will require US\$3.3 to US\$4.5 trillion per year in additional funding with the largest amounts needed for infrastructure, climate change and agriculture.<sup>19</sup>
24. The UN Third International Conference on Financing for Development 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda stressed that “development banks should make optimal use of their resources and balance sheets, consistent with maintaining their financial integrity, and should update and develop their policies in support of the post-2015 development agenda, including the sustainable development goals.” The Addis Ababa Agenda for Action also recognized IFAD’s efforts in mobilizing investment to enable rural people living in poverty to improve their food security and nutrition and raise their incomes.<sup>20</sup>
25. **The Asian Development Bank** in 2013 began planning the combination of ADF’s equity and lending operations with the Ordinary Capital Resources balance sheet. Completed in 2017, this allowed AsDB’s annual lending to increase by 50 per cent to US\$20 billion and donor contributions to the Asian Development Fund grant operations to fall by 50 per cent from US\$1.2 billion, beginning with the 2017 Fund replenishment. These measures increased AsDB’s lending capacity by more efficiently and effectively utilizing existing resources. This merger did not change AsDB’s governance or voting power and AsDB retained its AAA credit rating.
26. In 2016 AsDB and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) signed an agreement on an innovative risk transfer mechanism. SIDA will guarantee up to US\$155 million of AsDB’s sovereign loans. The guarantee will allow AsDB to increase its lending capacity by US\$500 million over the next 10 years from its Ordinary Capital Resources. Risk transfer agreements pass specified risks from one party to another party in return for a fee. This can release capacity for additional operations by improving the risk profile of balance sheets and reduce the capital held in reserve to cover guaranteed loans. This was the first time such a risk transfer arrangement was used for a sovereign loan portfolio of an MDB.
27. **The African Development Bank** is seeking to leverage its capital to tap private resources. That includes opening its non-concessional window to the poorest countries. To complement its efforts to strengthen its financial architecture, AfDB is working to become a more efficient institution: (i) AfDB’s administrative costs are the lowest among the MDBs; and (ii) the cost-to-income ratio has fallen during recent years. AfDB plans to achieve efficiency gains and greater value for money as it rolls out its new development and business delivery model.
28. **The Interamerican Development Bank**, in 2015, began maximizing its policy mandate and providing better services to member countries. The IADB and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) consolidated the IADB group’s private-sector activities to better use resources and improve coordination with private and public-sector projects. The structure involved a US\$2.03 billion capital increase for the IIC. The Fund for Special Operations (FSO) is IADB’s concessional window.<sup>21</sup> Its funding is part of IADB’s normal capital-raising process, which has

<sup>18</sup> The MDBs Action Plan to Optimize Balance Sheets. G20 Antalya Summit, 15-16 November 2015

<sup>19</sup> Brillherman. 2016. Exploring the role of Multilateral Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions in conjunction with capital markets, and how they can contribute to the funding need related to the new UN Sustainable Development Goals in emerging markets and developing economies. <https://brillherman.wordpress.com/.../exploring-the-role-of-multilateral-development-b...>

<sup>20</sup> Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 13-16 July 2015, Endorsed by the UN General assembly in Resolution 69/313 of 27 July 2015, UN New York.

<sup>21</sup> Only five IADB member countries qualify for access to FSO. Haiti qualifies for grants and four countries (Guyana; Bolivia; Guatemala; Honduras) have access to 40-year fixed interest rate bullet loans priced at 25 basis points.

been done nine times. The 2010 Ninth Capital Increase (IDB-9) recapitalization resulted in an additional US\$479 million in funds for FSO.

29. IDB-9 strengthened FSO by reducing administrative expenses by 3 per cent and transferring funding for the non-reimbursable technical cooperation to Ordinary Capital. In addition, US\$479 million in new FSO contributions were to be used to provide full debt relief and additional resources to Haiti and ensure the sustainability of the FSO until 2020. To ensure efficient use of FSO resources, the blend of market-based and FSO financing was maintained, thus preserving the degree of concessionality consistent with the DSF.
30. **The World Bank and the International Development Agency.** During the IDA18 Replenishment consultations, participants acknowledged the strong demand for resources to help countries achieve their 2030 goals. The IDA18 financing package pioneered market leverage and new instruments and blending grant contributions with capital market debt. The IDA18 financing framework is a hybrid model in which traditional sources of financing are blended with debt in the form of capital market borrowing and Concessional Partner Loans. As a first step in September 2016, Standard and Poor's and Moody's rated IDA AAA, a necessary pre-condition to issue bonds on the capital markets. Further steps will include: (i) updating IDA's financial framework, accounting policies, and risk management parameters to ensure robust sustainability rules commensurate with capital market and AAA rating requirements; and (ii) preparing for an IDA bond issue and investor engagement to launch market access by obtaining all required regulatory approvals, devising a funding strategy, programme, and outreach and establishing needed operational protocols and systems.<sup>22</sup> Importantly, IDA18 added loans at non-concessional terms to the continuum of terms available to eligible IDA clients.
31. The IDA18 consultations recognised that Concessional Partner Loans (CPLs) complement market debt in increasing the size of IDA18. Relative to IDA17, the IDA18 funding approach significantly increased IDA's commitment authority by US\$23 billion, a 44 per cent increase over IDA17. However, partner grant contributions fell by 4 per cent as compared to IDA17. IDA18 also introduced an IFC-MIGA Private Sector Window to mobilize increased private sector investment in IDA countries, especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

## **E. Structure of the report**

32. The remainder of the report is structured into the following chapters: (i) evaluation objectives, approach and methodology; (ii) source of funds; (iii) use of funds and products; (iv) financial oversight and management; (v) IFAD's financial performance and sustainability; and (vi) conclusions and recommendations to strengthen IFAD's financial infrastructure.

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<sup>22</sup> World Bank Group. 2016. IDA18. Draft of IDA18 Deputies' Report. Additions to IDA Resources: Eighteenth Replenishment. Towards 2030: Investing in Growth, Resilience and Opportunity.

**Key points**

- IFAD's financial architecture is defined as the policies and systems adopted to mobilize, manage, allocate and disburse financial resources to fulfil its mandate of helping to reduce rural poverty.
- IFAD is a Fund and a specialized UN agency dedicated to rural poverty reduction. Periodic replenishments, provided as equity, are at the heart of IFAD's financial architecture and main source of financing.
- The total for ODA from OECD donors increased from US\$133.6 billion in 2006 to US\$195.4 billion (constant price) in 2016. ODA for agriculture in 2015 was twice as large as in 2006 (constant price) and represented circa 6 per cent of ODA. Climate change-related commitments (ODA and other concessional development loan financing not classified as ODA) rose from 14 per cent of development financing committed in 2010-11 to 30.2 per cent in 2016.
- In spite of this ODA increase, the recent replenishments of IDA and ADF have experienced a decline in their traditional donor contribution but, in the case of IDA, there has been an increase in leveraging resources through borrowing from financial markets.
- The structure of IFAD's financial inflows and balance sheet differs from MDBs. The latter have credit ratings and issue debt (bonds) on the financial markets to leverage lending activities. Encouraged by the G20, MDBs are exploring ways to change their financial architectures to increase their financial support for Agenda 2030 and the SDGs by more efficiently leveraging the equity in their balance sheets, while maintaining their AAA credit ratings.

## II. Evaluation objectives, approach and methodology

### A. Purpose and objectives of the evaluation

33. The overarching purpose of this evaluation was to independently assess IFAD's financial architecture as a means to contribute to rural poverty reduction. **The evaluation's objectives** were to: (i) assess the relevance of the financial architecture in mobilizing resources; (ii) examine the value added of IFAD's financial instruments to Member States; (iii) analyse the efficiency of IFAD's financial architecture; (iv) assess the contribution of the investment and financial strategies to IFAD's financial sustainability; and (v) make recommendations and identify alternatives and options that would strengthen the financial architecture and IFAD's capacity to fund rural poverty reduction programmes.

### B. Scope of the evaluation

34. **The scope of the evaluation** covers: (i) the sources of funds mobilized through replenishments, cofinancing and other sources including sovereign borrowing; (ii) the use and allocation of the resources to countries; (iii) the financial instruments and their performance; (iv) IFAD's corporate financial management and oversight systems (senior management oversight, treasury and financial services); and (v) the external financial oversight system (including the role of the Governing Council, the Executive Board and the Replenishment Consultation).
35. **The evaluation focused on the years from 2007 to 2017.** During that period, important changes were made to IFAD's financial architecture (e.g., refinement of the PBAS; launching of the Additional Resource Mobilization Initiative; adoption of the DSF, SBF and CPL framework; and strengthening the financial management and treasury functions; see Annex V). As required, the evaluation reviewed developments prior to 2007 to the extent that they were relevant to understanding the evolution of IFAD's financial architecture.
36. In addition to looking at internal factors, the evaluation examined relevant aspects of the external environment to identify factors that affect IFAD's financial architecture and financial performance (e.g., trends in ODA and capital markets; experience of comparator organizations and impact investors, supporting private sector rural small and medium enterprises of the type that IFAD targets). The evaluation drew from the documentation prepared during the IFAD11 replenishment process.

### C. Approach and methodology

37. The evaluation was undertaken within the overall framework of the Revised IFAD Evaluation Policy (2011)<sup>23</sup> and followed the broad methodological fundamentals set out in the second edition of the 2015 IFAD Evaluation Manual.<sup>24</sup>
38. **A conceptual scheme.** The financial architecture of IFAD is not a self-standing "programme", "strategy" or "policy" but rather the results of a progressive accumulation of decisions, policies and working practices over a long period. Unlike a "programme" or a "strategy", the financial architecture has not been constructed through a formal logical framework. For this reason, rather than a full-fledged theory of change, this evaluation provides a simpler conceptualisation as to how the elements of the architecture are connected and how they may contribute (albeit indirectly) to development results. A graphic representation of this is provided in Figure 1.
39. As a first step (upper side of Figure 1), the financial architecture requires a governance system that sets the basic rules and exerts oversight functions, as well as a managerial structure that implements and reports on the same. The management structure and governance system relate to preparation, approval and

<sup>23</sup> [www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-7-Rev-2.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-7-Rev-2.pdf).


<sup>24</sup> [www.ifad.org/evaluation/process\\_methodology/doc/manual.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf). However, the CLE used past evaluations that were produced following the 2009 Manual and its definition of criteria and domains.

implementation of policies and procedures on: sourcing of funds that IFAD uses to finance its development programmes, coverage of operational costs and financial risk management. These policies determine the: (i) funding sources; (ii) financial instruments available; and (iii) procedures to allocate financial resources to development partners. The volume and type of financial resources are also, in part, determined by the international development and finance context.

40. The above description largely refers to the 'supply side' of the architecture: the total volume of resources available, the financing instruments and the resource allocation system provide the initial building blocks for negotiation with development partners at the country level. An important aspect in this conceptualization is also the role of the 'demand side': the development needs and priorities in borrowing countries and their decision-making in response to the allocation of financial resources and to the available financial instruments. Important elements here are the price, lending terms and suitability of financial instruments to country needs.
41. The interaction of the above 'supply and demand sides', along with a number of external factors, contribute to determining the contents of the strategies and projects agreed upon between governments and IFAD. In turn, the content of the development interventions, along with the quality of their implementation and their performance, as well as other external and contextual factors, contribute to the final development results. While this is obviously a simplified scheme, the main point to be taken here is that, the relation between the financial architecture and the final development outcomes is largely indirect.
42. On the other hand (lower side of Figure 1), the volume of funding, the characteristics of the funding sources, the financing instruments and the allocation system contribute in a more direct manner to shape the margins for cost recovery. Together with the policies and procedures to manage financial risks, they eventually contribute to the financial sustainability of the Fund and, ultimately, to IFAD's capacity to deliver development results.

Figure 1

**A conceptual scheme for the financial architecture**



Source: IOE Elaboration (2017).

43. As a first approximation, a desirable financial architecture may be defined as one that: (i) mobilizes sufficient resources to maximise IFAD's contributions to help

borrowing countries reduce rural poverty with a stable (or, ideally, growing) lending volume; (ii) provides instruments that respond to the priorities of recipient countries for rural poverty reduction; (iii) provides opportunities to enhance IFAD's financial efficiency through leveraging with due consideration to institutional capacities, costs and risk management; and (iv) ensures that IFAD is financially sustainable in the long term and is not subject to undue risks. This also requires some flexibility in the architecture and continued support from members.

44. The **evaluation framework** contains evaluation criteria (relevance; effectiveness; efficiency; financial sustainability) that have been adapted taking into account the above conceptual framework, through key questions and sub-questions and to the special subject of this evaluation (see more details in Annex I).<sup>25</sup> The main questions and sub-questions, by evaluation criterion, are summarised below and detailed in Annex I. It is recognized that, while fully valid for assessing a project or broader programme, standard evaluation criteria are not necessarily well suited to a non-standard evaluation topic such as IFAD's financial architecture. Evaluation criteria have been used as a broad reference to guide the definition of specific evaluation questions. For clarity of exposition, this report is organized following the key elements of the financial architecture rather than the standard evaluation criteria.
45. **Relevance.** The evaluation assessed the relevance of the current financial architecture and supporting policies and instruments to fulfil IFAD's mandate as expressed in the Agreement Establishing IFAD and subsequent corporate documents. The main related sub-questions were:
- (i) How relevant was/is the financial architecture in mobilizing financial resources and offering them to Member States for the expected value and types of interventions in rural poverty reduction and development?
  - (ii) How relevant were the assumptions underpinning the financial architecture to IFAD's operational performance, risk-adjusted results and cost efficiency? Are they still valid?
  - (iii) Did the financial architecture allow mobilizing additional financial resources beyond core replenishments (e.g. complementary contributions; supplementary funds; cofinancing) and at what conditions?
  - (iv) How could the relevance of IFAD's financial architecture be enhanced in light of the changing international development context and appetite for replenishments and increased financial leverage on IFAD's mission, operations and risk management?
46. **Effectiveness.** The key evaluation question for effectiveness was "How effective were IFAD's financial architecture and instruments used in supporting IFAD's contributions to reducing rural poverty?" The main related sub-questions were:
- (i) Was IFAD's financial architecture effective in addressing the demand of financial resources and in allowing PoLG to grow? Were borrowing countries able to avail of the resources? Did lending terms affect the typology of interventions financed or generate bias in programme performance and results?
  - (ii) Were the instruments (loans, grants, reimbursable technical assistance) effective in serving rural development demands from different countries (e.g. in countries eligible for DSF grants and highly concessional, blend and ordinary loans) and effective in delivering development results?
  - (iii) Does the experience gained by comparator organizations suggest alternatives that IFAD should consider in order to strengthen its financial architecture?

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<sup>25</sup> Key questions were presented in the approach paper and further refined in the course of the evaluation.

47. **Efficiency.** Under this criterion, the evaluation examined two main aspects: financial efficiency and financial organizational matters. The main related sub-questions were:
- (i) Were governance and financial organizational matters appropriate? This involved an analysis of policies for investing treasury assets, financial control, risk management, accounting, treasury and resource mobilization strategies, policies and procedures and financial governance, management, organizational structure, middle and back office functions, supporting systems and reporting systems.
  - (ii) Was the financial architecture efficient? This involved an analysis of treasury functions (investment profits within cash and risk constraints), recovery of operating costs from loan charges and profits from treasury investments and the trends in liquidity and other standard financial ratios.
48. **Financial sustainability** means that profits from loan margins, treasury investments and equity exits, cover both the operational costs and help build a buffer of provisions to deal with the institution's financial, credit and operational risks in the long term. This is different from the notion of sustainability often used at IFAD that relies mostly on future cash flow and liquidity scenarios. The evaluation assessed IFAD's financial sustainability in terms of its ability to provide the necessary funds to fulfil IFAD's mandate over the long run. By running simulations on a financial model, the CLE used standard financial ratios to assess financial sustainability by examining projected sources and uses of financing. The main related sub-questions were:
- (i) What are the effects of the mix of financial products, terms and conditions on IFAD's short and long-term financing (e.g., optimality of the balance sheet, use of financial leverage, amount of liquidity held, revenue generated from management of liquid assets and interest rate/service charges)?
  - (ii) What are the key drivers of IFAD's financial sustainability (e.g., volume, pricing and margins, terms, tenors, treasury operations)? What are the implications of external factors?
  - (iii) Do the profits from loan margins and treasury investments cover operational costs and help build a buffer of provisions to deal with IFAD's financial, credit and operational risks?
  - (iv) Can IFAD operate in the long term without further financial support from its shareholders? How does IFAD need to be structured to be financially sustainable in the long term with and without further sizable member contributions?
  - (v) What organizational changes would be required to deal with added risk factors associated with changes in the financial architecture, sources of financing, products and terms?
  - (vi) What are the lessons from other comparable organizations that could help enhance IFAD's financial sustainability and risk management?
49. **Nature of the evaluation.** While there are summative elements in this evaluation, it contains important formative aspects.<sup>26</sup> Because IFAD is in the process of examining ways to strengthen its financial architecture, the formative aspects of the Financial Architecture CLE were designed to identify findings, conclusions and recommendations intended to contribute to improving the financial architecture. However, many aspects of the financial architecture have been in

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<sup>26</sup> OECD defines formative evaluations as evaluations intended to improve performance, most often conducted during the implementation phase of projects or programmes and summative evaluations as those conducted at the end of an intervention (or a phase of that intervention) to determine the extent to which anticipated outcomes were produced. See OECD. 2010. Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management.

place for a decade or more. Thus, some data on performance are available for the summative aspects of the evaluation as well.

#### **D. Data collection and information sources**

50. The CLE adopted a **mixed-method approach**, using qualitative and quantitative data collection tools and analysis, including examining information from comparator institutions, to assess IFAD's financial architecture, experience to date and likely future financial sustainability. Taking the conceptual framework as a reference, the use of a mixed methods approach allowed IOE to consider information of different types and from different sources and to triangulate to increase the robustness of the findings, conclusions and recommendations.
51. **Management self-assessment.** In line with the Evaluation Policy, Management normally conducts a self-assessment as an input to CLEs. During 2016/2017, Management undertook significant work to review the financial architecture. Building on that, IOE identified key issues for Management to consider and Management prepared a self-assessment presentation that was discussed with IOE in a half-day internal workshop in September 2017. That process enriched the evaluation by providing an opportunity for different units from IFAD Management to present their experience and perspectives on IFAD's financial architecture.
52. **Document review.** The evaluation team reviewed many documents that are related to the financial architecture and the associated policies and instruments (e.g., reports from replenishment consultations; financial statements; annual programmes of work and budget; medium and long term strategic frameworks; the President's bulletins; related policies and procedures; selected COSOPs and operational documents; and minutes of Audit Committee meetings). The evaluation team also reviewed selected documents prepared by the G20 and the MDBs related to their financial architectures and replenishments of their concessional windows and relevant reports for the Rome-based Agencies. The evaluation team mined IOE evaluation reports, particularly CLEs and selected CPEs, to extract relevant findings and analysis.
53. **Key informant interviews in IFAD** were a major source of information for the evaluation. Semi-structured interviews, both of individuals and groups of people, were undertaken with a wide range of staff at Headquarters and working in country offices, including selected members of the Replenishment Consultation, Executive Board, Evaluation and Audit Committees, IFAD Senior Management, key staff in the Financial Operations Department (FOD), selected staff in the Programme Management Department (PMD), the Office of Partnership and Resource Mobilisation and other departments or divisions as required. Interactions were held with members of the Executive Board and of the Replenishment Consultation. Feedback collected during the interviews was not disclosed in a manner that could be traced back to the source.
54. **Analysis of IFAD's quantitative data.** Quantitative data was extracted and analysed from IFAD's financial systems, financial statements and reports and operational databases [i.e., the Grants and Investment Projects System (GRIPS, Flexcube)]. Based on historical performance and various assumptions, a financial model was developed by IOE and used to simulate long-term forecasts of IFAD's financial performance to assess the implications of various possible options to modify salient features of the financial architecture.
55. **Ratings generated by IOE project evaluations** were a source of information in assessing the contribution of the financial architecture to IFAD's operational performance and achievement of development results by type of financing. Statistical analysis was performed across types of financing (e.g., DSF grants; 50 per cent DSF grant/50 per cent highly concessional loan; 100 per cent highly concessional loan; blended loans; ordinary loans). Statistical tests were undertaken to determine whether the differences in the ratings were statistically significant at

the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels.<sup>27</sup> This analysis looked at correlation between type of financing and evaluation ratings. It did not assume nor imply a direct causal link between type of financing and project performance.

56. **Data from external sources.** Examples of external data used in the evaluation include selected World Bank governance indicators and country classifications in 2009 and 2017, OECD DAC data on the trends in ODA flows, trends in interest rates and returns in the international capital markets, international credit ratings and bond issues for borrowing member countries, and information on financial results, products, pricing, terms and other aspects available on MDB web pages.
57. During the **country interactions**, IOE obtained input from selected government officials, development organizations and IFAD staff on the use of PBAS allocations, whether loan terms affect the nature of the projects put forward for financing, the demand for IFAD financing and its sensitivity to terms and interest in new products. The following criteria were used to select the countries for the case studies: (i) a mix of countries that receive financial support on different terms; (ii) countries for which the loan terms changed during the evaluation period; (iii) countries where COSOPs or CPEs were being prepared in 2017 or 2018; (iv) regional representation; and (v) logistics that resulted in cost-efficient travel.
58. A mix of ways was used to undertake 17 country interactions: (i) six CLE dedicated country visits (Côte d'Ivoire; Indonesia; Mexico; Morocco; the Philippines; Zambia); (ii) five countries for which there were on-going CPEs (Angola; Cambodia; Cameroon; Georgia; Peru); and (iii) remote interviews interactions with CPMs and/or country stakeholders in six countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Ethiopia; Ghana; India; Sudan).
59. **Electronic survey of IFAD staff and stakeholders.** An anonymous electronic survey was used to seek feedback from many stakeholders (e.g. Executive Board members, Senior Management, IFAD staff in both the Headquarters and country offices, key government officials in ministries of finance, planning and selected line ministries in the List A, B and C countries). The e-survey was designed after the large number of interviews at IFAD and country visits and interactions had been completed. The survey was instrumental to probe into specific issues and triangulate the results with other data. A total of 1,194 people (343 IFAD senior management and professional staff; 851 government counterparts) were in the survey population. Including partial responses, the response rate was 68 per cent (IFAD: 82 per cent; non-IFAD 60 per cent).<sup>28</sup> The e-questionnaire included: (i) answers to categorical closed questions; (ii) answers requiring agreement/disagreement on a 6-point Likert scale (1-strong disagreement to 6-strong agreement); and (iii) a few open questions/comments.
60. The main tables resulting from the e-survey are shown in Annex VIII. Responses were broken down by IFAD respondents, non-IFAD respondents and respondents from LICs, LMICs, UMICs and List A countries. Statistical testing was undertaken on the differences in responses between various groups. Results of the surveys have not been utilised in isolation but after triangulation with other sources.
61. **Review of comparator organizations.** The evaluation team collected information on and conducted interviews and visits with major MDBs [e.g., the World Bank Group; Asian Development Bank (AsDB), African Development Bank (AfDB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)] as these are DFIs and have experience in financial

<sup>27</sup> In the text of the report '\*\*\*', '\*\*' and '\*' means significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively.

<sup>28</sup> Several measures were taken to get an adequate response rate: (i) translation of the questionnaire into IFAD's four official languages; (ii) personalised communications; and (iii) several follow-ups to non-respondents. Of the 1,310 invitations sent, 116 bounced or opted out, all of which were non-IFAD respondents. Netting out the bounced, opted out and partial responses, there were 595 complete returns (221 for IFAD; 374 from non-IFAD), resulting in a 50 per cent response rate (64 per cent for IFAD; 44 per cent for non-IFAD). Response rates were based on the 1,194 questionnaires received by the respondents. The e-survey covered 95 per cent of IFAD's active countries in WCA, 91 per cent in LAC, 89 per cent in NEN, 82 per cent in APR and 76 per cent in ESA.

products and practices that provide learning opportunities for IFAD. This covered areas such as governance and organizational matters, treasury management, financial performance and balance sheet restructuring, products, pricing, terms and currency choice and the views of donors as enunciated by the G20 and during replenishments of concessional windows.

62. In order to better diversify the spectrum of experiences, interviews and visits were also conducted with: (i) bilateral agencies that have introduced reforms to grow balance sheets and borrow on the capital markets (e.g., Agence Française de Développement (AFD); the Netherlands Development Finance Company, FMO); and (ii) the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI);<sup>29</sup> (iii) Rome-based UN agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP); (iv) six social impact investors, which were members of the Council on Smallholder Agriculture Finance (CSAF);<sup>30</sup> and (v) with KfW.
63. **Timeline and phases.** The CLE was undertaken during 2017 and 2018. The Evaluation Committee considered the approach paper in March 2017<sup>31</sup> and the evaluation was completed in March 2018. The draft report was peer reviewed in IOE in January 2018. The approach paper and the main report benefited from comments by two Senior Independent Advisors, Frederik Korfker, former Manager and Chief Evaluator, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and Zenda Ofir, Honorary professor at the School for Public Leadership at Stellenbosch University in South Africa and Independent Evaluator (Annex XIII). The report was shared with IFAD Management in February 2018. Management provided written comments which were taken into consideration in finalizing the report. After consideration by the Evaluation Committee in June 2018, the final report was presented to the Executive Board in September 2018.
64. **Boundaries, constraints and limitations to the evaluation.** A major challenge for the Financial Architecture CLE was the absence of an established methodology for assessing financial architecture in a comprehensive manner. Another challenge was to set a “boundary” for the analytical framework. As presented in Figure 1, IFAD’s financial architecture has implications for its development results. However, this happens in an indirect manner, because results are also affected by many other factors including: the quality of operations, national strategies and policies, capacity of institution, the work of many individuals and by a number of other exogenous factors. Many of these were beyond the boundaries of this evaluation. Thus, while part of the analysis contemplates statistical correlation between specific features of the financial architecture and some indicators of performance and results, it is important not to assume deterministic causal association between them.
65. While the financial architecture is not a “development programme” and does not have comprehensive and clearly stated targets and objectives, it can be evaluated by using: (i) internal benchmarks (i.e., identify which options are available/absent within the present architecture and how important they are for IFAD’s mandate); and (ii) external benchmarks (existing options and lessons learned in other development organizations). While the review of comparator organizations was useful, there are important caveats: IFAD has a specific mandate for rural poverty and agriculture and is much smaller than MDBs: not all the features of other institutions can be replicated at IFAD and vice versa. MDBs were established as banks and have a credit rating and they support both sovereign and non-sovereign operations.

<sup>29</sup> GAVI brings together key UN agencies, governments, the vaccine industry from developed and developing countries, the private sector and civil society. GAVI has developed an innovative financing structure to turn long-term pledges into large-scale, long-term funding through the International Finance Facility for Immunisation and raises financing on the international capital markets.

<sup>30</sup> The impact investors were: Alterfin, Root Capital, Triodos Investment Management, Incofin Investment Management, ResponsAbility, Rabo Rural Fund. Interviews were also held with the Council on Smallholder Agricultural Finance (CSAF), an alliance of social lending institutions/impact agricultural lenders.

<sup>31</sup> EC 2017/96/W.P

66. Finally, a very specific issue related to the uncertainty of the long-term forecasts needed to assess IFAD's financial sustainability. To address this issue, sensitivity testing of various scenarios was undertaken. A time frame was set at 10 years (2018-2028), encompassing three replenishment cycles (IFAD11-IFAD13). From an analytical point of view, this seemed more helpful than making projections over 30-40 years, when too many variables and parameters are out of control and cannot be modelled in a credible manner.

**Key points**

- While there are summative elements in this evaluation, it also contains important formative aspects. The evaluation focused on the years from 2007 to 2017. The objectives of this evaluation were to: (i) assess the relevance of the financial architecture in mobilizing resources; (ii) examine the value added of IFAD's financial instruments to Member States; (iii) evaluate the efficiency of IFAD's financial architecture; (iv) assess the contribution of the investment and financial strategies to IFAD's financial sustainability; and, (v) make recommendations and identify alternatives and options that would strengthen the financial architecture and IFAD's capacity to fund rural poverty reduction programmes.
- The scope of the CLE covers: (i) the sources of funds mobilized; (ii) the use and allocation of the resources; (iii) the financial support instruments and their performance; (iv) IFAD's corporate financial management and oversight systems; and (v) the external financial oversight system.
- The evaluation developed a simple conceptual framework outlining: (i) how the main elements of the financial architecture interact with demands from borrowing countries and other country context and external factors in shaping country strategies, and how these may contribute (mostly indirectly) to development results; (ii) through what mechanisms the financial architecture contributes to shape the financial sustainability of IFAD.
- The evaluation used mixed methods and analysed both quantitative and qualitative information and data from a range of sources (e.g., information from IFAD's treasury system and financial modelling; document reviews; semi-structured interviews of key informants; 17 country consultations; quantitative analysis of data available in various IFAD information systems; an electronic survey of stakeholders; information from comparator organizations).

### III. IFAD's Funding sources


67. This chapter addresses questions that fall under the area of relevance, as defined in the methodology section (Chapter II). Such questions relate to the mobilization of financial resources to be utilized by IFAD for rural poverty reduction and development interventions. In doing so, this chapter reviews costs, risks and practical arrangements that relate to the mobilization of resources. The governance aspects of the sourcing of funds are treated in Chapter V.
68. Prima facie, IFAD's reliance on members' replenishment contributions and funds derived from operations (e.g. loan reflows, income from Treasury investments) seems a relevant arrangement to support financing at concessional terms. The implicit assumption is that, in the long period, IFAD members would be in a financial position and willing to continue providing financial support in grant form and to a level that allows the Fund to maintain (and ideally increase) its PoLG. As noted in the previous chapters, ODA from OECD donors has been increasing from 2007 up to 2016 but the recent replenishment of IDA and ADF have experienced a decline in their donor contribution.
69. The next paragraphs review IFAD's funding source and examine trends, constraints and risks. As will be clear from the discussion, the definition of financial resources stated in the Agreement establishing IFAD allowed flexibility in introducing of additional funding sources beyond replenishment contributions, although they remain the most important source.

#### Incoming resources at IFAD's disposal

70. The financial resources incoming at IFAD's disposal are those that can be used by IFAD for loans and grants and to pay for its administrative costs and are not reimbursable (instead, sovereign loans are not "at disposal"). They include the following categories: (i) replenishment receipts; (ii) loan principal reflow and interest receipts; (iii) income from financial investments made by IFAD's Treasury; (iv) supplementary funds and complementary contributions (since IFAD10, complementary contributions have been replaced by Unrestricted Complementary Contributions); and (v) other income (e.g., foregone debt forgiveness in the context of the HIPC, foregone loan repayments and service charges associated with DSF grants).
71. **Between IFAD7 and IFAD9, reliance on replenishment and loan reflows increased.** Between IFAD7 and IFAD9, there was an initial slight increase followed by a decline in overall IFAD incoming resources at disposal. Based on IFAD's financial statement data, these financial resources were US\$2,605 for IFAD7 (2007-2009); US\$2,663 for IFAD8 (2010-12) and US\$2,398 for IFAD9 (2013-15) at constant 2015 prices. The IFAD10 period will finish in 2018.

Figure 2

#### Changes in the composition of non-reimbursable resources to IFAD (IFAD7-IFAD9)



Source Calculated on Basis of IFAD Financial Statements Data

72. Figure 2 provides a breakdown of incoming resources during the 7th, 8th, and 9th Replenishment periods and 2016, the first year of the 10th Replenishment period (excluding sovereign borrowing as they are not available). The proportion of income from treasury investments declined notably between IFAD7 and IFAD9, while the proportion of supplementary funds and complementary contributions of the total has tended to increase. In the same period, reliance on loan reflows, and even more so on replenishment contributions, has grown markedly.


## A. Core replenishment resources and loan reflows

### A.1 Trends in pledges for replenishments

73. **After a steep rise in total pledges of core contribution for IFAD8 compared with IFAD7, pledges have largely stabilised at constant prices.** There was a slight further rise to IFAD9 and a slight decline to IFAD10 (Figure 3). One hundred and thirty-seven countries made pledges between IFAD7 and IFAD10.<sup>32</sup>

Figure 3

**Pledges of core contributions, US\$ million (2015 constant prices)**



Source: Core Replenishment Contributions calculated from IFAD Financial Statements (in 2016 Appendix H) also with reference to Summaries of Status of Contributions presented to the Executive Board. Constant Prices obtained from OECD multiplier for second year of Replenishment Period.

74. **More members participate in pledging for IFAD replenishments compared to other institutions. However, as with other DFIs, IFAD remains dependent on a few major donors.** Ninety-eight countries have pledged for the 10<sup>th</sup> IFAD Replenishment, compared with 52 for IDA 18 and 26 for the ADF 14<sup>th</sup> Replenishment.<sup>33</sup> However, the nine countries contributing five per cent or more of funding pledges accounted for 63 per cent of the total pledges to IFAD. The further 12 countries contributing more than 1 per cent to pledges brought the proportion of total pledges to 93 per cent.<sup>34</sup> The 21 countries contributing more than one per cent of IFAD's resources include five borrowing countries: Brazil, China (5.8 per cent of the total); India, Indonesia and Nigeria.
75. **There are risks connected to foreign exchange movements.** Because countries can make pledges in their own currencies but the total replenishment is accounted in US\$, IFAD is exposed to a currency exchange risk, a topic that is further discussed in Chapter V. Similar to other institutions, such as WB-IDA, IFAD is considering the introduction of hedging instruments.<sup>35</sup> The movement of

<sup>32</sup> For the 10th Replenishment, Belgium did not make pledges. Denmark withdrew its pledge and Sweden reduced its own (if these three countries had pledged at their 9<sup>th</sup> Replenishment level the 10<sup>th</sup> Replenishment would have been some US\$70 million larger). The UK increased its commitment to provide the largest pledge in the 10<sup>th</sup> Replenishment. Spain did not Pledge for the 9<sup>th</sup> or 10<sup>th</sup> Replenishments.

<sup>33</sup> IFAD's major donors' pledges contributions to IFAD10 replenishment as a percentage of the total were: UK (9.3), USA (8.8), Italy (8.3), Netherlands (7.3), Germany (6.8), Canada (6.7), China (5.8), Japan (5.5), and Norway (5.0). The big difference between IFAD and IDA in terms of number of countries is the number of poorer borrowing countries contributing small amounts to IFAD.

<sup>34</sup> In order of size of pledge: Switzerland; France; Sweden; India; Saudi Arabia; Austria; Finland; Brazil; Nigeria, Kuwait, Algeria and Indonesia

<sup>35</sup> IDA allows members to make contributions in local currencies but hedges against foreign exchange risk with US\$. Instead, IBRD for its capital increase eliminates currency exchange risk by establishing that all contributions be denominated in US\$, thus shifting the risk to contributors.


currencies against the US\$ means that, even where the major non-dollar contributors maintain or increase their contributions in national currencies, this may not be reflected in the Replenishment Pledge. In the 9th Replenishment, the UK increased its UK£ contribution by 51 per cent but this only resulted in a 27 per cent increase in US\$ terms. France held its contribution steady and this resulted in a drop of 6 per cent in its US\$ Pledge. The most striking changes occurred with IFAD10, compared with IFAD9. Canada, Japan, Germany and France held their Pledges steady but this resulted in 11; 24; 7; and 7 per cent declines respectively for the pledges expressed in US\$. Instead, the UK pledged an 11 per cent increase in national currency, but this was recorded as a 15 per cent increase in US\$ due to GBP appreciation. The GBP has since declined considerably vis à vis the US\$.<sup>36</sup> The topic of the hedging of promissory notes is discussed in Chapter V.

## A.2 Trends in receipts from replenishments

76. **Received replenishment contributions during the replenishment period rose markedly from the 6th to 8th replenishments but then declined in the 9th** (Figure 4).

Figure 4

**IFAD Received replenishment contributions (US\$ million - 2015 constant US\$)**



Source: IFAD Financial Statements Appendix C. Conversion to constant prices using OECD multiplier (Note that these figures do not correspond to receipts for the actual replenishment as some are from previous replenishments and encashed during the replenishment period and there are minor advance payments).

77. **IFAD's encashment schedule for pledges is more favourable than for comparator institutions.** Instruments of contribution are to be deposited by the end of each replenishment cycle and are normally encashed in either one or two or maximum three instalments, except in the few cases where extended encashment periods are agreed. As loan disbursements extend considerably beyond the replenishment cycle, with many projects only getting started as the cycle ends, this contributes to IFAD's cash balance and opportunity for investment income, which accrues to IFAD.
78. Among the comparators, IDA17 has a nine-year standard encashment schedule; however, members may pay earlier and either receive discounts and pay amounts less than their contribution amount or receive acceleration credits and pay the full contribution amount, receiving additional voting rights. The African Development Fund has a ten-year schedule and is moving to offset the problems of the encashment schedule through a hedged accelerated encashment framework approved at the 12<sup>th</sup> Replenishment in 2016. The framework allows the Fund to accrue investment income for the benefit of donors by encashing their

<sup>36</sup> Some major countries have occasionally chosen to make their pledges in US\$ rather than the national currency, notably the Netherlands in the 9th and 10th Replenishments and Germany in the 8<sup>th</sup>. It may be noted that the biennial assessed contributions to the United Nations and UN specialised agencies are normally paid in two tranches in the currency specified in the budget (normally US\$ but some agencies have a split assessment in US\$ and the currency of the HQ location). Thus, for two years the entity knows exactly what it will receive.

subscriptions at earlier dates, in fewer instalments or in different proportions than those specified in the standard 10-year calendar.<sup>37</sup>

79. **IFAD has not experienced a significant problem of delays in honouring of pledges and payments against promissory notes** until the recent retraction of initial pledges by Denmark and Sweden. This compares positively with the experience in some other funds and IFIs.<sup>38</sup> At the close of 2016, only the USA had minor amounts outstanding for the seventh and eighth Replenishment cycles. A total of US\$47.5 million was outstanding for IFAD9 but this was only one year after closure and represented just 3.3 per cent of total pledges. Special arrangements have been entered into for some members who have had severe internal cash flow problems, notably Iraq.<sup>39</sup>

### A.3 Loan reflows

80. Reflows, including repayments of loan principals and interest rates have increased, as expected with an increasing portfolio (Table 4). Reflows are a fundamental feature of the financial architecture. Together with replenishment, they are fundamental in the financing of the PoLG. The same is funded on a “pay-as-you-go” basis: the PoLG and operational expenses of IFAD in a given replenishment period are not fully paid up by the sum of replenishment contributions reflows and borrowing that takes place in the same replenishment period but will require funds from loan reflows and replenishment that come in the future.
81. **There are minimal issues of loan default with IFAD.** Countries tend to privilege loan repayment to multilateral financing institutions. HIPC and DSF ensure that countries with major difficulties that meet the criteria are not placed in an unsustainable debt position.

Table 4

#### IFAD loan reflows at 2015 constant US\$ million

	<i>Interest</i>	<i>Principal Repayment</i>	<i>Total</i>
7 <sup>th</sup> Replenishment period 2007-09	164.7	509.8	674.6
8 <sup>th</sup> Replenishment period 2010-12	155.0	655.8	810.8
9 <sup>th</sup> Replenishment period 2013-15	157.9	660.9	818.8

Source: IFAD Financial Statements 2007-15 with application of OECD Multiplier

<sup>37</sup> Donors can use this investment income to: (i) increase their contributions and burden share in the replenishment; (ii) pay a discounted amount on their subscription while maintaining burden share; (iii) to reduce ADF-13's technical gap; (iv) pay for other commitments to the Fund (such as grant contributions of MDRI compensation); (v) meet their past due payments on past and future replenishments.

<sup>38</sup> For example, the GEF has at times suffered from major delays in honouring pledges.

<sup>39</sup> As per the 2016 financial statements, Iran has not paid US\$83.2 million of its initial pledged contribution of US\$124.8 million or US\$2.4 million of its pledged contribution to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Replenishment of US\$4 million. No other country had significant receivables outstanding with limited expectation of payment (i.e. an allowance had been made in the accounts).

### Key points

- IFAD's financial architecture can be considered as broadly relevant for providing financing at highly concessional terms. IFAD's financial architecture has been centred on replenishment contributions and other non-reimbursable sources of funding (e.g., reflows from loans, income from treasury investments, supplementary funds and complementary contributions).
- The underlying assumption in this architecture was that member countries would be able and willing to continue providing grant resources in the foreseeable future to a level that allows for PoLG growth. The PoLG is financed to a large extent on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, requiring liquidity from future replenishments and future loan reflows.
- The above assumption is increasingly under strain. There was an initial slight increase followed by a decline in overall IFAD incoming non-reimbursable resources between IFAD7 and IFAD9. Because of the reduction of income from treasury investments, reliance increased on replenishment contributions and loan reflows. Received replenishment contributions rose markedly from IFAD6 to IFAD8 but declined in IFAD9.
- While IFAD's replenishment procedures generally follow those of MDBs, there are also some differences. IFAD's encashment schedule for pledges and experience of timeliness of payment are more favourable than for MDBs. More member countries participate in pledging for IFAD. However, the largest pledges are concentrated over a small number of members. Pledges in currencies other than the US dollar are vulnerable to foreign exchange movements.

## B. Overview of funds additional to core replenishment resources

82. **Specially earmarked and supplementary funds are not new to IFAD.** As an example, in 1995, IFAD EB decided to integrate the US\$351 million Special Resources for Sub-Saharan Africa (SRS) into IFAD's programme but the funds remained separately stated. Most additional funding since that time has been disbursed as grants. Supplementary, complementary and other non-regular resources from members and other sources are a very substantial part of the new resources and are mostly utilised for grants. At constant 2015 prices, a total of some US\$610 million (of which almost half was for ASAP) was provided by Member States to IFAD in the period 2007-16 and this included contributions and supplementary funds. In addition, non-members (mostly the European Union and GEF) provided the equivalent of US\$870 million in supplementary funding. In the same period, IFAD received US\$2,765 million in replenishment contributions. Therefore, the ratio of volumes of complementary contributions and supplementary funds combined, vis à vis the volume of core Replenishment Contributions can be estimated at 0.53:1.
83. The mechanisms for mobilizing resources additional to IFAD's replenishment funding, have fallen into the following major categories:
- a) **Funds raised in the contexts of replenishments but additional to the regular replenishment (special and complementary).** Such funds are made without restrictions as to the countries where they are to be used but the Governing Council decides in consultation with the contributing Member State how they will be used. In practice, for complementary contributions, this has meant the Member State decides the thematic area(s) of use, the most recent major example being the contributions in the tenth Replenishment for ASAP.
  - b) **Supplementary funds** are received for specified purposes from one or more donors and normally carry a service charge. In practice, nearly all significant funding passes through the EB for approval. Supplementary Funds include: (i) Trust Funds for specific programmatic purposes raised from donors; and (ii) funds for Associate Professional Officers.

- c) **Cofinancing arrangements** where each party remains responsible for its own resources. In practice many shared project initiatives fall into this category (see further definition and discussion at the end of this Chapter).
- d) **Financing by private foundations and private entities.** These are among the options explored since IFAD9 and 10.
- e) **Sovereign borrowing.** If KfW and AFD loans are taken to apply to IFAD9 and 10, their combined size would represent a ratio of 0.39:1 compared to the replenishment in the same period.

## C. Complementary contributions and supplementary funds

### C.1 Complementary contributions

84. Complementary contributions are pledged in the context of and counted in IFAD Replenishments but do not accrue voting rights. Complementary contributions amounted to US\$76.1 million in IFAD8, US\$360 million in IFAD9 (100 per cent for ASAP-Climate change adaptation) and US\$100 million in IFAD10 (92 per cent for Climate change adaptation). Since IFAD 10, complementary contributions have been called Unrestricted Complementary Contributions. As far as the evaluation could ascertain, they do not have an equivalent in comparator MDBs. In theory, they are not restricted as to their (country-wise) use but are in effect thematically earmarked and the great majority are placed in trust funds. There are no service charges on complementary contributions and special contributions, so their operational costs are absorbed by IFAD's administrative budget and, as nearly all have been used for grants so far, there is no reflow. There is no requirement for individual reporting to donors, but when there was a single donor (as with the Belgian Survival Fund, Russian, Chinese and Saudi complementary contributions), there was de-facto separate reporting.
85. **There is no evidence that complementary contributions reduce core contributions** and will often be provided by countries from alternative national donor budget allocations. While complementary contributions are received as a part of replenishments (but without voting rights) and supplementary funds are established outside the replenishment, **in many ways, proceedings from complementary contributions are used in a very similar way to supplementary funds** (*de facto* there is a thematic although not country earmarking) **but do not contribute to the coverage of administrative costs.** Such contribution to administrative costs would be possible if they were treated in exactly the same way as supplementary funds, placed in trust accounts and subject to service charge. This would in no way impinge on donors' possibilities to record their contributions against purposes such as climate change, or on IFAD announcing them within the headline replenishment figure.

### C.2 Supplementary funds

86. In IFAD, the office of Partnership and Resource Mobilization (PRM) provides an overall coordination function and has responsibility for developing new initiatives. Supplementary funds were introduced in 2001 and updated procedures for them were set out in a President's Bulletin in November 2014. Funds can be used directly by IFAD, or they can be channelled through other entities. The implementation of nearly all supplementary funds are currently under the responsibility of PMD (mostly by PTA and ECD within the framework of bilateral partnership agreements with donors, the latter manages climate and environment funds, including the GEF and ASAP).
87. **Institutions other than Member States contributed more than Member States to supplementary funds - US\$870 million** in the period 2007-2016 and 98 per cent of this total was contributed by just four other sources: The European Commission (59 per cent); and three specialist funds: The Global Agriculture and

Food Security Programme (15 per cent);<sup>40</sup> the LDC Climate Fund (11 per cent) and the Global Environment Facility - GEF - (14 per cent).<sup>41</sup> IFAD was accredited to the Green Climate Fund in 2016, which may become a significant source of additional funding. It is of interest that List A members appear to see the Green Climate Fund as a source of future funds to ASAP.<sup>42</sup>

88. **IFAD's Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP).** ASAP, along with GEF and other climate-related funding, is IFAD's current flagship non-core programme. The ASAP trust fund has been resourced from both complementary contributions and supplementary funds. Allocation criteria include the application of IFAD's Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures (SECAP). ASAP is a grant programme which aims to mainstream climate change in IFAD's project work with the goal of improving the climate resilience of eight million farmers by 2020. The ASAP multi-donor Trust Fund<sup>43</sup> was established in April 2012, launched in September 2012 and received a major increase in funding under IFAD9 as complementary contribution. The first phase was of five years, from September 2012 to September 2017 and a second phase was approved by the EB in December 2016 with the intention of raising a further US\$100 million for commitment by the end of IFAD10 (December 2018). The devaluation of the GBP (UK was the largest donor) and to a lesser extent the euro against the US\$ posed a financing challenge for ASAP.
89. **Other significant focus areas** for supplementary funds have been: (a) the *Financing Facility for Remittances* (to date US\$21.2 million committed from the EC, Spain, Switzerland and the NCDF); (b) the *Agricultural Risk Management*: about US\$7 million from the EC, France and Italy; (c) *Contributions to and work with the CGIAR*, the EC has funded a pass-through arrangement (US\$36 million completed 2016; US\$54 million completing 2017; and US\$21.7 million completing 2019); and (d) The EU-funded programme for strengthening farmer organizations (US\$20 million). There are also cases of thematic areas in which projects are currently ongoing with support from one or more donors including: Nutrition Sensitive Agriculture and Rural Development; Food-loss Reduction; Mainstreaming Gender Equality; and Rural Finance.
90. **IFAD staff interviewed for this evaluation considered that IFAD did not have a well-developed strategy for supplementary funding**, with a mechanism to prioritise needs and opportunities. Some staff stressed that supplementary funds were opportunistic and enabled them to do knowledge work and make IFAD responsive to donors' interests as well as those of recipients. Others considered that, in the absence of a strategy, supplementary funds were not necessarily directed to the priorities of Management and EB and could lead to work being diverted from core country priorities. In its presentations to the EB, as well as in programmes such as ASAP, Management has emphasised that supplementary funds permit IFAD to develop pilot approaches and cross-country approaches in a way that is not possible with loan funds.

<sup>40</sup> The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) is a fund for which the WB provides a coordination secretariat and acts as Trustee. It was established following the World Food crisis of 2008 by the G20 and works in partnership with the World Bank, Regional Development Banks and the RBAs. Pledges have been very largely received and there appears to be limited expectation of future funding during the ongoing consultations. GAFSP has a public-sector window (US\$1.2 billion) and a much smaller private sector window (US\$0.4 billion) managed separately by the IFC. Eligible countries are only those qualifying for IDA. The majority of resources have been committed. According to the 2015 annual report, GAFSP has financed US\$1.02 billion in public sector projects and US\$223 million in private sector projects (61 per cent in Africa, 11 in East Asia and 10 in South Asia). IFAD supervises projects of US\$130 million, a relatively small part of the total.

<sup>41</sup> Since 2013 IFAD has reported annually to the EB on supplementary funds and includes funds received in the annual financial statements. The figures presented in the report are, however, derived by difference from the cumulative figures reported in the financial statements over a ten-year period on a roughly comparable basis.

<sup>42</sup> See minutes of 119<sup>th</sup> Session December 2016.

<sup>43</sup> 11 donors: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Flanders (Belgium), France, Norway, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

91. **IFAD service charges are unlikely to be adequate to cover the administrative costs associated with supplementary funds.** IFAD has established a service charge in a range of 5-10 per cent. This was on the basis of an internal review, but the basis is not clear since IFAD has no staff time recording system. Where UN system agencies have assessed their costs for very similar work, the percentage has been higher and there has often been a cross-subsidy from core resources. IDA/IBRD are stricter in their service charges for supplementary funds, which are intended to cover indirect as well as direct costs, and average 10-12 per cent.<sup>44</sup>

#### D. Cofinancing and counterpart financing


92. Cofinancing and national counterpart financing form an essential element of IFAD's funding architecture.<sup>45</sup> IFAD Management has consistently endorsed the idea of increasing cofinancing. The target for the cofinancing ratio has been increased from 1.2 under IFAD9 and IFAD10 to 1.4 under IFAD11, with the Member States requesting differentiated targeting for national and international cofinancing. **IFAD data are reported based on predictions at project design. Although these predictions may on occasion be over-fulfilled, the reverse is much more often the case.** Government inputs frequently do not materialise in full, and the input from beneficiaries for such things as feeder road and irrigation system improvement is unpredictable. Also inputs from donors and IFIs may be out of sequence, less complementary than hoped, simply not materialise or be parallel funding for projects which would have materialised anyway.
93. On the basis of IFAD's reported data, **over the ten-year period 2007-16 there was a slight tendency for the ratio of international cofinancing to decline and that of domestic counterpart funding to increase** (Figure 5).<sup>46</sup> Domestic counterpart funding has an average ratio of some 0.7: 1 to IFAD financing and has formed 57 per cent of total co-financing. The proportion increases with country income status from 50 per cent in LICs to 79 in UMICs. LAC is the region with the highest domestic cofinancing as a ratio to IFAD investment, but Asia is surprisingly low, comparable with East and Southern Africa, and NEN has a less favourable ratio of domestic cofinancing to IFAD investment (Annex XII). While those countries borrowing on ordinary terms report a ratio of 0.9 to IFAD'S resource input, DSF countries also had relatively good ratios, compared with the Highly Concessional and Blend borrowers. Beneficiaries are reported overall to contribute some 19 per cent of counterpart financing with the highest proportion in Latin America.
94. **International cofinancing accounts for 43 per cent of total cofinancing.** IFIs accounted for 63 per cent of international cofinancing and bilaterals 16 per cent (of which 3 per cent EU, Table 5). The ratio of international cofinancing to IFAD financing was 0.52:1 in 2007-16. The Regional Development Banks account for more international cofinancing than the World Bank but this is entirely due to the AsDB and AfDB which are more significant than the WB in Asia and West Africa respectively. International cofinancing is most important as a ratio to IFAD investment in the LICs and least in the UMICs, but in regional terms Asia has the highest amount of international cofinancing and the highest proportion of DFI financing due to stronger partnership with AsDB since country offices were established (see CLE on Decentralization, 2016). IFAD management points to its arrangements with the AsDB as a model, and a pipeline for cofinanced projects has been developed.

<sup>44</sup> IDA Financial Statements.

<sup>45</sup> International cofinancing is parallel funding to that of IFAD by another international funder which is integrated to a greater or lesser extent with an IFAD project and makes a contribution towards the achievement of the IFAD projects' objectives. Domestic cofinancing is resources mobilized nationally from governmental, private, civil society or beneficiary sources to contribute to the achievement of the IFAD project objectives.

<sup>46</sup> According to the 2017 Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness, in the IFAD9 period and early in IFAD10, the Fund exceeded the cofinancing ratio target of 1.2 (ratio of 1.4 by the end of 2015) but then decreased to 1.27 in 2016.

Figure 5

**Trend in ratio of international cofinancing and counterpart funding to IFAD investment**

Source: IFAD Management Data

Table 5

**Percentage of domestic counterpart and international cofinancing by source (2007-2016)**

Percentage of domestic counterpart financing		Percentage of international cofinancing	
Total Governmental	58.1%	World Bank including IFC	22.0%
Domestic Financial Institutions and parastatal corporations	14.0%	Regional Development Banks	26.9%
Local Private Sector including some financial institutions	4.8%	IsDB	2.8%
Local NGOs	1.2%	OFID	8.5%
Other Domestic Institutions and not identified	3.0%	Other IFIs	2.9%
Beneficiaries	18.9%	GEF	2.4%
		Bilaterals	13.5%
		European Institutions	2.7%
		UN System	1.0%
		International private sector	0.3%
		International NGOs	0.2%
		Other interntl. org. and other institutions	16.9%
Total domestic cofinancing	100.0%	Total International	100.0%

Source: CLE Elaboration from GRIPS (Oct 2017)

95. During country visits, respondents from government and international organizations expressed positive views about IFAD's capacity to attract cofinancing but highlighted that there could be opportunities to attract more cofinancing from MDBs. The CLE e-survey shows overall moderate satisfaction with cofinancing but with IFAD respondents being more critical than non-IFAD respondents (Table 6). To provide a sense of the size of engagement in the agricultural sector of other IFIs, according to OECD Data and IFAD's financial information, in the period 2007-2016, disbursements for agricultural development were US\$9.9 billion for IBRD, US\$6.9b for IDA, US\$2.8b for IADB, US\$2.5b for AfDB, US\$2.2b for AsDB and US\$1.2b for EBRD (for comparison, IFAD's cumulative disbursements were US\$5.6 billion). Additional opportunities include climate-related funding (note the figure of commitments of bilateral and multilateral for US\$47 billion in 2014, Chapter I).
96. **Although cofinancing opportunities are often scouted and discussed at the country level, these can be facilitated through higher-level management engagement with IFIs**, where regional or sub-regional cofinancing and cooperation opportunity can be reviewed. The examples provided by IFAD staff related to talks with the AsDB in recent years, as well as discussions held with the AfDB and World Bank ten years ago.

Table 6.  
Views of e-survey respondents on cofinancing

Category of respondent	Descriptor for the average of the ratings for all responses	Firmly agreed (rating 5-6)	Moderately agreed (rating 4)	Moderately disagree (rating 3)	Firmly disagree (rating 1-2)	No opinion
<b>IFAD respondents</b>						
IFAD is good at mobilizing national counterpart funding	<i>Moderately agree</i>	20%	36%	21%	10%	13%
IFAD is good at mobilizing international cofinancing	<i>Moderately agree</i>	16%	42%	22%	10%	10%
<b>Non-IFAD respondents</b>						
IFAD is good at mobilizing national counterpart funding	<i>Moderately agree</i>	41%	32%	11%	5%	11%
IFAD is good at mobilizing international cofinancing	<i>Agree</i>	58%	24%	6%	2%	10%

Source: Financial Architecture E-survey.

## E. Potential for financing cooperation by foundations

97. **Significant resources are disbursed by private foundations but most have distinct agendas.** Many are also closely linked to the sector of the corporation that has established them. Compared with over US\$164 billion in official ODA flows, total private philanthropic ODA flows for 2014 were estimated at US\$64 billion<sup>47</sup> (this includes religious, individual and private company flows). The USA accounted for US\$44 billion of the private flows and, in this, foundations were 11 per cent.<sup>48</sup> The largest of the foundations contributing to development ODA is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Since 2009 the Gates Foundation has been providing data on its ODA to the OECD. This reached US\$3.6 billion in 2015 (64 per cent of the US Foundations total). In 2015 the Gates Foundation was a larger donor than Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Spain, Russia, Switzerland, and the Republic of Korea, but considerably smaller than the USA (US\$31 billion), UK (US\$18.5 billion), Germany (US\$17.9 billion) EU (US\$13.7 billion); Japan; France; Sweden; Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands. Over the period 2009-15, 57 per cent of Gates' funding went to health. The only other sector receiving a substantial proportion was agriculture with 15 per cent. The Gates Foundation contributes and sits on the governing bodies alongside Member States in the Global Fund and GAVI. This arrangement would not be possible at IFAD given that only member countries and not foundations can be represented in its governing bodies.
98. **IFAD has had limited cooperation with private foundations to date.** Traditional foundation donors in agriculture include Rockefeller and Ford but there has not been significant collaboration with IFAD. A study conducted by the IFAD Private Sector and Foundations Unit (based in New York) of the Partnership and Resource Mobilization Office found that the greatest alignment of IFAD priorities with those of the 20 target foundations it identified was in climate resilience and environment, women's economic empowerment, food security and nutrition, poverty reduction, smallholder agricultural development and fragile contexts.<sup>49</sup> Foundations were reportedly interested in IFAD's capacity to scale up their pilot approaches.<sup>50</sup> An IFAD document produced for the Consultation on IFAD11

<sup>47</sup> Hudson Center for Global Prosperity.

<sup>48</sup> The remainder being made up of Private and Voluntary Organizations (NGOs); Corporations; Religious Organizations; Volunteers and higher Education Institutions.

<sup>49</sup> EB 2016/119/R.31 Proposed framework for new financing facilities: Enhancing IFAD's catalytic role in mobilizing resources for rural transformation.

<sup>50</sup> Areas identified in which to develop collaboration, included: (i) A Professional Pathways Programme with foundation partners that are sponsoring global tertiary education scholarship programmes, provision by IFAD of three-year professional work experience for graduates; (ii) an Accelerator Fund, with lead Foundations to scale-up innovative approaches and technologies developed by foundations and by IFAD through IFAD projects. The focus would be on:

recognises the limited funding received from private foundations and companies and envisages greater efforts to increase such funding.<sup>51</sup>

99. The Bill and Melinda Gates foundation has made minor contributions to individual initiatives (US\$1.8 million in the ten-year period 2007-16). The most recent ongoing initiative is for small ruminant value chain development in India (US\$0.5 million). A newly developed project is for the Rural Finance Institution-Building Programme (RUFIN) in Nigeria with support of US\$300,000 to US\$500,000 for policy development over a period of 36 months. An agreement with the Rockefeller Foundation to finance work on cassava value chain development in Nigeria (US\$1.5 million) working with the private sector was approved in 2016 by the EB.
100. **Questions arise on returns to the effort**, when small amounts of money are involved. There is currently one New York-based P4 post working 30 per cent on this activity and other staff and incidental costs. Although there may be opportunities to expand funding from foundations, based on recent experience it is not clear whether they will provide major additional resources.
101. It is probably at national level that there is the greatest potential for a return on IFAD's investment in private sector partnership. Value added production, whether it be in livestock, fisheries, fruit and vegetables, flowers or cash crops is largely in the hands of subsidiaries and joint ventures, local companies and individuals. Finance, insurance, mobile telephony and IT may be more in the direct hands of multinationals, depending on the local context. MoUs with multinationals can provide an underpinning for local initiative but private sector potential may be better captured at the time of COSOPs and project identification and implementation.

#### Key points

- Complementary contributions and supplementary funds are an important part of resources at disposal. Their combined volume in the period 2007-2016 represented slightly over half of the volume of replenishment contributions. There is no evidence that complementary contributions displaced core contributions.
- While there are clear differences from the legal point of view between complementary contributions and supplementary funds, this CLE found little difference in practice between the utilisation of the two, except that complementary ones do not contribute to covering administrative costs. Supplementary funds provide coverage of administrative cost but at a lower rate than in comparator organizations. Overall, mobilization of supplementary funds appears to be more opportunistic than strategic. In practice, nearly all significant funding passes through the EB for approval.
- Cofinancing and national counterpart financing form an essential element of IFAD's funding architecture to mobilize resources from national partners and international organizations and are essential for scaling-up. Since 2007, there has been a slight decline in international cofinancing but an increase in national counterpart funding.
- There is scope for increasing international cofinancing through Management-concerted efforts with the World Bank and Regional Banks. Additional opportunities may come from climate-related funding. IFAD cofinancing data are often *ex ante* and likely to provide an over-optimistic picture.
- In principle, foundations could provide options to expand and diversify funding of operations. However, so far, the size of funding and cooperation has been very limited. More opportunities could materialize at the country strategy and project level, rather than broadly at the corporate level.

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resilience, food security and nutrition, poverty reduction, women's economic empowerment and smallholder agricultural development; (iii) the Smallholder and Small and Medium-Enterprise Investment Finance Fund SIF; (iv) Financing Facility for Remittances, and the Facility for Refugees, Migrants, Forced Displacement and Rural Stability.

<sup>51</sup> IFAD11 – Leveraging partnerships for country-level impact and global engagement, IFAD11 Replenishment Consultation, October 2017.

## F. Extending the IFAD programme through borrowing

### F.1 Sovereign borrowing

102. **IFAD is currently authorised to borrow from sovereign lenders and not from the capital markets. Sovereign lenders include state-owned financial institutions.** A precursor to sovereign loans was the Spanish Food Security Co-financing Facility Trust Fund approved by the EB in 2010. This agreement for loans in euro was more favourable to IFAD than subsequent sovereign borrowing in that it consisted of a loan<sup>52</sup> of euro 285.5 million and a grant of euro 14.5 million. Accounts were maintained separately for this Trust Fund. The loan was drawn down as a lump sum and interest receipts were used to defer IFAD's costs. The majority of funds were used to finance loans on ordinary terms to Latin American countries and outside the PBAS.
103. The first sovereign borrowing after the Spanish Trust Fund was designed to help bridge the difference between the IFAD9 target PoLG and the financing level realised from the replenishment. A sovereign loan of euro 400 million was obtained from KfW (a development bank owned by the German federal government), with the agreement of the EB in September 2014. In April 2015, subsequent to the KfW loan, the EB approved a sovereign borrowing framework.<sup>53</sup> The negotiation of a loan with the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) was completed in 2017 for euro 200 million to help finance the IFAD10 PoLG.<sup>54</sup> Discussions are underway with further sovereign lending institutions. Currently IFAD will only enter into borrowing discussions with a Member State, or a state-supported institution, if the Member State's core contribution to the latest replenishment is at least equal to the amount contributed in the previous replenishment (or 10 per cent higher than the penultimate replenishment).
104. **Sovereign borrowing from KfW and the Spanish Trust Fund has allowed IFAD to finance a larger PoLG than would have been possible by relying only on replenishment contributions, loan reflows and Treasury income.** Sovereign lending was IFAD's first step in introducing debt to leverage the equity in its balance sheet. This has provided a learning experience and allowed IFAD to develop a framework for sovereign borrowing which safeguards against donors reducing their replenishment contributions and offering instead loans from sovereign lending institutions. **However**, the lending terms from KfW mean that **IFAD can only on-lend funds on ordinary loans** (in euro on a floating rate basis) without incurring serious financial risks (this is further discussed in Chapter V).<sup>55</sup> Sovereign borrowing through concessional partner loans is expected to provide more favourable conditions than borrowing from state-owned DFIs, both with regards to interest rates and matching incoming borrowing durations to those of outgoing loans.

<sup>52</sup> Repayment within 45 years, including a grace period of five years. Interest rate Reuters-screen 12-month flat EURIBOR prevailing on the first day of the interest calculation period.

<sup>53</sup> Sovereign Borrowing Framework: Borrowing from Sovereign States and State-Supported Institutions (EB 2015/114/R.17/Rev.1), April 2015.

<sup>54</sup> Negotiation is on-going with the Government of Canada for a new sovereign loan.

<sup>55</sup> Considering the different return target on the borrowed funds and in order to avoid mingling the KfW borrowed funds with IFAD's existing portfolio IFAD Management established a new investment portfolio, the Asset Liability Portfolio (ALP) dedicated to the management of the borrowed funds and following a fair value (marked-to-market) strategy. This necessitated IFAD investing in other than Government Euro Bonds to meet the cost of the KfW borrowing and quality floating rate Corporate Bonds were purchased with shortened maturities of 2-4 years. The funds are kept in euro so as to avoid currency mismatch pending disbursements, which is also in euro. As current sources of sovereign borrowing are all denominated in euro and some countries prefer SDRs or US\$ hedging is now being considered to match the currencies with the demand (however it would be difficult to hedge repayments). In November 2015 ALP was comprised of about 40 percent corporate bonds and 37 percent government bonds, while the remainder was kept in cash to fund expected disbursements. More than half of the portfolio was invested in securities rated AA- or above. A negative marked-to-market valuation of the portfolio was caused predominantly by the two investments in government bonds that the portfolio had to execute to comply with the investment guidelines.

## **F.2 Ongoing options for extension of IFAD Borrowing**

### **F.2.a Concessional Partner Loans (CPLs)**

105. IFAD management has proposed, and the Executive Board agreed (EB special session of October 2017) to the introduction of Concessional Partner Loans for the 11<sup>th</sup> Replenishment. CPLs are loans offered by Member States (or their institutions) under concessional terms. These include well-below market interest rates, long maturities, long grace periods and no ear-marking for particular countries or themes. CPLs are to be in addition to and not a substitution for core contributions, at least as concessional as the loans to be funded from them, so they are serviced by re-flows and any support credits approved.
106. CPLs were introduced for the first time for the IDA17 (2013) replenishment when five countries made such loans for a total of SDR 2.3 billion (US\$3.4 billion, six percent of the total IDA17 financing). They were also negotiated for IDA18 and introduced at the African Development Fund in its fourteenth replenishment.<sup>56</sup> **Both IDA and AfDB started consultation with donors on the introduction of CPLs well before the start of the Replenishment Consultation.** Even though there was the IDA experience to draw from, ADF consultation began with a working group in May 2015.
107. IFAD management has proposed that the core contribution to a replenishment, for a country that intends to provide a CPL, should not fall below 80 per cent of the average core contribution for the past two Replenishments and that the calculated ODA contribution of the CPL should make up at least the difference to reach 100 per cent or more. Voting rights would be allocated for the concessional portion of the loan and the discount rate for determining the concessional element is calculated on the basis of the alternative of sovereign borrowing (slightly higher than in IDA and ADF). All CPL funds will be allocated through the PBAS and CPLs are intended to be raised on terms to allow IFAD to match the requirements for outgoing funding.<sup>57</sup> Given that the PBAS is applied to all IFAD loans, there is a gap in the discussion. **It is not clear what would happen if the PBAS did not permit the whole of sovereign borrowing and CPLs to be allocated on terms that cover the repayment schedule and interest rate.**

### **F.2.b Borrowing from the markets**

108. **IFAD is considering options for market borrowing as a potential for IFAD12.** The current IFAD11 proposal is that total borrowing from all sources will not exceed 50 per cent of Replenishment Resources, in any one replenishment period. However, the great majority of IFAD's PoLG is intended for countries that qualify for DSF, concessional or blend terms. Such loans cannot be funded with market borrowings without generating considerable financial risks and losses, as discussed further below in this report.

<sup>56</sup> For IDA18 (2016) five countries committed to lend a total of SDR 3.7 billion (US\$5.2 billion five percent of the total IDA18 financing). Concessional donor loans (CDLs) were introduced by the African Development Fund (AfDF) in its Fourteenth Replenishment (2016). CDLs are being used to fund AfDF loans to gap, blend and graduating countries. Bridge Loans have also been introduced for the AfDF 14<sup>th</sup> Replenishment. These are loans on very similar terms to CDLs and also accrue voting rights based on the grant component. The AfDF obtained one CDL and two Bridge Loans of which by far the largest was from Japan. Together, the two types of loan amount to US\$964 million (16 per cent of the total Replenishment Resources as reported in February 2017). Bridge Loans are intended, not as an addition to total lending, but as a means of bringing forward, the commitments. This is apparently because loan reflows are expected to accelerate in the AfDF 16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Replenishments and the Bridge Loans will have the effect of smoothing the Programme of Work and effectively target fragile states because of the way AfDB's PBAS is constructed.

<sup>57</sup> CPL resources will be allocated through the PBAS to Member States borrowing on terms comparable to or higher than those applicable to the CPL. It is expected that priority would be given to loans provided on highly concessional and blend terms. The difference between the coupon rate on the CPL and the country's target coupon rate (if higher) may be covered by an additional grant payment, as Member States would have the option of providing such an additional grant payment to bridge the difference between the target coupon provided by the framework and the desired coupon on the loan. In cases where a Member State plans to provide an additional grant to lower the coupon rate on the CPL, IFAD will require the payment of the additional grant as a prerequisite to accepting the loan disbursements from the CPL provider. EB 2017/121/R.28/Rev.1

109. The CLE e-survey shows that member countries and IFAD staff were in favour of IFAD extending its borrowing in order to increase the total volume of resources available to onlend to developing countries (Table 7). There was also support (albeit less firm) for borrowing on the international capital markets.
110. Borrowing from the markets was introduced for IDA 17 after a long period of preparation and consultation with the contributors. IDA has secured triple AAA rating, perhaps in part because it is implicitly, if not legally, underwritten by the IBRD. The ADF has for the moment excluded the possibility of market borrowing as this would require a change in its statutes. Borrowing from markets is further discussed in Chapters V and VI.

Table 7

**E-Survey responses – IFAD borrowing<sup>58</sup>**

	Firmly agree (rating 5-6)	Moderately agree (rating 4)	Moderately disagree (rating 3)	Firmly disagree (rating 1-2)	No opinion
<b>1. IFAD should mobilize long term financing from sovereign sources (e.g., national development finance institutions, or concessional partnership loans) to support higher volume of operations.</b>					
<b>All member countries</b>	78%	12%	3%	2%	5%
Non-Borrowing High and Upper Income countries	71%	22%	2%	0%	4%
UMICs	71%	13%	4%	5%	7%
LICs/LMICs	82%	10%	3%	1%	4%
<b>IFAD Staff</b>	71%	19%	4%	2%	4%
<b>2. IFAD should issue bonds on the international capital markets to support a higher volume of operations</b>					
<b>All member countries</b>	40%	27%	9%	11%	13%
Non-Borrowing High and Upper Income countries	39%	27%	10%	14%	10%
UMICs	35%	35%	8%	10%	13%
LICs/LMICs	42%	25%	8%	11%	14%
<b>IFAD Staff</b>	45%	20%	11%	11%	13%

Source CLE E-Survey (2017)

**G. Implications of the HIPC initiative and DSF for IFAD resources****G.1 Participation in the HIPC Debt Initiative**

111. **IFAD Executive Board endorsed engagement in the original HIPC Debt Initiative in December 1996** and the 1997 Governing Council amended the *Lending Policies and Criteria* to allow for HIPC and in 1998 adopted the operational policy framework for IFAD's participation in HIPC and authorized the establishment of IFAD HIPC Debt Trust Fund. The Trust Fund is designed to reimburse IFAD for the principal and interest foregone from debt relief.
112. **The total cost implications of IFAD's participation in the HIPC initiative results in debt relief being charged against core replenishment income.** As per the 2016 IFAD Consolidated Financial Statements, the total contribution to the IFAD HIPC Trust Fund to December 2016 was US\$287.14 million and there was interest income of US\$8 million (total US\$295.14 million). Total debt relief under HIPC was expected to be US\$478.01 million plus US\$135.21 million for Eritrea, Somalia and the Sudan not yet included (a total of US\$613.22). About two thirds of this total debt relief are to be covered by further transfers from the WB-HIPC Trust Fund. However, the total to be covered by IFAD from its own resources can be expected to be of the order of US\$300 million. The tendency of some donor members to accept the use of Core Replenishment resources for debt relief has negative implications for IFAD financial sustainability.

**G.2 IFAD's Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF)**

113. **The DSF forms part of the architecture of multilateral financial institutions' support for debt relief and management in the poorest countries** in order to

<sup>58</sup> Respondents to the electronic survey – responded to statements on a six-point Likert scale: 1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Moderately disagree; 4=Moderately agree; 5=Agree; 6=Strongly agree.

maintain the poorest countries debt at sustainable levels in follow up to HIPC. In 2006 the IFAD Governing Council decided that, commencing in 2007, IFAD would adopt the IDA model of a debt sustainability framework to govern the allocation of assistance to countries eligible for highly concessional assistance and with high to moderate debt-distress risk. The 11<sup>th</sup> IFAD Replenishment has agreed to maintain the existing DSF framework.

114. **IFAD follows the IDA country classification of risk of debt sustainability but there are important differences in the mechanisms** notably regarding the compensation of foregone principal (Box 2). The analyses are carried out jointly by World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and result in country classification as "red", "yellow" and "green". The level of funding for countries in both IFAD and IDA is determined by Performance Based Allocation Systems (PBAS). The compensation to IFAD for foregone loan principal is on the basis of compensation in each Replenishment for income foregone in the previous Replenishment as additional contributions by Member Countries.

Box 2

**DSF at IFAD and in other IFIs**

**The DSF mechanism in IFAD differs in important respects from that applied in IDA and the ADF**

1. The amount to be granted / lent to the country on the basis of the PBAS is reduced by 20 per cent in IDA and ADF compared with 5 per cent in IFAD. In the case of the ADF, currently 13.3 per cent is allocated as an upfront charge to compensate the DSF;
2. IFAD is intended to receive the difference between highly concessional and grant terms (principal). It appears that in IDA and AfDB compensation is on interest at ordinary terms (IDA currently 3.125 per cent);
3. The compensation to IDA and ADF is received earlier than in IFAD, as both IDA and the ADF calculate the amounts to be compensated to coincide with the Replenishment disbursement schedule and not with the repayment schedule (thus 10 years in IDA and ADF as compared with 40 years in IFAD);
4. There is a clearer degree of donor commitment. In IDA there is now a pre-determined burden share which contributes to clarity as compared with the ADF and IFAD system which calculates the share of each country for DSF compensation based on the loans made under the donor countries share in each Replenishment.

Source: CLE Elaboration

115. DSF contributions accrue voting rights. Member States in IFAD may opt to make a single pledge from which their assessed DSF compensation contributions will be taken or alternatively, they may pledge two separate amounts (comprising DSF and regular contributions). In the case of a single contribution, Member States' obligations towards the DSF take precedence over the regular contributions. **Unless there are major increases in pledges over the years, the IFAD funding is eroded.** By 2016 total DSF funding approved was US\$1,460.4 million. The amounts required to date remain minor because the compensation is not paid until after the ten-year grace period.
116. At the 11<sup>th</sup> Replenishment discussion in July 2017, management brought the risks for the future of the growing need for compensation on a "pay as you go" basis and the continuance of the DSF for country loans into the future, to the attention of member states and proposed that DSF either be aligned with the practice in other IFIs or discontinued. The discussion was inconclusive both in terms of any reform and members' extent of commitment to increase their Replenishment contributions in-line with DSF obligations. As very long-term horizons are being considered (with countries still being eligible for DSF and 40-year time horizons for repayments), the commitment of countries to ensuring IFAD financial sustainability on a "pay as you go" basis has limited credibility and practical value.

**Key points**

- During more recent replenishment periods, replenishment contributions, loan reflows and Treasury income have not been sufficient to finance the desired PoLG. Thus, IFAD has begun to change its financial architecture by using debt to leverage its equity to close the gap between the available financial resources and the PoLG.
- The use of sovereign borrowing from the Spanish Trust Fund and KfW has been a relevant source to increase the PoLG and bridge the gap. However, the lending terms of KfW only allow for on-lending at ordinary terms and in euro without incurring serious financial risks, thus limiting the number and type of countries where they can be utilized.
- Concessional partnership loans are a new instrument that could fund on-lending at highly concessional terms if very low interest rates can be negotiated and if member countries agree to continue providing such funding to a large amount in the foreseeable future. It is not clear what would happen if the PBAS did not permit the entire amount of sovereign borrowing and concessional partnership loans to be allocated at terms that cover the repayment of their interest rate.
- The lack of a clear agreement from donors to compensate IFAD for the foregone DSF reflows in a way that is incremental to replenishment contributions represents a serious risk to IFAD's financial sustainability and ability to grow the PoLG.

## IV. Use of funds and financial instruments


117. This chapter focuses on: (i) how financial resources are allocated to support rural development and poverty reduction interventions; (ii) to what extent they are used and whether they appear to satisfy demand for funding in quantitative terms from the borrowing countries; (iii) any observable association between the lending terms and the typology of development intervention supported and their performance and results; and (iv) the financial instruments available to IFAD to fund rural poverty reduction and development interventions, their appreciation by borrowing countries and their demand for additional instruments and products. In terms of the evaluative criteria and questions, this chapter mainly attempts to address questions that relate to effectiveness issues (with particular focus on the allocation systems and on the financial instruments and how they relate to strategies, operations and development results). As stated in Chapter II, there are indirect linkages between the financial architecture, the preparation of country strategies, project and their results that are mediated by a number of steps and factors.

### A. The PoLG and potential demand from borrowing countries

118. As already noted, reliance on replenishments to finance the annual PoLG served IFAD well during IFAD7 (2007-2009) and IFAD8 (2010-12) when annual PoLGs consistently increased (Figure 6). The total PoLG increased from US\$1.8 billion in IFAD7, to US\$2.8 billion in IFAD8, then to US\$3.0 billion in IFAD9 and is projected to slightly decline to US\$2.9 billion in IFAD10. During IFAD9 and IFAD10, IFAD augmented its core resources with funds mobilized from the Spanish Trust Fund and sovereign borrowing from KfW and AFD to close the gap between supply and demand to finance larger PoLGs.

Figure 6

Trend in the Programme of Loans and Grants



Source: CLE derived from IFAD systems.

119. One of the questions that the CLE pursued with IFAD staff and government representatives during country interactions and through its e-survey related to perceptions on the size of funding from IFAD. Answers were diverse, as expected, and subject to uncertainty given the hypothetical nature of the questions (the actual demand for funding from IFAD is contingent upon the identification of a project proposal). **Overall the CLE interviews and e-survey suggest that for many (but not for all) countries, the demand for IFAD funding exceeds the size of PoLG.** Most countries would like to be able to borrow more from IFAD on the prevailing terms. Some countries expressed interest in borrowing more on harder terms.
120. The e-survey rated the volume of financing available from IFAD to meet the demands from client countries as moderately satisfactory but over a quarter of respondents firmly disagreed (i.e., thought that resources available from IFAD were

insufficient, see Table 8 and data disaggregated in Annex VIII). LIC, LMIC and UMIC respondents strongly agreed that public investment in agriculture and rural development would remain an important priority in their countries (suggesting a continuing demand for IFAD financing). Government officials from all types of borrowing countries agreed that their governments would like to borrow more money from IFAD on the terms and conditions prevailing in 2016. Respondents moderately disagreed that their countries would borrow more if IFAD hardened its terms, although a quarter firmly agreed (i.e., would hypothetically consider borrowing more on harder terms).

**Table 8**  
**E-survey respondents views on the demand for the financing from IFAD**

Criteria	Descriptor for responses	Firmly agree /satisfactory (rating 5-6)	Moderately agree/satisfactory (rating 4)	Moderately disagree/unsatisfactory (rating 3)	Firmly disagree/unsatisfactory (rating 1-2)	No opinion
Rating the volume of financing available from IFAD to meet the demands from client countries.	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>	30%	39%	12%	7%	11%
Supporting agriculture and rural development will remain an important priority for the foreseeable future	<i>Strongly Agree</i>	97%	2%	0%	0%	1%
Country would borrow more from IFAD on the same terms and conditions prevailing in 2016	<i>Agree</i>	62%	20%	3%	2%	13%
Country expects to borrow less from IFAD	<i>Moderately Disagree</i>	19%	14%	17%	37%	13%
Country expects borrowing from IFAD to remain about at the current level	<i>Moderately Agree</i>	27%	20%	14%	27%	13%
Country would like to borrow more money if IFAD hardened its terms	<i>Moderately Disagree</i>	22%	21%	18%	26%	13%

Source: CLE E-survey (2017).

121. **IFAD's long-term plan is to increase leverage.** An option could be to issue bonds in the international capital market, beginning under IFAD12. If IFAD wishes to pursue this plan, it will need to determine to what extent: (i) countries are actually willing and have the capacity to effectively absorb the funds that are allocated through the PBAS; and (ii) IFAD has capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver a larger PoLG. Although these issues are partly addressed further below in this report, a full analysis of IFAD's capacity to deliver higher volumes of lending was beyond the scope of this evaluation.

## B. Allocation of financial resources

### B.1 The Performance-Based Allocation System (PBAS)

122. The PBAS was introduced in 2003. The PBAS allocation process can be separated into two formulae. The first formula uses performance and needs components to generate country scores.<sup>59</sup> The second formula [(country score/sum of country scores) \*PoLG] calculates country allocations. The PBAS was evaluated in 2016 and

<sup>59</sup> The version of the formula approved by the Executive Board in September 2017 is the following: Country Score = (Rural Pop<sup>0.405</sup> x GNI<sub>pc</sub><sup>-0.265</sup>) x IVI<sup>0.95</sup> x (0.35x RSP + 0.65 PAD). Rural Pop is the rural population (in absolute number), GNI<sub>pc</sub> is the GNI per capita, IVI is the IFAD Vulnerability Index, RSP is the rural sector performance indicator and PAD is the portfolio performance and disbursement indicator. Since the topic of the PBAS has already been the subject of an evaluation and the discussion with governing bodies has been extensive, treatment in the present evaluation is rather succinct. In addition to the CLE on the PBAS, a reference is the 2017 September Board document on the revised PBAS formula: <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/121/docs/EB-2017-121-R-3.pdf>

the evaluation concluded that, although some issues needed to be addressed, on the whole the PBAS resulted in a more systematic, transparent, flexible and predictable resource allocation system and contributed to greater fairness in the allocation of IFAD's resources across borrowing Member States. IFAD revised the PBAS in 2017, with guidance provided by the Executive Board, and drawing on the PBAS CLE recommendations. The major changes included: (i) increasing the focus on rural poverty; (ii) rebalancing the weights of the rural sector performance variable and the portfolio performance and adding a disbursement variable within the country performance component; (iii) adding IFAD's Vulnerability Index; and (iv) adjusting the weights and exponents of variables to increase stability and predictability.<sup>60</sup>

123. In commenting on the proposed changes in the PBAS, IOE found that there were efforts to follow up on the PBAS CLE recommendations. IOE commended the proposals to strengthen the rural-sector performance assessment, introduce the IFAD Vulnerability Index, technical improvements in the formulae, and the greater rigour, transparency and quality of the new PBAS. At the same time, IOE pointed out that, despite the positive changes to the formula, the PBAS was largely driven by country needs variables rather than performance indicators.

## **B.2 The actual use of the original PBAS**

124. Not all borrowing Member States were included in past PBAS allocations at the beginning of each replenishment cycle. For IFAD7, IFAD8, IFAD9 and IFAD10, the number of countries receiving an initial PBAS allocation was 112, 136, 114 and 103 respectively. The number of potential borrowing countries that were not included in the original PBAS allocations totalled 45 for IFAD7, 21 for IFAD8, 39 for IFAD9 and 50 for IFAD10<sup>61</sup> (see Annex IX). More detailed analysis showed that many small island countries, primarily in APR and LAC, were included in every second replenishment cycle because of limited absorptive capacity. Other countries were excluded because of peace and stability concerns,<sup>62</sup> portfolio performance or repayment problems<sup>63</sup> or no request for borrowing from IFAD.<sup>64</sup> A few countries were not included in any of the PBAS allocations in IFAD7, IFAD8 and IFAD9.<sup>65</sup>
125. While retaining its principles of universality, IFAD plans to improve the transparency of selecting the countries included in the IFAD11 PBAS formula. Three criteria are being considered:<sup>66</sup> (i) **strategic focus**: the availability of a valid COSOP or country strategy note early in the PBAS cycle that sets out a strategic vision on how to use IFAD resources in the country; (ii) **absorptive capacity**: all operations that have been effective for more than one year must have disbursed funds at least once in the previous 18 months; and (iii) **ownership**: no approved loans are pending signature for more than 12 months. IFAD11 replenishment documents indicated that about 80 countries would be included in the PBAS allocation process, which is lower than the number of countries included in the IFAD allocation process for previous replenishment periods.
126. **The majority of countries have been able to use at least 90 per cent of PBAS allocation but there are variations between countries.** Table 9 shows the use of PBAs allocation under IFAD7, IFAD8, IFAD9 and consolidated between the three. As can be seen, 53 per cent of the countries used at least 90 per cent of PBAS allocation. If countries not included in the original PBAS allocation are taken out of this calculation, then 68 per cent of countries used at least 90 per cent of

<sup>60</sup> The expectation is that, during IFAD11, 90 per cent of IFAD's core resources will be allocated to LICs and LMICs, 50 per cent to Africa, and between 25 and 30 per cent to the most fragile situations. The new PBASs will only be applied during IFAD11.

<sup>61</sup> A few of these countries received PBAS allocations during the reallocation process: 2 during IFAD7 and 1 during both IFAD8 and IFAD9.

<sup>62</sup> Libya and South Sudan.

<sup>63</sup> Eritrea, Gabon and Somalia.

<sup>64</sup> Algeria, Chile and Jordan.

<sup>65</sup> Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Namibia, Oman, Romania and Uruguay

<sup>66</sup> IFAD. 2017. PBAS formula enhancements.

PBAS allocation. Also, a sizeable proportion of countries used more funds than originally allocated. However, there were also countries that used less and some less than 50 per cent. Variations in PBAS absorption was a consistent pattern across the three replenishments, underlining the importance of having a mechanism that reallocates funds in a timely manner.

127. **Factors at both the country level and within IFAD contribute to the less than full use of PBAS allocations.** Country-level issues were the main reasons for not fully using PBAS allocations (e.g., fragility and peace and order conditions;<sup>67</sup> changes in governments or government priorities).<sup>68</sup> In some cases there was a long delay in project processing that resulted in project approval slipping from one IFAD replenishment period to another, thus depressing the use of the original PBAS allocation.<sup>69</sup> According to the CLE interviews and the CPE, in Indonesia the reason for a major shortfall in lending during IFAD8 was that the Fund disengaged from the country for a period of time. With the appointment of a new CPM and the opening of the Indonesian country office, IFAD established a stronger partnership and the PBAS usage increased substantially during IFAD9 (148 per cent, against 75 per cent during IFAD8).

Table 9

**Use of original PBAS allocations**

<i>% of original PBAS allocations used</i>	<i>Number of countries for IFAD7</i>	<i>Number of countries for IFAD8</i>	<i>Number of countries for IFAD9</i>	<i>Total</i>
Countries not included in the original PBAS allocations <sup>A</sup>	45 (29%)	21 (13%)	39 (25%)	105 (22%)
PBAS usage under 50%	17 (11%)	36 (23%)	26 (17%)	79 (17%)
PBAS usage between 50% and 90%	13 (8%)	16 (10%)	9 (6%)	38 (8%)
PBAS usage between 90% and 110%	33 (21%)	38 (24%)	26 (17%)	97 (21%)
PBAS usage between 110% and 150%	34 (22%)	38 (24%)	38 (25%)	110 (24%)
PBAS usage exceeded 150%	15 (10%)	8 (5%)	15 (10%)	38 (8%)
Total	157 (100%)	157 (100%)	153 (100%)	467 (100%)

Note: A = The number of countries that did not receive allocations during the original PBAS allocation process and were subsequently included in the PBAS during the reallocation were 2 for IFAD7 and 1 for both IFAD8 and IFAD9.

Source: Derived from the detailed tables in Annex IV

128. **At the aggregate level, LICs have absorbed PBAS allocations more than LMICs or UMICs.** Between IFAD7 and IFAD9, LICs used 107 per cent of the original PBAS allocations compared to 90 per cent for LMICs and 75 per cent for UMICs, a relative ranking that was consistent across IFAD7, IFAD8 and IFAD9. The PBAS reallocation process, in aggregate, shifted funds from UMICs and LMICs to LICs as conditions changed at the country and project level.<sup>70</sup>
129. **IFAD is the only DFI in which all lending is allocated through the PBAS.**<sup>71</sup> MDB with concessional windows only allocate concessional funds through their PBAS; they allocate ordinary lending and support for the private sector based on project demand, risk management principles, (e.g., geographic, sectoral and portfolio exposure limits) and the asset/liability management strategy. Given the

<sup>67</sup> Central African Republic, Congo, Syria, and Yemen.

<sup>68</sup> Azerbaijan, Colombia, Lebanon, Mauritania and the Philippines.

<sup>69</sup> The Philippines and Peru.

<sup>70</sup> Given these findings, this evaluation conducted regression analysis to search for any robust patterns of PBAS usage at the country level. The analysis found that there was no systemic relationship between the use of PBAS allocations and the type of financing: coefficients were not statistically significant for most types of financing. Instead, the regressions found that the larger the PBAS allocation, the less likely it was to be fully used and this negative relationship was statistically significant across IFAD7, IFAD8 and IFAD9. Countries in ESA tended to have higher than average usage in IFAD7. During IFAD8 countries in ESA, LAC and NEN had lower than average usage. There was no statistically significant difference across regions during IFAD9.

<sup>71</sup> GEF has a performance allocation system but does not provide loans.

importance of their AAA credit ratings MDBs are concerned about the allocation of their assets (i.e., loans) to various categories of borrowers based on their country credit ratings and concentration of lending. The 2017 Executive Board document on PBAS formula enhancement and the documentation presented by Management to the IFAD11 Replenishment mention the option of a separate financing window under IFAD12, particularly if borrowing from international markets is pursued.

130. **The e-survey provided mixed messages on respondents' perceptions regarding the single PBAS window.** On average, respondents moderately agreed that IFAD should continue to do so. However, respondents also agreed that: (i) for countries wishing to borrow more than the PBAS allocation, IFAD should be able to provide additional resources on ordinary terms (as other IFIs do); and (ii) IFAD should only allocate grants and highly concessional funding through the PBAS and allocate ordinary lending and market-based funds separately. On the option of the separate financing windows, the stronger consensus was from borrowing LIC and LMIC countries, moderate consensus from UMICs countries and from IFAD staff while list A respondents were "in between" (see Table 10, and Annex VIII for further disaggregation).

Table 10

**E-survey respondents' views on the system IFAD uses to allocate funds**

Criteria	Descriptor for responses	Firmly agree (rating 5-6)	Moderately agree (rating 4)	Moderately disagree (rating 3)	Firmly disagree (rating 1-2)	No opinion
<b>All respondents</b>						
IFAD should continue to allocate all of its funding through the PBAS	Moderately agree	41%	22%	15%	14%	7%
For countries that wish to borrow more than the PBAS allocation, IFAD should provide additional financing on ordinary terms	Agree	58%	22%	6%	6%	7%
IFAD should only allocate DSF grants and highly concessional funding through the PBAS and allocate ordinary lending and market-based funds separately	Agree	54%	20%	9%	7%	10%

Source: CLE E-survey (2017)

**B.3 The IFAD country classification system**

131. The country classification determines the price and terms on which financing is provided. MDBs classify countries based largely on GNI per capita and debt sustainability. IFAD broadly applies the IDA country classification system to determine eligibility for DSF grants, highly concessional and blend loans eventually graduate to ordinary loans.<sup>72</sup>
132. **As economic development has progressed, there has been a gradual hardening of IFAD's lending terms at portfolio level** (see maps in Annex IX). Although there was a noticeable shift in IFAD's classification of countries between 2007 and 2017, progress was uneven and not uniform:
- 64 of the 141 (45 per cent) countries had the same classification in 2017 as they had a decade earlier;
  - 44 countries (31 per cent) had a country classification with harder financing terms;
  - 8 (6 per cent) changed their classification so that IFAD provided lending on softer terms; and

<sup>72</sup> The IDA graduation policy was reviewed during the IDA18 replenishment. World Bank. 2016. IDA18. Review of IDA'S Graduation Policy.

- iv. the classifications of 25 countries (18 per cent) fluctuated, both hardening and softening terms.
133. Similar to all MDBs, IFAD uses the DSF framework and the red, yellow and green traffic light system based on IMF's estimate of eligibility for DSF grant financing.<sup>73</sup> Regarding highly concessional loan eligibility, Member States having a gross national product (GNP) per capita of US\$805 or less in 1992 prices are classified as IDA-only countries and are normally eligible to receive loans from IFAD on highly concessional terms. Eligibility for IDA support depends on a country's relative poverty, defined as GNI per capita below an established threshold and updated annually (US\$1,215 in fiscal year 2016). Although IFAD has guidelines for **country classification**, it has sometimes exercised discretion in determining the financing terms when a project is being processed and approved soon after a country's classification has changed, especially if the change in classification resulted in a hardening of the financing terms. During the IFAD11 consultation process, IFAD developed an approach to a transition framework to more clearly guide the transition of borrowers through changing levels of income, vulnerability and performance and provide the rationale for different country-specific solutions.<sup>74</sup>
134. The approach is based on the principles of predictability, transparency and sustainability and is generally consistent with the principles underlying MDB transition frameworks: (i) the use of both objective criteria<sup>75</sup> and judgment based on country situations; and (ii) dialogue with borrowers to promote smooth, sustainable transitions that avoid abrupt changes in financing terms to reduce uncertainty for borrowers. IFAD11 proposals include: (i) aligning IFAD's GNI per capita thresholds with those of IDA; and (ii) continuing to review financing terms annually but only hardening terms to coincide with the replenishment period rather than annually, with reversals implemented annually. IFAD expects to approve the transition framework at the end of 2018. In February 2018 the Governing Council of IFAD also approved a resolution on the revision of the Policies and Criteria for IFAD financing which shall take effect from 2019.
135. **IFAD does not have a policy of when, or whether, it would cease lending to countries.** Although that differs from the practice at some MDBs, it is consistent with IFAD's universality principles. The approach to the transition framework proposes a voluntary and not mandatory graduation threshold. **The literature on the graduation policies does not present a uniform view on the need for such a policy.**<sup>76</sup> It rather presents "pros and cons" but without a firm conclusion. Reasons cited to have such a policy include: (i) development is viewed as a process of graduation from both the demand and supply sides; (ii) the national and international prestige and signalling effect associated with graduation; (iii) using limited resources in a more effective way; and (iv) effectively planning future resource requirements. Arguments against a having such a policy include: (i) development is a non-linear process; (ii) lending is a vehicle for policy change and for promoting international goals, such as the SDGs, and standards; and (iii) some UMICs that have graduated from MDBs could benefit from access to MDB resources if this approach were selectively and flexibly applied.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Countries classified as: (i) red, receive 100 per cent grant financing; (ii) yellow, receive 50 per cent DSF grant and 50 per cent highly concessional loans; and (iii) green, receive 100 per cent concessional loan financing.

<sup>74</sup> IFAD. 2017. Approach to a Transition Framework

<sup>75</sup> Primarily GNI per capita income and creditworthiness.

<sup>76</sup> ODI. 2016. Graduation from ADB regular assistance: a critical analysis and policy options.

<sup>77</sup> The World Bank Group's vision to 2030 calls for engagement with MICs to help eradicate extreme poverty and ensure shared, sustainably prosperity because: (i) MICs have a high demand for financing, knowledge and innovation to reduce poverty and inequality, promote growth, address climate change, provide basic infrastructure and build robust institutions; and (ii) without assistance, some MICs are at risk of losing their poverty-reduction gains. A recent World Bank evaluation concluded that: (i) many MICs have unfinished development agendas and need to accelerate their economic, social, and structural transformation through a set of second-generation reforms; and (ii) continued engagement would promote learning, financial sustainability, income generation, south-south learning and advancement on global issues such as the SDGs.

#### B.4 Allocation of IFAD financing by type of lending

136. **Consistent with the Agreement establishing IFAD, the financial architecture has resulted in the large majority of the funds during the evaluation period being provided on highly-concessional terms or DSF:** 21 per cent as DSF grants and 50 per cent as highly concessional loans. A further 11 per cent was provided on blended terms and 18 per cent was ordinary loans (see Table 11). This mix of funding over the evaluation period is consistent with the Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing (2013 revision) requiring about two thirds of IFAD's funding to be provided on highly concessional terms. Such financing can only be provided because of the replenishments.
137. **There has been an increase in the proportion of ordinary loan volume between IFAD7 and IFAD9** (Table 11). There was a gradual decline in the share of the lending made as DSF grants and highly concessional loans from IFAD7 to IFAD9. Looking at the country income classification, for IFAD7 to IFAD9 combined, LICs accounted for nearly two thirds (63 per cent) of total approvals, Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) for 30 per cent and Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs) for 6 per cent (see Annex IX). This is consistent with the provision in the agreement establishing IFAD that gives priority in allocating its resources to assisting the poorest rural populations living in food-deficit countries.

Table 11

IFAD lending by type, 2007 to 2016 (US\$ million and percentages in parentheses)<sup>A</sup>

	IFAD7 2007-2009	IFAD8 2010-2012	IFAD9 2013-2015	First year IFAD10 2016	Total
DSF Grants	402 (23%)	681 (25%)	457 (18%)	106 (21%)	1,646 (21%)
Highly concessional loans	949 (55%)	1,315 (49%)	1,284 (50%)	292 (50%)	3,840 (50%)
Blended loans <sup>B</sup>	180 (10%)	248 (9%)	250 (10%)	159 (11%)	837 (11%)
Ordinary loans	187 (11%)	442 (16%)	594 (23%)	181 (18%)	1,404 (18%)
Total <sup>C</sup>	1,718 (100%)	2,686 (100%)	2,585 (100%)	738 (100%)	7,727 (100%)

Notes: A = Amounts are from the President's report for each programme or project approved by the Executive Board. The data excludes fully cancelled or rescinded loans. B = Blended loans include \$60 million in hardened loans and \$368 million in intermediate loans. Those products, which carried terms between highly concessional and ordinary lending, were discontinued in 2012. C = A project may be financed by both a loan and a DSF grant.

Source: Extracted from IFAD's grants and investment projects systems.

### C. Terms of financing, project design content and project performance

#### C.1 Terms of finance and type of project design

138. **Government priorities and the evolution of the national context have been stronger determinants of the nature of projects than the terms of IFAD's financing.** The evaluation examined 20 projects in 10 countries that changed country classification, two in each region and broadly distributed by type of financing. In each country, the type of project design (i.e., the detailed description of the project objectives and project components) were compared for a project approved immediately before and after the change in country classification (see Annex IX). This analytical work suggested that **changes in country classifications, and the resulting hardening of the terms of financing, was not consistently associated with changes in the type of project design.**
139. This was confirmed by feedback received during key informant interviews and during the CLE country interactions. According to the respondents, while there has been a gradual shift to designing projects with more emphasis on marketable production, value chains, and interventions that may be expected to generate higher financial (and not only economic) rates of returns, that shift was largely unrelated to the IFAD country classifications and loan terms. Rather, it reflected

changes in government policies, perceptions from the financial or technical ministry on changing needs and opportunities in the country, and expectations on the contribution of market linkages to rural poverty reduction. In some cases, that shift had begun in the absence of any discussion on changes in lending terms.

140. Moreover, while ministries of finance are concerned about IFAD's terms, in most countries loan proceeds are passed onto implementing agencies as a grant.<sup>78</sup> Unsurprisingly, during interviews, representatives from the line agencies were less likely to mention the financing terms of projects or link design contents and priorities with loan terms. Respondents' views from the e-survey also suggest that government priorities and the needs of the rural poor are more strongly associated with the project design rather than lending terms (Table 12), while, regarding the association between IFAD's lending terms and type of projects, responses were more mixed.
141. The only caveat to this finding, as signalled by some IFAD staff members, was that, during loan negotiation, some ministries of finance may raise issues about using borrowed funds for "soft" components, such as training. However, this item did not emerge consistently during interviews and country consultations.

Table 12

**Views of e-survey respondents on the determinants of project design**

Category of respondent	Descriptor for responses	Firmly agree (rating 5-6)	Moderately agree (rating 4)	Moderately disagree (rating 3)	Firmly disagree (rating 1-2)	No opinion
<b>All respondents</b>						
	Government priorities, policies and the needs of the beneficiaries determine the nature of the projects rather than IFAD's terms.	72%	20%	4%	2%	2%
	IFAD's terms have no influence on project design.	36%	22%	21%	18%	4%
	If IFAD hardened its terms, governments would propose different types of projects.	40%	25%	14%	13%	8%

Source: CLE E-survey (2017)

**C.2 Lending terms and project performance**

142. IFAD's Rural Sector Performance (RSP) index is a unique knowledge product in the international community that assesses aspects of governance that are directly related to rural development. IFAD assesses relevant aspects of the policy and institutional environment for every country of operation and summarises the findings in the RSP score, which is included as a variable in the PBAS formula.<sup>79</sup>
143. **Countries eligible for ordinary lending score better on the RSP and World Bank governance indicators<sup>80</sup> than those eligible for the other types of financing.** Conversely countries with access to DSF score lower on these indicators (see Annex X). These findings are statistically robust and suggest that implementing projects in countries eligible for DSF financing would, *prima facie*, be more challenging than for projects financed by ordinary loans.
144. **The time required to reach entry into force is shorter for fully DSF-funded projects.** Compared to an average time of 8.4 months for 424 projects in the active portfolio, the time required to enter into force was shorter,\*\*\* 2.7 months, for

<sup>78</sup> There are of course also exceptions such as China, India and Mexico.

<sup>79</sup> The 2016 PBAS CLE identified weaknesses in the RSP: (i) the processes for RSP scoring were not systematic; (ii) quality assurance varied from division to division; and (iii) stakeholder input varied significantly across countries.

<sup>80</sup> (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political stability and absence of violence; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) rule of law; and (vi) control of corruption. These governance indicators are for countries and are not specific for agriculture and rural development.

projects that were 100 per cent DSF grant financed.<sup>81</sup> The time required for the other types of financing all clustered around the average, although the time for projects financed by highly concessional loans required to reach this milestone was longer\*\* than average. The reasons why 100 per cent DSF grant-financed projects enter into force more quickly include: (i) simplified legal formalities, as soon as the legal documents are signed the project enters into force; (ii) parliamentary approval is not generally required for grant-financed projects; and (iii) while new governments may question the need for loan-financed projects, that is less often the case for grant-financed projects.

145. Projects that were 100 per cent DSF grant-financed also took significantly less time to reach the first disbursement at milestone (0.5 years against 1.5 for other projects).\*\*\* Conversely projects in ordinary countries required more time to make the first disbursement (2.0 years).\*\*\* Similar patterns were observed for the time from approval to completion which impinges on efficiency.

### C.3 Lending terms and project results

146. **IOE's ratings of project performance and results ratings do not show strong patterns of project success by type of financing** (see Annex XI).<sup>82</sup> Across project evaluation criteria, the ratings by type of financing were not statistically different from the average. The 8 ratings that were significantly different were for blended loans and were better than average.<sup>83</sup> There is no evidence that the priorities set by the financial architecture to the poorest countries were affecting IFAD's ability to finance successful projects. The type of financing is not consistently related to either better or worse IOE project ratings.

### C.4 Loan size and project performance and results

147. **Average loan size increased during IFAD7, IFAD8 and IFAD9.** Average financing per project during IFAD9 (\$32 million) was 2.5 times more than the average for the 1978 to 2006 period (\$13 million). Changes proposed for the PBAS during the IFAD11 replenishment are designed to reinforce the trend toward larger loans by limiting the number of countries included in the PBAS.
148. Policies and procedures covering processing, approval and implementation are the same, regardless of loan size, borrowing country capacity or the strength of country systems. The time and costs involved in identifying, designing and supervising implementation do not vary greatly with loan size. The evaluation analysed IOE ratings by loan amount for the cohorts of projects closed between 2010 and 2015 (to control for other confounding factor such as direct supervision and implementation support and country presence), dividing the loan sizes into four quartiles (see Figures 7-8 and Annex XI). The average loan sizes for the quintiles were: (i) highest quartile: \$28.7 million; (ii) highest quartile: \$18 million; (iii) lower quartile: \$14 million; and (iv) lowest quintile: \$9.0 million.
149. **Statistical analysis of IOE ratings by IFAD loan size quintile showed that projects in the lowest quartile performed significantly worse than average in 9 evaluation criteria.**<sup>84</sup> Instead, there was almost no significant difference between the upper three quartiles (Figures 7 and 8).


<sup>81</sup> The symbols \*\*\*, \*\* and \* mean significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.

<sup>82</sup> IOE's database covers 288 projects that have been independently rated using a scale of 1 (highly unsatisfactory) to 6 (highly satisfactory). For each project IOE rates 16 evaluation criteria. These projects were grouped by the five types of financing, resulting in a total of 80 average ratings. The large majority of the ratings were in the moderately satisfactory range, i. e., a little above or below 4.0 on the 6-point scale.

<sup>83</sup> These differences were for the following evaluation criteria: (i) effectiveness; \*\* (ii) efficiency; \*\*\* (iii) sustainability; \*\* (iv) rural poverty impact; \*\*; (v) IFAD performance; \*\* (vi) government performance; \*\*\* (vii) overall project achievement; \* (viii) household income and assets. It is to be noted that the evaluated projects on blended terms were relatively more recent than average and clustered around a small number of countries.

<sup>84</sup> These were: effectiveness; efficiency; project performance; innovation and scaling-up; gender equality and women's empowerment; IFAD performance; government performance; overall project achievement; household income and assets.

Figures 7 and 8  
**IOE ratings by quintile of IFAD loan size amount of funding (project closed in 2010-15)**



Notes: Projects were grouped into quintiles for the amount of IFAD funding  
 Source: CLE elaboration from IOE rating database (2017)

150. One of the explanatory arguments made by IFAD and government staff was that loan size may directly correlate with attention received from governments (the lower the size, the lower the attention and priority received). In addition, small loan size may also be correlated with limited absorption and implementation capacity of specific line agencies. In any case, these findings suggest that, as far as evaluations could assess thus far, the shift towards larger projects has not compromised performance and effectiveness results and that the results at the portfolio level are likely to improve if IFAD approves fewer smaller projects. The obvious caveat here is that these findings are for evaluated projects that have been designed at a time when a US\$30 million project was 'large' by IFAD standards. It is to be seen whether in the future the same result will hold for larger loan sizes.

### Key points

- IFAD's resource mobilization has been effective at increasing the PoLG from IFAD6 to IFAD8. However, the PoLG has stabilised around US\$3.0 billion since IFAD9.
- This CLE interviews and e-survey suggest that, for many countries, the demand for IFAD funding exceeds the size of their PBAS allocation and some countries would even consider borrowing more than allowed by the PBAS at harder terms.
- On the other hand, demand of funds does not translate automatically into use of funds. While the majority of countries have used at least 90 per cent of their original PBAS allocation between IFAD7 and IFAD9, about a quarter have used less. Lower-income countries absorbed on average 107 per cent of the original PBAS allocations while upper-middle income countries 75 per cent. The reason for using more or less of the PBAS original allocation is idiosyncratic: country-level issues were the main reasons (e.g., fragility, conflicts and order conditions; changes in governments or changes in government priorities).
- Consistent with the Agreement establishing IFAD, the financial architecture has been effective in providing the large majority of the funds (71 per cent) during the evaluation period on highly concessional terms or DSF. At the same time, there has been an increase in the proportion of ordinary loan volume between IFAD7 and IFAD9 (from 11 to 23 per cent), reflecting the fact that 31 per cent of countries experienced a shift to harder financing terms between IFAD7 and IFAD9.
- Government priorities and the evolution of country context appear to have had more weight in determining the design of projects than the terms of IFAD's financing. In other words, there is no impediment a priori to keep a strong poverty focus even when projects are financed on ordinary terms. While ministries of finance are more sensitive to interest rates, most technical agencies in charge of projects are not, as they receive funds in the form of grants.
- Based on evaluation ratings, the terms and conditions of financing do not seem to have introduced bias to the performance and results of the operations financed. Projects financed at highly concessional terms or DSF (i.e., in countries with lower governance and RSP indicators), do not systematically under-perform compared with projects financed under ordinary loans. This means that the IFAD mandate to provide most resources to countries under a high degree of concessionality has not generated a downward bias in the use of resources, performance and results.
- Regarding average project size, there is some evidence that very small loans (in the lowest size quartile) are associated with projects that perform worse than others. However, differences disappear in the higher quartiles.

## D. Current terms and pricing of IFAD's loans and the demand from borrowing countries for more flexible options

### D.1 Interest rates

151. **IFAD's interest rates on ordinary loans are generally comparable with those on similar MDB loans** (see Table 13). Spreads over Libor vary from MDB to MDB but they are transparent and formula-driven.<sup>85</sup> The formula involves the contractual spread, a maturity premium, if applicable, and a rebate/surcharge on the cost of borrowing.<sup>86,87</sup> There are, nonetheless, limitations in comparing interest

<sup>85</sup> IBRD flexible loans offer borrowers the option of fixed and variable spreads. As of end-FY16 70 per cent of such loans had a variable spread and 30 per cent had a fixed spread. One commentator recently suggested that IBRD should consider introducing differentiated pricing for LMICs and UMICs. The commentator noted that such a policy would not be welcomed by UMICs and that the specifics would have to be negotiated by all IBRD shareholders (see Center for Global Development). 2017. Getting to Yes on a World Bank Recapitalization).

<sup>86</sup> Because the MDBs have AAA credit ratings they can generally mobilize the funds through bonds at a cost lower than the 6-month LIBOR rate. IBRD recalculates the variable spread every January 1 and July 1 based on the cost of the underlying funding. IBRD's variable spread is composed of a 0.50 per cent contractual spread, a 0.50 per cent annual maturity premium and a rebate/premium that reflects IBRD's actual funding cost of borrowing, which was -0.06 per cent in 2017. IBRD's fixed spread for the same maturity is higher at 1.65 per cent that reflects a 0.15 per cent market risk premiums and 0.50 per cent for projected funding cost. The sub-Libor funding cost margin is returned to borrowers through a rebate following the principle of automatic cost pass-through pricing. A surcharge is added if the MDB's

rates between DFIs because IBRD, IDA, AfDB, AsDB and IADB levy other fees (e.g. commitment fees; front end fees) while IFAD does not.<sup>88, 89</sup> IBRD also provides options to help borrowers mitigate currency and interest rate risks.

Table 13

**Benchmarking IFAD's interest rates on ordinary loans (June 2017)**

<b>MDB</b>	<b>Product</b>	<b>Libor rate<sup>A,B</sup> (%)</b>	<b>Spread (%)</b>	<b>Interest rate</b>
IFAD <sup>A,B,C</sup>	Ordinary	1.32	0.94	2.26
IBRD <sup>B</sup>	Flexible w/variable	1.32	0.94	2.26
IDA	Hard term (floating)	1.32	0.31	1.63
AfDB	Fully flexible	1.32	0.97	2.29
AsDB	Libor-based loan	1.32	0.63	1.95

Notes: A = Based on maturities of between 18 and 20 years for US dollar loans. LIBOR rates change. For comparability the LIBOR rate as of 30 December 2016 was used. B = As of 30 June 2017 the Libor rate was 1.45 per cent and the World Bank and IFAD spreads were 0.95 per cent. From 1 April 2017 IBRD is calculating its variable spread on a quarterly basis because of asset liability management considerations. Because IFAD does not borrow from the markets it continues to change its spreads on a semi-annual basis. C = As of 30 June 2017, IFAD's spread for ordinary loans denominated in SDRs, US dollars and euro was 0.95 per cent. When added to the corresponding Libor rates, the resulting interest rate charged to borrowers was 2.41 per cent for US dollar-denominated loans, 0.95 per cent for euro-denominated loans and 2.08 for SDR-denominated loans.

Source: CLE elaboration (2017).

152. **Officials in ministries of finance are well aware of the pricing structures of the MDBs, bilateral sources of financing and the coupon rate of their international bonds.** Some countries did not view the marginally higher interest rate on IFAD's loans compared to some regional development banks and bilateral sources as a significant factor, noting that the MDBs levied other charges and that IFAD provided other sources of value added. In other countries officials were focused on interest rates and advised that if IFAD's pricing were not competitive, other sources of financing would be sought. The e-survey found that government officials from borrowing countries rated IFAD's interest rates as satisfactory, a rating that was consistent across LICs, LMICs and UMICs. IFAD staff rated IFAD's pricing as moderately satisfactory.
153. **There was a close relationship between country classifications and whether or not countries had a sovereign credit rating.** While two thirds of IFAD's borrowing member countries have sovereign credit ratings, the large majority of countries eligible for DSF grants do not have access to the international capital market.<sup>90</sup> A significant majority of countries eligible for 100 per cent highly concessional loans, blend or ordinary loans had a credit rating. Credit ratings above A- are rare for IFAD's borrowing members.<sup>91</sup> About half of the sovereign ratings were between B- and B+ (see Annex IX).
154. **The pricing of IFAD's ordinary loans is more attractive for most member countries than borrowing funds on the market.** Average bond spreads are

funding cost exceeds the 6-month Libor rate. MDBs calculate rebates and surcharges on their funding cost margin twice a year based on the actual average funding cost margin for the preceding 6 months. The rebate or surcharge is applied to individual loans on the interest payment date following announcement date.

<sup>87</sup> IFAD's Transition Framework is considering more favourable terms for Small Island Development States and/or Small State Economies.

<sup>88</sup> IBRD's fees include: (i) a 0.25 per cent front-end fee; (ii) a 0.25 per cent commitment fee; (iii) Development Policy Loans with a Deferred Drawdown Option incur a 0.25 per cent Front-End Fee and a 0.50 per cent Stand-by Fee; and (iv) Development Policy Loans with Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options incur a 0.50 per cent Front-End Fee and a 0.25 per cent Renewal Fee. IBRD levies a 0.50 per cent per annum surcharge on countries with loan balances exceeding \$16.5 billion (e.g., Brazil; China; Indonesia; Mexico) and \$17.5 billion for India. A basis swap adjustment of -0.15 per cent is applicable for euro fixed spreads, -0.35 per cent for yen fixed spread, and -0.05 per cent for British pounds.

<sup>89</sup> AfDB, AsDB and IADB charge commitment fees on undisbursed loan amounts.

<sup>90</sup> None of the countries that received 100 per cent DSF grants had a credit rating and only 17 per cent of the countries eligible for 50 per cent DSF grants/50 per cent highly concessional loans had a sovereign credit rating.

<sup>91</sup> Only three borrowing countries (e.g., Botswana; China; Malaysia) have ratings of A- or above.

significantly higher than IFAD's spread.<sup>92</sup> This may suggest that the demand for ordinary lending exceeds PBAS allocations for some countries eligible for highly concessional, blend and ordinary countries that also issue bonds. That proposition is consistent with the feedback received during some country interactions and the e-survey results discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter. However, there is also evidence that some MICs have not used their full PBAS allocations over the IFAD7-IFAD9 period.

155. **For some countries, MDBs provide highly concessional loans on harder terms than IFAD does.**<sup>93</sup> IFAD's pricing of highly concessional loans is consistent with the pricing that all MDBs used for many years for their concessional windows. More recently, MDBs have adopted differentiated pricing structures for concessional loans, based on country classifications. IDA terms take into account the increasing variation in the level of development of IDA countries and are designed to promote a smooth transition to IBRD lending terms. For IDA funding: (i) there is a 0.25 per cent front-end fee and a 0.25 per cent commitment charge; (ii) pricing varies by country classification;<sup>94</sup> and (iii) the pricing for IDA's hard loans is linked to IBRD pricing.<sup>95</sup> Resources for transitional support to IDA18 graduating countries<sup>96</sup> and for the IDA18 Scale-up Facility are provided on IBRD lending terms. Under IDA18, additional non-concessional financing can be provided to IDA clients taking into consideration their debt situation. AsDB applies differential pricing for concessional loans for countries that are only eligible for concessional financing, blend countries and for emergency loans. AfDB introduced differentiated pricing and hardened financing terms for regular ADF-only countries, advanced ADF-only countries and blend, gap and graduating countries.
156. **E-survey results suggest that borrowing countries would be moderately sensitive to a hardening of IFAD's pricing.** E-survey respondents from borrowing countries 'moderately agreed' that their countries would borrow less if IFAD increased interest rates by 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 per cent (Table 14).<sup>97</sup> However, some respondent disagreed and about a fifth to a fourth of respondents had no clear view. Respondents agreed that, if IFAD's terms were harder than those of MDBs and bilateral sources, countries would maximize their borrowing for agriculture and rural development from those sources before seeking financing from IFAD (57 per cent firmly agreed with that notion and 13 per cent moderately agreed).

<sup>92</sup> 6.20 per cent for LICs; 3.42 per cent for LMICs; 3.15 per cent for UMICs. Peru had a bond spread (0.85 per cent) lower than IFAD's spread for ordinary loans. Two countries had spreads slightly higher than IFAD's (Mexico; China).

<sup>93</sup> MDBs price all loans to a particular country based on its country classification. To ensure that pricing does not distort priorities, loans for all sectors are priced the same within a country.

<sup>94</sup> IDA's pricing for fixed rate US dollar loans: (a) small island countries: 1.39 per cent service charge; (b) IDA only countries: 1.42 per cent service charge; and (c) blend countries: of 2.85 per cent (1.47 per cent service charge plus a 1.38 per cent interest rate).

<sup>95</sup> The fixed rate for a US\$ loan is 3.02 per cent (0.75 per cent service charge plus a 2.27 per cent interest rate).

<sup>96</sup> Bolivia, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam

<sup>97</sup> However, during country interactions there was feedback that Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Zambia would consider borrowing more on ordinary terms.

Table 14  
**The views of government officials from borrowing countries on the sensitivity of borrowing to increased loan charges**

Questions	Descriptor for responses	Firmly agree (rating 5-6)	Moderately agree (rating 4)	Moderately disagree (rating 3)	Firmly disagree (rating 1-2)	No opinion
"Our government would ....."						
-reduce borrowing if IFAD increased interest by 0.5%	Moderately agree	34%	19%	12%	15%	20%
-borrow at the same level if IFAD increased interest by 0.5%	Moderately agree	25%	21%	14%	20%	20%
-reduce borrowing if IFAD increased interest by 1.0%	Moderately agree	38%	17%	9%	11%	25%
-borrow at the same level if IFAD increased interest by 1.0%	Moderately disagree	16%	14%	21%	25%	24%
-reduce borrowing if IFAD increased interest by 1.5%	Moderately agree	42%	15%	5%	13%	25%
-borrow at the same level if IFAD increased interest by 1.5%	Moderately disagree	10%	11%	16%	38%	25%
-reduce borrowing if IFAD increased interest by 2.0%	Agree	50%	8%	4%	12%	26%
-borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased interest by 2.0%	Moderately disagree	10%	8%	11%	45%	26%
-borrow from MDB and bilaterals before seeking financing from IFAD, if IFAD's terms were harder	Agree	57%	13%	4%	9%	17%

Source: CLE E-survey (2017)

## D.2 Grace and maturity periods

157. **Compared to other DFIs, there is limited flexibility in IFAD's grace and maturity periods for all classes of loans.** There is a mismatch between the grace period for ordinary (3 years) and blend (5 years) loans and the average project implementation period (about 9 years). This means that countries must begin repaying loans before project implementation is complete and the full benefits associated with projects materialize. For ordinary loans, **the World Bank<sup>98</sup> and AsDB offer options to choose to pay an interest rate premium for longer maturities or grace periods and can tailor repayment schedules to debt management and project needs.** The MDBs' flexible Libor-based loans provide clients with the ability to make choices based on their needs and debt management strategies. Such decisions are transparent as borrowers can use a formula to simulate the cost of different options for the amortization profile, maturities and grace period. During interactions with countries that borrow on ordinary terms, government officials stated that they appreciated the flexibility and choice offered by MDBs and suggested that IFAD adopt a similar approach.
158. **MDBs have a more differentiated approach than IFAD for loan maturities for concessional loans.** Over the last 30 years, the maturity period for IDA loans was progressively shortened from 50-years prior to 30 June 1987 to 35 to 40-years from 30 June 1987 to 30 June 2011 and 25 to 40 years between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 2014. Since 1 July 2014, IDA maturities have been linked to IDA's country classification: (i) 40 years for small island countries; (ii) 38 years for IDA-only countries; and (iii) 25 years for blend countries. IDA's three scale up facilities have maturity periods of 24, 27 and 30 years respectively. The maturity periods of highly concessional loans offered by AsDB and AfDB are shorter than IFAD's 40-year maturity for some borrowers depending on the country classification. The amended

<sup>98</sup> World Bank. 2013. Product Note. IBRD's Flexible Loan: Major Terms and Conditions. Treasury Department.

Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing approved in February 2018 are meant to provide some more flexibility, although this cannot be compared to other DFIs.<sup>99</sup>

159. **MDBs also have differentiated grace periods for highly concessional loans, depending on country classification.** For IDA loans, grace periods range from 5 years for blend countries and hard IDA loans, to 6 years for IDA-only countries and up to 8 and 9 years for some scale-up facilities. AsDB and AfDB also vary the grace period based on country classifications.
160. **IDA credit agreements have included an accelerated repayment clause since 1987.** The clause, which was amended in 1996, applies to the borrowers that have a GNI per capita above the IDA operational cut-off for three consecutive years and are creditworthy for IBRD. The clause stipulates a doubling of the principal repayments on outstanding credits provided that a five-year grace period has elapsed,<sup>100</sup> subject to consideration of the country's economy and effect on debt sustainability. During IDA16 and IDA17, the accelerated repayment clause was exercised for fifteen IDA graduates.<sup>101</sup> A similar accelerated repayment provision was introduced under AfDB's AFD13.

### D.3 Currency choice

161. **For more than two decades, MDBs have offered their clients options, appropriately priced, to select the currency for market-based lending, although concessional lending continues to be denominated in special drawing rights (SDRs).**<sup>102</sup> When the MDBs were established, SDRs were viewed as a hedge for countries with little or no capacity to manage financial risks. Countries have now far better access to international capital and currency markets and many have sophisticated treasuries that manage their foreign exchange assets and liabilities and understand the financial risks associated with currencies.
162. **IFAD was slow to introduce currency choice for ordinary borrowers.** Until recently, all IFAD loans were denominated in SDRs. The use of SDRs adds complexity to, and complicates, transactions and both governments and IFAD incur frictional costs.<sup>103</sup> During IFAD10, IFAD began to provide some currency choice by offering ordinary loans denominated in a single currency (either euro or US dollars) as an alternative to SDR-denominated loans.<sup>104</sup> Judging by the uptake, the introduction of single currency lending was successful. Feedback from interviews with key informants at Headquarters and during country interactions was that allowing greater currency choice was a welcome development, although some countries would prefer to remain with SDRs.
163. **The strong demand for US dollars was reiterated during country interactions and key informant interviews at Headquarters.** Most countries in APR and LAC wanted to borrow in US dollars. To manage its foreign exchange risks, IFAD initially required loans financed from the KfW sovereign loan to be lent

<sup>99</sup> Paragraph 12 of the amended Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing takes the case of ordinary loans whereby IFAD applies a 3-year grace period and a maturity of 15-18 years and states that a borrower could be given the flexibility of up to a 10-year grace period and a maturity up to 35 years as in the World Bank Group. The same paragraph acknowledges that: "a marked difference, however, would still remain between IFAD and IFIs in terms of full flexibility and options".

<sup>100</sup> Instead of doubling the principal repayments, borrowers may request IDA to substitute an interest charge for some or all of the higher principal repayments, provided the new terms have a grant element equivalent to that resulting from doubling of the principal payments alone.

<sup>101</sup> Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Macedonia FYR, the Philippines and St. Kitts and Nevis. For the three IDA18 graduates IDA deferred exercising the acceleration clause until the IDA18 Mid-Term Review.

<sup>102</sup> Although IDA accounting is done in SDR and all IDA commitments and grants are denominated in SDR, a small (SDR7 million) single currency window was recently expanded to accommodate expected demand. AfDB denominates their concessional loans in the Unit of Account.

<sup>103</sup> Accounts must be kept in SDRs, US dollars and, for governments, local currencies. IFAD has a currency mismatch because its audited financial statements are in US dollars, but its loans are denominated in SDRs. Depending on currency movements, IFAD can experience a gain or loss on its financial statements. During the past several years IFAD has recorded substantial financial losses because of this factor.

<sup>104</sup> IFAD cautiously offered currency choice. The first pilot phase had a ceiling of US\$200 million, which was reached in early 2016. In November 2016, the ceiling was increased to US\$1.6 billion, about half of IFAD10.

in euro. Some countries in APR and LAC were unhappy that they were required to borrow in euro. Some countries in NEN, whose economies are closely linked to Europe, and WCA, whose currency is linked to the euro, expressed interest in borrowing in euro.<sup>105</sup>

164. **Some IFAD clients would like to have the option to borrow in their local currency.** During some country interactions government officials noted that MDBs offer local currency loans.<sup>106</sup> Although the e-survey showed that the preference of most respondents would have been to borrow in US dollars, it also showed that some government officials from borrowing countries would consider the option of local currency borrowing (local currency products allow countries to avoid foreign exchange risks and foreign risk premiums that some ministries of finance charge when the proceeds of foreign loans are on-lent).<sup>107</sup>

#### **D.4 Financial management issues related to loans**

165. **During some country interactions (e.g., Indonesia; Mexico; Morocco; the Philippines), the feedback was that IFAD's requirements as well as its paper-based system for processing withdrawal applications and disbursements was antiquated, cumbersome and time-consuming.** They generally welcomed IFAD's ongoing efforts to roll out an online portal and felt that it should have been done earlier. Because of the paper-based system some government officials reported that it could take IFAD up to a month to process withdrawal applications and disburse the funds. This is considerably longer than for MDBs that had simplified these unwieldy procedures many years ago. Government officials noted that they needed training to be able to efficiently use the new online portal.
166. Government officials reported that delays in processing drawn-down applications contributed to delays in reaching key milestones during project implementation. They reported that there were also issues on the government side related to disbursements: (i) late delivery of withdrawal applications because of delays by the spending units submitting the required documents to the executing agency; and (ii) detailed documents needed to support withdrawal applications.
167. Key problems identified during country interactions associated with IFAD's procedures include: (i) too much detail required to support withdrawal applications; (ii) the time required between the receipt of the withdrawal application and the disbursement.

#### **E. Demand for additional financial products**

168. **IFAD offers a more limited range of products than MDBs do** (see Annex X), which is related to the larger number of sectors and typology of interventions (e.g., beyond the classical project financing). In addition to sovereign lending, MDBs have a lending window that supports the private sector.
169. During country visits and at Headquarters interviews and through the e-survey, the general view was that more products would increase choice and flexibility so that borrowing countries could select the product that best meets their needs. This view was particularly prevalent in countries eligible for ordinary lending. Those interviewed noted that the needs of borrowing member countries have evolved over time and have become more sophisticated. While government officials interviewed during the country visits generally felt that IFAD could develop a wider range of projects and provided many examples, there was no clear consensus on

<sup>105</sup> As of end-FY16 US dollar loans accounted for 79 per cent of the total outstanding loans in IBRD's portfolio; 19 per cent were euro-denominated.

<sup>106</sup> IBRD and IADB offer local currency loans for some clients. AsDB introduced local currency loans in 2005 for private sector enterprises and certain public-sector entities, (e.g., local governments, public sector enterprises).

<sup>107</sup> This view was more strongly held in UMICs than in LICs and LMICs. UMIC respondents agreed that their countries would like to borrow in local currency but respondents from LICs and LMICs moderately agreed that they would like to have that option. LICs were less interested in this option than LMICs.

what new products should be prioritised. Interest in new products was stronger in ministries of finance and planning but less pronounced in line agencies where some of those interviewed felt that IFAD should stick with traditional project finance.

170. The overwhelming majority (92 per cent) of e-survey respondents were of the view that IFAD should develop a broader range of products (see further details in Annex VIII). Government officials responding to the e-survey assigned a high priority to IFAD developing products such as: (i) results-based lending (RBL) (i.e., a lending instrument that disburses against the achievement of specific programme results and performance indicators); (ii) a special facility for managing the risks of natural disasters and drought; (iii) agriculture trade financing; (iv) drought and natural disaster insurance for IFAD's target groups; (v) quick disbursing, policy-based sovereign loans (i.e., loans disbursed against the achievements of policy-related milestones);<sup>108</sup> and (vi) sector adjustment sovereign loans (i.e., includes both a policy component and a project component).
171. In contrast IFAD respondents assigned a high priority to developing only one new product – results-based lending. This may reflect caution regarding IFAD's capacity, to develop and use a full range of differentiated products.
172. The decision to develop new products will require *ad hoc* feasibility studies, which is beyond the remit of this evaluation. The next paragraphs concentrate on needs that have emerged more prominently throughout the analysis undertaken for this evaluation: (i) products to support scaling up; (ii) products to support the management of the risk of natural disasters and drought; and (iii) products to support pre-financing of implementation preparedness; in addition (iv) trade financing; (v) hedging commodity prices; and (vi) non-sovereign lending are also discussed.

### **E.1 Products for supporting scaling up**

173. **IFAD is the only DFI that has a formal scaling-up framework.** At IFAD scaling up means that a government, international organization, private entrepreneur, NGO, or other entity outside IFAD commits resources to broaden and strengthen results. When IFAD allocates more of its resources on its own, this is not necessarily an example of scaling up. Yet, actual practice differs from the theory. In order to facilitate scaling up by others, it is often necessary for IFAD to continue to be involved financially over an extended period of time. This is in order to provide a 'proof' of commitment, to safeguard the quality of design and ensure the 'fidelity' of implementation (2017 Evaluation Synthesis on Scaling up).
174. **IFAD does not have a product specifically designed to facilitate scaling up or the programmatic approach.**<sup>109</sup> As recommended in several IOE evaluations,<sup>110</sup> IFAD sometimes provides additional financing for an existing project to close a financing gap or to increase the coverage and impact of the projects (e.g., expanding the geographic scope). Issues that need to be considered include: (i) the terms on which the additional financing would be provided; (ii) procedures for allocating funds across multiple PBAS cycles; and (iii) the role of the Executive Board in approving the additional financing, including the minimum threshold when formal Executive Board approval is required. In considering options to support a tailor-made scaling up product, MDB experience with some of their products is discussed below (details in Annex X).

<sup>108</sup> Typically programme loans, a form of budget support, are used in sectors other than agriculture and rural development. However, some World Bank development policy loans include components related to changes in agricultural policies, AsDB approved agriculture programme loans to help Mongolia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic make the transition from centrally planned to market oriented agriculture sectors.

<sup>109</sup> This is mentioned as a possibility in the Transition Paper approved by the Executive Board in December 2017.

<sup>110</sup> Because a single project does not usually solve poverty issues in a certain geographic area or sub-sector, IOE has recommended a programmatic approach in several project and country programme evaluations.

175. **Results-based Lending:** Consistent with the responses to the e-survey,<sup>111</sup> during IFAD11 IFAD will test Results-based Lending (RBL) in countries with well-developed financial management, safeguard and monitoring and evaluation systems. In RBL, disbursements are linked to the achievement of specific performance indicators rather than on specific contracts or expenditures, which is the typical case of traditional investment project financing. Both the World Bank and AsDB have introduced RBL products and IADB will soon introduce it. This product uses country institutions, programmes and country systems, including procurement and fiduciary systems. A World Bank real time evaluation of RBL<sup>112</sup> found that: (i) RBL was well accepted by countries and World Bank staff and its use had grown rapidly; (ii) borrowing countries appreciated the use of country systems; (iii) there was a cautious introduction of this product with initial limits on total RBL lending; and (iv) there was a need for significant frontloading training to the World Bank staff on this modality and this had not been done to a sufficient extent.
176. **Multitranche Financing Facility (MFF):** AsDB piloted this product in 2005 and mainstreamed it in 2008 to: (i) strengthen its capacity to mobilize development finance; (ii) reinforce the flexibility and client orientation of its financial products; and (iii) make AsDB more compatible with evolving market practices. The MFF facilitates the efficient programming of a sequence of individual loan tranches in a sector. MFFs now account for almost a third of AsDB's resource envelope indicating widespread acceptance by clients and AsDB staff. In 2012 real-time evaluation of this product was conducted.<sup>113</sup> The AsDB board approves the financing for the entire MFF programme and the first sub-project but not the subsequent tranches. If IFAD decided to adopt an MFF product, then the role of the EB in approving subsequent subprojects would have to be considered.
177. **IFAD's flexible lending mechanism:** In the past IFAD had a product that was, in theory, suited to promote scaling up. Key features of the flexible lending mechanism, adopted in 1998, were: (i) **project design:** programming and decision-making tools and participatory methods reflected on-going experience and changing priorities; (ii) **identification of activities in cycles:** physical targets and costs were specified only for the first sub-project; and (iii) **use of defined triggers** to release funding for later sub-phases. A 2009 Management self-assessment concluded that the flexible lending mechanism had only had limited success. A lack of resources during implementation and an overly bureaucratic approach led to shortcomings. Operational issues included: (i) ill-defined triggers (i.e., too many, not quantified; weight of individual triggers not defined); (ii) the expected shift in resources from design to implementation supervision during implementation did not occur; (iii) weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation; and (iv) a financing gap if the process of moving from one cycle to the next was not processed quickly. After reviewing the self-evaluation, the Board decided that: (i) no new projects would be approved using this modality; (ii) positive features, including a programmatic approach combined with the use of triggers, would be integrated into IFAD project designs. IFAD's experiment with the flexible lending mechanism preceded the direct supervision policy and establishment of country offices: the Fund's capacity for implementation support was constrained.
178. **IDA Scale Up Facility:** The IDA Scale Up Facility was developed in 2016 to mobilize additional resources to help meet the SDGs in IDA countries.<sup>114</sup> Financing is provided on non-concessional terms after considering the country's debt situation and ability to absorb non-concessional lending. IDA estimated that the demand for such financing would exceed the available supply. The allocation framework reflects equity, performance, poverty and debt sustainability.

<sup>111</sup> There was a strong agreement that IFAD should develop an RBL instrument – 70 per cent of non-IFAD respondents assigned a high or highest priority to developing an RBL product as did 59 per cent of IFAD respondents.

<sup>112</sup> IEG. World Bank Group. 2016. Program-for-Results: An Early-Stage Assessment of the Process and Effects of a New Lending Instrument.

<sup>113</sup> IED. AsDB. 2012. Real-Time Evaluation Study of the Multitranche Financing Facility.

<sup>114</sup> The additional funds can be provided for project financing, development policy, RBLs and guarantees.

## **E.2 Products to support an integrated strategy for managing the risk of natural disasters and drought and fragility**

179. **IFAD does not have a product to rapidly provide financing to help mitigate the impact of natural disasters and conflict on the rural poor.**<sup>115</sup> Natural disasters and extreme weather events and emergencies related to fragility and conflict impact severely on the rural poor and food security. Extreme weather events (e.g., floods; droughts), which often receive extensive coverage in the international media, can wipe out harvests resulting in famine and worsening rural poverty. The CLE on the Grant Policy (2014) found some examples of grants used to finance emergency operations because no other product was available to act upon emergencies and the Grant Policy of that time (2009) did not contemplate such use of grants. IFAD did, however, adopt Guidelines for Disaster Early Recovery in 2011 and IDA's guidelines for post-conflict and crisis-affected countries in 2007, which also cover natural disasters. MDBs have special products that can be used in such situations and IFAD could build on their experience.<sup>116</sup>
180. As an example, AsDB has an integrated policy for managing its disaster and emergency assistance that links the phases of the disaster management cycle from prevention and mitigation through preparedness and recovery.<sup>117</sup> Should such an event occur, AsDB provides two types of loans: (i) emergency assistance loans, which are provided in the immediate aftermath; and (ii) normal development loans, which are provided after emergency assistance loans and follow normal AsDB policies, procedures and pricing.
181. Emergency assistance loans finance emergency, short-term transitional assistance: (i) rehabilitating high priority physical and social infrastructure; (ii) revitalizing basic services; and (iii) jump-starting economic productivity. After the emergency crisis period, efforts shift to designing comprehensive medium to long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, which are financed by a subsequent normal development loan.
182. The completion period for emergency assistance loans is normally up to 2 years for natural disasters and 3 years for a post-conflict situation. Subsequent normal development loans address comprehensive, medium to long-term reconstruction, including prevention and mitigation activities, and complement Emergency Assistance Loans. Because the burdens created by sudden and unpredictable emergencies fall hardest on the poor, emergency assistance operations are normally financed on ADF terms and conditions for countries eligible to receive such assistance (i.e., an interest rate of 1 per cent per year; 40-year maturity including a 10-year grace period). A portion of ADF resources may be allocated on a grant basis to poor countries emerging from conflict. Because emergencies and disasters are unpredictable, funding for emergency assistance is not allocated through the PBAS and is incremental to the country programme.
183. Another example comes from the Policy Guidelines for Emergency Relief Assistance of ADF/AfDB which distinguishes between short-term assistance (through grants up to a maximum of US\$1 million) outside the PBAS and with fast-tracking approval procedures, and longer-term relief assistance through loans using the common procedures.<sup>118</sup> These guidelines have not yet been evaluated by AfDB to the

<sup>115</sup> This is mentioned as a possibility in the Transition Paper approved by the Executive Board in December 2017.

<sup>116</sup> Examples include the IDA Crisis Response Window<sup>7</sup>, IADB's Contingent Credit Line for Natural Disasters and AsDB's Disaster Response Facility.

<sup>117</sup> AsDB. 2015. Operations Manual Bank Policies. Disaster and Emergency Assistance

<sup>118</sup> <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/REVISED%20POLICY%20GUIDELINES%20AND%20PROCEDURES%20FOR%20EMERGENCY%20RELIEF%20ASSISTANCE%20AND%20GENERAL%20REGULATIONS%20OF%20THE%20SPECIAL%20RELIEF%20UND.pdf>

knowledge of this CLE and their experience would need to be assessed before IFAD decided to follow their example.<sup>119</sup>

184. Also related to these, and highlighted in the e-survey, was interest in **insurance products connected to the risk of drought and natural disasters**. Detailed worldwide mapping, both satellite and on the ground, can help farmers even in remote parts of the world buy protection for pre-specified geographic areas. Under "parametric insurance" insured losses are correlated to an index (e.g., rainfall or even levels of soil moisture) and a set amount is paid out if that index is reached. The drawbacks include "basis risk", i.e. the risk that a specific farm may have suffered from flooding whilst the general area observed has not recorded similar rainfalls.<sup>120</sup>
185. IFAD has accumulated some knowledge in these areas through two supplementary funds, the Platform for Agriculture Risk Management (PARM)<sup>121</sup> and the Weather Risk Management Facility (WRMF).<sup>122</sup> PARM is a four-year multi-donor partnership between developing countries and development partners that identifies risks and the most appropriate tools to make agricultural risk management an integral part of policy planning in 8 sub-Saharan African countries.<sup>123</sup> WRMF, established in 2008, supports initiatives to reduce the vulnerability of smallholders to weather and other agricultural production risks, to encourage and protect investments in smallholder agricultural production, and contribute to food security. WRMF is designed to develop and support innovative weather and climate risk management tools such as weather index insurance to improve rural livelihoods and reduce hunger. Weather index insurance pilots have been supported in China, Ethiopia and Mongolia. The challenge is to translate such knowledge into new financial products or approaches.
186. Through a grant, IFAD is also collaborating with Milliman/Micro Insurance Centre on developing new products. Additional initiatives are funded through a euro 4 million grant from SIDA. Pilot initiatives have also been included in projects in Kenya and Senegal (approved in 2015 and 2017 respectively). While pilots have been promoted through grants and in the context of loan-financed projects, it is not clear at this stage whether supporting parametric insurance would require IFAD to develop new financial products or support could be provided through traditional loans and grants.

### **E.3 Financing of Project Pre-Implementation Support**

187. In IFAD, as in DFIs, project approval by the Executive Board is a key project milestone that is used to assess the delivery of corporate, regional, divisional and individual work programmes. However, project implementation does not begin immediately after project approval. Rather, several steps need to be taken before the first disbursement is made and implementation begins in earnest (e.g., completing the legal formalities; establishing the project office; completion of design; recruitment of consultants; preparation of contract packaging; securing counterpart financing).

<sup>119</sup> In a different context, another initiative rolled out in 2016 is that of the European Investment Bank Economic Resilience Initiative. The initiative, part of the joined-up EU response to the challenges posed by forced displacement and migration, is to be implemented in close cooperation with EU Member States, the European Commission and other partners. It aims at rapidly mobilizing additional financing in support of the capacity of economies in the Southern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans regions to absorb and respond to crises and shocks, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, while maintaining strong growth. <http://www.eib.org/projects/initiatives/resilience-initiative/index>

<sup>120</sup> The World Bank is currently working on this area as well <http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/disaster-risk-financing-and-insurance-programme>

<sup>121</sup> PARM is a four-year multi-donor partnership between developing countries and development partners to make agricultural risk management an integral part of policy planning in 8 sub-Saharan African countries.

<sup>122</sup> WRMF is designed to develop and support innovative weather and climate risk management tools such as weather index insurance to improve rural livelihoods and reduce hunger. Weather index insurance pilots have been supported in China and Ethiopia.

<sup>123</sup> Cameroon; Cape Verde; Ethiopia; Liberia; Niger; Senegal; Uganda; Zambia.

188. Many IOE evaluations have reported delays in project start-up which may detract from the development results achieved by some projects (this is also regularly reported in the ARRI and recognized by Management). Such delays have often been attributed to gaps in project implementation readiness. Issues of this type were echoed during CLE country visits, including issues of length and complication in project design documents (e.g., Indonesia, Philippines, Mexico).
189. One way to shorten the time required for actual implementation start up and to reduce the front-end delays is to invest more resources in the preparation phase and to ensure strong country ownership, implementation capacity and preparedness, so that projects are ready to implement when they are submitted to the Executive Board. IFAD used to have a Special Operations Facility to help start-up projects. This was discontinued after the approval of the Grant Policy of 2003 and as Management had some concerns over its actual use (i.e., covering administrative costs rather than strengthening implementation preparedness).
190. IFAD's Financing Administration Manual contemplates the option of retroactive financing, whereby on an exceptional basis, and with the approval of the Executive Board, project expenditures may be incurred before *entry into force*. However, this is considered as an exception and not necessarily geared towards improving implementation preparedness and implementation capacity. In this regard, AsDB has recently reformed its technical assistance, introducing "transaction technical assistance grants" which can be used to finance project preparation and project implementation capacity support or develop capacity in the project-executing agency.<sup>124</sup> This may provide useful lessons for IFAD as well.

#### **E.4 Trade and supply chain finance**

191. Trade finance helps to manage the risks faced by companies engaged in international trade by providing a means of payment and/or guaranteeing payments. MDBs and commercial banks provide trade finance in many sectors and lines of business and are not limited to the agriculture sector. Trade finance is typically used to support private sector clients rather than sovereign borrowers. IFAD does not (yet) have a portfolio of private sector clients or a systematic way of providing agriculture trade finance. The CLE interviews with impact investors found that they provided agriculture-related trade finance to help cooperatives export their products (mainly coffee and cocoa). If IFAD succeeds in developing a viable private sector portfolio (see section below) and a large portfolio of value chain projects focuses on exports, and if an unsatisfied demand for trade materialises, then there may be an option to study trade finance product at a later stage.

#### **E.5 Hedging commodity prices**

192. Some recent value chain projects supported by IFAD are beginning to link small holders, through intermediaries and international companies, to export markets for commodities like cocoa and coffee. One of the risks of such a strategy is that commodity prices are volatile (see an example in Figure 9). Tools are available to hedge prices for some commodities. The question is whether those tools could be adopted to support small holders involved in projects that IFAD supports.

<sup>124</sup> AsDB. 2017. Technical Assistance Reforms—Improving the Speed, Relevance, and Quality of Technical Assistance Operations and AsDB. 2017. Operational Manual Policies and Procedures Section D12.

Figure 9.  
Coffee price US\$/MT (using a 60-day moving average)



Source: Elaborated from Bloomberg (2018).

193. MDBs have relatively little experience in providing hedging products of the type that would benefit small farmers. In 2000 the World Bank convened an international task force on commodity risk management in developing countries to explore market-based approaches to help those countries better manage their vulnerability to commodity price volatility.<sup>125</sup> Although the task force agreed on the principles of a possible market-based approach to bridge the gap between providers of risk management instruments and potential users in developing countries, this did not become a major World Bank product to help smallholders. IFC offers derivative, structured finance and local currency products and solutions to help clients hedge foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity price exposure. EBRD had some experience helping clients to hedge price risks associated with some commodities (e.g., gold; aluminium) but little in the way of hedging commodities that would be more directly relevance to smallholders. Some impact investors have provided hedging services to cooperatives and associations of farmers but some of these were involved in speculation and became insolvent.
194. Hedging products involve risks and, so far, IFAD has limited experience and expertise in this area. While this is certainly an area of interest for IFAD, considerably more analysis of options for hedging products would be required before taking a decision on whether to work on such products. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether this can be done within the framework of traditional lending products or whether it would require developing new products.

### **E.6 Products to support the private sector**

195. The private sector plays an important role in value chain development and facilitating the growth of micro, small and medium-sized rural enterprises. All MDBs have private sector windows that offer a sophisticated range of products (e.g., loans, equity investment and guarantees). Only a small share of MDBs' private sector lending supports agriculture and rural development and MDBs generally do not target the types or scale of organization that IFAD wants to support. The 2011 evaluation of IFAD's private sector strategy recommended establishing a private-sector development financing facility and assessing IFAD's human resources and organizational architecture to support private sector development. IFAD's 2012 private sector strategy committed the Organization to exploring options in a gradual manner in order to better support the growth of small- and medium-sized rural enterprises in line with its mandate. The recent Evaluation Synthesis on building partnerships for enhanced development effectiveness acknowledges the limited instruments available for supporting partnerships with the private sector.

<sup>125</sup> <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/commoditypriceriskmanagement.pdf>

196. The Dalberg pre-feasibility study for an IFAD private sector finance facility<sup>126</sup> concluded that IFAD acting as a direct funder of rural SMEs was not feasible and would have little impact. In examining direct lending to the private sector by IFAD, it is critical to define what is intended to incrementally, sustainably achieve for IFAD's target group through institutional arrangements that are cost-efficient.
197. **Some private impact investors are providing financing to small rural enterprises.** Members of the Council on Smallholder Agriculture Finance (CSAF) support private sector agribusinesses in the "missing middle"<sup>127</sup> in low and middle-income countries. Financing has been provided for: (i) trade finance; (ii) capital expenditure; (iii) harvest cycle loans; (iv) equity; and (v) guarantees. Loans were generally between US\$200,000 and US\$3 million. Interest rates ranged between 7 and 12 per cent and maturities were 5 years on average for loans financing capital expenditures and under 12 months for short-term loans. All of these financiers take collateral to secure their loans.
198. **Evaluation interviews with CSAF members found that lending to micro, small and medium-sized rural enterprises involves substantial risks.** CSAF impact investors have non-performing loans (NPLs) ranging between 3 and 36 per cent. Of the 12 CSAF members only one or two were making a small profit.<sup>128</sup> The others incurred losses.<sup>129</sup> Investing solely in agriculture was not deemed to be financially sustainable as revenues were not covering costs, thereby resulting in an erosion of capital. Losses were related to weather, poor corporate governance and weak management. Few of the clients produced reliable monthly/quarterly reports or financial statements. The risks involved raise issues of whether it is the right time for IFAD to provide private sector financing in this area and whether it may not be a better priority to fund technical assistance, providing mechanisms for local currency hedging, catastrophe-risk insurance, supporting domestic agriculture markets and working with intermediaries (e.g. micro finance institutions) rather than on a quasi-retail basis. Deepening its exchanges with CSAF would allow IFAD to monitor the performance of their portfolios and determine whether and when there is a way for IFAD to work with such organizations.

### **E.7 IFAD ongoing initiatives for the private sector**

199. Through the European Union (EU)-financed Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund in Uganda (SMADF) and the Smallholder and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Investment Finance Fund (SIF), IFAD is beginning to experiment with initiatives that provide financial support to the private sector. IFAD's challenges in developing private sector products include: (i) identifying profitable and sustainable investments that benefit small holders and the rural poor; (ii) keeping IFAD's overheads low and (iii) not replacing existing private sector lenders through over-competitive pricing.
200. **The Small and Medium Agribusiness Development Fund** in Uganda (SMADF), an EU-driven initiative, is a partnership between public and private investors offering equity and semi-equity funding to small/medium agribusiness companies. The planned euro 30 million fund has three components: (i) SMADF establishment; (ii) capital investment; and (iii) business development services support. IFAD provides supervision through the country office, sits on the board of directors and the management committee and manages the second component.
201. Investments are to range from euro 200,000 to euro 2 million and normally have a 5-7-year time horizon. Investments must be in limited liability companies. In

<sup>126</sup> Dalberg: Pre-feasibility Study for an IFAD Private Sector Finance Facility targeting Rural SMEs – Final Report 18 November 2011.

<sup>127</sup> Small and growing agricultural businesses that are too large for microfinance and often do not qualify for loans from local financial institutions.

<sup>128</sup> Triodos Investment Management, ResponsAbility, Alterfin, Root Capital, Rabo Rural Fund and Incofin Investment Management were interviewed in addition to IFAD managers and document review.

<sup>129</sup> Incofin Investment Management and ResponsAbility were considered the best peers in 2016 with 3 per cent NPLs, the worst had a 36 per cent NPL rate.

- Uganda, cooperatives do not have the scale or shareholder structures that permit equity investment. Although five projects have been approved by the internal deal review committee and are undergoing full due diligence, no investments had been approved as of November 2017. There have been some differences of opinion between IFAD staff and the fund manager on the concept of indirect benefit and benefits created through employment generation. The fund manager believes that the minimum size for a viable equity investment is about euro 500,000 to ensure that overheads are controlled.
202. It is far too early to draw firm conclusions and lessons about SMADF. The early experience suggests that: (i) it takes considerable time to identify and approve investments; (ii) issues related to the minimum and maximum size of investments and direct and indirect impacts on beneficiaries need to be addressed in a manner that is both consistent with IFAD's mandate and does not undermine the financial viability of the fund; (iv) the choice of crops is important to ensure that poor small holders can be lifted out of poverty by producing and selling the crops; and, (v) given that the fund is limited to making investments only in agriculture, this increases risks relative to funds that can invest in many sectors. Further limits by category of investment and beneficiary may impact adversely on the funds' profitability. Perhaps a wider definition of rural and peri-urban development than purely agriculture could be considered while maintaining a clear pro-poor focus.
203. **The Proposed Smallholder and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Investment Finance Fund (SIF) and Technical Assistance Facility (TAF).**<sup>130</sup> This proposal was approved by the Executive Board in December 2017<sup>131</sup> and will be formally launched in 2018. IFAD's approach has three pillars: (i) Pillar 1: leveraging IFAD's existing project portfolio as the major source of SIF's pipeline of investments and to reduce risks; (ii) Pillar 2: the SIF Fund, which will target farmer organizations and SMEs using both direct financing and financial intermediation. (iii) Pillar 3: TAF that will provide pre- and post-investment technical assistance to the entities supported by SIF and incubate young entrepreneurs and their start-ups. The TAF will also support monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
204. The SIF portfolio is expected to reach between US\$50 million and US\$100 million during the first phase (3 to 5 years) and further diversify its funding sources to include commercial investors during the second phase. During the first phase, SIF will provide debt and subordinated debt, ranging between US\$100,000 to US\$1 million, to SMEs and to larger, more structured rural producer organizations for working capital, term loans, farm renewal, agro-tourism, climate adaptation, input supply, plantations, irrigation, marketing, certification, distribution, food services, new technologies and equipment for processing or transformation. Smaller loans in the US\$25,000 to US\$250,000 range will be provided through financial intermediation. SIF will provide between US\$2 million and US\$5 million to local financial institutions. Initially SIF will prioritize sub-Saharan Africa countries.
205. SIF will operate as an independent entity registered as an investment fund. It will have arm's length autonomy from IFAD but will be aligned with IFAD's strategic objectives and existing portfolio.<sup>132</sup> Initial SIF funding will come from supplementary funds and other investors. While this will limit the transmission of financial risks to IFAD, IFAD nevertheless may be exposed to reputational risk if SIF is not successful.
206. A portion of TAF could be used to address youth employment opportunities and capacity-building to incubate young people's enterprises that could eventually become eligible for SIF financing. The TAF is envisaged as a separate multi-donor

<sup>130</sup> EB 2017/120/R.26 Update on the design of the SIF at IFAD.

<sup>131</sup> IFAD. 2017. Strategy for Establishment of the Smallholder and SME Investment Finance (SIF) Fund.

<sup>132</sup> SIF's investment committee will include two to three independent members with investment experience in private-sector agriculture, which will somewhat offset the lack of experience of IFAD Management and staff in making risk-based decisions to invest in private sector entities in the agriculture sector.

fund to provide technical assistance at all stages, including the pre-investment phase. TAF would partner with UN agencies, consultancy firms, and specialized technical agencies to provide support for SIF operations and private-sector development under sovereign lending.<sup>133</sup>

207. **The SIF proposal addresses a real gap in available financing but also leaves open questions.** It identifies as its target not the missing middle (which is now the target at upper levels of many MDBs, charities and impact investors), but the missing low middle. However, all risks and issues are not fully captured in the proposal. First, there is a question on the level of overhead costs and technical support of the initiative, likely to be high, particularly for the direct debt-financing. The emphasis on direct lending, rather than lending through intermediaries, both significantly raises costs and makes the minimum size of enterprise which can benefit higher. The second question relates to the cost recovery potential of the initiative: this evaluation's interviews with impact investors have documented serious problems with non-performing loans and loan losses. The third question relates to the expertise that IFAD country staff have in dealing with private entrepreneurs (they typically work with public-sector partners).
208. The SIF proposal states that there will be start-up costs in the first two years but SIF is expected to break even by year three. IFAD Management did not release detailed financial data on the grounds that this is sensitive and confidential and may undermine the effort if disclosed too early. This implies that it is not possible to verify the soundness of financial analysis on which decisions were taken to establish SIF.
209. **Instruments to fund microfinance intermediaries** may offer an opportunity for IFAD to support private-sector institutions in small-scale agribusinesses.<sup>134</sup> An evaluation of AfDB's microfinance operations<sup>135</sup> found that private-sector micro credit operations performed better and were more sustainable than micro credit provided through governments or public-sector institutions. The evaluation recommended that AfDB should consider stopping indirect microcredit financing to retailers through governments and state-owned apexes and avoid including micro finance components in larger non-financial sector projects. The best performing micro finance projects involved investing in retail institutions, including supporting the creation of new institutions, with sufficient internal risk management capacity and sound lending methodologies.

## F. Grants

210. IFAD's Policy for Grant Financing covers grants funded from core resources but excludes DSF grants and grants funded from supplementary funds and complementary contributions. Grant financing is designed to: (i) promote innovative, pro-poor approaches and technologies with the potential to be scaled up; (ii) strengthen institutional and policy capacities; (iii) enhance advocacy and policy engagement; and (iv) generate and share knowledge. In preparing the grant policy of 2015, Management drew on the 2014 CLE on the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing.<sup>136</sup>

<sup>133</sup> The Smallholder Agriculture Finance and Investment Network (SAFIN) is to complement SIF and TAF. IFAD plans to establish SAFIN in 2018, with a secretariat in Rome, to bring together smallholder representatives and agrifood SMEs with international and country-based public and private financial institutions, governments and larger businesses to promote knowledge exchange and incubate scaling-up pathways. SAFIN was announced at the international conference on *Investing in inclusive rural transformation: Innovative approaches to financing* held by IFAD and the Government of Italy in Rome in January 2017.

<sup>134</sup> IFAD does not provide credit lines for subsidized lending. The 2009 Rural Finance Policy provides guidance for rural finance projects. One of its six guiding principles is that IFAD will work with private-sector partners to support market-based approaches that strengthen rural financial markets and avoid market distortions thereby leveraging IFAD's resources. The policy recognizes the success of microfinance and states that IFAD will focus in this area.

<sup>135</sup> AfDB. 2014. *Fostering Inclusive Finance in Africa: An Evaluation of the Bank's Microfinance Policy, Strategy and Operations, 2000–2012*.

<sup>136</sup> While the 2014 Grant CLE concluded that grants have the potential to be an important instrument, it rated the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the policy as moderately unsatisfactory.

211. **By policy the funding for grants is set at 6.5 per cent of the PoLG,**<sup>137</sup> a figure that Management believes to be an appropriate balance between the demand for grants, IFAD's capacity to manage grants and IFAD's financial capacity. According to the 2014 Grant CLE, in MDBs grants were typically between 1 and 1.5 per cent of the annual programme of loans and grants, although comparisons should be viewed with caution due to large differences in the lending portfolio size and different categorization of non-reimbursable financing in different organizations. Inter alia, the CLE found that grants allowed IFAD to better collaborate with a wider range of organizations, for example non-governmental organizations, notably farmers' federations, civil society organizations, indigenous people's organizations, and of course institutions involved in international agricultural research. However, IFAD had missed opportunities to leverage the grant programme in a strategic manner, notably due to weak linkages with corporate and country-level priorities.
212. Although the 2015 revision of the grant policy reflected many of the findings and recommendations in the CLE on grants, it did not address two areas:
- **Allocation for resources for country-specific grants.** These continue to be managed within the PBAS while the grant CLE recommended that country-specific grants should be allocated through a competitive process within each region rather than through the PBAS.
  - **Share of country grants relative to regional grants.** Of the 6.5 per cent of the PoLG used to finance grants, 5 per cent finances global and regional grants and 1.5 per cent finances country-specific grants. Thus only 23 per cent of the total grants can be allocated to country-specific needs. The Grant CLE recommended rebalancing the allocation in favour of country grants. The Decentralisation CLE found that limited resources were allocated at the country level in areas such as policy dialogue, knowledge management and capacity-building, where grant funding could be used. In the e-survey, 81 per cent of non-IFAD respondents firmly agreed that IFAD should allocate more of its regular grant funds to support operations at the country level rather than at the regional and global (IFAD respondents broadly agreed but only 41 per cent firmly agreed).

## G. Reimbursable Technical Assistance

219. IFAD introduced the Reimbursable Technical Assistance (RTA) product in 2012 as an instrument to provide analytical support to MICs, including those no longer borrowing from IFAD. The RTA is provided "on demand" and is incremental to country programmes. IFAD charges a mark-up of 15 per cent of the RTA's direct costs (this is defined as 'indirect costs').
220. Only two RTAs have been approved.<sup>138</sup> IFAD has not specialised in providing technical assistance and many countries can receive similar services for free under regular grants and the question is whether there is enough demand for this product. Other international organizations, especially the World Bank, have large numbers of staff devoted to analytical tasks. The World Bank, recognised as the leader in the international community in the production of knowledge products, offers Reimbursable Advisory Services to deliver specific assistance to eligible clients requiring services that cannot be fully funded from the World Bank's country programme. Since 2007, the World Bank has provided more than 800 reimbursable advisory services in more than 70 countries for knowledge and advisory services in a range of sectors and covering a broad spectrum of issues. The associated costs are determined by using uniform pricing norms based on the estimated costs of

<sup>137</sup> IFAD. 2015. Policy for Grant Financing.

<sup>138</sup> The 2015 RTA for the Development of Mauritius Seed Sector. An agreement for RTA has also been signed with Saudi Arabia in early 2018.

delivering the specific programme.<sup>139</sup> In FY16 Reimbursable Advisory Services generated fee revenues of US\$51 million.

221. AsDB provides TA to borrowing member countries for advisory or general institution building on a grant basis if: (i) there are likely to be continuing contacts with the entity; (ii) no other source of financing is likely to be available; (iii) the entity is relatively new and/or financially weak; and/or (iv) the activities are of high national importance and priority for development purposes. AsDB can also provide TA on a reimbursable basis to graduated developing member countries, should they so desire, for reviews of sector plans and policies, institution building or staff training. There has been little, if any, demand for this product among graduated countries.<sup>140</sup> An evaluation of AsDB's MIC strategy<sup>141</sup> concluded that, among other things, AsDB should increase the knowledge intensity of operations in MICs and with graduated countries by strengthening knowledge partnerships and expanding fee-based services, to cover a wide spectrum of development issues, noting that the World Bank Group (WBG) provides such services to UMICs and high-income countries. The evaluation also stated that to mainstream such services, AsDB would need to have credible in-house staff with expertise in the areas where such knowledge services would be provided.

#### Key points

- Borrowing countries deem that IFAD's financial products are broadly effective in financing their demand for rural poverty reduction and poverty interventions. However, this CLE makes several important qualifications. First, while IFAD's terms of lending are on par or competitive with those of other MDBs, for both ordinary and concessional loans, other MDBs offer far broader options, notably in terms of maturity, grace period and currency choice, depending on country and project needs. In particular, other MDBs have introduced accelerated repayment loan clauses.
- Second, for over two decades, other MDBs have offered options to select the currency for ordinary loans, although SDRs are still used for concessional lending. It was only recently that IFAD introduced single currency lending. Some IFAD clients have shown appetite for borrowing in their local currency.
- Third, MDBs offer a wider range of financial products than IFAD, both sovereign and non-sovereign. Considering the focus and strategic priorities of IFAD: (i) there is no specific product to facilitate scaling up or programmatic approaches; (ii) there is interest from borrowing countries for specific products to support the implementation of an integrated strategy for managing the risk of natural disasters and drought; (iii) there is interest for "parametric insurance" type of products to manage risks of natural disasters; and (iv) based on past evaluations, there is justification for (re)introducing instruments to pre-finance project implementation preparedness. The e-survey also highlighted trade finance and hedging for commodity price risk as areas of potential interest. However, given complication and risks, considerably more analysis of the pros and cons are required before working on these.
- IFAD cannot provide loans directly to non-sovereign entities. This limits its engagement with private sector operators. Through external funding, IFAD is piloting initiatives to support medium and small agribusinesses and rural finance institutions through equity and debt. However, key challenges such as overhead costs and risks stemming from non-performing loans are not adequately reflected in the existing proposal. The CLE survey of impact investors unveiled serious problems with non-performing loans.
- IFAD provides grants which are capped at 6.5 per cent of the PoLG. About three quarters of grants are regional and global while a quarter are country-specific. The CLE on the Grants noted that this constrained engaging in non-lending activities at the country level. It recommended rebalancing the two windows in favour of country grants, but this was not followed through.
- IFAD also has RTA. So far, its demand has been very limited and the question is to what extent, given its business model and limited involvement in traditional technical assistance, this product is an area of comparative advantage for IFAD.

<sup>139</sup> The fees charged by the Bank covered only the costs of the staff and resources provided and did not include a profit element.

<sup>140</sup> Brunei Darussalam joined AsDB on 27 April 2006 and accepted a \$600,000 reimbursable TA project in 2018 for capital market development. Since then Brunei Darussalam has not accepted any other support from AsDB.

<sup>141</sup> AsDB. 2016. The Asian Development Bank's Engagement with Middle-Income Countries.

## V. Financial governance, financial oversight and risk management

213. This chapter reviews key topics related to IFAD's financial governance, the internal financial oversight and risk management and the adequacy of the policies, procedures and organizational structure and treasury functions (investment profits within cash and risk constraints). It also reviews the matter of financial leverage, including comparisons with other DFIs. These topics mainly relate to the questions on efficiency as defined in Chapter II. Some of the topics reviewed in this chapter also have implications for IFAD's financial sustainability, the subject of the next Chapter.

### A. Role of the Replenishment Consultation

214. The replenishment discussion is critical to defining IFAD's strategy and determines the overall level of core funding and much of the willingness to provide supplementary funds. The representation and the focus and organization of the Replenishment Process are thus of major significance and a number of improvements have been made over the years, notably the introduction of an external chair in the 9<sup>th</sup> Replenishment, freeing the President to clearly represent Management. Informal sessions have also been introduced, that promote full discussions on selected topics.
215. The 2013 CLE of the replenishment fed into the decisions of the 10<sup>th</sup> Replenishment, but its follow-up is only really evident for the 11<sup>th</sup> Replenishment, following **an ad-hoc working group of the EB on governance, which issued its report<sup>142</sup> in time for the finalisation of arrangements for the 11<sup>th</sup> Replenishment Consultation**. The Recommendations were endorsed by the EB in December 2016 for decision by the IFAD Governing Council.<sup>143</sup> Major points discussed included: (a) the List System in IFAD and how this relates to representation in the EB and the replenishment; (b) the Replenishment Cycle (three years as at present or four years); (c) the format and number of replenishment meetings and to some extent the efficiency and clarity of the relative roles of the EB and the replenishment; and (d) the make-up of country delegations to the replenishment, which was discussed in the corporate evaluation of replenishment, but not extensively in the working group or the EB.
216. **The ad-hoc working group did not recommend any modification that would require a change in IFAD's articles of agreement.** The working group concluded that there should be no change in the list system but that definitions would be tightened. It was agreed that: (a) List A be restricted to Member States that are contributors to IFAD resources, declare themselves ineligible for IFAD financing and services, and not eligible for official development assistance (ODA) according to OECD definitions; (b) List B be restricted to Member States that are members of OPEC and are contributors to IFAD resources. Some members may also be eligible for IFAD financing and services; and (c) List C only include Member States that are "developing countries" and have not declared themselves ineligible for IFAD financing and services. Note that a number of list C members also contribute to IFAD resources (Chapter III).
217. In light of the above proposals, List A and List B offered two seats each in the 11<sup>th</sup> Replenishment consultation to be distributed one seat each to the three regional sub-lists in Group C, plus one floating seat.<sup>144</sup> This increased the number of seats available to List C to 22 (seven seats per Group, plus one floating seat).<sup>145</sup> The

<sup>142</sup> Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Governance Document: EB 2016/119/R.39/Rev.2 15 December 2016

<sup>143</sup> Minutes of the EB December 2016

<sup>144</sup> The previous position was that all List A and All List B members were entitled to send a delegation to the Replenishment meetings, which in practice did not happen

<sup>145</sup> EB 2016/119/R.52 14 December 2016 Establishment of the Consultation on the Eleventh Replenishment of IFAD's Resources.

current challenge for list C is to ensure a balance of representation from the poorest borrowing countries and the growing number of donor countries in list C.

218. **Format and structure of replenishment sessions.** Some recommendations of the working group were adopted for IFAD11, such as having an informal and open consultation on the agenda prior to the replenishment. It was also proposed to reduce the number of meeting sessions and the length and number of papers and make more use of the digital platforms. This did not happen for IFAD11, to some extent due to the pressure of members for papers. This evaluation noted the **duplicative content of papers presented** and questions whether there could not be one paper per session, which integrates the contents. This CLE also notes that there is some duplication of discussion between the EB and the replenishment, which could be avoided during the replenishment year.
219. **Establishing the target level for replenishments.** The starting point for IFAD in establishing the target funding level for replenishments has been setting several PoLG scenarios. In order to arrive at this, within regional divisions, country programme managers make an estimate of the demand and absorption capacity of countries (lower, middle and upper scenarios), based on historical experience and some consultation with the authorities in borrowing countries. This is then assessed by Management, at the regional divisional level and Programme Management Departmental level, and corporate level, which also includes assessing IFAD's delivery capacity, political factors and experience from other IFIs and the UN system. The eventual target is then a product of iterative discussion with Member Countries, in informal dialogue and in the replenishment meetings and is, to some extent, a compromise between the evident needs of borrowing countries and the assessed realities of the international funding environment. Although, not strictly based on "scientific methods", this approach to target setting is not fundamentally different from that in other IFIs, as the evaluation interviews suggest.

## **B. Length of the Replenishment Cycle**

220. **The ad-hoc working group of the EB recognized that a longer replenishment cycle could foster greater efficiency** (including a more balanced midterm review) and generate some cost savings. The working group recommended that the three-year replenishment cycle be maintained and discussions on the issue continued with other IFIs to ensure alignment and strengthen partnership opportunities. The factors which seem to have weighed most in reaching this conclusion were that: (i) most but not all other institutions had a three-year rather than four-year cycle; (ii) a fear expressed in other fora than IFAD, that an extension of the cycle could reduce the funding available per year as donors would not increase their pledges in a commensurate manner; and (iii) maintaining the timing vis-à-vis that of IDA and the ADF in particular. The extension of the Asian Development Fund cycle to four years did not have a negative funding effect.
221. What does not seem to have been considered in any depth, and is evident in the IFAD11 consultation, is the mismatch between the replenishment cycle and the term of the President. This has resulted in the new President taking up his post part way through the 11<sup>th</sup> Replenishment Consultation. The President took office when the consultation process had already started. This could be resolved for the future, either by adjusting the term of the replenishment cycle to four years with the President elected one year before the Replenishment Consultation starts, or extending the term of the President to, for example, a single six-year term, covering two replenishments with no re-election. Extending the Replenishment Cycle to four years would have the incidental benefit of making it easier for IFAD to increase loan size in smaller countries.

## C. Financial oversight and management

### C.1 Governing bodies

222. **The existing level of financial oversight can be considered adequate for the current level of operations and risks.** In terms of member oversight, the Governing Council, the Executive Board, and the Audit Committee share responsibilities. Having a single EB committee for financial matters is in line with practices of IFIs and bilateral financial institutions.<sup>146</sup> Audit Committee Members receive regular reports on financial ratios, performance and risk parameters. The documentation provided to the Committee and the Board is detailed and contains sufficient information for oversight and decision-making under the present configuration and risk structure. **However, the documentation of a financial nature submitted to the Executive Board is fragmented** into a number of separate documents. As sometimes observed by Board members, consolidation of the documentation would not only simplify accessibility but also help present information in a more consistent manner (particularly as far as different documents are prepared by different divisions).
223. **One area of limitation has been the practice of making all Audit Committee documentation confidential** and not open to the public or easily available beyond delegations (it is understood that disciplinary and investigation reports cannot be made public). The Action Plan on Increasing Transparency for Greater Accountability, approved by the Executive Board in December 2017 foresees public disclosure of additional information on “important financial trends” generated by the Accounting and Controller's Division.
224. The make-up of national delegations reflects the sector specialisation of IFAD and its location in Rome. The presence of permanent Representations for the Rome Based Food and Agriculture Agencies in Rome, has advantages for IFAD which does not have a standing Board and could not justify one, given its size. However, **during interviews with Board members, it was repeatedly mentioned that many country representatives have limited financial expertise** (which is not the case with the IFIs’ permanent Boards, as many of their executive directors are from ministries of finance and/or from central banks) and that, specifically, the Audit Committee does not have an independent expert to provide advice. These items also emerged during discussions with IFAD staff. When responding to the e-survey (see Table 15), country representatives were overall satisfied with financial governance arrangements and information submitted. There were some complaints with lack of technical competence of EB members and hints at some information overload.
225. **Moving forward, as IFAD’s financial architecture becomes increasingly complex** and more reliant on debt (and thus exposed to risks), **the Audit Committee and the Board will face further requirements.** However, this is not novel and other financial institutions have already followed a similar pathway. In the same way as IFAD’s management has been obtaining advice from peer IFIs, so can Board and Audit Committee members profit from a more formalised exchange of views with Board members of other IFIs that have a more sophisticated financial set-up, such as the World Bank Group and regional development banks. This would provide Audit Committee members with better familiarity with standards and benchmarks. An additional option could be to specify minimum qualifications for individuals for membership on the Audit Committee.

<sup>146</sup> There are exceptions of course such as EBRD (in addition to an Audit Committee it also has a Financial and Operational Policies Committee), which has a more complex balance sheet including leverage and the extensive use of derivatives for asset and liability management.

Table 15  
Adequacy of IFAD governance – Members' views

	All members			Non-borrowing – Donor Countries			Upper-Middle-Income Countries			Lower & Lower-Middle-Income Countries		
	% of respondents		No opinion	% of respondents		No opinion	% of respondents		No opinion	% of respondents		No opinion
	Agree (4-6)	Firmly agree (5-6)		Agree (4-6)	Firmly agree (5-6)		Agree (4-6)	Firmly agree (5-6)		Agree (4-6)	Firmly agree (5-6)	
The Executive Board (EB) and Audit Committee provide adequate oversight of IFAD's:												
• financing strategy and loan policy	73%	58%	25%	85%	65%	13%	61%	47%	38%	74%	72%	23%
• resourcing and loan management	71%	56%	26%	85%	65%	13%	61%	44%	36%	72%	70%	25%
Because of its diverse makeup, the EB has limited knowledge and expertise of strategic financial issues related to major changes in IFAD's financial architecture												
	33%	19%	50%	60%	25%	29%	39%	23%	59%	28%	25%	51%
The EB lacks independent external expert advice to assist it in making financing and loan policy decisions for IFAD												
	32%	21%	46%	48%	23%	33%	28%	17%	55%	33%	30%	47%
IFAD's internal and external audit arrangements are satisfactory												
	72%	57%	25%	88%	67%	10%	59%	44%	36%	74%	70%	24%
IFAD's management provides information of a financial nature:												
• sufficient for the EB to make decisions	62%	46%	36%	81%	46%	17%	48%	33%	48%	63%	60%	36%
• in excessive amounts, which overloads the EB and constrains decision-making.	32%	21%	46%	44%	15%	35%	39%	16%	53%	29%	24%	47%
• which is as transparent as in other DFIs	69%	55%	26%	75%	56%	19%	67%	55%	25%	69%	66%	26%

Source: CLE E-survey (2017)

Total number of respondents in each category: Non-Borrowing High and Upper Income countries 49; Upper-Middle-Income Borrowing Countries (UMICs) 84; Lower and Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LICs/LMICs) 282; All Members 415. Note that this table only reports answers in the 'agreement zone' (ratings of 4-6) and 'no opinion'. Answers in the 'disagreement zone' are the complement to 100%.

## C.2 Internal systems

226. At the level of management, the *Financial Operations Department* (established in 2012), is headed by an Associate Vice President who is part of IFAD's senior management and de facto the institution's Chief Financial Officer and Chief Risk Officer. Reporting to the AVP are three divisions: (a) the Financial Management Services, (b) Treasury Services and (c) Accounting and Controller's.
227. *Front office/Back office*. Treasury is responsible for both front-office and back-office functions. The cash-management and back office teams (who also deal with payments, disbursements, reconciliation and country office accounts) report to the Treasurer. This is different from some other DFIs, where there is a clear separation of responsibility between the front office and the settlement functions of the back office. Generally, in DFIs, the Treasurer, heads the front office and is responsible for the functions of funding, investments, asset and liability management (ALM) and the middle office which provides deal-capturing and a certain level of reporting. Settlements and the "moving of cash" are handled by the back office which is part of the controllers' division.
228. *Risk Management Division*. Absent in the Financial Operations Department is a fourth separate unit (with the same ranking) with responsibility for Risk

Management. Whilst in some DFIs Risk Management is part of the responsibilities of the CFO, e.g. at the World Bank or the AsDB, in others, notably the IFC or EBRD, risk is the responsibility of a separate unit with the same seniority as the CFO. At present, having an independent Risk Management function at the same level as the CFO may not be considered necessary for IFAD given the current low level of financial risk-taking and limited complexity of the organization. Except for its sovereign loan portfolio, which is not subject to independent credit reviews, it is only the Treasury that takes credit risk. However, **should IFAD grow its balance sheet through leverage and an expansion of its product and client base, this configuration may need to be revisited.**

229. **Staff are knowledgeable and skilled for current functions.** However, if and when the environment becomes more sophisticated (e.g. utilising derivatives more pro-actively, borrowing in the capital markets), there may be need for retraining or replacement. Box 3 summarises key areas for Treasury operations (i.e. funding, asset and liability management and investments) and the associated knowledge and experience requirements for staff.

Box 3

**Typical staffing requirements in Treasury operations and current IFAD situation**

Unit and typical requirement	Current at IFAD (2017)
<i>Front office.</i> This requires staff with a background in the areas of funding, investments and/or asset and liability management.	IFAD's Treasury team has more experience with investments and less with funding. There is good knowledge in the front office on modern ALM, albeit concentrated in a few staff members ('key person risk').
<i>Middle office.</i> Staff are required for deal capture and preparation of reports for the front office.	The reports produced are detailed and comprehensive, reflecting good knowledge.
<i>Back office.</i> Staff are required for the settlement of transactions; specialised knowledge (or training) is required for more complex transactions (sometimes forgotten, even in large investment banks).	Sufficient for current operations but will require training when it comes to the settlement of derivatives with collateral management and the management of a portfolio of liabilities.
<i>Risk management.</i> An independent risk manager is the typical standard for oversight. Knowledge in both market risk and credit risk assessment is necessary, as well as derivatives product knowledge.	IFAD has one individual responsible for risk management (rather thin staffing).
<i>Controller.</i> Staff need to have adequate knowledge to provide the more complex reporting.	Sufficient for current operations but, as IFAD adds leverage and uses more derivatives, product-specific further training may be required.
<i>Legal.</i> Lawyers with special knowledge in the field of bonds and derivatives may be needed.	Ad hoc specialist may be required in the future. Other IFIs often outsource these services but have experienced capital market lawyers to supervise the processes.
<i>Accounting.</i> Expertise in accounting standards.	The accounting team is knowledgeable and IFAD's accounts follow standard accounting rules and practices. As IFAD adds liabilities and derivatives, the treatment of such instruments needs to be decided and agreed with the external auditors.

Source: CLE Elaboration (2017)

**Risk reporting and review and key committees**

230. **IFAD does not have an operating Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO).** Financial institutions, including DFIs, have ALCOs responsible for matters such as policies (financial, liquidity and risk) and their implementation, funding, asset and liability management (ALM), hedging and other Treasury activities. ALCOs are generally chaired by the CFO. At IFAD, Management has organised the review of risk through regular reporting and through the top management level Investment and Finance Advisory Committee (FISCO). FISCO, chaired by the President, has a wide management level membership and draws on the experience and resources of the whole organization. Its role is to advise the President in determining the overall investment strategy and review, monitor and make recommendations to the President on strategic financial matters. In other DFIs, generally, the President delegates the determination of the investment strategy to the CFO and Treasurer and installs an ALCO as a part of the management checks and balances committee.

231. IFAD had a Finance Asset, Liability Management Advisory Committee (FALCO) but FALCO meetings were suspended during the departmental leadership transition period. At the 50<sup>th</sup> FISCO meeting in December 2016, it was decided that FALCO would cease its operations. With the dissolution of FALCO, its functions were taken over by a revised FOD management group. This is different from other DFIs where ALCO membership is generally wider, which lends more weight to the committee.<sup>147</sup> In terms of mandate, ALCOs key tasks are to review an institution's asset and liability management and its compliance, but increasingly, ALCOs are forward looking, focusing on the effects of future plans and strategy and their implications.
232. **Regular reporting.** Reports such as financial statements, Status of Replenishment, Status of Arrears of Loan Portfolio are prepared by the Accounting and Controller's Division.<sup>148</sup> The Treasury Services Division reports risk measurement metrics and analyses to the Executive Board and Audit Committee on a quarterly basis. Comprehensive monthly risk reports are also produced by the unit and shared internally with the Treasurer and the CFO. The key risk oversight lies in the monthly reports by the Treasury Services Division. The Portfolio Planning team in Treasury is responsible for these reports based on information provided by IFAD's Custodian (Northern Trust). These reports cover risks and portfolio performance. **The type of information that FISCO receives is detailed** (more detailed than those provided to similar committees by other DFI treasuries, as the papers include all bonds purchased and sold) **although some crucial market risk parameters do not seem to be consistently reported.** Duration and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR)<sup>149</sup> and performance attribution (i.e. splitting up of the various factors contributing to the profit and loss movements of the portfolio) are not consistently reported. It would also be more consistent to report performance and outperformance vs. benchmarks on a regular basis.<sup>150, 151</sup>

### C.3 Information Technology support systems

233. **IFAD has an adequate IT system for the current operating environment.** The main finance systems in use are: (i) *PeopleSoft*, an ERP legacy system used for payments, disbursements, investments, and accounting reconciliations. The IFAD Treasury Executive Manual prescribes daily account balance reconciliation against IFAD payment instructions using the PeopleSoft Cash Management Manual (on a monthly basis, Accounting and Controller's Division closes the books for reconciliation); (ii) *TRE Database*, an in-house developed system which provides limited, manual solutions to Treasury liquidity management and reconciliation; (iii) SWIFT, a critical international inter-bank system for payments and reconciliation. Because of its critical nature to IFAD and intrusion risk, SWIFT has been physically

<sup>147</sup> Reducing ALCO to FOD management may not be viewed as best practice. The Bank of England published a recommendation and stated, "The membership of good senior ALM committees includes all the business line heads, together with the chief finance officer, group treasurer, chief risk officer, head of market risk and head of ALM, and are often also attended by the head of internal audit and the chief economist." Bank of England, Supervisory Statement LSS1/13 Asset and liability management: suggestions for greater effectiveness April 2013.

<sup>148</sup> Since 2011, IFAD includes in its financial statements a management assertion as to the effectiveness of IFAD's framework of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). An attestation by the external auditors (Deloitte) regarding the reliability of the Management assertion has also been included since 2012, in line with international good practices. The ICFR provides a comprehensive account of IFAD's processes, underpinning the preparation of financial statements and the implementation of internal controls over transactions impacting financial statements. The ICFR is subject to internal and external auditing testing on a yearly basis.

<sup>149</sup> CVaR is defined as the "potential average probable loss of a portfolio under extreme conditions. CVaR Budget level is: *Maximum 6.0 per cent of total portfolio market value for portfolio with a 95 per cent confidence level over a one-year time horizon.* IFAD uses a 95 per cent confidence level and a one-year time horizon. This quantifies the distribution of losses in the 5 per cent left tail and is an indicator of so-called "tail risk". IFAD 2016 Investment Policy Statement.

<sup>150</sup> E.g. in FISCO 44 vs FISCO 51, 52 or 53.

<sup>151</sup> Furthermore, given that the portfolio funded by borrowings is going to be managed on a floating rate basis, it is noteworthy that other managers like the World Bank's Trust Funds, also report spread duration. The duration of a floating rate note is short term even if the maturity is long term. The spread of a long term floating rate note remains the same, however, until maturity. Spread duration is therefore linked to the maturity of the note. It is an important risk indicator as the price of the floater falls if the spread widens. The longer the spread duration, the higher the sensitivity of the floater's price to an increase in spread.

cut off from IFAD's internal local network, including PeopleSoft, and payments are now processed by manual upload (USB drives) in a badge-access room within Treasury;<sup>152</sup> (iv) *Oracle FLEXCUBE*, introduced to IFAD in 2013, primarily used for loan and grant disbursements. Add-on integrations can be made dependent on IFAD's operational needs. For instance, funding front-office reporting tools can be integrated should IFAD issue bonds on the capital markets. Treasury could also opt for other integrated platforms in the future.

234. The Treasury Cash Management team is experiencing moderate growth in total volume of transactions, alternative borrowing mechanisms (sovereign borrowing framework and potential market participation), and an increase in internally managed funds and their complexity.
235. Holistically, IFAD's IT security architecture is robust given its operating risk exposure. As part of the UN IT infrastructure, IFAD benefits from three layers of firewalls and daily systems backup on to UN data sites. Two of these sites are located in Continental Europe, and one in North America. Whilst IFAD possesses a multi-tiered systems backup mechanism, it lacks a physical disaster recovery site for its Treasury. This is a long-established best practice amongst financial institutions (including DFIs). However, this is not an issue of immediate concern because traders have access to Bloomberg anywhere and the custodian portal through which trades may be booked and executed remotely. Going forward, if IFAD leverages its balance sheet and issues bonds, commercial paper and derivatives more actively to manage financial risks, it may consider purchasing systems to deal with the complexities of new instruments and to provide correct deal capture and risk reporting.

#### **D. Adequacy of the policies, procedures and organizational structure for IFAD's financial architecture**

236. Changes are taking place particularly in the following areas:
- Treasury Investments: Treasury is in the process of restructuring its investment activities and managing investments in a more sophisticated – and risk-conscious – manner.
  - Leverage: IFAD has started taking sovereign loans in the form of floating rate debt, from other DFIs (from KfW and AFD). As detailed in IFAD's Financial Strategy for IFAD11 and beyond, Management considers that borrowing from these sources is a first step and hopes to eventually be able to borrow from the capital markets and better leverage IFAD's balance sheet.<sup>153</sup>
  - Asset and Liability Management (ALM): IFAD has recently started using derivatives for hedging purposes, i.e. to manage financial exposures, related inter alia to exchange rate fluctuations.<sup>154</sup>
237. For all three of these activities, IFAD requires policies and guidelines. The policies and guidelines for the investment activities are relatively detailed and appropriate but less so in the areas of funding and asset and liability management (ALM).<sup>155</sup>

<sup>152</sup> Whilst this de-automation may introduce the risk of human error, and reduce systems integration and efficiency, such retroactive method is a constructive fast-response reaction in dealing with the emerging security/hacking threat.

<sup>153</sup> See various papers regarding the Sovereign Borrowing Framework, including the Second Review of IFAD's Sovereign Borrowing Framework for Borrowing from Sovereign States and State-Supported Institutions of 8/17.

<sup>154</sup> Cf IFAD11/2/R.5 Financial Strategy for IFAD11 and beyond; Executive Board Informal Seminar 5-4-17, Update on IFAD's Strategy for Borrowing.

<sup>155</sup> Both multilateral and bilateral DFIs have well developed policies, strategies and guidelines, setting parameters and managing the processes of borrowing and ALM as well as of measuring and managing risks. Regarding IFAD's funding and ALM, one option would be to internalize existing best practices common across DFIs.

### **D.1 Treasury investments guidelines, portfolio structuring and risks and investment policies**

238. The key document is IFAD's Investment Policy Statement as approved by the Executive Board. This document empowers the President to invest IFAD's liquidity and sets the general parameters and processes. While giving the President wide-ranging powers in the execution of the mandate of the Investment Policy Statement, the document is notably vague when it comes to the delegation of specific functions and roles in the investment process.
239. **The role and responsibilities of risk management are defined in too broad terms** in IFAD's Investment Policy Statement. The statement that "*The President will ensure that the adequacy of risk-budgeting measures and their tolerance levels are constantly monitored and reviewed on a quarterly basis by the relevant organizational unit*" is not specific enough. Other DFIs operate with more clearly defined checks and balances and the delegation of responsibility to specific functions (e.g., to the treasurer for the selection of external asset managers).
240. **IFAD's policies regarding the investment of Treasury assets are defined in less detail than in other DFIs.** Particularly with regards to permitted risks, both market risk and credit risk, the documents leave a fair degree of leeway. However, IFAD's Treasury portfolios are professionally structured and managed. Risk has been reduced in the last two years.
241. **In spite of the reduction, IFAD's investment risk profile is higher than in other IFIs.** Market risk is set for the overall Treasury portfolio and is defined in relation to Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR). Market risk taken was reported to be at CVaR of 2.71 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level over a one-year horizon.<sup>156</sup> This refers to the average investment (nominal) loss in the 5 per cent of worst-case scenarios of the overall portfolio over a one-year horizon, i.e. in absolute terms about US\$28 million. The duration of investment was reduced from 3.49 years to 2.83 years.<sup>157</sup> While a duration of 2.83 years is more conservative than before, it is also on the high side compared to other IFIs. Thus, the portfolio may be exposed to mark-to-market losses if medium and long-term interest rates rise. As Treasury in the future is likely to have a greater proportion of its assets financed by liabilities rather than equity, duration may have to be further reduced, limiting potential revenues between the investment returns and funding costs.
242. In terms of credit risk, the portfolio was invested in investment grade exposure. Whilst generally the portfolio is highly rated, about 10 per cent was invested in BBB-rated assets. This is a higher proportion than that of its peers and several DFIs would not allow investments below single A.<sup>158</sup> Also, in terms of **asset class split**, IFAD's portfolio has a higher amount of both corporate and emerging market exposures than its peers.
243. **Treasury investment portfolio performance is good but with higher volatility than for comparator DFIs.** IFAD's Treasury Net investment income of US\$43.1 million on a portfolio of US\$1.3 billion (by end 2016) is a very good result. In yield terms, the net return amounted to 2.94 per cent, outperforming the benchmark of 2.39 per cent. The performance of IFAD's investment portfolio compares well with that of other institutions. Also, in a comparison of investment returns for the years 2012-2016, IFAD's performance was higher than that of other peer institutions (Figure 10) but also showed a higher degree of profit and loss (P/L) volatility, as measured by the so-called Sharpe ratio (a higher Sharpe Ratio indicates a more favourable risk-return relationship).<sup>159</sup>

<sup>156</sup> IFAD 2016. Report on IFAD's Investment Portfolio for 2016.

<sup>157</sup> IFAD's Investment Policy Statement, 2016.

<sup>158</sup> Sources: DFI's 2016 Annual Financial Reports.

<sup>159</sup> The Sharpe ratio, also known as the reward-to-volatility ratio, is a measurement of the risk-adjusted rate of return of a portfolio. It is calculated by deriving the excess portfolio return over a risk-free asset and adjusting for the level of volatility measured by the standard deviation of returns. The higher the Sharpe ratio, the greater the compensation per

Figure 10  
Returns and Sharpe Ratio (2012-16)




Source: CLE calculation (2017) from: IFAD: Annual Financial Report; IADB: Annual Financial Report; AsDB: Annual Financial Report; IFFIm: IFFIm's World Bank Trust Fund trustee reports.

**D.2 Liquidity policy and volume of Treasury assets**

244. **IFAD's liquidity policy is conservative and prudent.** The current policy prescribes that IFAD keep 60 per cent of the next three year's gross disbursement plus a buffer for potential shocks as liquidity.<sup>160</sup> Figure 11 compares IFAD's liquidity in terms of per cent of total assets with that of other DFIs. Other DFIs have to hold higher levels of liquidity because of their obligation to serve outstanding liabilities. Any delay in the payment of interest or capital would have negative consequences for a DFI and could even lead to the default of the institution. Looking at the comparative table, IFAD's liquidity position is satisfactory given the limited leverage. However, the policy may require adjustment as IFAD continues borrowing to take all cash-flows into account, not just disbursements. Liquidity policies are a key input for the rating agencies and one can observe a quite standardized approach towards liquidity across the DFIs.

Figure 11  
Liquidity ratio (liquid assets / total assets)



Source: CLE Elaboration from data extracted from institutional website

**D.3 Longer term challenges regarding liquidity**

245. Liquidity can be funded out of equity or debt. If IFAD increases reliance on borrowing, in the long term a higher portion of the institution's liquidity position may be funded using debt. Such borrowings will have to be longer term in order to satisfy the institution's liquidity requirements. Longer-term borrowings generally

unit of volatility or total risk. In the graph, the 3-Month US Treasury Bill return was used as the risk-free rate. The relatively short duration of the sampled portfolios makes this the most appropriate risk-free benchmark. For the period, the average Sharpe ratio of the sampled portfolios stood at 1.07. IFAD's Sharpe ratio of 0.69 fell below the average.  
<sup>160</sup> As stated in IFAD's 2016 Investment Portfolio Report: *IFAD's latest financial model assumptions – incorporating 2016 resources available for commitment under the sustainable cash flow approach – calculate a minimum liquidity requirement of US\$582.5 million (60 per cent of gross annual outflows), which is comfortably cleared by IFAD's investment portfolio balance of US\$1,328.3 million.*

carry a higher margin over Libor. Treasury may thus be faced with the challenge of having to generate a positive spread ("positive carry") in an environment where its funding costs are at a spread above Libor. This is likely to be challenging if Treasury remains committed to maintaining a conservative investment profile. As a comparison, the Dutch FMO's treasury portfolio which is funded at FMO's average borrowing costs of US\$ Libor plus 30 basis points is invested at a lower margin. This generates "negative carry", i.e. a loss to the institution.<sup>161</sup>

246. Over the long term, **if IFAD's Treasury assets are increasingly derived from borrowed funds rather than from equity, Treasury will only be able to generate a margin over the cost of funds** (IFAD's Treasury will no longer have the benefit of "free" equity). As a result, Treasury's contribution to IFAD's bottom line is likely to diminish significantly. A conservatively-managed floating rate portfolio generates about between 10 and 20bp over Libor. If IFAD's funding costs are at Libor flat, Treasury's investment operations, assuming a portfolio of US\$1.5 billion, would only generate about US\$ 1.5 - US\$3 million. If IFAD's borrowing costs continue to be in the range of Euribor + 30 bp, as per its sovereign borrowings, it would make a loss on investments, unless it invests at a higher risk profile (the case may be different if very low interest rates are negotiated under concessional partner loans).

#### **D.4 Asset and Liability Management**

247. Asset and Liability management (ALM) refers to managing risks that are generated by mismatches between assets and liabilities. These include, interest rate risks, currency risks and liquidity risks. As previously noted, **ALM is an area where IFAD policies, guidelines and instruments are at an incipient stage.**
248. **Other DFIs actively use derivatives to manage financial exposures.** For this purpose, DFIs define the open currency (and open interest rate) positions and measure and report them internally to the relevant committees (generally the ALCO). DFIs enter into ALM transactions using over the counter derivatives or exchange traded derivatives as appropriate in order to: (i) swap borrowings into the desired currency; (ii) swap loans denominated in other currencies into the base currency;<sup>162</sup> (iii) manage interest rate risks on borrowings and on loans; (iv) allow for a wider choice of investment products; (v) hedge future capital contributions; (vi) hedge certain aspects of a DFI's budget; (vii) hedge loans made in local currency; and (viii) provide local currency hedging to clients, particularly to local banks, allowing them to lend in local currency to those of their clients that do not generate foreign currency revenues.
249. **IFAD's operations with derivatives are at their beginning phase.** IFAD has started incorporating borrowings into its balance sheet. The loans from KfW and AFD were both denominated in euro and on a floating rate basis. This means that IFAD can only on-lend these funds on a floating rate basis in euro without incurring undue financial risks. However, in terms of demand for single currency loans, most demand is US\$ denominated and there remains considerable demand for SDRs. IFAD would have to use derivatives – a cross currency swap - to transform a liability denominated in euro into a liability denominated in US\$ if it wanted to on-lend in US\$. If IFAD wished to on-lend such funds on a fixed rate basis, it would have to lock in the interest rate via an interest rate swap.<sup>163</sup> An ALM policy defines these strategies, setting the parameters (also in terms of credit risk and collateral) and delegates authority to the CFO and to the Treasurer to execute an effective ALM for the institution.

<sup>161</sup> FMO's Treasury portfolio is very conservatively invested mainly in AAA and AA-rated sovereign and the primary aim is not to achieve positive carry but to reduce the amount of capital allocated for regulatory reasons to the Treasury portfolio. As IFAD is not subject to banking regulation, it is not bound by such capital usage constraints.

<sup>162</sup> Even loans made in SDR, which are currently left unhedged, can, in principle, be swapped into US\$

<sup>163</sup> Without an interest rate swap, IFAD would incur very significant interest rate risks as its funding would be floating rate whereas its lending would be fixed rate.

250. **Hedging future replenishment commitments.** Since its establishment, IFAD has received capital payments in a number of currencies. As of end January 2018, close to 80 per cent of the replenishment contribution funds due were denominated in non-dollar currencies.<sup>164</sup> **Non-dollar contributions pose a foreign exchange risk as IFAD does not have a clear calculation basis of its equity base in the future.** For instance, if certain payments are pledged, for example, in euro and the euro depreciates vis-à-vis the US dollar, then IFAD would receive less capital contributions than originally anticipated.
251. In the future, IFAD will continue to receive future capital contributions as payments in a number of currencies. From the time of commitment, these non-US\$ payments pose an open currency position for IFAD and could be hedged – or if there is a degree of uncertainty about the likelihood of payment, partially hedged - in order to have a higher degree of certainty of the amount of equity available to support IFAD's business. The point of time when the hedges are to be entered into would have to be decided: whether at the time of verbal commitment or when a promissory note has been received, or, staggered with a certain percentage hedged upfront and the remainder at a later date when promissory notes, which have a more binding character, are received.<sup>165</sup> These non-dollar payments can be hedged by entering into foreign exchange forwards, converting any non-dollar payments into US\$ contributions.
252. Other IFIs either request their shareholders to make future capital payments in the currency of the DFI (IBRD requests payments to be made in US\$) or hedge those payments that are made in the donor's home currency. When EBRD was established, it used this method to hedge its yen and US dollar-denominated capital contributions into the ECU,<sup>166</sup> thereby locking in its future equity instalments and providing a clearer basis of calculation of available equity. IDA also hedges its future contributions.<sup>167</sup>
253. As reviewed in Chapter IV, **other DFIs offer more diversified options in terms of interest rates on their loans.** DFIs generally run their balance sheet on a Libor basis. This means that all liabilities are swapped into pools of e.g. US\$ Libor or Euribor funding. Funds are invested by Treasury in these currencies in floating-rate products until such time that they are needed for loan disbursement, eliminating foreign exchange risks and interest rate mismatches. When loans are Libor-based, there would not be a mismatch in interest rates and no currency mismatch if loans are made in one of the pool currencies. Where a client prefers to have fixed rate loans, such fixed rate funding can be 'created' using interest-rate swaps. The rate for a loan is fixed at the time of disbursement or, possibly, at the time when the loan terms are agreed upon and the loan is signed. DFIs also offer loans with an interest-rate cap, limiting a client's risk that floating interest rates rise beyond a certain level. A cap needs to be hedged with derivatives. Some DFIs also offer loans in local currency.
254. **In principle, IFAD could offer local currency loans, if they can be hedged using cross-currency swaps.**<sup>168</sup> IFAD could flexibly offer products on other interest rate bases: rates linked to inflation, or floating rates with a maximum rate (a so-called cap), as long as Treasury is able to hedge the exposures. An important

<sup>164</sup> Of the total due, 8 per cent was in CAD, 25 per cent in euro, 22 per cent in GBP, 12 per cent in CHF and NOK and 21 per cent in US\$.

<sup>165</sup> Source: IOC Schedule of Payments, provided by Accounting and Controller's Division, Financial Operations Department, IFAD, as of 25 July 2017. Nota bene, promissory notes are not legally binding instruments for the donor.

<sup>166</sup> Prior to the euro, the ECU was EBRD's currency of accounts

<sup>167</sup> IDA pledges can be made and paid in local currency. "IDA uses currency forward contracts to convert the majority of partners' encashments provided in national currencies into the five currencies of the SDR basket. These transactions are intermediated by IBRD for efficiency purposes." (*IDA MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS: SEPTEMBER 30, 2015*).

<sup>168</sup> Local currency loans were first offered by EBRD and are now a standard product for many DFIs. DFIs issue bonds in local currency or hedge with TCX, a fund that was created by DFIs to provide local currency hedging.


caveat here is that IFAD's loans are very long term and certain of the above hedges may not be available for such long-term maturities.

## E. Leveraging

255. As a Fund, IFAD has approached equity and liabilities as a part of its "resource mobilization" (i.e. replenishments). Banks, including bi-lateral and multilateral Development Banks, in contrast, focus on equity and debt. Equity is raised from shareholders (and increased by adding profits as reserves) and used to back the business. Debt is added to increase the operational capacity and thus the outreach of the institution. The World Bank and other DFIs would be unthinkable without capital markets borrowings and leverage. Reflows, which appear as a key component for IFAD's financial planning, are generally not a factor in balance sheet management for DFIs and are taken into consideration mainly for calculating liquidity requirements and the borrowing programme. DFIs make loans (and in some cases equity investments) and fund these loans with both equity and debt. Treasury assets are there to provide and manage liquidity and 'park' money until it is needed for operations and to contribute to the institution's profit and loss (P/L), where possible.
256. IFAD has historically been funded by equity (replenishment) and loan reflows. Equity was used to make loans, grants and, when IFAD's income was insufficient, to pay for its operational costs (or other losses). IFAD thus needed regular replenishments in order to grow its operations and cover its losses. IFAD requires additional equity to continue its operations (retained earnings in 2017 stood at a negative of US\$1.36 billion) by raising new equity through a replenishment every three years. Other IFIs, which are operating on a financially sustainable basis (the IBRD, IFC, EBRD, AfDB or AsDB), seek additional capital when they reach limits to their operating capacity. However, concessional arms of other IFIs (e.g., IDA and ADF) do also have periodic replenishments.
257. **Liabilities and leverage.** IFAD operated without leverage until it contracted its first loan from KfW. Being incorporated as a fund, liabilities were not envisaged at the time of IFAD's establishment, though, generally, there is no principal limitation to leveraging funds. Leverage can double or triple the operational outreach of an institution. IFAD would not be the first development entity incorporated as a Fund that uses borrowings to grow its operations. In Paris, the Council of Europe Resettlement Fund for National Refugees was an active borrower in the capital markets in the 1980s and 1990s, before it changed its name in 1994 to Council of Europe Social Development Fund and then in 1999 to Council of Europe Development Bank.
258. **There are constraints from limited leveraging.** With US\$6.6 billion of equity (taking into account US\$1.5 billion of negative retained earnings), IFAD has a solid capital base. Operating by deploying only this capital, however, limits IFAD's size of PoLG. This capital could be leveraged to the order of 1:1, 2:1 or even more. Figure 12 illustrates the leverage of other DFIs for which leveraging is 'business as usual'.<sup>169</sup> IDA has now obtained a credit rating and is set to borrow in the international capital markets to increase its operational capacity and contribution to achieving the SDGs.

<sup>169</sup> Sources: Financial Statements, 2016.

Figure 12  
**Leveraging - debt-to-equity (usable capital) ratio** <sup>170</sup>



Source: CLE Elaboration from data available from DFI website and documentation (2017)

### E.1 Main considerations regarding IFAD's leveraging potential

259. IFAD's loan products set certain parameters for the structure of its balance sheet. The premise is that assets and liabilities should be matched to avoid structural interest rate and/or currency risks in the balance sheet that would have the potential of producing serious losses. The next paragraphs review IFAD's assets against its liability structure. The review suggests that, **at this juncture, given the current loan pricing terms, it is challenging to fund IFAD's assets sustainably through borrowings**, perhaps with the exception of concessional partner loans in the future (and only under highly favourable interest rates).
260. **Highly concessional loans.** IFAD's assets are dominated by very long-term loans with a fixed interest rate (de facto) of 0.75 per cent p.a. Such loans are generally funded out of an institution's equity. Funding such loans out of debt could be theoretically feasible if IFAD can raise long-term debt that carries very low interest. Such loans would have to be funded with a fixed-rate debt as funding with a floating-rate debt would pose a serious interest rate mismatch.<sup>171</sup> Fixed-rate debt can be obtained either by borrowing directly in the fixed-rate bond markets or by hedging floating-rate funds with an interest-rate swap. To illustrate the long-term fixed-rate funding costs for IFAD, it is important to consider the long-term swap rate.<sup>172</sup> The 30-year swap rates had the following levels as of August 2017: 30-year swap rate euro 1.75 per cent and US\$2.50 per cent.<sup>173</sup>
261. If IFAD funded its long term fixed rate loans from borrowing, it would generate losses (Table 16). On a loan portfolio of euro 2 billion or US\$1 billion, the losses would be in the range of EUR 12.5 million p.a. and US\$22.5 million p.a. respectively. The situation would only change if IFAD could obtain long-dated fixed-rate funding at a level below 0.75 per cent p.a. Such low market interest rates for long-dated euro and US dollar-denominated interest rate swaps are exceptional and mainly a result of Central Bank policies of quantitative easing adopted to combat the 2009 financial crisis. In the future, long-term swap rates are likely to rise significantly again as central banks move away from quantitative easing.

<sup>170</sup> Excluding callable capital, but including reserves

<sup>171</sup> If Libor rises, the funding cost of IFAD would increase but the revenues would remain fixed at 0.75 per cent of the outstanding loan

<sup>172</sup> Via an interest rate swap, IFAD can swap floating rate debt for fixed rate debt, i.e. IFAD would pay a market counterparty, usually a bank, the fixed rate and in return receive Libor, or in the case of euro, Euribor. In this way, IFAD can lock in long term fixed funding rates.

<sup>173</sup> Swap rates are subject to change and are generally correlated to long term government bond rates.

Table 16

**Losses to IFAD on highly concessional loans in case of borrowing with interest rate swap**

Euro Loans		US\$ Loans	
Loan income in euro:	0.75%	Loan income in US\$	0.75%
IFAD Funding at Euribor +	-0.25%	IFAD Funding at Libor +	-0.50%
Interest rate swap	-1.75%	Interest rate swap	-2.50%
Total loss for IFAD p.a.	-1.25%	Total loss for IFAD p.a.	-2.25%

Source: CLE simulation (2017)

262. **Blended term loans.** Blended term loans are similar to concessional loans but carry a rate of 2 per cent p.a. fixed for the life of the loan. As such, whilst providing marginally higher revenues, if funded via market borrowings, they may generate losses and are exposed to the same risks as already discussed.
263. **Ordinary loans.** As the interest rate of ordinary loans is floating rate, such loans can be funded with sovereign or capital market borrowings without necessarily generating losses. IFAD's profit/loss will be determined purely by the margin it generates over its own cost of funds. Borrowing at a margin of 25-30 basis points over Libor is sustainable as long as IFAD can charge on its ordinary loans a margin above the cost of funds.
264. **As a result of the pricing of IFAD loans, only ordinary loans have the potential to be funded out of borrowings without generating losses.** If the PBAS remains the sole determinant of the allocation of available funding for loans, then this sets the limit to leveraging. Assuming ordinary loans constitute 10 per cent allocation and assuming IFAD's available equity equals US\$6.5 billion, then the total volume of loans would be equal to and limited to 1.111 times 6.5 billion = US\$7.222 billion (US\$722 million could be funded by debt). On the other hand, if IFAD decided to allow countries to take up additional loans on the basis of project demand and their credit situation, but on ordinary terms (this option exists at IDA for example), any additional ordinary loan allocated outside PBAS could be funded (without generating losses) by leverage, as long as the loan is floating rate (denominated in US dollars or euro or another currency that can be generated via a cross currency swap) and carries a margin which is higher than IFAD's funding cost.
265. In summary, there are four potential uses for borrowed funds without IFAD incurring losses: (i) loans that are Libor-based and that carry a margin above IFAD's cost of funds; (ii) loans that are fixed rate and carry a margin reflecting IFAD's cost of generating fixed-rate funds via an interest rating swap; (iii) loans that are in local currency reflecting IFAD's cost of generating local currency funds through local currency borrowings or cross-currency swaps; (iv) and Treasury.<sup>174</sup> Conversely, funding other types of loans through borrowing would generate considerable losses, to be covered through replenishment, thus reducing the new resources available for on-lending.
266. **"Pros and cons" of capital market borrowing.** Only capital markets provide volumes, liquidity, the range of currencies and interest rate bases that are necessary for DFIs to structure their balance sheets. Institutions like the World Bank, the first DFI to extensively borrow from the capital markets, have borrowed billions since inception and continue to tap the markets on a weekly basis. For the World Bank, the first bond issue was in 1947. There are, however, "pros and cons" and requirements which are discussed below.
267. *Pros* - Capital markets provide the widest range of funding opportunities, subject to credit rating:
- Potential to grow the size of the PoLG and increase the contribution to reducing rural poverty

<sup>174</sup> In principle, borrowed funds could also be allocated to the treasury's liquidity portfolio Point, freeing up equity from funding Treasury Liquidity to support additional loans on concessional terms. However, this would reduce Treasury's contribution to IFAD's P/L, thus increasing IFAD's annual losses.

- Potential to reduce the burden of taxpayers to ordinary lending through replenishments
  - An unprecedented depth and liquidity, practically eliminating re-funding risks
  - A multi-trillion investor base ranging from central banks to pension funds and other institutional investors to retail and impact investors
  - The widest range of maturities
  - Currencies in which IFAD operates
  - Advanced and standardized documentation
  - Appropriate regulation
268. *Cons* - Potential drawbacks on borrowing on capital markets include:
- IFAD's very long dated assets cannot economically be match-funded by liabilities of similar maturities. This has the implication that IFAD will have to run a continuing borrowing operation, issuing bonds not only to fund new loans but also to repay maturing bonds. This is normal practice amongst DFIs.
  - Unless IFAD borrows in the form of floating rate notes, all funding would need to be swapped into Euribor/Libor-based funding. Whilst this also applies to other DFIs, building up a derivatives portfolio implies additional risks and costs, including more sophisticated accounting requirements than those required for simple loans.
  - Derivative counterparties will require IFAD to post (and accept) cash as collateral under certain circumstances. This may require IFAD to borrow additional funds with the implication that posting collateral is likely to incur some losses due to so-called "negative carry."<sup>175</sup>
269. On balance, the "pros" of market borrowing outweigh the "cons" which can be addressed by drawing on the experience of the MDBs in tackling similar issues.
270. **Constraints from leveraging through sovereign borrowings.** The so-called sovereign borrowings, i.e. borrowing in the form of loans from other DFIs, are a convenient first step towards capital market borrowings but may prove not to be sustainable both in terms of volumes and cost. IFAD's clients borrowing on ordinary terms have, in addition to euro, predominantly a need for loans denominated in US\$. IFAD would thus need to contract US\$ liabilities but the loans from KfW and AFD are denominated in euro.<sup>176</sup> Principally, with the help of derivatives, such liabilities can be transformed into floating rate US\$ funding. But the conversion of such loans into floating rate US\$ liabilities would, up to now, have incurred an additional cost of about 40 – 60 basis points per annum due to the cost of the hedge.<sup>177</sup> Other DFIs would not borrow in the form of sovereign borrowings as the cost of funds would not be advantageous, even if the long maturities offered are attractive.
271. **Concessional partner loans contribute to leveraging but are not a panacea.** If partners are willing to provide IFAD with funding at (quasi-) zero per cent interest rate, and in the currency in which IFAD has loan demand (presently more in US dollars than in euro), IFAD could utilise such funds to make concessional loans and blended loans, provided that there is no significant maturity mismatch.

<sup>175</sup> IFAD's cost of funds is likely to be higher than the margin earned on the collateral. The amount of collateral posted depends on the mark to market of the totality of derivative positions with each counterparty and is likely to be a fraction of the nominal amounts. IFAD may also receive collateral posted by derivative counterparties as the collateral agreements are mutual.

<sup>176</sup> IFAD pays KfW an interest rate based on the Euribor six-month rate plus a spread based on KfW's variable funding costs (0.25 per cent in July 2017). IFAD on-lends the proceeds of the KfW loan for projects on ordinary terms (i.e. the Euribor six-month rate plus a spread based on the relevant IBRD variable spread, 0.94 per cent, July 2017). Thus IFAD's 0.69 per cent net margin on the KfW loan is lower than the margin on highly concessional loans.<sup>176</sup> This means that IFAD's margins on sovereign loans contribute less to help finance IFAD's operating costs, particularly if swaps into the US dollar are needed. Assuming a swaps cost at 0.50 per cent, IFAD's net margin would then be 0.19 per cent.

<sup>177</sup> The cost of the hedge varies over time. Whilst theoretically it should be close to zero, in reality, it is driven by supply and demand and currently IFAD would have to pay about 40bp per annum, i.e. 3 or 6-month US\$ Libor + 0.40 per cent p.a. over the life of the swap if it wanted to receive EUR Libor flat in return. IFAD's all-in funding cost in US\$ would thus be approximately US\$ Libor + 0.70 per cent as the cost of funds from KfW/AFD amount to approximately Euribor plus 0.30 per cent.


Here it would be important for IFAD to analyse whether it is preferable to receive the subsidy in the form of a reduced interest rate or as a cash contribution. When calculating the concessional element of such financing for US\$ and euro, it is important to correctly assess the NPV of the difference between IFAD's hypothetical all-in cost of funds for the respective maturities and the concessional rate.

### E.2 Requirements for accessing market borrowing: an overview

272. **Time to market.** IFAD's tentative plan to enter the capital markets stretches over five years. Depending on the decision of the governing bodies, the current timetable envisions a first bond issue in 2022. This timeline would be prudent and conservative, subject to the outcome of credit rating (see below).<sup>178</sup>
273. **Inaugural benchmark.** For an inaugural bond issue, DFIs (and other institutions) generally need to have a benchmark-sized transaction denominated either in euro or US\$. Benchmark size means a minimum of US\$500 million to establish a new DFI in the markets. The inaugural benchmark is of utmost importance as it determines the institution's standing in the market, and the spread it has to pay in comparison to its peers, i.e. the pricing it will be able to achieve not only for the first issue but to some extent for future issues also. While DFIs generally try to obtain long-dated funding to avoid too large maturity mismatches, in the case of the inaugural benchmark, DFIs have tended to position themselves where a potential bond offering meets the greatest demand.<sup>179</sup>
274. **Infrastructure and Treasury staffing for capital markets borrowings.** IFAD has competency in Treasury and in finance. The experience of other DFIs suggests that IFAD may not need to hire many more additional staff: notably, FMO and AFD operate their treasuries with only four to six professionals respectively and both institutions issue billions of dollars-worth of bonds in the markets every year in addition to managing the financial risks (ALM) and treasury investments (see Figure 13). However, IFAD would need to hire, or retrain, at least one staff member to have specialized funding and derivatives experience. In addition, as already observed in this report, there would be a need to carefully revisit its arrangements for risk management function and significantly strengthen its ALM policies.

Figure 13

#### Capital market borrowings and funding team staff



Source: CLE Elaboration from several documents - EBRD: organigram and 2016 investor presentation; IFC: interview and 2016 IFC Investor Pitchbook; AFD: interview and 2016 investor presentation; FMO: interview; AfDB: interview and 2016 investor presentation; ADB: interview and 2016 investor presentation; IBRD: interview and the World Bank Treasury 2016 investor presentation.

<sup>178</sup> As a comparison, EBRD was inaugurated as a new DFI in April 1991. Policies, guidelines, strategies all had to be written – or adopted from other DFIs – and approved by the Board of Directors. By July, the bank had 30 staff members in total and EBRD's Treasury consisted of only three professionals. By late summer, EBRD had obtained an AAA/Aaa rating, its board of directors (nota bene, not the board of governors) had developed and approved the relevant policies, the borrowing programme, the finance team had set up the infrastructure, chosen the lead-manager and the banks to underwrite the bond issue through an open and transparent selection process and was therefore able to launch its inaugural ECU 500 million five-year bond by September 1991. However, EBRD's operations and "clients" differ notably from IFAD's.

<sup>179</sup> A different case is that of the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm), further discussed below. As a very small supranational borrower, it had a US\$ 1 billion five-year maturity inaugural bond issue in 2006. For a long time, as an AAA/Aaa rated borrower, its cost of funds was in the sub-Libor range. But having been downgraded to AA, its cost of funds is now generally about 15-20 bp higher than that of the AAA-rated World Bank.

275. **Credit rating.** A fundamental pre-condition for successful bond issuance is for IFAD to obtain a rating, ideally AAA/Aaa but at least AA. Rating agencies undertake very thorough due diligence of institutions, including an analysis of shareholder support, use of funds, policies, risks, profit/losses and balance sheet development, as well as interviews with key staff and top management. Certainty and predictability are key drivers for ratings and any issues providing uncertainty may negatively impact IFAD's future rating. **The most obvious issue in this respect is IFAD's financial sustainability** (which is examined in the next chapter) **and the dependence on, and unpredictability of, the amounts of future replenishments and the outflows in the forms of grants, DSF**, operating expenses and potential losses from currency exchange movements. The current financial architecture of IFAD is very different from that of DFIs with an AAA/Aaa rating. Annex VII provides a review of the requirements for credit ratings of multilateral DFIs
276. **Borrowing strategy.** DFIs generally have a defined, yet flexible annual borrowing strategy, detailing approach, and volume. Borrowing amounts can be determined either as an absolute amount linked to the institution's anticipated lending volumes or in relation to the balance sheet. Institutions with very long-dated assets, frequently aim to borrow as long term as possible, but lengthening the maturity of a bond issue, as discussed above, is normally only possible by increasing the all-in-cost in spread above Libor terms. Optimising the liability structure and the execution of the borrowing strategy within set parameters is generally delegated to the Treasury team and the implementation is reviewed by the institution's ALCO.
277. **Borrowing amounts.** Currently, the approved borrowing approach links IFAD's volume of liabilities directly to the amounts raised by the next replenishment. Other DFIs generally determine the amount of borrowings with reference to multi-year cash-flow forecast based on loan demand, cash-outflows and liquidity requirements. A cap is frequently set as an absolute number or in relation to total equity. In case IFAD accessed market borrowing, a more prudent alternative could be to initially fund the existing and future ordinary loans (even within the single PBAS window) through capital market borrowings. This would free up equity for other purposes (e.g. highly concessional loans), although there may be negative profit/loss implications on treasury operations. As a second step, capital market borrowings could fund loans where the volumes are not determined by PBAS but instead by demand for additional funding from member countries (two-window framework).
278. As a comparison, borrowing levels of other DFIs are presented below (Table 17). DFIs may borrow at costs below US\$ Libor and Euribor for short maturities but well above for longer ones: DFIs generally cannot achieve long-dated sub-Libor funding. To lower the average cost of funds, DFIs therefore frequently: (i) borrow with shorter dated maturities and "roll" the funding, i.e. allowing maturity mis-matches between long term assets and shorter-term liabilities; (ii) borrow in a variety of arbitrage markets and in different structures, using derivatives to swap the borrowings into US\$ or Euribor-based funding.

Table 17  
**Examples of market borrowing levels for selected DFIs**

<i>Issuer</i>				
<b>US\$</b>	<b>Amount (US\$ bil)</b>	<b>Issue Date</b>	<b>Maturity (years)</b>	<b>All-in Spread (bp)</b>
IADB	3.75	4/5/2017	3	\$L -2.6
EBRD	1.5	4/25/2017	3	\$L -1.6
AsDB	4.0	4/26/2017	3	\$L -1.6
Council of Europe Dev. Bank	1.0	5/10/2017	2	\$L -2.2
Asian Development Bank	1.75	5/31/2017	4	\$L+9.6
IADB	2.3	6/28/2017	10	\$L+25.9
IFFIm Indication as 6/30/2017 <sup>180</sup>				
IFFIm	1.0 (min.)		3	\$Libor+22
IFFIm	1.0 (min.)		10	\$Libor+22
<b>Euro</b>				
European Financial Stability Facility	1.0	4/4/2017	28	Euribor +54
European Financial Stability Facility	4.0	4/4/2017	8	Euribor -3
European Financial Stability Facility	6.0	4/25/2017	10	Euribor +1
European Financial Stability Facility	2.0	4/25/2017	26	Euribor +38
European Investment Bank	3.0	5/9/2017	16	Euribor -6
IFFIm Indication as 6/30/2017				
IFFIm	1.0 (min)		3	Euribor -5
IFFIm	1.0 (min)		10	Euribor +12

Source: IFC News + Views. Issue No 9, November 2017

<sup>180</sup> The numbers for IFFIm are indicative quotes for a potential issue, should IFFIm decide to tap the markets. In November IFFIm issued a 3-year US\$ denominated floating rate note at a spread of US\$ Libor + 16 bp all in (i.e. including all costs).

### Key points

- In terms of the efficiency of governance of the financial architecture, this chapter first discussed the replenishment consultation. This is a well-established process. However, a CLE on replenishment (2014) identified areas for improvement. Two of these are still outstanding. First, there is a challenge for list C to ensure balance of representation from the poorest countries and the increasing number of donors.
- Second, the periodicity of replenishment: the CLE on replenishment had recommended considering a four-year period, instead of the current three-year one. This may bring about more efficiency in the use of budget for replenishment consultation and could in principle help raise allocations for some “small” countries in the PBAS cycle. It could also avoid a mismatch between the periodicity of the IFAD replenishment cycle (three years) and the term of the president (four years renewable). There is no evidence that having a four-year cycle would be detrimental to the total replenishment size.
- In finance, the notion of efficiency is also linked to managing risks. The existing level of financial oversight by the governing bodies and by management is adequate for the current low level of risk of IFAD’s financial operations. However, should IFAD’s borrowing from sovereign or market sources increase in a significant manner, these may not be sufficient any more.
- Information of a financial nature submitted to governing bodies is adequate although fragmented into many documents. There is limited financial expertise among members of the Board and Audit Committee which constrains members’ contributions to the discussions.
- Internally, the roles and responsibilities for risk management on treasury investments are defined in very broad terms without clear delegation of responsibility. The Asset and Liability Committee, which is standard in other DFIs, has ceased its operations. IFAD’s treasury investments have higher returns compared to other DFIs but also a higher risk profile and volatility.
- In terms of asset and liability management, IFAD’s experience with derivatives is at a very early stage. Other DFIs make wide use of derivatives, for example, to hedge future capital contributions, swap loan currency denomination, manage interest rate risks on borrowings and on loans.
- IFAD’s leveraging of its capital base through borrowing is limited, compared to other DFIs. This leads to lower efficiency of use of capital resources. At present, as a result of the pricing of IFAD loans, only ordinary loans have the potential to be funded out of borrowings without generating losses.
- Borrowing from markets offers wider options (volumes, liquidity interest rates) to expand IFAD’s leveraging and PoLG, compared to sovereign borrowing. While there are “pros and cons” to market borrowing, these are dealt with by other DFIs on a routine basis. In order to issue bonds at favourable terms, IFAD would need to take a number of steps and meet some requirements. The most challenging of these is to obtain a high credit rating (see also next chapter).
- Concessional partner loans may offer leveraging opportunities, only if donor countries agree to very low interest rates (ideally close to zero) and continue to provide such loans in large volumes in the future.

## VI. Key aspects of IFAD's financial performance and sustainability


### A. Definition and current situation

279. For this evaluation, financial sustainability is defined as the extent to which an institution has financial resources to operate without regular recourse to donors/ shareholders, protect its equity capital and generate enough revenues to cover its operational costs and build up loan provisions. This is more stringent than IFAD Management's definition of financial sustainability, which is based on the notion of liquidity and ability to meet loan disbursement commitments by relying largely on future replenishments.<sup>181</sup> While replenishments are indeed important, relying on replenishments is not consistent with the notion of financial sustainability used in the markets: priorities of donors may change in the future that may result in lower replenishments. A satisfactory degree of financial sustainability is one of the likely conditions needed to obtain a high credit rating. Sustainability also implies that an institution's balance sheet is structured in a way that risks are managed in order to avoid structural imbalances which may lead to the occurrence of heavy losses. It does not preclude leverage. Leverage, in fact, may be a pre-condition for an institution to become financially sustainable.
280. **In the past decade, IFAD has incurred financial losses in most cases.** IFAD made losses every year from 2009 to 2016. IFAD made an accounting profit of US\$58.7 million in 2017 (Figure 14) but this was only due to an exceptional accounting gain from currency exchange movement (US\$338.8 million) which cannot be relied upon in the future. Within the current modus operandi, conditions for financial sustainability are not met. As shown in Figure 15, since 2010, revenues from loans and treasury investments have been insufficient to cover IFAD's operational costs.
281. **The breakdown of profits and losses** can be explained using the year 2016 as an example. The main performance drivers of the IFAD P/L are on the revenue side: (i) interest and fees from loans of US\$51 million (of these approximately 85 per cent for concessional loans, and 2 and 13 per cent for blended and ordinary, respectively); and (ii) treasury income of US\$46 million. On the expense side, the main drivers are: (i) operating expenses (the cost of running the organization) of US\$156 million; (ii) US\$55 million grants; (iii) US\$124 million DSF; and (iv) US\$169 million foreign exchange losses. There are also other categories of revenues and expenses, but these are less important for the purpose of this discussion.
282. The factor that allowed IFAD to run profits in the past was the high gains from treasury investment operations (in some years, but not recently, IFAD also experienced high gains from currency exchange movements). Those high rates from treasury investments have not been feasible recently, given the financial market trends, and the liquid portfolio managed by Treasury has been shrinking. The introduction of DSF has generated additional accounting losses.<sup>182</sup>

<sup>181</sup> "The long-term sustainability of the Fund is safeguarded by the sustainable cashflow approach." IFAD Resources available for commitment, Dec 14-15, 2016. The document states, "A certain level of PoLG is defined as sustainable cash flow (SCF PoLG) over the next 40 years if, after forecasting all of the inflows and outflows derived from the current and future PoLGs and related obligations during such period, IFAD's liquidity (i.e. the balance of its cash and investments) never breaches the minimum liquidity requirement stipulated in its Liquidity Policy".


<sup>182</sup> Also, the introduction of fair value accounting has added to accounting losses.

Figure 14  
IFAD's net income/loss 2003 – 2017 (US\$ million)



Source: CLE Elaboration from IFAD's financial statements (Several years).

Figure 15  
Proportion of IFAD operating expenses recovered by loan and investment income



Source: CLE Elaboration from IFAD's financial statements (Several years).

283. Longer-term effects of the above on the balance sheet are illustrated in Table 18. Changes between 2005 and 2010 (increase in retained earnings) reflect a period in which IFAD could run profits, while changes between 2010 and 2017 reflect several years of losses and this caused retained earnings to turn negative. Ultimately, this leads to capital erosion which needs to be compensated for through the replenishments, thus reducing the funds that can be used to finance the PoLG.

Table 18

**Key figures from IFAD's balance sheet**

	2005 (US\$ 000)	2010 (US\$ 000)	2017 (US\$ 000)	Change 2005-2010	Change 2010-2017
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>5 625 376</b>	<b>8 232 327</b>	<b>7 711 33</b>	46%	-6%
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>371 307</b>	<b>436 139</b>	<b>863 481</b>	17%	86%
Total contributions	4 618 124	6 157 886	8 205 537	33%	33%
General reserve	95 000	95 000	95 000	0%	0%
Retained earnings	540 945	871 850	(1 357 585)	61%	-141%
<b>Total equity</b>	<b>5 254 069</b>	<b>7 124 736</b>	<b>6 847 952</b>	36%	-4%

Source: Extracted from IFAD's financial statements (2005, 2010, and 2016).


284. **Revenues from interest on loans are too low to cover operating expenses:** under the present conditions, IFAD would have to charge an average rate of circa 3 per cent which is well above current margins on interest rates (average portfolio

yield was circa 1 per cent in 2016), or a rate of approximately 3-month US\$ Libor plus a margin of 1.5 per cent. Although borrowing members may criticize this increase in rates, such interest rates would still be below the coupon rate that many borrowing member countries would have to pay if they issued bonds (see Chapter IV).

285. Generally, a key indicator for an organization's financial sustainability is return on equity. A positive return on equity implies that the organization strengthens its capital base. A negative return on equity means that the institution is depleting its reserves and, ultimately, its capital base. Looking at other DFIs (with the exception of IDA and ADF), all of them are financially sustainable (Figure 16). Soft-loan windows of the World Bank and the African Development Bank have negative return on equity. However, IDA and ADF cannot be compared to IFAD, as these two entities do not have dedicated separate staff, office buildings or other infrastructure. IDA receives capital and operational support from the World Bank and ADF from the AfDB. As such, these institutions are part of a larger, financially sustainable group, i.e. the World Bank Group and the African Development Bank. IFAD, in contrast, is a stand-alone institution. These considerations are likely to be important in the context of a credit rating assessment.

Figure 16

**Return on equity, comparison across DFIs**



Source: DFI's annual financial statements (2006, 2011, 2016).

## B. Main factors related to financial sustainability

### B.1 Operating expenses

286. A detailed review of operating expenses is not part of this CLE. This section looks at some comparator figures across DFIs while noting that differences in mandate and financial structure are important. Operating expenses at IFAD (comprising staff costs, office and general expenses, consultant and other non-staff costs, and direct bank and investment costs) increased from US\$104 million in 2004, to US\$151 million in 2010, to US\$171 million in 2013 and 2014, then fell to US\$156 million in 2016 and increased to US\$172.8 million in 2017. As IFAD is set up as a fund, emerging market debt funds generally charge a fee of 2 per cent of assets under management to cover their operating expenses. Impact investment funds that lend to organizations benefiting smallholder farmers charge a management fee of around 2-2.5 per cent p.a.<sup>183</sup> to cover operating expenses. IFAD's operating expense ratios are in the range of impact investment funds but above those of other DFIs.

<sup>183</sup> Alterfin, Incofin, Triodos, Rabobank Foundation, ResponsAbility, Root

287. Staff costs are a major driver of IFAD operational costs. Table 19 provides an overview of the operating costs in relation to total assets, loans and equity outstanding, and to risk assets as well, in relation to the annual PoLG (for the year 2016 for comparative purpose). **IFAD is in the upper end of comparator DFIs.**<sup>184</sup> A few caveats have to be added: (i) the larger DFIs benefit from “economies of scale”; (ii) IFAD operates in the “difficult to reach” areas of countries while many other DFIs structure transactions close to countries’ capitals; and (iii) impact investors making private sector investments also have rather high cost to assets ratios.<sup>185</sup> If IFAD achieves a significant increase in PoLG through leveraging but does not increase by the same proportion (or ideally reduces) its operating expenses, by definition, operating expense ratios would decrease.

Table 19

**Operational cost and ratio comparison (US\$ billion and percentages) - 2016**

<b>Balance sheet (US\$ billion)</b>	<b>IFAD</b>	<b>AsDB</b>	<b>AfDB</b>	<b>EBRD</b>	<b>IADB</b>	<b>IBRD</b>
Total assets	7.2	125.9	39.9	59.2	113.3	371.3
Net loans outstanding	5.2	67.6	20.3	23.4	81.4	167.6
Equity investments	0	0.814	0.967	5.6	0	0
Investments and cash on hand and in banks	1.3	26.7	16.0	25.3	27.9	51.7
<b>Statement of comprehensive Income (US\$ billion)</b>	<b>IFAD</b>	<b>AsDB</b>	<b>AfDB</b>	<b>EBRD</b>	<b>IADB</b>	<b>IBRD</b>
Operating expenses	0.156	0.412	0.190	0.492	0.743	2.131
<i>Operating expenses to total assets</i>	<i>2.2%</i>	<i>0.3%</i>	<i>0.5%</i>	<i>0.8%</i>	<i>0.7%</i>	<i>0.6%</i>
<i>Operating expenses to net loans &amp; equity outstanding</i>	<i>3.0%</i>	<i>0.6%</i>	<i>0.9%</i>	<i>1.7%</i>	<i>0.9%</i>	<i>1.3%</i>
<i>Operating expenses to risk assets*</i>	<i>2.6%</i>	<i>0.4%</i>	<i>0.8%</i>	<i>1.5%</i>	<i>0.9%</i>	<i>0.7%</i>
<i>Operating expenses to annual PoLG</i>	<i>13.1%</i>	<i>2.9%</i>	<i>3.2%</i>	<i>5.2%</i>	<i>6.9%</i>	<i>7.2%</i>

\*Total assets- Treasury assets.

Source: CLE Elaboration from figures in DFI financial documents (Oct. 2017).

288. Relative to other MDBs, IFAD allocates a lower proportion of its budget for the programme management department (taking 2014 for comparability purpose, the proportion of IFAD’s “operational” costs was 49.2 per cent, against 75.3 at AfDB, 74.9 at AsDB and 70.2 at IBRD).
289. IFAD is also exposed to inflation, mainly through its operating expenses. IFAD’s operating expenses may grow in line with inflation while income from outstanding loans will remain static till maturity. This may not be seen as an issue at present, but inflation is likely to pick up again during the next 20 – 30 years (the lifetime of concessional loans). An average inflation rate of 2-3 per cent would increase the operating expenses from US\$156 million in 2016 to US\$190-210 million p.a. by 2027. Other institutions that lend predominantly on a floating rate basis do not face this problem with the same magnitude, as Libor usually rises in parallel with the rise of inflation, off-setting the negative effects, while IFAD mainly lends at fixed rates (highly concessional and blended loans).<sup>186</sup>

## **B.2 Foreign exchange factors**

290. IFAD has an inbuilt **foreign exchange exposure in the budget** in so far as not all its expenditures are in US\$. Because its headquarters are in Rome, some

<sup>184</sup> IFC costs include those charged by IBRD for common overhead shared for efficiency reasons. (US\$ 1 = UA 1.34 and EUR 1.055)

<sup>185</sup> These impact investors have high operational expenses as their average investment size is in the range of US\$1 – 2 million, with many loans below the US\$1 million mark, significantly smaller than those of IFAD and also in the most difficult regions of the world. Furthermore, as their portfolios consist of short-term loans, new loan evaluations have to be made every 1-3 years on average.

<sup>186</sup> IFAD Treasury has its own financial model which takes inflation into account by projecting key variables such as replenishment contributions and administrative budget to remain flat in real terms.

expense items are, for instance, in euro. This is mitigated by the fact that part of its revenues is also in other currencies such as the euro.<sup>187</sup>

291. **Foreign exchange losses related to loans are a result of foreign exchange fluctuations of the SDR vs the US dollar.** Although IFAD accounts are denominated in US\$, loans are predominantly denominated in SDR. Many institutions have either never adopted a basket (IFC, EBRD) or have at a later stage moved to single currency lending (World Bank, AfDB, AsDB and others; IDA and AsDB's concessional windows still denominate concessional loans in SDR).<sup>188,189</sup> Some IFAD borrowing members have stated a clear preference for single currency loans and also to convert their existing loans into US\$. Many borrowers still favour SDRs and if clients chose to stay in SDR or decide to take up loans in euro or other currencies, such positions could then be hedged in the derivatives markets.<sup>190</sup> Swapping floating rate funding in one currency into floating rate funding in another currency may entail a cost for the institution.<sup>191</sup> The cost is dependent on market movements and is thus subject to change (but once it is locked in through a swap, it stays locked-in until maturity).

### B.3 DSF and Grants

292. Both DSF and Grants are an important part of IFAD's array of operational instruments. DSF and Grants will remain part of the product range of the institution, unless there is a major change of strategy by members in the Governing Council. However, it needs to be recognized that **DSF and Grants are a serious source of uncertainty for the institution's financial sustainability**, posing threats to the assessment of IFAD's credit standing.
293. Should IFAD continue to provide DSF and grants on an annual basis to the tune of over US\$192.6 million as it did in 2017, the P/L impact would be substantial and the erosion of the institution's capital noticeable. DSF grants appear as an expenditure on IFAD's financial accounts in the period when conditions for the release of funds are met and this is only balanced in later years once donor countries compensate IFAD for the DSF made in previous years. This has significant uncertainty, given that it will happen in a 40-year period and after a 10-year grace period. P/L losses due to DSF and Grants, unless compensated by replenishments, lead to a shrinkage of IFAD's equity base and thus to a reduction of IFAD's lending activities. Donors that have agreed to compensate IFAD for making operations in the form of DSF will only compensate the institution in future years, i.e. starting from 10 years from the time the DSF are made. While these commitments can be considered as 'morally binding', they are not legally binding: governments can opt to change decisions and not to pay if their priorities change. Such uncertainty can be detrimental to IFAD's credit rating.
294. **Separate accounts are an option for the funding of DSF and grants.** One alternative to provide a key building block for IFAD's financial stability and

<sup>187</sup> The World Bank does not hedge its non-US\$ budget as the large majority of its expenses are in US\$. EBRD hedges its non-EUR expenses on an annual basis. AfDB hedges its administrative budget every year into SDR.

<sup>188</sup> IDA now offers loans in US\$, euro, British pounds and yen in addition to SDR. Floating rate loans are not available in SDR. <http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/htm/ibrd.html>

<sup>189</sup> From 2017 WB Annual Report, page 17 (PDF page 157): "Commitment Currency The currency of commitment for IDA grants and loans is predominantly the SDR. However, in response to client needs to reduce currency exposure and simplify debt management, IDA offers a Single Currency Lending option that allows IDA recipients to denominate new IDA loans in US\$, euro, British pounds and yen. As of June 30, 2017, \$5.5 billion of US dollar-denominated loans and US dollar equivalent \$3.3 billion in euro-denominated loans had been approved under the Single Currency lending programme, of which \$1.2 billion in US\$ equivalent was outstanding. Further, loans provided under IDA18 from the Scale-up Facility and for transitional support, may only be denominated in either US\$, euro, British pounds and yen [circa \$0.5 billion for FY 16 & FY 17].

<sup>190</sup> Nota bene: long term hedging in derivatives markets has potentially an indirect cost as IFAD would, under certain conditions, have to post collateral to its counterparties. Depending on whether the posting of collateral has a positive or negative spread, such posting could have negative P/L implications, albeit at a fraction of the losses recorded for foreign exchange fluctuations in the 2016 P/L.


<sup>191</sup> That is the main reason why the funds from KfW had to be on-lent in euro; swapping the KfW Euribor funding into US\$ Libor funding would have added a cost of about 40 to 60 bp a.

transparency, could be to hold Grants and DSF in separate accounts, similar to trust fund accounts, rather than being financed via IFAD's balance sheet and P/L. The initial funding for DSF grants made during current replenishment cycles would have to come directly from fresh replenishment donations. In this way, only money in those separate accounts can be spent on DSF or Grants. As a result, IFAD's P/L and balance sheet would be shielded from the drain of DSF and Grants and IFAD's financial stability better protected.<sup>192</sup> Separating DSF and Grants from IFAD's balance sheet would thus take a crucial factor of uncertainty away and help in the stabilisation of IFAD's financial predictability and sustainability. Even if IFAD continued to operate on a loss-making basis, its credit standing would be strengthened.<sup>193</sup>

295. **The IFFIm Model.** A second, more complex, model for addressing the issue of DSF can be found in the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) that provides front-loaded funding to the GAVI. In 2006, donors agreed to make multi-year legally binding payment pledges to GAVI to support vaccination. These pledges, amounting to over US\$6 billion in total, were legally assigned to IFFIm, providing a very strong balance sheet to obtain a (then) AAA/Aaa rating and allowing IFFIm to raise funds in the international capital markets at low costs. Figure 17 shows IFFIm's use of donor payment commitments stretching out to 2030 as the basis for borrowing in the capital markets (purple columns). IFFIm's model was explicitly mentioned in the UN Third International Conference on Financing for Development – Addis Ababa July 2015 declaration: "We encourage consideration of how existing mechanisms, such as the International Finance Facility for Immunisation might be replicated to address broader development needs." Applying the IFFIm example to IFAD would mean that future DSF compensation could be made legally binding, thus enabling the use of these pledges as assets on the balance sheet and to borrow against them in order to make pay-outs under the DSF.

Figure 17

### IFFIm issues bonds based on long-term pledges



Source: IFFIM website.

296. **Allowing for shifting borrowing conditions.** Complementary to the above, an additional measure would be to change the loan arrangements for future loans, to replace DSF by a loan whose terms and conditions follow the country's classification. Interest and principal repayments would be waived as long as the country is classified as a DSF recipient. Should the classification change, then the principal and interest repayment may be re-introduced (e.g., after an adjustment

<sup>192</sup> In each replenishment, the DSF/Grant accounts would have to be refilled if IFAD were to continue to use DSF/Grants as part of its product range. If the DSF/Grant accounts are empty, then these instruments would no longer be offered until they are replenished.

<sup>193</sup> EBRD obtained an AAA/Aaa rating from the start though it was predicted to be loss making for a while as it started operations.

period) so as to match the lending conditions normally applied to that country classification. A similar principle could be applied in the future to DSF and highly concessional loans: the terms of the loan could be hardened depending on the evolution of the country classification (loan maturity is 40 years). While not applying strictly this principle, other DFIs have moved towards accelerated repayment clauses for concessional financing as the classification of a country changes (see Chapter IV).

#### B.4 Loan terms

297. **Revenues from concessional loans are limited and eroded by inflation.** The low amount of US\$51 million in interest income on a net loan portfolio of US\$5.2 billion is evidence of the fact that the vast majority of loans are made on highly concessional terms (see Chapter IV and breakdown in section A of this Chapter). As inflation drives an increase in the operating budget (even if the budget itself is at zero real growth), the income/expense ratios would continually deteriorate as IFAD's concessional loans charge only a fixed fee of 0.75 per cent p.a., regardless of the interest rate environment or inflation.
298. Even if there were a marginal increase of the fee on highly concessional loans (e.g. by 25 bp to 1 per cent), it would take time before having a significant effect due to the fact that the fee for existing loans cannot retroactively be changed and highly concessional loans remain outstanding for many years. By the year 2027, when new concessional loans will have been made to the order of around US\$2.3 billion, the additional revenue would amount to about US\$6 million p.a.<sup>194</sup>
299. Changes to future loan structures that may improve financial sustainability in the long term may consist of: (a) allowing the term of a loan to change during its life following the classification of the country (IFAD could charge ordinary loan fees once a country is no longer eligible for highly concessional loans, including an accelerated repayment option for the country at that stage); (b) instead of a flat fee of 0.75 per cent, charge a fee that is linked to Libor (or even inflation) which could provide a partial hedge to the operating budget; (c) another alternative, could be to link the interest payments of highly concessional loans to the country's GDP growth.<sup>195</sup>
300. **Ordinary loans can avoid erosion by inflation,** inasmuch as they are Libor-based (thus adjusting for market trends and expectations in inflation) and IFAD can determine the spread rate. When such loans are funded using borrowed funds (currently sovereign borrowings) there is an option to modify loan terms so as to explicitly charge over average cost of funds.<sup>196,197</sup>

#### B.5 Treasury income

301. **It may prove difficult in the long run to maintain or increase Treasury income without either significantly increasing the volume of funds under management or increasing the risk parameters.** Assuming that an increase in the risk parameters is not on the agenda, Treasury could increase its assets under management by either managing a larger portion of IFAD's equity or by increasing the amounts of borrowed funds. In the former case, IFAD would have fewer funds available for making loans on concessional terms which is contrary to its mandate.

<sup>194</sup> As blended loans charge a fixed rate of 2% p.a., the same considerations apply as for the concessional loans.

<sup>195</sup> Cf Christian Kopf, The Case for GDP Linked Securities;  
[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/bmcg/170207/Item\\_1\\_-\\_GDP-linked\\_bonds\\_and\\_sovereign\\_bond\\_backed\\_securities.pdf?be259a371b60997ecddf4fa3276631dd](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/groups/pdf/bmcg/170207/Item_1_-_GDP-linked_bonds_and_sovereign_bond_backed_securities.pdf?be259a371b60997ecddf4fa3276631dd)

<sup>196</sup> The funding cost of the KfW loan is Euribor + 30bp and the cost of the AFD loan is Euribor + 35bp. Note that most demand for ordinary loans is in US\$ and converting the KfW and AFD funding into US\$ Libor would add about 40-50bp p.a. The all-in cost IFAD would thus have to achieve in order to cover this funding is ca. US\$ Libor + 80bp p.a. A loan margin of US\$ Libor + 130 bp would generate revenues of 50bp.

<sup>197</sup> Also, the African Development Bank lends at a margin that takes its cost of funds into account and the formula amounts to Libor +/- cost of funds + a margin of 80bp.

302. Increasing Treasury assets by borrowing would only make sense if Treasury can invest such funds profitably, i.e. at a better margin than the spread over Euribor or Libor it has to pay on its funding. The funding spread greatly depends on IFAD's funding strategy. In turn, borrowing at 'aggressive' levels in the international capital markets will depend on IFAD's future rating. A triple-A rating would enable the institution to borrow at attractive terms in the markets. With an AA rating in contrast to an AAA rating, the terms would deteriorate by 10 – 20+ basis points or more, depending mainly on maturity and market conditions. If IFAD managed to lock-in a 10 bp positive carry on additional borrowings of US\$1 billion, it would only contribute an additional US\$1 million to the P/L. While a higher positive carry may be possible, it may not be sustainable in the long run. Such small additional revenue is no panacea to solve IFAD's issue of financial sustainability.


## C. IFAD's future financial sustainability under various scenarios

### C.1 General questions

303. The **fundamental question** to be addressed by IFAD's members or Management is whether IFAD is satisfied with its current modus operandi and volume of loans which is limited to its equity and a small amount of borrowed funds or whether it should seek to significantly leverage its equity to full capacity through borrowing, and thus increase its outreach to help a greater number of poor rural people move out of poverty. Other DFIs never asked themselves this question and decided from the outset to maximize their investments and separate out programmes for the poorest countries and poorest people into separate lending facilities such as IDA. The lending portfolios of other DFIs would be dramatically reduced without borrowing. Figure 18 below illustrates how small other DFIs would likely be today, had they operated the way IFAD operates.

Figure 18

**A hypothetical comparison of IFIs with and without leveraging (US\$ billion)**



Source: CLE Elaboration from DFI data

304. Some IFAD members and Management have repeatedly stressed that IFAD is a fund and not a bank. In practice, IFAD operates as a supranational financial institution and enjoys privileges such as: (a) preferred creditor status in its countries of operations; (b) independence from national regulation and financial supervision; and (c) potentially, zero per cent risk weighting of its securities, which is crucial for many institutional investors. Becoming incorporated as a bank would not bring obvious additional advantages.
305. Two institutions recently changed their status: the Dutch DFI, FMO, became a development bank and it is now supervised by the Dutch Central Bank and has to fulfil capital adequacy and other requirements. The Council of Europe Resettlement Fund for National Refugees and Over-Population in Europe became the Council of Europe Development Bank, following a change in its main activities. Neither example provides a compelling reason for IFAD to change its form of incorporation into a bank.

306. **Continuing business as usual?** If IFAD decides to continue its operations as at present, it would depend on regular replenishments to cover the losses or experience depletion of its equity base and reduction in the PoLG. Even assuming that Grants and DSF are either fully covered by donations or reduced to zero, the operating budget would exceed IFAD's revenue generation from loans plus a more variable contribution from Treasury operations. Making annual losses in the range of US\$250 to US\$400 million per year would require replenishments in equal amounts to preserve the *status quo*, let alone allow the institution to grow. Continuing business as usual would not lead to bankruptcy (assuming that replenishments continue to materialize), but severely limit IFAD's contribution to the 2030 agenda.

## C.2 Assessing different scenarios for sustainability

307. While the future evolution of IFAD's financial sustainability cannot be easily predicted, it is possible to run simplified scenarios to illustrate what would be the consequences of different measures regarding the Fund's borrowing and lending policies, including leveraging options. Other measures, such as changes in operating expenses, would also have implications for financial sustainability. However, they are not examined in detail in this report as they do not strictly belong to the financial architecture. The following paragraphs analyse, for each scenario: (i) the profit/loss implications; (ii) the cumulative additional profit/loss; and (iii) the size of the loan portfolio outstanding. The model for the scenarios, developed for this CLE, is a recursive one: it simulates a baseline for replenishment and sovereign borrowing, revenues and expenses of IFAD, based on 2017 mid-year data, starting in 2018 and projects it through 2028 (a ten-year time frame). The simulation could have been run for a longer period but holding assumptions constant over several decades would not have been meaningful.
308. Key assumptions for the model are: (i) all existing loans continue as before, no loan terms changes and no defaults; (ii) inflation: 2.00 per cent p.a. over the next 10 years; (iii) Libor: 2.50 per cent p.a.; (iv) treasury assets remain at about US\$1.4 billion and Treasury return is set at Libor + 50 bp; (v) operating expenses: US\$156 million p.a., growing at inflation (in case of a major increase in lending, this assumption translates into some improvement in the economies of scale); (vi) replenishment: US\$400 million p.a. (i.e. US\$1.2 billion replenishment per triennium); (vii) DSF: US\$125 million p.a.; (viii) grants: US\$55 million p.a.;<sup>198</sup> (ix) new loans have been limited (to simplify) to highly concessional: 0.75 per cent p.a. and ordinary: Libor + 0.95 per cent p.a. (85 per cent of volume on highly concessional and 15 on ordinary loans);<sup>199</sup> and (x) cost of borrowed funds for IFAD: 25 bp over Libor.<sup>200</sup> Some of these assumptions depend on the evolution of monetary trends and financial markets and may not be realised in the forthcoming decade. The simulation outcomes are summarized in tabular form further below. Detailed outcomes are presented in Annex III in graphic form (with a breakdown of treasury net profit, interests on loans, operational expenses and DSF).
309. The scenarios analysed below differ from IFAD's financial statements as they do not take into account losses or gains from potential foreign exchange movements, income from other sources, depreciations, loan impairments and other items. The concentration on the key factors serves as a general indicator of the balance sheet and P/L dynamics and, specifically, to provide an indication of the magnitude of changes needed to achieve financial sustainability.

<sup>198</sup> The amounts for DSF and grants are assumed to remain static till 2028.

<sup>199</sup> [https://www.ifad.org/what/operating\\_model/tags/interest\\_rates/1966113](https://www.ifad.org/what/operating_model/tags/interest_rates/1966113)

No assumption about grace periods has been made. The basic premise is that, generally, reflows are on-lent without any great time delay, keeping the amounts of Treasury assets basically constant over the years.

<sup>200</sup> The average cost of funds will greatly depend on IFAD's future rating and IFAD's borrowing strategy. Currently, the cost of sovereign borrowings is higher than the 20 bp assumed. If IFAD receives a very strong rating and can establish itself as a premier borrower in the capital markets, an average cost of funds of Libor + 20bp may be achievable. However, in the next paragraphs, if scenario F were re-run using Libor +50bp, the results would not change in a substantial manner.

310. The modelling starts with a base-case scenario (Table 20-i). This scenario shows that, without any adjustment, and without borrowing, the loan portfolio would continue to increase until 2028 but, due to increasing annual losses, cumulative losses would approach US\$3 billion. Thus, an increasing percentage of the replenishments would be devoted to cover losses. The base-case scenario is then slightly modified (Table 20-ii) should Libor increase in the future to 3.5 per cent. If global economic growth continues and expansive monetary policies are progressively phased out, Libor is likely to increase. This would lead to slightly lower cumulative losses and larger loan portfolio.

Table 20

**Base-case scenario and base-case scenario plus Libor increase to 3.5 per cent (US\$ 000)**

<b>(i) Base Case</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>
Net profit	(233,566)	(241,791)	(252,202)
Cumulative additional P/L		(1,656,977)	(2,896,233)
Total lending	6,881,854	7,698,394	8,469,549
<b>(ii) Base Case and Libor at 3.5%</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>
Net profit	(214,511)	(220,808)	(229,228)
Cumulative additional P/L		(1,518,069)	(2,646,462)
Total lending	6,900,676	7,816,319	8,696,346

Source: CLE modelling exercise (2017).

311. Next, the model considers several scenarios (*ceteris paribus* on the base-case). These are presented in Table 21.
312. **Scenario A** assumes that IFAD makes all future loans on highly concessional terms and would not borrow. IFAD would only generate a net margin of 0.75 per cent on all of its future loans instead of a margin of Libor + 95bp on the 15 per cent of reflows and net replenishments that are onlent at ordinary terms. Under this scenario, in 2028 cumulative additional losses slightly increase and the loan portfolio size slightly decreases compared to the base-case scenario.
313. **Scenario B** explores the consequence for IFAD of borrowing additional funds at half of replenishment size, i.e. US\$200 million p.a.<sup>201</sup> and on-lending these at highly concessional terms of 0.75 per cent fixed. As the borrowings are at a floating rate but highly concessional loans are at fixed rates, the funds would have to be swapped into fixed-rate funding at a rate in euro of 1.75 per cent p.a. and in US\$ of 2.50 per cent.<sup>202</sup> IFAD would lock in an annual loss of about 2 per cent on these onlent funds. Not hedging the funding, i.e. borrowing floating rate and lending fixed rate would lead to potentially higher losses. Such open interest rate positions would have negative implications for IFAD's credit rating and thus IFAD's borrowing costs.<sup>203</sup> Compared to the base-case, this scenario would imply a larger loan portfolio in 2028 but higher cumulative losses.
314. **Scenario C**. This scenario simulates borrowing (sovereign or market-based) set at half of the annual replenishment (i.e. US\$200 million p.a.) and onlending these amounts at ordinary terms of Libor plus 0.95 per cent. Driven by borrowings and ordinary loans, by 2028 the loan portfolio would further increase compared to scenario B but with lower cumulative losses (lending margins on borrowing are now positive). Reduction in losses would be beneficial but not sufficient for full cost recovery.

<sup>201</sup> Sovereign or from the market at a rate of Libor + 25bp p.a.

<sup>202</sup> Nota bene: these rates are assumption of market rates and can vary significantly

<sup>203</sup> If, for example, Libor rose to 5%, the annual additional loss as a result of such lending would amount to US\$90 million by 2028

315. **Scenario D** is based on Scenario C but assumes that IFAD borrows US\$500 million p.a. and onlends the funds at the level of Libor + 0.95 per cent.<sup>204</sup> This scenario implies two separate lending windows in order to lend all borrowings at ordinary terms. Again, driven by borrowings and ordinary loans, by the year 2028, the loan portfolio would be over US\$14 billion but with lower cumulative losses compared to scenario C because a higher amount of borrowing would be invested on ordinary loans carrying a positive margin. This would further improve the P/L situation of IFAD but would still fall short of recovering operating expenses.

Table 21

**Summary of simulations A, B, C and D (US\$ 000)**

Scenarios	Scenario Description	Years			Comparison with base case for 2028
		2018	2023	2028	
<b>Scenario A</b>	No borrowing; all loans are highly concessional	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>	<i>Total lending decreases by 0.3%; Additional cumulative losses increase by 1.%</i>
Net Profit		(234,022)	(244,511)	(257,148)	
Cumulative additional P/L			(1,656,514)	(2,926,068)	
Total Lending		6,881,854	7,691,576	8,444,659	
<b>Scenario B</b>	Borrow additional funds (volume of half replenishment), onlend at highly concessional terms	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>	<i>Total lending increases by 23.2% and additional cumulated losses increase by 9.8%</i>
Net Profit		(238,429)	(267,319)	(299,473)	
Cumul. additional P/L			(1,748,583)	(3,180,267)	
Total Lending:		7,081,001	8,832,316	10,432,786	
<b>Scenario C</b>	Borrowing additional funds at half of replenishment, onlend at ordinary terms	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>	<i>Total lending increases by 26.9% and additional cumulated losses reduce by 3.4%</i>
Net Profit		(232,146)	(233,050)	(235,760)	
Cumul. additional P/L			(1,626,644)	(2,799,249)	
Total Lending:		7,081,854	8,919,986	10,750,091	
<b>Scenario D</b>	Borrows US\$500 million p.a. and onlend at ordinary terms	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>	<i>Total lending increases by 67.3% and additional cumulated losses reduce by 8.4%</i>
Net Profit		(230,016)	(219,940)	(211,749)	
Cumul. additional P/L			(1,581,145)	(2,653,773)	
Total Lending:		6,381,854	10,752,374	14,170,903	

Source: CLE modelling exercise (2017).

316. **Key lessons** from the above scenarios are that: first, borrowing and lending at highly concessional terms entails increasing the loan portfolio but at the price of generating high cumulative losses. This option would produce further imbalances and uncertainty for future financial sustainability. Second, more borrowing and onlending at ordinary terms leads to increasing the size of the loan portfolio and reducing cumulative losses. Inter alia, these results are due to the fact that a lower proportion of the replenishment would be used to subsidize losses and more of it would be used for increasing the PoLG. Moreover, onlending at ordinary terms the borrowed funds would carry a positive margin under the model's assumptions. Note that a sizeable increase in the borrowing would require two lending windows, as that amount could not be allocated via the PBAS.

### C.3 Moving closer to financial sustainability

317. The previous scenarios succeeded in increasing the loan portfolio but did little to improve financial sustainability (cumulative losses would continue to grow in all the above scenarios, albeit at a different speed, because interest rate margins are too low for cost recovery). For this reason, two additional scenarios are proposed (Table 22). In these, some parameters are changed from the base-case assumptions in order to 'solve' for financial sustainability.
318. **Scenario E. Removing DSF and grants from the balance sheet.** Under this scenario, payment for DSF and Grants would be held in separate accounts and taken out of IFAD's balance sheet. Replenishments for IFAD's operations would be subsequently reduced to US\$220 million. The remaining amount to cover DSF and grants (assumed to amount to US\$180 million p.a.) would need to be deposited in

<sup>204</sup> Nota bene, allocating loans not using PBAS but project demand would require a change of policy and the opening of a "demand window".

a separate fund to finance DSF and grants. The “cost” to IFAD members would be the same as before (US\$400 million per year). Under this scenario, the loan portfolio would increase up to the same level as the base-case scenario, IFAD would still run an annual loss but this would be dramatically reduced.

319. **Scenario F. Removing DSF and grants from the balance sheet and increasing the margin on ordinary loans.** As a further development of scenario E, in order to cover IFAD’s operating expenses of US\$156 million p.a. (growing at 2 per cent inflation rate) IFAD would need to increase its loan margins on ordinary loans. Under scenario F, IFAD would: (i) invest reflows 85:15 highly concessional: ordinary; (ii) charge a margin of 0.75 per cent on highly concessional, and Libor + 2.0 per cent on new ordinary loans;<sup>205</sup> and (iii) borrow US\$500 million p.a. and onlend the funds for ordinary loans at the same terms as above. By the year 2028 the loan portfolio would reach US\$14 billion and, soon after 2023, IFAD would break even.<sup>206</sup> Lending at a margin of 2 per cent over Libor would still constitute lending at favourable terms in comparison to the terms achieved by sovereign borrowers in the capital markets.<sup>207</sup>

Table 22

**Summary of simulations E and F (moving towards financial sustainability) (US\$ 000)**

Scenarios	Scenario Description	Years			Comparison with base case for 2028
		2018	2023	2028	
<b>Scenario E</b>	Case-base but remove DSF and grants from the balance sheet	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>	<i>Total lending reaches same level but cumulative losses on balance sheet are reduced to a fourth</i>
Net Profit		(53,556)	(61,791)	(72,202)	
Cumulative additional P/L			(396,977)	(736,233)	
Total Lending		6,713,580	7,698,076	8,468,906	
<b>Scenario F</b>	Remove DSF and grants from the balance sheet, borrow US\$500m pa. and onlend at 2% increased margin on ordinary loans	<b>2018</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2028</b>	<i>Total Lending would increase by 71% and the Fund would achieve net positive profit, decreasing cumulative losses.</i>
Net Profit		(43,700)	(4,223)	35,642	
Cumulative additional P/L			(195,089)	(96,651)	
Total Lending		7,382,502	10,842,714	14,501,287	

Source: CLE modelling exercise (2017).

320. **Summary and key observations from the simulation exercise.** The above scenarios, while being the outcome of a simplified modelling exercise, provide a sense of the magnitude of the issues that IFAD would face when seeking to expand the size of its operations while trying to improve financial sustainability.
321. Inter alia, the scenarios show that, trying to simultaneously increase borrowing (i.e., leverage) while onlending borrowed funds at highly concessional terms, would increase the loan portfolio but aggravate losses. Such a strategy would not be implementable as IFAD’s credit rating would deteriorate, driving up costs or even preventing IFAD from borrowing from the markets. Instead, significantly increasing leverage while onlending at ordinary terms (this may require a second lending window) would increase the loan portfolio and only slightly reduce losses.
322. In order to move closer to full cost recovery (financial sustainability), IFAD would need two main measures. First, it could remove DSF and grants from the balance sheet and create a separate account (as described earlier in this chapter) to finance them, whereby DSF and grants could be fully paid-up *ex ante*, instead of being funded through a pay-as-you-go system as at present. Removing this situation of uncertainty may improve credit rating assessment opportunities.


<sup>205</sup> As IFAD’s borrowings both from other DFIs or from the capital markets is likely to be at a margin above Libor on average, it is important to reflect this in the interest rate charged on ordinary loans which thus has to be Libor + IFAD’s borrowing cost + its margin to cover operating expenses and capital charges, etc.

<sup>206</sup> If we assume a borrowing cost of 50bp instead of 25bp, IFAD would break even only in year 2025 and by 2028 the net profits would be US\$21 million instead of US\$35 million.

<sup>207</sup> Compare with the spreads of 6.20 per cent for LICs; 3.42 per cent for LMICs; 3.15 per cent for UMICs mentioned in Chapter IV.

323. Second, IFAD could also consider increasing its lending margins on ordinary loans. While there may be some initial sensitivity from borrowing members (as discussed in Chapter IV), this would still be more favourable for sovereign borrowers than the existing terms on capital markets.
324. The above discussion is visualized in Figure 19, comparing the base-case scenario with scenarios B (borrowing and onlending at highly concessional terms), D (increased borrowing and onlending at ordinary terms), E (Removing DSF and grants from the balance sheet) and F (i.e., E plus increasing the margin on ordinary loans).

Figure 19

**Modelled total lending and additional cumulative losses in 2028 (US\$ billion)**

Source: CLE modelling exercise (2017)

**Key points**

- This evaluation defines financial sustainability as the extent to which an institution has financial resources to operate without regular recourse to donors/shareholders, protect its equity capital and cover its operational costs and loan-loss provision.
- In the past ten years, conditions for financial sustainability at IFAD have not been met. Income from loans (structurally low) and treasury investments have not covered operating expenses. Until 2007, IFAD was able to cover expenses mainly due to large revenue from treasury investments, which is not feasible under the current market trends. IFAD experienced continuous losses since 2010 which have led to some capital erosion.
- Operating expenses as a ratio to the total assets are significantly higher for IFAD than for other DFIs. IFAD has dis-economies of scale compared with other institutions and operates in areas that are more difficult to reach (design and implementation support are costlier per dollar lent). Relative to other DFIs, IFAD allocates a lower proportion of its administrative budget to "operational" work. Measures to reduce expenses, to increase the size of PoLG (or ideally on both) would lead to a decline of IFAD's operating expense ratio.
- DSF, as well as grants, are important factors in determining the size of losses. While IFAD members have agreed to compensate for the foregone principal of DSF, this will happen in the decades to come and is not legally binding, causing high uncertainty. This may be a detrimental factor to high credit rating. Options to address this issue may be: (i) for members to pre-pay the principal of DSF (and grants) by establishing a separate fund from the replenishment; or (ii) to make the compensation for DSF principal legally binding. In addition, an innovative approach could be to set clauses for shifting borrowing conditions for future loans (when country classification changes in the future, so would lending terms change).
- Financial scenarios run by this evaluation provide three key findings: first, increasing IFAD's leveraging (borrowing) and onlending borrowed funds at highly concessional terms is not feasible as this would increase losses (this would prevent IFAD from borrowing at acceptable terms). Second, by significantly increasing borrowing while onlending at ordinary terms, IFAD would increase the loan portfolio and reduce losses compared to the base-case scenario but would not achieve cost recovery. Third, in order to move closer to achieve full cost recovery, IFAD would need to establish a mechanism to pre-pay the DSF principal and increase its lending margins (i.e., its interest rates) on ordinary loans.
- The main conclusion of the scenario analysis is that there is a possible path to move closer to financial sustainability while increasing leverage and total lending. However, this requires significant changes to the current financial architecture in order to remove factors of uncertainty and to raise the portfolio yield.

## VII. Conclusions and recommendations

### A. Conclusions

#### A.1 Relevance of the financial architecture

325. **Since IFAD9, IFAD's financial architecture has been under strain and could not support an expanding financial portfolio of loans and grants for rural development and poverty reduction.** One of the implicit assumptions of IFAD's financial architecture was that member countries would continue to provide replenishment contributions at a level that supports the expansion of the PoLG. However, the international context poses challenges. While total ODA and agricultural ODA increased between 2006 and 2016, there has been a decline in donor contributions to the concessional funds of other multilateral DFIs, such as in IDA and ADF in the recent years.
326. Between IFAD6 and IFAD8, replenishments have increased considerably but, since IFAD9, they have declined at constant prices. Income from treasury investments decreased, following the low interest rate trends in the financial markets. As a result, IFAD has become increasingly reliant on replenishment contributions, supplemented by 'sovereign borrowing'. This will become increasingly apparent in the future as the financial footprint of DSF grows.
327. Achieving Agenda 2030 and the SDGs will require a significant increase in funding, in the order of US\$3.3 to US\$4.5 trillion per year. MDBs have leveraged their equity by issuing bonds on the international capital markets since their inception and the G20 are now encouraging MDBs to reform their financial architectures in order to more efficiently leverage the equity in their balance sheets, while maintaining their high credit rating, something all MDBs are now doing.
328. **Efforts to diversify the pool of financing resources have palliated some of the shortcomings of the financial architecture. However, the alternatives have costs, constraints and risks.** Following generous replenishments, the POLG grew between IFAD7 and IFAD8 but, from IFAD9, the replenishments and reflows were insufficient to finance the PoLG. To fill in that gap, IFAD began introducing modest amounts of debt through sovereign borrowing from the Spanish Trust Fund, KfW and, most recently, from AFD. However, the demand for financial assistance from many borrowing member countries exceeds IFAD's capacity to provide financing even with the additional funds mobilized through sovereign borrowing. Moreover, the KfW borrowing terms are such that IFAD can only onlend the proceeds on ordinary terms and in euro without incurring financial losses. This limits the number and categories of borrowing countries.
329. Concessional partner loans have the potential to offer lending terms that are more favourable to IFAD than the sovereign borrowing undertaken to date. However, they are unlikely to provide a sufficient volume and a predictable stream of funding to meet needs.
330. Complementary contributions and supplementary funds are additional to the replenishment pledges and this CLE found no evidence that complementary contributions replace core replenishment contributions. Their combined volume in the period 2007-2016 was slightly over half of the volume of replenishment contributions. In spite of the normative differences between complementary contributions and supplementary funds, in practice there are many similarities in their usage. An important difference, however, is that no commission is levied on complementary contributions to cover their administrative costs. The latter are subsidised by IFAD's administrative budget. On the other hand, a commission is paid to IFAD for supplementary funds but at a rate that is lower than in comparator organizations.
331. Cofinancing and national counterpart funding add important resources from international organizations and national partners. International cofinancing has

slightly declined and national counterpart funding has slightly increased in the past ten years. The level of funding of MDBs in agriculture and the amounts committed by bilateral and multilateral sources for climate change-related projects suggests that there are further opportunities for scaling up the results of IFAD-funded interventions.

332. IFAD Management is considering, for IFAD12, the possibility of further leveraging its equity resources by borrowing on international capital markets. The latter provide volumes, liquidity, the range of currencies and interest-rate bases that are necessary for DFIs to structure their balance sheets. However, the challenge is to obtain a high credit rating.

## **A.2 Effectiveness of the financial architecture**

333. **The current system to allocate financing resources based on performance (PBAS) has merits in terms of transparency. However, there are challenges regarding its future application, particularly if IFAD increases its sovereign borrowing or accesses capital markets.** The benefits of introducing the PBAS and the enhancement it brought to IFAD's credibility have been recognised by a dedicated CLE completed in 2016. However, many countries are interested in borrowing more from IFAD than their PBAS allocations and some would consider borrowing additional amounts on hardened terms. It is a challenge to satisfy these demands with the current allocation system.
334. In case of a large increase in borrowing, either from sovereign sources or from international capital markets (should IFAD decide to take this direction), only ordinary-term loans would carry an interest rate margin capable of covering borrowing costs. The challenge is that the PBAS constrains IFAD's ability to increase ordinary lending relative to other types of lending. To overcome this challenge, Management has considered an option, on a preliminary basis, to further reform the PBAS under IFAD12, establishing a second window, dedicated to ordinary loans, to be allocated through a risk-based system rather than a country needs and performance-based system.
335. **There is general appreciation from borrowing countries for IFAD's project financing modality. However, compared to other DFIs, IFAD offers a limited range of financial products and flexibility of lending terms.** The current loan modalities and conditions (notably the long-term amortization plan) allow borrowing members to finance a wide range of activities to support rural development and poverty reduction. However, other DFIs offer far more flexibility in terms of the choice of maturity, grace period and amortization schedule, including accelerated repayment loan clauses. Regarding the currency of lending, other DFIs introduced options other than SDRs many years ago while single currency borrowing has been introduced at IFAD only recently. Many countries manage their national debt in US dollars (or euro) and would appreciate the flexibility to select the currency of their choice, including, in some cases, their national currency.
336. Considering IFAD's current priorities and needs, the CLE finds that some financial instruments are missing, such as: (i) products to facilitate scaling up of development results; (ii) products to support integrated strategies for managing the risk of natural disasters and fragility; and (iii) a facility for pre-financing of project implementation preparedness. Borrowing countries have some appetite for financial products that support agricultural trade finance and hedging for agricultural commodity price risk. However, these may require non-sovereign lending instruments and careful analysis of possible options before being operationalised.
337. The Agreement establishing IFAD prevents the Fund from engaging in non-sovereign lending. In 2017, IFAD's Executive Board agreed on a proposal to establish a company with external funding, to support medium and small

agribusinesses and rural finance intermediaries through loans (SIF). Experience from prominent social impact investors suggests that the current proposal may face two risks: (i) high overhead costs; and (ii) problems of non-performing loans and significant financial losses.

338. **The IFAD terms and conditions for lending, including for ordinary loans, have been consistent with focus on rural poverty.** This CLE finds that the country needs, policies, priorities and the evolution of the national context have been stronger determinants of the contents of project design than the loan terms. In general, there is no evidence that hardening of lending terms has reduced project focus on poverty reduction.
339. Project performance and results are not correlated with lending terms in a significant manner. In the past ten years, IFAD has provided 71 per cent of its funding on highly concessional terms or as DSF. While countries eligible for these terms typically score low for governance and rural sector performance, on average, their project performance and results are at par with countries that borrow on ordinary terms.

### **A.3 Efficiency of the financial architecture**

340. **While the replenishment consultation is a well-established process, there is space to improve the representation of selected members, as well as the efficiency of the consultation.** The replenishment process is critical in establishing the overall level of resources available for lending and for operating expenses as well as in shaping the strategic focus of IFAD. A number of improvements have been made over the years in the representation, focus and organization of the replenishment process. At present, however, List C has difficulty in ensuring a balance of representation from the poorest borrowing countries and the growing number of MIC donors, whereas List A can be over-represented if all eligible members take their seats.
341. **The current internal and external systems of financial oversight are geared to a low risk environment, characterized by a relatively low level of borrowing. However, should IFAD shift to higher leveraging and sophistication of Treasury instruments, these systems may not be sufficient.** This CLE found that the financial information and data provided to the governing bodies is sufficient, albeit fragmented in its presentation, involving several documents. The capacity of the IFAD Governing Bodies for financial oversight is limited by the make-up of national government delegations in Rome and lack of financial background of many members of the Board and Audit Committee.
342. Internal control systems have some missing elements whose importance may increase with an increasing financial complexity. For example, IFAD does not have an Asset and Liability Committee which is standard in other DFIs, with the responsibility to review matters such as financial, liquidity and risk policies, funding, asset and liability management, hedging and other Treasury activities. The role and responsibilities for risk management are defined in broad terms in IFAD's Investment Policy Statement and rest with the President, without a clear delegation of authority and responsibility.
343. IFAD's policies regarding the investment of Treasury assets are less detailed than in comparator organizations. Because of higher risk tolerance, IFAD's treasury investments have higher yields and volatility than those of other DFIs. However, IFAD has adopted a more conservative risk appetite in the recent years.
344. **IFAD has made limited use of hedging instruments until recently and is exposed to foreign exchange fluctuations and risks.** DFIs use derivatives for risk management purposes, notably to swap borrowings and loans denominated in other currencies into the base currency, manage interest rate risks on borrowings

and loans, hedge future replenishment contributions and provide options to borrow in some national currencies.

345. Replenishment pledges in non-dollar contributions pose a foreign exchange risk for IFAD if, for example, they are denominated in a currency that depreciates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Since IFAD financial accounts are denominated in US dollars and loans are denominated in SDRs, IFAD is also exposed to foreign exchange losses related to loans, as a result of foreign exchange fluctuations of the SDR against the US dollar. IFAD also has some exposure to foreign exchange risk in the administrative budget because not all of its expenditures are in US dollars. Other DFIs (i.e., EBRD, AfDB) have hedged their administrative budget.

#### **A.4 Financial sustainability**

346. **The current financial architecture fails the test of financial sustainability, at least as far as the latter is generally understood in the markets. This has implications for the use of the replenishment proceeds and for future size of the PoLG.** IFAD has incurred financial losses every year since 2010 (except in 2017 and only due to favourable currency exchange movements), resulting in an erosion of its retained earnings and capital base. From a financial standpoint, the main contributing factors to this loss situation have been: (a) the low yield of the portfolio, dominated by highly concessional loans with fixed interest rates; (b) the DSF foregone principal and interest as well as the grant programme; and (c) the current low interest environment that suppresses yields on Treasury investments.
347. In addition to the above financial factors, there are also non-financial factors affecting cost recovery. These factors relate to the structural size of IFAD's operational expenses in relation to the size of the PoLG. As already highlighted by past evaluations such as the CLE on IFAD's Institutional Efficiency (2013), this CLE also notes that IFAD's operating expense ratios are higher than in comparator multilateral DFIs. These are due to lack of economies of scale (given IFAD's lower PoLG) and the specific nature of IFAD's operations involving interventions in areas that are remote and costly to serve. Any measure to reduce the size of expenses or to increase the size of the PoLG (or a combination of both) would also reduce operating expense ratios, other things being equal.
348. Losses lead to capital erosion and need to be compensated for by replenishment infusion. Thus, an increasing proportion of the replenishment receipts is used to subsidize losses and to fully pay for operating costs rather than to increase the size of the PoLG. As IFAD plans to increase its leverage and thus the efficiency of its use of capital, the implications for profit and losses must be considered. The simulations run for this evaluation show that there are possible measures to increase the size of the PoLG (through higher leveraging) and bring IFAD closer to financial sustainability. A scenario of full cost recovery would require an increase in the interest rate margin from the loan portfolio, notably from ordinary loans.
349. **The current arrangements of DSF, and to some extent the regular grants, contribute to IFAD's deteriorating profit and loss situation and lack of financial sustainability. This is a matter of concern, particularly if IFAD seeks to obtain a high credit rating.** DSF appears as an expenditure on IFAD's financial accounts in the period when conditions for the release of funds are met. This may be balanced in later years once donor countries compensate IFAD for the foregone principal. However, according to the present system, compensation will be on a "pay as you go" basis over a period of 40 years and with a ten-year grace period. While IFAD members have made and reaffirmed a commitment to repay the foregone principal (but not the foregone interest), this agreement is not legally binding and vulnerable to future policy reversal in the concerned donor countries. This uncertainty, if unresolved, may hamper a high credit rating.
350. In sum, as highlighted by this evaluation, **four decades after its establishment, the financial architecture of IFAD requires important reforms.** These

reforms concern the mobilization of financial resources, the system for allocating financial resources, the financial products available to respond to the need and demand of borrowing member countries, the financial sustainability of the Fund as well as internal and external financial governance features. Accomplishing these reforms will be essential in order to fulfil IFAD's unique mandate of rural poverty reduction and contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals in a more effective and efficient manner.

## **B. Recommendations**

351. **1. Address the problem of systematic financial losses which leads to substantial capital erosion.**
352. 1.a IFAD needs to address the long-terms effects and risks on its balance sheet connected to DSF and regular grants. Reducing the degree of future uncertainty would improve IFAD's situation in terms of both financial sustainability and when seeking a credit rating. All DSF and grants could be moved to a special purpose fund that is not consolidated on IFAD's balance sheet. At each replenishment, the accounts of this fund would be refilled and further DSF and grants would not be approved until the accounts have been replenished. As an alternative, IFAD may consider turning future compensation for DSF principal into a legally binding agreement.
353. 1.b In order to move closer to financial sustainability, it will be important to improve the return of the IFAD portfolio of loans. A measure to be considered is to increase interest rate margins for ordinary loans, and this can be done to a level that remains favourable compared to prevailing market rates for borrowing by sovereign entities, as shown by this evaluation.
354. 1.c In order to support the above fundamental changes to IFAD's financial architecture, this CLE reiterates the importance of cost-efficiency measures that have been recommended by past evaluations (notably the CLE on IFAD's Institutional Effectiveness). Measures to reduce the size of expenses, increase the PoLG, or a combination of both, would improve economies of scale and reduce operating expense ratios.
355. **2. Provide more flexible conditions for existing financial products and prepare for the introduction of new products.** IFAD should conduct feasibility studies on both broadening choices on terms and conditions of current loans and on introducing new financial products. These studies will need to review current practices in other international DFIs and assess their adaptability to IFAD's context.
356. 2.a Broaden the options on existing financial products. IFAD should offer more flexibility regarding the length of the grace period, maturity period and the amortization schedule, including the accelerated repayment option as is currently provided by some MDBs. IFAD could also offer the option of selecting of currency for new loans (e.g., euro, US dollars), including in some cases national currencies, appropriately priced, if IFAD can generate such funding either through borrowing in the market or via cross currency swaps.
357. 2.b Adjusting the terms of new loans to reflect changes in a country's classification. For new loans and DSF, IFAD could introduce a clause allowing loan terms to be adjusted to reflect changing country classifications (thus hardening or softening of terms, depending on the direction of change). In particular, the lending conditions for DSF or highly concessional loans would be applied as long as a country classification remains in that category.
358. 2.c Preparing the introduction of new financial instruments. This may include: (i) loan products designed to facilitate scaling up, drawing from experience of other DFIs and streamlining project approval procedures (e.g., results-based lending, multitranches financing facility or IDA scale-up facility); (ii) instruments to better

- respond to natural disasters or situations of fragility; and (iii) instruments to pre-finance project implementation preparedness and reducing project start-up time.
359. 2.d The Smallholder and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Investment Finance Fund (SIF) would benefit from further refinements. For financially sustainable results and a viable exit strategy and to enhance efficiency, the SIF could emphasize working through intermediaries (e.g., in the finance sector or marketing, whether these be micro-finance institutions, investment funds, banks, mobile phone companies or more apex-level marketing or processing companies) rather than processing and administering many small loans at the quasi-retail level.
360. **3. Revise the financial allocation system.** IFAD's plans to substantially increase leverage through borrowing would mean that the totality of resources cannot be lent through the existing PBAS only. Responding to this challenge would consist of creating a second lending window for proceeds from borrowing (e.g., sovereign loans; bonds issued on international markets). This window would be for ordinary loans (i.e. Libor-based, single currency with a margin that compensates IFAD for the risk and administrative costs), separate from the PBAS, administered in a manner that is consistent with IFAD's asset liability management strategy. The PBAS could then be used to allocate concessional funds only. In line with practices in other DFIs, IFAD could allow selected Member States to borrow amounts in excess of their PBAS allocation on terms that are similar to ordinary loans.
361. **4. Conduct preparatory work for potential access to capital markets.** Learning from the IDA case, it may not be strictly necessary for IFAD to be profitable to tap markets. However, a high credit rating is a *condicio sine qua non* and would in all likelihood require a restructuring of IFAD's financial architecture, by addressing those factors that create uncertainty. In particular, it would be fundamental to address the issues of DSF, grants and foreign exchange swings. IFAD would need to obtain a rating from at least two of the main rating agencies that have experience in rating DFIs (i.e., S&P, Moody's and Fitch/IBCA) and early initial discussions may be helpful in order to be able to address any fundamental concerns that the credit rating agencies may have.
362. **5. Use hedging instruments to better manage foreign exchange risks.** To reduce risks connected with foreign exchange fluctuations, IFAD could consider hedging future replenishment pledges into US dollars either fully or at certain stages during the encashment process. Pledges are not legally binding but have had a fair degree of certainty of being realised. In addition, IFAD could consider offering its clients the possibility of converting their existing portfolios of SDR-denominated loans to US dollars or euro-denominated loans. In this context, IFAD may consider the pros and cons of undertaking currency swaps into the US dollar for the remaining SDR loans to hedge the foreign exchange risk. Finally, IFAD could also hedge non-US dollar administrative expenditures (e.g., staff salaries) or operate a split budget, holding the latter in euro.
363. **6. Strengthen IFAD's financial governance.** This includes aspects of both the external and internal governance; in particular:
364. 6.a Enhance the capacity of the IFAD Governing Bodies for financial oversight. As the complexity of IFAD financial architecture increases with the introduction of borrowing, further leverage and hedging, it may be beneficial to extend the terms of reference and role of the audit committee and to specify minimum qualifications of individuals for audit committee membership.
365. 6.b Elaborate more detailed guidelines for asset and liability management and for risk management. IFAD would benefit from more detailed policies and guidelines for asset and liability management and for liquidity management. These would cover the use of derivatives, swaps, futures and options as hedging mechanism, as well as the hedging of future replenishment payments and budgetary items, and liquidity. An Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) should be reconstituted to

periodically review these policies and their application. Moreover, should IFAD significantly increase borrowing, it would need to strengthen the internal Risk Management function which could be tasked with overseeing Treasury and other risk factors such as treasury market risks (interest rate, foreign exchange, derivatives, credit, spreads, and liquidity), treasury operational risk (including middle and back office and IT), operational risk of lending and of any fund managed.

**366. 7. Strengthen the efficiency of the replenishment process**

367. 7.a In the replenishment consultation, there is a need to improve the balance of representation between A and B countries, the poorest borrowing countries and the growing number of List C donors.

368. 7.b Complementary contributions and supplementary funds should be treated in the same way. Both may be announced in headline replenishment figures, but both should be subject to service charges so as to cover the administrative costs related to them, which are currently subsidised by IFAD's regular administrative budget. IFAD management also needs more flexibility for acceptance of supplementary funds for minor amounts in line with the agreed strategy and criteria, including from private sources.

## Evaluation framework

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Data sources</i>
<b>Relevance</b>	KEY QUESTION: How relevant has IFAD's financial architecture been in mobilizing the necessary funding to maximize IFAD's contribution to reducing rural poverty?	Timeline of key events in the evolution of IFAD's financial architecture from 1978 to the present.	Analysis of corporate policies, strategies and IFAD replenishment documents.
	How relevant was/is the financial architecture in mobilizing financial resources and offering them to member states to increase investment in rural poverty reduction and development?	Responses to the Financial Architecture CLE E-survey	Analysis of selected evaluation reports, especially the Replenishment CLE.
	How relevant were the design and assumptions underpinning the financial architecture? Are these still valid?	The degree that the financial architecture mobilized financial resources to deliver the corporate objectives set out in key documents (e.g., Articles Establishing IFAD; IFAD replenishment papers; medium/long term strategies).	Interviews with Executive Board members, IFAD management and staff.
	What needs to be done to enhance the future relevance of IFAD's financial architecture in the context of the changing international development context and appetite for replenishments?	Ability to respond to requests for increased financial assistance from client countries	The Financial Architecture CLE E-survey
	What are the implications of increased financial leverage on IFAD's mission, operations and risk management? Would IFAD be more relevant in terms of reducing rural poverty if it: (i) retains the current financial architecture; or (ii) changes the financial architecture to expand or widen it financing activities?'	Trends in the PoLG and gaps between the size of PoLGs and IFAD replenishments.	Interviews with clients during selected country visits.
	What changes would be required in the Agreement Establishing IFAD and other legal documents?	IFAD's ability to meet the needs of all borrowing countries ranging from the poorest to the MICs.	Data extracted from IFAD's systems
		Analysis of risk management practices	Financial support provided to groups of countries.
	Risk adjusted returns	Analysis of comparator institutions.	
	Lessons from MDB for risk management	Shareholders' view about: (i) IFAD's structure and focus on providing loans exclusively to sovereign entities; (ii) cofinancing; (iii) mobilizing thematic or geographic trust funds; (iv) growing IFAD's balance sheet by borrowing funds; (v) providing other forms of support to allow IFAD to borrow long term funds to increase lending to MICs.	
	Under what conditions would countries be willing to borrow from IFAD on harder terms for projects that are focused on the rural poor?		
<b>Effectiveness</b>	KEY QUESTION: How effective were IFAD's financial architecture and instruments used in supporting IFAD's contributions to reducing rural poverty?	Influence of key events in the evolution of IFAD's financial architecture on its effectiveness.	Interviews with Executive Board members, IFAD management and staff.
	Were the instruments (loans, grants, reimbursable technical assistance) effective in serving rural development demands from different countries (e.g. in countries eligible for DSF grants and highly concessional, blend and	Trends in the size and composition of PoLGs. Examining whether the demand for IFAD financing exceeds the level of funding	Interviews with clients during selected country visits, MDBs and members of the Council on Smallholder Agriculture Finance (CSAF).

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Data sources</i>
	ordinary loans) and in delivering development results?	allocated through the PBAS and an analysis of the actual use of PBAS allocations.	The Financial Architecture CLE E-survey
	Was IFAD's financial architecture effective in mobilizing sufficient resources to meet the demand for IFAD's financing and allow the PoLG to grow without incurring disproportionate risks? How did IFAD manage its risks? (treasury investment risks; foreign exchange risks related to replenishment pledges/payments; risks related to lending in SDRs; inflation risks).	Analysis of IFAD's pricing, terms and choice of currency, including benchmarking to those of MDBs and the price and terms of bonds issued by borrowing member countries.	Data related to IFAD's terms and pricing and those of comparator organisations and bond pricing and credit ratings for borrowing member countries.
	Were the volume, pricing, tenor and flexibility of financing appropriate and would new products and pricing/terms enhance IFAD's effectiveness by offering more flexibility to borrowers and generating additional income to IFAD?	Assessment of policies that define which countries are eligible for which types of assistance.	Analysis of corporate policies, strategies and documents including IFAD replenishment documents.
	Do the products and instruments influence the type of projects included in COSOPs?	Analysis of evaluation report ratings by type of IFAD financial support: (i) DSF grants; (ii) 50 per cent DSF grants/50 per cent highly concessional loans; (iii) highly concessional loans; (iii) blend loans; (iv) ordinary loans.	Comparison of project objectives approved before and after a change in country classification in selected countries
	How did IFAD's financial strategies contribute to mobilising additional financial resources beyond core replenishments (e.g. complementary contributions; supplementary funds; cofinancing)?	The degree that various policies, instruments and processes enhanced or detracted from the effectiveness of IFAD's financial architecture and decisions to include projects in COSOPs.	Data extracted from IFAD's systems Analysis of evaluation project and PSR ratings and GRIPs/Flexcube project implementation data.
	How have the financial policies and procedures supported the financial architecture and risk management and what needs to be strengthened?	Trends in the amount of international and domestic cofinancing leveraged during the replenishment periods by type of financing.	Analysis of governance and RSP indicators. Analysis of the range of IFAD's products and comparison to those offered by MDBs.
	Does the experience gained by comparator organizations suggest alternatives that IFAD should consider to strengthen its financial architecture?	Comparison of results for projects with and without international cofinancing by type of financing. Comparison of results for projects with and without grant financed loan components by type of financing. Analysis of general financial policies, credit risk management for lending, credit risk management for treasury, market risk management, treasury policies, borrowing, lending products, pricing, liquidity; etc. Responses to the Financial Architecture CLE E-survey.	Data extracted from IFAD's systems related to the PoLG, approvals, cofinancing and other funding. Regression analysis of the use of PBAS allocations for IFAD7, IFAD8 and IFAD9. Model simulations of various scenarios Analysis of: - DSF, including reimbursing IFAD for foregone principal and interest reflows; - Pros and cons of one PBAS covering all financial support or two PBASs, one for concessional financing and one for ordinary lending allocated depending on the ALM; - Sovereign borrowing framework and procedures for managing the associated risks; - Single currency lending, use of SDRs and procedures for managing the associated risks.

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Data sources</i>
			<p>Analysis of relevant comparative information for: (i) the World Bank/IFC/IDA; (ii) AfDB; (iii) AsDB; (iv) IADB; (v) MDB's provision of private sector agriculture financing, including GAFSP; (vi) bilateral organizations that have changed their financial architecture (e.g., AFD and FMO); (vii) GAVI, an organization that uses innovative financing and includes non-government representatives on the Board; and (viii) CSAF members.</p> <p>Review of MDB graduation policies and relevant reports on the pros and cons of graduation policies</p>
<b>Efficiency</b>	<p>KEY QUESTION: How efficient is the financial architecture?</p> <p>Policy for investing treasury assets, borrowing funds, asset and liability management. Are risk management and the middle and back office adequately staffed to support treasury and lending?</p> <p>Is IFAD's treasury IT system adequate and does it allow the correct reporting of risks and P/L</p> <p>Is the governance and financial organizational framework adequate to support IFAD's financial architecture?</p> <p>The oversight framework, including the guidance and control provided by the governing bodies, including the Executive Board, the Governing Council and the Audit Committee.</p> <p>Organization of the governing bodies and related decision making and voting procedures, Executive Board representation and membership in Lists A, B and C.</p> <p>Organizational structure for the internal financial management and procedures, IFAD's financial indicators and reporting procedures and systems.</p> <p>Are IFAD's supporting systems for the financial architecture appropriate?</p> <p>What proportion for IFAD's operating costs were recovered from loan charges and profits from treasury investments?</p> <p>Estimated incremental costs to support a new financial architecture</p> <p>Timing and phasing to implement the required changes.</p>	<p>Financial efficiency indicators (e.g., P/L; risk-return analysis liquidity ratio; cost of funds).</p> <p>Optimal debt-equity ratio for IFAD to obtain a high credit rating from key rating agencies?</p> <p>Appropriate separation of front office and middle and back office and risk management</p> <p>Risk management framework</p> <p>Analysis of trends in the recovery of IFAD's operating costs from loan charges and profits on treasury operations.</p> <p>Adequacy of IFAD's corporate governance and organizational framework related to financial architecture.</p> <p>Adequacy of incentives for members to contribute to IFAD's financing.</p> <p>Appropriate roles of structures for risk management, asset and liability management, loan approval and pricing.</p> <p>Adequacy of IFAD's human resources/skills, treasury tools and systems related to financial architecture.</p> <p>Responses to the Financial Architecture CLE E-survey</p>	<p>Data extracted from IFAD's systems, for comparator organisations and from international bond issues and ratings and reports prepared by credit rating agencies.</p> <p>Interviews with Executive Board members, IFAD management and staff.</p> <p>Interviews with clients during selected country visits and officials from comparator institutions.</p> <p>The Financial Architecture CLE E-survey</p> <p>Findings from relevant IOE evaluations, particularly CLEs and selected CPEs</p> <p>Examination of the experience gained by comparator organizations that is relevant to IFAD and its financial architecture.</p> <p>Analysis of the trends in IFAD's operating costs, loan revenues and profits from treasury operations.</p> <p>Financial modelling</p> <p>Review of IFAD's corporate governance and procedures for determining voting power.</p> <p>Analysis of IFAD's organizational structure, human resources/skills and systems supporting IFAD's financial architecture.</p>

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Evaluation questions</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Data sources</i>
<b>Financial Sustainability</b>	<p>KEY QUESTION: How financially sustainable is IFAD?</p> <p>What are the effects of the mix of financial products, terms and conditions on IFAD's short and long-term financing (e.g., optimality of the balance sheet, use of financial leverage, amount of liquidity held, revenue generated from management of liquid assets and interest rate/service charges)?</p> <p>Do the profits from loan margins and treasury investments cover operating costs and help build a buffer of provisions to deal with IFAD's financial, credit and operational risks?</p> <p>What are the implications of external factors (e.g., interest rates and ODA trends on IFAD's sustainability)?</p> <p>Can IFAD operate in the long term without further financial support from its shareholders? How does IFAD need to be structured to be financially sustainable in the long term with and without further sizable member contributions?</p> <p>What are the needs arising from a possible new financial architecture to enhance IFAD's financial sustainability and risk management?</p> <p>Given the increased cost of funds that IFAD may face, what lending rates/credit margins would IFAD have to charge to operate sustainably?</p> <p>Does IFAD have the right financial structure to successfully broaden its financial infrastructure?</p> <p>What would be the optimal capital structure and balance sheet in terms of equity and debt?</p> <p>Would a private sector window generate a profit to enhance financial sustainability at an acceptable level of risk?</p> <p>What organizational changes would be required to deal with added risk factors associated with changes in the financial architecture, sources of financing, products and terms?</p> <p>What are the lessons from other comparable organizations that could help enhance IFAD's financial sustainability and risk management?</p>	<p>Responses to the Financial Architecture CLE E-survey</p> <p>Possible trends in ODA and the implications for future IFAD replenishments.</p> <p>Key indicators of IFAD's past and expected future financial performance. A PoLG was judged to be Cash Flow Sustainable if, by projecting all the cash inflows and outflows resulting from the past, current and future PoLGs if IFAD's liquidity never falls below its minimum liquidity requirement (60 per cent of the annual projected gross disbursements).</p> <p>Comparison of inflows (e.g., loan reflows, treasury investment income, compensation for foregone DSF principal and interest reflows; contributions through IFAD replenishments; other contributions; sovereign loans; market borrowings) and outflows (disbursements for loans and grants for the past, current and future PoLGs; uncompensated foregone DSF principal and interest reflows; repayment of sovereign loans; repayment of capital market borrowings; disbursements for operating costs).</p> <p>Key indicators of IFAD's future financial performance under different scenarios and assumptions.</p> <p>Proportion of contributions likely to be counted as IFAD equity by rating agencies.</p> <p>Benchmarking IFAD against the MDBs.</p>	<p>Interviews with Executive Board members, IFAD management and staff.</p> <p>Interviews with government officials during selected country visits and officials from comparator institutions.</p> <p>Data extracted from IFAD's systems and for comparator institutions.</p> <p>The Financial Architecture CLE E-survey</p> <p>OECD DAC trends in ODA in absolute terms and as a per cent of GDP and government budgets.</p> <p>Analysis of key IFAD policies (e.g., Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing; products, pricing and terms; DSF; PBAS) and possible new policies.</p> <p>Past IFAD replenishments and assumptions about future replenishments and the demand for IFAD financing.</p> <p>Possible changes in IFAD's financial architecture.</p> <p>Model simulations of various scenarios going forward.</p>

## Glossary of technical terms

<i>Additional Resource Mobilization (ARM)</i>	<i>Launched by the President of IFAD in May 2012 to implement Governing Council resolution 166/XXXV (2012), the ARM initiative explores possibilities for mobilizing new resources beyond the Replenishment to finance agricultural and rural development that are in line with IFAD's operational, financial and legal structures.</i>
Advanced Commitment Authority (ACA)	The ACA allowed IFAD to use its stable and predictable loan reflows as a basis for commitment authority to make loans and grants. ACA was used for the first time in 2001, with the maximum amount available through ACA equal to the total loan reflows expected for the subsequent three years. This maximum had increased to seven years for IFAD8 and IFAD9.
Asset Liability Management (ALM)	ALM is the management of financial risks, arising mainly from an institution's mismatches between its assets and liabilities of interest rates, foreign exchange denominations and maturity profiles.
Cash flow sustainable	For IFAD9 steps were taken to ensure that financing projections were cash flow sustainable meaning: (i) for all PoLG scenarios, IFAD's liquidity (i.e. the balance of its cash and investments) should never breach the minimum liquidity requirement stipulated in its Liquidity Policy over the next 40 years; and (ii) the donor contribution requirement for a given PoLG scenario should be sustainable in future replenishments.
Core replenishment contributions	Contributions that are additional resources to the resources of the Fund. These contributions are made without restriction as to their use and carry voting rights
Debt/equity ratio	(a) The ratio of (i) principal portion of total outstanding debt to (ii) total contributions plus General Reserve (expressed in percentage terms); (b) Calculated as (total outstanding debt principal/contributions + General Reserve); (c) The threshold to be complied with by IFAD shall not be higher than 35 per cent.
Debt service coverage ratio	(a) The ratio of (i) principal and interest to all IFAD lenders in a given year to (ii) total yearly loan reflows from IFAD borrowers as per latest audited financial statements; (b) Calculated as total debt service (principal and interest)/(average of the previous year's actual total loan reflows and the current year's projected total loan reflows); (c) The threshold to be complied with by IFAD shall not be higher than 50 per cent.
Demand for IFAD resources	Demand for IFAD's resources for projects funded by IFAD's programme of loans and grants
Equity ratio	(a) The ratio of (i) total contributions plus General Reserve to (ii) total assets (expressed in percentage terms) (b) Calculated as (total contributions and General reserve)/total assets (c) The threshold to be complied with by IFAD shall not be lower than 60 per cent.
Existing lending terms	See document GC 36/L.9 – Review of the Lending Policies and Criteria
Financial statements	The consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements (including a balance sheet, income statement, statement of changes in equity, cash flow statement and notes to the accounts of IFAD, prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards on a yearly basis and in nominal terms semi-annually.
Framework agreement	An umbrella agreement covering the terms and conditions of the total amount borrowed.
General Reserve	IFAD's General Reserve as established by Governing Council resolution 16/IV.
Governance structures	As defined in the Agreement Establishing IFAD. EB 2015/114/R.17/Rev.
IFAD Member	State Membership of IFAD is open to any state that is a member of the United Nations, any of its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency.
IFAD's minimum requirement	liquidity As defined in the Liquidity Policy ( <a href="http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/89/e/EB-2006-89-R-40.pdf">http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/89/e/EB-2006-89-R-40.pdf</a> )
IFAD resources	IFAD's resources consist of external resources (Replenishment contributions from Member States) and internal resources.
IFAD total equity	Total contributions plus General Reserve.
Internal resources	Internal resources consist mainly of loan reflows, investment income and future net flows in the amount determined under the Sustainable Cash Flow approach.

<i>Additional Resource Mobilization (ARM)</i>	<i>Launched by the President of IFAD in May 2012 to implement Governing Council resolution 166/XXXV (2012), the ARM initiative explores possibilities for mobilizing new resources beyond the Replenishment to finance agricultural and rural development that are in line with IFAD's operational, financial and legal structures.</i>
Investments	The investments at amortized costs as well as investments at fair value as stated in IFAD's balance sheet in accordance with IFRS.
Liquidity ratio:	(a) The ratio of (i) cash-in-hand and in banks plus investments to (ii) total assets, expressed in percentage terms; (b) Calculated as (cash-in-hand and in banks + investments)/total assets; (c) The threshold to be complied with by IFAD shall not be lower than 5 per cent.
Loan products	See document GC 36/L.9.
Periodic reports	The Financial Statements, IFAD Annual Report and financial ratios reports.
Programme of loans and grants (PoLG)	The annual total of IFAD loans, Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) grants, and grants for approval in a specific year. This also includes grants financed under the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) (as of 2012) and loans provided under the KfW Development Bank loan (as of 2014).
Programme of work (POW)	This includes the PoLG plus other funds managed by IFAD from the Spanish Food Security Cofinancing Facility Trust Fund, Global Environment Facility/Least Developed Countries Fund, Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), European Commission and European Union, in addition to bilateral supplementary/complementary grants. In addition, the POW includes cofinancing (net of cofinancing managed by IFAD and domestic cofinancing) (see GC.38/L.6, page 7, table 3).
Recipient countries	IFAD Member States entitled to borrow from IFAD.
Total assets	The aggregate of IFAD's balance sheet assets in accordance with IFRS or in nominal terms, and off-balance sheet engagements in accordance with IFRS or in nominal terms.
Total debt service (principal and interest)	The interest received from loans plus the loan principal repayments, as defined in the consolidated cash flow statement of IFAD.
Total loan reflows	The cash flows from financing activities as defined in the Financial Statements of IFAD.
Sovereign States	IFAD Member States and Sovereign States that are not members of IFAD.
State-Supported Institutions	All state-owned or state-controlled enterprises and development finance institutions of IFAD Member States.

Note: Financial ratios are calculated regularly on the basis of IFAD's unconsolidated and consolidated financial statements. All financial ratios are based on figures calculated in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and all applicable laws.

Source: Adapted from IFAD. Sovereign Borrowing Framework: Borrowing from Sovereign States and State-Supported Institutions. 2015.

## Detailed Outputs from Financial Scenario Modelling (Graphs)

Figure 1  
Base-case scenario




Figure 2  
Scenario A. Assuming all loans are concessional and no-borrowing




Figure 3.  
**Scenario B. Borrowing and onlending proceedings on highly concessional terms**




Figure 4.  
**Scenario C. Borrowing and onlending proceedings at ordinary terms**




Figure 5.  
**Scenario D. Increasing borrowing and onlending proceedings at ordinary terms**




Figure 6.  
**Scenario E. Taking the base case but removing DSF and grants from the balance sheet**





Figure 7

**Scenario E. Remove DSF and grants from the balance sheet and increasing sizeably the lending margins on ordinary loans**



Source for all the above graphs: CLE modelling exercise (2017).

## Loans and DSF grants by type

1. IFAD policies state concessional loans must be provided on more favourable terms (i.e., in terms of interest rate, maturity period, fees, etc.) than borrowers can obtain from the market.<sup>208</sup> The policy on concessional loans states that developing Member States that have graduated from IBRD may receive concessional loans from IFAD subject to the availability of funds, including funds that IFAD obtains from sources other than replenishment. That approach allows IFAD to coordinate its lending to concessional borrowers with the different sources of funding (e.g., the Spanish Food Security Cofinancing Facility Trust Fund).
2. IFAD provides financing on the following terms:<sup>209</sup>

Table 1  
IFAD Lending Terms

	<i>Interest rate</i>	<i>Maturity</i>	<i>Grace period</i>	<i>Service charge</i>	<i>Observation</i>
<b>DSF grants</b>					Financing is provided as a grant, but IFAD compensated by donors based on the amortization schedule of a highly concessional loan
<b>Highly Concessional</b>	Interest free	40 years	10 years	0.75 per cent per annum	
<b>Blend</b>	1.25 per cent per annum	25 years	5 years	0.75 per cent per annum	
<b>Ordinary</b>	A variable interest rate plus a spread. The interest rate is based on the six-month Libor rate for the five SDR currencies (Euribor rate for euro) weighted by the SDR weights. SDR weights are based on SDR units and exchange rates published by IMF.	15 to 18 years	3 years. The Executive Board may vary the grace period.		The IBRD variable spread for loans with maturity greater than 15-18 years is applied.
<b>Hardened</b>	Interest free	20 years	10 years	0.75 per cent per annum	Discontinued in 2012
<b>Intermediate Terms</b>	An interest rate of one half of the IFAD Reference Interest and have a 20-year maturity, including a 5-year grace period. This product was discontinued in 2011	20 years	5 years. The Executive Board may vary the grace period.		Discontinued in 2012

Source: IFAD. Review of the Lending Policies and Criteria. 2012

<sup>208</sup> IFAD. Review of the Lending Policies and Criteria. 2012.

<sup>209</sup> The Policies and Criteria for IFAD Financing states "No commitment charge shall be levied on any loan."

Table 2  
**Summary of loans and DSF grants, 1978 -2016 (US\$ millions)<sup>A</sup>**

	1978-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012	2013-2015	2016	1978-2016
<b>DSF Grants</b>						
Amount		402	681	457	106	1,645
Number of Grants		43	50	33	8	134
<b>Highly Concessional Loans</b>						
Amount	6,826	949	1,315	1,284	292	10,666
Number of Loans	545	55	61	62	11	734
<b>Hardened Loans</b>						
Amount		9	51			59
Number of Loans		1	4			5
<b>Intermediate Loans</b>						
Amount	1,606	171	197			1,975
Number of Loans	133	9	6			148
<b>Blend Loans</b>						
Amount				250	159	409
Number of Loans				13	7	20
<b>Ordinary Loans</b>						
Amount	951	187	442	594	181	2,353
Number of Loans	69	17	24	25	9	144
<b>Total</b>						
Amount	9,382	1,717	2,686	2,584	737	17,106
Number of Loans and DSF Grants <sup>B, C</sup>	747	125	145	133	35	1,185

Notes: A = Amounts are from the President's report for each programme or project approved by the Executive Board.

B = A programme or loan may be financed by more than one loan or DSF grant.

C = Fully cancelled or rescinded loans are not included.

Source: Extracted from IFAD's grants and investment projects systems.

## Key policies supporting IFAD's financial architecture

### A. Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative

1. Since 1996, IFAD has been involved debt relief and debt management in Member States by participating in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt initiative. The objective of the HIPC debt initiative is to reduce the net present value of the debt of poor countries that carry unsustainable levels of debt to a level that will no longer compromise their on-going economic reforms and rural poverty eradication efforts. Five principles guided the design of the HIPC debt initiative: (i) addressed countries total debt sustainability with a reliable exit strategy and involved all creditors to be effective and equitable; (ii) assisted only countries with a track record of economic policy and structural reform and are making efforts towards poverty eradication; (iii) built on the existing mechanisms of debt relief; (iv) preserved the financial integrity of the IFIs involved; and (v) secured a continued flow of new external financing on appropriately concessional terms from IFIs and from the private sector.
2. For IFAD the HIPC debt initiative involves two financial factors: (i) agreed reduction of debt repayments from debtor countries to IFAD; and (ii) payments to IFAD's loan fund accounts to compensate for the associated loss of the financial reflows. IFAD participated in the HIPC debt initiative on a country-by-country basis.
3. IFAD established an operational policy framework for its participation in the HIPC Debt Initiative and a Trust Fund. The main issues that IFAD addresses during the preparation of each country specific HIPC debt initiative were: (i) the country's policy focus on rural poverty eradication; (ii) the strength of the country's poverty eradication and rural development programme; and (iii) the sensitivity to rural poverty eradication of the on-going structural adjustment efforts. During replenishments, IFAD's compensation for the debt write-off for HIPC countries is shown separately.

### B. Performance based allocation system

4. Introducing the PBAS had important implications for the financial architecture. The PBAS formula incorporates measures of both country needs and country performance.<sup>210</sup> With the PBAS, IFAD abandoned the provision in Para 21 of the Lending Policies and Criteria that IFAD "will not seek to develop a pattern of country allocations; it will, instead, designate a number of priority countries for programming purposes."
5. Prior to the PBAS, IFAD's funding was allocated by region, based on country needs, with Africa receiving about half of the funding. Under the PBAS APR had the highest allocation (33 per cent), followed by ESA (22 per cent), WCA (19 per cent), NEN (14 per cent) and LAC (12 per cent). Although regional lending shares were not included in the PBAS design, 41 per cent of total funds were allocated to sub-Saharan Africa. If countries in North Africa were included, then Africa received about half of the financing.
6. The PBAS CLE concluded that although some issues needed to be addressed, the PBAS resulted in a more transparent, flexible and predictable resource allocation system and contributed to greater fairness in the allocation of IFAD's resources across developing Member States than was the case with the allocation system in place before 2003. IOE found that the PBAS was generally well tailored to IFAD and enhanced IFAD's credibility.
7. IFAD enhanced the PBAS in 2017, with guidance provided by the Executive Board, and drawing on operational experience and the PBAS CLE findings. The major changes included: (i) increasing the focus on rural poverty; (ii) rebalancing the weights of the rural sector performance variable and the portfolio performance and

<sup>210</sup> IOE found that 65 per cent of a country's allocation is driven by country needs and 35 per cent by country performance. See IOE. Corporate-level evaluation of IFAD's performance-based allocation system. 2016

disbursement variable within the country performance component; (iii) adding IFAD's Vulnerability Index; and (iv) adjusting the weights and exponents of variables to increase stability and predictability. These changes were designed to increase allocations to the countries with the greatest needs and that perform the best. The expectation is that during IFAD11 90 per cent of IFAD's core resources will be allocated to LICs and LMICs, 50 per cent to Africa, and between 25 and 30 per cent to the most fragile situations. The new PBAs will only be applied during IFAD11 as it is recognised that further changes may be needed if IFAD changes its financial architecture during IFAD 12 to increase leverage through market borrowing.

8. Relative to the other MDBs, IFAD is unique in that all loans, DSF grants and country grants, including ordinary lending and the proceeds of sovereign borrowing, are allocated through the PBAS.<sup>211</sup> The other MDBs use their PBASs to allocate only concessional funds and their ordinary lending is allocated on the basis of asset liability management considerations.<sup>212</sup> Consequently, MDBs have been able to grow their market related portfolios by increasing their lending to MICs and other countries that were able to absorb the increased lending. By growing that part of their portfolios, future MDB profitability increases. This will generate funds that can be contributed to their soft windows, technical assistance funds, reserves and finance operating costs.

### C. Debt sustainability framework

9. The Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) was developed to complement the HIPC initiative. Since 2007 the DSF has been an important part of IFAD's financial architecture because it governs the nature of the financial assistance provided to eligible countries. IFAD uses the IMF/World Bank debt sustainability country classification<sup>213</sup> to determine which countries are eligible for DSF grants.
10. Based on the country classification, IFAD provides financial support allocated by the PBAS on the following basis: (i) for countries with low debt sustainability: 100 per cent DSF grants; (ii) for countries with medium debt sustainability: 50 per cent DSF grants and 50 per cent highly concessional loans; and (iii) for countries with high debt sustainability: 100 per cent highly concessional loans.<sup>214</sup>
11. Under the 2007 DSF policy, IFAD's Member States expressed a commitment "to compensate IFAD within a pay as-you-go mechanism as adopted under the fourteenth replenishment of the International Development Association" (underscoring added). IFAD was to be compensated for the financial impact from the DSF in a way that reflected the repayment schedule of the loans that were converted into DSF grants. Since IFAD's first DSF grant financed projects were approved in 2007 and included 10-year grace periods, the impact of the foregone reflows will materialize from 2017 onwards. Since the PoLG has increased, and the 10-year grace periods will end for a larger number of projects in future years, the impact of the DSF on IFAD's financial position will grow progressively from 2017 onwards. As of 31 December 2016, the estimated foregone reflows until 2056 totalled SDR 1.26 billion, which will increase as more DSF grants are approved.
12. There are several issues related to the IFAD's compensation for the DSF: (i) during the IFAD10 replenishment consultations, Members agreed to compensate IFAD for foregone principal payments but not for foregone service charges; (ii) for IFAD10

<sup>211</sup> In principle, about 95 per cent of the PoLG is allocated through the PBAS with the remaining 5 per cent is set aside for the Regional and Global Grants programme.

<sup>212</sup> AfDB has identified seven to eight ADF only countries that are allowed to borrow more than their PBAS allocation on non-concessional terms if they have the demand and if their public debt is sustainable. Similarly, IDA has now offers hard IDA loans to selected countries that is incremental to the PBAS allocation and is subject to similar conditions as at AfDB.

<sup>213</sup> The World Bank and the IMF assessed the debt sustainability of 38 countries of which 35 are receiving debt relief. Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea are not yet eligible.

<sup>214</sup> Since most of the DSF eligible countries are in Africa the greatest impact of the DSF among MDBs is on IDA, AfDB and IFAD.

only five countries made incremental pledges to cover the DSF; and (iii) some countries that were part of IFAD7 and IFAD8 were not part of IFAD10, raising the issue of how their share of DSF compensation would be covered if they are not part of IFAD11 and subsequent replenishments. As part of the IFAD11 replenishment IFAD prepared a paper on its experience and that of other MDBs on the DSF reflecting actual and estimated net losses in service charge payments and proposals on future approaches to compensation. If IFAD were not fully reimbursed for the foregone DSF reflows it would have an adverse impact on IFAD's financial sustainability, thus putting downward pressure on the feasible size of future PoLGs.

#### **D. Single currency window**

13. In the past all IFAD loans were denominated in SDRs. Most countries in APR and LAC receiving ordinary loans would prefer to borrow in dollars, while the economies and currencies of some countries in NEN and WCA are more closely linked to the euro. IOE received feedback that some countries were unhappy at being required to borrow in euro when their projects were financed from the proceeds of the KfW loan. IFAD has made progress in introducing the single currency lending option. The initial \$200 million ceiling was reached in the first year of IFAD10. It will eventually reach 100 per cent of the IFAD10 resource envelope.
14. As long as single currency loans are made in US dollars, and out of equity, IFAD would not face foreign currency risk as the institution's equity is denominated in US dollars. Loans made in another currency would either have to be funded in that currency or hedged back into US dollars via a cross currency swap. Equally, borrowings denominated in non-US dollars would have to be either swapped back into US dollars or on-lent in that currency. Consistent with the practice of MDBs, IFAD should have the ability to lend in a currency that is demanded by, and appropriate for, the client's project. If IFAD received attractive funding in Japanese yen, market conditions suggest that it might be challenging to find natural takers of yen-denominated loans. If that proves to be the case IFAD would have to swap such funding into US dollars. Funding denominated in renminbi, however, could be interesting for a number of IFAD's Asian borrowers.

#### **E. Sovereign borrowing framework**

15. The IFAD9 replenishment was not sufficient to finance the planned \$3.1 billion PoLG. To fill that gap, in 2014 IFAD negotiated a loan of up to euro 400 million with KfW to be used to finance loans on ordinary terms and allocated through the PBAS.<sup>215</sup> Although the KfW loan facility was approved prior to the Sovereign Borrowing Framework (SBF), all the financial covenants of the SBF are being monitored for the KfW facility. Based on lessons learned from implementing the KfW facility, IFAD is strengthening its in-house capacity to manage forthcoming SBF loans.
16. The SBF was approved in 2015 for IFAD to borrow from sovereign states and state-supported institutions, thus providing a mechanism to mobilize additional resources through debt to be made available on concessional terms during IFAD10 and beyond. Sovereign borrowing is to be: (i) demand-driven with consideration given to the terms (i.e., interest rate, currency denomination, and grace and maturity periods); (ii) incremental to, and not a substitute for, the contribution of Members to replenishments; (iii) condition free (i.e., no beneficiary, purpose, theme or geographic area restrictions); (iv) allocated through the PBAS if the sovereign borrowing is expected to fund the PoLG<sup>216</sup> and in accordance with the Policies and

<sup>215</sup> The establishment of the Spanish Food Security Cofinancing Facility Trust Fund (Spanish Trust Fund) in 2010 gave IFAD some experience managing borrowed funds. Because the Spanish Trust Fund resources are considered cofinancing, they are not allocated through the PBAS and can be used to increase IFAD's support in particular countries/areas. The grant element of the Spanish Trust Fund facilitates allowed IFAD to on-lend to Member States at concessional rates. However, at least 50 per cent of the Spanish Trust Fund will be allocated under IFAD's ordinary terms.

<sup>216</sup> The framework also envisions the possibility that sovereign loans could be used to increase the PoLG above the level decided during replenishments.

Criteria for IFAD Financing; and (iv) satisfy the principles of financial sustainability in isolation (or “self-funding”). The anticipated effect of the sovereign borrowing framework is to increase IFAD's PoLG by approximately 1:1. The Executive Board approved a sovereign loan from AFD in 2016.

17. IFAD has established prudential norms to manage the impact of sovereign borrowing: (i) debt/equity: not higher than 35 per cent; (ii) liquidity ratio: not lower than 5 per cent; and (iii) debt service coverage ratio: not higher than 50 per cent. IFAD has also adopted risk mitigation measures for sovereign borrowing related to term risk, interest rate risk, currency risk, default risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, conflict of interest risk, and other risks that IFAD faces in its normal operations (e.g., reputational, environmental and social) that are mitigated through IFAD’s existing measures.

## F. The concessional partner loan framework

18. Concessional partner loans (CPLs) have been introduced in IDA and AfDB as a financing instrument to expand the funding base beyond core contributions. CPLs are attractive to some donors because of financial constraints faced by some and the willingness of others to increase their development assistance.
19. CPLs are provided at an interest rate well below market rates and have long maturities and grace periods. There are no restrictions on the use of the proceeds of CPLs as they are used as part of the overall pool of funding that includes grant contributions, loan reflows and investment income. An important principle of CPLs is additionality, i.e. CPLs are additional to core contributions and do not substitute for core contributions. Voting rights accrue based on the grant element of the CPL.
20. In October 2017 the Executive Board approved the Concessional Partner Loan (CPL) Framework, which will be effective in 2018 when the Governing Council adopts the IFAD11 Resolution including necessary amendments to the Agreement Establishing IFAD related to the CPL framework.<sup>217</sup>
21. Key elements of the CPL framework include: (i) **additionality**: Member States providing CPLs will provide core contributions equal to at least 80 per cent of a minimum grant contribution benchmark and target a total grant equivalent contribution (which includes core contribution and the grant element of the CPL) to at least their minimum grant contribution benchmark. The minimum grant contribution benchmark will be equal to 100 per cent of the average core contribution of the preceding two replenishment periods; (ii) **use**: The proceeds of CPLs will finance the PoLG and thus there will be no restrictions on their use; (iii) **allocation**: CPL proceeds will be allocated through the PBAS on terms comparable to or higher than those applicable to the CPL with priority being given to loans provided on highly concessional and blend terms. (iv) **pricing and terms**: an all-in SDR equivalent coupon of up to 1 per cent and maturities of 40 years including a 10-year grace period or 25 years including a 5-year grace period; (iii) **currencies**: SDR or any SDR basket currency (United States dollar, euro, Japanese yen, British pound and Chinese renminbi); (v) **amounts**: CPLs must be \$20 million or more; (vi) **grant element**. The grant element is calculated as the present value of IFAD’s financial benefit of the CPL compared to a loan on market terms; (vii) **voting rights**: The amount of the grant element of the CPL determines the Member’s voting rights associated with the CPE in accordance with the voting rights formula; and (vii) **risk management**: The proceeds of CPLs will be subject to the same risk management measures as are used for the SBF.

<sup>217</sup> Article 4, section 5(c) of the Agreement establishing IFAD states that contributions are to be made in the form of cash, promissory notes or obligations payable upon demand. The IFAD11 Resolution will propose an amendment to recognize the grant element of CPLs as type of contribution and the associated voting rights.

## Financial architecture reforms in MDBs

### A. The context

1. Some factors constrain direct comparisons of IFAD to the MDBs. Importantly, IFAD was established as a fund within the UN system whereas the MDBs were established as banks and were expected to operate at a profit. MDBs provide both financing raised in the international capital markets by issuing bonds and on concessional terms. The MDBs have generally high (AAA – AA) credit ratings.<sup>218</sup> Funds for concessional lending are raised through periodic replenishments, reflows and transferring net operating surpluses. The administrative budgets are financed from profits on the MDBs' operations. The MDBs have generally highly sophisticated treasury and financial management systems.
2. All MDBs are much larger than IFAD, operate in many sectors and have larger average loan sizes. Size and economies of scale matter. These factors undermine the relevance of MDB comparisons with IFAD using standard indicators of efficiency (e.g., operating costs as a ratio of the active portfolio; the size of the portfolio per staff; disbursements per staff; cost per dollar disbursed; etc.).
3. IFAD's main product is sovereign project financing. MDBs have many more products (e.g., large structural/sector adjustment loans; counter-cyclical support facilities; programmatic approaches; multitranche financing facilities; quick disbursing policy loans; sector wide approaches; trade finance; programs for results). All MDBs also have a private sector window, either within the institution, or in a sister organisation, that provide non-sovereign risk priced loans and equity investments. In addition to providing their own financing, MDBs also mobilize cofinancing from official and commercial sources and offer various forms of guarantees and types of credit enhancement products.
4. Although most MDBs offered loans denominated in SDRs when they were created, they shifted to providing appropriately priced loans in currencies requested by their clients 20 to 30 years ago for their market-based lending. Concessional loans are still denominated in SDRs.

### B. Specific steps MDBs have taken to reform their financial architecture

5. **AsDB.** In 2013 AsDB began planning the combination of ADF's equity and lending operations with the OCR balance sheet. When completed in 2017 it allowed AsDB's annual lending to increase by 50 per cent to \$20 billion, OCR equity to triple from \$18 billion to \$53 billion and donor contributions to ADF grant operations fell by 50 per cent from \$1.2 billion, beginning with the 2017 ADF replenishment. These measures will increase AsDB's lending capacity by more efficiently and effectively utilizing existing resources. This merger did not change AsDB's governance or voting power and AsDB retained its AAA credit rating.
6. In 2016 AsDB and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) signed an agreement on an innovative risk transfer mechanism. SIDA will guarantee up to \$155 million of AsDB's sovereign loans. The guarantee will allow AsDB to increase its lending capacity by

<sup>218</sup> The major MDBs, including EIB and the Islamic Development Bank, have AAA credit ratings, although AfDB had an AA rating for a considerable period of time. The ratings of the smaller MDBs (e.g., Black Sea Trade and Development Bank; Corporación Andina de Fomento; the Caribbean Development Bank; Council of Europe Development Bank; range between A- and has an AA+) and the rating for the Eurasian Development Bank is BBB-. The rating of the Asian Infrastructure Bank has not yet been assigned. The New Development Bank, owned by the BRICs, received an AAA rating from a Chinese rating agency but has not yet received a rating from international credit rating agencies.

\$500 million over the next 10 years from its Ordinary Capital Resources. Risk transfer agreements pass specified risks from one party to another party in return for a fee. This can release capacity for additional operations by improving the risk profile of balance sheets and reducing the capital held in reserve to cover guaranteed loans. This was the first time such a risk transfer arrangement was used for a sovereign loan portfolio of an MDB.

7. **AfDB** is focusing on five goals: (i) light up and power Africa; (ii) feed Africa; (iii) industrialize Africa; (iv) integrate Africa; and (v) improve the quality of life for the people of Africa. AfDB views these as development “accelerators” that could help Africa achieve 90 per cent of the Sustainable Development Goals. AfDB is working to align donor countries around these five priorities and Japan, South Korea, China and France have committed billions of dollars to support them.
8. AfDB is trying to squeeze investment resources out of limited capital reserves, but will eventually need more money if it is going to stay responsive to its client countries’ financing needs. AfDB is seeking to leverage its limited capital to tap private resources and using all available instruments at its disposal. That includes opening a non-concessional window to the poorest countries and exploring the possibility for the African Development Fund, which focuses on the 40 least developed African countries, to raise money by going to capital markets.
9. To complement its efforts to strengthen its financial architecture, AfDB is also working to become a more efficient institution: (i) AfDB's administrative costs are the lowest among the MDBs; and (ii) the cost-to-income ratio has fallen during recent years. AfDB plans to achieve greater efficiency gains and value for money as it rolls out its new development and business delivery model.
10. **IADB**. In 2015, the IADB and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) consolidated the IADB group’s private-sector activities to better use resources and improve coordination with private and public-sector projects. The structure involved a \$2.03 billion capital increase for the IIC (\$1.305 billion new contributions, payable over a seven-year period starting in 2016; \$725 million in capital transfers from the IADB as of 2018).
11. The Fund for Special Operations (FSO) is IADB’s concessional window.<sup>219</sup> Its funding is part of IADB’s normal capital raising process, which IADB has gone through nine times. The 2010 Ninth Capital Increase (IDB-9) recapitalization resulted in an additional \$479 million in funds for FSO.
12. IDB-9 strengthened FSO by reducing administrative expenses by 3 per cent and transferring funding for the non-reimbursable technical cooperation to Ordinary Capital. In addition, \$479 million in new FSO contributions were to be used to provide full debt relief and additional resources to Haiti and ensure the sustainability of the FSO until 2020. To ensure efficient use of FSO resources, the blend of market based and FSO financing was maintained, thus preserving the degree of concessionality consistent with the DSF. IDB-8 provided for a program of direct lending to the private sector to encourage greater private provision of infrastructure. In the next five years, IADB approved \$13.4 billion in loans and guarantees through its Sovereign Guaranteed and Non-Sovereign Guaranteed windows, representing 36 per cent of IADB’s total lending for the period, as well as technical assistance amounting to \$24.8 million.

<sup>219</sup> Only five IADB member countries qualify for access to FSO financing. Haiti qualifies for grants and four countries (Guyana; Bolivia; Guatemala; Honduras) have access to 40-year fixed interest rate bullet loans priced at 25 basis points.

13. Although IADB has appropriate exposure limits, the overriding issue in risk management is to maintain the AAA rating, which means satisfying the capitalization requirements rating agencies. Following the 2009 global financial crisis, demand for IADB loans increased resulting in reductions in capital buffers as the balance sheet grew. In response, IADB decided to merge FSO into IADB's balance sheet, thereby increasing its overall capital. This was primarily in response to the need for capital and reflects the fact that rating agencies consider callable capital in their calculations, but only callable capital from non-borrowing shareholders, which FSO was able to provide. Effective 2017, the assets and liabilities of FSO were transferred to IADB's balance sheet, thereby providing an additional \$5.2 billion in capital.
14. Credit rating agencies changed their rating methodology that involves the weight placed on single country exposures. Regional MDBs lend to a relatively small number of sovereign states which results in asset concentration, thus requiring regional MDBs to hold additional capital. In the past MDBs managed their capital concentration risks by reducing or limiting exposure in countries where lending volumes were especially high. The sovereign exposure exchange agreement is a risk management tool collaboratively developed by the major MDBs that was launched in October 2013 by the World Bank and endorsed by MDB heads following a meeting of the G8 Ministers of Finance.
15. Exchanging exposures between MDBs enhances flexibility and efficiency in capital management. This initiative was endorsed by the G20 and was discussed at multiple international conferences, including the Financing for Development Forum in Addis Ababa in July 2015. The swaps involve what have been agreed between the counterparties as equal risk on both sides so no fees are paid between counterparties. The swaps are for 15 years; 10 years of full guarantees. For each exposure swapped, the issuing party must retain half the exposure to align incentives. On 15 December 2015, AfDB, IADB and IBRD approved the first three bilateral exposure exchanges totalling \$6.5 billion. IADB swapped a total of \$4.9 billion in exposure. As a result, the exposure of the top 10 countries in the IADB portfolio declined from 82.6 per cent before the swaps to 77.2 per cent, which is similar to a \$1.8 billion capital injection according to the new credit rating methodology.
16. **IDA.** The World Bank Group's "margins for manoeuvre" initiative is designed to leverage IBRD's balance sheet. The IFC is expanding its Asset Management Company and syndications platforms to mobilize more third-party capital. The IDA18 replenishment discussed ways to leverage IDA's capital for non-concessional loans through a private sector set aside window. During the IDA18 consultations participants acknowledged the strong demand for resources to help countries achieve their 2030 goals.
17. The IDA18 financing package pioneered market leverage and new instruments and blending grant contributions with capital market debt. The IDA18 financing framework is a hybrid model in which traditional sources of financing are blended with debt in the form of capital market borrowing and CPLs. The systems required to implement the new IDA financing model are being put in place. As a first step, in September 2016, Standard and Poor's and Moody's rated IDA AAA, a necessary pre-condition to issues bonds on the capital markets. Further steps will include: (i) updating IDA's financial framework, accounting policies, and risk management parameters to ensure robust sustainability rules, commensurate with capital market and AAA rating requirements; and (ii) preparing for an IDA bond issue and investor engagement to launch market access by obtaining all required regulatory approvals, devising a funding strategy, program, and outreach and

establishing needed operational protocols and systems.<sup>220</sup> The IDA18 consultations recognised that Concessional Partner Loans (CPLs) (i.e., sovereign loans) complement market debt in increasing the size of IDA18. The existing IDA voting rights system will continue for the IDA18 period and the CPL contributors will receive additional voting rights based on the grant element of the CPL. CPL funding will not be earmarked for any purpose and will be allocated to IDA's pool of funding.

18. Relative to IDA17, the new funding approached developed under IDA18 significantly increased IDA's commitment authority by \$23 billion, a 44 per cent increase over IDA17. Of particular note was the fact that partner contributions fell by 4 per cent for IDA18 as compared to IDA17. IFAD18 also introduced an IFC-MIGA Private Sector Window to mobilize increased private sector investment in IDA countries, especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations, by strengthening the collaboration among IDA, IFC and MIGA to scale up their work in the most challenging countries.

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<sup>220</sup> World Bank Group. 2016. IDA18. Draft of IDA18 Deputies' Report. Additions to IDA Resources: Eighteenth Replenishment. Towards 2030: Investing in Growth, Resilience and Opportunity.

## Note on Credit Rating Treatment of MDBs

### Brief Overview: Credit Rating Agencies' Treatment of MDBs

1. The capital market's three major credit rating agencies, Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch, each have dedicated rating methodologies for multilateral lending institutions. Whilst there are a number of other rating agencies, most international investors would look at the ratings of these three agencies for credit evaluation and risk assessment. As a multilateral development institution using leverage, IFAD is likely to be evaluated using the rating methodology these agencies apply for the rating of multilateral development banks (MDBs).
2. The agencies are guided by two primary criteria – the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) and the impact of extraordinary shareholder support (ICR). SACP is comprised of financial and business assessments. Once the stand-alone credit profile has been determined, an increase of the resulting rating by taking into account strong shareholder support may or may not be made.
3. MDB's ratings are determined by their standing against the characteristics highlighted below.

#### *Business Profile*

4. Policy significance: The analysis would focus on the policy significance of an institution which is contingent on its historic support, contemporary policy relevancy, and level of unique expertise in carrying out its objective. An institution's policy importance is greatest if its objective constitutes a priority for member states and its know-how is not easily replicated by peer institutions.
5. Governance and management expertise: the assessment evaluates how the institution is run, its ability to implement strategic plans and achieve long-term financial and operational goals.
6. Asset quality: Much scrutiny is made on the quality of the loan portfolio and risk management policies. Loan portfolios are assessed on the historic performance (defaults and arrears), diversification, and single name concentration.

#### *Financial Profile*

7. Solvency: Credit rating agencies assess an institution's financial profile by analyzing the capital adequacy and profitability as well as its funding and liquidity positions. Central to this evaluation is for example S&P's risk-adjusted capital ratio (RAC) that looks at current capital adjusted for projected earnings, divided by the risk adjusted assets (23 per cent being extremely strong).
8. Historic and projected profitability: this is central to this assessment and balance sheet indicators alone are not sufficient. Fitch measures capital adequacy by more traditional ratios such as equity-to-total assets and guarantees (above 25 per cent being excellent), and debt to shareholder's equity. Moody's focuses on the assets coverage ratio, debt as percentage of usable equity, NPLs, and return on assets (ROA).
9. Because of their unique nature (i.e. countercyclical) and inability to increase capitalization without complex shareholder negotiations, MDBs are subject to highly conservative stress-tests and are unlikely to attain even an AA-rating solely on the premise of extraordinary shareholder support or a strong business profile.

10. Shareholder support is assessed by the long-term significance of the MDB and the callable capital provided, where it is recognized that in the long-term it is difficult to gauge the level of favourable impact of callable capital on a given rating; it is common practice for rating agencies to count callable capital for AAA-oriented MDBs only if the capital comes from AAA countries. Fitch provides an ICR uplift by up to 3 notches if significant callable capital is pledged by highly-rated countries. Callable capital pledged by the US is not counted.

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## E-survey results

### Response rates

369. The objective of the E-survey was to assess the views stakeholders and IFAD staff on the current financial architecture, possible future changes, the likely demand for new products and views on terms and pricing.
370. The survey population included: (i) Executive Board members; (ii) IFAD senior management and professional staff; and (iii) government officials from borrowing and non-borrowing IFAD member countries. There were 1,194 people<sup>221</sup> in the survey population of which 343 were IFAD senior management and professional staff and 851 were government counterparts<sup>222</sup> from borrowing and non-borrowing member countries and Executive Board members.
371. Several measures were taken to enhance the response rate: (i) translating the questionnaire into IFAD's four official languages; (ii) personalized communications; and (iii) several follow-ups to non-respondents. Netting out the bounced, opted out and partial responses, there were 595 complete returns (221 IFAD staff; 374 non-IFAD respondents). Thus, the total response rate was 50 per cent – 64 per cent for IFAD and 44 per cent for non-IFAD respondents. Including partial responses, the response rate was 68 per cent – IFAD 82 per cent and non-IFAD 60 per cent. Table A shows detailed information about the response rate.

Table A  
Detailed response rate

	<i>Email addresses provided by PMD</i>	<i>Bounced emails</i>	<i>Emails received</i>	<i>Total responses (partial and complete)</i>	<i>Complete responses</i>	<i>Response rate</i>
<b>IFAD</b>	343	0	343	283	221	64%
<b>Non IFAD</b>	967	116	851	509	374	44%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,310</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>1,194</b>	<b>792</b>	<b>595</b>	<b>50%</b>

Source: CLE (2017)

372. IFAD respondents were asked whether they worked in PMD, FOD, AOU, PRM or another division. Using the responses to that question and the number of professional staff in the relevant divisions shows that 86 per cent of PMD professional staff and 87 per cent of professional staff from FOD, AOU and PRM participated in the E-survey.

### Survey design

373. The anonymous survey had two sets of questions. The first set of 12 questions was to be answered by all the survey respondents. The second set had a number of filter/classification questions that led the respondents to questions that were relevant to them. In total the E-survey had 22 questions. However, given the various filters, the maximum number of questions for a group of respondents was 18 (government officials in borrowing countries).
374. The survey was designed to seek feedback on issues such as: (i) sources of IFAD funds; (ii) use and allocation of IFAD's resources; (iii) IFAD's financial instruments, their characteristics, performance and preferences; and (iv) possible future scenarios and likely demand for new products.

<sup>221</sup> Of the 1,310 E-survey invitations sent, 116 bounced or opted out. Response rate calculations were based on the 1,194 survey invitations received by the respondents.

<sup>222</sup> For each country the respective CPMs and CPAs provided the contacts for the in-country respondents. The E-survey covered 82 per cent of active countries in APR, 76 per cent in ESA, 91 per cent in LAC, 89 per cent in NEN and 95 per cent in WCA.

### Data analysis

375. Consistent with IOE's evaluation manual, the survey used 6-point rating scales. Depending on the formulation of the question, the rating scale was used in the following way: 1=highly unsatisfactory/highly disagree; 2=unsatisfactory/disagree; 3=moderately unsatisfactory/moderately disagree; 4=moderately satisfactory/moderately agree; 5=satisfactory/agree; and 6=highly satisfactory/strongly agree.
376. The filter/classification questions helped to categorize and disaggregate the results by the different groups of respondents. For example, respondents were asked to: (i) select the country where they worked; (ii) if their countries were borrowing or non-borrowing members; and (iii) the type of organization they worked in. An example on the way the filter/classifications questions were used was by asking respondents whether they worked for IFAD or in a government agency and to identify the country where they were located. Those responses allowed the E-survey responses to be analysed by countries according to GNI per capita classification.
377. The results shown below are disaggregated by:
- IFAD: IFAD Senior Management and IFAD professional staff.
  - Non IFAD, including IFAD's Executive Board members:
    - Government officials from non-borrowing countries.
    - Government officials from borrowing countries by LIC, LMIC and UMIC.
    - Government officials from non-borrowing member countries.

Table B

Number of respondents by type


	Completed responses	Share (%)
<b>IFAD</b>	221	100%
<b>Senior Management</b>	10	5%
<b>IFAD professional staff</b>	211	95%
<b>Non IFAD</b>	322 <sup>223</sup>	100%
<b>Non-borrowing countries</b>	49	15%
<b>Borrowing countries</b>	273	85%

Source IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey

378. Graph 1 shows the distribution of non-IFAD staff respondents by region, and by country by income classification. There is a reasonable balance among IFAD regions and between countries based on their 2016 GNI per capita income group classification (atlas method). For comparison, the GNI per capita income group classification of countries included in the 2016 PBAS is: LICs 31 per cent; LMICs 36 per cent and UMICs 33 per cent.

Graph 1

Non IFAD responses by region and country income classification



<sup>223</sup> 52 survey respondents stated that they worked in "another organization". However, the survey was only sent to government officials and IFAD staff.

Table 1

**How familiar are you with IFAD's activities, operations and/or replenishments?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Extremely familiar	3%	7%	5%	4%	5%	25%	12%
Very familiar	29%	42%	42%	41%	36%	37%	35%
Familiar	46%	38%	44%	45%	39%	27%	35%
Some knowledge	21%	13%	8%	10%	14%	12%	13%
Very little knowledge	0%	1%	1%	0%	5%	0%	5%
No knowledge	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Answered	<b>117</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>459</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>796</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 2

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on IFAD's resource mobilisation?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
IFAD's has mobilized sufficient financial resources to meet the demand for financing of rural poverty reduction.	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.0	3.8
In the future, IFAD is likely to experience increasing difficulty mobilising financial resources from the replenishment.	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.3	4.0	4.7	4.3
IFAD should be an institution that primarily provides funding at concessional terms.	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.1	4.6
IFAD should mobilize long term financing from sovereign sources (e.g., national development finance institutions, or concessional partnership loans) to support higher volume of operations.	5.2	5.2	4.9	5.0	5.1	4.9	5.0
IFAD should mobilize financing from commercial sources (e.g., banks; pension funds; insurance companies) to support higher volume of operations.	3.6	4.0	4.3	4.1	3.9	4.1	4.0
IFAD should issue bonds on the international capital markets to support higher volume of operations.	4.0	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.2
IFAD should mobilize more "supplementary funding", additional to the replenishment.	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0
Supplementary funds should be subject to full recovery of the related IFAD administrative and operational costs.	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.9	4.7
IFAD should mobilize other sources of financing (Please specify)	30	43	25	11	104	43	152
<b>Answered</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>659</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 3

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements related to IFAD's replenishment process?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
IFAD's replenishment process works well.	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.6	3.9	4.3
When specific funds are established outside of the normal replenishment, contributors to these funds, including non-governmental organisations, foundations and private donors should have a voice in their governance.	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.3	4.6	4.2	4.4
IFAD is good at mobilizing national counterpart funding.	4.3	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.3	3.7	4.1
IFAD is good at mobilizing international cofinancing.	5.0	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.7	3.7	4.3
<b>Answered</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>659</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 4

**To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements on the allocation and use of IFAD funding?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
The terms and conditions associated with IFAD loans are appropriate for helping the rural poor to escape from poverty.	5.1	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.4	4.7
IFAD should continue to allocate all of its financial resources only through the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS).	4.8	4.7	4.2	4.4	4.6	3.1	4.1
For countries that wish to borrow more than the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS) allocation, IFAD should provide additional resources on ordinary terms.	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.6
IFAD should only allocate grants and highly concessional funding through the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS) and allocate ordinary lending and market-based funds separately.	4.8	4.7	4.2	4.5	4.6	4.3	4.5
IFAD should allocate more of its regular grant funds to directly support operations at the country level (rather than at the regional and global level).	5.3	5.2	4.9	4.7	5.1	4.0	4.7
<b>Answered</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>393</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>642</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 5

**Where should IFAD concentrate its financial resources?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
All countries that request IFAD assistance.	3%	11%	21%	18%	12%	20%	15%
Countries with the highest number of rural poor.	35%	22%	12%	16%	23%	24%	24%
Countries with the lowest GNI per capita.	4%	10%	1%	14%	7%	10%	8%
Countries with the highest situations of fragility and vulnerability in rural areas.	38%	38%	51%	43%	40%	32%	37%
Countries where the track record of the performance of IFAD-funded projects is good.	20%	16%	12%	8%	16%	10%	14%
No knowledge / no opinion	1%	3%	2%	0%	2%	3%	3%
<b>Answered</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>393</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>642</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 6

**Please rate the following aspects of IFAD's products**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
The choice of IFAD products (i.e., loans and grants) that can be used to finance projects.	4.3	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.5	3.8	4.3
The pricing of IFAD's products (Interest rates).	3.6	4.1	4.3	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.1
The grace period of IFAD's products.	3.5	4.1	4.4	3.9	4.0	4.4	4.2
The maturity period for IFAD's products.	3.3	4.1	4.4	3.7	3.9	4.2	4.1
The flexibility of currency selection for IFAD products.	3.7	4.2	4.2	3.6	4.0	3.6	3.9
The volume of financing available from IFAD to meet the demands from client countries.	3.4	3.9	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.1	3.5
IFAD's performance in mobilizing cofinancing.	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.0	3.4	3.9
The way in which IFAD classifies countries for different lending terms: Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) grants, highly concessional financing, blended loans and ordinary loans.	3.4	3.6	3.5	4.0	3.6	3.8	3.7
IFAD's ability to provide grants to finance some components of the project.	4.2	4.3	4.0	3.9	4.2	3.6	4.1
IFAD's ability to provide financing in convertible currencies that indirectly helps to build up the foreign reserves of a country.	3.3	3.7	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.4
<b>Answered</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>613</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 7

**Should IFAD offer a wider range of financial products?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Yes	78%	78%	84%	82%	79%	79%	79%
No	5%	7%	3%	6%	6%	8%	6%
No knowledge / no opinion	17%	15%	14%	12%	16%	14%	15%
<b>Answered</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>624</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 8

**Please indicate the level of priority that you would assign to IFAD introducing new products in the following areas.**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
A private sector window that provides loans priced on market, risk adjusted terms	4.2	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.9	4.0
A private sector window that makes equity investments on commercial terms	4.0	3.6	3.5	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7
Quick disbursing, policy-based sovereign loans (i.e., loans disbursed against the achievements of policy related milestones)	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.0	4.3
Sector adjustment sovereign loans (i.e., includes both a policy component and a traditional project component)	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.5	3.8	4.3
Line of credit to a financial intermediary for a defined purpose	4.3	3.9	3.7	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.8
A refinancing facility for a defined purpose	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.4	3.5	4.1
Local currency sovereign loans	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.2	3.6	4.0
Results based lending (i.e., a lending instrument that disburses against the achievement of results)	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.7
<b>Answered</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>472</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 9

Please indicate the level of priority that you would assign to IFAD introducing new products in the following areas.

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Islamic financing	3.7	3.7	3.2	3.6	3.5	3.2	3.4
Guarantees/credit enhancement products	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.0	4.2
A special facility to support the implementation of an integrated strategy for managing the risk of natural disasters and drought	5.3	5.0	5.0	4.8	5.0	4.2	4.7
Agriculture trade financing	5.3	5.1	5.1	4.7	5.1	4.1	4.8
Import credit guarantees for basic farm inputs used by the IFAD target group	4.9	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	3.6	4.2
Minimum price guarantees for marketed production by the IFAD target group	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.5	4.7	3.6	4.3
Drought and natural disaster insurance for the IFAD target group	5.2	5.1	5.2	4.8	5.1	4.4	4.8
IFAD lending should only cover the foreign exchange needs of the projects that it supports in middle-income countries	4.0	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.7	2.9	3.4
Other (please specify)	3	9	5	2	20	6	26
<b>Answered</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>472</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 10

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements related to IFAD's cost recovery and efficiency?

	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
IFAD should harden the terms of its financing to recover more of its operating costs	3.9	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6
IFAD should improve its cost efficiency by cutting its overheads	5.0	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.0	4.4
<b>Answered</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>598</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 11

**Please indicate which role best describes your relation to IFAD**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
I work in a Government ministry or agency of a non-borrowing member country	6%	7%	21%	100%	13%	0%	8%
I work in a Government ministry or agency of a borrowing member country	79%	76%	69%	0%	72%	0%	46%
I am a member of Senior IFAD Management (D1 and above)	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	2%
Government ministry or agency in a donor country (List A or List B country)	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
I am an IFAD staff member	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	95%	35%
I work for another organization	15%	17%	9%	0%	15%	0%	9%
<b>Answered</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>598</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 12

**For IFAD staff, in which department do you work?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
I work in the PMD or a country office	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	47%	47%
I work in FOD, AUO or PRM	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	20%	20%
I work in another department / office	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	33%
<b>Answered</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>211</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for IFAD staff.

Table 13

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the nature/design/type of projects put forward for IFAD financing by a country?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
The nature of the projects is determined by government priorities and policies and the needs of the beneficiaries rather than the terms of IFAD's financing.	5.3	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.1	4.8	5.0
The terms of IFAD's loans have no influence on the nature and design of the projects.	3.9	3.9	4.0	0.0	3.9	3.8	3.9
If IFAD hardened its loan terms, governments would propose different types of projects for IFAD to finance (e.g., projects with more financial sustainability).	4.1	4.3	4.1	0.0	4.2	3.8	4.1
Projects financed on grant or highly concessional terms are more likely to directly benefit the rural poor.	5.0	5.0	4.9	0.0	5.0	3.5	4.6
Projects financed on harder loan terms are more likely to benefit the rural poor indirectly.	3.3	3.6	3.4	0.0	3.4	2.9	3.3
<b>Answered</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>369</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Common question for IFAD staff working in management, or FOD, PRM, AUO and government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 14

**Which statement best describes your organisation?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Government ministry or agency of a non-borrowing member country	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Government ministry or agency of a borrowing member country	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	0%	73%
Senior IFAD Management (D1 and above)	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
IFAD staff member	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	27%
<b>Answered</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>369</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Common question for IFAD professional staff and government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 15

**To what extent do you agree or disagree that you would prefer to borrow from IFAD in the following currencies?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
No currency preference	3.0	2.8	3.1	0.0	2.9	0	2.9
SDRs	4.7	4.0	3.7	0.0	4.2	0	4.2
US dollars	4.6	4.7	4.8	0.0	4.7	0	4.7
EUR	4.3	3.6	3.8	0.0	3.8	0	3.8
GBP	2.8	2.6	2.5	0.0	2.6	0	2.6
Yen	2.3	2.3	2.3	0.0	2.3	0	2.3
Chinese Yuan (renminbi)	2.3	2.2	2.9	0.0	2.4	0	2.4
Local currency	3.6	4.1	4.7	0.0	4.0	0	4.0
Other (please specify)	4	6	1	0	13	0	13
<b>Answered</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 16

**To what extent do you agree or disagree that you would prefer to convert your existing SDR denominated loans from IFAD to one of the following currencies?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Do not wish to convert existing SDR denominated loans to another currency	3.9	3.2	3.9	0.0	3.6	0	3.6
US dollars	4.4	4.7	4.6	0.0	4.6	0	4.6
EUR	4.1	3.4	3.5	0.0	3.6	0	3.6
GBP	2.7	2.6	2.6	0.0	2.6	0	2.6
Yen	2.3	2.4	2.4	0.0	2.3	0	2.3
Chinese Yuan (renminbi)	2.3	2.4	3.1	0.0	2.5	0	2.5
Local currency	3.7	4.2	4.3	0.0	4.1	0	4.1
Other (please specify)	3	5	2	0	11.0	0	11
<b>Answered</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 17

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on your country's borrowing from IFAD?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Supporting agriculture and rural development will remain an important priority in our country for the foreseeable future.	5.9	5.7	5.8	0.0	5.8	0	5.8
We would like to borrow more money from IFAD on the same terms and conditions prevailing in 2016.	5.2	4.9	5.1	0.0	5.0	0	5.0
Going forward, we expect to borrow less from IFAD.	2.6	3.4	3.4	0.0	3.1	0	3.1
We would like our borrowing from IFAD to remain about at the current level.	2.9	3.7	4.1	0.0	3.5	0	3.5
We would like to borrow more money even if IFAD hardened its terms.	3.9	3.2	3.4	0.0	3.4	0	3.4
IFAD's terms and conditions are competitive with those of other sources of funding that can be used to help the rural poor escape from poverty.	4.5	4.8	5.1	0.0	4.7	0	4.7
<b>Answered</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 18

**If IFAD increased the interest rate currently paid by your country to recover more of its operating expenses do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the likely impact on your country's decisions to seek financial support from IFAD?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 0.5%.	4.2	4.2	3.3	0.0	4.0	0	4.0
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 0.5%.	3.7	3.5	3.9	0.0	3.6	0	3.6
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.0%.	4.2	4.4	3.8	0.0	4.2	0	4.2
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.0%.	3.4	2.9	3.6	0.0	3.2	0	3.2
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.5%.	4.0	4.6	4.1	0.0	4.3	0	4.3
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.5%.	2.9	2.6	3.0	0.0	2.7	0	2.7

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 2.0%.	4.3	4.8	4.6	0.0	4.6	0	4.6
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 2.0%.	2.7	2.4	2.8	0.0	2.6	0	2.6
If IFAD's terms were harder than the terms of the Multilateral Development Banks and bilateral sources, our country would maximize our borrowing for agriculture and rural development from those sources before seeking financing from IFAD.	4.9	4.9	4.1	0.0	4.7	0	4.7
<b>Answered</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>260</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 19

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about possible future developments?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
Pro-poor agricultural and rural development will continue to be a major priority.	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.7	5.4	5.6
Declining development funding by some member states and the needs of emergencies will reduce the total amount of funding available for development.	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.8	4.8	4.8
Because of competing priorities and fiscal constraints, budgets for Official Development Assistance will be under increasing pressure in future years.	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.7	5.0	4.8
IFAD's target funding level is based on a satisfactory methodology.	4.8	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.7	3.8	4.5
IFAD's target funding level should be based on countries' demands and needs.	5.1	5.3	5.1	4.8	5.1	4.8	5.1
The fiscal/political conditions in member states countries are the main determinants of the level of IFAD's replenishments.	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.7	4.3	4.6
Member states should fully reimburse IFAD dollar for dollar for the foregone principal associated with the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) grants.	4.4	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.5	5.0	4.6
Compensation for Debt Sustainability Framework principal should be incremental to their replenishment contributions.	4.2	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.8	4.4
<b>Answered</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>356</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 20

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on the governance of IFAD's financial architecture?**

Answer Options	Government respondents in LICs	Government respondents in LMICs	Government respondents in UMICs	Government respondents in List A countries	Government respondents	IFAD respondents	Total
The Executive Board and Audit Committee provide adequate oversight of IFAD's financing strategy and loan policy.	5.2	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.4	4.8
The Executive Board and Audit Committee provide adequate oversight of IFAD's resourcing and loan management.	5.3	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.3	4.8
IFAD's internal and external audit arrangements are satisfactory.	5.1	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.7	4.8
IFAD's management provides sufficient information for the Executive Board to make decisions with regard to IFAD's financial management, resourcing and loan policies.	5.1	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.8	4.5	4.8
If IFAD expands its borrowing (from sovereign, markets and other sources), at present there is adequate capacity to manage the organization from a financial point of view.	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.1	4.5	3.2	4.2
Information on IFAD's resourcing and loan policy is as transparent as in other development financing institutions. IFAD management presents excessive amounts of information, which overloads the Executive Board and makes decision making difficult.	5.1	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.3	4.8
The Executive Board lacks independent external expert advice to assist it in making financing and loan policy decisions for IFAD.	3.6	3.6	4.2	3.7	3.7	3.2	3.6
IFAD's voting rights formula provides adequate incentives to encourage Members to contribute core resources.	4.3	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9
Because of its diverse makeup, Executive Board has limited knowledge and expertise of strategic financial issues related to major changes in IFAD's financial architecture.	4.6	4.5	4.2	3.8	4.4	3.9	4.3
	4.0	3.6	4.7	4.1	3.9	4.3	4.0
<b>Answered</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>356</b>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Common question for government officials and IFAD senior management and IFAD professional staff working in FOD, AUO or PRM

### Statistical tests for the significance of the difference of means (t-test)

Statistical significance testing was undertaken<sup>224</sup> to determine whether differences were statistically significant for the survey responses when divided into subgroups of respondents. In the tables below the underlined values are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level, **bold values** denote statistical significance at the 5 per cent level and **underlined and bold values** denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent level. The table numbers below correspond to the table numbers in the preceding section of this annex.

Table 21

#### To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on IFAD's resource mobilisation?

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD ( <i>P value</i> )	LIC vs. LMIC ( <i>P value</i> )	LMIC vs. UMIC ( <i>P value</i> )	LIC vs. UMIC ( <i>P value</i> )
IFAD's has mobilized sufficient financial resources to meet the demand for financing of rural poverty reduction.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.7206	0.8924	0.6697
In the future, IFAD is likely to experience increasing difficulty mobilizing financial resources from the replenishment.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.9647	0.1435	0.2058
IFAD should be an institution that primarily provides funding at concessional terms.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.888	0.6165	0.5628
IFAD should mobilize long term financing from sovereign sources (e.g., national development finance institutions, or concessional partnership loans) to support higher volume of operations.	<u>0.0006</u>	0.6439	0.1009	0.0744
IFAD should mobilize financing from commercial sources (e.g., banks; pension funds; insurance companies) to support higher volume of operations.	0.2818	<u>0.0765</u>	<u>0.0607</u>	<u>0.0018</u>
IFAD should issue bonds on the international capital markets to support higher volume of operations.	0.6498	0.0391	0.6688	0.166
IFAD should mobilize more "supplementary funding", additional to the replenishment.	0.7192	0.238	0.5771	0.146
Supplementary funds should be subject to full recovery of the related IFAD administrative and operational costs.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.0374	0.2762	0.3883

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

<sup>224</sup> Two sample t-test for unequal variances. The statistical software used is STATA: Data Analysis and Statistical Software, version 15.

Table 22

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements related to IFAD's replenishment process?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
IFAD's replenishment process works well.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.5374	0.3908	0.9006
When specific funds are established outside of the normal replenishment, contributors to these funds, including non-governmental organisations, foundations and private donors should have a voice in their governance.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.8728	0.7637	0.8862
IFAD is good at mobilizing national counterpart funding.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.214	0.2013	0.9037
IFAD is good at mobilizing international cofinancing.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.0329	0.2972	0.0105

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 23

**To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements on the allocation and use of IFAD funding?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
The terms and conditions associated with IFAD loans are appropriate for helping the rural poor to escape from poverty.	<u>0.00001</u>	<u>0.0534</u>	0.9742	0.1689
IFAD should continue to allocate all of its financial resources only through the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS).	<u>0.00001</u>	0.4471	<u>0.0099</u>	<u>0.0042</u>
For countries that wish to borrow more than the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS) allocation, IFAD should provide additional resources on ordinary terms.	0.98	0.2525	0.4454	0.1048
IFAD should only allocate grants and highly concessional funding through the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS) and allocate ordinary lending and market-based funds separately.	<u>0.001</u>	0.9173	<u>0.0026</u>	<u>0.0048</u>
IFAD should allocate more of its regular grant funds to directly support operations at the country level (rather than at the regional and global level).	<u>0.00001</u>	0.1787	0.1543	0.0171

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 24

**Please rate the following aspects of IFAD's products**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
The choice of IFAD products (i.e., loans and grants) that can be used to finance projects.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.0228	0.1386	0.5876
The pricing of IFAD's products (Interest rates).	<u>0.0064</u>	0.8622	0.3306	0.2849
The grace period of IFAD's products.	0.743	0.6362	0.1927	0.3685
The maturity period for IFAD's products.	0.1238	0.1364	0.8104	0.1831
The flexibility of currency selection for IFAD products.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.4372	0.6353	0.8623
The volume of financing available from IFAD to meet the demands from client countries.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.1475	0.1482	0.9294
IFAD's performance in mobilizing cofinancing.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.2603	0.7204	0.2276
The way in which IFAD classifies countries for different lending terms: Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) grants, highly concessional financing, blended loans and ordinary loans.	<u>0.0044</u>	0.1702	0.4361	0.0475
IFAD's ability to provide grants to finance some components of the project.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.3359	0.3939	0.9727
IFAD's ability to provide financing in convertible currencies that indirectly helps to build up the foreign reserves of a country.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.2627	0.4506	0.8459

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 25

**Please indicate the level of priority that you would assign to IFAD introducing new products in the following areas.**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
A private sector window that provides loans priced on market, risk adjusted terms	0.7262	<u>0.0876</u>	0.4994	0.4773
A private sector window that makes equity investments on commercial terms	0.8588	<u>0.0524</u>	0.9015	<u>0.0766</u>
Quick disbursing, policy-based sovereign loans (i.e., loans disbursed against the achievements of policy related milestones)	<u>0.00001</u>	0.7321	0.1832	0.3298
Sector adjustment sovereign loans (i.e., includes both a policy component and a traditional project component)	<u>0.00001</u>	0.9897	0.4213	0.4661
Line of credit to a financial intermediary for a defined purpose	<u>0.0006</u>	0.0473	0.383	0.0157
A refinancing facility for a defined purpose	<u>0.00001</u>	0.4652	0.8995	0.4933
Local currency sovereign loans	<u>0.00001</u>	0.9195	0.8566	0.9316
Results based lending (i.e., a lending instrument that disburses against the achievement of results)	0.0231	0.6214	0.8986	0.6046

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 26

**Please indicate the level of priority that you would assign to IFAD introducing new products in the following areas.**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
Islamic financing	0.0203	0.9927	0.1271	0.1373
Guarantees/credit enhancement products	<u>0.00001</u>	0.3505	0.3954	0.9293
A special facility to support the implementation of an integrated strategy for managing the risk of natural disasters and drought	<u>0.00001</u>	0.0205	0.7824	<u>0.082</u>
Agriculture trade financing	<u>0.00001</u>	0.0152	0.4705	0.1
Import credit guarantees for basic farm inputs used by the target group	<u>0.00001</u>	<u>0.0014</u>	0.2723	0.1094
Minimum price guarantees for production by the target group	<u>0.00001</u>	0.901	0.6951	0.7806
Drought and natural disaster insurance for the IFAD target group	<u>0.00001</u>	0.3914	0.1952	0.7281
IFAD lending should only cover the foreign exchange needs of the projects that it supports in middle-income countries	<u>0.00001</u>	0.1052	0.8385	0.1442

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 27

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements related to IFAD's cost recovery and efficiency?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
IFAD should harden the terms of its financing to recover more of its operating costs	0.7408	0.017	0.5272	0.0137
IFAD should improve its cost efficiency by cutting its overheads	<u>0.00001</u>	0.0192	0.7769	0.0332

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

Table 28.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the nature/design/type of projects put forward for IFAD financing by a country?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
The nature of the projects is determined by government priorities and policies and the needs of the beneficiaries rather than the terms of IFAD's financing.	0.0377	0.0171	0.5769	0.1089
The terms of IFAD's loans have no influence on the nature and design of the projects.	0.2988	0.9708	0.6904	0.6928
If IFAD hardened its loan terms, governments would propose different types of projects for IFAD to finance (e.g., projects that have a greater degree of financial sustainability).	<u>0.009</u>	0.1281	0.2521	0.8654
Projects financed on grant or highly concessional terms are more likely to directly benefit the rural poor.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.8296	0.3049	0.4085
Projects financed on harder loan terms are more likely to benefit the rural poor indirectly.	<u>0.0007</u>	0.1082	0.2439	0.8737

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Common question for IFAD staff working in management, or FOD, PRM, AUO and government officials from borrowing member countries.

143

Table 29

**To what extent do you agree or disagree that you would prefer to borrow from IFAD in the following currencies?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
No currency preference	na	0.5673	0.2955	0.6291
SDRs	na	<u>0.0005</u>	0.3786	<u>0.0002</u>
US dollars	na	0.6511	0.6341	0.3953
EUR	na	<u>0.0015</u>	0.4043	<u>0.0876</u>
GBP	na	0.306	0.8636	0.3423
Yen	na	0.7514	0.9526	0.7652
Chinese Yuan (renminbi)	na	0.4476	0.014	<u>0.0617</u>
Local currency	na	<u>0.0946</u>	0.109	<u>0.0052</u>

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 30

**To what extent do you agree or disagree that you would prefer to convert your existing SDR denominated loans from IFAD to one of the following currencies?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
Do not wish to convert existing SDR denominated loans to another currency	na	0.0133	0.0385	0.8829
US dollars	na	0.2643	0.9222	0.4699
EUR	na	0.0102	0.7196	0.1014
GBP	na	0.8296	0.8522	0.7426
Yen	na	0.6511	0.8635	0.6278
Chinese yuan (renminbi)	na	0.6511	0.0328	0.022
Local currency	na	<u>0.0731</u>	0.8707	0.1338

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table31

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on your country's borrowing from IFAD?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
Supporting agriculture and rural development will remain an important priority in our country for the foreseeable future.	na	0.0119	0.1858	0.3513
We would like to borrow more money from IFAD on the same terms and conditions prevailing in 2016.	na	0.0327	0.2557	0.5037
Going forward, we expect to borrow less from IFAD.	na	<u>0.0002</u>	0.8288	<u>0.0036</u>
We would like our borrowing from IFAD to remain about at the current level.	na	<u>0.0005</u>	0.2007	<u>0.0001</u>
We would like to borrow more money even if IFAD hardened its terms.	na	<u>0.0016</u>	0.3382	0.1407
IFAD's terms and conditions are competitive with those of other sources of funding that can be used to help the rural poor escape from poverty.	na	0.2312	<u>0.0922</u>	0.0126

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 32

**If IFAD increased the interest rate currently paid by your country to recover more of its operating expenses do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the likely impact on your country's decisions to seek financial support from IFAD?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 0.5%.	na	0.6564	<u>0.0004</u>	<u>0.0031</u>
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 0.5%.	na	0.2884	<u>0.0932</u>	0.5279
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.0%.	na	0.1937	0.0222	0.2053
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.0%.	na	0.046	0.0424	0.6782
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.5%.	na	0.0126	<u>0.0688</u>	0.778
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 1.5%.	na	<u>0.0801</u>	0.1775	0.8431
Our country would reduce our borrowing if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 2.0%.	na	<u>0.0625</u>	0.5975	0.2437
Our country would continue borrowing at the same level if IFAD increased the cost of borrowing by 2.0%.	na	0.1161	0.2152	0.7637
If IFAD's terms were harder than the terms of the Multilateral Development Banks and bilateral sources, our country would maximize our borrowing for agriculture and rural development from those sources before seeking financing from IFAD.	na	0.7421	0.0165	0.0124

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Question for government officials from borrowing member countries.

Table 33

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about possible future developments?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
Pro-poor agricultural and rural development will continue to be a major priority.	<u>0.006</u>	<u>0.0018</u>	0.7076	<u>0.0033</u>
Declining development funding by some member states and the needs of emergencies will reduce the total amount of funding available for development.	0.6004	0.734	0.1352	0.2895
Because of competing priorities and fiscal constraints, budgets for Official Development Assistance will be under increasing pressure in future years.	<u>0.074</u>	0.5121	0.2173	0.5708
IFAD's target funding level is based on a satisfactory methodology.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.7963	0.4242	0.3484
IFAD's target funding level should be based on countries' demands and needs.	0.0122	<u>0.0847</u>	0.1343	0.9015
The fiscal/political conditions in member states countries are the main determinants of the level of IFAD's replenishments.	0.039	0.9349	0.4318	0.5028
Member states should fully reimburse IFAD dollar for dollar for the foregone principal associated with the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) grants.	<u>0.004</u>	0.2146	0.4209	0.8261
Compensation for Debt Sustainability Framework principal should be incremental to their replenishment contributions.	0.0447	0.1501	0.3311	0.8082

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Common question for government officials and IFAD senior management and IFAD professional staff working in FOD, AUO or PRM.

Table 34

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on the governance of IFAD's financial architecture?**

Answer Options	IFAD vs. Non IFAD (P value)	LIC vs. LMIC (P value)	LMIC vs. UMIC (P value)	LIC vs. UMIC (P value)
The Executive Board and Audit Committee provide adequate oversight of IFAD's financing strategy and loan policy.	<u>0.0013</u>	<u>0.0017</u>	0.8178	0.0121
The Executive Board and Audit Committee provide adequate oversight of IFAD's resourcing and loan management.	<u>0.0006</u>	<u>0.0002</u>	0.7633	<u>0.0041</u>
IFAD's internal and external audit arrangements are satisfactory.	0.2599	0.0289	0.2824	<u>0.0074</u>
IFAD's management provides sufficient information for the Executive Board to make decisions with regard to IFAD's financial management, resourcing and loan policies.	<u>0.0832</u>	0.0127	0.4314	0.0137
If IFAD expands its borrowing (from sovereign, markets and other sources), at present there is adequate capacity to manage the organization from a financial point of view.	<u>0.00001</u>	0.1502	0.6424	0.4154
Information on IFAD's resourcing and loan policy is as transparent as in other development financing institutions.	<u>0.0017</u>	0.0322	0.8626	<u>0.0693</u>
IFAD management presents excessive amounts of information, which overloads the Executive Board and makes decision making difficult.	0.014	0.9915	0.0247	0.0432
The Executive Board lacks independent external expert advice to assist it in making financing and loan policy decisions for IFAD.	0.9325	0.0433	0.5909	0.2344
IFAD's voting rights formula provides adequate incentives to encourage Members to contribute core resources.	<u>0.0038</u>	0.4341	0.3564	0.1723
Because of its diverse makeup, Executive Board has limited knowledge and expertise of strategic financial issues related to major changes in IFAD's financial architecture.	0.0246	0.1838	<u>0.00001</u>	0.0176

Source: IOE, CLE-Financial Architecture E-survey.

\*Common question for government officials and IFAD senior management and IFAD professional staff working in FOD, AUO or PRM

## Use of PBAS Allocations, maps of IFAD Country Classification (2007, 2012, 2017) and Comparative Tables

Table 1  
Use of original PBAS allocation by country classification for IFAD7 to IFAD9

	100% DSF grants	50% DSF grants/50% highly concessional loans	100% highly concessional loans	Blended loans	Ordinary loans	Total
<b>IFAD7</b>						
Countries not included in the original PBAS allocation	10 (2 were added in the PBAS pool later)	0	6	1	28	45 (2 were added in the PBAS pool later)
Used <50% of the original PBAS allocation	2	1	6	0	6	17
Used between 50% and 90% of the original PBAS allocation	5	3	4	0	1	13
Used between 90% and 110% of the original PBAS allocation	6	4	8	5	10	33
Used between 100% and 150% of the original PBAS allocation	6	5	10	7	6	34
Over 150% of the original PBAS allocation	5	2	2	0	6	15
Countries receiving funds under the PBAS that were not included in the initial PBAS allocation	2	0	0	0	0	2
Average % use of the original PBAS allocation for IFAD7	110%	107%	86%	110%	99%	98%

Source: Compiled by IOE from data provided by the PMD front office

Table 2  
Use of original PBAS allocation by country classification for IFAD7 to IFAD9 (continued)

	100% DSF grants	50% DSF grants/50% highly concessional loans	100% highly concessional loans	Blended loans	Ordinary loans	Total
<b>IFAD8</b>						
Countries not included in the original PBAS allocation	1	0	1	2 (1 was added in the PBAS pool later)	17	21 (1 was added to the PBAS pool later)
Used <= 50% of the original PBAS allocation	4	2	7	1	22	36
Used between 50% and 90% of the original PBAS allocation	3	2	3	2	6	16
Used between 90% and 110% of the original PBAS allocation	6	4	14	1	13	38
Used between 100% and 150% of the original PBAS allocation	8	7	15	0	8	38
Over 150% of the original PBAS allocation	4	0	2	1	1	8
Countries receiving funds under the PBAS that were not included in the initial PBAS allocation	0	0	0	1	0	1
Average % use of the original PBAS allocation for IFAD8	98%	93%	86%	92%	47%	74%

Source: Compiled by IOE from data provided by the PMD front office

Table 3  
Use of original PBAS allocation by country classification for IFAD7 to IFAD9 (continued)

	100% DSF grants	50% DSF grants/50% highly concessional loans	100% highly concessional loans	Blended loans	Ordinary loans	Total
<b>IFAD9</b>						
Countries not included in the original PBAS allocation	3	6	10	1	19 (1 was added in the PBAS later)	39 (1 was added in the PBAS later)
Used <50% of the original PBAS allocation	7	2	4	5	8	26
Used between 50% and 90% of the original PBAS allocation	0	2	4	0	3	9
Used between 90% and 110% of the original PBAS allocation	6	4	4	5	7	26
Used between 100% and 150% of the original PBAS allocation	6	2	7	5	18	38
Over 150% of the original PBAS allocation	3	3	2	4	3	15
Countries receiving funds under the PBAS that were not included in the initial PBAS allocation	0	0	0	0	1	1
Average % use of the original PBAS allocation for IFAD9	85%	112%	92%	83%	90%	91%

Source: Compiled by IOE from data provided by the PMD front office

Table 4

## IFAD7 to IFAD9 PBAS allocations and use by region and country grouping (\$)

	APR	ESA	LAC	NEN	WCA	Total	% of total
<b>Original PBAS allocations for IFAD 7 to IFAD9</b>							
UMICs	11,004,768	60,803,187	428,931,454	106,504,212	3,000,000	610,243,621	8%
LMICs	889,394,728	86,148,208	408,361,180	656,870,765	376,427,814	2,417,202,695	33%
LICs	1,542,598,769	1,464,206,124	38,146,563	183,659,136	1,037,507,921	4,266,118,513	58%
Total	2,442,998,265	1,611,157,519	875,439,197	947,034,113	1,416,935,735	7,293,564,829	100%
% of total	101%	66%	37%	39%	58%	100%	
<b>Total approvals for IFAD7 to IFAD9</b>							
UMICs	9,512,315	11,651,470	317,099,254	112,359,669	6,000,163	456,622,871	6%
LMICs	873,245,103	86,281,655	338,456,610	545,331,647	340,151,905	2,183,466,920	30%
LICs	1,673,208,824	1,592,486,437	13,199,902	179,059,182	1,087,393,532	4,545,347,877	63%
Total	2,555,966,242	1,690,419,562	668,755,766	836,750,498	1,433,545,600	7,185,437,668	100%
% of total	108%	65%	29%	35%	63%	100%	
<b>Usage ratio of original PBAS allocations (%)</b>							
UMICs	86%	19%	74%	105%	200%	75%	
LMICs	98%	100%	83%	83%	90%	90%	
LICs	108%	109%	35%	97%	105%	107%	
Total	105%	105%	76%	88%	101%	99%	


Source: Compiled by IOE from data provided by the PMD front office

Map 1  
Country classifications, 2007




Note: The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the definition of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.  
Source: Derived by IOE from PMD data

Map 2  
**Classification of counties, 2012**



Note: The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the definition of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.  
 Source: Derived by IOE from PMD data

Map 3  
**Classification of counties, 2017**



Note: The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the definition of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.  
 Source: Derived by IOE from PMD data

Table 5  
**Benchmarking IFAD and World Bank Classifications, 2009**

		2009 World Bank Country Classifications							
		100% DSF Grant	50% DSF Grant/ 50% Highly Concessional	100% Highly Concessional	Blend	Ordinary	No Data	Total	Per Cent (%)
2009 IFAD Country Classifications	100% DSF Grant	19	2	3	1	0	0	25	24
	50% DSF Grant/ 50% Highly Concessional	1	10	1	0	0	0	12	12
	100% Highly Concessional	0	0	18	5	0	1	24	23
	Blend	0	0	0	3	5	0	8	8
	Ordinary	0	0	0	2	26	1	29	28
	No Data	0	0	1	1	2	1	5	5
	Total	20	12	23	12	33	3	103	100
	Per Cent	19	12	22	12	32	3	100	

Source: IOE estimates based on a country by country review of IFAD and World Bank country classifications

Table 6  
**Benchmarking IFAD and World Bank Classifications, 2009**

		2017 World Bank Country Classifications							
		100% DSF Grant	50% DSF Grant/ 50% Highly Concessional	100% Highly Concessional	Blend	Ordinary	No Data	Total	Per Cent (%)
2017 IFAD Country Classifications	100% DSF Grant	9	0	0	0	1	0	10	10
	50% DSF Grant/ 50% Highly Concessional	0	18	0	0	0	0	18	17
	100% Highly Concessional	0	0	15	4	0	1	20	19
	Blend	0	0	8	8	0	0	16	16
	Ordinary	0	0	0	0	38	1	39	38
	No Data	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	9	18	23	12	39	2	103	100
	Per Cent (%)	9	17	22	12	38	2	100	

Source: IOE estimates based on a country by country review of IFAD and World Bank country classifications

Table 7  
**IFAD's country classification benchmarked against sovereign credit ratings**

<i>IFAD's 2017 country classification</i>							
Sovereign credit rating	100% DSF Grant	50% DSF Grant/ 50% Highly Concessional	100% Highly Concessional	Blend	Ordinary	Total	Per Cent (%)
A- to A+	0	0	0	0	3	3	3
BBB- to BBB+	0	0	0	1	9	10	10
BB- to BB+	0	0	1	2	11	14	13
B- to B+	0	3	11	9	11	34	33
C to CCC+	0	0	0	0	3	3	3
D	0	0	2	0	0	2	2
Not rated	10	15	6	4	2	37	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>100</b>
% Distribution of IFAD's country classification	10	17	19	16	38	100	
% Distribution of countries with a sovereign rating	0	17	70	75	95	64	
% Distribution of countries without a sovereign rating	100	83	30	25	5	36	

Note: The default was to use S&P's rating as the S&P ratings were available for the largest number of countries. For countries rated by Fitch but not be S&P, the Fitch rating was used. For the few countries with a Moody's rating but no S&P or Fitch rating, a rating equivalency scale was used to convert the Moody's rating to the equivalent S&P rating. For the investment grade ratings the equivalencies were straightforward. For ratings in near-default/default territory the equivalency is less clear.

Sources: country classifications: PMD; sovereign ratings: Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch

Table 8

## Annex IVD: Project objectives and changes in country classifications

Region	Country	Comparison of project objectives before/after a change in country classification and financing terms	
APR	Indonesia	<b>Smallholder Livelihood Development Project in Maluku and North Maluku (SOLID)</b>	<b>Coastal Community Development Project (CCDP)</b>
		Lending terms – <b>Intermediate (2010)</b>	Lending terms – <b>Ordinary (2011)</b>
		Approval year – <b>2011</b>	Approval year – <b>2012</b>
		<b>Project goal:</b> reduce poverty and improve food security and incomes in poor rural communities located in the two provinces of Maluku and North Maluku. Most of the targeted populations are engaged in tree and food crop production. The project builds on the positive experiences of the Post-Crisis Programme for Participatory Integrated Development in Rainfed Areas.	<b>Project goal:</b> reduce poverty and enhance economic growth for poor but active coastal and small island communities from West Kalimantan to Papua by increasing household incomes for families involved in fisheries and marine activities in the target communities in eastern Indonesia with a high incidence of poverty.
		Project interventions focus on: (i) community empowerment; (ii) boosting productivity by introducing integrated farming systems; (iii) enhancing natural resource management; (iv) value chain development and marketing; (v) investing in productive rural infrastructure; and (vi) strengthening local institutions.	Project interventions focus on: (i) community empowerment; (ii) a market-focused strategy so fisher and marine households can increase their incomes in a sustainable manner through the creation of community enterprise groups that develop high-potential value chains; (iii) using poverty and pro-poor targeting to select the project communities; (iv) replication and scaling up of successful project activities and processes.
	India	<b>Jharkhand Tribal Empowerment and Livelihoods Project</b>	<b>Livelihoods and Access to Markets Project</b>
		Lending terms – <b>Highly concessional (2012)</b>	Lending terms – <b>Blend (2013)</b>
		Project approval year: <b>2012</b>	Project approval year: <b>2014</b>
		The overall project goal is to improve the living conditions of tribal communities, especially PTGs, across the tribal scheduled area districts of Jharkhand.  The project development objective is to empower and enable 136,000 tribal households, including 10,000 PTG households, to take up livelihood options based on sustainable and equitable use of natural resources.	The goal of the Project is to improve family incomes and the quality of life in rural Meghalaya.  The objective of the Project is to adapt expanded and sustainable livelihood opportunities to the hill environment and to the effects of climate change.

Region	Country	Comparison of project objectives before/after a change in country classification and financing terms	
		Project components: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>community empowerment;</li> <li>integrated natural resource management;</li> <li>livelihoods support; and</li> <li>project management</li> </ol>	Project components: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Natural resources and food security;</li> <li>Livelihoods Support;</li> <li>Knowledge Service</li> </ol>
ESA	Ethiopia	<b>Community-based Integrated Natural Resources Management Project</b>	<b>Rural Financial Intermediation Programme – Phase II</b>
		Lending terms – DHC (2010)	Lending terms – Highly concessional (2011)
		Approval year: 2009	Approval year: 2011
		The project objectives are to enhance access by poor rural people to (i) natural resources (land and water), and (ii) improve agricultural production technologies, mainly through the adoption of sustainable land management practices.  Goal: Poverty sustainably reduced for about 450,000 rural households in 21 districts of Lake Tana Watershed.	The goal of the Programme shall be to contribute to the reduction of poverty in rural Ethiopia.  The objective of the Programme is to provide access to a range of financial services for an estimated 6.9 million rural households in Ethiopia building on the accomplishments of the Rural Financial Intermediation Programme I (RUFIP I). The Programme will achieve this through a nationwide network of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and 5 500 RUSACCOs and RUSACCO Unions. The Programme shall also support these Rural Financial Institutions to bridge their liquidity gap through a credit fund, and improve the policy environment including regulatory and supervisory architecture.
	Project components: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>community-based integrated watershed management; and</li> <li>institutional, legal and policy analysis and reform</li> </ol>	Project components: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>institutional development in the microfinance and cooperative sub sectors including knowledge management;</li> <li>improved regulation and supervision of MFIs; and</li> <li>credit funds for MFIs and RUSACCOs</li> </ol>	
	Mali	<b>Fostering Agricultural Productivity Project</b>	<b>Rural Youth Vocational Training Employment and Entrepreneurship Support</b>
		Lending terms: High concessional (2011)	Lending terms: DHC (2012)
Approval year: 2010		Approval year: 2014	

Region	Country	Comparison of project objectives before/after a change in country classification and financing terms	
		<p>The key project objective is to increase the productivity of smallholder agricultural and agribusiness producers in the targeted production systems (irrigated rice and vegetables, rainfed cereals, cowpea, fodder, livestock) within the targeted project areas.</p>	<p>The development objective of the project is to facilitate access by rural young people to employment opportunities and attractive, well-paying jobs in agriculture and related economic activities. As a result, they will become actors in modern agricultural value chains that are responsive to market demand and resilient to climate change.</p>
		<p>Project component:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) technology transfer and service provision to agricultural producers;</li> <li>(ii) investments in small- and large-scale irrigation; and</li> <li>(iii) comprehensive programmatic approach and sector monitoring</li> </ul>	<p>Project component:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) improve regional training mechanisms in response to demand from young people, based on the labour market and potential job prospects; and</li> <li>(ii) promote economic initiatives by rural young people in agricultural value chains and related economic activities, to enable them to gain sustainable access to vocational employment.</li> </ul>
LAC	Bolivia	<p><b>Plan Vida - PEEP to Eradicate Extreme Poverty – Phase I: Pilot Project to Strengthen the Capacity of Communities and Families Living in Extreme Poverty in Cochabamba and Potosí</b></p> <p>Lending terms: Highly concessional (2009)</p> <p>Approval year: 2009</p> <p>The main objective of the project is to promote the economic and productive capacities of families and community organizations according to their potential at the regional level, while at the same time lowering poverty rates and providing income sustainability.</p> <p>The specific objectives are to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) promote and strengthen identified potential productive activities in order to contribute towards the economic development of extremely poor families living in northern Potosí and southern Cochabamba;</li> <li>(ii) extend and support the organizational capacities of beneficiary communities in a way that respects their cultural identities, maintains their organizational patterns,</li> </ul>	<p><b>Economic Inclusion Programme for Families and Rural Communities in the Territory of the Plurinational State of Bolivia</b></p> <p>Lending terms: Blend (2010)</p> <p>Approval date: 2011</p> <p>The development objective of ACCESOS is to improve the quality of life of approximately 32,000 mainly food-insecure rural households that are largely dependent on small-scale agriculture and related activities for their livelihoods and are consequently vulnerable to the effects of climate change.</p>

Region	Country	Comparison of project objectives before/after a change in country classification and financing terms	
		and furthers coordinated efforts among stakeholders that will be to the advantage of the communities involved; and (iii) develop monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms to assess project results and impacts.	
		Project component: (i) Strengthening and managing means of production; (ii) Organizational strengthening and capacity-building.	Project component: (i) Natural resource management, investment in assets and enterprise development; (ii) Financial inclusion and protection.
	Honduras	<b>Northern Horizons-Competitiveness and Sustainable Rural Development Project in the Northern Zone</b>	<b>Project for Competitiveness and Sustainable Development in the South-Western Border Region</b>
		Lending terms: Highly concessional (2012)	Lending terms: Blend (2013)
		Approval year: 2011	Approval year: 2013
		The project development objective is to increase income, employment and food security of rural poor families in the project area and reduce their environmental vulnerability within a framework of gender equality and rural youth inclusion.	The project development objective is to improve incomes, employment opportunities, food security and general living conditions of the poor rural population, with a focus on social inclusion and gender, and with a view to reducing poverty and extreme poverty.
		Project component: (i) Human and social development; (ii) Value chains and competitiveness;	Project component: (i) Development and strengthening of rural organizations; (ii) Productive and business development; and (iii) Improvement of rural infrastructure and management of natural resources.
NEN	Egypt	<b>Promotion of Rural Incomes through Market Enhancement Project</b>	<b>Sustainable Agriculture Investments and Livelihoods Project</b>
		Lending terms: Blend (2011)	Lending terms: Blend (2012)
		Approval year: 2011	Approval year: 2014
		The project will contribute to the reduction of rural poverty in the seven governorates of Lower and Upper Egypt, through improved production and profitability in high value crops and	The development goal of the project is to contribute to poverty reduction and increased food and nutrition security for poor rural women and men in Egypt.

Region	Country	Comparison of project objectives before/after a change in country classification and financing terms		
		promotion of SMEs for better market linkages and employment creation.		The development objective is to enable smallholder farmers to enhance their incomes, increase profitability and diversify their livelihoods.
		Project component: (i) marketing support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- organizing and strengthening farmer groups/associations;</li> <li>- market intelligence;</li> <li>- value chain linkages; and</li> <li>- market-oriented production</li> </ul> (ii) rural finance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- market-based credit research and development;</li> <li>- credit facility; and</li> <li>- strengthening financial intermediaries</li> </ul>		Project component: (i) Community and livelihood development; (ii) Agriculture development and diversification; and (iii) Rural financial services
	Georgia	<b>Rural Development Project</b>	<b>Agricultural Support Project</b>	<b>Agricultural Modernization, Market Access and Resilience</b>
		Highly concessional (2007)	Blend (2008)	Ordinary (2010)
		Approval Year: 2005	Approval Year: 2009	Approval Year: 2014
		The project's overall goal is sustained rural income growth and poverty reduction. This will be achieved by facilitating the access of Georgia's mainly small and medium scale farmers to commodity supply chains, improving the competitiveness of agribusinesses and the associated supply chains, and strengthening the capacity of selected agricultural and financial institutions serving private-sector agricultural market activity. Project activities are expected to increase incomes and employment and reduce poverty in rural areas.	The overall goal of the project is to increase income among rural people engaged in agriculture activities in Georgia.  The project's objectives are: (i) to increase assets and incomes among actually and potentially economically active poor rural women and men willing to move towards commercially viable agricultural and associated rural enterprises; and (ii) to remove infrastructure bottlenecks that inhibit increasing participation of economically active rural poor in enhanced commercialization of the rural economy.	The overall goal of the AMMAR project is to sustainably increase incomes and reduce poverty for women and men in rural Georgia.  Its development objective is to stimulate private investments in climate-smart agricultural value chains to increase incomes and strengthen resilience of smallholder farmers in selected project areas.

Region	Country	Comparison of project objectives before/after a change in country classification and financing terms		
		Project component: (i) Agricultural Supply Chain Development; (ii) Rural Financial Services; and (iii) Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Development	Project component: (i) Support for leasing operations in rural areas; (ii) Small-scale rural infrastructure	Project component: (i) irrigation and agricultural value chain investment - Irrigation and value chain infrastructure; - Private investments in agricultural value chains (ii) climate-smart agricultural and value chain development - Value chain development processes and support; - Climate-smart agricultural technology transfer
WCA	Côte d'Ivoire	<b>Support to Agricultural Development and Marketing Project</b>		<b>Support to Agricultural Production and Marketing Project</b>
		Lending terms: 100% DSF grant (2012)		Lending terms: 50% DSF grant/50% highly concessional (2013)
		Approval year: 2011		Approval year: 2014
		PROPACOM's overall objective is to contribute to a reduction in rural poverty and to stimulate economic growth in the regions of Savanes, Bandama Valley and Zanzan. The development objective of the project is to sustainably improve the food security and incomes of the population in the project areas, through smallholder access to markets, effective services and appropriate technologies.		The overall objective of the project is to contribute to reducing rural poverty and stimulating economic growth in the regions of Tonpki, Kabadougou, Folon, Bafing, Worodougou and Béré. The development objective is to sustainably improve food security by increasing smallholder access to effective services, appropriate technology and markets while increasing the resilience of production systems to climate change.
		Project component: (i) enhancing agricultural production; (ii) value addition and marketing; (iii) coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge management		Project component: (i) sustainable improvement in agricultural production - APO organization and professionalization; - access to factors of production; and - access to rural finance (ii) value addition and marketing of agricultural products - professionalization of post-harvest actors and access to markets; and - marketing infrastructure

Region	Country	Comparison of project objectives before/after a change in country classification and financing terms	
	Togo	<b>Support to Agricultural Development Project</b>	<b>National Rural Entrepreneurship Project</b>
		Lending terms: 100% DSF grant (2011)	Lending terms: 50% DSF grant/50% highly concessional (2012)
		Approval year: 2010	Approval year: 2014
		The project's overall goal is to help improve the food security and incomes of farm families. Its specific objectives are to: (i) boost the productivity and outputs of three staple food crops (maize, rice and cassava); and (ii) improve the processing and marketing of outputs.	The objective of the project is to promote the development of rural enterprises generating long-term paid employment for young people at the local level.
		Project component: (i) support to production and productivity, involving both technical support (quick-start kits, proven packages, animal traction, pilot mechanization, advisory services, soil fertility management, irrigation) and capacity-building of farmers and their organizations; and (ii) value addition by facilitating access to processing equipment and economic infrastructure (storage, roads), marketing assistance (review of existing policy and law, market studies, bulking of produce, information systems, support to farmers' forums)	Project component: (i) Facilitating access to non-financial services - Strengthening the supply of MSRE support services; - Supporting MSRE start-ups and consolidation and promoting their products and services (ii) Facilitating access to financial services - Supporting start-ups by first-time entrepreneurs; - Building supply and developing capacity

Source: IOE as extracted from the relevant project documents

## Overview of MDB Financial Products

**Table 1**  
**Summary of the products of the World Bank Group**

	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Disbursement mechanism</i>	<i>Implementation mechanism</i>
<b>Sovereign operations</b>			
Investment Project Financing (IPF), which accounts for about three quarters of the World Bank Groups sovereign operations. Special provisions for small and fragile states.	Support specific investment operations. Can include provisions for project preparation advances. Variations allow for financing a series of projects, providing additional financing or lines of credit.	Disbursed against the implementation of specific contracts or expenditures that support the project.	World Bank IPF rules and procedures, including procurement rules.  Funds specific expenditures.
Development Policy Financing (DPF), which accounts for about a quarter of the sovereign operations of the World Bank Group. The use of the DPL in a country is determined in the context of the Country Partnership Framework (i.e., the COSOP).	Supports government programs or subprograms in both LICs and MICS and is used in many sectors, including agriculture, water resource management and rural development.	Disburses upon policy change achievements of results and performance indicators/triggers/milestones as specified in advance.	Changes in country policies and processes.  Funds are not earmarked specific purposes budget rather are for general budget support. Thus, country processes, public financial management and anti-corruption and other safeguards govern the use of the funds.
Adaptable Program Loan (APL). Provides for phased World Bank support for long-term development programs. APLs require agreements between the World Bank and the client on: (i) the phased, long-term sector development program supported by the APL; (ii) development priorities for sector investments and recurrent expenditures within the sector; and (iii) the evolution of sector policies in each APL phase.	APLs are used when sustained changes in institutions, organizations, and client behaviour are needed to successfully implement a programme. Such reforms generally take a long time to implement, requiring sequenced activities, specific investments, institutional strengthening, policy reforms and constituency building.	APLs have triggers, or conditions, that define when the next sequential loan can initiate operations. APLs provide incentives through staggered disbursements for clients to implement such long run programmes.	Key advantages for clients include: (i) <b>reform realism</b> : arbitrary front-loading of policy conditionalities is replaced by realistic phasing of reforms; (ii) <b>continuity</b> : Long-term planning and sustainable institution-building that is supported by bridging electoral cycles and administration changes; and (iii) <b>financial charges</b> : Commitment fees are reduced.
Program-for-Results (PforR) financing, developed in 2012, the use of which has been increasing steadily.	Delivers results through a country's institutions, programmes and processes and uses country systems, including those for procurement. Supports government programs or subprograms and can be used in many sectors.	Disbursements linked to the achievement of specific programme results and performance indicators.	Program systems Funds for a specific expenditure programme, for example in the agriculture, rural development or water resource management sectors.
The IDA Scale Up Facility was developed in 2016 to mobilize resources to help meet the 2030 SDGs. The IDA18 scale up facility is designed to increase non-concessional financing available for potentially transformational projects. Such funds would be provided to meet the very strong client demand. IDA estimated that the demand for such financing would far exceed the available funds in the facility.	Provides additional, non-concessional support to IDA countries assessed as having a low to medium risk of debt distress, consistent with the World Bank Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy and IMF's Debt Limits Policy, to finance projects with a strong development impact, which could include investment project financing for both infrastructure and non-infrastructure projects, development policy and program for results operations and guarantees.	Disbursed following IPF, DPL or PforR procedures, depending on the design of the transaction.	IPF, DPL, PforR or guarantee, depending on the design of the transaction. While the nature of the non-concessional resources requires a flexible allocation framework, ideally it would draw as much as possible on links with the PBAS to ensure consistency with its performance and poverty orientation. The allocation framework would reflect equity, performance, poverty and debt sustainability.

	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Disbursement mechanism</i>	<i>Implementation mechanism</i>
<b>Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAs)</b> , introduced in the 1990s, leverage World Bank funds by disbursing against large, priority client programme expenditures. SWAs are designed to bring together governments, donors and other stakeholders within any sector. SWAs are characterized by a set of operating principles rather than a specific package of policies or activities, acceptable to all stakeholders.	SWAs meet demands for flexibility and harmonization with COSOPs and the strategies of borrowing member countries. SWAs are designed to minimize transaction costs associated with more traditional World Bank products, such as the need to detail loan components, procure goods and services, and then account for them through statement of expenses, supervision missions, and audits.	Donors deposit that funds into, and disburse from, a single account to support the SWAp. World Bank loan disbursed at a rate defined as a per cent of the annual client expenditures in the sector.	Mostly used in the social sectors. Relatively few for agriculture and rural development because: (i) role of governments in the agriculture/rural development sector is different than in health and education; (ii) agriculture involves millions of producers and market intermediaries; and (iii) it is difficult to arrive at consensus on the key issues in the sector. Using client systems can simplify the process. Expected development benefits of SWAs derive from their being vehicles for strengthening governance and implementation capacity by encouraging: (i) stronger country ownership; (ii) coordinated and open policy dialogue; (iii) rational resource allocation based upon priority programs; (iv) scaling-up of program benefits throughout the country; (v) sector-wide accountability and strengthening of fiduciary and environmental and social safeguards; (vi) upgrading client capacity, systems and institutions; (vii) reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and transactions costs; and (viii) a greater results focus.
<b>Non-sovereign/private sector operations</b>			
Loans	IFC finances projects and companies through loans and makes loans to intermediary banks, leasing companies and other financial institutions for on-lending.	Disbursed against milestones that are applicable for the transaction.	Used for specific purposes are applicable for the transaction (project procurement; balance sheet restructuring; line of credit).
Trade and supply chain financing	Guarantees trade-related payment obligations of approved financial institutions to complements the capacity of banks to deliver trade finance by providing risk mitigation on a per-transaction basis.	Disbursed against milestones that are applicable for the transaction.	Follows IFC procedures that are applicable for the transaction.
Equity investments	IFC invests equity both directly in companies and indirectly through equity funds. IFC generally invests between 5 and 20 per cent of a company's equity and encourages companies to broaden share ownership and other reforms.	Disbursed as an equity investment.	Follows IFC procedures that are applicable for equity investments. IFC's exit mechanism is considered up front.
Syndications	IFC mobilizes commercial financing for the private sector through syndications.	Disbursed against milestones that are applicable for the syndication.	IFC procedures applicable to: (i) B loans; (ii) parallel loans; (iii) A loan participations; or (iv) Managed co-lending portfolio programmes.

	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Disbursement mechanism</i>	<i>Implementation mechanism</i>
Partial credit guarantees. Guarantees are mainstreamed into the operational policy for IPF (in the case of project-based guarantees) and DPF (in the case of policy-based guarantees). Guarantees are no longer treated as a separate instrument, but rather as an alternative source of financing. Policy-based guarantees are available to some IDA countries at low or moderate risk of debt distress.	A partial credit guarantee represents a promise of full and timely debt service payment up to a predetermined amount if there is a default.	Only disbursed if the guarantee is called, which is rare.	Procedures applicable to guarantees.
Securitization	Help companies seeking financing that cannot tap funding sources for the desired tenor and funding cost because of perceived credit risk. In general, any asset class with relatively predictable cash flows can be securitized.	Disbursed against milestones that are applicable for securitization.	Procedures applicable to securitization.
Blended financing	Blend financing, with funds from development partners alongside IFC's commercial funding, crowds in private sector financing that would otherwise not be available to projects with high development impact. Blended finance helps mitigate early-entrant costs or project risks. IFC currently uses this approach in three areas: (i) climate change; (ii) agribusiness and food security; and (iii) finance for small and medium enterprises, including women entrepreneurs.	Disbursed against milestones that are applicable for blend financing.	Procedures applicable to blend financing.
IFC-MIGA IDA private sector window. Introduced under IDA18 to mobilize increased private sector investment in IDA countries, especially Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations. Collaboration among IDA, IFC and MIGA is expected to scale up their work in the most challenging markets.	Can be implemented through: (i) a Local-Currency Financing Facility; (ii) a Risk-Mitigation Facility; (iii) a MIGA Guarantee Facility; or (iv) a Blended-Finance Facility.	As per the facility chosen.	As per the facility chosen.

Note: In AsDB and IFAD, PforR is referred to as results-based lending (RBL). AsDB's sector development programme combines elements of both IPFs and DPLs.

Source: Adapted from World Bank. Products and Services: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services#2> and World Bank. Independent Evaluation Group. 2016. Program-for-Results: An Early-Stage Assessment of the Process and Effects of a New Lending Instrument. Page 36.

## Statistical Analysis Tables Related to Country Classification

Table 1  
Average RSP and governance scores for countries receiving IFAD financing as 100 % DSF grants

	1996	2000	2004	2006	2009	2012	2015	Average
Voice and Accountability Score	19.4	18.7	16.8	19.7***	20.0***	26.5*	35.9	22.2
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Score	24.1	20.1	22.9	22.4***	21.8***	32.2*	37.4	25.3
Government Effectiveness Score	16.2	17.2	14.0	14.0***	12.4***	16.8***	17.8***	14.5
Regulatory Quality Score	14.0	16.8	14.8	15.2***	14.5***	21.2***	19.2***	16.2
Rule of Law Score	20.7	18.3	16.4	17.1***	13.9***	22.7**	24.3	17.5
Control of Corruption Score	22.7	22.5	19.0	19.1***	18.2***	24.6**	28.7	20.5
Average Governance Score	19.5	18.9	17.3	17.9	16.8	24.0	27.2	20.2
Rural Sector Performance Score	NA	NA	3.3	3.4***	3.4***	3.4***	3.3***	3.4
GDP/capita (US \$) (preferably in real terms -- what)	193.7	211.6	292.6	542.8***	941.6***	848.9***	1070.9***	668.2
number of observations	29	28	29	29	29	20	13	25

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level compared to the rest of the financing terms

Sources: Rural Sector Performance database and World Bank governance indicators. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#doc>

Table 2  
Average RSP and governance scores for countries receiving IFAD financing as 50% DSF grants and 50% highly concessional loans

	1996	2000	2004	2006	2009	2012	2015	Average
Voice and Accountability Score	34.8	38.2	37.2	36.4	33.9	30.4	29.8	32.8
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Score	35.3	37.0	37.6	39.7	33.8	31.8	31.7	33.3
Government Effectiveness Score	28.0	31.3	30.0	27.6**	31.9	24.5**	18.7***	26.5
Regulatory Quality Score	32.6	34.5	32.6	31.2	31.8	30.6	24.0***	30.3
Rule of Law Score	29.1	29.5	29.8	31.8	31.5	26.4*	22.4***	28.4
Control of Corruption Score	35.3	35.3	33.4	30.1	33.2	28.7	22.3***	30.1
Average Governance Score	32.5	34.3	33.4	32.8	32.7	28.7	24.8	31.3
Rural Sector Performance Score	NA	NA	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.6*	3.5***	3.7
GDP/capita (US \$)	253.2	249.4	323.3	407.4***	504.6***	899.6***	729.4***	599.0
number of observations	13	13	13	13	14	17	20	1

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level compared to the rest of the financing terms

Sources: Rural Sector Performance database and World Bank governance indicators. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#doc>

**Table 3**  
Average RSP and governance scores for countries receiving IFAD financing on highly concessional terms

	1996	2000	2004	2006	2009	2012	2015	Average
Voice and Accountability Score	37.2	38.3	37.2	38.8	39.1	34.1	39.3	37.4
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Score	31.6	33.6	38.1	37.8	37.8	34.7	35.0	36.2
Government Effectiveness Score	31.9	34.7	34.2	35.2	32.6	29.5*	30.0	32.7
Regulatory Quality Score	31.5	34.1	32.3	33.3	35.2	27.8**	33.1	32.3
Rule of Law Score	34.5	35.3	34.6	35.9	35.5	29.4	36.2	34.3
Control of Corruption Score	31.1	30.9	31.9	34.8	31.2	27.9*	35.6	32.1
Average Governance Score	33.0	34.5	34.7	35.9	35.2	30.6	34.9	34.1
Rural Sector Performance Score	NA	NA	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.7	4.0	3.8
GDP/capita (US \$)	430.6	466.2	638.5	830.5***	1072.5***	1397.8***	1051.2***	1044.3**
number of observations	33	33	33	33	27	33	24	31

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level compared to the rest of the financing terms

Sources: Rural Sector Performance database and World Bank governance indicators. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#doc>

**Table 4**  
Average RSP and governance scores for countries receiving IFAD financing on blend terms

	1996	2000	2004	2006	2009	2012	2015	Average
Voice and Accountability Score	24.4	26.4	25.9	23.9**	26.3*	46.5***	39.8	32.6
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Score	26.2	24.2	23.0	21.7***	24.0**	22.3	38.6	27.8
Government Effectiveness Score	37.1	35.3	40.2	38.9	43.6	50.9	34.2	38.9
Regulatory Quality Score	38.7	34.3	35.8	38.2	45.6**	37.7	31.7	38.1
Rule of Law Score	41.5	39.0	39.2	37.3	38.1	26.3	33.7	35.9
Control of Corruption Score	37.3	31.2	31.2	26.1	29.9	29.9	33.5	30.8
Average Governance Score	34.2	31.7	32.5	31.0	34.6	35.6	35.3	33.6
Rural Sector Performance Score	NA	NA	4.0	4.1*	4.4***	4.1**	3.8	4.0
GDP/capita (US \$)	761.5	931.4	1440.6	1920.8***	3303.0	2932.5	1790.9**	2126.1
number of observations	9	9	9	9	10	2	17	9

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level compared to the rest of the financing terms

Sources: Rural Sector Performance database and World Bank governance indicators. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#doc>

**Table 5**  
Average RSP and governance scores for countries receiving IFAD financing on ordinary terms

	1996	2000	2004	2006	2009	2012	2015	Average
Voice and Accountability Score	50.2	51.1	50.0	49.2***	49.5***	38.7	44.6*	47.3
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Score	44.0	46.0	48.7	46.0**	49.2**	34.3	42.6	45.1
Government Effectiveness Score	45.5	49.7	50.9	51.1***	50.1***	44.8**	50.4***	49.7
Regulatory Quality Score	47.7	50.7	49.8	50.8***	48.0***	44.4**	49.5***	48.8
Rule of Law Score	46.0	48.2	48.4	47.2***	46.7***	39.8	45.7***	45.6
Control of Corruption Score	45.2	51.1	50.6	50.7***	51.4***	43.3*	46.2***	48.9
Average Governance Score	46.4	49.5	49.7	49.2	49.1	40.9	46.5	47.3
Rural Sector Performance Score	NA	NA	4.0	4.2***	4.1**	4.2***	4.3***	4.2
GDP/capita (US \$)	4014.6	3933.0	4494.7	5944.1***	7473.4***	6523.3***	7345.8***	6710.4
number of observations	51	50	51	51	54	44	57	5

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level compared to the rest of the financing terms

Sources: Rural Sector Performance database and World Bank governance indicators. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#doc>

**Table 6**  
Average 2015 RSP and governance scores by IFAD country classification

	100% DSF grants	50% DSF grants/50% highly concessional	100% highly concessional	Blend	Ordinary
Voice and Accountability Score	35.9	29.8	39.3	39.8	44.6*
Political Stability and Absence of Violence Score	37.4	31.7	35.0	38.6	42.6
Government Effectiveness Score	17.8***	18.7***	30.0	34.2	50.4***
Regulatory Quality Score	19.2***	24.0***	33.1	31.7	49.5***
Rule of Law Score	24.3	22.4***	36.2	33.7	45.7***
Control of Corruption Score	28.7	22.3***	35.6	33.5	46.2***
Average Governance Score	27.2	24.8	34.9	35.3	46.5
Rural Sector Performance Score	3.3***	3.5***	4.0	3.8	4.3***
GDP/capita (US \$)	1070.9***	729.4***	1051.2***	1790.9**	7345.8***
number of countries	13	20	24	17	57

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level compared to the rest of the financing terms

Sources: Rural Sector Performance database and World Bank governance indicators. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#doc>

Table 7  
Time required to reach selected project milestones by type of financing (projects approved 1979 – 2015)

<i>Lending term</i>	<i>Time from project approval to original completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from project approval to actual completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from entry into force to original completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from entry into force to actual completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from approval to disburseable (years)</i>	<i>Time from project approval to first disbursement (years)</i>	<i>Project duration difference (years)</i>
<u>Ordinary</u>							
Average	9.0**	10.0**	7.6	8.7	2.0***	2.0***	0.78*
Median	8.3	10.5	7.0	9.1	1.7	1.7	0.8
Standard deviation	2.1	2.5	1.9	2.5	1.0	1.0	0.9
number of observations	75	73	75	73	75	75	68
<u>Blend</u>							
Average	8.6	9.50	7.50	8.50	1.40	1.50	0.67
Median	8.6	9.6	7.4	8.4	1.3	1.3	0.6
Standard deviation	2.2	2.6	2.1	2.5	0.8	0.8	1.2
number of observations	140	136	140	136	140	140	115
<u>Highly concessional</u>							
Average	8.4	9.23	7.54	8.36	1.38	1.38	0.82
Median	8.2	9.0	7.5	8.1	1.3	1.3	0.5
Standard deviation	2.4	2.7	2.2	2.6	0.8	0.8	1.1
number of observations	240	240	240	240	240	240	206
<u>50% Highly concessional and 50% DSF grant</u>							
Average	8.4	9.7	7.4	8.6	1.4	1.4	0.8
Median	8.4	9.6	7.5	8.5	1.3	1.3	0.9
Standard deviation	2.3	2.5	2.1	2.3	0.8	0.8	2.2
number of observations	305	291	305	291	305	305	284
<u>DSF Grant</u>							
Average	3.0***	4.1***	2.9***	4.0***	0.51***	0.51***	0.92
Median	2.7	3.6	2.6	3.7	0.3	0.3	0.6
Standard deviation	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.7	0.8	0.8	1.3

<i>Lending term</i>	<i>Time from project approval to original completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from project approval to actual completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from entry into force to original completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from entry into force to actual completion (years)</i>	<i>Time from approval to disbursable (years)</i>	<i>Time from project approval to first disbursement (years)</i>	<i>Project duration difference (years)</i>
number of observations	22	21	22	21	22	22	19
<b>Loan Component Grant</b>							
Average	5.7***	6.5***	5.3***	6.0***	3.0***	3.0***	0.8***
Median	5.95	6.37	5.59	5.87	1.55	1.55	0.54
Standard deviation	3.21	3.24	2.97	2.98	3.60	3.60	1.06
number of observations	130	130	130	130	115	115	79
<b>Total</b>							
<b>Average</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>1.45</b>	<b>1.45</b>	<b>0.79</b>
<b>Median</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>0.7</b>
<b>Standard deviation</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>1.8</b>
<b>number of observations</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>761</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>761</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>692</b>

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 8  
Average IOE project ratings by type of financing (2003 – 2016)

Financing terms	Number of projects	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Project Performance	Rural Poverty Impact	Innovation and Scaling-up	Gender equality and women's empowerment
<u>Ordinary</u>									
Average		4.5	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.0
Median		4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	45	0.8	0.8	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.0
Number of observations		45	45	45	45	45	42	45	34
<u>Blend</u>									
Average		4.4	4.3*	4.1**	3.9	4.3	4.4**	4.2	4.4
Median		4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	27	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8
Number of observations		27	27	27	27	27	27	27	20
<u>Highly Concessional</u>									
Average		4.4	4.1	3.9	3.6	4.2	4.1	4.3	4.2
Median		4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	76	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.1
Number of observations		76	76	75	76	76	74	75	63
<u>50% DSF grant / 50% highly concessional</u>									
Average		4.6	3.9	3.5	3.6	4.0	3.9	4.1	4.3
Median		4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	39	0.8	0.8	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.0
Number of observations		39	39	39	39	39	38	39	29
<u>Grant</u>									
Average	41	4.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.8	3.9	4.0	3.9

Financing terms	Number of projects	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Project Performance	Rural Poverty Impact	Innovation and Scaling-up	Gender equality and women's empowerment
Median		5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation		0.8	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9
Number of observations		41	41	41	40	41	40	38	36
Total	228	4.5	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 9  
Average IOE project ratings by type of financing (2003 – 2016)

Financing terms	IFAD performance	Government performance	Overall project achievement	Household income and assets	Human and social capital and empowerment	Food security and agricultural productivity	Institutions and policy	Environment and natural resources management
<u>Ordinary</u>								
Average	4.1	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.3	3.8	3.9	3.9
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.8
Number of observations	45	45	44	36	37	33	37	39
<u>Blend</u>								
Average	4.2	4.2*	4.3*	4.7***	4.4	4.4*	4.1	4.2***
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.7
Number of observations	27	27	27	22	21	21	21	23
<u>Highly concessional</u>								
Average	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.6
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	0.8	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1

Financing terms	IFAD performance	Government performance	Overall project achievement	Household income and assets	Human and social capital and empowerment	Food security and agricultural productivity	Institutions and policy	Environment and natural resources management
Number of observations	76	76	76	64	66	62	64	56
<u>50% DSF grant / 50% highly concessional</u>								
Average	4.1	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.5	3.5
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.8
Number of observations	36	38	39	31	33	28	31	34
<u>Grant</u>								
Average	3.9	3.6	3.7	4.1	4.2	3.8	4.1	3.6
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard Deviation	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0
Number of observations	40	41	41	29	31	30	29	34
Total	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.0	3.9	3.7

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 10  
Average IOE project ratings for some evaluation criteria by loan size (2003 -2016)

<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of projects</i>	<i>Relevance</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Sustainability</i>	<i>Project Performance</i>	<i>Rural Poverty Impact</i>	<i>Innovation and Scaling-up</i>	<i>Gender equality and women's empowerment</i>
Highest Quintiles	46	4.5	4.4**	4.1**	3.7	4.3**	4.2	4.3*	4.4*
Number of observations		45	45	45	45	45	43	45	39
Higher Quintile	47	4.6	4.0	3.7	3.7	4.1	4.3**	4.3**	4.2
Number of observations		46	46	46	46	46	46	46	32
Middle quintile	44	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.1	4.2	4.0	4.3
Number of observations		44	44	43	43	44	41	44	36
Lower quintile	46	4.6	4.0	3.6	3.7	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Number of observations		47	47	47	47	47	47	46	38
Lowest quintile	45	4.4	3.5***	3.3**	3.2**	3.7**	3.5***	3.9*	3.7***
Number of observations		46	46	46	46	46	44	43	37
Total	228	4.5	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 11  
Average IOE project ratings for some evaluation criteria by loan size (2003 -2016)

<i>Region</i>	<i>IFAD performance</i>	<i>Government performance</i>	<i>Overall project achievement</i>	<i>Household income and assets</i>	<i>Human and social capital and empowerment</i>	<i>Food security and agricultural productivity</i>	<i>Institutions and policy</i>	<i>Environment and natural resources management</i>
Highest Quintiles	4.3**	4.1**	4.2**	4.5**	4.3	4.2	3.9	3.9
Number of observations	44	45	45	34	36	32	36	38
Higher Quintile	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.4	4.6***	4.3**	4.0	3.9
Number of observations	46	46	46	36	35	34	35	40
Middle quintile	4.2	3.9	4.1	4.4*	4.1	4.1	4.1	3.7
Number of observations	44	44	43	31	34	29	33	34
Lower quintile	4.1	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.1	3.9	4.0	3.7
Number of observations	47	47	47	43	44	42	42	34
Lowest quintile	3.7***	3.5***	3.6***	3.6***	3.8**	3.5***	3.6	3.4**
Number of observations	43	45	46	38	39	37	36	40
Total	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.0	3.9	3.7

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

## Projects with grant financed components

Table 12  
2016 PSR ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from any source

<i>Loan projects with different types of grants</i>	<i>Effectiveness lag (month)</i>	<i>Quality of financial management</i>	<i>Acceptable disbursement rate</i>	<i>Counterpart funds</i>	<i>Compliance with financing covenants</i>	<i>Compliance with procurement</i>	<i>Quality and timeliness of audits</i>	<i>Quality of project management</i>
<u>Projects with a grant</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average	8.3	3.9	3.5	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.3	4.0
Median	6.3	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	8.2	0.7	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7
number of observations	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222
<u>Projects without a grant</u>								
Average	8.5	3.9	3.3	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.1
Median	5.1	4.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	8.4	0.7	1.2	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7
number of observations	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
Source: IOE analysis of PSR rating data

Table 13  
2016 PSR ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from any source

<i>Loan projects with different types of grants</i>	<i>Performance of M&amp;E</i>	<i>Gender focus</i>	<i>Poverty focus</i>	<i>Effectiveness of targeting approach</i>	<i>Innovation and learning</i>	<i>Climate and environment focus</i>	<i>Institution building (organizations, etc.)</i>	<i>Empowerment</i>
<u>Projects with a grant</u>								
Average	3.9	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.2
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7
number of observations	222	222	222	222	222	222	222	222
<u>Projects without a grant</u>								
Average	4.0	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.2
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7
number of observations	205	205	205	205	203	203	203	203

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
Source: IOE analysis of PSR rating data

Table 14  
IOE ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from any source

<i>Loan projects with or without a grant</i>	<i>Relevance</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Sustainability</i>	<i>Project Performance</i>	<i>Rural Poverty Impact</i>	<i>Innovation and Scaling-up</i>	<i>Gender equality and women's empowerment</i>
<u>Projects with a grant component</u>								
Average	4.7**	4.0	3.5	3.6	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.2
Median	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.76	0.91	1.10	0.80	0.78	0.83	0.80	0.84
number of observations	51	51	51	50	51	49	50	39

Projects without a grant component

Loan projects with or without a grant	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Project Performance	Rural Poverty Impact	Innovation and Scaling-up	Gender equality and women's empowerment
Average	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.76	0.90	1.06	0.88	0.78	0.82	0.95	0.98
number of observations	177	177	176	177	177	172	174	143

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 15

**IOE ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from any source**

Loan projects with or without a grant	IFAD performance	Government performance	Overall project achievement	Household income and assets	Human and social capital and empowerment	Food security and agricultural productivity	Institutions and policy	Environment and natural resources management
<u>Projects with a grant component</u>								
Average	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.3**	3.8	3.9
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.76	0.75	0.84	0.78	0.98	0.85	1.23	1.08
number of observations	49	51	51	37	38	36	37	41
<u>Projects without a grant component</u>								
Average	4.1	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.2	3.9	4.0	3.7
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.85	0.95	0.81	0.96	1.01	1.08	1.08	0.94
number of observations	175	176	176	145	150	138	145	145

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 16

**2016 PSR ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from IFAD allocated through the PBAS**

	Effectiveness lag (month)	Quality of financial management	Acceptable disbursement rate	Counterpart funds	Compliance with financing covenants	Compliance with procurement	Quality and timeliness of audits	Quality of project management
<u>Projects with a loan component grant</u>								
Average	9.3	4.0	3.6	4.2***	4.2	4.0	4.2	4.1
Median	7.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Standard deviation	9.1	0.8	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8
Number of observations	112	115	115	115	115	115	115	115
<u>Projects without a loan component grant</u>								
Average	8.1	3.9	3.4	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.0
Median	4.9	4	3	4	4	4	4	4
Standard deviation	7.9	0.7	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7
Number of observations	312	312	312	312	312	312	312	312

Table 17

**2016 PSR ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from IFAD allocated through the PBAS**

	Performance of M&E	Gender focus	Poverty focus	Effectiveness of targeting approach	Innovation and learning	Climate and environment focus	Institution building (organizations, etc.)	Empowerment
<u>Projects with a loan component grant</u>								
Average	3.8	4.6***	4.5*	4.3	4.2	4.4***	4.2*	4.3
Median	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.7
number of observations	115	115	115	115	115	115	115	115
<u>Projects without a loan component grant</u>								
Average	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.2
Median	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
standard deviation	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7
number of observations	312	312	312	312	310	310	310	310

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: IOE analysis of PSR rating data

Table 18

**IOE ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from IFAD sources allocated through the PBAS**

	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Project Performance	Rural Poverty Impact	Innovation and Scaling-up	Gender equality and women's empowerment
<u>Projects with a loan component grant</u>								
-								
Average	4.6	3.9	3.7	3.6	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4**
Median	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.66	0.92	1.12	0.83	0.87	0.83	0.92	0.91
number of observations	34	34	34	33	34	32	32	29
<u>Projects without a loan component grant</u>								
Average	4.5	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.78	0.90	1.07	0.87	0.76	0.82	0.92	0.95
number of observations	194	194	193	194	194	189	192	153

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 19

**IOE ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from IFAD sources allocated through the PBAS**

	IFAD performance	Government performance	Overall project achievement	Household income and assets	Human and social capital and empowerment	Food security and agricultural productivity	Institutions and policy	Environment and natural resources management
<u>Projects with a loan component grant</u>								
Average	4.3	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.2	3.7	4.0
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.72	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.78	0.72	1.31	1.16
number of observations	32	34	34	25	26	24	25	27
<u>Projects without a loan component grant</u>								
Average	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.2	3.9	4.0	3.7
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.85	0.92	0.81	0.93	1.03	1.08	1.07	0.94
number of observations	192	193	193	157	162	150	157	159

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 20

**2016 PSR ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant sources not allocated through the PBAS**

Loan projects with different types of grants	Effectiveness lag (month)	Quality of financial management	Acceptable disbursement rate	Counterpart funds	Compliance with financing covenants	Compliance with procurement	Quality and timeliness of audits	Quality of project management
<u>Projects with international grant</u>								
Average	7.4	3.9	3.4	3.8***	4.1	3.9***	4.2	3.9
Median	5.5	4.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	6.4	0.7	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.7
number of observations	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129
<u>Projects without a grant</u>								
Average	8.5	3.9	3.3	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.1
Median	5.1	4.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	8.4	0.7	1.2	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7
number of observations	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: IOE analysis of PSR rating data

Table 21

**2016 PSR ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from sources not allocated through the PBAS**

Loan projects with different types of grants	Performance of M&E	Coherence between AWPB & implementation	Gender focus	Poverty focus	Effectiveness of targeting approach	Innovation and learning	Climate and environment focus	Institution building (organizations, etc.)	Empowerment
<u>Projects with international grant</u>									
Average	3.9	3.6	4.4**	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.2***	4.0	4.2
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7
number of observations	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129
<u>Projects without a grant</u>									
Average	4.0	3.7	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.2
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7
number of observations	205	205	205	205	205	203	203	203	203

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: IOE analysis of PSR rating data

Table 22

**IOE ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from sources not allocated through the PBAS**

Loan projects with or without a grant	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability	Project Performance	Rural Poverty Impact	Innovation and Scaling-up	Gender equality and women's empowerment
<u>Projects with an international grant</u>								
Average	4.8*	4.0	3.3*	3.5	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.0
Median	5.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.84	0.95	1.12	0.84	0.76	0.86	0.65	0.72
number of observations	32	32	32	32	32	32	31	22
<u>Projects without a grant component</u>								
Average	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.6	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.76	0.90	1.06	0.88	0.78	0.82	0.95	0.98
number of observations	177	177	176	177	177	172	174	143

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 23

**IOE ratings for projects with and without a component financed by a grant from sources not allocated through the PBAS**

Loan projects with or without a grant	IFAD performance	Government performance	Overall project achievement	Household income and assets	Human and social capital and empowerment	Food security and agricultural productivity	Institutions and policy	Environment and natural resources management
<u>Projects with an international grant</u>								
Average	4.6*	4.1*	3.9	4.3	4.2	4.2	3.7	3.7
Median	5.0	4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.80	0.69	0.76	0.87	1.05	0.93	1.23	1.21
number of observations	31	32	32	24	25	25	24	25
<u>Projects without a grant component</u>								
Average	4.1	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.2	3.9	4.0	3.7
Median	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
standard deviation	0.85	0.95	0.81	0.96	1.01	1.08	1.08	0.94
number of observations	175	176	176	145	150	138	145	145

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: Analysis of IOE project ratings

Table 24

**Time required to reach implementation milestones loans with and without a grant from IFAD sources that are allocated through the PBAS (closed projects)**

Projects with and without a loan component grant	Time from project approval to original completion (years)	Time from project approval to actual completion (years)	Time from entry into force to original completion (years)	Time from entry into force to actual completion (years)	Time from approval to disburseable (years)	Time from project approval to first disbursement (years)	Project duration difference (years)
<u>Projects with a loan component grant</u>							
Average	7.6***	8.4***	6.8***	7.6***	2.6***	2.6***	0.8***
Median	7.6	8.4	6.7	7.5	1.7	1.7	0.7
Standard Deviation	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	0.7
Sample size	163	163	163	163	162	162	131
<u>Projects without a loan component grant</u>							
Average	8.4	9.4	7.3	8.4	1.5	1.5	1.0
Median	8.6	9.5	7.5	8.3	1.4	1.4	0.7
Standard Deviation	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.6	0.9	0.9	1.1
Sample size	753	753	753	753	753	753	688

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: IOE analysis of Flexcube data

Table 25

**Time required to reach implementation milestones loans with and without a grant from sources that are not allocated through the PBAS (closed projects)**


Loan grants	Time from project approval to original completion (years)	Time from project approval to actual completion (years)	Time from entry into force to original completion (years)	Time from entry into force to actual completion (years)	Time from approval to disburseable (years)	Time from project approval to first disbursement (years)	Project duration difference (years)
<u>International financed grants</u>							
Average	4.5***	6.2***	4.0***	5.7***	1.0***	1.0***	1.7***
Median	3.8	5.2	3.2	4.7	0.7	0.7	1.0
Standard deviation	2.6	3.4	2.4	3.2	0.9	0.9	2.3
Number of observations	184	184	184	184	184	184	184
<u>Projects without a grant</u>							
Average	8.3	9.3	7.3	8.3	1.5	1.5	1.0
Median	8.4	9.4	7.4	8.2	1.4	1.4	0.7
Standard deviation	2.5	2.8	2.3	2.6	0.9	0.9	1.1
Number of observations	838	838	838	838	838	838	838

Note: \*\*\*, \*\* and \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level

Source: IOE analysis of Flexcube data

## Data on Government Counterpart Funding and Cofinancing

Figure 1  
Trends in sources of project financing



Source: IOE derived from GRIPS, Investment project portfolio

Table 1  
Source of project financing, 2007-2015, by type of financing (US\$ '000 000)

Type of financing	Domestic	IFAD	International	Total
<b>IFAD 7 (2007-2009)</b>				
Ordinary	121	194	47	362
Blend	153	181	22	356
Highly Concessional	480	895	518	1 893
50% HC and 50% Grant	105	223	184	512
DSF Grant	81	238	226	545
<b>Total IFAD 7</b>	<b>940</b>	<b>1 731</b>	<b>997</b>	<b>3 668</b>
<b>IFAD 8 (2010-2012)</b>				
Ordinary	542	454	215	1 211
Blend	157	253	244	654
Highly Concessional	1 279	1 164	656	3 099
50% HC and 50% Grant	225	393	113	731
DSF Grant	152	431	256	839
<b>Total IFAD 8</b>	<b>2 355</b>	<b>2 695</b>	<b>1 484</b>	<b>6 534</b>
<b>IFAD 9 (2013-2015)</b>				
Ordinary	824	623	700	2 147
Blend	328	258	49	635
Highly Concessional	636	1 233	654	2 523
50% HC and 50% Grant	270	466	116	852
DSF Grant	212	336	274	822
<b>Total IFAD 9</b>	<b>2 270</b>	<b>2 916</b>	<b>1 793</b>	<b>6 979</b>
<b>IFAD 7, 8 and 9 (2007-2015)</b>				
Ordinary	1 487	1 271	962	3 720
Blend	639	692	314	1 645
Highly Concessional	2 394	3 293	1 828	7 515
50% HC and 50% Grant	600	1 082	413	2 095
DSF Grant	445	1 005	756	2 206
<b>Total</b>	<b>5 565</b>	<b>7 343</b>	<b>4 273</b>	<b>17 181</b>

Source: IOE derived from GRIPS, Investment Project Portfolio, total financing as of current amounts (August 2017)

Table 2  
**Source of Project financing by type of financing, 2007-2015 (%)**

<b>Type of financing</b>	<b>Domestic</b>	<b>IFAD</b>	<b>International</b>	<b>IFAD resource mobilisation ratio</b>
Ordinary	40%	34%	26%	1.9
Blend	39%	42%	19%	1.4
Highly Concessional	32%	44%	24%	1.3
50% HC and 50% Grant	29%	52%	20%	0.9
DSF Grant	20%	46%	34%	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>1.3</b>

Source: IOE derived from GRIPS, Investment Project Portfolio, total financing as of current amounts (August 2017)

Table 3  
Co-financing 2007-2016 (figures in US\$ million)

	APR	ESA	LAC	NEN	WCA	Lower Income Countries	Lower Middle Income Countries	Upper Middle Income Countries	DSF	Highly Concessional	Blend	Ordinary	Total
Total Financing	6,315	4,241	2,155	2,363	3,046	7,850	7,236	3,034	7,495	3,730	2,096	4,799	<b>18,120</b>
Total IFAD Financing	2,666	1,916	836	1,177	1,521	3,685	3,290	1,141	3,265	2,084	804	1,963	<b>8,116</b>
Total Cofinancing	3,649	2,325	1,319	1,186	1,525	4,165	3,946	1,893	4,231	1,646	1,291	2,836	<b>10,004</b>
Ratio All Co-financing to IFAD Financing	1.37	1.21	1.58	1.01	1.00	1.13	1.20	1.66	1.30	0.79	1.61	1.44	<b>1.23</b>
Total Domestic Co-Financing	2,062	1,360	917	756	651	2,067	2,193	1,487	2,583	851	573	1,739	<b>5,747</b>
Domestic % of Co-financing	56.5%	58.5%	39.5%	33.8%	42.7%	49.6%	55.6%	78.6%	51.1%	51.7%	44.4%	61.3%	<b>57.4%</b>
Ratio Domestic Co-financing to IFAD Investment	0.77	0.71	1.10	0.64	0.43	0.56	0.67	1.30	0.79	0.41	0.71	0.89	<b>0.71</b>
Domestic % co financing without beneficiaries' contribution	48.8%	50.1%	51.0%	45.1%	33.3%	41.0%	44.3%	63.6%	50.7%	35.9%	36.0%	51.4%	<b>46.6%</b>
Governmental % cofinancing	33.5%	34.9%	44.4%	26.8%	26.1%	27.8%	30.0%	52.6%	34.7%	24.5%	25.7%	40.0%	<b>33.4%</b>
Beneficiaries % cofinancing	7.7%	8.4%	18.6%	18.7%	9.5%	8.6%	11.3%	15.0%	10.3%	15.8%	8.4%	9.9%	<b>10.9%</b>
Total International Cofinancing	1,587	965	402	430	874	2,098	1,754	406	1,647	796	718	1,097	<b>4,258</b>
International % of cofinancing	43.5%	41.5%	30.5%	36.2%	57.3%	50.4%	44.4%	21.4%	38.9%	48.3%	55.6%	38.7%	<b>42.6%</b>
Ratio international co-financing to IFAD Financing	0.60	0.50	0.48	0.37	0.57	0.57	0.53	0.36	0.50	0.38	0.89	0.56	<b>0.52</b>
IFIs inc. WB & Reg Banks % of cofinancing	34.5%	26.0%	11.8%	19.0%	29.2%	31.1%	31.3%	8.4%	28.2%	25.1%	41.0%	19.5%	<b>27%</b>
World Bank % of co-financing	11.2%	15.5%	0.0%	2.4%	9.1%	19.9%	1.9%	1.6%	5.1%	16.3%	23.1%	5.5%	<b>9%</b>
Reg Dev Banks % of co-financing	23.0%	6.2%	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%	6.6%	22.1%	0.0%	18.3%	3.0%	5.8%	8.8%	<b>11%</b>
GEF % of cofinancing	0.1%	0.6%	0.6%	3.7%	2.2%	1.3%	1.0%	0.4%	0.9%	2.1%	0.0%	1.0%	<b>1%</b>
Bilaterals % of co-financing	3.2%	4.0%	15.8%	6.3%	5.3%	4.8%	4.0%	11.3%	4.3%	6.3%	10.8%	5.1%	<b>6%</b>
European Institutions as% of co-financing	0.6%	1.6%	0.0%	2.9%	1.3%	1.3%	1.4%	0.2%	0.1%	1.8%	0.0%	2.7%	<b>1%</b>
UN as % cofinancing	0.2%	1.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.5%	0.8%	0.2%	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	0.3%	0.3%	<b>0%</b>

Source: CLE computation from GRIPS database

## **Report of the Senior Independent Advisors: Frederik Korfker and Zenda Ofir**

### **Summary statement**

1. This Corporate Level Evaluation (CLE) is a very necessary and timely initiative. It offers an extraordinary amount of useful information about IFAD's financial policies and instruments, challenges and risks. It should be an essential point of reference during any process aimed at improving the financial architecture in order to respond better to internal demands as well as external changes in context. At the moment IFAD faces challenges in ensuring financial sustainability, and the analysis and findings presented in the report present a serious situation. It is surprising that capital erosion with i.a. major exposure to foreign exchange movements, unpredictable grant incomes or replenishment, and high operating expenses have been allowed to continue. As the CLE team also points out, it will be very important to be fully cognisant of the risks inherent in both the current situation and the solutions proposed in the evaluation report. According to the Review Panel, it will be imperative to have a conservative approach to capital market engagement, carefully monitor and respond nimbly to emerging opportunities and risks, and track and learn from innovative policies and ways of working among conventional as well as non-conventional actors. At the same time it is important that IFAD's development function does not become weaker at the behest of a stronger banking function.

### **Evaluation credibility and utility**

2. The evaluation has been well conceptualised and executed and establishes a good methodology for this type of still rather unique evaluation. The extent and diversity of data collection methods and analyses make for rich detail that respond well to the comprehensive set of very relevant evaluation questions. The methodology was appropriate, even impressive within noted constraints. The sampling for triangulation was reasonable. Especially appreciated is the integrated mixed methods design with extensive use of available data, case studies and financial scenario modelling as evidence that could inform or enhance interviews and the survey. The report contains a wealth of useful facts on the use of funds, allocation approaches and financial instruments. It provides excellent insights into the diversity of instruments and charges within IFAD's mandate, with the concomitant risks and challenges. The analyses are done in a manner that highlights nuances and variations between groups and countries. This strengthens the credibility of conclusions and recommendations in the report.

### **Comparator organizations**

3. IFAD's area of work is worldwide recognised as very important for sustainable development with a "no-one left behind" focus - an area where until now grants and highly concessional financing were the only available finance options, as is generally the case in UN institutions. In this report the focus for comparison and possible adjustments to financial architecture is on the MDBs, even though they are far larger and with distinctive characteristics that set them apart from IFAD. The experience of the MDBs in dealing with lending instruments, currency issues and other challenges is frequently highlighted in the report as an important learning opportunity for IFAD. The focus is largely justifiable as these organizations have valuable experience. They have been given preferential status to leverage their capital effectively for sustainability, while other organizations mentioned in the report provide grants largely dependent on ex-ante replenishments.
4. However, MDB models and strategies should not be blindly followed. There are also increasingly other financing actors and funding streams from the private sector and emerging economies that are taking traditional donors' and lenders' place and

altering the financial landscape. In this respect, the implications for IFAD's financial architecture, its underpinning capacities and structures should be adequately understood.

5. IFAD's evolving landscape. Ideally, the CLE would have been complemented by an evaluation of IFAD's strategic positioning and comparative advantage, performance and value proposition within the evolving rural poverty reduction and sustainable development landscape, cognisant of dynamics in closely related fields such as climate change, economic advancement and disaster risk reduction. The report recommends that IFAD should conduct feasibility studies about options for the introduction of new products (e.g. ordinary loans) and increased flexibility of choice in the terms and condition of existing products. It is essential to understand how attractive IFAD is likely to (continue to) be for ODA, philanthropic foundation and private sector funding streams, as well as for strategic partnerships and coalitions that can strengthen funding flows into the future. Such insights, together with detailed information on the demand for IFAD grants and (concessional) loans, could lead to a better understanding of the extent to which it can for example benefit from partnerships and grants from non-traditional sources, raise interest rates, harden borrowing terms or implement other measures to arrive at a sustainable financial architecture.
6. Learning to handle risks. If IFAD is likely to follow a path similar to other MDBs in becoming more reliant on debt, it will be more exposed to risk. It will therefore have to cope with more complex structures and demands for new capacities among its Board, Audit and other relevant Committees, IT systems and staff. The critical question remains whether the size of IFAD, and the scope and nature of its work would justify all the demands and trade-offs that will result. The organization will take a big step by moving forward with processes to borrow from capital markets and use derivatives for hedging purposes to mitigate foreign exchange risk. At this point the policies and guidelines for asset and liability management are still underdeveloped, and relevant functions, roles and responsibilities are not clearly defined. IFAD will require a conservative approach to investment strategies in the light of the likelihood of increased risk in capital markets in coming years, and hedging against foreign exchange fluctuations, dependence on derivatives or investment in BBB rated equities (already in use) will have to be very carefully managed. Capital markets performed very well from a low base over the last decade, but this situation is unlikely to continue. It will therefore be prudent to ensure that IFAD, possibly with expert external help, creates sufficient internal expert knowledge and experience, as well as internal guidelines and controls. These will also be a prerequisite for obtaining an acceptable credit rating from rating agencies.

## **Recommendations**

7. The proposals presented in the Recommendations chapter are constructive, and focus on enhancing flexibility and introducing innovations into financial products and the Review Panel largely agrees with the recommendations. Scaling up and drawing from the experience of other development finance institutions around the world is important and building instruments to better respond to natural and man-made disasters will help IFAD to stay close to its mandate. Providing more options for existing instruments, such as the length of the grace period and amortisation schedule and selecting the currency for new loans will help IFAD on its path to become sustainable. The suggestion to change the financial allocation system through creating a second lending window for ordinary loans separate from the existing performance-based allocation system is useful and can provide selected member states with new opportunities. At the same time, it will be essential to ensure that there are no increased risks or unforeseen negative impacts – financial or otherwise – that result for recipient or borrowing countries.

8. Addressing the problem of systematic financial losses causing substantial capital erosion is correctly at the heart of the CLE. The concrete proposals are challenging as it is suggested that all concessional financing (DFS) and grants be moved to a special purpose fund that is not consolidated on IFAD's balance sheet. In this respect it would be essential for IFAD to turn future compensation for DFS principal into a legally binding agreement, thereby reducing the degree of future uncertainty related to DSF and improving IFAD's financial architecture and potential for a good credit rating. The envisaged increased margin on IFAD's ordinary loans are not without risk; IFAD's traditional member states might have reservations about such type of financing for their highly developmental programmes. It is indeed critical that the proposed strategies and instruments aimed at improving IFAD's financial architecture consider and protect not only its own financial interests, but also those of the borrowing member countries.
9. Going the route of entering the capital market carries high risk and will require substantial work before rating agencies will be ready to provide IFAD with the required rating. If IFAD would indeed move its financial architecture to a higher degree of complexity, as the CLE recommends, the drafting of a more detailed Funding Policy and Annual Borrowing Strategy will be crucial, and the Risk Management Function in IFAD will have to be substantially strengthened. However, following this route does not necessarily require a long period of time, as expertise is readily available at the other MDBs and/or can be easily acquired in the market. Early discussion with the rating agencies when preparing for this higher degree of complexity will be essential.

## Key Persons Met

### IFAD

#### Executive Board Representatives

Mr Adolfo Di Carluccio, EB Representative for Italy

Mr Alberto Cogliati, EB member for Italy

Mr Arnaud Guigné, EB Representative for France

Mr John Hurley, EB Representative for USA

Mr Quaye-Kumah, EB member for Ghana

Mr Shi Jiaoqun, Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative for China

Ms Martina Metz, EB Member for Germany

Mr Wierish Ramsoek, EB member for Netherlands

#### Financial Operations Department (FOD)

Mr Mikio Kashiwagi, Associate Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Controller, Financial Operations Department (FOD)

Mr Advit Nath, Director and Controller of ACD, Accounting and Controller's Division (ACD)

Ms Allegra Saitto, Chief Financial Reporting & Corporate Fiduciary, Accounting and Controller's Division (ACD)

Ms Ruth Farrant, Director, Financial Management Services Division (FMD)

Mr Gianluca Capaldo, Finance Officer, Financial Management Services Division (FMD)

Mr Malek Sahli, Senior Finance Officer & Team Leader, Financial Management Services Division (FMD)

Mr Domenico Nardelli, Director of Treasury, Treasury Services Division (TRE)

Mr Henk Janse Van Vuuren, Senior Treasury Officer, TRE Treasury Services Division, (TRE)

Ms T. Galloni, Treasury Senior Officer, Back Office, Treasury Services Division (TRE)

Mr Marco Penna, Resource Modelling Officer, Treasury Services Division (TRE)

Mr Domenico Passafaro, Financial Data Analyst, Treasury Services Division (TRE)

Ms B. Vukadin, Assistant Treasurer, Middle Office, Treasury Services Division (TRE)

#### Programme Management Department

Mr Périn Saint Ange, Associate Vice President, PMD

Mr Amine Zarroug, Consultant, OPE

Ms Soledad Marco, Programming and resource officer, OPE

#### Asia and the Pacific Division (APR)

Ms Hoonae Kim, Director, (APR)

Mr Nigel Brett, Portfolio Advisor, APR

Mr Ronald Hartman, Country Director Indonesia, APR

Ms Anissa Pratiwi, Country Programme Analyst, Indonesia, APR

Ms Heike Hakim, Country Programme Assistant, Indonesia, APR

Mr Muhammad Iskandar, Country Programme Analyst, Indonesia, APR

Ms Rasha Omar, Country Programme Manager India, APR  
Mr Omer Zafar, Country Programme Manager, APR  
Mr Jerry Pacturan, Country Programme Officer Philippines, APR  
Mr Yolando Arban, Former Country Programme Officer, APR

East and Southern Africa Division, (ESA)

Mr Sana Jatta, Director, ESA  
Ms Shirley Chinien, Regional Economist, ESA  
Mr Henrik Franklin, Portfolio Advisor, ESA  
Mr Alessandro Marini, Country Portfolio Manager for Uganda, ESA  
Mr Francisco Pichon, Country Programme Manager Tanzania, ESA  
Ms Abla Benhammouche, Country Director and Representative Zambia, ESA  
Mr Dick Siame, Country Programme Officer Zambia, ESA  
Mr Oscar Anaadumba, Consultant, ESA

Latin America and the Caribbean Division (LAC)

Mr Joaquin Lozano, Director, LAC  
Mr Paolo Silveri, Country Programme Manager Brazil, LAC

Near East, North Africa and Europe Division (NEN)

Ms Khalida Bouzar, Director, NEN  
Mr Abdelkarim Sma, Regional Economist, NEN  
Ms Sylvia Schollbrock, Portfolio Adviser, NEN  
Mr Ahmed Tarek, Country Programme Manager, NEN  
Mr Naoufel Telahigue, Country Programme Manager Morocco, NEN  
Mr Chakib Nemmaoui, Programme Officer Morocco, NEN

West and Central Africa Division (WCA)

Mr Ides de Willebois, Director, WCA  
Mr Bernard Mwinyel Hien, Country Programme Manager Cameroon, WCA  
Ms Odile Sarassoro, Country Programme Officer Côte d'Ivoire, WCA

Environment and Climate Division (ECD)

Ms Margarita Astralaga, Director, ECD  
Mr Gernot Laganda, Lead Technical Specialist, ECD

Other IFAD Departments/Divisions

Mr Michel Mordasini, Vice President of IFAD, Office of the President and Vice President (OPV)

Mr Paul Winters, Associate Vice President, Strategy and knowledge Department, (SKD)  
Mr Ashwani Kaul Muthoo, Director, Global Engagement, Knowledge and Strategy Division, (GKS)

Mr Luis Jimenez Mc-Innis, Director, Partnership and Resource Mobilization Office, (PRM)  
Ms Nicole Carta, Senior officer, Partnership and Resource Mobilization Office, (PRM)

Mr Bambis Constantinides, Director, Office of Audit and Oversight (AUO)  
 Mr Saheed Adegbite, Director, Office of Budget and Organizational Development (BOD)  
 Mr Ed Gallagher, Senior budget specialist, Office of Budget and Organizational Development (BOD)

## **Government**

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mr Samir Bakić, Assistant to the Minister, sub-national Federal, Ministry of Finance

### Cambodia

Mr H.E. Mam Amnot, Secretary of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries  
 Mr H.E. Hem Vandy, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and Finance  
 Mr H.E. Pen Thirong, Director General, General Department of International Cooperation and Debt Management

### Cameroon

Mr Patrick Mvondo Nna, Secretary General, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  
 Mr Bernard Comoe, Director of production and food security, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  
 Mr Charles Assamba Ongodo, Director general of international cooperation and regional integration

### Côte d'Ivoire

Mr Siaka Coulibaly, Chief of office, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  
 Mr Sidy Cisse, Deputy chief of office, Ministry of Budget and State Portfolio  
 Mr Franck Herve Aduko, Deputy Director Guaranteed loans public sector debt and PPP financing, Ministry of Economy and Finance

### Georgia

Mr Ioseb Skhirtladze, Head of Foreign Debt Department, Ministry of Finance  
 Mr Lasha Komakhidze, Minister of Agriculture of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara  
 Mr Me Nodar Kereselidze, First Deputy Minister for Agriculture

### Indonesia

Mr Agustin Arry Yanna, Director for Multilateral Foreign Financing, Bappenas, State Planning Agency  
 Mr Arief Rachman, International Cooperation Division, Ministry of Agriculture  
 Mr Dalyono, Deputy Director Multilateral Forum, Fiscal Policy Agency, Ministry of Finance  
 Mr Syaiful, Deputy Director of Cash Management, Ministry of Finance  
 Mr Ferryal, World Bank Loans, Cash Management Division, Ministry of Finance  
 Mr Kukuh Widodo, IFAD Loans, Cash Management Division, Ministry of Finance  
 Mr Mesah Tarigan, Director of International Cooperation, International Cooperation Division, Ministry of Agriculture  
 Mr Sagcing Meraes Rasno Dewi, International Cooperation Division, Ministry of Agriculture

Mr Pak Amdi Very Darma, Director of Audit of Foreign Loans and Grants, General Auditor (BPKP)

Mr Riki Antariksa, Manager of Programme Section, Research and Development Center, General Auditor (BPKP)

Mr Zandy A. Rassat, Deputy Director, Loans and Grants Division, Ministry of Finance

Ms Aisyah Mayuliani, Sub Division Head, Loan and Grants Division, Ministry of Finance

Ms Ayu Sukorini, Director, Loans and Grants Division, Ministry of Finance

Ms Era Herisne, Staff, Multilateral Forum, Fiscal Policy Agency, Ministry of Finance

Ms Rosianna, Multilateral Foreign Financing, Bappenas, State Planning Agency

Ms S. Fifi Herwati, Deputy Director of Audit of Foreign Loans and Grants, Financial Aid Supervisory Board, General Auditor (BPKP)

### Mexico

Mr Oscar Alonso Ramirez Herrera, International Affairs Unit, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Mr Celestino Calderon Martinez, Coordination Manager Director, Prospera, Social Inclusion Programme

Ms Teresita de Jesus Fausto Moya, Productivity Manager, Prospera, Social Inclusion Programme

Mr Luis Alfonso Franco Maraver, External credit manager director, Prospera, Social Inclusion Programme

Mr. Pablo Alejandro Villaseñor Vazquez, Director of the Regional Coordination of Prospera, Social Inclusion Programme

Ms Veronica Caras Contreras, Project Officer, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN), Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Mr Luis Gomez Menendez, Deputy Director of Finance Operations, Nacional Financiera, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Ms Lourdes Gonzalez C., Financial agent manager, Nacional Financiera, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Ms Violeta Silva Juarez, Executive sub-director, Financial Agent, Sectorial Executive, Nacional Financiera, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Ms Liliana Velazquez Correa, Finance Deputy Director, Nacional Financiera, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Mr Alejandro C. Vazquez Leon, Deputy Director and Financial Agent, Project Executive, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Mr Mauricio Castañeda Leon, Disbursement manager and financial follow up, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Mr Julio Cesar Toledo Ordaz, Administrative and debt portfolio manager, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit

Mr Francisco Arrasate Garcia, Finance and Monitoring Division, Comisión Nacional Forestal

Ms Berenice Hernandez, Financial Inclusion Director, Comisión Nacional Forestal

Ms Victoria Muñoz, Administration and Product Department, Comisión Nacional Forestal

### Morocco

Mr Mohamed El Guerrouj, Director General, Agriculture Development Agency

Mr Mohamed Lemghari, Divisional inspector, Budget Division, Ministry of Finance

Mr Said Laith, Directeur du Développement de l'Espace Rural et des Zones de Montagne.  
Ministère de l'agriculture, de la pêche maritime du développement rural et des eaux et  
des forêts

#### Peru

Mr Cobenas, Ministry of Economy and Finance

#### Philippines

Ms Rhya L. Daluddung, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)  
Ms Maria Luisa R. Magbojos, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)  
Mr Calixto M. Mangilin Jr, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)  
Ms Sylvia Mallari, Under Secretary Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)  
Mr Romy C. Maningai, Chief of staff/Technical staff Department of Agrarian Reform  
(DAR)  
Mr Rowel B. Del Rosario, Project Development Service, Department of Agriculture (DOA)  
Ms Stella Laureano, Director, Department of Finance (DOF)  
Ms Donalyn Minimo, Department of Finance  
Ms Everette Villaraza, Department of Finance  
Ms Ester Aida G. Simbajon, Development Management Officer, Special Projects  
Coordination and Management Assistance Division  
Ms Evelyn L. Valeriano, Development Management Officer, Special Projects Coordination  
and Management Assistance Division

#### Uganda

Mr Benjamin Kumumanya, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Development  
Mr Frederick Matyama, Commissioner, Financial Services Department, Ministry of  
Finance, Planning and Economic Development  
Ms Maris Wanyera, Acting Director, Directorate for Debt and Cash Policy, Ministry of  
Finance, Planning and Economic Development

#### USA - Treasury

Mr Chuck Moravec, covered IDB 9th and IDA18 replenishment  
Ms Joanna Veltri, covered IDB 9th and IDA18 replenishment

#### Zambia

Mr Brian Childamba Senior Economist, Ministry of Finance  
Mr William Kabwe, Director Investments and Debt Management, Ministry of Finance  
Mr Boyd Nga'ndu, Senior Economist Government Investment, Investment and Debt  
Management Department, Ministry of Finance  
Mr Thomas Phiri, Chief Accountant, Ministry of Finance  
Mr Likumba Zyambo, Senior Economist, Ministry of Finance  
Mr Kaunda Kapepula, Acting Director Agribusiness and Marketing Department, Chief  
Agricultural Economist, Ministry of Agriculture  
Mr Derrick Sikombe, Acting Director, Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of  
Agriculture  
Mr Charles M. Sondashi, Deputy Director Agric. Advisory Services Branch, Ministry of  
Agriculture

Mr Michael M Mbulo, Programme Coordinator IFAD funded Rural Finance Expansion Programme

Ms Cecilia Brumér, First Secretary Agriculture, Environment and Inclusive Growth, Embassy of Sweden; SIDA-Sweden

## **Development Partners**

### Belgium

#### *Alterfin*

Mr Jean-Marc Debricon, General Manager

#### *Incofin Investment Management*

Mr David Dewez, Chief Risk & Compliance Officer

### Cameroon

#### *African Development Bank (AfDB)*

Mr Albert Nyaga, Agriculture Task team leader

#### *Agence française de développement (AFD)*

Mr Gael Wassmer, project manager for rural development and biodiversity

### *JICA*

Ms Junko Masuda, Resident Representative

Mr Takayuki Muraoka, Deputy representative

### *World bank*

Mr Thomas Ngue Bissa, National coordinator PIDMA project

### Colombia

#### *Incofin Investment Management*

Ms Rita van den Abbeel, Regional Director LAC/Fund Manager Agro

### Côte d'Ivoire

#### *African Development Bank (AfDB)*

Mr Ben Messaoud, Resource Mobilization and Partnerships Department, Senior Resource Allocation Officer

Mr Bourlard Gauthier, Chief Resources Mobilization Officer

Mr Ricardo Carvalho, Principal Treasury Officer, Treasury Department

Mr Trevor De Kock, Ag. Director, Financial Management Department

Mr Hachem Samer, Division Manager IDEV

Mr Kapoor Kapil, Vice President for Strategy and Operational Policies

Mr Densil Magume, Assistant to Vice President, Finance Complex

Mr Alex M Mubiru, Division Manager, Resource Mobilization and Partnerships Department

Mr Stefan Nalletamby, Director, Financial Sector Development

Mr Rakesh Nangia, Director of Independent Development Evaluation (IDEV)

Mr Omar Sefiani, Chief Investment Officer Treasury

Ms N'Sele Hassatou, Treasurer and Director, Treasury Department

Ms Sheila Codamus-Platel, Treasury Department Senior Investment  
Ms Toda Atsuko, Director for Agricultural Finance and Rural Development

*Agence française de développement (AFD)*

Mr Lezou Joachim, Operation Officer agriculture and environment, focal point NGOs and Civil society

*World Bank*

Mr Jean Philippe Tre, Agro-Economist Senior

France

*Agence française de développement (AFD)*

Mr François Parmentier, General secretary

Mr Jean-Luc François, Director, Agriculture, rural development and biodiversity

Ms Françoise Lombard, Director, Finance Division

Mr Bokar Cherif, Trading room manager

Mr Cédric Vautier, Chief of mission, General secretary

Mr Claude Torre, Agriculture, Rural development biodiversity

*ResponsAbility*

Ms Gaëlle Bonnieux, Head Agriculture Debt Investments

Indonesia

*Asian Development Bank (ADB)*

Mr Anthony Gill, Senior Country Specialist

*World Bank*

Mr Yogana Prasta, Operations Adviser

Mr P. K. Subramanian, Lead Financial Management Specialist

Italy

*FAO*

Mr William Marvin, OiC Treasury group

Ms Simona Colaiacomo, Treasury group

*WFP*

Mr Sedulio Amari, Chief of Treasury Branch

Mr Nicholas Nelson, Director, Finance and Treasury Division

Rob van der Zee, Deputy Director and Treasurer, Finance and Treasury Division

Mexico

*Inter-American Development Bank*

Ms Veronica Zavala Lombardi, Representative

*World Bank*

Mr Gregor V. Wolf, Sector Manager, Sustainable Development Department

Mr Renan Poveda, Senior Environment Specialist

Morocco

*African Development Bank (AfDB)*

Ms Yacine Diama Fall, Resident Representative

*World Bank*

Mr Mohammed Medouar, Senior Specialist In Rural Development

Netherlands

*FMO*

Mr Pim Arends, Senior Treasury Officer

Mr Tony Bakels, Credit Manager

Mr Jan-Job de Vries Robbe, Manager, Legal Affairs

Mr Steven Duyerman, Manager, Agribusiness, Food and Water Division

Mr Jeroen Horsten, Senior Risk

Mr Bas Rekveld, Manager, Financial Institutions Africa

Ms Ima Schoonbeck, Senior Planning and Control Office, Strategy Department

Mr Anton Timpers, Senior Investment Officer, Agricultural Department

*Rabo Rural Fund*

Mr Alexander Meyer, Manager

*Triodos Investment Management*

Mr Karel Nierop, Fund Manager Hivos-Triodos Fund (MicroFinance)

Mr Michael van den Berg, Fund Manager Triodos Sustainable Trade Fund (Emerging Markets)

Philippines

*Asian Development Bank (AsDB)*

Mr Allan Carlo H. Soller, Attorney Resource Person

Mr Joven Balbosa, Country Specialist

*Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)*

Mr Romeo Carandang, Senior Assistant Vice President, Small and Medium Investment and Loans for Entrepreneurs Department

*Foundation for a Sustainable Society Inc.*

Mr Jay Lacsamana, Executive Director

Mr Jerome Ignacio, Assistant Director for Development Services

*World Bank*

Ms Frauke Jungbluth, Lead Agriculture Economist

USA

*Global Environment Facility (GEF)*

Dr. Juha I. Uitto, Director, Independent Evaluation Office Global Environment Facility

*IDB*

Luis Alberto Giorgio, Chief of Staff, Office of the Presidency

Marcelo Bisogno, Executive Director for Paraguay

Cheryl Gray, Director, Office of Evaluation and Oversight

Luis Echebarria, Country Representative for Haiti

*Root Capital*

Mr Brian Milder, EVP Strategy & Innovation

*UN DESA*

Mr Alexander Trepelkov, Director, *Financing for Development Office*

*UNDP*

Mr Arild Hauge, Deputy Director, Independent Evaluation Office

*World Bank*

Ms Angelic De Plaa, Acting Director, DFIRM and Ms. Natalia Antsilevich, Acting Manager, Finance, DFIRM

Ms Caroline Heider, Director General of the Independent Evaluation Group

Mr Martin Spicer, Director of Blended Finance Department, IFC

Mr van Trotsenburg, World Bank Vice President for Development Finance

Zambia

*African Development Bank (AfDB)*

Mr Damoni Kitabire, Resident Representative

Mr Lewis Bangwe, Agricultural Expert

*European Union*

Mr Friedrich Mahler, Agriculture and Rural Development Advisor

*USAID*

Mr Anafrida Bwenge, Chief, Feed the Future Division

Mr Mlotha Dameaseke, Agriculture Specialist

*World Bank*

Mr Willem Janssen, Lead Agricultural Specialist

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