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Investir dans les populations rurales

## République-Unie de Tanzanie Évaluation du programme de pays

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Pour: **Examen**

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## Vue d'ensemble

1. Le présent document constitue la seconde évaluation du programme de pays (EPP) concernant la République-Unie de Tanzanie conduite par le Bureau indépendant de l'évaluation du FIDA (IOE). Cette EPP évalue trois des piliers du programme de pays: i) la performance et l'impact du portefeuille de programmes et projets financés par des prêts du FIDA; ii) la performance et les résultats des activités hors prêts dans le pays: concertation sur les politiques, gestion des savoirs et partenariats, y compris les activités financées par des dons; et iii) la pertinence et l'efficacité des programmes d'options stratégiques pour le pays (COSOP) 2003 et 2007, y compris les objectifs stratégiques, le ciblage sous-sectoriel, les approches de ciblage et l'assemblage des programmes de pays.
2. Concernant le portefeuille de prêts, l'EPP actuelle a évalué les cinq opérations en cours: trois de ces prêts étaient des contributions à une approche sectorielle du développement agricole (le Programme de développement du secteur agricole [PDSA]) par le mécanisme d'un panier de financement sectoriel et deux finançaient des programmes "traditionnels": le Programme d'appui aux micro, petites et moyennes entreprises en milieu rural (MUVI) et le Programme d'appui à l'infrastructure de commercialisation, à l'ajout de valeur et à la finance rurale (MIVARF). L'EPP a examiné la documentation pour juger du bien-fondé d'élaborer une proposition de prêt pour un mécanisme de production en sous-traitance de petits exploitants (le Programme pour la production contractuelle de canne à sucre et le développement communautaire à Bagamoyo). En outre, cette EPP a examiné les évaluations précédentes menées par IOE pour la période 2004-2014, y compris les évaluations de trois projets et une évaluation thématique.
3. Les éléments à l'appui de cette EPP proviennent d'une analyse et d'une triangulation entre plusieurs sources d'informations et de données. Ils incluent: i) un examen approfondi de la documentation disponible; ii) une autoévaluation réalisée par la Division Afrique orientale et australe (ESA) du FIDA en collaboration avec les pouvoirs publics; iii) des entretiens indépendants avec les principales parties prenantes et les informateurs clés (représentants du FIDA, de l'État, d'organisations internationales actives dans le pays, d'ONG, d'organisations de la société civile, d'institutions de recherche et d'entreprises privées); iv) une analyse des données secondaires des enquêtes par sondage du PDSA disponibles; et v) des visites et entretiens sur le terrain avec des bénéficiaires et des informateurs locaux.
4. Depuis 1978, le FIDA a approuvé 14 prêts à la République-Unie de Tanzanie, d'une valeur de 360 millions d'USD (48% du coût total du portefeuille estimé à 769 millions d'USD). La République-Unie de Tanzanie est le deuxième plus important portefeuille de prêts du FIDA dans la région ESA, après l'Éthiopie. L'État a apporté un cofinancement de 72 millions d'USD pour des projets financés par le FIDA (soit 9,6 % du coût total du portefeuille). Les frais restants ont été cofinancés par la Banque africaine de développement (BAfD) (financement parallèle), la Banque mondiale, la Belgique et l'Irlande. Outre les prêts, le FIDA a également approuvé 37 dons, principalement au titre du guichet mondial/régional, pour appuyer des activités dans le pays. Le FIDA y a lancé fin 2003 une initiative pilote relative à la présence dans les pays et a détaché son chargé de programme de pays en 2008 et le Directeur dans le pays en 2014 qui est également responsable du programme de pays du FIDA au Rwanda.
5. **Le contexte du pays.** Comme dans d'autres pays de la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est, l'économie de la République-Unie de Tanzanie s'est développée à un rythme élevé dans la période 2004-2012, avec un taux annuel moyen de croissance du PIB de 6,9%, bien que la croissance du PIB agricole ait été seulement de 4,2%. Avec un PIB par habitant estimé à 695 USD (2013), la République-Unie de Tanzanie se classe parmi les pays à faible revenu. Le taux de

pauvreté de la partie continentale du pays a légèrement diminué passant de 35,6% (38,7% en milieu rural) en 2000 à 28,2% (33,3% en milieu rural) en 2011/2012. À Zanzibar, il a baissé de 49% (54,6% en milieu rural) en 2004-2005 à 44,4% (50,7% en milieu rural) en 2010. La productivité agricole est faible en raison du recours limité aux intrants améliorés et à la mécanisation. Néanmoins, le pays est en mesure de produire un excédent de céréales, et les exportations de grain (principalement dans la région de l'Afrique de l'Est) ont pris une importance croissante. Outre son potentiel agricole encore insuffisamment exploité, le pays possède un large éventail de ressources d'élevage sous-utilisées, parmi les plus importantes de l'Afrique subsaharienne. La commercialisation de son secteur laitier est en retard.

6. Dans le passé, la principale référence nationale pour le développement du secteur agricole était la Stratégie pour le développement du secteur agricole (SDSA-2001). Elle a ensuite été rendue opérationnelle par le PDSA en 2005 avec un financement de la Banque mondiale, de la BAfD, du FIDA, du Japon, de l'Irlande et de l'Union européenne. La SDSA et le PDSA ont mis l'accent sur une approche sectorielle avec un panier de financement comme forme privilégiée de contribution des donateurs. Les objectifs fondamentaux étaient de favoriser une harmonisation des interventions dans le secteur agricole, plutôt qu'une prolifération de différents projets non coordonnés. En outre, la SDSA a reconnu l'importance des collectivités locales dans les progrès soutenus du Programme de réforme des administrations locales. L'approbation par les pouvoirs publics d'une nouvelle phase de la SDSA et du PDSA était initialement prévue pour 2013, mais on la prévoit maintenant pour 2015.
7. Deux initiatives plus récentes: le Corridor Sud de la croissance agricole de la Tanzanie (SAGCOT) (2011) et Big Results Now (BRN) (2013) impliquent certains changements par rapport au paradigme du PDSA. Elles se concentrent sur des zones géographiques particulières (plutôt que sur l'ensemble du territoire) et sur certains produits en particulier (plutôt que sur l'ensemble du secteur). Le SAGCOT est un cadre d'investissement pour les partenariats public-privé, s'étendant au nord et au sud du corridor central, route et "colonne vertébrale" du pouvoir reliant Dar es-Salaam aux régions du nord de la Zambie et du Malawi. L'initiative de BRN a des objectifs spécifiques pour l'agriculture (parmi d'autres secteurs) et se concentre sur trois produits de base: maïs, riz, canne à sucre, et un objectif primordial de faire du secteur agricole un secteur commercial garantissant, à l'échelle nationale, la sécurité et l'autosuffisance alimentaires d'ici 2025.

### **Conclusions sur le portefeuille de projets**

8. La **pertinence** du portefeuille a été jugée dans l'ensemble plutôt satisfaisante. Elle était entièrement satisfaisante pour les opérations soutenant l'infrastructure et la vulgarisation agricoles (PDSA). Bien qu'il ait fallu beaucoup de temps à l'État et aux donateurs pour s'entendre sur le contenu du PDSA et les mécanismes de financement, au bout du compte, il en est résulté un programme qui répond aux besoins du secteur, aux priorités du pays et des donateurs et dont les objectifs sont réalistes. Conformément aux politiques nationales de décentralisation, les administrations locales, en particulier au niveau du district, étaient les véritables "exécutants" du programme. Le PDSA a également introduit un système ascendant plus participatif pour l'élaboration de plans locaux de développement agricole.
9. Pour ce qui est des opérations ayant soutenu le développement de filières (MUVI et MIVARF), leurs conceptions présentaient une pertinence pour les politiques et les besoins nationaux, mais souffraient d'un certain nombre de problèmes. Le MUVI avait été conçu comme un programme d'entreprise rurale, en se plaçant dans l'hypothèse que les agriculteurs disposeraient d'excédents de production suffisants pour la transformation. Il est apparu que cela ne s'était pas avéré durant la mise en œuvre, et le programme a dû intervenir au niveau de l'exploitation pour stimuler la productivité et la production. La conception était axée sur le segment

local des filières de produits de base (c'est-à-dire, au niveau du quartier et du district de production), en omettant les transformateurs et acheteurs nationaux et internationaux. Du fait de l'insuffisance des ressources et de la faible représentation sur le terrain de l'organisme d'exécution, la mise en œuvre du programme a été confiée à des prestataires externes embauchés sous contrat. Cela a représenté une menace pour la durabilité, puisqu'on ne pouvait pas s'attendre à ce que les prestataires de service poursuivent leur appui après la résiliation de leur contrat à la fin du programme.

10. La conception du MIVARF était très complexe et reposait sur l'hypothèse déterminante qu'il y aurait une coopération avec les partenaires clés; mais cela ne s'est pas produit. En outre, l'opération était placée sous la responsabilité du Bureau du Premier Ministre, au motif que cela contribuerait à "intégrer" les différentes composantes sectorielles. Toutefois, cette institution n'a aucun mandat particulier ni expertise en matière de développement de filières agricoles.
11. Au moment de cette EPP, le FIDA, ainsi que la BAfD, était en train de concevoir un projet pour financer un dispositif de production contractuelle de canne à sucre dans le district de Bagamoyo. Il s'agissait du premier programme financé par le FIDA dans le pays à envisager une collaboration en partenariat public-privé-producteur. On n'a toujours pas reconnu que, au stade de la conception, le FIDA a fait un effort pour tirer les enseignements des précédentes expériences de soutien aux petits exploitants dans le cadre de mécanismes de production en sous-traitance en Ouganda (huile de palme) et au Swaziland (canne à sucre). En revanche, sous un angle plus positif, le programme vise à introduire des pratiques et techniques résistantes au changement climatique dans les zones d'intervention. Le document de conception ne fait aucun mystère d'un certain nombre de risques pesant sur le programme, notamment les retards d'exécution, les problèmes de sécurité foncière et la question de l'accès saisonnier des pasteurs à la zone de programme. Dans son examen de la documentation disponible, cette EPP a mis en évidence d'autres problèmes, par exemple: i) un risque d'impact environnemental négatif sur le système estuarien côtier; ii) des coûts de base par hectare très élevés (quand on prend en compte les investissements dans l'infrastructure à la ferme et de gros); et iii) des hypothèses trop optimistes sur "l'effet multiplicateur" du programme pour favoriser la création d'emplois.
12. L'**efficacité** du portefeuille a été jugée plutôt satisfaisante, ce qui traduit le dualisme entre les opérations soutenant l'infrastructure et la vulgarisation agricoles (via le PDSA) et celles soutenant la commercialisation agricole et le développement de filières. Sur la partie continentale du pays, les réalisations par rapport aux objectifs relatifs aux zones irriguées élargies, aux infrastructures agricoles (cuves de trempage et entrepôts), à la participation à l'agriculture sous contrat et aux services de vulgarisation étaient supérieures d'au moins 85%. Elles étaient inférieures aux attentes (moins de 85%) pour les objectifs en relation avec l'adoption de semences, de souches animales et d'engrais améliorés. Les services de vulgarisation au niveau des districts ont maintenant recours aux fermes-écoles, méthode qui améliore la participation des agriculteurs et l'apprentissage par la pratique. Cependant, on constate des écarts importants dans la quantité et la qualité de la prestation dans et selon les districts.
13. À Zanzibar, où l'action du PDSA a porté sur la vulgarisation uniquement, la qualité des services de vulgarisation est plus uniforme, et quelques pratiques innovantes (formation de facilitateurs agricoles et d'agents communautaires chargés de la santé animale) ont été introduites qui ont des répercussions sur les agriculteurs voisins et leurs communautés. Alors que les avantages des fermes-écoles se limitent en général à quelques petits groupes d'agriculteurs, le cas de Zanzibar montre qu'il est possible de renforcer la sensibilisation et d'améliorer la rentabilité de cette approche de la vulgarisation.

14. Dans le domaine de la transformation et de la commercialisation de la production agricole, les réalisations du MUVI ont été hétérogènes, en grande partie selon la région de mise en œuvre. Le MUVI a facilité l'accès des agriculteurs aux services de vulgarisation et à la distribution d'intrants assurée par les agents de vulgarisation agricole de district (ce qui ne faisait pas initialement partie de la conception). En contrepartie, l'appui au renforcement des capacités pour les entreprises et les entrepreneurs ruraux a été limité et de courte durée. Les plates-formes de produits de district introduites dans certaines régions, notamment à Tanga, ont contribué à réunir les parties prenantes des filières, identifier les problèmes et fournir un cadre pour le travail en réseau. Ces plates-formes pourraient contribuer à améliorer la cohésion des filières, mais jusqu'à présent elles restent confinées à l'intérieur des districts, qui ne sont qu'un segment de la filière. Quant au MIVARF, plus de trois ans après son entrée officielle en service, la mise en œuvre de sa partie financée par le FIDA est en retard.
15. L'**efficience** du portefeuille a été jugée plutôt satisfaisante. Le PDSA (à la fois sur le continent et à Zanzibar) a montré des cas de rendement élevé de l'investissement. Par exemple sur le continent pour la composante principale (irrigation), les estimations des taux de rentabilité internes étaient élevées (de 20 à 110% selon le type d'intervention), bien qu'il soit possible que les coûts de maintenance n'aient pas été pris en compte. À Zanzibar, les estimations des rendements des interventions fermes-écoles étaient également élevées pour certaines cultures (riz, bananes et manioc): entre 290 USD et 500 USD avec un coût moyen de vulgarisation par bénéficiaire de seulement 59 USD.
16. En revanche, dans le domaine de la transformation, de la commercialisation et du développement des filières, le MUVI et le MIVARF ont fait face à des problèmes de retard d'exécution, de sous-exécution et de coûts opérationnels élevés (20% ou plus), qui sont susceptibles d'affecter négativement les rendements.
17. L'**impact** a été jugé plutôt satisfaisant en général. Un meilleur accès aux services de vulgarisation sur le continent, et bien meilleur encore à Zanzibar, a aidé les agriculteurs à adopter des techniques améliorées de gestion des cultures et du cheptel. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats les plus remarquables concernent l'impact sur la productivité agricole et la sécurité alimentaire, ainsi que sur les institutions. Le PDSA et le MUVI ont l'un et l'autre joué un rôle dans l'augmentation des rendements agricoles dans les zones d'intervention, principalement par des services de vulgarisation et des périmètres d'irrigation. Sur le continent, on a signalé des augmentations de rendement d'environ 80% pour le maïs et de 160% pour le riz dans les sites où les activités de vulgarisation et d'irrigation avaient été dûment mises en œuvre.
18. Pour ce qui est de l'impact sur les institutions, la principale réalisation a été d'améliorer la capacité des services de vulgarisation de district et d'établir des processus participatifs pour préparer des plans de développement agricole de district. Ces plans, et les directives pour leur élaboration et leur mise en œuvre, ont fourni un cadre stratégique et budgétaire pour le directeur de l'agriculture, de l'irrigation et des coopératives et pour le personnel du district. Mais comme le relève cette EPP, des problèmes persistent et il y a encore une marge d'amélioration.
19. Pour ce qui est de la **durabilité**, l'EPP a évalué la probabilité que les avantages nets résultant des interventions financées par le FIDA puissent continuer au-delà de la phase de soutien financier extérieur. Entre autres, un élément clé à cet égard est la continuité institutionnelle permettant l'extension de la disponibilité des services qui sont essentiels pour les petits exploitants et les chefs de microentreprises et de petites entreprises. Au niveau du portefeuille, l'évaluation globale est dans la "zone positive" et la note est plutôt satisfaisante. Encore une fois, la balance penche nettement en faveur du PDSA (à la fois sur le continent et à Zanzibar) où le système et les mécanismes de prestation des services de

- vulgarisation et les infrastructures sont bien en place et maintenant mieux intégrés dans les structures administratives locales, en particulier au niveau du district.
20. En revanche, le MUVI est confronté à de sérieuses menaces de durabilité: la gestion des activités du programme a été confiée à des prestataires de services externes, qui ont réduit leurs effectifs et leurs activités dans la zone du programme, à mesure qu'approchait la fin de leur contrat. Cela veut dire qu'il est possible que les services essentiels aux agriculteurs et aux entrepreneurs ruraux ne soient pas disponibles au-delà du cycle de financement du FIDA, car aucune institution permanente n'a été créée pour continuer à offrir ce type de soutien à long terme. Pour pallier ce problème, le FIDA a accepté que ce programme soit prolongé de deux ans avec des exigences plus sélectives quant aux zones géographiques et aux filières à appuyer. Compte tenu de la complexité de l'appui à la création de filières, ce délai est probablement trop court pour définir une stratégie de sortie de programme, mais il permettra peut-être de renforcer les groupes d'agriculteurs et leurs associations.
  21. La contribution du portefeuille à **l'innovation et à la reproduction à plus grande échelle** a été jugée plutôt satisfaisante. Du point de vue des innovations technologiques, les technologies et techniques agricoles introduites par le PDSA existaient déjà, y compris dans la République-Unie de Tanzanie, même si nombre de petits exploitants agricoles les découvriraient pour la première fois. Concernant les approches novatrices, le MUVI a introduit dans certains districts la nouvelle pratique de la Plate-forme de produits de district, qui réunit des acteurs de district au sein d'un produit donné pour discuter de problèmes, trouver des solutions et travailler en réseau.
  22. Le plus grand mérite du portefeuille a été dans la reproduction à plus grande échelle des fermes-écoles et la diffusion de nouvelles techniques, pratiques et approches de la vulgarisation financées par plusieurs donateurs dans le cadre du PDSA. Dans le sous-programme de Zanzibar, l'approche des fermes-écoles était accompagnée de deux innovations progressives locales (les facilitateurs agricoles et les agents communautaires chargés de la santé animale), ce qui a élargi l'accès des petits exploitants agricoles aux services de base et amélioré la sensibilisation et la rentabilité.
  23. En revanche, le portefeuille a raté l'occasion de tirer des enseignements du programme de dons, qui consistait principalement en dons régionaux. Certains de ces dons ont innové en pilotant des initiatives visant à améliorer la connaissance des petits exploitants agricoles des prix du marché et leur accès aux marchés. Toutefois, ces initiatives n'ont pas été suffisamment intégrées par le FIDA et sont en grande partie inconnues de ses principaux partenaires; elles risquent donc d'être vite oubliées.
  24. Enfin, le portefeuille a contribué de manière satisfaisante à **l'égalité des sexes et à l'autonomisation des femmes**. Toutes les conceptions de projet ont veillé à l'importance de promouvoir l'égalité des sexes non seulement comme un instrument de justice sociale, mais aussi pour améliorer la productivité et la production agricole. Surtout, les pratiques de mise en œuvre se sont avérées répondre en grande partie aux aspirations de la conception. Dans le cadre du PDSA, tant sur le continent qu'à Zanzibar, les femmes ont activement participé aux fermes-écoles et aux groupes d'agriculteurs et y ont souvent occupé des postes de direction. Dans le cadre du MUVI, l'action menée auprès des groupes d'entraide communautaires a contribué à renforcer la confiance des femmes et leur pouvoir de négociation. Une réserve s'impose: les femmes ciblées ont été autonomisées en termes de connaissances et de compétences de production végétale et animale, mais on n'a pas suffisamment insisté sur leurs liens aux marchés.

### Activités hors prêts

25. Comparée à la situation au moment de l'EPP 2003, la présente EPP a permis de constater que les **partenariats** avec l'État (sur le continent et à Zanzibar) et les principaux donateurs dans le secteur agricole (notamment la Banque mondiale, la BAfD, le Japon, la Belgique et l'Union européenne) étaient beaucoup plus solides. Cela s'explique en grande partie par la présence du FIDA dans le pays et la contribution active de son personnel. Les interactions avec ces partenaires ont principalement eu lieu dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du PDSA où la participation du FIDA est maintenant bien reconnue et appréciée.
26. Malgré les améliorations remarquables mentionnées ci-dessus dans le développement de partenariats, l'EPP a également mis en évidence quelques lacunes. C'est le cas pour: i) des partenariats limités, jusqu'à une date récente, avec la société civile et le secteur privé qui auraient été importants pour la création des filières agricoles. Le dialogue avec la société privée Agro EcoEnergy au stade de la conception du programme à Bagamoyo est le premier cas pour le FIDA dans le pays; ii) des partenariats faibles, jusqu'à récemment, avec le système des Nations Unies dans la République-Unie de Tanzanie, y compris les institutions ayant leur siège à Rome. Ici, il convient de noter que pour un petit bureau comme celui du FIDA, avec des moyens relativement limités, les initiatives du système des Nations Unies peuvent être trop nombreuses pour en assurer le suivi et une certaine forme de sélectivité est requise; et iii) l'absence de collaboration avec les ministères chargés de la gestion des ressources naturelles et du changement climatique, ainsi qu'avec le Ministère des Terres, du logement et du développement des établissements humains, compte tenu du fait que les questions environnementales et foncières ont été retenues comme des domaines stratégiques dans le COSOP 2007.
27. Les activités de **gestion des savoirs** ont été limitées. Au niveau du projet, les systèmes de suivi-évaluation (S&E) ont été faibles (avec quelques exceptions pour Zanzibar) et la systématisation des expériences locales est restée insuffisante. Les interventions financées par le FIDA sont riches en expérience pratique (par exemple, sur la création de groupes d'agriculteurs, l'introduction d'initiatives après récolte, l'appui aux organisations locales de financement), mais elles ne sont pas suffisamment documentées et traduites sous forme de directives pratiques. Le risque est de négliger les expériences acquises au moment de concevoir un nouveau projet ou une nouvelle initiative.
28. Le FIDA a également financé plusieurs dons régionaux avec des activités dans le pays. Certains d'entre eux ont mis à l'essai des approches novatrices pour améliorer les connaissances des petits exploitants agricoles des prix du marché ainsi que leur accès aux marchés. Malheureusement, la collaboration est restée limitée entre les activités financées par des dons et celles financées par des prêts, avec le risque de négliger des expériences financées par des dons pleines de promesses.
29. En particulier, le MUVI n'a pas su documenter l'expérience, cette question étant laissée aux compétences et intérêts variés des prestataires de service régionaux. S'il est vrai que l'organisme d'exécution, l'Organisation pour le développement de la petite industrie, a des bureaux dans les régions concernées, ils manquent de personnel et ne sont donc pas en mesure d'assurer le suivi des questions de S&E, et aucune norme rigoureuse pour les besoins de S&E n'a été élaborée. Outre l'insuffisance du S&E, quelques tentatives limitées ont été faites au cours du programme pour tirer des enseignements. Même quand une directive axée sur la bande dessinée a été produite à Tanga sur la production de tournesol, elle n'a pas été diffusée.



30. Le FIDA a récemment fait quelques tentatives pour tirer ses propres enseignements en procédant à une autoévaluation et une analyse de fin de programme pays à Zanzibar et sur le continent (2013-2014). En outre, le FIDA a entrepris une analyse de l'approche de création de filières du MUVI pour appuyer sa demande de prolongation du prêt. En fait, la prolongation de deux ans récemment approuvée du MUVI pourrait être une excellente occasion pour systématiser les expériences (les réussites et les échecs) au profit de futurs travaux sur les filières agricoles.
31. En ce qui concerne la **concertation sur les politiques**, on a constaté un déséquilibre entre les nombreux objectifs fixés dans les COSOP 2003 et 2007 et les ressources limitées attribuées (humaines et financières) pour atteindre ces objectifs. Les COSOP 2003 et 2007 ont fixé un vaste programme sans doute trop ambitieux. Le COSOP 2003 a identifié cinq domaines critiques exigeant l'appui des donateurs à l'État. Le COSOP 2007 a répertorié huit domaines de concertation sur les politiques, qui vont de la sécurité des droits à la terre/l'eau jusqu'à la formulation d'une réglementation fiscale agricole plus efficace au niveau du district, en passant par l'accès équitable pour diverses utilisations des terres et l'atténuation de l'impact du changement climatique.
32. Le programme ambitieux du COSOP n'a pas abouti à la formulation d'un plan opérationnel. Contribuer à la concertation sur les politiques exige de sélectionner certains domaines spécifiques où le FIDA et des partenaires aux vues similaires ont une expertise ou une expérience concrète à offrir. Il faut également porter l'analyse des expériences à la discussion. Pour cela, on doit mobiliser des ressources humaines (par exemple, des spécialistes thématiques) et financières. Le programme de pays appuyé par le FIDA a été limité par une mauvaise gestion des savoirs. Les autres contraintes rencontrées par le FIDA incluent le manque de ressources humaines (spécialistes en la matière) et le coût élevé de la gestion du portefeuille. Les dons à des pays spécifiques sont des ressources supplémentaires qui pourraient être mobilisées, mais ces dernières années, aucun de ces dons n'a été approuvé sur les ressources ordinaires du FIDA.
33. Du côté de l'État, le nombre élevé des politiques et stratégies pour le secteur agricole et rural produit ces dernières années et la répartition des responsabilités dans le secteur agricole entre plusieurs institutions (Ministère de l'Agriculture, Ministère de l'Élevage, Bureau du Premier Ministre, Bureau de livraison du Président) rendent difficile de coordonner la concertation sur les politiques.
34. Dans l'ensemble, les progrès réalisés par l'État, le FIDA et leurs partenaires dans les activités hors prêts ont été jugés plutôt insuffisants.

#### **Performance stratégique (COSOP)**

35. Au niveau stratégique, la **pertinence du COSOP** a été jugée satisfaisante, surtout parce que les COSOP 2003 et 2007 ont contribué à orienter différemment la coopération entre le FIDA et les pouvoirs publics pour soutenir: i) une approche sectorielle dans l'agriculture, financée par un panier de financement; et ii) le processus de mise en œuvre de la politique de décentralisation, aux termes de laquelle les administrations locales sont chargées de la préparation et la mise en œuvre des plans de développement agricole locaux.
36. Cette décision d'apporter un soutien par le biais d'un panier de financement se justifiait pour la vulgarisation et les infrastructures agricoles dans le contexte du PDSA. Le recours à un panier de financement dans une approche sectorielle agricole était l'une des modalités de financement privilégiées par l'État et entraîne des coûts de gestion et de transaction moins élevés.
37. En revanche, la modalité du programme était la seule option viable pour la création des filières agricoles: au moment de la formulation du COSOP 2007 et jusqu'à aujourd'hui, il n'y a eu aucune approche harmonisée comparable au PDSA. Le contraire a été la prolifération désordonnée d'interventions de création de filières

qui peuvent conduire, entre autres, à des interventions incohérentes et des coûts de transaction élevés pour l'État. De nouvelles initiatives émergent aujourd'hui pour renforcer la coopération entre les donateurs dans ce domaine.

38. Il n'y a eu aucun classement géographique par ordre de priorité dans les COSOP 2003 et 2007, parce que la priorité principale du FIDA à l'époque était de réorienter sa stratégie vers le mécanisme du panier de financement qui était censé couvrir la totalité du territoire national. Cependant, couvrir l'ensemble du territoire a entraîné des coûts de gestion et de supervision de programme élevés. Compte tenu des ressources limitées dont dispose le bureau de pays du FIDA à Dar es-Salaam, la capacité de gestion du programme de pays est une préoccupation majeure.
39. L'EPP a jugé plutôt satisfaisantes l'**efficacité du COSOP** (les COSOP 2003 et 2007 combinés) et la **performance du COSOP** dans son ensemble. Les objectifs du COSOP en rapport avec l'appui au PDSA, comme l'amélioration de l'accès des pauvres aux technologies agricoles améliorées (irrigation, semences, mécanisation, engrais), ont été réalisés dans une large mesure. Des progrès ont été réalisés sur le continent en ce qui concerne les cultures, avec un moindre recours aux activités liées à l'élevage et au pastoralisme. Les résultats concernant l'amélioration du système de vulgarisation et de la productivité agricoles des ménages étaient encore plus "visibles" à Zanzibar. On doit aussi souligner l'importance de l'établissement de processus de planification participatifs ascendants pour préparer des plans de développement agricole au niveau du village, du quartier et du district.
40. Cependant, les progrès ont été beaucoup plus limités dans les domaines de la finance rurale, de l'amélioration de l'accès des agriculteurs aux marchés et du soutien à la création de filières, qui représentaient la majeure partie des objectifs du COSOP. En outre, le S&E au niveau du COSOP n'a pas atteint l'ampleur envisagée par le COSOP 2007. Des ateliers de contrôle annuels du COSOP sont organisés depuis 2010. Ces ateliers donnent aux pouvoirs publics, au personnel du FIDA et aux équipes chargées des opérations financées par des prêts l'occasion d'échanger leurs expériences. Les participants à ces ateliers ont présenté les progrès accomplis dans leurs activités ou projet respectifs, mais cela n'a pas conduit à une évaluation des progrès réalisés sur les objectifs du COSOP, et les comptes rendus des ateliers ne permettent pas d'extrapoler cette évaluation. À titre de comparaison, au Rwanda, autre pays de la région ESA, les réunions d'examen annuelles du COSOP jouent un rôle important dans le suivi de la réalisation des objectifs du COSOP. Un outil plus utile a été le Plan d'action du COSOP 2014 pour la République-Unie de Tanzanie, qui énumère un certain nombre de contraintes de mise en œuvre du programme de pays et présente les mesures envisagées pour y remédier.

Tableau 1  
**Évaluation du partenariat gouvernement-FIDA**

	<i>Notes*</i>
Performance du portefeuille	4
Activités hors prêts	3
Performance du COSOP	4
<b>Partenariat gouvernement-FIDA</b>	<b>4</b>

\* Échelle de notation: 6 = très satisfaisant; 5 = satisfaisant; 4 = plutôt satisfaisant; 3 = plutôt insuffisant; 2 = insuffisant; 1 = très insuffisant.

## Conclusions

41. Depuis 2004, les investissements du FIDA en République-Unie de Tanzanie ont été adaptés à la modalité de financement privilégiée par les pouvoirs publics en matière de développement agricole durable. En particulier, le FIDA a participé au mécanisme du panier de financement dans le cadre d'une approche sectorielle (PDSA) pour les investissements dans la vulgarisation et les infrastructures agricoles. Dans le même temps, le FIDA a aussi fourni une assistance sous forme de projets d'investissement financés par un prêt dans les domaines de la commercialisation des produits agricoles et la création de filières, comme aucun mécanisme de coordination spécifique n'avait encore été établi pour ces types d'interventions dans le pays.
42. L'exemple le plus remarquable de performance a été le soutien à la vulgarisation et aux infrastructures agricoles sur le continent (PDSA) et, plus encore, dans le sous-programme de Zanzibar. Le PDSA a prouvé qu'il y a des avantages à soutenir un programme agricole sectoriel d'envergure nationale. Travailler dans le cadre d'une approche sectorielle en République-Unie de Tanzanie présente des avantages importants: i) elle a été mise en œuvre par les administrations locales et a permis de renforcer la capacité des services de vulgarisation locaux; ii) les frais de gestion ont été plus bas comparés à la solution de rechange qui aurait consisté à mettre en œuvre de 15 à 20 projets distincts; et iii) cette approche a réduit également les coûts de transaction pour l'État, qui, autrement, aurait été contraint d'assurer le suivi de plusieurs projets financés par des donateurs différents, chacun ayant différentes procédures et exigences en matière d'établissement des rapports.
43. L'EPP relève que, sur le continent, le PDSA met surtout l'accent sur les cultures et prête moins attention aux productions animales, aux zones pastorales et agropastorales, et la qualité du système de vulgarisation est inégale. Néanmoins, les résultats au niveau institutionnel et au niveau local sont encourageants dans l'ensemble.
44. Quelques avancées ont été réalisées jusqu'à présent dans l'appui à la commercialisation des produits agricoles et à la création de filières. En particulier, des interventions comme le MUVI et le MIVARF ont été limitées par un certain nombre d'hypothèses erronées au stade de la conception, dues à: i) des diagnostics insuffisants des filières; ii) une conception se limitant au niveau des segments locaux (quartier/districts) des filières, alors que les acteurs clés peuvent être nationaux ou internationaux; iii) une consultation limitée au stade de la conception avec des acteurs non étatiques; iv) une conception pas suffisamment axée sur la faisabilité de la mise en œuvre; et v) une mauvaise intégration de l'expérience des dons régionaux sur l'accès au marché et l'information sur les marchés.
45. Bien que les COSOP aient fixé des objectifs ambitieux pour les activités hors prêts, des ressources limitées ont été affectées à cette fin. Outre les prêts, le FIDA a également financé des dons régionaux qui incluaient des activités dans la République-Unie de Tanzanie. Bien que riches en expériences novatrices, les activités financées par des dons ont été jusqu'à présent mal intégrées dans le programme de pays; il s'agit là d'une constatation récurrente dans de nombreuses EPP du FIDA, ainsi que dans l'évaluation au niveau de l'institution sur la Politique en matière de dons du FIDA.

## Recommandations

46. **Recommandation 1.** Préparer un nouveau COSOP, en collaboration avec l'État et les principaux partenaires nationaux et internationaux, pour définir une nouvelle stratégie des priorités d'intervention et d'investissement dans le pays. Le nouveau COSOP doit refléter les principales conclusions et recommandations de cette EPP et choisir des priorités prenant en compte les ressources disponibles pour le crédit. En particulier, le COSOP doit lier le soutien du FIDA au panier de financement, dans le

PDSA, avec son soutien à d'autres initiatives comme la création de filières agricoles, explorer les possibilités de coordination avec d'autres donateurs et éviter la dispersion géographique et sous-sectorielle. Il doit aussi établir des liens clairs entre les activités hors prêts, les dons et le programme de prêts et consacrer davantage d'attention aux examens des COSOP, afin que des ajustements puissent être faits pour s'adapter à l'évolution du contexte.

47. **Recommandation 2.** La première priorité programmatique doit être de soutenir l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de la prochaine phase de la SDSA/du PDSA tant sur le continent qu'à Zanzibar. Au sein de la SDSA et du PDSA, le sous-secteur de l'élevage, ainsi que la gestion des parcours et la filière laitière, méritent une attention particulière. La République-Unie de Tanzanie a un grand potentiel en matière d'élevage, mais jusqu'ici il a reçu des investissements et une attention limités. S'il y a des occasions à saisir, il y a aussi des risques, notamment ceux liés aux conflits entre éleveurs et agriculteurs, ainsi que des questions de politique nationale. Les dons de pays pourraient être utilisés pour le diagnostic et le pilotage d'initiatives.
48. **Recommandation 3.** Sous réserve de la disponibilité des ressources, outre l'appui à la SDSA/au PDSA, le FIDA pourrait envisager de financer des projets traditionnels, répondant à certaines priorités et sous certaines conditions. Des projets traditionnels peuvent être nécessaires pour cibler des groupes socioéconomiques particuliers, en répondant à des problèmes liés à des contextes de ressources ou géographiques spécifiques, et pour tester/développer des innovations avant qu'elles ne puissent être reproduites à plus grande échelle par le biais du système de vulgarisation appuyé par le PDSA. Pour ces types de projets, le FIDA doit insister sur les zones géographiques ou les produits de base qui sont susceptibles d'avoir d'importants avantages sociaux pour un grand nombre de ménages pauvres, tout en contrôlant les coûts de gestion de projet. En outre, l'accent doit être mis bien davantage sur la préparation à la mise en œuvre au stade de la conception du projet, les pouvoirs publics jouant un rôle plus actif dans la conception.
49. **Recommandation 4.** La création de filières exige davantage de consultation *ex ante* avec les acteurs du secteur privé et une meilleure coordination entre les donateurs pour créer un environnement plus propice à la formulation des politiques, renforcer la cohérence des interventions et réduire les coûts de transaction pour l'État. Cela pourrait se faire soit dans le cadre du PDSA-II (le cas échéant) ou de nouvelles initiatives multidonateurs. Les entrepreneurs du secteur privé et d'autres partenaires concernés (par exemple les organisations faitières coopératives) pourraient participer plus activement à des réunions régulières d'examen du COSOP, ainsi que par des initiatives financées par des dons de pays.
50. **Recommandation 5.** Appuyer des activités de gestion des savoirs, de développement de partenariats et de concertation sur les politiques qui soient étroitement liées aux opérations financées par le FIDA. Pour être réalistes, les objectifs des activités hors prêts doivent être mieux ciblés et liés aux ressources. Les options sont notamment: i) intégrer les composantes de gestion des savoirs et de concertation sur les politiques dans les futures opérations financées et appuyer la capacité de S&E des organismes nationaux au moyen d'instruments de don; ii) utiliser plus stratégiquement les ateliers d'examen annuel des COSOP pour associer les partenaires clés (par exemple les organisations non gouvernementales et du secteur privé); iii) mobiliser le financement sous forme de dons de pays sur ses ressources ordinaires et auprès des donateurs extérieurs; et iv) tirer les enseignements des pratiques adoptées dans d'autres programmes financés par le FIDA, par exemple à Madagascar.

# United Republic of Tanzania Country Programme Evaluation

## Agreement at Completion Point

### A. Introduction

1. The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) carried out a Country Programme Evaluation (CPE) in 2014. This is the second CPE conducted by IOE in the United Republic of Tanzania since the Fund started its operations in the country in 1978. The first CPE was completed in 2003 and its findings served as an input to the preparation of the 2003 COSOP. The main objectives of the second CPE were to assess the overall partnership between IFAD and Tanzania in reducing rural poverty, and to generate a series of findings and recommendations that will inform the definition of future cooperation between IFAD and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania as well as to assist in the implementation of ongoing operations and in the design of future IFAD-funded projects in the country.
2. Based on the analysis of the cooperation during the period 2004-2014, the CPE aims at providing an overarching assessment of: (i) the performance and impact of programmes and projects supported by IFAD operations; (ii) the performance and results of IFAD's non-lending activities in Tanzania: policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership building; (iii) the relevance and effectiveness of IFAD's country strategic opportunities programmes (COSOPs) of 2003 and 2007; and overall management of the country programme. This Agreement at Completion Point (ACP) contains a summary of the main findings from the CPE (see section B below).
3. The ACP has been finalized between the IFAD management (represented by the Associate Vice-President, Programme Management Department) and the Government of the United Republic Tanzania (represented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives on the Mainland and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Zanzibar), and reflects their understanding of the main findings from the CPE and discussions held at the CPE National Roundtable Workshop held in Dar es Salaam on 29 January 2015, as well as their commitment to adopt and implement the recommendations contained in section C of the ACP within specified timeframes.
4. This ACP will be included as an annex to the new COSOP for Tanzania. In line with the decision in 2013, the Tanzania CPE will be discussed in the IFAD Executive Board at the same time when the new Tanzania COSOP will be considered by the Board. Moreover, IOE will prepare written comments on the new COSOP for consideration at the same Board session. The written comments will focus on the extent to which the main findings and recommendations from the Tanzania CPE have been internalized in the new COSOP. The implementation of the recommendations agreed upon will be tracked through the President's Report on the Implementation Status of Evaluation Recommendations and Management Actions, which is presented to the IFAD Executive Board on an annual basis by the Fund's Management.

### B. Main evaluation findings

5. Relevance of the portfolio was fully satisfactory for the operations supporting agricultural infrastructure and extension (ASDP). While it took a long time for the Government and the donors to agree on the ASDP content and the financing mechanisms, eventually this resulted in a programme that addressed sectoral needs, national and donors' priorities and had realistic objectives. In line with national decentralization policies, local government authorities, particularly at the

district level, were the actual "implementers" of the programme. Regarding the operations that supported value chain development (MUVI and MIVARF), their designs were relevant to national policies and needs but suffered from a number of flaws, which caused subsequent implementation delays.

6. Effectiveness of the portfolio was moderately satisfactory, reflecting the dualism between operations supporting agricultural infrastructure and extension (through ASDP) and those operations supporting agricultural marketing and value chain development (through two IFAD-funded projects). On the Mainland, district-level extension services are now using the farmer field school (FFS) approach as a method that improves farmers' participation and practical learning. There are, however, important variations in the quantity and quality of delivery between districts. In Zanzibar, quality of extension services is more uniform and a few innovative practices (farmer facilitators and community animal health workers) have been introduced that can generate spill over effects on nearby farmers and their communities. These successful innovations also offer strong potential for scaling-up in both Zanzibar and mainland.
7. MUVI's achievements were heterogeneous, depending on the region of implementation. It facilitated farmers' access to extension and input distribution provided by district agricultural extension staff (which was originally not part of the design). The capacity building support for rural entrepreneurs and enterprises has been limited and of short duration. As for MIVARF, after more than three years from official entry into service, the implementation of its IFAD-funded portion lags behind.
8. Portfolio efficiency was moderately satisfactory. ASDP (both on the Mainland and in Zanzibar) showed cases of high returns to investment. For example, estimates of the internal rates of return were high on the Mainland for irrigation; in Zanzibar, estimates of returns to FFS interventions were also high for selected crops and livestock. On the other hand, MUVI and MIVARF faced problems of implementation delays and high operational cost ratios.
9. Impact was overall moderately satisfactory. The most remarkable results were for impact on agricultural productivity and food security, as well as impact on strengthening key institutions. Both ASDP and MUVI played a role in increasing crop and livestock yields in the intervention areas, mainly through extension and irrigation schemes. As for impact on institutions, the main achievement was to improve the capacity of district extension services and to establish and strengthen participatory processes to prepare District Agricultural Development Plans (DADPs). The District Agricultural Development Plans and the operational guidelines for developing, implementing and tracking the plans have provided a strategic and budgetary framework for the district Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and Cooperatives and the district staff. As the CPE notes, there are still challenges and ample room for improvement.
10. Sustainability has been assessed as moderately satisfactory. Again, the stronger case is ASDP (both on the Mainland and in Zanzibar) where the system and mechanisms for delivery of extension services and infrastructure are in place. On the Mainland, the main remaining risk is financial, if central government and development partners reduce or terminate their funding. On the other hand, MUVI faces serious sustainability threats: the management of project activities has been outsourced to external service providers and these have reduced their personnel and activities in the project area as the termination day of their contract approached. To address this problem, IFAD has accorded a two-year extension to this project with more selective requirements as to the geographical areas and value chains to be supported.
11. The portfolio's contribution to innovation and up-scaling was assessed as moderately satisfactory. The largest merit of the portfolio has been in **up-scaling**

**the FFS and disseminating improved techniques, practices and extension approaches** with funding from several donors under ASDP. In the **Zanzibar sub-programme, the FFS approach was accompanied by two local incremental innovations, the Farmer Facilitators and the Community Animal Health Workers, broadening smallholder farmers' access to basic services.**

However, the portfolio missed the opportunity to learn from the grant programme, consisting mainly of regional grants. Some of these grants have been innovative in piloting initiatives to improve smallholder farmers' knowledge of market prices and access to markets. However, these initiatives have not been internalised well by IFAD and are largely unknown to its main partners.

12. Finally, the portfolio has contributed to gender equality and women's empowerment to a satisfactory level. Overall the portfolio has satisfactorily promoted women's participation both as members and leaders of groups, such as FFS groups and producer groups.
13. Taking into account the relatively large size of the programme, non-lending activities have received fewer resources. As for **knowledge management**, there has been little systematization of grassroots-level experiences. IFAD-funded interventions are rich in practical experience (e.g. on farmers' group formation, introducing post-harvest initiatives, supporting grassroots finance organizations), but this is not sufficiently documented. IFAD has also funded several regional grants with activities in Tanzania but, unfortunately, there has **been limited collaboration between grant-funded and loan-funded activities**, with the risk of neglecting learning from several grant-funded experiences.
14. Compared to the situation at the time of the 2003 CPE, **partnerships** with the Government (Mainland and Zanzibar) and the main donors in the agricultural sector are much stronger, which can be attributed to IFAD's country presence. Some gaps have been identified in the: (i) limited partnerships with the civil society and the private sector which would have been important for agricultural value chain development; (ii) weak partnerships with the UN System in Tanzania, including the Rome-based organizations; and (iii) absence of collaboration with the Ministries responsible for natural resource management and climate change, as well as with the Ministry of Lands, given that environment and land tenure issues have been underlined as areas of importance in the 2007 COSOP.
15. As for **policy dialogue**, there has been an imbalance between the numerous objectives set in the 2003 and 2007 COSOP and the limited resources available (human and financial) to achieve these goals. While resources have been a constraint, the **national policy environment has also been challenging, due to the high number of existing policies and strategies for the rural and agricultural sector**. Moreover, the split responsibilities between several institutions on the Mainland make it difficult to coordinate policy dialogue and implementation.
16. Overall, progress made in non-lending activities by IFAD, the Government and their partners has been assessed as moderately unsatisfactory.
17. At the strategic level, COSOP relevance has been assessed as satisfactory, mainly because the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs have been instrumental in realigning the cooperation between IFAD and the Government of Tanzania towards supporting: (i) a sector-wide approach in agriculture, funded through basket funding; and (ii) the process of implementation of the decentralization policy whereby Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are in charge of the preparation, implementation and tracking of local agricultural development plans.
18. It was a relevant and timely decision to provide support through basket funding for agricultural infrastructure and extension in the context of ASDP. Basket funding within an agricultural sector-wide approach was and continues to be one of the

Government's preferred financing modalities and entails lower management and transaction costs.

19. On the other hand, the project-modality was the only viable option for agricultural value chain development: at the time of the 2007 COSOP formulation and up to now there was no harmonized approach comparable to ASDP. The backside of this has been the proliferation of uncoordinated value chain development interventions which may lead, inter alia, to inconsistent interventions, high transaction costs for the Government, and possibly mixed signals to the private sector. New initiatives are now emerging, under Government leadership, to enhance cooperation between donors in this area, and therefore good potential for achieving stronger alignment and harmonization in this strategic area.
20. There was no geographic prioritization in the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs because the main priority at that time for IFAD was to realign to the basket funding mechanism which purported to cover the entire territory of Tanzania. However, covering the entire territory of Tanzania has implied higher project management and supervision costs.
21. The CPE assesses COSOP effectiveness (COSOP 2003 and COSOP 2007 combined) and the overall COSOP performance as moderately satisfactory. The COSOP objectives that related to the support to ASDP, such as the enhancement of poor people's access to improved farming technology (irrigation, seeds, mechanization, fertilizers) have been achieved to a significant degree. Good progress on the Mainland has been made on crops, with less emphasis on livestock-related activities and pastoralism. Results in terms of a strengthened extension system and enhanced farming household productivity were even more "visible" in Zanzibar. Also of importance was the establishment of participatory bottom-up planning and implement processes to prepare and implement agricultural development plans at the village, ward and district levels.
22. However, progress has been far more limited in the areas of rural finance, in enhancing farmers' access to markets and in supporting the development of value chains which represented an important part of the COSOP objectives. Moreover, M&E at the COSOP level did not happen to the extent envisaged by the 2007 COSOP: annual reviews were organized since 2010 but were not used to generate an assessment of progress made on the objectives and to agree on priority follow-up measures.

### **C. Recommendations**

23. **Recommendation 1. Prepare a new COSOP in collaboration with the Government of Tanzania and key national and international partners, to define a new strategy of intervention and investment priorities in the country.** The new COSOP should reflect the main findings and recommendation of the current CPE and select priorities taking into account the estimated resources available for lending. In the short term, according to the Performance Based Allocation System (December 2013), US\$ 55 million are available to Tanzania in the period 2013-2015.
24. In particular, the COSOP needs to articulate IFAD's support to basket funding within ASDP, with its support to other initiatives such as agricultural value chain development, and explore opportunities for coordination with other donors on the latter. The COSOP should also specify the geographic and sub-sector selectivity for future investments, with the aim of avoiding dispersion for better efficiency and outcomes. It should also establish clear linkages between non-lending activities, grants and the lending programme and devote stronger attention to COSOP reviews (annual, mid-term, completion).



Proposed follow-up:

The new COSOP is already being prepared incorporating lessons learnt, findings and recommendations arising from the Tanzania CPE, as discussed during the National Roundtable Workshop on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2015. Based on a detailed formulation plan, the COSOP is following a participatory approach that involves consultation with key public and private sector stakeholders, both local and international. The COSOP will be submitted to IFAD's Executive Board by the end of 2015.

25. **Recommendation 2. The first programmatic priority is to support the preparation and implementation of the next phase of ASDS/ASDP both on the Mainland and in Zanzibar.** In addition to its positive effects on crop yields, income and food security, ASDP had an important institutional impact on local government authorities which needs to be consolidated. Improvements are also needed in the programme design: (i) higher selectivity on the type of agricultural infrastructure to be financed; (ii) strengthening of the M&E capacity and reporting at the local and central government levels; (iii) transferring of successful approaches tested in Zanzibar (e.g., farmer facilitators and community animal health workers) to the Mainland.
26. Within ASDS and ASDP, the livestock sub-sector, together with rangeland management and the dairy value chain deserve specific focus. Tanzania has an important livestock potential but this has received limited attention and investment so far. In addition to opportunities, there are also risks, notably those related to conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, as well as national policy issues. Country grants could be used for better diagnosis and for piloting initiatives.

Proposed follow-up:

IFAD is ensuring that the new COSOP is well aligned with the Government's agricultural development strategy and priority programmes. Preparation of ASDS II and ASDP II is in the final stages of completion for Tanzania Mainland. However, ASDS II and ASDP II do not include Zanzibar. As such, the Government of Zanzibar has prepared a draft sector-wide proposal, which it plans to submit for IFAD's technical review/enhancement and financial support. In both cases, IFAD is providing strategic and timely inputs to these important sector documents. The new COSOP also focuses on coordinated support to a strengthened sectoral M&E system. Specifically, the proposed ASDP II will be guided by an enhanced Results Framework, which will also be aligned with a strong Results Framework for the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy II. Government, with support from consultants, has prepared a draft ASDS II and ASDP II for Mainland Tanzania, which is currently under discussion, and expected to be finalized by the end of June, 2015. This ASDP 2 document will enable the on-going preparation of the COSOP to be strongly aligned with the final version of the ASDS II and ASDP II.

The new COSOP will also consolidate and strategically scale-up successful innovations (e.g., use of farmer facilitators and community animal health workers under the FFS extension approach in Zanzibar; promotion of bottom-up participatory planning, implementation and tracking of the District Agricultural Development Plans/DADPs in mainland and pilot Shehia Agricultural Development Plans/SADPs in Zanzibar). Given that the livestock sub-sector has received limited attention, emphasis may also be placed on supporting range management and strategic livestock value chains (e.g., dairy). The new COSOP, using appropriate instruments, shall also consider supporting the pastoralists/agro-pastoralists, including ecologically sound strategies for resolving conflicts between pastoralists and farmers.

27. **Recommendation 3. Subject to the availability of resources, in addition to supporting ASDS/ASDP, IFAD could consider funding traditional loan-funded projects, within certain priorities and conditions.** In special cases, traditional projects may be needed to focus on themes and issues not dealt with in general extension coverage, such as targeting of specific socio-economic groups, addressing problems relating to specific geographic or resource contexts, as well as to test/develop innovations before they can be later scaled up through the ASDP-supported extension system.
28. For these types of projects, IFAD should consider geographical areas or commodities that are likely to have significant welfare effects on high number of poor households while controlling project management cost ratios (i.e., avoiding geographically scattered interventions). In addition, there needs to be far more focus on implementation readiness at the project design stage, with the Government playing a more active role in the design, and on learning from grant-funded pilot initiatives.

Proposed follow-up:

While the thrust of IFAD's support aims to focus on sector-wide projects/programme, support to traditional projects may continue if enough resources are available, provided such projects have potential to introduce innovative approaches and techniques for inclusive agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction; and to be replicated and scaled up (that is, potential for wider adoption after pilot testing) by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and other agencies. Such projects shall pay close attention to maintaining reasonable project management cost ratios (especially avoiding interventions that are geographically scattered), including transaction costs. Possible examples include, inter-alia, the "Tanzania Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending" and the "Rural Finance Innovation Fund". An additional example is in Zanzibar where the impressive performance of the FFS approach that was accompanied by two local incremental innovations, namely the Farmer Facilitators and the Community Animal Health Workers—that demonstrate cost-effectiveness and good sustainability prospects -- need to be consolidated, customized, and scaled up to other areas, including Mainland Tanzania, through appropriate mechanisms.

Consideration of IFAD support for priority traditional projects will be made during the formulation (2015) and early implementation process of the new COSOP (2016 – 2018).

29. **Recommendation 4. Value chain development requires more consultation ex ante with key stakeholders, notably private entrepreneurs.** In the past, private sector entrepreneurs have played a negligible role in the design of agricultural value chain development interventions. Partnerships with private sector actors need to be emphasised from the beginning. Private sector entrepreneurs and other relevant partners (e.g. the cooperative apex organizations) could be more actively involved in regular COSOP review meetings as well as through country grant-funded initiatives.
30. Coordination is needed to join efforts to develop private and public stakeholders' involvement and cooperation, to enhance public capabilities for enabling strategic policy formulation and implementation. This could be done either within the ASDP-2 framework (if found suitable) or, through other emerging multi-donor initiatives. New multi-agency initiatives are emerging (such as the Agricultural Marketing Development Trust supported by SIDA, DANIDA, IrishAID and other agencies). IFAD needs to follow these initiatives with attention and consider support if they are found of relevance for IFAD's end-clients.

Proposed follow-up:

The current CPE has noted that successful value chain development requires working closely with several private sector actors (such as wholesalers, processors and exporters); the new COSOP will accord stronger emphasis to working with these private sector stakeholders. As concluded in the CPE, building trust among partners, both state and non-state and improving knowledge of the fundamentals of the value chain development are essential. So is forging more coordinated approaches with relevant international organizations. The new COSOP is therefore based on inclusive consultations and on forging sound partnerships with strategic private sector actors and other relevant non-state partners -- both local and international. This would help identifying relevant partners, better understand their interest and potential, and internalize incentives for their active participation. Additionally, these consultations and partnerships could be forged within the ASDP II framework and on-going and new multi-agency initiatives (e.g., SAGCOT and BRN; Agricultural Marketing Trust Fund Initiative (by DANIDA, IrishAID, SDC, SIDA).

Timeline: during the preparation of the COSOP, especially: (1) validation stage (September, 2015); and (2) initial phase of COSOP implementation (2016 – 2018).

31. **Recommendation 5. Support knowledge management, partnership development and policy dialogue activities that are closely connected to IFAD-funded operations.** While IFAD has recognised knowledge management, partnership development and policy dialogue as an integrating part of its country programme in Tanzania, it has faced human and financial resources constraints. By concentrating its effort on ASDP, the country office could devote more time to non-lending activities. IFAD will need to elaborate more focused objectives for non-lending activities and mobilize resources. Options include: (i) embedding knowledge management and policy dialogue components in future financed operations (to document and systematise experiences, establishing practical guidelines on "what and how to do", and to contributing to policy discussions and related stock-taking events with policy makers); (ii) use more strategically the annual COSOP review workshops to engage key partners (e.g. non-governmental and private sector organizations); (iii) mobilise country-grant financing both from its regular resources and from external donors, thus also improving synergy between grants and the lending portfolio; (iv) learn from practices adopted in other IFAD-supported programmes, for example in Madagascar (see CPE 2013).
32. More specifically, IFAD could provide significant contributions to:
- *Knowledge management:* (i) learn from FFS improved practices supported by ASDP in Zanzibar in order to enhance extension approaches on the Mainland; (ii) conduct a dedicated review work to systematize experience through past and ongoing grants in market access, market intelligence in view of its future use for project design and implementation support. In addition, this review should cover experiences of MUVI project in value chain development during the two-year project extension; (iii) provide support (e.g. through grants as in the case of Zanzibar) to the capacity of the Government agencies to monitor and assess development interventions and build a functioning M&E system.
  - *Policy dialogue* (i) support the preparation and implementation of ASDS/ASDP-2 by helping prioritize the different areas of investment (e.g., extension/FFS, vs. irrigation, vs. farm equipment, vs. agro-processing equipment); (ii) supporting the Government in designing livestock and rangeland management programmes with emphasis on conflict prevention between pastoralists and farmers, benefiting from knowledge accumulated through previous grants.

- Establish *partnerships*: (i) with governmental agencies in charge of land tenure, environment and climate change in order to facilitate a dialogue on policy and regulatory issues; (ii) with non-governmental organizations and private sector organizations for agricultural value chain development; and (iii) selectively, with UN agencies that are closest to the IFAD's mandate.


Proposed follow-up:

The new COSOP will consider more focused objectives and approaches to non-lending activities, including more effective mechanisms for mobilizing resources and collaborative partnerships. The non-lending activities, namely, knowledge management, partnership development and policy dialogue are an integral part of the IFAD's country programme, but over time have suffered from human and financial constraints in the IFAD country office.

These issues will be addressed through relevant on-going operations, especially to the extent the findings and results can enhance portfolio performance and strategic impacts. Analyzing and systematizing field and operational experiences are also among IFAD's priorities at the corporate level, with increasing practical guidelines and approaches that can be used for project preparation and implementation, as well as for policy dialogue. The country office will explore ways to mobilize regional and country specific grants for these purposes, and to forge closer partnerships with key agencies that share IFAD's vision and smallholder focus.

Timeline: by end of July, 2015: completed draft COSOP document); by end of September, 2015: final COSOP document, following the COSOP validation workshop with key stakeholders.

## Signatures



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Associate Vice-President  
Programme Management Department, IFAD

JUNE 11, 2015


Date



Stephen Wassira  
Minister for Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
United Republic of Tanzania

JUNE 20, 2015

Date



Sira Ubwa Mamboya  
Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources  
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar

JUNE 18<sup>TH</sup>, 2015

Date

# United Republic of Tanzania Country Programme Evaluation

## Main Report

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- III. Rural infrastructure
- IV. Gender and social inclusion

The appendices are available upon request from the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD ([evaluation@ifad.org](mailto:evaluation@ifad.org)).

## Currency equivalent, weights and measures

### Currency equivalent

Currency unit = Tanzanian Shilling (TZS)

1 US\$= 1660 TZS (late July 2014)

### Measures

Metric measure

## Abbreviations and acronyms

ACP	Agreement at Completion Point
AMSDP	Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme
ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme
ASDP	Agricultural Sector Development Programme (this acronym is used to refer to both a national sector-wide programme of the Government of Tanzania as well as to an IFAD loan title)
ASDP-L	Agricultural Sector Development Programme – Livestock
ASDS	Agriculture Sector Development Strategy
ASSP	Agricultural Services Support Programme
COSOP	Country Strategic Opportunity Programme
CPE	Country Programme Evaluation
EAC	East African Community
ESA	East and Southern Africa Division
FFS	Farmer Field School
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, a German government-owned development bank
MFI	Micro Finance Institution
MIVARF	Marketing Infrastructure, Value Addition and Rural Finance Support Programme
MUVI	Rural Micro Small & Medium Enterprises Support Programme
PIDP	Participatory Irrigation Development Programme
PMD	Programme Management Department of IFAD
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth & Reduction of Poverty, better known (also known by the Kiswahili acronyms of MKUKUTA for mainland and MKUZA for Zanzibar)
RFSP	Rural Financial Services Programme
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
SACCOS	Saving and Credit Cooperative Societies
SADC	South African Development Community
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SIDO	Small Industry Development Organization
SWAp	Sector-wide Approach

## Map of on-going IFAD-supported operations

### The United Republic of Tanzania

Ongoing projects

Country programme evaluation



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.


IFAD Map compiled by IFAD | 29-01-2014



# Map of previous IFAD-supported operations in Tanzania

## The United Republic of Tanzania

Projects approved since 2003 and currently closed



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.  
 Map compiled by IFAD | 14-04-2014

# United Republic of Tanzania

## Country Programme Evaluation

### I. Background

#### A. Introduction

1. At the request of the Executive Board,<sup>1</sup> the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertook a country programme evaluation (CPE) of the IFAD-supported programme in Tanzania in 2014-15, to assess the cooperation between the Government of Tanzania and IFAD during the period 2004-2014 and provide recommendations that can help the IFAD/Government partnership in developing a new country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) and designing future projects. The Tanzania CPE has been prepared based on the overall provisions of the IFAD Evaluation Policy<sup>2</sup> and follows IOE's methodology and processes for CPEs as per the Evaluation Manual.<sup>3</sup> This is the second CPE for Tanzania: the first was completed in 2003. IFAD prepared its first COSOP for Tanzania in 1998 and the second in 2003 after the first CPE. A third COSOP was prepared in 2007, originally meant to be valid until 2014, and later extended (pending the current CPE results) until 2015.
2. **Overview of IFAD-supported programme.** IFAD's Executive Board approved its first loan to Tanzania in 1978 (historically, this was the second loan ever approved by the Fund, see Annex II). Since then, IFAD has approved 14 loans (Table 1) worth of US\$360 Million, corresponding to 48 per cent of the total estimated portfolio costs (US\$769 million). Tanzania is the country with the second largest portfolio of IFAD (in terms of volume of lending) in the East & Southern Africa region (ESA) after Ethiopia.
3. The government of Tanzania has provided co-financing for US\$72 million to IFAD-funded projects (or 9.6 per cent of total portfolio costs). The major external co-financers (in terms of value of co-financing) of IFAD-funded projects have been the African Development Bank (parallel financing), the World Bank, the Government of Belgium and the Government of Ireland. Apart from the loans, IFAD has also approved 37 grants, mostly under the global/regional windows, with foreseen activities in Tanzania (Annex II). IFAD piloted country presence in Tanzania since late 2003, out-posted a Country Programme Manager in 2008 and a Country Director in 2014 who is also responsible for the IFAD country programme in Rwanda.

#### B. Methodology and process

4. Focusing on the period 2004-2014 (i.e. after the first CPE), the present CPE assesses three pillars of the country programme: (i) the performance and impact of the portfolio of programmes and projects supported by IFAD's loans; (ii) the performance and results of non-lending activities in Tanzania: policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership building; (iii) the relevance and effectiveness of the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs, including strategic objectives, subsector focus, targeting approaches, and country programme mix.
5. This CPE examines the **portfolio of programme and projects** on the basis of the internationally recognized evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact — including impacts on household income and assets, human and social capital empowerment, food security and agricultural activity, natural resources and the environment (including climate change), and institutions and policies — and the other performance criteria specified, including sustainability, gender equality and women's empowerment, and innovation and scaling up (see definitions in Annex IV). It also assesses the performance of partners (IFAD and the

<sup>1</sup> EB/2013/ /110/R.2.

<sup>2</sup> Available at: [http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/policy/new\\_policy.htm](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/policy/new_policy.htm).

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process\\_methodology/doc/manual.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf).

Government of Tanzania) by examining how well each partner fulfilled the tasks expected of them in their contribution to the design, execution, supervision, implementation- support, and monitoring and evaluation of the specific projects.

Table 1  
**Overview of IFAD-supported Programme in Tanzania**

<i>First IFAD-funded Project</i>		1978
Total loan-funded projects approved		14
Total amount of IFAD financing		US\$360.0 million
Lending Terms		Highly concessional
Counterpart Funding (includes government, beneficiaries and domestic financial institutions)		US\$72.0 million
Co-financing amount		US\$337.0 million
Total portfolio cost		US\$769.0 million
Focus of operations	Rural development, irrigation and rural infrastructure, credit and financial services, agricultural value chain development	
Main Co-financiers	African Development Bank, the World Bank, the Government of Belgium and the Government of Ireland	
Number of ongoing loans		5 (October 2014)
Total amount of grants (IFAD contribution)	US\$30.9 million (mostly regional allocations for regional grants)	
Country programme manager/Country Director	M. Faisal (1998 – 2004); I.de Willebois (2004 – 2007); S. Eremie (2007-2010); J. Gicharu (2010-2012) M. Okong'o <i>ad interim</i> (2013); F.Pichon (February 2014-present)	
Lead agencies	<u>Mainland:</u> Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives; Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development; Ministry of Industry and Trade; Prime Minister's Office. <u>Zanzibar:</u> Ministry Of Agriculture and Natural Resources ; Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries	

Source: FlexCube (June 2014)

6. During the evaluation period, IOE conducted a number of project-level evaluations, as well as a thematic evaluation.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the 2005 Independent External Evaluation of IFAD carried out one of its country case study in Tanzania. This CPE has reviewed the findings of these evaluations.
7. Since 2004, IFAD has approved five loans (see Annex II) which the CPE has more closely reviewed: (i) Agriculture Services Support Programme (ASSP); (ii) Agriculture Sector Development Programme- Livestock Support Pastoral & Agro-Pastoral Development (ASDP-L); (iii) Rural Micro Small & Medium Enterprises Support Programme (MUVI); (iv) Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) and (v) Marketing Infrastructure, Value Addition and Rural Finance Support Programme (MIVARF). IFAD is currently developing a new loan proposal for a small farmer out-grower scheme (Bagamoyo Sugar Outgrower and Wider Community Development Programme), together with the African Development Bank.
8. Including the five loans approved since 2004 and the three already evaluated by IOE in the period 2004-2013, this CPE has covered eight loans. In the past ten years, the IFAD-funded portfolio in Tanzania has been a mix of loans financing "traditional" projects and loans that contributed to the multi-donor basket funding in the context of the sector-wide Agricultural Sector Development Programme.

<sup>4</sup> They were: Thematic evaluation of IFAD's Performance and Impact in Decentralizing Environments: Experiences from Ethiopia, Tanzania & Uganda (2005); Participatory Irrigation Development, Programme (PIDP, 2007); Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP, 2011); and Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP, 2011).

9. In Tanzania Mainland, ASSP, ASDP-L and ASDP are not three separate “projects”: they are three loans contributing to basket funding of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme. This programme has been managed by a central inter-ministerial structure established by the Government, with field level activities planned and implemented under the responsibility of local government authorities (mainly districts). The main donors (The World Bank, African Development Bank, IFAD, the Governments of Japan and Ireland) have contributed to a common funding mechanism and participated in annual joint implementation review missions. In Zanzibar, which has a semi-autonomous Government, through ASSP and ASDP-L, IFAD has financed a separate sub-programme in the agricultural sector. IFAD is the only international financier of the Zanzibar sub-programme which has its own implementation unit, located within the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Zanzibar. IFAD has fielded its own separate supervision missions for the Zanzibar sub-programme. For the above reasons, the CPE has considered the Zanzibar sub-programme as a separate operation.
10. Instead, MUVI and MIVARF are not part of the basket funding and have their own implementation units: they are projects of the traditional sort. In sum, this CPE assesses four operational clusters financed by IFAD since 2004: (i) the mainland Agricultural Sector Development Programme (funded inter alia by IFAD’s ASSP, ASDP-L and ASDP)<sup>5</sup>; (ii) the Zanzibar sub-Programme of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (funded by IFAD only through an ASSP and ASDP-L sub-programme); (iii) MUVI; and (iv) MIVARF. It has also reviewed past evaluations and presents considerations on the ongoing the design of the Bagamoyo project (Table 2).

Table 2

**Portfolio coverage of the present CPE****A. Older operations reviewed through past IOE evaluations**

- Participatory Irrigation Development , Programme (PIDP, evaluated in 2007)
- Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP evaluated in 2011)
- Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP, evaluated in 2011)

**B. Operations approved since 2004**

- Mainland Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASSP, ASDP-L, ASDP)
- Zanzibar Agriculture sub-programme (ASSP and ASDP-L Zanzibar)
- Rural Micro Small & Medium Enterprises Support Programme (MUVI)
- Marketing Infrastructure, Value Addition and Rural Finance Support Programme (MIVARF)
- (Bagamoyo Sugar Out-grower and Wider Community Development Programme – under design)

Source: IOE (2014)

11. This CPE has assessed the **performance of the non-lending activities** by reviewing the combined efforts of IFAD and the Government of Tanzania to promote policy dialogue, knowledge management and partnership building, as well as the experience in grant financing. Finally this CPE has assessed the **COSOP performance** by analysing the relevance and effectiveness of the country strategy, taking into account the existing situation at the time the strategies were elaborated and the evolution. The CPE has examined the effectiveness of the COSOPs by reviewing progress made against the initial objectives and other achievements originally not foreseen.
12. While the CPE assessed each of the three pillars individually, it also examined the synergies among the various projects and programmes financed by IFAD in Tanzania, including lending and non-lending activities. Accounting for these synergies and building on the performance of the COSOP, the CPE generated a

<sup>5</sup> The assessment of this CPE is on the performance and results of the ASDP-Mainland as a whole: IFAD’s contribution cannot be separated from the rest of the programme as this is a joint effort of the Government and donors adopting the same objectives, approaches and delivery mechanisms

- composite rating and assessment for the overall IFAD-Government partnership.
13. The CPE **process** involved several stages, each of them producing specific deliverables. The preparatory stage entailed developing the CPE approach paper in February 2014. The paper specified the evaluation objectives, methodology, process, timelines, and key questions. A CPE preparatory mission visited Tanzania in April 2014 to discuss the approach paper with key partners. During this stage, members of the Government of Tanzania and other relevant institutions were invited to form a Core Learning Partnership, which has provided input to IOE during key stages of the evaluation process. The lead evaluator of this CPE also participated in the Executive Board country visit to Tanzania in mid-May 2014 which provided further opportunities to familiarise with the IFAD-supported programme and with the national policy framework.
  14. **Evidence** for the evaluation comes from analysis and triangulation between multiple sources and data. First, IOE conducted a thorough review of the documentation (e.g. COSOPs, design reports, supervision reports, mid-term reviews, completion reports, project status reports, and selected IFAD policies), IOE previous evaluations, as well as reports of other international organizations, and studies and articles in peer reviewed journals of relevance to the CPE. Second, ESA, in consultation with the Government, in 2013-14 prepared a COSOP Completion Report that adopted the same criteria as the CPE and was based on document review and interviews with the IFAD country office, project managers and officials of the central Government. Third, the CPE used data from sample surveys that were commissioned under ASDP on the Mainland (an impact survey on irrigation, an impact survey of farmer field school and an impact survey on infrastructure) and in Zanzibar (a sample survey on farmer field school) and included both treatment and comparator groups. Fourth the CPE independently conducted interviews with the main stakeholders (see below and Annex V) and, fifth, visited selected field sites and interviewed project end-users.
  15. **Limitations.** Due to time and budget constraints, the CPE could not launch its own household surveys. While the CPE has some caveats on the quality ASDP periodic monitoring system, the impact surveys provide useful information. Being a large programme with national coverage, there are of course issues of attribution for many of ASDP performance indicators. Fortunately, impact surveys have collected data from comparator groups which help address attribution issues. The real dearth of data concerns the MUVI project where monitoring and evaluation was weak as it was left to externally contracted service providers, with variable capacity and interest in M&E. In assessing impact of MUVI, the CPE had to proceed through a theory-based approach, that is reconstructing *a priori* the logical chain of events and effects that might have led to certain socio-economic changes (impacts) and verifying through the existing information whether these events and effects occurred. In the case of MIVARF, the implementation is still at its initial stage and only relevance was assessed. Another obvious constraint was given by the size of the Tanzanian territory covered by IFAD-funded operations: the CPE team had to split into two-three sub-teams to optimize the time spent in the field but, even in this way, only a fraction of the sites could be visited.<sup>6</sup>
  16. The main mission visited Tanzania from 30 June to 25 July 2014. In Dar es Salaam the mission interacted with IFAD-funded project teams, government officials, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, private sector enterprises, research institutions. The mission also visited the regions of Arusha, Iringa, Manyara, Pwani, Ruvuma, Tanga and travelled to Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba). On 25 July 2014 the mission presented its preliminary findings at a wrap-up meeting hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture and with representatives of the Government of Tanzania and of Zanzibar. Comments

<sup>6</sup> Random selection of sites was not practical. The CPE mission made a selection of regions on the Mainland in order to generate opportunities to visit two or more operations in the same regions. Discussions were held with persons in charge of project operations in each region in order to visit both successful and problematic sites.

received during and after the meeting have been considered in preparing the present report. The draft report was first submitted to an internal IOE peer review and thereafter shared with IFAD and the Government of Tanzania in November 2014. Their comments were taken into consideration by IOE in finalizing the report. In January 2015 a national roundtable workshop was organised in Dar es Salaam, with a broad partnership to share and discuss the main findings and recommendations.

17. **Self-assessment instruments.** Self-assessments have been one of the multiple sources used by this CPE. For simplicity and brevity, self-assessment instruments can be classified in three groups: (i) those prepared by IFAD on individual operations; (ii) those that have been prepared on recurrent basis on the country programme (by IFAD and the Government); (iii) those prepared ad hoc by IFAD in 2013-2014 inter alia having in mind the forthcoming CPE; and (iv) the impact surveys commissioned by ASDP (Mainland and Zanzibar).
18. Project-level periodic self-assessment documents have included supervision reports, mid-term review reports and their syntheses (e.g. project status reports). A joint completion report is also available on ASDP-Mainland, commissioned by the Government of Tanzania and integrating comments of the main donors involved. Supervision reports for ASDP-Mainland have been prepared jointly by the Government and the main donors involved, while those for ASDP-Zanzibar, MUVI and MIVARF by IFAD on its own. These reports are generally informative and their contents resonate with the CPE's own findings in terms of operation's performance assessment. Due to the M&E gaps, information is limited on projects' effects on poor households (e.g. yield, income, asset increase) but also on targeting.
19. Annual COSOP review reports have been prepared since 2008 based on workshop held with national (mainly Government) stakeholders. As argued in Chapter VI, these reports do not give a clear sense of the level of attainment of the strategic objectives of the COSOP. Of higher interest for this CPE has been the COSOP Action Plan prepared by the country office in 2014. This includes an assessment of operational issues, business processes, fiduciary aspect and non-lending activities. Findings are very close to those of this CPE.
20. Between 2003 and 2014, IFAD has also conducted an overall self-assessment of the country programme (Mainland and Zanzibar), in collaboration with the Government. These contain a large amount of factual information and record the opinions of multiple actors. The one prepared for the Mainland, however, would have benefited from more synthesis.
21. Finally, the surveys conducted under ASDP were commissioned towards the end of the programme, thus based on a post-treatment survey of programme clients and comparator groups. While baseline data are not available and there is no control for sample bias (e.g., they could have adopted propensity score matching, instrumental variables or Heckman selection method), surveys provide a wealth of data and information that, combined with other sources of evidence, help appreciate progress made under this programme.

**Key points**

- This is the second IFAD CPE in Tanzania. The previous one was completed by IOE in 2003.
- The main objectives of the CPE are to: (i) assess the performance and impact of the operations in Tanzania; and (ii) generate a series of findings and recommendations to support formulation of the forthcoming Tanzania results-based country strategy opportunities programme (COSOP), to be prepared by IFAD and the Government of following completion of the CPE.
- The CPE assessed the project portfolio, non-lending activities, and the performance of the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs. Regarding the loan portfolio, the CPE reviewed five ongoing loans as well as the past evaluations of three older loans. Some of them were financial contributions to the ASDP sector-wide programme (basket funding) rather than traditional "projects".

**II. Country context**

22. Tanzania is located in East Africa bordering Kenya and Uganda in the north, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo in the west, Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi in the south and the Indian Ocean in the east. The country spans a land area of 881,289 Sq. Km on the Mainland, 2,460 Sq. Km in Zanzibar and additional 59,100 Sq. Km are covered by lakes.<sup>7</sup> It has a long coastline of 423 Km with Indian Ocean along the east of the mainland and encompassing the islands of Zanzibar. The country had an estimated population 45 Million (National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania) in 2012. In the period of 1990-2012, the population grew at 2.9 per cent per annum, driven by the high fertility rate (5.3 births per woman in 2012).<sup>8</sup> As of 2012, about 70 per cent of the population resided in rural areas, down from 77 per cent in 2002.<sup>9</sup>
23. After attaining independence in 1961, a socialist government under the leadership of Julius Nyerere nationalized the major enterprises and actively promoted rural collectivization (known as *Ujamaa*). In the late 1970s the country entered a phase of severe economic crisis. Tanzania started liberalizing its economy in 1986 through reforms in agriculture and industrial policies. Reforms in the second half of the 1990s (structural adjustment) enabled Tanzania to reinvigorate economic growth and attract donor interest.

**A. Economy and Agriculture – Key Aspects**

24. **Tanzania had a fast growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade** with an average GDP growth rate of 6.9 per cent in the period of 2004-2012, compared to 5.2 per cent for Sub Saharan countries and 6.9 per cent for countries belonging to the East African Community.<sup>10 11</sup> The discovery of oil and natural gas in recent times is expected to boost the prospects of growth in the medium term.<sup>12</sup> However, agricultural GDP growth has lagged behind with an average of only 4.2 per cent in the same period (Table 3). Inflation has been in the two digits for several years. Per capita income stood at a US\$695 in 2013: Tanzania is classified as a low-income country.

<sup>7</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Tanzania Country Report as on 15<sup>th</sup> January, 2014

<sup>8</sup> UNICEF Country Profile, Tanzania: [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania_statistics.html)

<sup>9</sup> National Bureau of Statistics, 2002: <http://www.nbs.go.tz/takwimu/references/2002popcensus.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> World bank databank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS>

<sup>11</sup> IMF Regional Economic Outlook: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo0412.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> African Economic Outlook, AfDB – Tanzania: <http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2013/PDF/Tanzania%20-%20African%20Economic%20Outlook.pdf>

Table 3  
Basic economic indicators over 2004-12

Year	GDP Growth Rate (Annual growth in %)	Agricultural GDP growth rate (Annual growth in %)	Agricultural GDP as % of total GDP	Inflation (Consumer Prices)	GDP per Capita (Current US\$)
2004	7.8%	5.9%	33.3%	4.7%	350
2005	7.4%	4.4%	31.8%	5%	375
2006	6.7%	3.9%	30.4%	7.3%	369
2007	7.1%	4.0%	30.0%	7%	421
2008	7.4%	4.6%	29.7%	10.3%	504
2009	6%	3.2%	28.8%	12.1%	504
2010	7%	4.1%	28.1%	6.2%	525
2011	6.4%	3.4%	27.7%	12.7%	530
2012	6.9%	4.2%	27.6%	16%	609
2013	7%	4.2%	Not available	8%	695

Source: World Bank Databank

25. **Slight poverty rate decrease in the past decade.** According to a recent publication of the National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania, the headcount poverty rate of Tanzania (based on monetary household consumption estimates) in 2011/12 was 28.2 per cent, down from 33.4 per cent in 2007 and 35.6 per cent in 2000, thus slowly decreasing in a ten-year period.<sup>13</sup> Income inequalities have marginally increased in the recent past, with a Gini Coefficient<sup>14</sup> of 0.376 in 2007 against 0.346 in 2000.<sup>15</sup> Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas with about 33.3 per cent of the rural population estimated to be below the poverty line in 2011/12,<sup>16</sup> declining from 37.6 per cent in 2007<sup>17</sup> and 38.7 per cent in 2000/01. Data on poverty prevalence according to monetary indicators are available for Zanzibar in 2004-2005 (49 per cent overall and 54.6 in rural areas) and 2010 (44.4 per cent overall and 50.7 in rural areas), also showing a slight decrease.
26. Looking at stunting rates (low height for age in children 0-5 years) as an indicator of chronic malnutrition for children and an overall indicator of household food insecurity, at the national level its prevalence decreased from 44.4 per cent in 2004-2005, to 42.5 per cent in 2009-10 and was estimated at 34.8 per cent in a 2010-2011 survey (National Bureau of Statistics), which is still high. For Zanzibar, prevalence of stunting was 30.5 per cent in 2008-09 and 30.4 per cent in 2010-11, practically unchanged.
27. There are **limited geographically-disaggregated statistics** on consumption poverty and stunting. Regarding monetary household consumption estimates, the latest published geographically disaggregated data were from the 2000 national household budget survey showing that poverty prevalence was concentrated in the southern-most regions as well as in the north-western regions of the country. As for children's chronic malnutrition, the latest geographically-disaggregated statistics relate to 2010. While showing high prevalence of stunting in the southern regions as well, they also display cases of high prevalence in central regions, less so in the northern part of the country (see also Table 1, Annex VI).

<sup>13</sup> Press Release, World Bank: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/11/14/new-poverty-figures-from-household-budget-survey>

<sup>14</sup> Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality.

<sup>15</sup> UNDP Data: <https://data.undp.org/dataset/Income-Gini-coefficient/36ku-rvri>

<sup>16</sup> Household Budget Survey 2011/13, National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania 2013

<sup>17</sup> Tanzania in figures, 2012 (Revised figures of previous years): [http://www.nbs.go.tz/takwimu/references/Tanzania\\_in\\_figures2012.pdf](http://www.nbs.go.tz/takwimu/references/Tanzania_in_figures2012.pdf)



28. Tanzania ranked 152th out of 187 countries in the 2013 Human Development Index. The average life expectancy at birth increased to 59 years in 2012 from 50.6 years in 1990. Maternal mortality rate stood at 460 per 100,000 live births while the under-five child mortality rate stood at 54 per 1,000 live births in 2012.<sup>18</sup> Adult literacy rate stood at 68 per cent in 2010. These basic social indicators are not very encouraging in the light of the progress towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A recent report by UNDP (*Tanzania Country report on the Millennium Development Goals, 2010*) provides insights into the level of progress of Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar towards achievement of MDGs. Tanzania has made significant progress on MDGs relating to primary education (MDG2), gender equality (MDG3), reduction of child mortality (MDG4), combating the spread of HIV and AIDS (MDG6). Shortfalls are expected in meeting targets on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1), improving maternal health (MDG5) and ensuring environment sustainability (MDG7).
29. **The share of agriculture as a percentage of GDP declined** from 33 percent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2010 and it is expected to decline further to 18 per cent by 2025. Of the total land area, about 51 per cent is considered fit for agriculture, of which only 23 per cent is cultivated. Smallholder farmers grow about 85 per cent of the total cultivated land and agriculture provides livelihood to 75 per cent of its active workforce.<sup>19</sup>
30. Some of Tanzania's major food crops are maize, cassava and rice while major cash crops include coffee, cotton and sugarcane. Agricultural products accounted for 24 per cent of exports in 2012 and almost 34 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings of Tanzania. The sector is characterized by **low productivity** wherein the average cereal yield in Tanzania stood at 1314 kg/hectare against 1417 kg/hectare for the entire Sub Saharan Africa (which is already low). In addition to this, **value chains for food commodities are still under-developed**, compared to other countries in the sub-region (for some examples, see Table 2, Annex VI): they exhibit low vertical integration, non-transparent price formation mechanisms, and high transportation costs.
31. Government expenditure allocated to the agriculture sector stood at 7.8 per cent of the entire budgeted government expenditure in 2010-11 and 6.8 per cent in 2011-12, compared with the 10 per cent target of the Maputo Declaration - Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme.
32. **Important livestock resources, still under-utilised.** Tanzania has a wide range of livestock resources, among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, including an estimated 21.3 million cattle, of which 680 000 are dairy cattle. The livestock industry accounts for 3.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) of which 30 per cent from the dairy sector, although commercialization lags behind: it is estimated that about 4 per cent of cow milk production goes through formal processing.
33. **However, Tanzania has achieved self-sufficiency in grain production.** According to a FAO study, in the period 2002-2011, the sector has managed to produce between 5 and 19 percent more than the normal national aggregate food requirements for basic cereals.<sup>20</sup> Grain export (mainly regional), and related policies, have acquired further importance. In this context a number of **trade and domestic policy issues** have been prominent in the past years, including, notably:<sup>21</sup>
- **Export bans** (mainly for maize and rice). When they were introduced, these bans depressed prices thus reducing farmers' incomes. An IFPRI study

<sup>18</sup> World Bank Databank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT/countries?display=default>

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania:

<http://www.Agriculture.Go.Tz/Attached%20web%20pages/DASIP/Documents/Agricultural%20Policies%20%20smallholders%20farmers.Pdf>

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>21</sup> Sources: FAO-MAFAP (2013); IFPRI (2013); The World Bank (2012) *Agricultural and Trade Opportunities for Tanzania*; and private conversation with Dr David Nyange, advisor to USAID-Tanzania and Assistant Professor of Economics at Michigan State University (2014).

estimated 7-26 percent farm-gate price reductions and minimal effects on consumers' price (the major incidence of the ban was on farmers).<sup>22</sup> The Government has changes its policy on bans and, in the past two seasons, export bans have been lifted.

- Import duty free measures for rice from Asia were introduced in 2012, based on wrong estimates of a nation-wide rice production deficit. This measure depressed paddy prices and caused massive re-exportation of Asian rice varieties to other countries in East Africa. This measure was repealed in the same year and not reinstated so far.
- Produce cess. Cess is a tax (up to 5 per cent) on food production currently levied by local Governments. The government is in the process of gradual removal of produce cess. It has been argued that produce cess reduces farmers' incentives to produce although Local Governments rely on produce cess as a source of budget.
- Subsidies for fertilizers. In the past, in spite of applying a voucher scheme that tried to introduce competition between private distributors, subsidy schemes were criticised for lack of transparency and limited outreach to the poorer farmers. In late May 2014 the Ministry of Agriculture of Tanzania set a moratorium on the voucher system and proposed the introduction of a subsidised credit scheme.

## **B. Government strategies for overall, rural and agricultural development.**

34. During the **period 2003-2007** (corresponding to the 2003 IFAD COSOP period), the main national reference documents for general growth and poverty reduction were the: Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (1999 for the Mainland), Development Vision 2020 (2000 for Zanzibar), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2000/01-2002/03) and the Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Paper (ZPRP) (2002-2005); the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP or MKUKUTA in Kiswahili acronym, 2005) or the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (The ZSGRP or MKUZA I, 2007). Common traits of these documents were an emphasis on: (i) growth and reduction of income poverty; (ii) improved quality of life and social well-being; and (iii) good governance and accountability.
35. For the rural and agricultural sector, the main reference was the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS 2001), later operationalised by the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP, 2005) and complemented by other sub-sectoral documents.<sup>23</sup> Prepared through wide consultation with the international development partners, ASDS emphasised, sector-wide approach and basket funding as the preferred form of contribution from donors. One of the over-arching objectives was to foster harmonization of interventions as opposed to the proliferation of individual projects. Furthermore, ASDS recognized the importance of the local governments in the context of the steady progress of Local Government Reform Programme. The operationalization of ASDS through ASDP was financed since 2005 by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, IFAD, the Governments of Japan and Ireland, and by the European Union for a short period. The Government planned to develop a second phase of the Agricultural Sector

<sup>22</sup> IFPRI (2013), *Economy wide impact of maize export bans on agricultural growth and household welfare in Tanzania, A Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model Analysis*.

<sup>23</sup> Notably, the Rural Development Policy (2002); the Zanzibar Agriculture Sector Policy (2002); the National Livestock Policy (2006); the Cooperative Development Policy (2002); the Cooperative Reform and Modernization Programme. The self-assessment of the Tanzania country programme prepared by ESA in 2013-2014 in collaboration with the Government of Tanzania provides a good summary of the main official Government policies and strategies for general as well as rural development and poverty reduction.

- Development Strategy and Agricultural Sector Development Programme in 2013 but its approval has been delayed to 2015.<sup>24</sup>
36. During the **period 2007-2014** (corresponding to the 2007 IFAD COSOP), the main strategies for general growth were the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II (in Kiswahili acronyms MKUKUTA II for the Mainland and /MKUZA II for Zanzibar, 2010-2015), the Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) 2011/12-2025/26, the Tanzania Five-Year Development Plan (2011/12 – 2015/16) and the Big Results Now (BRN, 2013).
  37. As for the rural and agricultural sector, the following main strategies and policies have been approved: The Agricultural Marketing Policy (2008), the Livestock Development Strategy (2010), the Livestock Sector Development Programme (2011), the Zanzibar Livestock Policy (2009), the *Kilimo Kwanza* (Agriculture First) Resolution and the Zanzibar Agricultural Transformation Initiative (2009), the Zanzibar Agricultural Sector Strategic Plan 2011 – 2014, the Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania (2010), the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme Compact (2010) and its spin-off Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (2011), and the National Agriculture Policy (2013).
  38. **New focus on specific areas and commodities.** Two initiatives, The Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT, 2010) and *Big Results Now* (2013), entail significant changes from the paradigm of ASDP since they focus on specific geographical areas (rather than on the entire territory) and on specific commodities (rather than on the whole sector). The *Big Results Now* follows the example of a programme of the government of Malaysia and focuses on six priority areas: energy and natural gas, agriculture, water, education, transport and mobilization of resources. The newly-created President's Delivery Bureau (under the Office of the President of Tanzania) is in charge of implementation oversight.<sup>25</sup> The Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania is an investment framework for public-private sector partnerships, extending north and south of the central rail, road and power "backbone" from Dar es Salaam to the Northern areas of Zambia and Malawi (regions of Pwani, Morogoro, Iringa and Mbeya). The Big Results Now has specific goals for agriculture (among other sectors), focusing on three commodities, maize, rice, and sugarcane and an overarching goal to commercialize the agricultural sector by 2025 to ensure nationwide self-sufficiency and food security.
  39. **In the past decade there has been a high number of policy and strategic documents of relevance to agriculture and rural development**, raising the issues of their consistency with the general directions imparted by the ASDS and ASDP. As noted, the approval of the second phase of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy and of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme initially foreseen for 2013 is now slated for 2015 in the best case scenario. Given the renewed emphasis to geographic and commodity targeting the emerging questions are whether: (i) emphasis will remain on decentralization of support functions to agriculture and on capacity building of local government authorities; and (ii) geographic and commodity focus may exacerbate the social and regional divide.
  40. **Natural resources, environment and climate change.** Tanzania is abundant in green cover and pasture lands with about 37.3 per cent of the land being covered by forests in 2011 and another 27 per cent of the land composed of permanent meadows and pastures.<sup>26</sup> It has five agro-ecological zones with about 60 per cent of the land area lying in the arid and semi-arid zones.<sup>27</sup> The per capita availability of renewable internal freshwater is on the lower end at about 1812 cubic meters

<sup>24</sup> A peer review of the draft second phase ASDS document was undertaken by the economist John Mellor in July 2014 with funding from IFAD.

<sup>25</sup> The Big Results Now also has a working laboratory on business environment.

<sup>26</sup> FAOSTAT (2011), accessed in march 2014: [http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/browse/E/\\*E](http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/browse/E/*E)

<sup>27</sup> FAO: <http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/AGPC/doc/Counprof/tanzania/tanz.htm>

compared to an average of 4400 cubic meters for Sub Saharan Africa.<sup>28</sup> According to the Tanzania National Adaptation Programme for Action, climate change is expected to result increase in temperature by 2oC -4oC altering the distribution of the agro ecological zones. This makes it important for the small farmers and agro-pastoralists in Tanzania to increasingly adopt sustainable land management practices to mitigate the effects of climate change on their livelihoods. The effects of climate change are expected to cost almost 2 per cent of GDP annually by 2020.

### C. Governance Aspects

41. **Decentralization.** For most part of the post-independence period, Tanzania witnessed a highly centralized form of governance. The wide ranging reforms undertaken by Tanzania in the mid-1990s included a commitment to shift away from the highly centralized system of governance to a more district-centred development approach.
42. At present, every year, the government, led by the Prime Minister's Office – Regional Administration and Local Governance, follows a process involving field visits to assess the allocation of budget for every district in the country. The district-wise allocations for next financial year are finalized and disseminated to the district administration by November-December each year through issuance of 'Planning and Budget Guidelines'. This marks the commencement of the operational planning by Local Government Authorities. The operational plans for development originate from the villages which are then consolidated at the ward level (consisting of 3-5 villages) to be forwarded to the district council. The district council then consolidates plans of all wards under its jurisdiction. The proportion of expenditure of local governments of the total government expenditure in Tanzania was 22.9 per cent in the fiscal year 2010-11.
43. **Private sector.** There is an increasing level of understanding that agriculture sector's investment needs cannot be met from government's resources only. However, decades of state directed economy have resulted in slow private sector engagement. The Government and donors have prepared programmes such as Private Agricultural Sector Support supported by Denmark, under which a private trust fund provides technical services and financial linkages to small and medium agricultural enterprises. A new multi-agency partnership initiative known as the Agricultural Marketing Development Trust, supported by SIDA, DANIDA, IrishAID and other agencies, is emerging.
44. **Tanzania's regulatory and business environment leaves scope for improvement.** The 'Doing Business' index compiled by the International Finance Corporation ranks Tanzania at 145 out of a total 189 countries in 2014, compared to a rank of 136 in 2013. Similarly, the 'Global Competitiveness Index' for 2013-14, compiled by the World Economic Forum, ranks Tanzania's competitiveness at 125 of a total of 148 countries.<sup>29</sup> This report underlines high prevalence of corruption, poor infrastructure, low labour productivity and low penetration of technology as the main roadblocks to Tanzania's competitiveness. Related to the above, it is to be noted that Tanzania ranked 111th out of 177 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, with a score of 33 out of 100 (lower scores denote a perception of more serious corruption problems).
45. **Rural financial services.** The rural financial services sector in Tanzania is mainly guided by the National Microfinance Policy (2001) currently under review by the Bank of Tanzania (with funding from IFAD), while other policies such as Cooperative Development Policy (2002) also have a bearing on the sector. Only 8 per cent of the rural population in Tanzania has access to any kind of formal<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> World Bank Databank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC/countries/ZG-TZ?display=graph>

<sup>29</sup> Global Competitiveness Index, World Economic Forum: [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2013-14/GCR\\_CountryHighlights\\_2013-2014.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2013-14/GCR_CountryHighlights_2013-2014.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> According to Bank of Tanzania formal sources of credit include 'registered and regulated financial institutions such as banks, mobile money providers, microfinance institutions and savings and credit cooperative societies (SACCOs)

financial services.<sup>31</sup> One of the major hindrances to accessing formal credit is the lack of collateral (banks demand collateral to the extent of 125 per cent of the credit value). Land can seldom be used as collateral in the face of weak land tenure rights in Tanzania. Thus informal and semi-formal institutions such as Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOSs), Village Community Banks and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are the source for bulk of the credit requirements. At the end of March 2013 there were about 5559 registered SACCOSs.<sup>32</sup> However, the giant strides in mobile technology in recent times and the high level of penetration of mobiles in rural areas in Tanzania have opened a channel for delivering financial services in the remotest parts of the country. As of April, 2013 there were about 28.2 million registered mobile payment service users of which about 8.5 million are active.<sup>33</sup> The potential of this channel is duly recognized in the National Financial Inclusion Framework of Tanzania (2014-16).

46. **Membership of regional bodies.** Tanzania is a member of sub-regional development blocs such as the East African Community (EAC) and South African Development Community (SADC). As a result of its membership of EAC and SADC, Tanzania also participates in the East African Customs Union, East African Common Market, SADC Free Trade Agreement and the East African Development Bank. One of the prime beneficiaries of the EAC customs union is agriculture which dominates the intra-regional trade. Within agriculture, almost 75 per cent of trade is in staple food products like rice, beans, millets, potatoes, cassava.<sup>34</sup> The regional trade integration in general and of agricultural markets in particular is being supported by donors such as USAID under their programme called *Competitiveness and Trade Expansion Programme* and by DFID and others under *TradeMark East Africa*.
47. **Official Development Assistance.** In the period covered by this evaluation (2004-13), Tanzania has received a total Country Programmable Assistance<sup>35</sup> of US\$24.49 billion (Table 4), an annual average of US\$2.5 billion/annum.<sup>36</sup> Specifically in the field of agriculture, Official Development Assistance inflow into Tanzania was US\$1.069 Billion. Over the period of 2004-2011, the largest Official Development Assistance source has been the International Development Association (The World Bank) followed by United Kingdom and the European Union. Other donors include United States of America, The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Japan, and African Development Fund. New bilateral development partners like China are also increasingly proactive through provision of trainings, highly concessional lending, technical assistance, inter-institutional cooperation<sup>37</sup> and foreign direct investments in agriculture.<sup>38</sup>
48. IFAD's disbursements in the period of 2004-2013 period corresponded to USD 170.5 million or about 0.69 per cent of the total Country Programmable Assistance received by the country between 2004 and 2013. Sector-wise, in terms of Country Programmable Assistance for agriculture in the period of 2004-11, IFAD's disbursements represented almost 16 per cent of the total.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>31</sup> National Financial Inclusion Framework: <http://www.bot-tz.org/NFIF/National%20Financial%20Inclusion%20Framework.pdf>

<sup>32</sup> OECD Investment Policy review, Tanzania 2013

<sup>33</sup> Monetary Policy Statement, Bank of Tanzania 2013/14: <http://www.bot-tz.org/Publications/MonetaryPolicyStatements/MPS%20JUNE%202013.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> Feed the future project, U.S Government's Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative: <http://www.feedthefuture.gov/country/east-africa-regional-0>

<sup>35</sup> Country Programmable Assistance reflects the amount that is subjected to multi-year planning at the country/regional level, and is defined through exclusions, by subtracting from total gross ODA that is: unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief); entails no cross border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, and research and refuges in donor countries; that does not form part of the cooperation agreements between governments (food aid and aid from local government); is not country programmable by the donor (core funding of NGOs)

<sup>36</sup> Amount for 2013 is projected. OECD Stat: [http://webnet.oecd.org/dcdgraphs/CPA\\_recipient/](http://webnet.oecd.org/dcdgraphs/CPA_recipient/)

<sup>37</sup> China Development Bank (CDB) is in discussions to assist Tanzania to set up its own Agriculture Development Bank

<sup>38</sup> IFPRI, An overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural Engagement in Tanzania: <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01214.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> OECD Stat [http://webnet.oecd.org/dcdgraphs/CPA\\_recipient/](http://webnet.oecd.org/dcdgraphs/CPA_recipient/)

Table 4  
**Development Assistance to Tanzania in 2004-13 (disbursements)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Official Development Assistance (million US\$)</i>	<i>Country Programmable Assistance (million US\$)</i>
2004	2 513.2	2 002.5
2005	1 999.7	1 792.5
2006	7 449.3	1 978.8
2007	3 285.6	2 244.2
2008	2 425.2	2 261.8
2009	3 239	3 081
2010	3 203.4	3 047.5
2011	2 376.8	2 552.8
2012	Not available	2 796 <sup>40</sup>
2013	Not available	2 855 <sup>41</sup>

Source: OECD-DAC

49. In the past decade there has been a shift towards donor coordination and aid harmonization and these efforts began even before the Rome and Paris declarations. General Budget Support has been considered by the Government as the preferred mode of donor financing. However, Official Development Assistance is still largely channelled through Development Project Financing modality with only 35 per cent in the period of 2006-11 channelled through General Budget Support.<sup>42</sup> Sector level basket funds also have also received substantial interest among donors with some of the major basket funds being in health, education, water and local governance support (decentralization) as well as in agriculture.
50. Donor coordination has taken the form of Development Partners Group, formed in 2004. The group consists of about five multilateral donors (UN agencies counted as one) and seventeen bilateral donors. The thematic areas and sectors are divided into four clusters and each thematic area has a working group comprising of interested donors who coordinate funding and policy inputs in that particular sector. Agriculture is a part of cluster one and the relevant sector working group consists of nineteen donors (including IFAD) with Japan being designated as lead member and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) designated as the deputy lead (2014). This group plays an important role in supporting the implementation of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme.

<sup>40</sup> Preliminary estimates

<sup>41</sup> Projected estimates

<sup>42</sup> Tanzania Joint Assistance Strategy Implementation Report.

**Key points**

- In the past ten years, general GDP has been growing at high rate, 7 per cent annually, while agriculture lagged behind, just above 4 per cent.
- On the Mainland, Prevalence of poverty in monetary terms has reduced slightly from 35.6 in 2000 to 28.2 per cent on a national basis. Prevalence of stunting changed only marginally from 44 per cent in 2004-05 to 42.5 per cent in 2009-10 but a national survey in 2010-2011 showed a sudden fall to 34.8 per cent. Statistics for Zanzibar suggest a slight decrease in poverty and a marginal one for stunting.
- Agriculture is characterised by low crop yields, particularly for cereals and low productivity and commercialisation of livestock products. Agricultural value chains are still under-developed and with a limited private sector involvement. However, Tanzania has achieved self-sufficiency in grain production and there is potential to further develop, given that 51 per cent of land in Tanzania is considered fit for agriculture, of which only 23 per cent is cultivated.
- A high number of policies and strategies for agriculture and its sub-sectors have been approved in the past 10-15 years in Tanzania. At the beginning of the past decade, the Government and the major donors agreed to improve coordination and harmonisation. This resulted in an Agricultural Sector Development Strategy and an Agricultural Sector Development Programme to be mainly financed through basket funding, devolving implementation responsibility to local government authorities.
- In the recent years, public agricultural development support has emphasised private-public sector partnerships and has been more selective on geographic areas and commodity sets. It is not clear yet whether this will affect previous attention for decentralised planning for agriculture and how geographic and commodity selectivity will affect poverty reduction and equity.
- Tanzania is an active member of sub-regional blocs such as the South African Development Community and the East African Community. Given that Tanzania has now reached self-sufficiency in grain production, regional trade is gaining importance.

### III. Overview of the IFAD- supported operations and evolution of the country strategy

51. IFAD prepared its first Country Strategic Opportunities Paper (COSOP) in 1998 stipulating the following priorities: (i) small-scale participatory irrigation; (ii) rural financial services; (iii) development of agricultural marketing systems
52. **The 2003 COSOP: an attempt to respond to the first CPE.** IFAD introduced its second Country Strategic Opportunities Paper (COSOP) in Tanzania in 2003, after the first Country Programme Evaluation (a synthesis of the recommendations of this CPE is presented in Annex VII). Recommendations of this CPE included, in particular: (i) the need to ensure better consistency of IFAD's strategy and intervention modalities with the Government policy framework and donor harmonization processes; (ii) the importance of greater thematic and sub-sectoral concentration to avoid dispersion of limited resources; (iii) a clearer definition of the target group and targeting mechanisms in project design; (iv) strengthen policy dialogue and advocacy work at the national and local government levels.
53. The 2003 COSOP aimed at addressing the following priorities: (i) a pro-poor growth strategy, combining both the economic and social dimensions of poverty to improve the rural poor's overall livelihood systems; (ii) technological change, in order to increase production and productivity of land, labour and capital; and (iii) support to the grass-roots institutions of the poor to enable them to influence public and private policy formulation, investments and services.
54. **A step towards active participation in the agricultural SWAp.** After the 2003 COSOP approval, IFAD took steps to align its portfolio to harmonised approaches for agricultural development support that were emerging at that time. Initially IFAD considered contributing to the agricultural sector-wide programme ASDP in a project modality and later converted its contributions to sectoral basket funding.

55. The other major change that took place after the elaboration of the 2003 COSOP was the beginning of country presence which gradually allowed IFAD to participate more regularly in ASDP-related periodic consultation meetings with the Government and other international partners.
56. In terms of sub-sectors and themes of interventions (Table 5), the 2003 COSOP maintained a relatively wide scope (agricultural technology and advisory services, livestock and pastoral development, small-scale irrigation, small agro-processing, health service and HIV/AIDS). It did not identify geographic priorities or targeting mechanisms, perhaps assuming that a significant part of financing would be made through basket funding within a national programme.
57. Between 2003 and 2007 (the year in which the next COSOP was produced), IFAD approved three loans. The first two became IFAD's contribution to the basket funding within the sector-wide Agricultural Sector Development Programme while the third was a traditional project:
- *Agriculture Services Support Programme (ASSP)*. The approval of this loan (US\$25 million) in 2004 was as a contribution to the agricultural sector-wide programme ASDP. This loan co-funded activities to be implemented in the Mainland and in Zanzibar.
  - *Agriculture Sector Development Programme- Livestock (ASDP-L)*, approved in 2005. This was initially meant to support the national ASDP but with some traits of the traditional "project modality" (targeting specific geographical areas and initiatives). Eventually it became a contribution to basket funding. The total cost was estimated at US\$29m with an IFAD loan of US\$20m, a contribution from the Belgian Government of US\$5m (mainly for potable water, health and sanitation) and Government counterpart funding.
  - *Rural, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Programme (MUVI* in its Kiswahili acronym), approved in 2006. This was a project, initially conceived as a rural enterprise intervention. With a total cost of US\$25m with an IFAD loan of US\$20m and co-funding from Irish Aid, the project covered six regions of Tanzania Mainland: Iringa, Manyara, Mwanza, Pwani, Ruvuma and Tanga. Its objectives were to: (i) enhance the poor's access to information for rural livelihoods and rural businesses through the media; (ii) improve value chain coordination, contributing to household food sufficiency and cash income adequacy.
58. In addition to the above newly-approved operations, in the period 2003-2007 the implementation continued of the following older projects:
- *Participatory Irrigation Development Project (PIDP)*, approved in 1999. This was a small -scale irrigation project in five regions. It had a total cost of US\$27 million, financed by a loan from IFAD (US\$17m) with external co-financing by WFP and Irish Aid. The objectives of this project were to: (i) increase the availability and reliability of water through improved low-cost systems of water control; (ii) raise agricultural productivity through better extension services; and (iii) build capacity of government agencies and water user organizations.
  - *Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP)*, approved in 2000. This was a sub-sector specific project covering a vast area (North, Central, and South zones of Tanzania) and mainly working through grassroots rural finance institutions (Saving and Credit Cooperatives and Savings and Credit Associations). It had a total cost of US\$23 million, financed by a loan from IFAD (US\$18.5m) with external co-financing by the Government of Switzerland. The objectives of this project were to: (i) enhance the capacity of MFIs for savings and lending operations; (ii) minimise legal, regulatory and social barriers to financial services for the rural poor; and (iii) strengthen the financial instruments, skills and capital base of the grassroots MFIs and the financial intermediaries.



- *Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (AMSDP)*, approved in 2001. This project covered the Northern and Southern zones of Tanzania. The main goal was to support the marketing of agricultural products. It had a total cost of US\$51 million, financed by a loan from IFAD (US\$19m) with co-financing by Irish Aid, parallel funding from the African Development Bank. The main objectives were to: (i) strengthen social, organizational and financial structure and market information of producer groups, and small and medium scale traders and processors; (ii) establish appropriate vertical and horizontal linkages with formal market players; (iii) improve access to financial services including the testing of a guarantee fund and a warehouse receipt system; and (iv) enhance access to physical infrastructure for market access (e.g., roads, warehouses).
59. **The third (Results-Based) COSOP was introduced in 2007.** The 2007 COSOP aimed at promoting increased rural productivity, the participation of the rural poor in development processes, access by the poor to sustainable financial service and markets, and the development of rural microenterprises. It was introduced after the establishment of the Development Partners Group and the One-UN initiative.
60. The 2007 COSOP was results-based: it set four strategic objectives (Table 5), each of them de facto corresponding to one or more IFAD loan-projects, as follows:
- 1: Improved access to productivity-enhancing technologies and services.* This consists of contributing to the agricultural SWAp through three ongoing loans (Agricultural Sector Development Programme – Livestock/ASDP-L; and Agricultural Services Support Programme/ASSP) and a new one (called Agricultural Sector Development Programme/ASDP).
- 2: Enhanced participation of farmer organizations in national sector wide planning.* This again consists of contributing to the national ASDP through loan and grants but with special focus on improving planning and advocacy capacity of farmers' organizations.
- 3: Increased access to sustainable rural financial services.* This refers to RFSP and to MUVI.
- 4: Increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprise.* This refers to the AMSDP and to the new Marketing Infrastructure, Value Addition and Rural Finance Support Programme (MIVARF), a follow-up loan to RFSP and AMSDP.
61. **In terms of sub-sectoral focus, the 2003 and 2007 COSOP were similar** as can be seen in Table 5. The 2007 COSOP dropped the previous specific emphasis on health service, sanitation and HIV-AIDS. This was in line with an IFAD corporate shift away from direct intervention in health and sanitation, with the understanding that the related services may be provided by other donors through co-financing agreements (this was in fact done with funds from the Belgian Government). The shift towards basket funding within an agricultural SWAp, accompanied by other sub-sectoral specific programmes with national coverage (rural finance, agricultural marketing and value chains) may explain the reason why the 2007 COSOP did not define the geographic priorities of the country programme.
62. Regarding the socio-economic targeting of beneficiaries, the 2007 COSOP admitted that this had been a challenge in the past (risk of capture by the élite or by non-intended beneficiaries) and that the challenge may remain under a regime of SWAp basket funding. The 2007 COSOP suggested that interventions in different sectors may apply differentiated targeting strategies (Table 5): in agriculture, IFAD would support participation of farmers' organizations in the planning of the agricultural SWAp; in rural finance, it would support the development of products and new approaches that cater for poorer groups.
63. **Cross-cutting themes.** The 2007 COSOP did not propose a country-wide gender strategy, assuming that each project would elaborate its own approach. With regard to the adverse impacts of climate change on food security, access to water and ecosystem services, it outlined a set of broad adaptation and mitigation

principles (close monitoring of the implementation of the strategic objectives to ensure that they continue to strengthen the resilience of the rural poor to climate change; climate-proofing of new projects to strengthen the local capacity to predict and prevent the adverse impacts of climate change; support joint efforts to predict the impacts of climate change on development options.

Table 5

**Main Elements of 2003 & 2007 COSOPs**

	<b>COSOP 2003</b>	<b>COSOP 2007</b>
<i>Strategic Objectives</i> <sup>43</sup>	1) Diversify rural economy based on pro-poor growth strategy to increase household incomes, production and employment opportunities.  2) Enable the rural poor to overcome poverty by increasing access to technology finance, natural resources	1) Improved access to productivity-enhancing technologies and services  2) Enhanced participation of farmer organizations in ASDP planning  3) Increased access to sustainable rural financial services  4) Increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprise
<i>Geographic Priority</i>	No specific priority.	No specific geographic priority
<i>Sub sector focus</i>	i) Agricultural technology and advisory services  ii) Livestock and agro-pastoral community development  iii) Small-scale irrigation development  iv) Development of small-scale agro-processing and income-generating activities  v) Health services, sanitation and HIV/AIDS	i) Agriculture through an agricultural SWAp (basket funding according to established programmatic priorities)  ii) Rural finance  iii) Agricultural marketing and value chains
<i>Targeting Approach</i>	No targeting approach specified.	Differential targeting approaches, according to each strategic objective.  <b>Agriculture (SO 1,2):</b> Raise awareness within basket fund stakeholders and target farmers' organizations for increased participation at district level planning.  <b>Rural Financial Services (SO3):</b> Establishment of an apex body and emphasis on targeting existing Savings & Credit Cooperatives (SACCOSs). In new districts, social or community based targeting. Emphasis on derivative financial product for very poor clients.  <b>Markets and rural enterprises (SO4):</b> Geographical targeting (geographic area unspecified).  <b>Gender:</b> Targeting to be continued as per individual project/programme criteria.
<i>Gender Dimension</i>	Specific undertaking in the COSOP to conduct gender analysis and assessment in all of its programmes to reflect needs and priorities of women.	This is expected to be taken care of within individual project design.
<i>Country programme management</i>	N.A.	Country Program Manager out-posted to Tanzania. Project coordinators participating in supervision missions of other projects to enhance peer review and learning. Participation in ASDP joint implementation reviews.

Source: CPE elaboration (2014)

<sup>43</sup> In the COSOP 2003 log frame these are mentioned at the output level.

64. **The mixed approach of basket funding and projects continued.** The following loans were approved after the 2007 COSOP:
- *Agriculture sector development programme (ASDP)*, approved in 2007. This IFAD loan of US\$56m bears the same name as the sector-wide programme ASDP and it correspond to IFAD's financing of an ASDP funding shortfall.
  - *Marketing Infrastructure, Value Addition and Rural Finance Support Programme (MIVARF)*, approved in 2010. This operation, delivered in project-mode, merges the follow-up phases of the "older" RFSP and AMSDP, thus combining support to agricultural marketing and rural finance. The total cost is US\$169 million financed by IFAD for US\$90m (mainly for rural finance), a parallel loan of the African Development Bank (US\$63m: this is in fact a parallel project focusing on marketing infrastructure), an expected contribution of US\$7m from AGRA and Government counterpart funding. The main expected outcomes are: (i) for marketing infrastructure and systems, to improve access of poor farmers to production and marketing centres, increased share of value added and effectively functioning of producer and marketing groups; (ii) for rural finance, to improve access of rural farmers and micro small and medium enterprises to financial services, and to strengthen financial and operational performance of target grassroots MFIs on a sustainable basis.
65. **A new shift, supporting private-public partnerships through an out-grower scheme.** IFAD is currently preparing a new loan proposal to co-fund with the African Development Bank (AfDB) a small farmer out-grower scheme in the district of Bagamoyo, linked to a larger private sugarcane investment project. The investment cost of the smallholder out-grower scheme is currently estimated at about US\$128 million to be shared between IFAD (US\$58m including a US\$47m loan, a US\$2m loan-component grant and a US\$10m grant from the Adaptation to Smallholder Agriculture Programme), AfDB (US\$30m), banks and companies (US\$19.6m), the Government (US\$14m) and farmers' companies (US\$4.5m). This intervention is not included in the 2007 COSOP (whose duration has been extended from 2014 to 2015): IFAD is responding to a new demand from the Government during an *interim* period between two COSOPs.
66. Because of the peculiar portfolio composition, **this CPE will review four loan-funded operations:** (i) the mainland Agricultural Sector Development Programme (funded inter alia by IFAD's ASSP, ASDP-L and ASDP); (ii) the Zanzibar sub-Programme of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (funded by IFAD only); (iii) MUVI; and (iv) MIVARF. Finally, the CPE will provide preliminary observations on the design of the Bagamoyo project.
67. As already noted, on the Mainland, ASSP, ASDP-L and ASDP are not three separate "projects": they are three loans contributing to basket funding of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme. During the implementation, IFAD has participated in joint supervision missions of the national mainland programme together with the other co-financiers. In Zanzibar, ASSP and ASDP-L have financed a separate sub-programme with a specific implementation unit located within the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Zanzibar (semi-autonomous government). In this CPE the Zanzibar sub-programme will be considered as a separate operation to assess. This is also in line with the practice adopted by IFAD: in fact IFAD fielded ad hoc supervision missions for the Zanzibar sub-programme. Regarding MUVI and MIVARF, these projects are not part of the basket funding and they have their own implementation units: they are traditional projects.

**Key points**

- The first COSOP was produced in 1998. The 2003 COSOP was prepared after the CPE completed in the same year. This COSOP opened the door to IFAD's participation in basket funding of a sector wide programme.
- Between 2003 and 2007, IFAD approved two loans that were mainstreamed into the basket funding for ASDP and one project of the traditional type.
- When IFAD prepared its 2007 COSOP, participation in a sector-wide approach was a *fait accompli*. After 2007, the mixed approach of basket funding and traditional projects continued. IFAD approved a loan to make up for a shortfall in ASDP financing as well as a large project on agricultural value chains, with parallel funding from the African Development Bank. Agricultural value chain development was given more emphasis by the 2007 COSOP.
- The 2007 COSOP was initially planned to "expire" in 2014 but has been extended until 2015, pending the results of the current CPE. In the meantime, IFAD is considering the funding of a private-public partnership in the context of a sugarcane out-grower scheme.

**IV. Portfolio performance****A. Synthesis of findings from past evaluations**

68. While focusing on the more recent cohorts of projects, this chapters starts with a brief synthesis of findings from past evaluations that took place since the CPE 2003 (see Table 6). In general, the **evaluations completed in the period 2004-2006** found mixed loan portfolio performance. The main issues raised were: (i) problems of alignment of IFAD operations with Government strategies, notably in agriculture; (ii) limited IFAD involvement in policy dialogue and donor coordination activities due to the absence of a representation; (iii) poor adaptation of project design to the decentralization framework and to the emerging role of districts.
69. The Independent External Evaluation of IFAD (2005) included a country case study in Tanzania. The major concern of this study was IFAD's absence from development partners' consultation processes. At that time IFAD typically discussed project design and strategies bilaterally with an individual Ministry of the Government of Tanzania. Unfortunately, this was at odds with the then ongoing efforts for better harmonization of development support, joint programming and review exercises.

Table 6

**Past Evaluations in Tanzania (2004-2011)**

<i>Evaluation Type</i>	<i>Evaluation</i>
<b>Project Evaluations</b>	Rural Financial Services Programme and Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme (2011)
	Participatory Irrigation Development Programme (PIDP) (2007)
<b>Thematic Evaluations</b>	IFAD's Performance and Impact in Decentralizing Environments: Experiences from Ethiopia, Tanzania & Uganda (2005)
<b>Corporate Level Evaluations</b>	IFAD's capacity to promote innovation and scaling up (2010)
	IFAD's Institutional Efficiency and Efficiency of IFAD Funded Operations (2013)
	Independent External Evaluation of IFAD (2005)

Source: IFAD IOE

70. The **cohort of evaluations conducted in the 2007-2011 found some improvements**. Project design was slightly better adapted to the national decentralization policy: districts were taking up a more active role in project implementation and decision making, compared to the past. IFAD-financed operations had evolved from area-based multi-component projects towards theme-specific projects: small-scale irrigation, rural finance, agricultural marketing systems. IFAD interventions continued to focus on grassroots organizations: semi-

- formal micro-finance institutions (SACCOSs, Saving and Credit Associations); farmers' groups; water users' associations. However, projects tried to cover very broad geographical areas, with high management costs and sustainability threats (too many scattered interventions).
71. IOE in 2007 evaluated the *Participatory Irrigation Development Programme*. The project had contributed to improving yields, household food security and assets and water management, and to women's empowerment. In terms of sustainability, the evaluation noted high degree of ownership by the communities but limited budgets for irrigation scheme maintenance and repairs at the district level after project closure: a threat to sustainability. The evaluation also found a ratio of 2.2 between actual and estimated cost of irrigation scheme construction and considerable implementation delays.
  72. IOE completed the evaluation of the *Rural Finance Services Programme* in 2011. The project departed from the previous piecemeal approach to rural finance (having a credit component within a multi-component project) and envisaged support at the macro (policy and regulation), meso (micro finance institutions) and micro (rural poor clients) levels. On the positive side, socio economic impacts were appreciable: for example, improved incomes through investment in income-generating activities in both farming and non-farming enterprises, increased areas of crop production and improved yields, and also better management of grassroots rural finance organizations.
  73. The main challenges derived from optimistic assumptions at design on the existing organizational capacity of grassroots micro finance organizations and on the large geographic area to be covered. The design of the programme had underestimated the challenge of establishing or promoting viable private enterprises whilst working to reach more remote locations, with difficult prospects of sustainability. This implied higher than envisaged investment costs, high recurrent project management costs (due to the need to support a high number of dispersed grassroots financial organizations with a limited number of clients) and impinged on the sustainability of benefits: few savings and credit cooperatives had reached a self-sustaining stage.
  74. In 2011 IOE also evaluated the *Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme*. The evaluation found that the design was addressing fundamental needs of the intended rural clients. However, once again, the size of the area to be covered, with many dispersed interventions, led to high management costs and sustainability threats. Part of the problem was the demand-driven approach (the project intervened whenever there was a demand without a strategy to establish a "critical mass" of interventions), which could have been improved by identifying more clearly clusters of intervention or "corridors" of development.
  75. Among the more successful interventions was the warehouse receipt system, providing farmers with safe storage access for agricultural produce and with a title (deposit receipt) that could be traded in financial transactions. This reduced the pressure on farmers to sell at low prices soon after the harvest and, if adopted by a sufficiently high number of farmers, could smoothen the seasonal price fluctuations for agricultural products. Feeder roads were also instrumental to enhance farmers' access to markets. Findings on the rural poverty impacts were broadly encouraging, helping increase farmers' incomes and assets through better prices. Sustainability prospects were mixed: higher for infrastructure (the bulk of project investments) but weak for producer/trader groups.
  76. To summarise the above, the evaluations conducted between 2004 and 2010 found: (i) improving articulation of project implementation with local government authorities; (ii) relevant design to address key constraints faced by rural poor households and communities (e.g. low yields, lack of access to rural finance, markets); (iii) high project management costs, to a large extent due to scattered interventions over wide areas (iv) issues with weak sustainability, again linked to the scattering of interventions.

## B. The project cohorts since 2004

77. The remainder of this Chapter is dedicated to more recent interventions funded by IFAD which, as explained in the previous chapters, are assessed as four blocks: (i) the mainland Agricultural Sector Development Programme (funded inter alia by IFAD's ASSP, ASDP-L and ASDP); (ii) the Zanzibar sub-Programme of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (funded by ASSP and ASDP-L); (iii) MUVI; and (iv) MIVARF.

### B.1 Relevance

78. This criterion looks at the extent to which the objectives of the IFAD-supported programmes were consistent with Government and IFAD priorities, and appropriate for the context, country needs and institutional priorities, and the beneficiaries' requirements. In addition, it assesses the quality of project design, including the relevance of approaches for achieving the objectives, and the realism of design assumptions.

#### **Operations in agricultural development and extension have an overall solid design**

79. **ASDP Mainland:** Before 2004, IFAD's portfolio was implemented in project mode through parallel, temporary and relatively costly Project Management Units. The approval of the Agriculture Services Support Programme (ASSP), followed by two more loans marked a turning point where IFAD started its contribution to basket funding within a sector-wide approach. This was a major achievement at the time when support for agriculture was characterised by numerous fragmented and uncoordinated interventions. Six development partners joined the ASDP basket (The World Bank, IFAD, the African Development Bank, the Governments of Japan and Ireland, and the European Union for three years) and IFAD was to become the second largest financier after the World Bank, with about US\$100 million or a fourth of the basket.
80. ASDP provided a mechanism for supporting agriculture nationwide following the decentralisation process which had transferred the responsibility for supporting agricultural and rural development to the districts. As noted in Chapter II, under the policy of decentralization by devolution, local government authorities are responsible for delivering all services at the local and village level. Central government ministries, departments and agencies retain the following major functions: policy formulation and guidelines, capacity development of local government authorities, coordination and feedback (technical backstopping), and policy monitoring and evaluation. District local governments are responsible for the execution of development activities in their districts, but have limited resources and operational capacities.
81. ASDP introduced District Agricultural Development Plans as the instrument for planning and financing agricultural development activities of the district and ward councils, following a bottom-up process. District-level plans were to be developed in a participatory process where farmers at the village level were asked to define their priorities within a relatively wide support menu. Their elected councillor at ward level was to advocate in the district council for the demand expressed by villages.
82. ASDP was designed as a fifteen-year programme, in two phases and with two objectives: (i) to enable farmers to have better access to, and use of, agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure, and (ii) to promote agricultural private investment based on an improved regulatory and policy environment. While ASDP has often been criticised for neglecting the market, this was certainly not a design omission. Programme objectives were overall realistic with the exception of the goal of shifting agricultural GDP growth from 4 to 9 per cent by 2010.
83. However, attention to M&E was not sufficient: on the one hand the system was complicated, initially with over 100 indicators without appreciating the challenges

- of weak agricultural statistics systems. No household baseline survey was conducted which complicated the assessment at the completion stage and there was no strong mid-term review assessment.<sup>44</sup> Data scarcity is sometimes invoked by donors as a reason to be sceptical of the programme's value for money.
84. It is of concern that Government and its development partners have failed to ensure development of the second phase of ASDS/ASDP and the required financial support package by mid-2013 when the first phase expired. The second phase of the ASDS 2013/14 – 2020/21 is still (September 2014) being drafted and discussed. In the best case, funding may only become available by 2015/16.<sup>45</sup>
  85. Related to its support to ASDP, IFAD channeled US\$5 million from the Belgian Fund for Food Security to the Ministry of Livestock. This was to co-finance IFAD's loan for ASDP-L when initially this was meant to be implemented in "project mode" in 21 districts in Tanzania.<sup>46</sup> The funds were to be used for *water and health* (drilling of boreholes, shallow wells, springs, rain water harvesting schemes, surveillance of zoonotic diseases), a traditional area for co-funding by the Belgian Government in IFAD-supported portfolio. The idea was to provide very poor communities in the envisaged villages with basic infrastructure and services. However, when ASDP-L became part of the basket funding, the water and health activities were still run by the Ministry of Livestock as a separate mini-project, but with a far less clear linkage with the rest of the larger ASDP programme.
  86. **ASDP Zanzibar:** In Zanzibar, there were no joint financing arrangements and only a few other development partners in the agricultural sector. Therefore, IFAD's support under ASSP and ASDP-L was provided "bilaterally" in project mode. The major part of the budget was allocated for "software" and only a minor part for infrastructure. This was a relevant prioritisation because, as compared to the Mainland, farmers in Zanzibar have relatively easy access to markets, distances are short, and Zanzibar has a better road network and rural electricity grid. The IFAD Zanzibar programme was well aligned to the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty of January 2007 (referred to as MKUZA I). One can argue that IFAD programme design primarily focused on productivity while limited priority was given to the MKUZA objective of improving market access. According to IFAD, this choice was made in order to keep the design as simple as possible. During implementation, there were expectations that MIVARF (approved in 2010) would provide support for market access, but the start of MIVARF was delayed.
  87. Compared to the Mainland, the programme setup was more centralised but relevant to the local contexts, considering the short distances in Zanzibar and the fact that the decentralisation process had not gone so far as on the Mainland. Nevertheless, the Zanzibar programme was based on farmers' demand and participation, facilitated through establishment of farmer field schools, and on a pilot basis two Shehia Agricultural Development Plans were prepared.
  88. While the overall strategy and approach was relevant, figures for outreach targets (132,500 households) were set based on imprecise data on the farm population, exceeding the number of actual farming families in Zanzibar. With a foreseen investment of US\$10.09 million, this meant an investment of USS 78 per beneficiary household, very low by regional standards.<sup>47</sup> Even after a reduction of the target to 66,000 households, this was ambitious.
  89. Given that fisheries are important to Zanzibar's economy and many poor coastal communities, it can be questioned why ASSP and ASDP-L support did not cover

<sup>44</sup> According to the Ministry of agriculture, a panel database of irrigation schemes built or rehabilitated exists but this is not available in an electronic form that can be exploited with common statistical packages.

<sup>45</sup> The current draft of ASDS II appears to give higher priority to making agriculture modern and commercial, yet it presents two overall strategic objectives that are not substantially different from those of ASDS I, i.e. (i) create an enabling and favourable environment for improving productivity and profitability of the agricultural sector; (ii) increase farm incomes in order to reduce rural poverty and ensure households food security.

<sup>46</sup> Initially, the Agriculture Sector Development Programme – Livestock was conceived as an intervention in project-modality. Later it was mainstreamed in the basket funding.

<sup>47</sup> Average per household investment costs in ESA are US\$280 (see Evaluation Synthesis on Water Conservation and Management, Table 1).

fisheries. At the time of design, the fisheries sub-sector was supported by the World Bank. According government officials, in the future it would be relevant for IFAD to explore support for fisheries and aquaculture if it can bring adequate expertise (either of its own or through strategic partnerships).

### **Design flaws in agricultural marketing and value chain support**

90. **MUVI's** focus on the overall theme of value addition and value chain development was relevant to the COSOP and a priority in government policy. Due to several design gaps, the project experienced serious delays in starting ground work and low disbursement at completion (IFAD has recently agreed to a two-year extension, with enhanced geographic and thematic selectivity).
91. The project's approach to value chain development hinged upon the support to rural micro, small and medium enterprises. There was an implicit assumption that primary production of the quality and quantity of a set of agricultural commodities would be well established through national programmes (ASDP) and the missing element was processing and market linkages. Instead, this was not the case and during implementation the project had to intervene upstream at the farm level to boost productivity and production.
92. **MUVI implementation in the concerned regions had to be outsourced to external service providers.** The Small Industry Development Organization (SIDO), under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing was selected as the executing agency, at the Government's insistence and as an attempt to avoid new project implementation units. As IFAD itself reckoned at the design stage, SIDO has mandate and capacity to assist enterprises (within manufacturing and agro-processing) to improve their technology, processes, and marketing but has limited experience within agricultural value chain development, improving farmers' participation and benefits.<sup>48</sup> The design recognised this and proposed outsourcing business support services for value chain development and market information services to service providers (mostly consulting companies), called "Value Chain Implementing Partners" and to a "Media Implementing Partner" and allocated 22 percent of the budget for institutional strengthening of public and private institutions. At regional level, SIDO's role was mainly that of an administrator, with planning and management of activities conducted by external service providers, under a three-year contract. Given the diverse capacity of service providers, project performance in each region was highly heterogeneous and the contractual relationship with external providers led to a lack of institutional continuity once the contract expired.
93. **Value chain development requires building trust.** The design significantly underestimated the time and efforts required to build trust between producers, and between producers, buyers and processors. Partly due to Tanzania's history of failed socialist cooperatives and crop parastatals, farmers, buyers and enterprises in Tanzania are generally hesitant about entering into long-term partnerships; instead they tend to opt for short-term opportunistic gains. Often, members start to side-sell on an individual basis when a middleman offers a higher price than the price of the partnership contract.
94. **Project design assumed that the main value chain actors to be supported were processors and traders in the same district as production. Instead, key actors may span between regions and countries.** As explained in Chapter II, regional trade has become a very important factor in agricultural development since Tanzania has become a net exporter in grain and there have been attempts at improving integration through the EAC. It was misleading to assume that it would be possible to support and develop a commodity value within confined area, i.e. district/region. Value chains are "longer": buyers, processors and competitors outside the selected district, even in neighbouring countries, often play an important role.

<sup>48</sup> Inter alia, SIDO has managed since 1994 a TzSh 40 billion revolving fund.



95. **MIVARF.** The overall theme and objective of MIVARF, i.e. improving farmers' access to markets and finance, is a priority in national policies such as MKUKUTA and MKUZA. However, similar to MUVI, the design had gaps at the time of approval: IFAD and the Government are still trying to address key ones.
96. The IFAD design documentation presents MIVARF as a single project cofinanced with the African Development Bank (AfDB). In reality, **MIVARF is the umbrella for two parallel projects** (initially supervised separately, more recently supervised jointly but with separate aide-mémoires), with AfDB's portion far ahead in implementation. AfDB supports rehabilitation of rural feeder roads and post-harvest training centres, and construction of market centres and storage facilities. It also provides matching grants for investments in post-harvest processing facilities. IFAD provides soft support for producer empowerment and development of market linkages, including a warehouse receipt system, but the major part of IFAD's loan is allocated for rural finance to develop grassroots MFIs and rural financial systems. IFAD's support has nationwide coverage while AfDB's support is limited to fourteen of 21 regions on the Mainland plus the five regions of Zanzibar.
97. The project is managed by a project coordination unit, based in Arusha, under the responsibility of the Prime Minister's Office. This institutional anchoring is debatable: this Office is overall responsible for the decentralisation process but its core competencies do not include rural finance and market linkages development. The main argument at design was that, given the multisectoral nature of the Programme, the Prime Minister's Office would be an adequate institution to chair the Programme Steering Committee comprised of all Permanent Secretaries from the concerned Ministries. The choice was also a continuation of the anchoring of the predecessor programmes RFSP and AMSDP which was similarly under the responsibility of the Prime Minister's Office.
98. Similarly, the rationale for the location of the coordination unit in Arusha is unclear for a programme with national scope and key partners based in Dar es Salaam. The argument made at the design stage was that the predecessor project AMSDP had invested considerably in building renovation in Arusha. However, this argument does not fully take into account practical logistic and managerial arrangements.
99. MIVARF merges follow-up investments of two previous operations financed by IFAD and AfDB (RFSP and AMSDP). The IOE evaluation of these (2011) noted that activities were spread out over too broad an area and recommended better geographical concentration. This recommendation was not followed up: MIVARF's area is in fact larger than the one covered by the predecessor projects, following Government requests. In order to reduce delivery costs, the IOE evaluation of these projects recommended that IFAD should facilitate the production of practical what-to-do manuals, developed based on the experiences and lessons learnt. Follow-up on this recommendation has been limited. The design also delegates responsibilities for procurement and monitoring to local government authorities assuming that the designated staff in districts and regions will have or obtain the capacity to manage these activities according to IFAD guidelines.
100. Under the Rural Finance Component, **two sub-components were designed assuming that crucial partnership would take place:**
- (i) that the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) would provide US\$6.92 million for the proposed Tanzania Incentive-based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending. There has been different understanding of the nature and role of the commitment between IFAD and AGRA. According to AGRA, US\$6.92 million represented its existing Tanzania portfolio, not a new contribution. According to IFAD, AGRA had expressed strong interest and commitment to participate and reassured IFAD of its experience but later reconsidered the extent of its cooperation.
  - (ii) that the Financial Sector Deepening Trust an organization funded by several donors supporting capacity building of financial institutions, policy and regulatory framework, would manage a MIVARF-financed Innovation Fund on

rural finance. As it later turned out, the Trust was unwilling to undertake this function on IFAD's conditions.

101. At the visit of the CPE team in July 2014, discussions were on-going between IFAD, Government and AGRA on how to design the Tanzania Incentive-based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending and the potential role of AGRA in the implementation. The limited remaining implementation period is a major challenge.
102. **Bagamoyo Sugar Out-grower and Wider Community Development Programme.** IFAD, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Government and the private investor EcoEnergy are currently engaged in preparing the design of this programme, aligned to Government's programmes such as *Big Results Now* and SAGCOT. The out-grower scheme, to be financed by IFAD and the AfDB would involve an out-grower area of 3,000 ha for sugarcane plantation, with an estimated project cost of US\$128 million (see Chapter III). This out-grower programme is linked to a larger private investment (estimated at US\$542 million) to be supported by AfDB and a number of national and international development banks for a larger 8,000 ha nucleus sugarcane farm and a processing plant, owned by EcoEnergy.
103. The design is under the development and it is too early for a full assessment. As with other similar operations in the past, this project design is likely to stir debates about land tenure issues, resettlement of farmers and pastoralists' access to the area, as well as a number of environmental issues. While these are potential threats, this CPE recognises that both IFAD and AfDB have adopted a cautious approach at this stage, with an effort to synthesise lessons from previous projects (for example in the palm oil industry in Uganda and in sugarcane smallholder schemes in Swaziland). IFAD and AfDB also recognise other risks, such as long time to start-up out-grower enterprises and delays in completing irrigation infrastructure, as well as international sugar price fluctuations. In general, the design is quite candid about the possible threats and puts forward a number of mitigation proposals.<sup>49</sup>
104. Another positive aspect to be acknowledged in the design is the inclusion of a sub-component on climate change resilient activities classified as "knowledge smart, water smart, carbon-smart, nitrogen smart, energy smart and weather smart".
105. Two main environmental and economic issues are, inter alia, outstanding and will require careful follow-up. First, assessing integrated (and wider) coastal area development in relation to the land-seascape area comprising the zone to be developed, and the Wami River basin.<sup>50</sup> A reduction (albeit seasonal) in the volume of fresh water flow reaching the Wami River estuary can be expected due to sugarcane irrigation need and may result in increased salinity in the estuary, with possible negative impact on the mangrove ecosystem, fisheries resources and eventually the sugarcane plantation itself. Further elaboration is provided in Annex VI, Table 3.
106. Second, the estimated unit costs are on the high side. While the project design report mentions on-farm investment costs of US\$8,400/ha, this leaves out the fundamental "bulk infrastructure" without which irrigation water cannot be delivered to villages and farmers. Once bulk infrastructure is included, the unit irrigation development costs raise to US\$17,300/ha.<sup>51 52</sup> The crucial question is

<sup>49</sup> See for example paragraphs 136 – 150 in the project design report (November 2014).

<sup>50</sup> The estuary serves as a crucial feeding and breeding ground for many life forms. The flora and fauna of estuaries are extremely rich, and the area of influence through the migration of species is large. The project's planned upstream dam and irrigation practices will certainly alter fresh water discharge and this might lead to higher estuarine and tidal salinity. Increased tidal salinity may cause upstream salty water encroachment and may affect large areas of cropland.

<sup>51</sup> In addition, if all baseline project-related costs were included and divided by the estimated area of the out-grower scheme (circa 3,000 ha), the average costs per ha would reach US\$39,500.

<sup>52</sup> In the design report, on-farm development costs are computed as a ratio between "outgrower development –on farm works" (US\$25.1m as per Appendix 9 of the design report, Table 1.3) and the estimated area of the out-grower scheme (circa 3,000 ha). However, this leaves out the bulk infrastructure which is necessary to deliver water for irrigation. The cost of bulk infrastructure is estimated at US\$26.7m (Appendix 9 of the design report, Table 1.3), adding an average cost of US\$8,900/ha, thus reaching an average cost of US\$17,300 /ha. This does not include infrastructure operation and maintenance costs (US\$4.5m in nine years) nor other project components and overhead costs.

whether the future stream of benefits obtained by the out-growers (net of maintenance costs) can justify these costs.<sup>53</sup> The project design report estimates a financial internal rate of return of 21 per cent and an economic rate of return of 18 per cent. On the side of the costs, this is obtained assuming an aggregate investment of US\$29.2m (of which US\$22.8m for capital expenditures and crop establishment funded through credit providers and US\$6.4m for farm investment funded by the programme) but this may not fully reflect the envisaged project infrastructure investment costs (see above).

107. As for the number of beneficiary households, the project design estimates 2,000 direct beneficiary households who will be operating sugarcane small farms. Because of expected agribusiness development activities, on-farm labour demand and other indirect effects, it arrives at an estimated 10,800 total household beneficiary estimates. However this includes workers employed in the nucleus farm (which should not be included as these jobs are generated by a separate investment and not by the smallholder out-grower scheme) and is based on optimistic assumptions of the project's multiplier effects.
108. The relevance of the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 is rated as moderately satisfactory (4) and based on individual ratings for ASDP Mainland and ASDP Zanzibar (both 5) and of MUVI and MIVARF (both 3). This reflects an overall realistic design of ASDP which was ready for implementation after a very long work of consultation between the Government and the donors. MUVI and MIVARF design contained a number of flaws, some of these still to be addressed. No rating is given to the Bagamoyo project given that the design phase is not yet completed (quality enhancement and quality assurance still had to be undertaken at the time of preparation of this report). The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory. Project-level ratings are presented in Annex I.

## **B.2 Effectiveness**

109. This criterion assesses the extent to which the IFAD portfolio objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
110. Key indicators for effectiveness are linked to the project objectives. They pertain to access to infrastructure, extension services, improved inputs and technology and marketing (ASDP), as well as to non-agricultural training and access to markets (MUVI).
111. **ASDP Mainland.** Among the donors, there has been some concern over the quality of M&E of this programme. This CPE agrees that quality of data could have been better for a large programme of this size. At the same time, three household impact surveys have been conducted at the conclusion of the programme and provide an indication of the changes to which ASDP can have plausibly contributed.
112. Through the available ASDP data there is **evidence suggesting that progress has been made towards ASDP's two development objectives, although with qualifications and inter-district variations.** A number of output/outcome indicators provide evidence of some progress towards the first objective of enabling farmers to access and use agricultural knowledge, technology, marketing systems and infrastructure: achievements are generally above 85 per cent and in several cases well above 100 per cent (Table 7).
113. While recognising that these figures are encouraging, this CPE suggests some caution in interpreting them. First, while numbers are high in terms of outreach and achievements, there is limited information on the quality of the same. During its field visits, the CPE observed variations in the quality of delivery between and within districts.

<sup>53</sup> The nucleus estate is not likely to pay out-growers far more than its own unit production costs. Therefore a tacit assumption here is that out-growers will have lower production costs.

114. Extension services are reaching an increasing proportion of farm households and an increasing number of farmers attend Farmer Field Schools (FFS).<sup>54</sup> An increased proportion of farmers use farm equipment (tractors, power tillers etc.) and improvements have been achieved on warehouse, market centres and rural access roads, although questions remain as to the quality of the same.
115. In three areas that are important to productivity growth, the data suggest that achievements are below targets albeit with some improvement over the baseline: percentage of farmers using fertilizers, improved seeds and improved livestock breeds. These figures remain low, which is disappointing considering that for part of the period inputs were subsidised under the voucher scheme. However, the data on seed use may not take fully into account the full impact of the programme on Quality Declared Seed and furthermore, the fertilizer indicator overlooks the soil fertility improvements achieved from promotion of farmyard manure and composting in many Farmer Field Schools (FFS). Overall on the Mainland focus has been on crops and less so on livestock-related activities and attention to pastoral areas has been limited.
116. Regarding ASDP's second development objective of promoting agricultural private investment based on an improved regulatory and policy environment, data on indicators suggests significant progress though policy makers and planners in discussions with the CPE team expressed perceptions that progress had been more moderate. Though there is no information on whether farmers and private investors find that the policy and regulatory environment has improved, the ASDP monitoring system provide data suggesting that the flow of private funds into agriculture has increased by almost three times over the baseline and surpassed the target by 49 per cent (however it is a complex exercise to estimate such flows).
117. Indicators for irrigation, which received the largest part of the ASDP budget, show 96 per cent achievement of target irrigated area (new and rehabilitated irrigation schemes combined) although do not inform about the cropping intensity and number of schemes in operation. Many schemes only provide supplementary irrigation in the rainy season, some schemes are not operational or operate below intended capacity due to poor maintenance, in some schemes there are problems of salinity.<sup>55 56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> "An Assessment of the Performance of Extension Services under the Agriculture Sector Development Programme, Final Report, 25th March 2013, - submitted to the Director of Policy and Planning, MAFC. Based on a sample, an estimated 59 per cent received extension services in 2013, i.e. above the target of 45 per cent.

<sup>55</sup> Where irrigation is based on permanent rivers providing water for irrigation throughout the year and where farmers are well organised, irrigation does have life-changing impact, ensuring farmers a permanent escape from poverty. The CPE witnessed such a situation in the irrigation scheme in Babati district supported by the IFAD-financed Participatory Irrigation Development Project in 2001, and fully operational since then without problems of maintenance.

<sup>56</sup> As explained in Chapter III, IFAD used funds from the Government of Belgium to target basic infrastructure development to very poor villages on the Mainland. This was expected to be part of ASDP-L but later became a separate "mini-project". About 1 168 traditional birth attendants and community health workers were trained. A community health fund created to ensure health coverage of the beneficiaries witnessed low community interest wherein only 8 000 households of the total of 63 000 households in the programme area registered for it by 2013. About 7 600 toilet slabs have been cast and sold in the programme area to promote hygienic sanitation. On the water subcomponent, the project completed only 28 boreholes against a target of 50 as of 2013. Initially there was a problem of low yielding or dry boreholes, but after the deployment on the ground of hydrologist consultant this issue has been progressively put under control.

Table 7  
Selected outcome indicators for ASDP Mainland

Expected Outcomes	Outcome indicators	Baseline	Target Values (Revised)	Achieved (% of revised target)
Increased resources in agriculture	Flow of private funds into agriculture (Tsh million)	167,000	463,000	149%
Expanded irrigation area	Irrigation Area developed (New and Rehabilitated)	249,992	380,000	96%
Increased use of agricultural mechanization	Oxen	20%	30%	80%
	Tractor	3%	5%	280%
Use of improved farm inputs	Improved seeds	18%	25%	79%
	Fertilizers	12%	22%	76%
	Improved livestock breed	2%	5%	80%
Contract farming and marketing	Number of Smallholder households participating in contract farming and marketing out-grower schemes	821,000	1,400,000	194%
Increased productivity of rice	Rice yields in irrigation schemes (Tons/ha)	4.5	6.0	83%
Extension services	Percentage of Farmers receiving visits from private and public extension staff	10%	55%	109%
Agricultural infrastructure	Dip tanks	0	640	369%
	Markets(warehouses)	0	250	180%
	Irrigation schemes	1,000	1,520	87%

Source: ASDP Implementation Completion Report (2014)

118. **ASDP Zanzibar: overall strong achievements.** The programme has directly or indirectly assisted more than 35,000 farmers (62 per cent of whom were women) adopt improved crop and livestock management and technologies. Though outreach is much lower than the revised target of 66,000, benefits have been significant. Programme innovations such as introduction of Farmer Facilitators and Community Animal Health Workers are contributing to a continuous process of technology transfer to additional farmers who did not participate in the Farmer Field Schools. According to a sample survey conducted by the programme, 70 per cent of beneficiaries increased their production, helping them to improve their household income and food security. They cite improved knowledge and skills as the major reason (52 per cent for crop producers, 57 per cent milk producers). Monitoring and evaluation surveys show that more than 60 per cent of households have adopted improved technologies.
119. The CPE agrees with the country programme self-assessment conducted by IFAD in collaboration with the Government that the Farmer Field School approach has worked well, changing crop management and animal husbandry practices. According to the self-assessment, members who applied what they learned have increased production and productivity by two to five-folds.
120. **Specific FFS features in Zanzibar: farmer facilitators and animal health workers.** The outreach of the FFS is enhanced by designating one of the best "farmer students" in the FFS as Farmer Facilitator who has the task to disseminate knowledge and technologies to non-FFS farmers. Furthermore, in the livestock sector, one of the best students in the livestock FFS is appointed and facilitated to become Community Animal Health Worker who on a private fee-basis provides advice and veterinary services to livestock owners.
- So far, limited achievements in marketing and value chain development.**

121. **MUVI.** Effectiveness of MUVI is assessed at the time of scheduled programme completion, with close to 30 per cent of the loan remaining unspent. The recent approval of a two-year extension may potentially improve performance if service providers can recruit suitable staff (some may have found other employment). The ultimate project objective was to raise cash income and food security of households by improving skills of entrepreneurs, implying a rather long and complex results-chain with several assumptions. The CPE Team does not have information on the number of households who have improved their income and food security, and to what extent. During field visits, the CPE met households, mainly farmers, who had improved their situation, though often because they had received improved seed and improved their crop or livestock husbandry with support of district agricultural extension staff (thus in fact through ASDP), facilitated by MUVI.
122. The indicators for component objectives have changed from approval to implementation, as illustrated below in Table 8. A Communication Strategy has been designed and implemented but continuous and sustainable broadcasting of relevant information by local community radios has not been ensured. The choice of community radios with very limited coverage against the existing radios with wider coverage was questionable.<sup>57</sup> With respect to knowledge management, the component and the entire programme have performed below expectations. There has been very limited transfer of best practices between the different value chain implementing partners.
123. Under Component 2, the Rural Business Support Services for improving value chains had varying fortunes, largely depending on the performance of the service providers. While the component directly and indirectly may have reached the reported 93,000 households, very few contracts have been facilitated between farmer groups and rural enterprises and between these enterprises and the market.<sup>58</sup> The capacity building support for rural entrepreneurs and enterprises has been limited and of short duration. The district commodity platforms, introduced in some regions, notably Tanga, have contributed to bringing the value chain stakeholders together, identifying issues and problems and providing a frame for networking. Potentially, these platforms could contribute to improving value chain cohesion but to do so they would need to be expanded beyond district boundaries. Under component 3, training of staff in SIDO, Ministry of Industry and Trade and private service providers has been delivered but there is little evidence of enhanced capacity in agricultural value chain development.

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<sup>57</sup> As a comparison, another radio programme (INUKA) facilitated by the Swiss-funded Rural Livelihoods Development Programme is aired by radio Free Africa, covers most parts of the country and sustains its operations through sponsorships and advertisements. In the case of MUVI, instead, only 3 out of eight MUVI partner radios managed to secure some sponsorship.

<sup>58</sup> Inter alia, MUVI also worked on mobilizing external financing, such as from Finland on the mango value chain.

Table 8  
**MUVI Objectives and Indicators, and Reported Achievements**

<i>Component/Objective President's Report</i>	<i>Indicator President's Report</i>	<i>Indicator - SIDO/MITM Self- Assessment (SA)</i>	<i>Actual achievement reported by SIDO/MITM in SA</i>
<b>1.Design/Implement Communication Strategy</b>	Communication Strategy Document  Integrated activities with KM dimension	550,000 rural adults accessing information through radio programmes	823,968 rural adults accessing information
<b>2. Improved value chain coordination &amp; cohesion</b>	150% rise in supply contracts between producers and RSMEs  175% rise in supply contracts between RSMEs and market (year 3)	114,000 HHs participating in the programme	92,910 HHs participating
<b>3. Public/private with skills to support RSMEs</b>	Technical training for 860 persons and institutional capacity building  12 regional, 18 district, 3 nation awareness campaigns  Contracts with 6 VCIPs and 1 MIP correctly awarded in year 1 and 3, and supervised	1,044 personnel in capacity development training	637 trained

Sources: President's Report, 14 December 2006 and Tanzania Country Programme Assessment, April 15, 2014, Volume II Annexes

124. **Targeting ex-post.** Few "hard" data are available on poverty targeting. According to the impact survey conducted under ASDP Mainland, ASDP investments were well targeted to districts with severe poverty, although district is only one of level of geographical stratification and there is no data on targeting at ward and village level. Data available through the studies conducted on ASDP, suggest that apart from covering a very wide territory, ASDP-Mainland implementation varies widely between and within districts in terms of quantity (the number and type of interventions promoted) and in terms of quality.
125. The CPE team did not find evidence of significant mis-targeting, although the mission could cover only a small fraction of the territory of Tanzania. In general, the components of ASDP are well adapted to the needs of smallholder farmers including poor ones: it can be argued, for example, that wealthy farmers would not be very interested in participating in FFS activities (which are time consuming) and could probably afford customized and more specific private extension services. ASDP placed adequate attention to involving women as FFS facilitators as well as client farmers but did not have explicit mechanisms to target other disadvantaged groups. Similar observations can be made on ASDP-Zanzibar.
126. In the case of MUVI, observations made in the field suggest that the project deliberately worked with economically active poor households (as per design target) when supporting micro and small enterprises as well as smallholder farmers (when it supported primary production), but there is no clear evidence that the project targeted households with members affected by illnesses (as was foreseen in the design). Even if the design was more explicit on targeting, no relevant data are available through the M&E system. MIVARF implementation is still at an early stage and there is no information on actual targeting.
127. The effectiveness of operations approved since 2004 is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), based on individual ratings of ASDP-Mainland (4), ASDP-Zanzibar (5) and MUVI (3). In the case of ASDP-Mainland the sometimes impressive achievements in terms of output and coverage have been mitigated by the quality of delivery and geographical variability (e.g., between and within districts). ASDP-Zanzibar has reached far fewer households than foreseen (although targets were set without accurate data analysis) but quality of delivery was more uniform. In the case of MUVI, delivery of services was scattered and uneven and this project made

little progress in value chain development, mainly because it focused only on the local post-production segments. MIVARF is not rated as implementation is still in its early stage. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I).

### B.3 Efficiency

128. Efficiency measures how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results and benefits. The financial and economic internal rates of return provide in theory the best indicators of the efficiency of converting resources into tangible benefits. For the irrigation investments of ASDP there are estimates of economic internal rates of return but not in other areas. For this reason this CPE uses proxy indicators on programme efficiency. These relate to project disbursement lags, project management costs, and returns on investments of specific technological packages.
129. Time lapses from approval to declaration of effectiveness are in many CPEs used as a proxy indicator of efficiency but in Tanzania this indicator is misleading:<sup>59</sup> a more reliable indicator is timely disbursement as a proxy of how fast a project progresses after declaration of effectiveness. Table 9 shows IFAD loan disbursement rate as of mid-June 2014 as well as the "disbursement lag" as of end June 2014, computed by IFAD-PMD: the lower the rate, the faster the project is disbursing and negative rates indicate that the loan is disbursing faster than foreseen.<sup>60</sup> The three loans for the ASDP Basket Fund are on time or even ahead in disbursing, while MUVI and MIVARF have experienced significant delays. In particular MIVARF is far behind. Under the Producer Empowerment and Market Linkage Component, only nine service providers out of 24 earmarked for 2012/13 on the Mainland were in place by June 2014. Considering that AfDB's support for market infrastructure is progressing faster, the opportunity for synergies between infrastructure and market linkage support may be missed.<sup>61</sup>

Table 9

#### Disbursement Rate: Simple and adjusted for project life span

<i>Loan</i>	<i>Simple Rate of Disbursement</i>	<i>Disbursement lag (30 June 2014)</i>
ASSP	100%	0%
ASDP-L	99.98%	0%
ASDP	100%	-34%
MUVI	64%	36%
MIVARF	11%	69%

Source: IFAD Flexcube system: mid June 2014 and ESA Annual Portfolio Review 2014.

130. **Programme management costs.** Though programme management and M&E indirectly may contribute to improving benefits, the rationale is that the more resources are used on programme management and M&E, the less resources remain for directly supporting the target groups.
131. For **ASDP Mainland**, it is difficult to estimate the total costs of programme management and M&E which comprises costs of four Agricultural Sector Lead Ministries with the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives providing staff from its Department of Policy and Planning. According to the Implementation Completion Report, for the local level support about 3.5 per cent of budget and expenditure was used for planning, monitoring and evaluation of the District Agriculture Development Plans but the figure is probably higher if all

<sup>59</sup> Operations with larger time lapses (ASDP Mainland and Zanzibar) required time to discuss the modality to participate in basket funding. But after declaration of effectiveness, implementation progressed relatively smoothly. Instead, projects with shorter time lapses (MUVI and MIVARF) experienced serious implementation delays due to unresolved design flaws: in such cases, effectiveness was declared too early with too many outstanding issues.

<sup>60</sup> The disbursement lag is computed by IFAD comparing what would have been expected with actual disbursement. This is done using fixed parameters, depending on the nature of project components.

<sup>61</sup> For example in Karatu district the CPE Team visited a road infrastructure constructed to benefit onion farmers in Mangola division but producer groups had not been formed or empowered due to the lack of a service provider.



administrative costs are included. Nevertheless, the total transaction costs of managing a financial flow of close to US\$400 million in ASDP Phase I are likely to be significantly below that of the alternative which would have involved some 20 projects with budgets of US\$20 million, project management costs ratio of 20 per cent. i.e. US\$80 million or higher.<sup>62</sup>

132. Regarding **ASDP Zanzibar**, at design the combined budgets of ASSP and ASDP-L planned to use 19 per cent of their total budgets on programme coordination but already by May 2013, this had increased to 30 per cent. At completion of ASDP-L in 2014, the figure is likely to be even higher. Part of the reason for the increase is the construction of offices for the Agricultural Sector Facilitation Team and it could be argued that this is rather a capital investment cost, as the building at programme completion will be used by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
133. **MUVI** design does not provide a clear estimate of the budget for programme management. It allocates 2 per cent of base costs for salaries and allowances and 3 per cent for operation and maintenance. However, one of the three components, Institutional Strengthening, is allocated 22 per cent of base costs to finance mainly capacity development of the "managers and suppliers", the major part of which may be interpreted as transaction costs of supporting the beneficiaries. In addition, under the second component Business Support Services (59 per cent of base costs), the contract with the service providers include their (high) overhead and programme administration costs, ranging from 30-36 per cent. Thus, total transaction costs ratio of delivering capacity building is likely to be above 20 per cent.
134. **MIVARF** design allocates 15 per cent of the IFAD loan for programme coordination and 11 per cent of the entire budget when including AfDB and other financiers. These percentages are likely to increase significantly due to the late start-up of IFAD activities. In addition, in each participating district, the district assigns a focal person who from MIVARF is paid monthly TShs 300,000 on top of the normal salary. MIVARF also pays TShs 3 million per quarter to facilitate the operations of the focal person (transport and other operational costs).<sup>63</sup> If the IFAD part of MIVARF eventually manages to cover 72 districts as expected the above would imply additional management costs of US\$US\$3.3 million over 5 years (or additional 2 per cent of project costs). Furthermore, in the districts covered by the AfDB infrastructure investments a district engineer is also assigned as supervisor/manager for the selected infrastructure project (financed from the AfDB contribution). Thus, if the local government facilitation costs are included, the total transaction or management costs become substantial.
135. **Financial management and procurement** have faced major issues in ASDP/Mainland, MUVI and MIVARF, but within ASDP Zanzibar these issues have had minor importance. Within ASDP/Mainland, the main problem has been that districts and research institutions receive funds for the approved budgets late in the financial year, often after the start of the agricultural season, and have limited procurement capacity. This has been a recurrent problem for decades, accompanied by continuous discussions on the reasons and a blame game between donors, the Parliament, the Ministry of Finance, the districts and research institutions. On a positive note, districts have introduced the system of carry-over funds to ensure that funds allocated for one fiscal year are not lost but can be carried over to the next fiscal year if not spent before the expiry of the fiscal year.
136. Within MUVI and MIVARF, procurement has followed government systems but with IFAD supervision and oversight in the form of giving "no objection" at various stages in the process, which slowed down the process and resulted in

<sup>62</sup> For comparison, it should be noted that programme management and M&E costs at completion often constituted more than 20 per cent of total expenditure at completion of previous IFAD traditional projects, e.g. 41 per cent in the case of RFSP.

<sup>63</sup> In the visit of the CPE Team to Karatu district, a focal person had been appointed and was being paid despite the fact that no implementation activities under PEML had been initiated on the ground

implementation delays (notably MIVARF). In 2014, the system of “no objection” was significantly simplified helping to accelerate implementation.

### **Efficiency issues within supported themes of ASDP**

137. Within ASDP-Mainland, irrigation constituted the main infrastructure investment in primary production, comprising financing of improvement (53 per cent of irrigation investment), construction of new schemes (37 per cent), and rehabilitation (10 per cent) and with Government funding the major part of costs. An Impact Evaluation undertaken by ASDP in 2013<sup>64</sup> estimated high internal returns on the investments: 110 per cent from investing in improvement, 65 per cent in rehabilitation, but with lower returns for building new schemes (20 per cent). The impact evaluation itself and this CPE have reservations on these figures (future maintenance and repair costs are probably underestimated).<sup>65</sup>
138. An assessment of Returns to Local Infrastructure<sup>66</sup> of ASDP-Mainland (warehouses, community market centres, livestock dip tanks, and *chaco* dams) found varying but also high returns, especially for dip tanks and some warehouses where the farmers’ organisations were strong. Many *chaco* dams were dry during a major part of the year, community market centres were designed for retail and not for bulking of produce; 27 per cent of the centres were not operating, many warehouses were too small to ensure economies of scale and profitability.
139. The ASDP Basket Fund through the District Agricultural Development Grants also financed agro-processing machinery for value addition (in total 968 machines e.g. milling machines, milk cooling tanks and processing machines, oil processing machines etc.) for farmers and their groups. While these investments were based on demand, the local government authorities seldom undertook a feasibility study or assisted the farmers with developing a business plan and their management capacity. The facilities therefore operate at varying levels of efficiency.
140. Farmer Field School (FFS) has been an important instrument in ASDP-Zanzibar but less so on the Mainland where there has been significant variation between the districts with respect to allocating budget for extension services and using the FFS methodology. Only 25 per cent of district extension staff on the Mainland has been trained in the FFS methodology.<sup>67</sup> Probably for this reason, the efficiency, in terms of the proportion of farmers adopting the demonstrated technologies, shows greater variation on the Mainland but it is generally lower. FFSs in Zanzibar appear to generate high returns though support for two years involves higher costs. Based on financial records of ASSP & ASDP-L and assessed adoption rates, the cost per farmer adopting an improved technology was estimated at US\$59.<sup>68</sup> The estimated annual returns of adopting the technology were for common crops several times higher: cassava 293 US\$/acre, banana 523 US\$/acre, rice 412 US\$/acre.
141. This CPE is concerned about the cost consequence of establishing ward-level Agricultural Resource Centres on the Mainland (ASDP). The one observed in Tanga Region has a very large structure, considerably surpassing the initial budget, and may be completed at a cost of TShs. 500 million to TShs. 1 billion. A clear budget for annual operational and maintenance costs had not been made. Given the limited government budget, there is a risk that Agricultural Research Centres may limit the budget allocation for FFS as well as re-orient the focus of village extension workers from the farmer’s field towards the office.

<sup>64</sup> E. Nkonya, L.K. Gezehegn, M. LKilasara, F. Kahimba, H. Nassoro, April 10, 2013: Impact Evaluation of the Irrigation Investment of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme

<sup>65</sup> According to the Impact Evaluation of ASDP irrigation support: (i) while costs per hectare is comparable or lower than corresponding costs in sub-Saharan Africa, most schemes are faced with water insufficiency/stress and cropping intensity is low; (ii) annual contribution of irrigators is low and some schemes do not have annual fees, reducing the durability and sustainability of the schemes. (iii) soil management is inefficient, including low and imbalanced fertilizer application, and salinity is building up in some schemes; and (iv) software investments (training and technical assistance) in improving production and scheme management as well as marketing have been insufficient.

<sup>66</sup> SUA, N.S.Y. Mdoe and ;D. Gabagambi, May 2014: Assessment of Achievement of the ASDP: Returns to Local Infrastructure Report.

<sup>67</sup> An Assessment of the Performance of Extension Services under the ASDP in Tanzania, 25th March 2013.

<sup>68</sup> IFAD/ESA, 3 April 2013: Country Programme Review, Zanzibar Sub-Programme.

142. The efficiency of the portfolio of operations approved since 2014 is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), based on individual ratings of ASDP Mainland (4), ASDP-Zanzibar (5) and MUVI (3). In essence, ASDP was characterised by lower project management cost ratios compared to other operations although, on the Mainland, variable quality of infrastructure is likely to affect internal returns on investment. MUVI and MIVARF experienced very serious delays, high management cost ratios and problems with quality of delivery (MUVI). MIVARF is not rated due to its early implementation stage although implementation delays add to cost and tend to depress benefits thus likely affecting efficiency. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I).

#### **B.4 Rural poverty impact**

143. The following sections provide a brief assessment of the impact of ASDP on the Mainland and Zanzibar, and MUVI across five impact domains: a) household income and assets; b) human and social capital and empowerment; c) food security and agricultural productivity; d) natural resources, the environment and climate change; and e) institutions and policies. Impact is often the most challenging criterion to assess because of limited data and methodological issues such as attribution (inferring the relationship between IFAD-supported operations and certain changes), as well as testing for sample bias between treatment and comparison samples. Impact of MIVARF is not assessed due to its early implementation stage.

##### **B.4.a. Household income and assets**

144. Information on changes in households' incomes and changes in land value have been the main indicators.
145. **Extension services on Mainland: significant impacts.** A sample survey undertaken on the Mainland for assessing the performance of extension services under ASDP compared three categories of farmers: (i) farmers who participate in FFS; (ii) farmers who are not members of the FFS but live in the same village where the FFS group was held (neighbours); and (iii) farmers who live in villages with no FFS and who therefore depend on the traditional extension system. Overall, the survey found that FFS participants learnt more technologies (see also next section) and had higher net income changes. Most technologies were related to crop and livestock husbandry, only a few to post-harvest handling and marketing. Though issues of access to markets were given limited attention, differences in net income changes between FFS farmers and comparator groups were high (Table 10).<sup>69</sup>

Table 10

**Increased income, additional costs and net increase in income (TShs) of different categories of farmers**

<i>Group</i>	<i>Income increase</i>	<i>Additional costs</i>	<i>Net increase in income</i>
FFS members (N=130)	1,496,900	215,374	1,221,500
Neighbours of FFS (N=197)	735,649	139,201	596,447
Outside FFS site (N=230)	679,374	89,475	589,899

Source: An Assessment of the Performance of Extension Services, 25<sup>th</sup> March 2013.

146. **Issues with extension coverage.** The ASDP sample survey suggests high returns on extension services. However, from a national/Mainland perspective the impact has been relatively modest because the total ASDP investment in extension services and in FFS in particular has been limited. In some districts, e.g. Mvomero, the proportion of farmers who are FFS participants is less than 1 per cent. In the surveyed districts, only 25 per cent of district agricultural extension staff had been

<sup>69</sup> Limitations in the impact survey were: (i) absence of baseline data (this is a post-test only analysis only); (ii) no testing for selection bias (other household or community characteristics may affect income changes, not just FFS participation).

trained in FFS. Among interviewed maize, rice and cattle farmers, the proportion who had participated in FFS were respectively 13.6, 16.4 and 7.5 per cent.

147. **Irrigation investments on the Mainland:** The ASDP survey found significant income gains from irrigation (through changes in the value of land) but also high variations between regions and depending on type of crop and management as well as cropping intensity. The most profitable crops were vegetables followed by maize and paddy. The largest part of the irrigated area is grown with paddy which on average provides a profit of about TShs 2.4 million per hectare under good management but less than TShs 1 million under poor management. Average irrigated area per household is about 0.6 ha but ranges from only 0.3 ha/farmer in Dodoma to about 1 ha/farmer in Mbeya. The income gains from irrigation are also captured in changes in land value and land rents. Estimated changes in land value, which could be attributed to the ASDP investment (comparison of before and after the improvement or rehabilitation) are that the value of land more than doubled in four irrigation zones (Mbeya, Mtwara, Mwanza, and Tabora) while the average national increase was 89 per cent.
148. **Extension services in Zanzibar** (Unguja and Pemba) and the FFS cover a much larger proportion of the farm population than on the Mainland. A project survey undertaken in connection with the 2013 Country Programme Review found that 77 per cent of sampled farmers had received knowledge or skills from an FFS, of which 93 per cent found that it had benefited them in some way, mainly increased production. The major reason cited for increased crop production was improved knowledge and skills (53 per cent). The Zanzibar survey only distinguishes between FFS participants and non-participants and does not separate non-FFS participants between those who are close to a FFS and those who are not. Given the introduction in Zanzibar of the role of farmer facilitator and of community animal health worker (see Effectiveness section), it is likely that many of the non-FFS participants indirectly have benefited from the FFS (spill-over effect). This may explain why the difference in benefits between FFS participants and non-participants is less in Zanzibar than on the Mainland (Table 11).
149. While a majority of the FFS participants said that production had increased, only 24 per cent said that their income had increased. Overall, for all interviewees, the majority (69 per cent) said that the amount they sell in the market has remained the same over the last five years, confirming that post-harvest and marketing issues have received modest attention.

Table 11

**ASDP Zanzibar - Perceptions of household income and asset changes among FFS member and comparison groups**

<i>Membership status</i>	<i>Remained the same</i>	<i>Increased</i>	<i>Decreased</i>
<b>Perceived impact on household income depending on membership in FFS</b>			
Member	36%	52%	11%
Non-Member	50%	41%	9%
<b>Perceived impact on household assets depending on membership in FFS</b>			
Member	69%	27%	4%
Non-Member	74%	22%	4%

Source: Zanzibar ASDP 2013 Quantitative Survey.

150. **MUVI:** The MUVI Self-Assessment<sup>70</sup> states that "It was targeted to have households' participating in the programme to have their revenue/income increase by Tshs. 18.6 billion, but total estimated increase in income of Tshs. 19.3 billion was realized by 92,910 Households, which implies an average income of Tshs. 207,728/= per Household. The interventions have also produced 13,026 new jobs as compared to the planned 15,250 jobs."

<sup>70</sup> Country Programme Assessment, Annexes, April 15 2014

151. Data obtained from and SIDO teams and combined evidence from field visits do not support these claims (see also the section of this report on Effectiveness). In most cases, income improvements were not achieved from strengthening producer organisations and linkages in the value chain: MUVI was facilitating support to the district agricultural extension staff working with farmers to improve production. With respect to job creation, the figures supposedly refer to the rural enterprises supported by MUVI. Such support primarily consisted of brief training and technical assistance, unlikely to have been a determining factor in generating the 13,000 jobs claimed. The assessment of this CPE is that MUVI's contribution to value addition overall has been limited, apart from some cases of helping with certification and advice.
152. The contribution of the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 to household income and assets is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), based on the individual ratings of ASDP Mainland and Zanzibar (both 4), and MUVI (3). Under ASDP-Mainland there is survey evidence suggesting income increases (through irrigation and FFS), which is mitigated by geographically uneven achievements. As for ASDP-Zanzibar, survey data show slightly higher *perceptions* of income and asset increase among FFS farmers, although with market access constraints. In the case of MUVI, available information suggests that the chain of results that could have led to income increases was not in place. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I).

#### **B.4.b. Human and social capital and empowerment**

153. Human and social capital and empowerment involves the development of capacity among poor people both collectively (social capital) and individually (human capital) as well as empowerment of individuals, the quality of grassroots organizations and the collective capacity of farmers. Key indicators relate to the dynamics generated by FFS and learning and adoption of improved crop and livestock techniques.
154. **ASDP Mainland:** The main contributions to this domain have been obtained from the Farmer Field Schools (FFS, see Table 12) and the participatory process of developing Village Agricultural Development Plans and District Agricultural Development Plans. ASDP/Mainland and the local government participatory planning process have made deliberate efforts to promote the participation of beneficiaries in the development of the village and district plans. FFS have also provided opportunities for increased interaction among community members both in qualitative and quantitative terms, thus enhancing social networks and promoting pro-social behaviour. Social capital was also fostered through the relationships that were forged and strengthened with extension workers.

Table 12

**ASDP- Mainland Average number of technologies adopted**

<i>Farmer category</i>	<i>Rice</i>		<i>Maize</i>		<i>Livestock</i>	
	<i>Learnt</i>	<i>Adopted</i>	<i>Learnt</i>	<i>Adopted</i>	<i>Learnt</i>	<i>Adopted</i>
<b>1. FFS Group</b>	4.3	3.4	3.45	2.29	0.667	0.455
<b>2. Neighbour of FFS</b>	2.6	1.9	2.54	1.88	1.03	0.705
<b>3. Out of FFS site</b>	2	1.03	1.5	1.08	0.55	0.491
<b>Difference T (1,2)</b>	S	S	S	NS	NS	NS
<b>Difference T (1,3)</b>	S	S	S	S	NS	NS
<b>Difference T (2,3)</b>	S	S	S	S	S	NS

Source: Ministry of Agriculture (2013). S = Significant, NS = Not Significant

155. In some areas the investment of ASDP in social capital has been inadequate, e.g., with respect to irrigators' organisations charged with management of the supported irrigation schemes. Many of these organisations are weak and mobilise insufficient

membership contributions, affecting the operation and durability of the schemes. This also applies to farmer groups charged with management of warehouses, agro-processing facilities, dip tanks and marketing centres. ASDP has done little to develop the capacity of farmers to undertake joint marketing.

156. **ASDP Zanzibar:** Though the decentralisation process in Zanzibar is not as far as on the Mainland, the programme has used Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques and Farmer Forums to allow farmers to participate in the prioritisation of support. The positive impacts on human capital of the FFSs, farmer facilitators and community animal health workers are highlighted in the Effectiveness section. There has also been an improvement with respect to empowerment though modest. According to the Quantitative Survey, 21 per cent of farmers said that their confidence (*kujiamini*) had increased over the last five years while 11 per cent said that their ability to make independent decisions had increased.
157. With respect to veterinary services, 48 per cent of the respondents said they benefited from the services of the community animal health workers (17 per cent in Pemba and 59 per cent in Unguja). The programme also supported the improvement of veterinary centres, vaccination of poultry against Newcastle Disease (likely contributing to reduction in potential income loss), and - to a lower extent- artificial insemination. Only 31 per cent reported benefiting from improvement of veterinary centres. Little has been done to develop groups (social capital) for marketing and value addition. There are unexplored options for using the FFS as platforms for developing social and commercial entities. Some support has been provided for SACCOS but work is unfinished. At the apex level, the programme has established cooperation, though not capacity development support, with some organisations such as the Zanzibar National Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, which holds the potential to play a positive role in a continuation of programme support that includes value chain development.
158. **MUVI:** Some contributions have been made to improve skills of farmers to manage crops and livestock, less to developing entrepreneurial and technical skills within rural enterprises. Some contribution to empowerment has also been made in selected regions through the district commodity platforms, allowing farmers and agro-processors to meet local government and advocate for their priorities.
159. There are some positive, scattered, cases where MUVI has assisted local self-help groups to formalise and develop. For example, the Sayuni SACCO in Hanang district started off as an informal group of 10 members in 1999. With the assistance from MUVI in 2012 they were able to register as a SACCO and currently have a total of 60 members. The group is engaged in financial services, processing and business but its commercial viability is yet not assured. Overall, however, there are few cases where groups have developed capacity for joint marketing. The limited impact should be considered against a background where farmers are hesitant to join efforts and the main project input was a 3-year contract with service providers whose performance was negatively influenced by issues of financial management and procurement and disagreements about strategic directions. Access to useful market information is still a constraint. MUVI's target was that at least 25 per cent of the rural dwellers would have access to information through wards and village communication interactive boards, however only 5 per cent was achieved. It is to be noted that IFAD has provided funding to NGOs through regional grants on market intelligence initiatives but collaboration with MUVI (and MIVARF) has been very weak: a missed opportunity.
160. The contribution of the portfolio of operations approved since 2014 to human and social capital and empowerment is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), taking into account individual project ratings: ASDP Mainland (4), ASDP-Zanzibar (4), and MUVI (3). In the case of ASDP this is thanks to the FFS approach which was adopted as an official approach, although not uniformly on the Mainland and more consistently in Zanzibar (with the successful introduction of farmer facilitators and community health workers but with limited attention to marketing). Under MUVI, initiative were simply too scattered to produce appreciable results overall. The

overall portfolio, including “older projects” (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I).

#### **B.4.c. Food security and agricultural productivity**

161. The main contributions to this domain have been provided through ASDP Mainland (irrigation and agricultural extension) and through ASDP Zanzibar (primarily through FFS), whereas MUVI has provided fragmented contributions. On the Mainland, the investments in irrigation have generated the most significant increases in yields but the area and population covered is relatively limited compared to the support for extension services and FFS, which may have had higher impact on increasing national production and food security.
162. **ASDP/Mainland – Irrigation:** High yield increases are recorded across the sampled irrigation schemes and zones, except for maize in Dodoma, Mtwara and Tabora, and paddy in Tabora (Table 13). This has contributed to significantly improving food security among the irrigation farmers and in the locality while the contribution to national production and food security has been more modest.

Table 13.

#### **Change in crop yield from before to after the ASDP irrigation investment**

<i>Irrigation Zone</i>	<i>Paddy</i>	<i>Maize</i>	<i>Tomato</i>
<i>Percentage change in yield</i>			
Dodoma	359	12	133
Kilimanjaro	87	80	215
Mbeya	93	24	25
Morogoro	119		
Mtwara	102	12	
Mwanza	180	75	
Tabora	9	5	
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>123</b>

Source: Impact Evaluation of the Irrigation Investment of ASDP, April 2013

163. **ASDP/Mainland – FFS:** With respect to maize and rice yields, the study on Performance Assessment of Extension Services finds major differences between FFS participants and non-participants (Table 14), although this is based on a single post-programme observation without baseline data and without testing for sample bias.

Table 14.

#### **Mainland - Crop Yields of FFS participants and non-participants**

	<i>Maize (Kg/Acre)</i>	<i>Rice (Kg/Acre)</i>
FFS members	678	1,452
Neighbours of FFS	552	866
Outside FFS site	369	556

Source: An Assessment of the Performance of Extension Services under ASDP, April 2013

164. **ASDP/Zanzibar:** The project sample survey found that 53 per cent of the interviewees had increased their production and productivity, 8 per cent had reduced their losses, and 16 per cent increased their food consumption as a result of applying the knowledge obtained from FFS. Compared to five years before, more respondents considered that they were food secure (68 per cent against 62 per cent) but Pemba accounts for all of this increase. The CPE Team visited several farmers with a life-changing increase in productivity. Often the first gains led to diversification; e.g. profits from productivity gains in a crop were invested in poultry production or the expansion of livestock production generated more manure, which was used to increase crop yields.

165. Within **MUVI**, the major focus of many activities has actually been to increase productivity and quality of the primary production, mostly in cooperation with the district agricultural extension services. There are several though fragmented examples of results in terms of raising yields and production and the use of quality declared seeds and improved farming technologies were often the main factors. In Tanga Region, it was reported that sunflower yields had increased from 150 kgs/acre to 300 kgs/acre while cassava production had increased from 59 ton/acre to 89 ton/acre. Also in Tanga, project support may have contributed to reducing potential losses of the important citrus industry in the region. In Iringa Region, it was reported that sunflower production had increased from 254 kgs/acre to 500 kgs/acre while tomato production had increased from 20 tons/acre to 30 tons/acre.
166. The contribution of the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 to food security and agricultural productivity is assessed as satisfactory (5) taking into account individual project ratings: ASDP Mainland and ASDP-Zanzibar (both 5) and MUVI (4). This is an impact domain where all operations have generated results to some extent. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated satisfactory (see Annex I).

#### **B.4.d. Natural resources, the environment and climate change**

167. IFAD has a Climate Change Strategy (2010) with three main purposes, namely to: (i) support innovative approaches to helping smallholder farmers build their resilience to climate change; (ii) help smallholder farmers take advantage of available mitigation incentives and funding; (iii) inform a more coherent dialogue on climate change, rural development agriculture and food security.
168. As a general observation, operations assessed by this CPE were approved before the Strategy. Their design does not contain a strong emphasis on natural resource management and use (only water management receives specific attention).
169. However, on the positive side, a large part of IFAD's portfolio covered by this CPE is environmentally neutral or positive. The technologies promoted by the extension services and in the FFSs are overall environmentally friendly, such as use of composting and animal manure, stall-feeding, good agricultural practices. Though chemical fertilizers are being promoted, the level of fertilizer use in Tanzania is still at such a negligible level<sup>71</sup> that little risk of environmental damage is involved. On the contrary, in many places soil fertility needs to be restored by adding nutrients that are in deficit.
170. The main impact on the environment is from the investment of ASDP/Mainland in irrigation (in addition the programme adopted the more stringent World Bank environmental safeguards measures). On the one hand, irrigation improves farmers' resilience to climate change effects such as more unreliable rainfall and extended periods of drought but irrigation development also creates some environmental problems. The ASDP Irrigation Impact Assessment notes that salinity is building up in several of the schemes, and recommends that "a combination of crop rotation including paddy rice, drainage and salt flushing, and irrigation management should be employed to address the problem." It also notes problems of siltation in schemes based on reservoirs. Contrary to general assumptions, water is in many areas scarce, in particular in the dry season where only 25 per cent of the irrigated area is used. Competition for water among different users is increasing, and there is ample room for improving water use efficiency in existing schemes.
171. MUVI has made some positive environmental contributions, e.g. assisted noisy polluting oil millers to move from the centre of the town to the non-residential areas. MUVI's support for primary production has overall been environmentally neutral or positive.

<sup>71</sup> In the major part of the country less than 20 per cent of farmers use fertilizers. Average use per hectare is estimated to be less than 9 kilograms of fertilizer nutrient, according to IFDC, June 2012: Tanzania Fertilizer Assessment.



172. The contribution of the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 in this impact domain is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), taking into account individual project ratings: ASDP Mainland (4), ASDP-Zanzibar (5), MUVI (4). In spite of limited emphasis in the design, extension services have introduced environmental-friendly practices and, equally important, the supported activities have overall done little environmental harm. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I).

#### **B.4.e. Institutions and policies**

173. The main elements reviewed to assess impact on institutions are: changes institution's capacity and behaviours that can be related to certain development interventions, and transfer of project experiences into public strategies and policies.
174. **ASDP/Mainland:** The main institutional impact of the programme has been the establishment of a system with processes and procedures for channelling funds from the centre to thousands of rural villages to support their agricultural development. This system now operates, though with challenges and room for improvement. The District Agricultural Development Plans and the guidelines for developing and implementing the plans have provided a strategic and budgetary framework for the district Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Cooperatives and the staff: the CPE team could ascertain that capacity and performance generally is superior to the situation before ASDP, though continuous capacity development is necessary. Below the district, villages and wards are now engaged in defining priorities and Village Agricultural Development Plans, and in implementing them. This has given a new sense of ownership and improved working relations between government staff and farmers. The FFS approach has moved "the office" of the extension workers to the farmers' fields where they are of more use.
175. Within agricultural extension, the ASDP objective of increasing involvement of private service providers was not fully met. By 2014 ASDP had achieved only 79 per cent of its indicator target that 558 private extension service providers would be contracted by local government authorities. According to the Assessment of the Performance of Agricultural Extension Services, over 73 per cent of farmers received their extension advice from the District, others from NGOs and inputs supplies, while only 1.1 per cent from private extension providers.
176. **ASDP/Zanzibar:** The programme Agriculture Sector Facilitation Team is now fully embedded in government structure. The FFS methodology and the Zanzibar-specific innovations (the Farmer Facilitators and the Community Animal Health Workers) have all been adopted by government as part of its policies and strategies and are being integrated in government programmes.
177. **MUVI:** While 22 per cent of the budget was allocated for institutional strengthening, the impact on the capacity of institutions to support value chain development is not very significant (SIDO *in primis* but also in the case of service providers). A number of SIDO staff members have been trained but institutional impact is modest, partly because of high turnover.
178. The contribution of the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 to the impact domain of institutions and policies is assessed as *satisfactory* (5), taking into account individual project ratings: ASDP Mainland and ASDP-Zanzibar (both 5) and MUVI (3). ASDP (Mainland and Zanzibar) deserves a satisfactory rating in recognition of the important institutional development that has taken place, inter alia reinforcing the capacity of local government agencies. So far MUVI has left little behind in terms of institutional capacity, to a large extent because the project implementation was outsourced to service providers who have started moving out of the area as their contract expiry approached. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I) as "older" project had less emphasis and lower results in this area.

## B.5 Other evaluation criteria

### B.5.a Sustainability

179. The assessment of sustainability looks at the likely continuation of net benefits from IFAD interventions beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the programme's life. It involves issues of institutional, technical, financial and natural resources sustainability addressed at two levels: (i) sustainability of activities of beneficiaries and their organizations; and (ii) continued availability of services that are essential for smallholder farmers and micro and small entrepreneurs and without which the gains generated through the projects' support may decline.
180. **ASDP Mainland:** Though continued capacity development support is required, the institutional sustainability risk is modest because the system and mechanisms for delivery of extension services and infrastructure are in place (see also the Effectiveness section). The main remaining risk is financial if central government and development partners reduce or terminate their funding (particularly if new programmes such as Big Results Now and SAGCOT compete for funding). While the M&E system of ASDP and the impact evaluations and assessments have their limitations, the CPE finds that there is sufficient evidence that the first ASDP phase has provided value for money. However, this message appears not to be well communicated to government decision-makers and development partners. Or perhaps ASDP, like other programmes, is experiencing the "donor fatigue" which usually sets in after 5-7 years.
181. While some donors have argued that extension services need to be commercialised, in Tanzania, the private agricultural sector is not yet at a level where one can expect it to self-finance extension services and investments in irrigation development. Nevertheless, there is certainly room for increasing the co-financing by private farmers in these support areas. Member contributions to Irrigators' Organisations can be increased to ensure proper maintenance. And within agricultural technology transfer, there are also options of increasing farmers' and buyers' contributions to financing the costs.
182. Issues of operation and maintenance were also highlighted by the supervision missions of the water and sanitation initiatives funded by the Belgian government which were initially to be associated to ASDP-L. Training to these communities for operation and maintenance has been inadequate in most cases. Some village councils have handed over completed water infrastructure to private individuals with no prior experience in operation and management, reportedly with high costs for village councils.
183. **ASDP Zanzibar.** Similar to the Mainland, also in Zanzibar the delivery system for agricultural extension services is well in place. The Zanzibar sub-programme has been more effective in its communication with government decision-makers and politicians, ensuring strong political support for the sub-programme. Therefore there should be less risk of losing the financial support. On the other hand, all IFAD funding has been used and the ASDP sub-programme in Zanzibar has faced a financial hiatus right at the time when there is an opportunity to build on the achievements. Two innovations, the Farmer Facilitator and the Community Animal Health Worker, have high probability of being sustained as they require no or negligible public support.
184. **MUVI:** With the provision that the sustainability prospects may improve during the recently granted two-year extension, the sustainability prospects at original completion (2014) are variable between regions and overall weak. Services introduced and financed by MUVI were outsourced to external service providers which may create an implementation hiatus even with two-year extension simply because they have already started disbanding the teams. This creates a serious institutional discontinuity as SIDO has played an administrative role and will not have the resources to take up the responsibility for the activities. The market

information dissemination through community radios has limited sustainability prospects due to weak capacity of partner radio stations and their failure to raise sponsorships. SIDO will remain with some experiences but it is beyond its mandate, capacity and budget to continue supporting agricultural value chains, from primary producer to consumer or export market. Other grant-supported experiences (see also Chapter VI) have not been internalised.

185. Some of the activities introduced and supported by MUVI have better likelihood of being sustained. Where MUVI has helped farmers to adopt profitable agricultural technologies, farmers are likely to continue using the technologies. The District Commodity Platforms may continue in some cases (e.g. Tanga) where the district authorities are committed to finance facilitation of the platforms. Some agreements made between farmers' groups and agro-dealers may also extend beyond the project life cycle.
186. IFAD has opted for an extension in the attempt to continue support to the grassroots association of producers and the entrepreneurs that have received support from the project. While the task is arduous with two years of time, IFAD and the Government have decided to provide focused support only to promising areas, based on the experience so far. Perhaps the main opportunity provided by the extension could be that of drawing lessons and preparing practical guidance for the future generation of investments.
187. The sustainability prospects for the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 are assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), taking into account individual project ratings: ASDP Mainland (4), ASDP-Zanzibar (5) and MUVI (3). ASDP has limited institutional risks but some financial and political support risks at present, as new national programmes compete for funding and donors are not clear in shaping their priorities. MUVI presents serious institutional risks and has done little so far to systematize its experiences. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I).

#### **B.5.b Pro-poor innovation and scaling up**

188. Assessment of pro-poor innovation and scaling up looks at the extent to which IFAD interventions have facilitated innovative approaches and technologies for rural poverty reduction and the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
189. It is useful to recall the definitions of innovative ideas in the 2007 IFAD Innovation Strategy. To be considered innovative, an idea needs to be: (i) new to its context of application; (ii) useful and cost-effective in relation to a goal; (iii) able to "stick" (i.e. potential for wide adoption) after pilot testing.
190. Scaling up at IFAD is understood as "expanding, replicating, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs or projects in geographic space and over time to reach a greater number of rural poor."<sup>72</sup> The dimensions of scaling-up considered by the Innovation Strategy are: (i) organizational scaling up (practices implemented in projects or country programmes that are integrated into broader, more complex programmes); (ii) appropriation by partners, including other donors, the private sector or governments and including the financial and technical support; (iii) scaling up from practice to policy.
191. **Innovative in relative terms.** Farming technologies and techniques introduced by ASDP already existed in some farms but are new to many smallholder farmers. The same can be said of MUVI that introduced a number of technologies to farmers and rural enterprises (see also under the Effectiveness section). In Tanga, the regional service provider facilitated the production of a sunflower production

<sup>72</sup> Brookings (2010), Scaling Up the Fight against Rural Poverty. An Institutional Review of IFAD's Approach, Global Economy & Development Working Paper 43.

- manual designed for non-literate farmers as an easily understandable cartoon (but it has not been shared with other regions).
192. MUVI has facilitated access to finance by linking producer groups and SACCOs with financial institutions (Pride Tanzania in Ruvuma, Mwanza and Tanga; National Microfinance Bank in Iringa) enhancing their access to credit so as to avoid that they have to pre-sell or sell crops when prices are low. There are innovative elements here: loans to producer groups were progressive depending on repayment performance, and lending terms were less stringent than commercial ones. However, the producer groups/SACCOs, visited by the CPE Team, had weak management and limited membership (less than 100 members). MUVI has in some districts introduced the District Commodity Platform, bringing together district stakeholders within a given commodity to discuss issues, find solutions and network. Yet, the platform is limited by district boundaries unlike the IFAD-supported Oilseed Sub-sector Platform in Uganda, which has national scope.
  193. Within MIVARF's Rural Finance Component, two interventions hold the promise of introducing some innovations that may improve the access to financial services of the rural poor: Tanzania Incentive-based Risk-Sharing System for Agricultural Lending and the Rural Finance Innovation Fund. However, at the time of drafting this report, the detailed design and modalities were still under discussion.
  194. As further argued in Chapter VI, overall the portfolio **missed the opportunity of learning from the grant programme**, mainly regional grants. Grants have been particularly active in the area of access to markets and market information, livestock and pastoralism, and strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations, often with innovative approaches. There is limited collaboration and information exchange between organizations and persons in charge of loan-based projects and those in charge of grants.
  195. Arguably, **the larger merit of the portfolio is in up-scaling and disseminating improved techniques, practices and extension approaches**. ASDP, including its multi-donor basket fund, constituted a new way of organising cooperation in agricultural development between the Government of Tanzania and its development partners, including IFAD. The adoption of District Agricultural Development Plans across the country can be considered as an example of up-scaling an institutional innovation that makes local agricultural development planning more participatory.
  196. In the **Zanzibar** sub-programme, the FFS approach was also disseminated, accompanied by **two local incremental innovations, the Farmer Facilitators and the Community Animal Health Workers**. Both appear cost-effective and with good sustainability prospects. A study on the feasibility of introducing and up-scaling these innovations on the Mainland would be an obvious option for IFAD's further support. The Mainland may also learn from the somewhat different FFS methodology applied in Zanzibar, including support over two years for the FFS and establishment of two demonstration plots, one with improved technology and one with traditional technology. Finally, it is to be noted that ASDP-Zanzibar is now mainstreamed in the Government policies thus practices have been up-scaled to policies.
  197. The contribution of the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 to the innovation and scaling up agenda is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4) based on project ratings for ASDP-Mainland (4), ASDP-Zanzibar (5) and MUVI (4). The main "new ideas" relate to farmer facilitators and community animal health workers in Zanzibar while in other cases already known practices have been brought to new areas. ASDP is a good example of up-scaling improved extension practices with additional resources from other donors and of raising practices to policy in the case of Zanzibar. The overall portfolio, including "older projects" (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) is also rated moderately satisfactory (see Annex I).

### **B.5.c Gender equality, women's empowerment**

198. Given the time frame of this evaluation, the assessment of gender equality mainly refers to the 2003 Gender Action Plan. A Policy for Gender equality and Women's Empowerment was approved by IFAD in 2012, with very similar objective to those of the 2003 Action Plan.<sup>73</sup>
199. The major limitation in assessing progress on gender equality and women empowerment is lack of M&E gender analysis of outputs, outcomes and impacts. Generally, information is limited to sex disaggregated data and in some cases collected data is not even disaggregated by sex.
200. MUVI design emphasizes that one of the factors to be considered in the selection of value chains should be the number of potential jobs that may be created for the youth and women. ASDP design promotes gender balance by targeting at least 40 per cent women membership in all implementation teams, committees, farmer's organizations and training programs. During implementation, MUVI, ASDP/Mainland and ASDP/Zanzibar undertook sensitization workshops at community level aimed at providing information on the objectives of the project/programs. On the Mainland, the District Agricultural Development Plans were sighted as an avenue to give women an opportunity to be part of the planning and implementation process. However, given the social and cultural context in Tanzania women's participation in public meetings has been limited. The ASDP Mid-Term Review reports that only few District Agricultural Development Plans focused on the needs of women and youths, HIV/AIDS affected or other vulnerable groups.
201. Overall the portfolio has to a satisfactory level promoted women's participation both as members and leaders of groups, such as FFS groups and producer groups. Women formed more than half of the groups visited by the CPE team. Even in Zanzibar where it is believed that Muslim women are mainly confined within their households, the participation of women in FFS activities was impressive. ASDP/Mainland reports a 50 per cent female participation in irrigation schemes both as farmers and members of the irrigators' organisations. It also reports that 22 per cent of extension staff are women and that 51 per cent of the FFS are led by women. ASDP has actively promoted female extension workers and discouraged the formation of male only groups.
202. In all the farmer and producer groups visited by the CPE Team, women held top positions in the groups, such as chairpersons, secretaries or treasurers. This has had a strong bearing on their self-esteem and the respect they command in their respective communities. The Farmer Field Schools have played an important role in building the self-confidence of women by providing them with space to discuss and design solutions to their own problems. MUVI's work with self-help groups has also contributed to enhancing women's confidence and bargaining power. Female beneficiaries to a large extent have been empowered in terms of knowledge and skills in crop and livestock production but this has not always been adequately converted into economic gains. All three programmes have fallen short in linking beneficiaries (both men and women) with markets. In Zanzibar, the CPE Team met women who were finding it difficult to secure markets for their produce given limitations of mobility and were often left at the mercy of the middlemen.
203. The contribution of the portfolio of operations approved since 2004 to gender equality, women's empowerment is assessed as *satisfactory* (5), based on individual project ratings for ASDP-Mainland, ASDP-Zanzibar and MUVI (5). The

<sup>73</sup> Respectively, the objectives of the 2003 Action Plan were to: (i) expand women's access to and control over fundamental assets – capital, land, knowledge and technologies; (ii) strengthen women's agencies – their decision-making role in community affairs and representation in local institutions; and (iii) improve women's well-being and ease their workloads by facilitating access to basic rural services and infrastructures. The objectives of the 2012 Policy on Gender equality and Women's Empowerment were to: (i) promote economic empowerment to enable rural women and men to have equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, profitable economic activities; (ii) enable women and men to have equal voice and influence in rural institutions and organizations; (iii) achieve a more equitable balance in workloads and in the sharing of economic and social benefits between women and men.

main contributions have come from FFS and support to producers' organization thus enhancing women's access to knowledge on improved agricultural practices and their representation and visibility in local groups and organizations (two of the three pillars of the Gender Action Plan and Policy). The more limited effects on income increase stem from limited overall progress of the portfolio on market access and value chain development, rather than from neglect of gender equality.

### B.6 Overall portfolio assessment

204. Overall portfolio achievement is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4). Table 15 presents the ratings of this CPE (details in Annex I) and the averages of ARRI project ratings in ESA for the period 2004-2013 as a benchmark: indicatively the portfolio seems to perform better than ARRI-ESA averages in terms of sustainability and gender equality, worse in terms of relevance and at a similar level for the other criteria, although these types of comparison need to be taken with a grain of salt.<sup>74</sup> Overall the assessment presented in this chapter suggests a **dualistic portfolio performance: solid in agricultural production but weak up to now in marketing and value chain development**. There is a cleavage in the portfolio between the overall positive performance of operations supporting agricultural production and extension (through the basket funding mechanism in the context of the ASDP sector-wide approach) and the modest progress made by projects focusing on marketing and value chains, at least so far.
205. ASDP was part of a well-defined national programme developed on the basis of a thorough (and lengthy) discussion with international partners. While it took years to have the programme hit the ground, implementation modalities and responsibilities were at that point clearly set (although there was and still is a capacity gap at local and central Government level). On the opposite side, support to agricultural marketing and value chain development was impaired by flaws and incorrect assumptions at the design phase that were not addressed adequately before the declaration of loan effectiveness. There were (and still are) also gaps in the partnerships with private entrepreneurs and non-government actors (see also Chapters VI and VIII) who may be key actors in value chain development.

Table 15  
**Summary Portfolio Ratings**

<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Current CPE Rating</i>	<i>ARRI average project ratings in ESA 2004-2012 (53 projects)</i>
Relevance	4	4.85
Effectiveness	4	4.17
Efficiency	4	3.73
Impact	4	4.29
Sustainability	4	3.56
Innovation and up-scaling	4	4.20
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	4.11
<b>Overall Assessment</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4.12</b>

a. This criterion has been introduced since late 2010.

Source: Current CPE. Details by project are presented in Annex I.

<sup>74</sup> As mandated by the current Evaluation Manual, overall portfolio ratings are integer numbers and not arithmetic averages.

### Key points

- The design of the agricultural Sector Wide Approach developed jointly by the Government and the main donors, was overall relevant. Implementation effectiveness and efficiency were in the “positive zone”, albeit with variations between districts on the Mainland and more homogeneous in Zanzibar.
- Instead, the design of interventions in rural enterprise, marketing and agricultural value chain development (MUVI and MIVARF) was based on incorrect assumptions and lacked agreement with envisaged partners on key issues. This negatively affected efficiency and effectiveness of MUVI and the start-up of MIVARF which implementation lags behind after about three years from entry into force.
- ASDP/Mainland and ASDP/Zanzibar have through their support for the Farmer Field Schools (and to irrigation development on the Mainland) provided the most significant contributions to impact, in particular household income and agricultural productivity (mostly crops on the Mainland: livestock has been emphasised in Zanzibar but far less so on the Mainland) but more attention to post-harvest and market issues would have enhanced the impact on household incomes.
- Importantly ASDP Mainland and in Zanzibar have contributed to set up an institutional delivery system and provided resources, capacity and empowerment to local government authorities, which have been the actual implementers on the ground, in line with the country decentralization policies. In addition, ASDP has supported the preparation of agricultural development plans in a bottom-up fashion, from villages, to wards and districts. However, further support is necessary to consolidate results of this programme which was initially envisaged for fifteen years.
- MUVI did not generate the expected impact, partly because of design flaws, and its institutional impact and sustainability is weak as implementation was outsourced to external service providers on a three-year contract.
- ASDP has up-scaled improved techniques and technology while the sub-programme in Zanzibar has introduced a few but important innovations with up-scaling potential.
- Women’s participation in programme-supported groups was satisfactory and, particularly through FFS, they gained visibility and were elected or co-opted in leadership role in local groups and farmers’ organizations.
- There is a significant difference between the overall positive performance of operations in extension and agricultural infrastructure and the so far more modest progress in agricultural marketing and value chain development.

## V. Performance of partners

206. Under this section, the CPE assesses the contribution of partners to the formulation of the country strategy as well as in project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support. The performance of each partner is assessed separately as each has a specific function and role to discharge. Inter alia, for IFAD, CPEs assess contribution to design, flexibility in reacting to changes in the context, follow-up and support in solving implementation bottlenecks, performance of the country office, and responsiveness to create and maintain effective partnerships. As for the Government, CPEs review the degree of ownership and responsibility for implementation of operations, policy guidance, project management, responsiveness to supervision recommendations and fiduciary aspects.

### C. IFAD

207. **IFAD deserves recognition for joining the first agricultural Sector Wide Approach** and mainstreaming three loans into the ASDP Basket Fund. This represented a major departure from the past where IFAD had operated through parallel, temporary and costly project implementation units, not embedded in government structures. Also to be recognised is the design concept of the sub-programme in Zanzibar, prioritising “software” and technology transfer, with implementation embedded in the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

208. **Instead, the design of MUVI and MIVARF has not been satisfactory.** In the case of MUVI, the aspects of institutional capacity of the implementation agency (SIDO) and of institutional continuity in the regions (where project implementation was delegated to external service providers) were not given sufficient attention. MIVARF was based on expectations about the co-financing terms with AGRA and the implementation partnership with the Financial Sector Deepening Trust that did not materialise. This generated high opportunity costs during implementation when considerable time and resources were spent on addressing project design flaws (some still to be sorted out). Some of these deficiencies were flagged during the “quality enhancement” phase at IFAD (e.g. in the case of MIVARF, project complexity, vagueness of agreements to be made with potential partners, notably AGRA). However, the quality enhancement panel was satisfied with the CPM response.
209. **Active participation in ASDP joint implementation arrangements.** Central and local governments implemented ASDP/Mainland according to government procedures. IFAD’s participation in annual joint reviews and contributions in the oversight and coordination structures were appreciated by Government and the other development partners. While government procedures and jointly agreed monitoring and evaluation systems were applied, the Government found it a challenge when IFAD tried to introduce the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) and requested separate RIMS-compliant reporting.
210. The cooperation between IFAD and the Agricultural Sector Facilitation Team in Zanzibar functioned well and issues related to financial management and procurement were few and of minor significance. Some concern was voiced that IFAD had not yet prepared and approved a continuation of the support, and as consequence the sub-programme will experience a funding hiatus, which could result in loss of momentum and motivation.
211. **Design flaws had repercussions on implementation, exacerbated by CPM turn-over.** In the case of MUVI, SIDO and some regional service providers argued that issues in the primary production needed to be addressed to create the basis for value chain development. IFAD supervision missions initially insisted that focus should be on rural enterprises and market linkages.
212. In the case of MIVARF, several of the implementation team leading officers had previous experience from RFSP and AMSDP with IFAD procurement and financial management procedures. However, during the period 2011-13, which was characterised by high turn-over of CPMs, IFAD introduced a requirement for “no objection” at all stages of the procurement process (pre-qualification, short-listing, tendering and contract award), delaying implementation. In 2014, the country office simplified the procedures, which was appreciated by the MIVARF team. In both MUVI and MIVARF, supervision missions tended to blame the implementation teams for poor capacity and performance while the implementation teams blame IFAD and the supervision missions for poor design and unrealistic directives and guidelines during implementation. However, these disagreements from project staff are not well recorded in the supervision mission aide-mémoires. Part of this issue is due to high CPM rotation (five CPMs in the past ten years), which sometimes meant different ways to approach supervision and fiduciary aspects and different degree of trust in the project teams.
213. **The beginning of country presence in 2004 was a turning point.** IFAD first started by appointing a national officer. This eventually allowed IFAD to establish itself as a recognized and appreciated partner by the Government and other donors although it took time. As noted, IFAD out-posted a CPM in 2008 and a country director in 2014. The IFAD client survey of 2014 and this CPE’s interviews with a number of partners convey an overall positive appreciation for the work of the country office. Government partners in particular have underlined positive long-term relationships with IFAD. More recently, the country office has been working on broadening the partnership with international organizations such as the European



- Union (additional financing to MIVARF) and on the development of public-private partnerships in the context of the design of the Bagamoyo project.
214. At present, the country office is staffed with a country director who is also responsible for the country programme of Rwanda, a country programme officer, a country programme assistant and a driver. It is currently hosted by FAO but with a plan to move to UNDP office, due to space and rental price considerations. On a temporary basis, the office also hosts a professional staff member who was previously in the Rwanda country office, a junior consultant who was in Rome and a UN volunteer, all supporting the country programme management and administrative functions. As a reference point, the office has made a budget request of US\$334,000 for 2015, including national staff, administrative and travel costs but excluding the CPM salary (not considered an additional cost compared with the traditional Rome-based CPM).<sup>75</sup> Comparisons with country offices working on a similar size portfolio (Ethiopia, for example) yield similar budget figures and show that the country office support staff (in addition to the country programme officer and assistant) tends to grow.
  215. The country office has also received administrative support from the regional office in Nairobi in processing disbursement requests and, on substantive matters from the land tenure specialist when the same was based in the regional office (for example in the design of the Bagamoyo sugarcane out-grower programme). There has also been collaboration with a communication consultant based in the Uganda country office, and with a Ugandan firm on procurement matters and in 2014 the country office has received support from a headquarter-based consultant to advise project and district staff involved in MIVARF on procurement requirements.
  216. In Tanzania, as elsewhere, country office staff claim that resources are insufficient. The CPE finds that administrative, procurement and financial procedures are onerous for the country office staff, even with the support from the regional or headquarters' offices. In addition, because IFAD's portfolio covers a very large territory, resources for supervision tend to be stretched. The above and the operational support to the lending portfolio take the bulk of staff time (see also Chapter VI), particularly when MUVI's and MIVARF's complicated design issues have to be dealt with. The increased recognition of the importance of developing partnerships and of being more incisive in policy dialogue consultations brings a stretch to resources. If administrative and portfolio support are kept at the same level, and with a programme covering a vast territory, it will become necessary to set priorities and manage expectations: deciding and communicating in what fora IFAD can/can not participate, on what topics and at what stages (it may not be feasible to join all meetings).
  217. As in other offices, the non-staff budget of the Tanzania country office is project supervision-oriented: there is no allocation for activities of analysis, studies or systematization of knowledge, with the consequence that these can be financed only by saving on supervision activities. Some administrative arrangements complicate day-to-day work: (i) the country office has no bank account, all the financial transactions need to be made through FAO, adding days to the procedures; (ii) recruitment of support for communication is heavily centralized at the headquarters, while the country office may need quick action and in Kiswahili, for which local hiring of specialists would seem a reasonable choice.
  218. IFAD's performance during 2004-2014 has been mixed but is overall assessed as moderately *satisfactory* (4) considering satisfactory performance in ASDP/Mainland and ASDP/Zanzibar (5) but moderately unsatisfactory performance in MUVI and MIVARF (3).

#### **D. Government**

219. The Government of Tanzania is to be recognized as well for having **developed and implemented a comprehensive and overarching framework for public**

<sup>75</sup> The official country office budget figures for 2014 are not clear as they do not report costs for national staff members.

- investment in the agriculture sector.** This allowed donors, including IFAD, to cooperate in the design of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) and ASDP and in the definition of its funding and delivery mechanisms. At present there is a discussion among development actors around the Government's recent approaches to agricultural development and initiatives such the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT), *Big Results Now*, as distinct from the ASDS and ASDP and how they are linked with each other. These initiatives have their merit and logic. However, delays in approving the second phase of ASDS and ASDP will result in funding hiatus at a time when the programme needs further consolidation.
220. **The existence of many centres and levels of authorities in the agricultural sector has complicated coordination during implementation.** One of the challenges, for IFAD, as well as for many other donors has been the existence of several public institutions involved (Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries, the Prime Minister's Office) and more recently the President's Delivery Bureau which is in charge of *Big Results Now*. According to several donors, the strongest leadership in agricultural policy development has recently come from the Prime Minister's Office and the President Delivery Bureau more than from the Ministry of Agriculture. In the specific case of IFAD, this has also meant that some projects (AMSDP and MIVARF) have been placed under the responsibility of the Prime Minister's Office which does not have specific expertise on agricultural value chain development. Multiplicity of agencies also complicates coordination when responsibilities cut across two or more Ministries.
221. **Programme Management.** The Tanzania portfolio has interesting peculiarities. First, since ASDP on the Mainland has been delivered as Sector-wide Approach, there has not been a "project management" unit of the traditional sort. Second, in the case of MUVI, while a project support unit was established within SIDO, project management has in fact been outsourced in the regions to externally recruited service providers (mostly consulting companies) with SIDO playing a financial and administration role. Instead, MIVARF has a project management unit. Finally ASDP-Zanzibar has been managed by a project management unit which was well inserted in the architecture of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources and cooperated well with the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries.
222. Some aspects of ASDP-Mainland management have been anticipated in Chapter IV. At the central level, the main issues relate to the weak monitoring system and the late transfer of funds to the local government authorities which are the actual "implementers" of the programme. This has been a problem for decades and still needs to be solved. The introduction of a system to carry-over funds has palliated the problem of belated transfers. At the local government authority level, performance has been mixed because capacity, organization and level of staffing differ widely between local government authorities and particularly between districts. However, it can not be denied that ASDP had a fundamental empowering effect on district and sub-district governments, particularly in the preparation and implementation of agricultural development plans. As for ASDP-Zanzibar, programme management has functioned smoothly with minor implementation problems. In Zanzibar, the Government system is less decentralized compared to the Mainland and the size of the territory to be covered is far smaller.
223. In the case of MUVI, SIDO and the Ministry of Industry and Trade had no previous experience in agricultural value chain development of the type envisaged, nor with IFAD procedures. It was a challenge for SIDO to contract and manage private service providers to which the implementation of the project was outsourced. Performance was also constrained by frequent staff turnover and the decision-making structure at SIDO Headquarters, where the decision-making power was delegated to a committee and not to the part-time MUVI coordinator. Another problem was the weak M&E system which was left to the service providers to develop.

224. As for MIVARF, several staff members of the project management unit had experience working on previous IFAD-funded projects. There were, however, two important differences: first in the case of MIVARF an important part of the implementation is under the responsibility of the districts with the management unit playing a supporting role. Second (as noted under the Relevance section), MIVARF had a number of design flaws and the related implementation problems can not be imputed to the management team only. The IFAD supervision reports point to a number of flaws in the procurement and financial management. However, their findings also denote a lack of mutual understanding, between IFAD, the Government and the project management team on a number of requirements on fiduciary aspects. Both the Government and IFAD could have taken a more proactive role in clarifying expectations, requesting/providing backstopping and training to the project and to district staff. This was in fact the more conducive direction taken since 2014 after about three years of implementation complications.
225. **Insights on project design approach.** While the design of a sector-wide approach took several years, something which might have been at times discouraging for both the Government and some development partners (including IFAD), in the end it produced a delivery system with a moderately satisfactory level of effectiveness according to this CPE.
226. By contrast, traditional projects such as MUVI and MIVARF were developed faster but had a number of serious design flaws, several of which still unresolved. The Government might have taken a more active role in project preparation. An interesting experience is presented in a recent CPE conducted by IOE in China. The roles and weights at design have somehow been reversed there: the Government sets a design team which will also be expected to manage the project afterward. IFAD provides technical backstopping but the element of "implementation feasibility" is better represented at the design stage. By contrast, in the case of MUVI and MIVARF, many ex ante assumptions (of substantive or administrative) were found not to be realistic. There are of course wide differences between Tanzania and China but the fundamental point is that the Government could have taken stronger leadership in the design.
227. Overall, Government performance is assessed as moderately satisfactory (4), taking into account its performance in the design and implementation of four operations: ASDP-Mainland (4), ASDP-Zanzibar (5), MUVI (3) and MIVARF (3).

**Key points**

- Both the Government and IFAD should be recognised for their contribution to developing and implementing ASDP which was overall a solid programme and contributed to improved institutional capacity and farm productivity. While the development of ASDP was a very lengthy process, in the end agreement was reached on key implementation mechanisms. Among the glitches of the management of ASDP-Mainland are the delays in the transfer of funds from central to local Governments. At the local level, there is still capacity gap in local government authorities in implementing the infrastructure component of the programme and in delivering extension services, although there has been an important empowerment effect on these authorities.
- There is some concern for the delays in preparing the second phase of ASDS and ASDP, in consideration of the important work of institutional capacity building and investment on the ground which is still needed. In general, there is a question of consistency between the ASDS/ASDP paradigm and more recent public initiatives in agriculture.
- In the design of MUVI and MIVARF there were a number of unwarranted assumptions and misunderstandings for which responsibility is shared between the Government and IFAD. Some of these issues are still being addressed and have caused significant implementation delays.
- The opening of a country office has marked a turning point in IFAD's cooperation approach in Tanzania and in the way it can interact with partners. As IFAD (rightly) broadens its ambitions of participation in international cooperation consultation process, it will be necessary to define realistic priorities, taking into account budget and human resource constraints in the country office.

**VI. Non-lending activities**

228. COSOP objectives are supported by loan projects and non-lending activities. The non-lending activities include policy dialogue, partnership-building and knowledge management. The assessment of non-lending activities is carried out separately from the loan portfolio, and attempts to examine the activities carried out and the results reached in making those activities support or synergize with the COSOP objectives. However, some of the so-called "non-lending" activities can in fact be supported by projects, for instance a project may have an allocation for initiatives of knowledge management (e.g. analytical work on small-scale irrigation) or for policy dialogue initiatives (e.g. helping the preparation of a new sectoral policy). Non-lending activities are to be understood as shared work and duty of the Government, IFAD and other relevant partners.

**E. Partnership building**

229. IFAD defines partnerships as collaborative relationships between institutional actors that combine their complementary strengths and resources and work together in a transparent, equitable and mutually beneficial way to achieve a common goal or undertake specific tasks. Partners share the risks, responsibilities, resources and benefits of that collaboration and learn from it through regular review.
230. The 2003 COSOP states that IFAD's strategy in Tanzania is to build partnerships and coalitions with NGOs, the private sector and civil society, to compensate for the Government's existing budgetary constraints and its limited administrative, technical and management capacity. The 2007 COSOP states that IFAD will continue to develop partnerships with Government agencies; the development partner group, including the United Nations family; civil society organizations and the private sector. However, none of the two COSOPs gives practical indication as to how to foster non-governmental partnerships.
231. **Partnerships with the Government (Mainland and Zanzibar) are much stronger compared to the 2003 CPE situation** when IFAD had no representation in the country and could not participate in coordination activities. IFAD has been very supportive of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme,

not only in financial terms but also through its participation in joint reviews and implementation coordination events. So far, on the Mainland, a potential gap has been the absence of direct collaboration with the Ministries responsible for natural resource management and climate change issues, as well as with the Ministry of Lands, particularly given that environment and land tenure have been underlined as areas of importance by the 2007 COSOP.

232. **IFAD is better recognized by other international development agencies.** Through its country office, IFAD has been engaged in consultation groups and information exchange with international partners, mainly around the implementation of ASDP: the World Bank, Japan, Ireland, and the African Development Bank. Exchanges have focused on operational issues of ASDP. New partnerships are sought with the European Union in the context of the financing and implementation of MIVARF.
233. IFAD has a long-standing collaboration with the Government of Belgium. This has mainly consisted of external funding of projects components for potable water, health and sanitation. Funds (US\$5 m) were also mobilized to accompany one of IFAD loans (ASDP-L) in targeting very poor communities. However, as ASDP-L later became part of the basket funding mechanism, it has been difficult to establish a clear strategic nexus with the broader ASDP. The Belgian government also funded land planning initiatives for the International Land Coalition which can support policy dialogue (see the “grant” section).
234. With AfDB, collaboration has been so far mostly in the form of parallel financing of separate projects that are managed by the same project management unit (as in MIVARF and AMSDP), initially with separate supervision arrangements and, more recently, with joint mission and separate aide-mémoires but less so in the exchange of knowledge and dialogue over policy issues. Moreover, the AfDB-funded portion of MIVARF is at a more advanced implementation stage compared to IFAD’s and it is not clear how synergies between the two may be realized.
235. **Partnerships with the UN System in Tanzania have been weak**, including the Rome-based organizations, (FAO, WFP), although IFAD is hosted in the FAO building. IFAD is not featured in the current UN Development Assistance Plan for Tanzania. UN agencies have noted a recent revival of interest from IFAD side to enhance collaboration. However, this CPE recognizes that taking part in the full range of periodic UN coordination meetings may be too onerous for a small office like IFAD’s<sup>76</sup> and it may be necessary to concentrate on a selected number of key meetings where IFAD’s presence is necessary, while developing direct contacts and common initiatives with those agencies that are closer to IFAD’s mandate (e.g. with WFP, a major grain buyer with which IFAD has collaborated elsewhere such as in Rwanda).
236. **Limited partnerships with the civil society and the private sector inter alia constraining value chain development.** IFAD’s collaboration through the loan portfolio has been mainly with the Government and donors. IFAD’s regional grants have funded national apex organizations such as the Agricultural Council of Tanzania, the Agricultural Non State Actor Forum and the Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives but this has been channeled through regional umbrella organizations. Due to the sharing of these resources over many countries, the volume of resources reaching the national civil society organizations has been limited. Moreover, regional grants are typically supervised from Rome with little involvement of the country offices. Yet, national umbrella organizations could be important partners. For example, the Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives could have helped identify some of their members that are active on a set of commodities (e.g. dairy products, fruits, vegetables) for further collaboration on

<sup>76</sup> For instance, being a member of the UN entails expectation of participation in UN country team meetings, security coordination, development partner group meeting, in addition to the other donor working groups in which FAD’s office participated (e.g., agricultural working group, environment working group).

value chain development. Similarly, there have been limited attempts to develop partnerships with NGOs that are active in rural development.

237. In the past, dialogue with private sector entrepreneurs has been marginal at the project design phase. While value chain development requires active involvement of the private sector, loan design was prepared between IFAD and Government agencies, with the assumption that private entrepreneurs somehow would join during implementation. Private sector advisers have been hired by MUVI to help plan value chain development but engagement with actual private sector operators has been limited. Recently, discussions have been held with the private company *Eco Energy* in the context of the Bagamoyo sugarcane out-grower scheme, and with dairy processors in Zanzibar.
238. In spite of some gaps (e.g. with the private sector, non-governmental organizations, selected Government agencies), partnership development is rated in the positive zone, *moderately satisfactory* (4) and this is thanks to the much enhanced participation of IFAD in consultations with Government and donors, compared to the time of the previous CPE.

## F. Knowledge management

239. Knowledge management is the process of generating, synthesizing, sharing, disseminating and using knowledge. It is useful to recall that the Knowledge Management Strategy of IFAD (2007) foresaw the strengthening of three major processes at the country programme cycle: (i) better integration of knowledge management throughout the project management cycle; (ii) testing of knowledge-based policy development; (iii) specific earning activities. In addition the 2011 COSOP Sourcebook contains a section (XIX) on knowledge management with very detailed guidelines (e.g. identification of stakeholders, knowledge need, how to capture, how to disseminate knowledge). While the COSOP Sourcebook is more recent than the latest Tanzania COSOP, it gives a sense of the emphasis currently put by IFAD on this area.
240. While the 2003 COSOP did not specifically discuss knowledge management objectives, these were defined in the 2007 COSOP, particularly in relation to these areas: (i) mechanization and agricultural productivity and profitability, (ii) market access, (iii) opportunities for rural enterprises, (iv) rural finance, and (v) the implementation of a SWAp. As a complement to analytical work, the 2007 COSOP envisaged communication work through presentations at international fora and publications, IFAD's website, an electronic library of project institutional memory, and the media, including newspapers and radio.
241. This CPE finds that knowledge management activities have been limited at all the levels: first, at the project level there have been gaps in M&E (with some exceptions for Zanzibar) and limited systematization of project experiences; second, at the programme level few resources have been made available to analysis and capitalization of experiences and, third, interactions between grant-funded activities (mainly regional) and the country programme have been marginal (this is further illustrated in the last section of this Chapter).
242. **At the project level, analysis and organization of lessons learnt has been weak.** IFAD-funded interventions are rich in practical experience on the ground on "how to do and how not to do" (e.g. farmers' group formation, introducing post-harvest initiatives, supporting grassroots finance organizations). As already argued in the evaluations of RFSP and AMSDP (2011), such information would be useful not only for IFAD-funded operations but for other development partners as well, and could also enhance the contents that IFAD brings to the discussions of the donors' thematic groups.
243. As noted in Chapter IV, on the Mainland, ASDP has produced some form of assessment of its main activities (in the form of three studies produced at the programme's end on irrigation, farmer field schools and agricultural infrastructure respectively) and provided "macro" level data on its achievement (see for example

Table 7 in this report). There has been no baseline survey and the quality of data collected at the district level is sometimes disputed by donors. According to the interviews of this CPE team with the Ministry of Agriculture, data has been routinely collected on the many irrigation schemes built or rehabilitated but the same are not available in an electronic database. In general, M&E has been hampered by limited staffing and guidance at the district level and unclear directions and standards set at the central level where ASDP has no strong implementation oversight structure including M&E. With the benefit of the hindsight, donors could have engaged a reputed international institution to support M&E function and the conduct of a baseline and follow-up survey. The costs would have been justified by the programme size.

244. In Zanzibar, monitoring and evaluation of ASDP has been somehow more systematic (ASSP/ASDP-L), including a baseline and follow-up survey (although the baseline took place after and not before start-up). This happened partly because this sub-programme has an implementation coordination unit which includes a centralized M&E function and partly because the Government of Zanzibar has received technical support on M&E from a grant from IFAD.
245. MUVI has been weak at documenting experience as this was left to the varying interest and skills of regional service providers. While the implementing agency SIDO has offices in the concerned regions, they are understaffed to be able to follow up on M&E issues and no stringent standards for M&E requirements have been elaborated. Apart from weak M&E, there have been limited attempts during project life to draw lessons. Even when a guideline based on cartoons was produced in Tanga on sunflower production, this was not disseminated.
246. IFAD has recently started to draw its own lessons by conducting a country programme completion analysis and self-assessment in Zanzibar and in the Mainland (2013-2014). In addition, IFAD has undertaken an analysis of MUVI's value chain development approach to support its request for a loan extension. In fact the recently approved two-year extension of MUVI could be an excellent opportunity for systematizing experiences (successes and failures) for the benefit of future work on agricultural value chains.
247. The 2007 COSOP had ambitious plans for COSOP-level M&E. **COSOP annual reviews** started in 2010 and have taken the form of a review meeting conducted with partners (mainly governmental agencies) and produced written reports. These workshops are structured as consultation events, useful for exchanges of information. **However, findings are not systematized** and it is challenging to extrapolate from the transcripts of the discussion an assessment of progress made with regard to the COSOP objectives. Past IOE evaluations have reported more systematic approaches for COSOP-level M&E and review in Madagascar and in Rwanda. In these countries project level M&E was also more advanced.
248. **Country office resources are concentrated on portfolio implementation support**, whereas knowledge management has received a small share. As discussed in Chapter V, the current country office budget does not include allocation for work of analytical nature and resources can only be obtained from savings in the supervision budget. In its COSOP self-assessment exercise (2014), IFAD estimated the time allocation of country office staff based on recall (Table 16). Supervision and implementation support to IFAD's portfolio of loans commanded the bulk of staff time, followed by COSOP management. Knowledge management ranked lowest.

Table 16

**Estimated Time Allocation of Key IFAD Staff According to Major Instrument/Activity**

Instrument/ Activity	COSOP period 2003-2007		COSOP Period 2007-2013			
	CPO* %	CPM* %	CPO* %	CPM* %	CD* %	CPA* %
<b>A) Portfolio and Implementation Supervision/Support</b>	50	40	45	60	60	30
<b>B) Non-Lending:</b>	30	20	25	10	10	5
1) Policy Dialogue	15		10			
2) Partnership Building	10		10			
3) Knowledge Management	5		5			
<b>C) COSOP Management</b>	20	40	20	25	25	5
<b>D) Administration</b>	0	0	10	5	5	60
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

\* CD stands for "country director", CPM for "country programme manager", CPO for "country programme officer" and CPA: country programme assistant. CD and CPM are international staff, CPO and CPA are locally recruited staff. At the time when the COSOP completion report was prepared, IFAD in Tanzania had a CPM *pro tempore* (based in Rome) and a CD who was preparing for out-posting.

Source: IFAD (2014) Comprehensive COSOP Completion Report and self-assessment,

249. In addition to loans, IFAD-funded grants are in principle an important resource for generating experiences and knowledge, for example by supporting pilot development initiatives as well as analytical work. As further explained at the end of this chapter, there has been **very limited synergy between the country programme and the activities of grants** (mainly regional) that had initiatives planned in Tanzania. Thus many interesting experiences are under-documented and risk being neglected.
250. Knowledge management is rated *unsatisfactory* (2), due to the limited systematization of experiences overall and limited learning and internalization of the results from the grant programme.

## G. Policy dialogue

251. Policy dialogue refers to the process by which IFAD, the Government and other stakeholders engage to shape policies, laws and regulations that affect economic opportunities for large numbers of rural poor. In the case of IFAD, the composition and ambitions of policy dialogue activities need to be calibrated to the type and volume of operations supported. IFAD can make an important contribution to policy discussion through its practical experience and "reality checks". This does not happen automatically, though, and often requires some analysis and knowledge management.
252. **The COSOPs set a wide, arguably over-ambitious agenda.** The 2003 COSOP identified the following critical policy areas requiring donors support to Government: (i) implementation of the policy relating to property rights and land titling; (ii) improvement of the water policy; (iii) establishment of a microfinance policy for rationalizing cooperative laws and private bank regulations; (iv) removal of trade barriers and marketing regulations; and (v) decentralization of decision-making processes to local government and civil society organizations. The 2007 COSOP listed in its Results Management Framework the following areas for policy dialogue: (i) security of right to land/water and equitable access for various land uses; (ii) increasing the participation of the private sector in agricultural service delivery; (iii) environmental safeguards for local investments; (iv) mitigating impact of climate change; (v) increasing participation of poorer farmer groups in ASDP planning at village/district level; (vi) development of regulatory framework for rural finance; (vii) development of strategy, rules and regulations for implementation of the Agricultural Marketing Policy (AMSDP-assisted), including



- produce quality certification and accreditation of inputs; and (viii) formulation of more efficient agricultural taxation regulations at the district level.
253. The 2014 COSOP completion report, prepared by IFAD, highlights that the Fund's contribution to policy dialogue in the agricultural sector has been through its participation in the meetings of the agriculture thematic working group, where representatives of the Government and of the donors participate. It further notes that it is not clear from the documentation what have been IFAD's specific inputs and the outcomes of such discussions.
254. According to the 2011 interim evaluation of RFSP and AMSDP, RFSP had provided funding to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Bank of Tanzania and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives to improve the regulatory framework for micro and rural finance. AMSDP had funded the development of an Agricultural Marketing Policy paper. In the overall assessment, however, the evaluations pointed out that in the domain of "institutions and policies", the two programs had overall low influence.
255. In Zanzibar, some of the elements introduced through ASSP/ASDP-L support (notably Farmer Field Schools and promotion of private service delivery), were later incorporated in the Agricultural Sector Strategic Plans (2011-2014) and the Zanzibar Agricultural Transformation Initiative, 2010-2020).<sup>77</sup> MIVARF is to provide support to the Bank of Tanzania in the review of the Microfinance policy of 2000 and in the formulation of the microfinance strategy in Zanzibar. MUVI has also provided funding to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) for a review of Tanzania's Small and Medium Enterprise policy, led by UNIDO. With the exception of the Zanzibar case, interviews with the relevant agencies and ministries suggest that project's support to policy review has been in most cases through financial support and less so in terms of technical input and lessons learned from practical experiences.
256. The grant "Sustainable Rangeland Management Program", financed by the Belgian Fund for Food Security and managed by the Ministry of Livestock pilots land use planning that inter alia attempt to address herder-farmer conflicts. In the future, activities are envisaged in support of the new project in Bagamoyo, to work on land tenure and conflict prevention between farmers and pastoralists. IFAD is also developing a new grant to the think tank *Kilimo Trust* on regional trade issues in the East African Community.
257. **The COSOP ambitious agenda has not been translated into an operational plan in consultation with the Government.** Without prejudice to the efforts mentioned above, the results achieved are limited with regard to policy dialogue issues that are outlined in the COSOPs. No operational planning (with some form of concrete outcomes/outputs and work plan) has been put in place and it is difficult to track policy dialogue processes beyond the projects' funding of some technical assistance to write policy-related papers. Also, as noted, it is not easy to track the substantive contributions made to the donors' thematic groups.
258. Contributing to policy dialogue calls for selecting specific domains where IFAD and like-minded partners have concrete experience or expertise to offer. It also requires bringing analysis of experiences to the discussion. This in turn requires human resources (e.g., thematic specialists) and financial resources (for example through grants) to be mobilized. The IFAD-supported country programme has been constrained by weak knowledge management. Other constraints faced by IFAD include limited human resources (subject matter specialists) and an onerous portfolio management workload (notably due to the need to address the MUVI and MIVARF design problems), competing for staff time. Country-specific grants are additional resources that could be mobilized but in the recent years no such grant has been approved from IFAD's regular resources.

<sup>77</sup> In the document "Zanzibar Agricultural Transformation for Sustainable Development, 2010-2020", the honourable President of Zanzibar, Mr Amani A. Karume, makes direct reference in the Preface to the ASSP&ASDP-L as government's medium and long term development programme for the sector

259. From the Government's side, the high number of policies and strategies for the rural and agricultural sector produced in the past years and the split responsibilities within the agricultural sector between several institutions (Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Livestock; Prime Minister's Office, President Delivery Office) make it difficult to coordinate policy dialogue.
260. Overall policy dialogue is rated *moderately unsatisfactory* (3), due to the setting of over-optimistic objectives which received limited follow-up.

## H. Grants

261. This CPE could track a total number of 37 grants (mostly regional) with activities in Tanzania (Annex II). Of these, a sample of thirteen has been reviewed more closely after stratification in four thematic strands: (i) Value Chains/Market Access and Market Information; (ii) Livestock & Pastoralism; (iii) Strengthening capacity of civil society organizations; (iv) Socio-economic applied research.
262. **Most grants could be broadly related to IFAD's portfolio but their relevance was diminished by poor consultation with IFAD's country office or Government.** Many grants have been negotiated between the IFAD headquarters (sometimes outside ESA) and the grant recipients without the awareness of the country office or with a "pro forma" notification, notably the IMI grant to MVIWATA, the grant to IITA for "Enhanced Smallholder Engagement in Value Chains", sponsored by the Office of the President, and the grant approved for ICRAF for Pro-poor Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa.

### D.1 Value chain and market information

263. **Grants supported innovative activities that could benefit value chain development but relevant project management teams (MUVI, MIVARF) and the IFAD country office are not acquainted with them.** Grants such as *First Mile, Cash on the Bag and Building Effective Commercial Rural Market Services in the United Republic of Tanzania* have tested new approaches to market access and market information mainly through the application of technology. However, experience from these grants has not been internalised so far. Project management teams have given grants lower priority due to high workload faced to implement the loan-funded projects off the ground (see Chapter IV).
264. The "first mile" grant sought to use technology, mobile and internet, to improve the flow of market price information to the target beneficiaries and build a network of local informants ("market spies") to disseminate price data to farmers. The "cash on the bag" grant seeks to introduce instruments that improve security and transparency of transactions for agricultural producers and traders. This grant also pilots grading and packaging by designated agents. A network of agents originally recruited under the 'Building Effective Commercial Rural Market Services in the United Republic of Tanzania' is used to secure orders for the smallholders in the pilot area.
265. The regional grant "*Enhanced Smallholder Engagement in Value Chains through Capacity Building and Organizational Strengthening*" was given to IITA and covered Kenya and Tanzania with the major proportion of activities of sub-contracted to the NGO Africa Harvest (about 75 per cent of budget). It worked with about 32 producer marketing groups formed under the erstwhile AMSDP project to understand the leadership issues they face and build their capacity to enable them to become sustainable. The comparative advantage of IITA in these activities (largely outside agricultural or socio-economic research) is not clear and, in any case, most of the grant-funded activities were outsourced to Africa Harvest. There have been almost no exchanges between this grant and IFAD's country office or project teams.

## D.2 Livestock & Pastoralism

266. **In this area, only the Sustainable Rangeland Management Programme had significant exchanges with the IFAD country office and government authorities.** *The Sustainable Rangeland Management Programme* supports the preparation of village land use plans to demarcate land use between pastoralists and farmers. The pilot activities entail joint planning between two or more villages. Land use plans are then registered with district authorities to provide them with legal sanction. The grant is funded through Belgian and Finnish supplementary funds to the International Land Coalition and is managed by the Ministry of Livestock. The grant has the potential to build evidence for policy dialogue on land tenure and rangeland management and conflict resolution with pastoralists. So far, however, it has suffered from high implementation costs and exclusive focus at the village level which is too narrow: it requires broader geographical scope to deal with pastoralists since transhumance involves long distances. This may be the focus of a next phase.
267. *Dairy Feed Innovation and Value Chain Development Approaches*. This grant given to the International Livestock Research Institute operates in India and Tanzania. The grant has facilitated the creation of village innovation platforms ranging from the suppliers of feed, small dairy farmers, village and district officials to dairy cooperatives. The grant's activities have been predominantly in India suggesting that this was indeed the centre of gravity, far less so for Tanzania.

## D.3 Strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations

268. *Strengthening capacity of East African Farmer Organizations*. This grant was given to a regional umbrella farmers' organization called 'East Africa Farmers Federation' with an intention to strengthen it and its member organizations. In Tanzania the grant worked with the Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives and the National Network of Small-Scale Farmers Groups (known by its Swahili acronym of MVIWATA). MVIWATA used the funding to carry out trainings for selected farmer leaders in policy dialogue and advocacy. MVIWATA, together with the Agriculture Council of Tanzania, has also received another grant under IFAD's Innovation Mainstreaming Initiative. Support to MVIWATA was one of the first cases of IFAD's support to civil society organizations in Tanzania and it was meant to raise awareness of farmers' organizations in the preparation of district agricultural development plans. The grant was used to build capacity of MVIWATA's network at village and ward level to have representation at district level in the planning process of District Agricultural Development Plans. This intervention was limited in few districts in Ruvuma, and Mtwara.
269. In general, the above grants have received limited follow-up in the country programme. The Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives could have helped IFAD identify promising agricultural producers' or savings and credit cooperatives with whom it could work, for example, in the MIVARF programme. Similarly, MVIWATA has a functioning market price information system which could be utilized by beneficiaries of MUVI and MIVARF. Unfortunately, there is little awareness of this grant and opportunity within the country office and project management teams.

## D.4 Socio-economic applied research

270. This is a very heterogeneous category. For one of the grants, the Programme *for Overcoming Poverty in Coconut-Growing Communities: Coconut Genetic Resources for Sustainable Livelihoods* (implemented by *Bioversity International*), no trace of the activities in Tanzania could be found. The grant to the World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF) *Programme for Pro-poor Rewards for Environmental Services* in Africa involves piloting of the payment for environmental services model in Kenya, Uganda, Guinea and Tanzania. In Tanzania the grant had two sites with a combined pilot beneficiary population of 150 small farmers where no other activity funded by IFAD has taken place. The grant has not yet established a successful and sustainable model for payment for environmental services. However, based on the

- experience, ICRAF is contemplating a publication titled 'Lessons from Payment for Environmental Services in Africa' which may be useful for similar future activities.
271. A new grant is envisaged to the think tank *Kilimo Trust* for policy analysis on the *Regional East African Community Trade in Staples*. This remains of keen interest as Tanzania is now self-sufficient in grains and exporting in the region. The potential of a larger regional market like East African Community common market area has been untapped. This is one of the few grants that are truly "regional", i.e. dealing with trans-border issues.
272. **Grants may have achieved their individual objectives but, overall, internalization of knowledge and experiences within IFAD's country programme has been weak.** There are missed opportunities in access to market and value chain development where loan-based projects have struggled to progress, grants have come up with interesting approaches but there has been little collaboration between the two. There have been few country-specific grants. As argued in the recent CLE on the Grant Policy, it is simpler to establish operational and strategic linkages with country-specific rather than with regional and global grants.

Table 17

**Assessment of non-lending activities**

	<i>Rating</i>
Partnership building	4
Knowledge management	2
Policy dialogue	3
<b>Overall non-lending activities</b>	<b>3</b>

## VII. COSOP Performance

### I. Relevance

273. The assessment of COSOP relevance covers the alignment of the strategic objectives, geographic priority, sub-sectoral focus, the combination of aid instruments (loans, grants and non-lending activities), with Government and IFAD's strategies and country needs, as well as the coherence of the main elements in the COSOP. A key aspect of COSOP management (annual reviews) is discussed under COSOP effectiveness rather than under COSOP relevance, because it is instrumental in achieving the COSOP objectives.
274. The preparation of the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs was more participatory than in previous exercises (e.g., the 1998 COSOP which was mostly an internal headquarters exercise), and involved IFAD's country team and its Government and development partners. The introduction of country presence since 2004 contributed to a major improvement in the quality of relationships with the Government and international partners.
275. **The strategic objectives were well aligned with the Government policies.** The 2003 and 2007 COSOPs have taken into account the evolution of the country policy environment. In particular, after the approval of the 2003 COSOP, IFAD made an effort to realign its strategy and approaches and adapt to two important changes that were taking place at that time: (i) the implementation of a national sector-wide approach in agriculture, funded preferentially through basket funding (to which IFAD contributed through three loans); and (ii) the decentralization policy whereby local government authorities would be in charge of preparation and implementation of local agricultural development plans.
276. The 2003 COSOP was inspired by the 2003 CPE which inter alia had highlighted disconnects between IFAD's portfolio and national strategies (Annex VII, Table 1 presents a more detailed tracking of the CPE 2003 recommendations). At that time, many at IFAD considered that participating in basket funding would be outside the

mandate of the organization. The debate over IFAD's participation in a sector-wide approach and in basket funding in Tanzania was instrumental to the broader IFAD-wide consultation that led to the preparation of a corporate policy on IFAD's participation in sector-wide approaches (2006). According to this policy, IFAD would not engage in general budget support but could consider forms of sectoral budget funding or the funding of a more traditional project within the framework of a sectoral agricultural/rural development programme.

277. **The 2007 COSOP introduced a balanced combination of support to ASDP as well as specific focus on the development of agricultural value chains.** The four objectives of the COSOP 2007 are equally shared between supporting the SWAp and supporting agricultural value chains. The first strategic objective "Improved access to productivity enhancing technology and services" corresponds to IFAD's support to ASDP. The second strategic objective "enhanced participation of farmer organizations in planning of ASDP" also relates to ASDP support, as it corresponds to the bottom-up preparation of village agricultural development plans that are aggregated in ward and district agricultural development plans. The third and fourth strategic objectives (respectively "increased access to rural financial services" and "increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprises") were linked to the then on-going RFSP and AMSDP and to the new MUVI and MIVARF. This was a relevant strategic priority given the limited development of value chains in Tanzania.
278. **It was a relevant choice to provide support through basket funding for agricultural infrastructure and extension in the context of a sector-wide programme, as well as to adopt the project-modality for value chain development.** Basket funding within a national coverage SWAp was and continues to be one of the preferred modes of the Government for supporting agriculture.<sup>78</sup> Apart from the argument of consistency and coordination among donors (in the spirit of the Paris declaration), other important arguments are those of: (i) lower management cost ratios, since it has proved less costly to manage the SWAp rather than having 15-20 separate projects each with management cost ratios of 20 per cent or more; (ii) lower transaction costs for the Government which has to deal with one national programme management structure rather than 15-20 project management units each having to respond to a different donor with different administrative, financial, procurement and reporting requirements.
279. While ASDP was in principle oriented to enhancing private sector participation, it did not have an explicit value chain support focus. At the time of the 2007 COSOP formulation and until very recently, there was no concerted and harmonized approach to agricultural value chain development and project-mode was the default option in spite of its potential costs in terms of consistency and efficiency of aid delivery. A 2012 study prepared by Irish Aid and DANIDA<sup>79</sup> found that some 25 internationally funded projects (international development agencies and NGOs) were supporting about 50 on-going agricultural value chain interventions in Tanzania. This may lead to non-consistent approaches and significant transaction costs either because Government resources are stretched in overseeing these interventions or because project management cost ratios are high. New initiatives are emerging in Tanzania such as the *Agricultural Marketing Development Trust* to be supported by SIDA, DANIDA, IrishAID and other donors. While it is too early to comment, it is an example of testing more harmonised approaches among donors.
280. **A new form of cooperation through public-private partnership is envisaged through the Bagamoyo Sugar Out-grower Programme.** In this case, IFAD is responding to a request from the Government and the African Development Bank to co-fund a smaller farmer out-grower scheme in the district of Bagamoyo, connected to a much larger sugarcane investment project that involves investments from private actors and development banks. This approach was

<sup>78</sup> The first priority of the Government of Tanzania is general budget support, followed by sector budget support, and sector basket funds. Parallel projects have been accepted but officially not encouraged.

<sup>79</sup> Irish Aid and DANIDA (2012) Scoping Study on value chain Initiatives and Studies in Tanzania.

originally not foreseen in the 2007 COSOP and it emerged from a request of the Government of Tanzania in 2013. The project design cannot yet be fully assessed at this stage. From the point of view of the Government, the project is justified *inter alia* by the need to reduce sugar imports and improve trade balance. From IFAD's perspective, the relevance would have to be assessed in terms of poverty reduction effects (number of household and people covered and size of income increase), economic viability, potential environmental risks and reputational risks due to land tenure issues, resettlements of farmers and pastoralists' access to the area (see also the Relevance section in Chapter IV).

281. There was **no geographic prioritization** in the 2003 and 2007 COSOP because the main priority of the time for IFAD was to realign itself to the national sector strategies and to the basket funding mechanism which purported to cover the entire territory of Tanzania. The overall national policy environment has somehow shifted **more recently** with the **introduction of both commodity and geographically targeted initiatives of the Government** (notably the *Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania* and *Big Results Now*) which has already resulted in a request for a locally targeted intervention (Bagamoyo out-grower scheme) and may result in further geographically or commodity-targeted cooperation requests.
282. **A programme covering a vast area.** However, covering the entire territory of Tanzania implies higher supervision costs as well as risks of scattering activities with limited sustainability prospects. This is in part the case of MUVI and even more so of MIVARF which has national coverage.
283. In terms of sub-sectoral focus, the COSOP 2007 dropped the specific emphasis on health services, sanitation and HIV- AIDS of the 2003 COSOP. This was in line with an IFAD corporate shift away from direct intervention in health and sanitation, with the understanding that the related services may be provided by other donors through co-financing agreements. As noted, some activities in health and sanitation have been funded by the Belgian Government. IFAD's perspective is that the Belgian-funded interventions target very poor communities with weak local infrastructure base and that the improvement of water quality and health is a key factor in raising labour productivity. This CPE acknowledges this perspective but notes that these initiatives are better suited to smaller-scale project-mode interventions, also in view of their limited financial volume (US\$5 million). When implemented in the context of ASDP (as it happened since ASDP-L was assigned to basket funding) their strategic relevance and nexus become less clear. Moreover, health and sanitation sectors are covered by sectoral programmes with which it is difficult to align through project-modality.
284. **Mixed multi-level approaches to institutional anchoring of interventions.** Three forms of anchoring of IFAD's support can be distinguished: (i) within the Ministerial structure as for ASDP; (ii) parastatal body as with SIDO under the MUVI project (under the oversight of the Ministry of Industry and Trade) and (iii) Prime Minister's Office (MIVARF). The integrated model followed for ASDP is relevant as far as alignment with agricultural SWAp is concerned. For MUVI, the anchorage in SIDO is debatable due to its limited experience within agricultural value chain development. Also debatable is the anchorage of MIVARF in the Prime Minister's Office (see also the Relevance section in Chapter IV). The multiple centres and levels of authority reduce its internal integration and increase the challenges of local governments of forging ASDP-MUVI-MIVARF linkages on the ground.
285. **While the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs recognised the need to build partnerships with the private sector and the civil society, there was no operationalization guidance.** The private sector plays a fundamental role in the framework of the 2007 COSOP fourth Strategic Objective "increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprise" and, generally, in value chain development. The Civil Society can play a role in relation to all the four 2007 COSOP's Strategic Objectives, given the limits of implementation capacity at regional and local government authority levels. The role of Civil Society

Organizations is recognized by the 2007 COSOP, but more in the SWAp planning than in partnership for project and program implementation at regional, local government authority and grassroots levels. Overall, there has been no concrete guidance on how to develop these principles in practice and in fact the design of agricultural value chain development has essentially been conceived between the Government and IFAD.<sup>80</sup>

286. **Gaps and emerging needs.** Although not affecting the overall validity of the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs, some areas that have not received sufficient attention in the past include:
- (i) Zanzibar's specific socio-economic features (small island economy, higher population density);
  - (ii) Natural resource management: although individual projects may have introduced improved agricultural practices (for example through the FFS approach), COSOPs did not provide clear guidance. In particular an emerging issue is rangeland resource management and pastoral livelihoods with the connected issue of conflicts between farmers and the pastoralists;
  - (iii) Both in Zanzibar and on the Mainland, the item of coastal area livelihoods (including fisheries) has received limited attention: the new project in Bagamoyo is likely to bring this item to the forefront. However, it is fair to recognize that it is an area where IFAD has no specific expertise so far and the Fund might require the support of and partnership with other organizations (e.g. NGO, international technical assistance).<sup>81</sup>
287. Overall, the 2003 and 2007 COSOPs were responsive to changes in the policy environment and the logic behind them was sound. The logical framework of the 2007 COSOP reflects well the general strategic directions promoted by the strategy. In retrospect, the objective and indicators are difficult to attribute to IFAD's programme given that they are formulated at a macro level and that IFAD contributed to sector-wide support. In addition, the objectives for policy dialogue are formulated in a rather ambitious manner given the limited resources. However, these and other shortcomings do not compromise the general relevance of the 2003 and 2007 COSOP which can be assessed as satisfactory (5).

## J. Effectiveness

288. COSOP-level effectiveness relates to the achievement (or likelihood of achieving) of the COSOP strategic objectives (through both lending and non-lending activities). As noted in Chapter VI of this report, non-lending activities have been limited which brings COSOP effectiveness closer to an aggregation of investment results.
289. A constraint in the assessment is the absence of specific data on some of the indicators proposed by the 2003 and 2007 COSOP, due to gaps in project-level and Government M&E systems.<sup>82</sup> The other main constraint is that in several instances targets are set at the national level and the extent to which changes can be attributed to IFAD-supported interventions is less clear,<sup>83</sup> either because part of the operations were through basket funding, or because of exogenous factors, including interactions between agriculture and other sectors, international trade and climatic factors.
290. In 2014 the country office has prepared an "Action Plan for improving COSOP Programme Performance and Enhanced Results". This is a useful document with a

<sup>80</sup> MUVI and MIVARF hired private sector advisers (value chain implementing partners) but partnerships with actual private sector operators are more limited.

<sup>81</sup> The 2013 CLE on Efficiency warned against IFAD getting directly involved in too many themes of domains (fisheries was used as one of the examples) suggesting that stronger partnerships with organizations that carrying specific expertise would reduce the risk of spreading too thin.

<sup>82</sup> The Zanzibar sub-programme review (2013) and the COSOP completion report of 2014 have made an ex post attempt to aggregate project-level data to monitor COSOP objectives, yet they are constrained by project M&E data scarcity.

<sup>83</sup> Given the relatively limited size of IFAD's portfolio, it is often a matter of contribution to national level indicators, rather than attribution

frank and detailed analysis of the major issues encountered (Strategic, Non-lending and Operational, see Box 1). This Action Plan resonates well with this CPE's own findings.

Box 1.

**Items excerpted from the COSOP Action Plan 2014**

<p><b>Strategic and non-lending</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Absence of proactive and systematic monitoring of the COSOP programme</li> <li>• Limited Operational Support to Private Sector in the past, notably little_people-public-private partnerships</li> <li>• The regional and country-level non-lending activities have been managed in an ad-hoc manner and not strategically</li> </ul>
<p><b>Portfolio/Projects</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overly complex project designs which cover very large geographical areas and have inadequate implementation readiness</li> <li>• Most of the IFAD-supported projects have experienced procurement challenges, at both national and sub national levels, causing implementation delays</li> <li>• Several projects rely on service providers, many of them have incurred difficulties in fulfilling their intended role and consequently led to implementation delays</li> <li>• Several projects have exhibited weaknesses in financial management, contributing to delayed disbursements and inadequate fiduciary compliance.</li> <li>• There are constraints to Scaling Up Innovations: notably due to: (i) weak scaling-up agency at design; (ii) weak M&amp;E systems and lesson documentation; reliable evidence of readiness of innovations to be scaled up; (iii) of continuity in funding by Govt. &amp; development partners; and (iv) gaps at policy and institutional level affecting the investment "enabling environment"</li> <li>• Weak M&amp;E Systems, including a persistent absence of "SMART" criteria and indicators. The monitoring of the projects is also problematic due to their geographical dispersion</li> </ul>

Source: summarised from IFAD-ESA COSOP Action Plan 2014

291. **Taking into account COSOP objectives, results can be qualified as overall moderately satisfactory.** Table 18 below provides a synopsis of available information. In the period 2004-2007, the COSOP 2003 was implemented through IFAD's contribution to PIDP, RFSP and AMSDP. Their evaluations pointed to overall moderately satisfactory project achievements. More specifically this was satisfactory in small-scale irrigation and moderately satisfactory in both rural finance and marketing. One of the main problems identified in the latter areas was the scattered nature of interventions, high management costs and the relatively low number of local micro finance institutions and farmers' marketing groups with solid viability prospects (see also Chapter IV, section A).
292. Regarding the 2007 COSOP, moderately satisfactory to satisfactory effectiveness has been achieved as refers to strategic Objective 1, "Improved access to productivity enhancing technology and services". This was mainly through IFAD's contribution to the basket funding of ASDP and to the sub-programme in Zanzibar. This report has illustrated the encouraging progress made on the Mainland in building a delivery system of extension services at the district level, based on the FFS approach, and in introducing improved agricultural technology (irrigation, seeds, mechanization, fertilizers), although significant district-level disparities exist. Progress on the Mainland has been made on crops, with less emphasis on livestock-related activities and pastoralism. Results at strengthening extension system and at enhancing farming household productivity were even more impressive in Zanzibar.
293. As for strategic objective 2, "Enhanced participation of farmer organizations in planning of ASDP", this partly refers to the more participative bottom-up planning process at the village-ward-district level which ASDP has introduced. It also, however, refers to the participation of local and national farmers' organisations in policy debates. As the IFAD 2014 COSOP Completion Report rightly cautions, "there



is limited available data to quantify the outcome and intermediate outcome targets regarding the extent and depth/quality of enhanced participation of farmer organizations in the planning and implementation processes of ASDP". In addition, IFAD approved a grant to MVIWATA for enhancing the involvement of this umbrella farmers' organization in policy discussion processes.

294. Finally, relating to strategic objective 3, "Increased access to rural financial services" and strategic objective 4 "Increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprise", there is information on some initial steps taken by the "old" generation projects RFSP and AMSDP through their dedicated evaluation (2011). As far as more recent projects are concerned, MUVI's progress has been weak so far and MIVARF's implementation has been significantly delayed and is still seriously constrained by design flaws. Rural finance and value chain development are weaker areas of the country programme.

Table 18

**COSOP objectives and progress made**

<b>2003 COSOP Summary of Strategic objectives<sup>84</sup></b>	<b>Synthesis Assessment of achievement (2004-2007)</b>
<b>Strategic objective 1</b> , "Enhance productive capacity/sustainability of the rural poor in both farm and non-farm"	<i>Achieved within the PIDP project. This objective would in principle apply to ASDP as well but the latter was implemented at later period thus covered under 2007 COSOP</i>
<b>Strategic objective 2</b> , "Increase the overall trade volume of agriculture and livestock products and its share to total export"	<i>No data available for the period 2004-2007</i>
<b>Strategic objective 3</b> , "Increase farmers' cash flow and employment opportunities enhanced"	<i>Partly achieved through PIDP, RFSP and AMSDP</i>
<b>2007 COSOP Summary of Strategic objectives</b>	
Strategic objective 1: Improved access to productivity enhancing technology and services	Achieved to a significant extent through ASDP (Mainland and Zanzibar). Moderate contributions in selected regions by MUVI.  (see selected ASDP indicators Table 7 in this report under "Effectiveness", see also Table 3 in Annex VII drawn from IFAD's COSOP self-assessment 2014)
Strategic objective 2: Enhanced participation of farmer organizations in planning of ASDP	This is mainly through the bottom-up planning approach followed by ASDP whereby district agricultural development plans are construed from village-level plans, further aggregated at the ward level. IFAD also approved a grant to a national umbrella farmer organization to foster involvement of farmers' representatives, no information is available on the results
Strategic objective 3: Increased access to rural financial services	This was partly achieved through RFSP. Instead the rural finance components of MIVARF are lagging behind given the general implementation delays and the delay which is still ongoing on the design of these components
Strategic objective 4: Increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprises	This was also partly achieved through AMSDP. MIVARF implementation is still lagging behind and MUVI has been of limited effectiveness in this area.

Source: CPE assessment

295. While the lending part of the programme is globally in the positive zone, mainly thanks to ASDP, there has been **limited progress in the non-lending activities**, notably due to weak knowledge management and some gaps in policy dialogue, particularly when compared with the 2003 and 2007 COSOP ambitious goals. The country programme is rich in practical experiences (both relating to successes and shortcomings) that deserve being documented and systematized. This would avoid the risk of "starting from square one" in the future and wasting time to "re-invent" approaches which have already been tested. Related to this, is the problem of the **weak interaction with and absorption of experience from grants**. There are interesting experiences from grants (notably in the case of marketing and value chain development), sometimes more innovative than those funded through loan-

<sup>84</sup> Though the terminologies used to describe strategies are different in the two COSOPs (IFAD adopted a results-based format in 2006), this CPE considers that the meaning of "Output" in the 2003 COSOP is equivalent to "Strategic Objective" in the 2007 COSOP. In general the output/objectives are pertinent to IFAD mandate. It can be argued that the second output of the 2003 COSOP ("increase the overall trade volume of agriculture") is rather ambitious and to some extent beyond IFAD's control.

based projects. However, perhaps because they are approved and managed at the regional level, loan-project management teams and sometimes the country office are barely aware of the existence of such grants.

296. **Annual COSOP review workshops contributed to exchanges between some partners but did not lead to an assessment of progress made on COSOP objectives.** These workshops have provided the Government, IFAD staff and the teams in charge of loan-funded operations an opportunity to exchange experiences. The workshops have not yet systematically included those in charge of grant-based operations even when based in Tanzania. Workshop participants have provided a briefing on progress in their respective activities or project but this has not led to an assessment of progress made on COSOP objectives and the proceedings of the workshops do not permit an extrapolation of such assessment. As a comparison, in another country within ESA region, Rwanda, annual COSOP review meetings are instrumental to monitor the delivery of COSOP objectives. As noted, a more useful tool is the 2014 Tanzania COSOP Action Plan which lists a number of country programme implementation constraints and outlines the envisaged measures to address them.
297. With respect to the adherence to **Paris declaration principles**, loans such as ASSP, ASDP-L and ASDP (basket funding) are highly compliant as they are fully integrated in the Government procurement and delivery system, agreed upon by the major donors. In the case of MUVI, project management is formally integrated within SIDO, a parastatal, thus not establishing an external unit. The project adopts the public procurement system but with IFAD's supervision. For MUVI the problem was not that of compliance of its design set-up with the Paris declaration tenets but rather: (i) the lack of specific expertise of SIDO in the specific project activities; (ii) the heavy-handed supervision by IFAD during the initial years of implementation.
298. Finally, MIVARF is managed by a separate programme management unit under the Prime Minister's Office. What is questionable is not so much the decision to establish an external unit (this might have been justified by the complexity of the project) but rather the choice of setting this project under the oversight of the Prime Minister's Office (value chain development is not part of its main mandate) and of locating the management unit for the Mainland in Arusha, for a national programme with key institutional partners located in Dar es Salaam. The programme adopts national procurement procedures but requires IFAD's no-objection which, during 2011-2013, was imposed at several procurement stages and caused delays.
299. Overall, taking into account the main results (the older cohort projects RFSP and AMSDP, the more recent support to ASDP, as well as MUVI and MIVARF), the rating for COSOP effectiveness is moderately satisfactory (4). This takes into consideration positive progress in two of the four COSOP objectives and more modest focus and progress in non-lending activities. The overall COSOP assessment is also moderately satisfactory (4), keeping in mind the satisfactory COSOP relevance as well as the limited progress in agricultural value chain development which was one of the new elements brought in by the 2007 COSOP.
300. Box 2 presents a set of lessons learned stemming from the CPE analysis which are further built upon in the next section of Conclusions and Recommendations. Lessons learned are articulated around the three pillars of the CPE: portfolio performance, non-lending activities and COSOP performance.

## Box 2

**Selected lessons stemming from the CPE**Portfolio performance

Setting up an agricultural sector-wide approach is a challenging task given the diversity of actors and agro-ecological environment within the sector. In Tanzania two factors have contributed to the overall moderately satisfactory experience of ASDP: (i) a tradition of planning at the national level with the related financing and policy mechanisms; (ii) the policies on decentralization and devolution to local government authorities, allowing decision making on implementation to be made by local government authorities.

On the other hand, gaps and differences in organizational capacity between and within local government authorities have been a constraint to implementation (particularly on the Mainland) and caused variation in the level and quality of performance of local agricultural development activities funded through ASDP. There is still a need to narrow the capacity gap by supporting local government authorities and to further target/differentiate interventions according to local needs and capacity.

Value chain development entails working with several private sector actors, such as wholesalers, processors and exporters. A proper diagnostic of value chain and identification of these partners can help better understand their interest and potential. Several key actors in value chain development are not local, but national or international (this is important given the increasing role of regional trade) and focusing initiatives on local/district level only would fail to involve these actors.

Developing value chains also requires building trust among the main partners. This in turn requires improving knowledge (particularly for farmers) of the prevailing prices, mechanisms for price formation and market structures. In this area, IFAD grant-funded initiatives have tried to come up with innovative solutions, still to be analysed and internalised.

Non-lending activities

Given its very distinctive mandate, IFAD's comparative strength in policy dialogue is not likely to be in setting Government macro-agenda but rather in using lessons from project experience to support policy preparation and implementation. Policies and strategies are better formulated when informed by hands-on knowledge of what happened "on the ground". The latter is an area of potential strength for IFAD.

However, for this to happen, there is a need to analyse and systematize field and operational experiences to identify factors for success and failure and elaborate practical guidelines and approaches that can be used for project preparation as well as for policy discussions. This may call for specific resources that are beyond the country office regular budget allocation but could be mobilised through country specific grants.

COSOP performance

To effectively implement a country strategy, important tools are the periodic reviews and assessments of the achievements. In the case of IFAD's COSOP, annual review have taken place but involving only government actors and not focusing enough on assessing the agreed objectives. Opportunities for improvement may consist of (i) broadening the participation beyond the Government, for example to private sector organizations, civil society organizations and organizations in charge of grants; (ii) better structuring the review around the assessment of the degree of achievement of COSOP objectives (experiences from IFAD programmes in the regions such as Rwanda and Madagascar may be useful).

**C. Overall achievements**

301. Table 19 presents the overall ratings of IFAD-Government partnership. This is based on the assessment of the portfolio performance, non-lending activities as well as COSOP performance, but it is not their average. The portfolio performance and COSOP performance are rated moderately satisfactory, while the performance of non-lending activities is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. The overall Government-IFAD partnership is rated as moderately satisfactory, in consideration of the fact that both portfolio and COSOP performance are assessed in the "positive" zone.

Table 19

**Overall assessment of the partnership**

<i>Portfolio performance</i>	4
Non-lending activities	3
COSOP performance	4
<b>Overall Government-IFAD partnership</b>	<b>4</b>

**Key points**

- COSOP 2003 and 2007 matched well Government's and donors' plans to improve coordination and harmonization in agricultural development. Emphasis was at that time on national coverage through ASDP. More recent Government sub-sectoral initiatives (SAGCOT and BRN) call for more explicit geographical/commodity targeting.
- The country programme includes a mix of contributions to basket funding and traditional project-mode interventions. This was a justified choice, as the project modality was at that time the only option for supporting agricultural value chain development.
- The Bagamoyo Sugar Out-grower and Wider Community Development Program presents a further modality of intervention (public-private partnership) but requires clarification on a series of environmental, social and economic cost-benefit items.
- Overall, effectiveness of the COSOP, based on the stated objectives, can be considered moderately satisfactory, mainly based on previous projects' contributions (PIDP, RFSP, AMSDP) and on the support to a decentralised extension system and to agricultural productivity (ASDP Mainland and Zanzibar). More recent programmes to support agricultural marketing and value chains have encountered serious implementation problems, affecting the achievement of COSOP-level results as well.
- Limited progress in knowledge management and policy dialogue and weak synergy with grant-funded activities (some of them pertinent and promising in their support to market intelligence and access) have reduced the scope for innovativeness and for sharing lessons learned with the Government and development partners.

**VIII. Conclusions and recommendations****K. Conclusions**

302. **Storyline.** Since 2004, IFAD investments in Tanzania were adapted to fit the Government's preferred financing modality for sustainable agricultural development. In particular, IFAD's main financial contributions were provided, inter-alia, using basket funding within a sector-wide approach (ASDP) for investments in agricultural infrastructure and extension.
303. At the same time, IFAD also provided assistance in the form of individual loan-funded investment projects in the areas of agricultural marketing and value chain development, as no specific coordination mechanism has yet been established for these types of interventions in Tanzania.
304. The CPE found that operations in agricultural infrastructure and extension within basket funding were overall moderately satisfactory or satisfactory in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact and sustainability. The support provided to the basket fund was instrumental in setting in place a system for delivery of services to smallholder farmers through local government authorities, contributing to the adoption of improved technologies and yield increase. Compared to the traditional project modality, two important features of the ASDP were the lower project management costs as well as the lower transaction costs for the Government and development partners, including IFAD.
305. Interventions focusing on agricultural marketing and value chain development were hampered by design flaws, which constrained their effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. In particular, the matter of implementation readiness did not receive sufficient attention at the design stage, such as the need to ensure adequate institutional capacity at the local level for service delivery. Moreover, in recent years, many donors and NGOs have supported a number of interventions on agricultural value chain development with a risk of inconsistent approaches and uncoordinated actions, which has limited their collective potential for rural transformation.

306. While COSOPs had set ambitious goals for the non-lending activities, limited resources were allocated to the same. In addition to loans, IFAD also financed regional grants that included activities in Tanzania. Though rich in innovative experiences, grant-funded activities have been poorly integrated in the country programme so far and this is a recurrent finding in many IFAD country programme evaluations as well as in the Corporate-level Evaluation on the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing.
307. **The stronger case of effectiveness, impact and sustainability has been the support to ASDP, both in its Mainland and in the Zanzibar sub-programme.** Malnutrition is still a serious problem in Tanzania and support to agriculture (production and marketing) is still a priority for which the public system has an important role to play, although opportunities exist for further private sector engagement. The results achieved by ASDP, including through the Farmer Field School, provide a message of hope that the agriculture sector can be transformed by using adequately participatory local level structures in planning and implementing development interventions from villages up to wards and districts. The performance of ASDP has benefited from the advancements made in the decentralization process and the long history of planning and implementation of public programs in Tanzania (see Chapter II and Chapter IV –Portfolio Relevance and Effectiveness).
308. ASDP contributed to the implementation of public policies by setting the stage for improving national and decentralised public systems for agricultural support. Through the grassroots farmers’ organizations, the poor are beginning to participate in shaping local agricultural development plans. There is evidence of positive effects on improving farmers’ knowledge and increasing yields. In Zanzibar, the programme went one step ahead in terms of quality of extension services and of introduction of innovative elements, such as the farmer facilitators and the community animal health workers (see Chapter IV under Effectiveness; Impact on Household Income and Assets; Impact on Human and Social Capital; and on Food Security).
309. **Working within a sector-wide approach modality in Tanzania had important merits.** First, implementation through local government authorities strengthened decentralization and local planning and delivery systems. Second, management costs were lower compared to the alternative which would have implied fielding 15-20 separate projects, each with management cost ratios of 20 per cent or more. Third, it reduced transaction costs for the Government which would have otherwise needed to follow-up several projects supported by different donors, each of them with different procedures and reporting requirements. Fourth, it adhered to the principles of the Paris Agenda, strengthened country ownership and contributed to harmonised mechanisms.
310. However, the CPE finds that coverage and quality of the extension system and of agricultural infrastructure and its management have been uneven. On the Mainland, focus has been mostly on crops with less attention to livestock production, rangeland management, and dairy value chain development. Much remains to be done institutionally and on the ground to ensure better performance in the ASDP extension system, not to mention the need for better monitoring (see Chapter IV- Effectiveness).
311. **Continuity and consistency in policies are key factors to ensure sustainability of results.** ASDP was originally conceived as a fifteen-year effort. The second ASDS-ASDP was initially slated for approval in 2013 but will be delayed to 2015 in the best-case scenario. It is precisely at this time that the system put in place, notably at the decentralised level, needs further investment in institutional capacity and methodology for enhancing outreach to farmers. In Zanzibar, while the Government fully embraces the principles of ASDP and FFS have become part of its mainstream approach, funds have been fully used, and in the absence of new financing, activities will be downscaled (Chapter II, Chapter IV - Sustainability).

312. **There has been limited progress in supporting agricultural marketing and value chain development.** Older-generation projects such as RFSP and AMSDP provided an initial contribution to enhancing the outreach of local microfinance institutions and some aspects of marketing (e.g. transportation infrastructure, storage). However, more recent interventions (MUVI and MIVARF) have been constrained by a number of wrong assumptions at design, due to: (i) insufficient value chain diagnostic; (ii) design focus limited to the local (ward/districts) segments of the value chains, while key actors may be national or international; (iii) design not sufficiently focusing on implementation feasibility; and (iv) limited internalisation of the experience of grants-funded initiatives in market access and market information (see Chapter II; Chapter IV-Relevance; Chapter V- Government Performance, Chapter VI- Knowledge Management and Grants).
313. The ongoing preparation of a loan to support an out-grower sugarcane scheme in Bagamoyo is a first attempt for IFAD to engage in a public-private sector partnership in Tanzania. The design has attempted to draw lessons from previous IFAD experiences in supporting out-grower schemes in the region (palm oil in Uganda and sugarcane in Swaziland), vows to introduce or strengthen climate change resilient technologies and practices and is candid about a number of risks. Questions remain in relation to the risk of negative externalities on the coastal ecosystem, high cost per hectare as well as land tenure issues and pastoralists' customary rights (see Chapter IV-Relevance and Chapter VII – COSOP Relevance).
314. In the past years, there has been a proliferation of uncoordinated activities in agricultural value chain development with a risk of inconsistent approaches. Multi-donor initiatives to coordinate interventions in value chain development are now starting to appear in Tanzania (Chapter VII- COSOP Relevance). As indicated in Chapter II, key constraints to value chain development include the following: (i) agriculture remains characterised by low crop yields, particularly for cereals and low productivity and commercialisation of livestock products; (ii) there is still limited private sector involvement in the rural sector; (iii) policies that do not allow value chains to fully benefit from regional integration (see also Chapter VI – COSOP Relevance).
315. **Traditional projects have presented opportunities for more refined targeting at design but entailed higher management and transaction costs.** Traditional projects' design provided for more refined social or geographic targeting criteria and may be better suited to test innovative components and approaches. At the same time, traditional projects displayed: (i) high management cost ratios (over 20 per cent); (ii) high transaction costs to the Government that has to follow up and report to several donors according to different standards; (iii) risk of inconsistent approaches and objectives between uncoordinated interventions; (iv) a tendency to develop projects through external teams of experts, with limited national leadership and insufficient attention to implementation readiness (see Chapter IV-Efficiency; Chapter V- Performance of the Government; Chapter VII- COSOP Relevance).
316. **Non-lending activities have received limited support, compared to the size and importance of the Programme.** Since 2004, thanks to IFAD's country presence, partnerships have perceptively improved with the Government and major international agencies. Moreover, involvement in the coordination groups and mechanisms has been more systematic. A current gap is the absence of partnership in the Mainland with the Ministries in charge of land, environment and natural resource management, and climate change issues. Partnerships have been traditionally weak with the civil society and the private sector. They have been limited with the UN family as well, including those agencies that are closer to IFAD's mandate (e.g. FAO and WFP), even though the IFAD country office is hosted by FAO. IFAD has recently shown more attention to collaboration with the UN family but cooperating with the UN country team can be time-demanding, particularly for a small country office (see Chapter VI – Partnership Development).

317. There was limited progress with respect to the COSOP objectives for knowledge management and policy dialogue. The IFAD-supported portfolio is rich in practical experience but there is a *deficit* in its analysis, extraction of lessons both on successes and failures, and documentation. The risk is that of “re-inventing the wheel” every time a new programme is designed. Therefore, weak knowledge management limits the capacity to convey practical experience to rural development policy makers when specific sub-sectoral policies/strategies are prepared or revised, and to support the government and the partners in implementing such policies or strategies (see Chapter VI – Knowledge Management, Policy Dialogue).
318. Finally, there has been **little synergy between IFAD’s loan interventions and the grants activities in Tanzania**. Most of the grants are regional and had limited visibility and weak linkages with the loan portfolio. At present, there are no country-specific grants funded through IFAD’s regular resources while these could fund knowledge management and policy dialogue activities in Tanzania (see Chapter VI – Knowledge Management, Grants).

## L. Recommendations

319. **Recommendation 1. Prepare a new COSOP in collaboration with the Government of Tanzania and key national and international partners, to define a new strategy of intervention and investment priorities in the country.** The new COSOP should reflect the main findings and recommendation of the current CPE and select priorities taking into account the estimated resources available for lending. In the short term, according to the Performance Based Allocation System (December 2013), US\$55 million are available to Tanzania in the period 2013-2015.
320. The COSOP should also be used as an instrument for IFAD’s strategic positioning for the next five –seven years in the country and to improve country programme management in general. In particular, the COSOP needs to articulate IFAD’s support to basket funding within ASDP, with its support to other initiatives such as agricultural value chain development, and explore opportunities for coordination with other donors on the latter. The COSOP should also specify the geographic and sub-sector selectivity for future investments, with the aim of avoiding dispersion for better efficiency and outcomes. It should also establish clear linkages between non-lending activities, grants and the lending programme and devote stronger attention to COSOP reviews (annual, mid-term, completion). The COSOP should be used as a truly living document, so adjustments can be made during COSOP life to respond to the evolving context.
321. **Recommendation 2. The first programmatic priority is to support the preparation and implementation of the next phase of ASDS/ASDP both on the Mainland and in Zanzibar.** In addition to its positive effects on crop yields, income and food security, ASDP had an important institutional impact on local government authorities which needs to be consolidated. Improvements are also needed in the programme design: (i) higher selectivity on the type of agricultural infrastructure to be financed; (ii) strengthening of the M&E capacity and reporting at the local and central government levels; (iii) transferring of successful approaches tested in Zanzibar (e.g., farmer facilitators and community animal health workers) to the Mainland.
322. Within ASDS and ASDP, the livestock sub-sector, together with rangeland management and the dairy value chain deserve specific focus. Tanzania has an important livestock potential but this has received limited attention and investment so far. In addition to opportunities, there are also risks, notably those related to conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, as well as national policy issues. Country grants could be used for better diagnosis and for piloting initiatives.

323. **Recommendation 3. Subject to the availability of resources, in addition to supporting ASDS/ASDP, IFAD could consider funding traditional loan-funded projects, within certain priorities and conditions.** In special cases, traditional projects may be needed to focus on themes and issues not dealt with in general extension coverage, such as targeting of specific socio-economic groups, addressing problems relating to specific geographic or resource contexts, as well as to test/develop innovations before they can be later scaled up through the ASDP-supported extension system.
324. For these types of projects, IFAD should insist on geographical areas or commodities that are likely to have significant welfare effects on high number of poor households while controlling project management cost ratios (i.e., avoiding geographically scattered interventions). In addition, there needs to be far more focus on implementation readiness at the project design stage, with the Government playing a more active role in the design, and on learning from grant-funded pilot initiatives.
325. **Recommendation 4. Value chain development requires more consultation ex ante with private sector actors and more coordinated approaches with other international organizations.** In the past, private sector entrepreneurs have played a negligible role in the design of agricultural value chain development interventions. Partnerships with private sector actors need to be emphasised from the beginning as they need to play an increasing role. Private sector entrepreneurs and other relevant partners (e.g. the cooperative apex organizations) could be more actively involved in regular COSOP review meetings as well as through country grant-funded initiatives.
326. Coordination is needed to join efforts to develop private and public stakeholders' involvement and cooperation, to enhance public capabilities for enabling strategic policy formulation and implementation. This could be done either within the ASDP-2 framework (if found suitable) or, through other emerging multi-donor initiatives. New multi-agency initiatives are emerging (such as the Agricultural Marketing Development Trust supported by SIDA, DANIDA, IrishAID and other agencies). IFAD needs to follow these initiatives with attention and consider support if they are found of relevance for IFAD's end-clients.
327. **Recommendation 5. Support knowledge management, partnership development and policy dialogue activities that are closely connected to IFAD-funded operations.** While IFAD has recognised knowledge management, partnership development and policy dialogue as an integrating part of its country programme in Tanzania, it has faced human and financial resources constraints. By concentrating its effort on ASDP, the country office could devote more time to non-lending activities. IFAD will need to elaborate more focused objectives for non-lending activities and mobilize resources. Options include: (i) embedding knowledge management and policy dialogue components in future financed operations (to document and systematise experiences, establishing practical guidelines on "what and how to do", and to contributing to policy discussions and related stock-taking events with policy makers); (ii) use more strategically the annual COSOP review workshops to engage key partners (e.g. non-governmental and private sector organizations); (iii) mobilise country-grant financing both from its regular resources and from external donors, thus also improving synergy between grants and the lending portfolio; (iv) learn from practices adopted in other IFAD-supported programmes, for example in Madagascar (see CPE 2013).
328. More specifically, IFAD could provide significant contributions to:
- *Knowledge management:* (i) learn from FFS improved practices supported by ASDP in Zanzibar in order to enhance extension approaches on the Mainland; (ii) conduct a dedicated review work to systematize experience through past and ongoing grants in market access, market intelligence in view of its future use for project design and implementation support. In addition, this review



should cover experiences of MUVI project in value chain development during the two-year project extension; (iii) provide support (e.g. through grants as in the case of Zanzibar) to the capacity of the Government agencies to monitor and assess development interventions and build a functioning M&E system.

- *Policy dialogue* (i) support the preparation and implementation of ASDS/ASDP-2 by helping prioritize the different areas of investment (e.g., extension/FFS, vs. irrigation, vs. farm equipment, vs. agro-processing equipment); (ii) supporting the Government in designing livestock and rangeland management programmes with emphasis on conflict prevention between pastoralists and farmers, benefiting from knowledge accumulated through previous grants.
- Establish *partnerships*: (i) with governmental agencies in charge of land tenure, environment and climate change in order to facilitate a dialogue on policy and regulatory issues; (ii) with non-governmental organizations and private sector organizations for agricultural value chain development; and (iii) selectively, with UN agencies that are closer to the IFAD's mandate (e.g., WFP on grain procurement, FAO or UNDP on technical assistance and policy issues).

## Ratings of IFAD-funded operations in Tanzania (2004-2014)

Portfolio Assessment	"Older projects" (approved in 1999-2001) Ratings from past IOE evaluations				More recent operations (approved 2004-2014) closely reviewed by the present CPE					Overall Rating
	PIDP	RFSP	AMSDP	Rating 1999- 2001 cohort	ASDP- Mainland	ASSP/ASDP- L Zanzibar	MUVI	MIVARF	Rating 2004- 2014 cohort	
<b>Core performance criteria</b>										
Relevance	6	4	4	5	5	5	3	3	4	4
Effectiveness	4	5	5	5	4	5	3	n.r.	4	4
Efficiency	4	3	4	4	4	5	3	n.r.	4	4
<b>Project performance<sup>a</sup></b>	4.7	4	4.3	4.7	4.3	5	3	n.r.	4	4
Household income and assets	4	5	5	5	4	4	3	n.r.	4	4
Human/social capital and empowerment	4	5	4	4	4	4	3	n.r.	4	4
Food security and agricultural productivity	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	n.r.	5	5
Natural resources and the environment	4	n.r.	n.r.	4	4	5	4	n.r.	4	4
Institutions and policies	4	4	4	4	5	5	3	n.r.	5	4
<b>Rural poverty impact<sup>b</sup></b>					4	5	3	n.r.	4	4
Sustainability	4	3	4	4	4	5	3	n.r.	4	4
Pro-poor innovation, replication and scaling up	5	4	4	4	4	5	4	n.r.	4	4
Gender equality and women's empowerment	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.		5	5	5	n.r.	5	5
<b>Overall project achievement<sup>c</sup></b>	4	4	4	4	4	5	3	n.r.	4	4
<b>Performance of partners</b>										
IFAD	5	4	4	4	5	5	3	3	4	4
Government	5	4	4	4	4	5	3	3	4	4

a. Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency.

b. This is not an average of ratings for individual impact domains.

c. This is not an average of ratings for individual criteria. Moreover, the ratings for the performance of partners is not a component of the overall assessment rating.

## IFAD-funded loans and grants in Tanzania

Table 1  
List of IFAD Loans approved in Tanzania since 1978

Proj Id	Proj. Name	Proj. Type	Total Cost (in million USD)	IFAD Fin	Co-financing	Govt. Funding	Cofinancier	Board App	Loan Eff	Proj Comp	Current Status
2	Mwanza/shinyanga rural dev. Project	Rural Dev	25.08	9.48			World Bank	13/04 1978	28/02/1979	31/12/1983	Closed
176	Southern Highlands Smallholders food crop project	Agriculture Dev	13.448	7.741	1.3	4.3	DANIDA	05/09/1985	03/08/1987	30/06/1993	Closed
242	Smallholder support project in Zanzibar	Agriculture Dev	7.1	6.3		0.56	-	13/09/1989	07/03/1991	30/06/1997	Closed
324	Sothern highlands extension and rural financial services project	Research/Extension/ Training	18.08	15.81		2.275	-	06/04/1993	30/06/1993	31/03/2000	Closed
489	Mara regional farmers initiative project	Agriculture Dev	19.3	14.37		2.17	BSF	2.18	25/06/1996	31/12/2002	Closed
1006	Kagera Agriculture & environmental management project	Agriculture Dev	24.119	14.834	6.6	2.06	BSF, OFID	04/12/1996	10/09/1997	30/06/2004	Closed
1086	Participatory Irrigation Development Project	Irrigation	25.25	17.05	4.4	3.1	Ireland, WFP	08/09/1999	18/02/2000	31/12/2006	Closed
1151	Rural financial services programme	Credit & financial services development	21.602	16.34	2.16	2.7	OFID, SDC	07/12/2000	12/10/2001	31/12/2010	Closed
1166	Agricultural marketing systems development prog.	Agriculture Dev	42.302	16.34	20	5.4	African Development Fund	06/12/2001	04/10/2002	31/12/2009	Closed
1273	Agriculture Services Support Programme	Research/Extension/ Training	114.428	25	72.72	11.86	Basket Fund	02/12/2004	30/01/2007	31/03/2014	Ongoing
1306	Agriculture sector development programme- Livestock	Livestock	29.07	20.6	4.79	3.06	Belgium	08/09/2005	30/01/2007	31/03/2015	Ongoing
1363	Rural, micro, small and medium enterprises prog.	Credit & financial services development	25.31	19.94	0.91	4.23	Ireland	14/12/2006	12/07/2007	30/09/2014	Ongoing
1420	Agriculture sector development programme	Rural Dev	180	56	89.75	16.875	Basket Fund	17/12/2008	21/08/2009	30/09/2016	Ongoing
1553	Marketing infrastructure, value addition and rural finance support programme	Marketing/storage/pr ocessing	170.46	90.5	76.254	3.43	AfDB, AGRA, Sweden	15/12/2010	25/02/2011	31/03/2018	Ongoing

Table 2  
**IFAD-funded grants in Tanzania**

<b>LGS ID</b>	<b>Title of Grant</b>	<b>Recipient<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Amount (in USD)</b>
705	Programme for Overcoming Poverty in Coconut-Growing Communities: Coconut Genetic Resources for Sustainable Livelihoods	Bioversity International	1 000 000
738	Developing a Pro-Poor Competitive Cashew Industry in East Africa: Pilot Project	Technoserv Inc.	120 000
774	Programme for Enhanced Bamboo- and Rattan-Based Smallholder Livelihood Opportunities	International Network for Bamboo and Rattan	1 500 000
819	Programme for the Development of Sericulture and Apiculture Products for the Poor in Fragile Ecosystems, Using the Value Chain Approach	International Center of Insect Physiology and Ecology	1 400 000
825	Project for Technical Assistance to the United Republic of Tanzania's Rural Financial Services Programme	Mennonite Economic Development Associates	100 000
830	Building a Knowledge Management Strategy for Effective Rural Development in East Africa	International Support Group	200 000
831	Combat Hunger and Rural Poverty Through Increasing Access to Knowledge	CAB International	175 000
835	Competence Development Programme for IFAD-financed Programmes in the United Republic of Tanzania	Capacity Building International	110 000
836	Developing Approaches, Tools, Methods and Institutional Arrangements to Increase Scalability and Adaptive Replication of Bamboo and Rattan Options in Investment Projects	International Network for Bamboo and Rattan	190 000
874	Programme for the Integrated Protection of Cassava from Emerging Pests and Diseases that Threaten Rural Livelihoods	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture	1 300 000
911	Assessing and Developing Replicable Methodologies and Approaches for Sustainable Charcoal Production for Livelihood Development, Rural Energy Security & Environmental Protection	International Network for Bamboo and Rattan	130 000
950	Assessing the Potential of Farmer Field Schools to Fight Poverty and Foster Innovation in East Africa	International Food Policy Research Institute	196 000
953	Programme for Pro-poor Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa	World Agroforestry Centre	1 000 000
955	Alleviating Rural Poverty Through Improving Rice Production in East and Southern Africa	International Rice Research Institute	1 500 000
957	Programme for Green Water Credits – Pilot Operation	International Soil Reference and Information Centre	1 500 000
973	Programme for Integrated Innovations for Improving Legume Productivity, Market Linkages and Risk Management in Eastern and Southern Africa	International Crops Research Institute for Semiarid Tropics	1 400 000
977	Support to AFRACA Development Programme 2008-2012	African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association	1 100 000
978	Programme for Extending Agro-Input Dealer Networks	International Fertilizer Development Centre	1 000 000
1011	Rural HIV/AIDS Impact Mitigation Project – Phase II (United Republic of Tanzania)	World Vision	200 000
1012	Building Effective Commercial Rural Market Services in the United Republic of Tanzania	Traidcraft Exchange	200 000

<sup>1</sup> Names of recipients as given in the GRIPS System

<b>LGS ID</b>	<b>Title of Grant</b>	<b>Recipient<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Amount (in USD)</b>
1035	FIDAFRIQUE-IFADAFRICA Network – Programme for Promoting Knowledge-sharing and Innovation for Rural Poverty Reduction in sub-Saharan Africa	West Africa Rural Foundation	2 000 000
1037	Programme for Enhanced Bamboo-based Smallholder Livelihood Opportunities – Phase II	International Network for Bamboo and Rattan	1 250 000
1038	Traidcraft Exchange: Local Market Services Development Project	Traidcraft Exchange	1 000 000
1078	Regional Initiative for Smallholder Agriculture Adaptation to Climate Change in the Indian Ocean Islands	Indian Ocean Commission	750 000
1080	Rural Finance Knowledge Management Partnership – Phase II	African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association	1 300 000
1168	Programme for Improved Management of Agricultural Water in Eastern and Southern Africa, Phase II	International Water Management Institute	1 500 000
1175	Programme for Enabling Sustainable Land Management, Resilient Pastoral Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction in Africa	International Union for Conservation of Nature	950 000
1224	Social Investment in Commercial Market Access Services [in Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania]	Swiss Association for Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas	200 000
1228	Enabling Rural Transformation and Grass-roots Institution Building for Sustainable Land Management and Increased Incomes and Food Security	World Agroforestry Centre	1 500 000
1255	Programme for Increasing the Impact of the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund	Alliance for a Green Revolution In Africa	1 000 000
1278	Development of a viable Cash-on-the-Bag transaction model for small farmers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda	Pride Africa	440 000
1298	Strengthen capacity of Eastern African farmers' organizations through knowledge management and institutional development	Eastern Africa Farmers Federation	150000
1311	Enhancing Dairy-based Livelihoods in India and the United Republic of Tanzania through Feed Innovation and Value Chain Development Approaches	International Livestock Research Institute	1 000 000
1325	Land and Natural Resource Tenure Security Learning Initiative for East and Southern Africa	United Nations Human Settlements Programme	200 000
1329	Strengthening capacity of East African farmers' organizations	Eastern Africa Farmers Federation	1 500 000
1438	Enhanced Smallholder Engagement in Value Chains through Capacity Building and Organizational strengthening	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture	495 000
1450	Land and Natural Resource Tenure Security Learning Initiative for East and Southern Africa – Phase 2	United Nations Human Settlements Programme	1 425 000

**Table 3**  
**Grants reviewed by this CPE**

*a. Value Chains/Market Access and Market Information:*

- First Mile Project
- Cash on the Bag Scaling up a secure, transparent trading business model for smallholders in East Africa
- Building Effective Commercial Rural Market Services in the United Republic of Tanzania
- Enhanced Smallholder Engagement in Value Chains through Capacity Building and Organizational Strengthening, given to IITA.
- Cash-on-the-Bag – Scaling up a secure, transparent trading business model for smallholders in East Africa.

*b. Livestock & Pastoralists:*

- Sustainable Rangeland Management Program (SRMP)
- Dairy Feed Innovation and Value Chain Development Approaches
- Program for Enabling Sustainable Land Management, Resilient Pastoral Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction in Africa, given to IUCN.

*c. Strengthening capacity of civil society organizations*

- Strengthening capacity of East African Farmers Organization, given to the East Africa Farmers Federation.
- Innovation Mainstreaming Initiative (IMI), given to Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives and the National Network of Small-Scale Farmers Groups (Known by its Swahili acronym of MVIWATA).

*d. Socio-economic research*

- Program for Overcoming Poverty in Coconut-Growing Communities: Coconut Genetic Resources for Sustainable Livelihoods
- Regional East African Community Trade in Staples (Kilimo trust)
- Program for Pro-poor Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa, given to the World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF).

## Methodological note on country programme evaluations

329. A country programme evaluation (CPE) conducted by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) has two main objectives: assess the performance and impact of IFAD-financed operations in the country; and generate a series of findings and recommendations that will inform the next results-based country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP). It is conducted in accordance with the directives of IFAD's Evaluation Policy<sup>1</sup> and follows the core methodology and processes for CPEs outlined in IOE's Evaluation Manual.<sup>2</sup> This note describes the key elements of the methodology.
330. **Focus.** A CPE focuses on three mutually reinforcing pillars in the IFAD-government partnership: (i) project portfolio; (ii) non-lending activities; and (iii) the COSOP(s). Based on these building blocks, the CPE makes an overall assessment of the country programme achievements.
331. With regard to assessing the **performance of the project portfolio** (first pillar), the CPE applies standard evaluation methodology for each project using the internationally-recognized evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and rural poverty impact - including impact on household income and assets, human and social capital, food security and agricultural productivity, natural resources and the environment (including climate change<sup>3</sup>), and institutions and policies. The other performance criteria include sustainability, innovation and scaling up, and gender equality and women's empowerment. The performance of partners (IFAD and the government) is also assessed by examining their specific contribution to the design, execution, supervision, implementation-support, and monitoring and evaluation of the specific projects and programmes. The definition of all evaluation criteria is provided in Annex V.
332. The assessment of **non-lending activities** (second pillar) analyzes the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts of IFAD and the government to promote policy dialogue, knowledge management, and partnership building. It also reviews global, regional, and country-specific grants as well as achievements and synergy with the lending portfolio.
333. The assessment of the **performance of the COSOP** (third pillar) is a further, more aggregated, level of analysis that covers the relevance and effectiveness of the COSOP. While in the portfolio assessment the analysis is project-based, in this latter section, the evaluation considers the overall objectives of the programme. The assessment of relevance covers the alignment and coherence of the strategic objectives - including the geographic and subsector focus, partners selected, targeting and synergies with other rural development interventions - , and the provisions for country programme management and COSOP management. The assessment of effectiveness determines the extent to which the overall strategic objectives contained in the COSOP were achieved. The CPE ultimately generates an assessment for the overall achievements of the programme.
334. **Approach.** In line with international evaluation practices, the CPE evaluation combines: (i) desk review of existing documentation - existing literature, previous IOE evaluations, information material generated by the projects, data and other materials made available by the government or IFAD, including self-evaluation data and reports; (ii) interviews with relevant stakeholders in IFAD and in the country; and (iii) direct observation of activities in the field.

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/102/e/EB-2011-102-R-7-Rev-1.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process\\_methodology/doc/manual.pdf](http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/process_methodology/doc/manual.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> On climate change, scaling up and gender, see annex II of document EC 2010/65/W.P.6 approved by the IFAD Evaluation Committee in November 2010: <http://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/ec/e/65/EC-2010-65-W-P-6.pdf>

335. For the field work, a combination of methods are generally used for data gathering: (i) focus group discussions with a set of questions for project user and comparison groups; (ii) Government stakeholders meetings – national, regional/local, including project staff; (iii) sample household visits using a pre-agreed set of questions to household members, to obtain indications of levels of project participation and impact; (iv) key non-government stakeholder meetings – e.g. civil society representatives and private sector.
336. Evaluation findings are based on triangulation of evidence collected from different sources.
337. **Rating scale.** The performance in each of the three pillars described above and the overall achievements are rated on a scale of 1 to 6 (with 1 being the lowest score, and 6 the highest), enabling to report along the two broad categories of satisfactory (4, 5, and 6) and unsatisfactory performance (1, 2 and 3). Ratings are provided for individual projects/programmes, and on that basis, for the performance of the overall project portfolio. Ratings are also provided for the performance of partners, non-lending activities, the COSOP's relevance and effectiveness as well as the overall achievements of the programme.
338. In line with practices of international financial institutions, the rating scale, in particular when assessing the expected results and impact of an operation, can be defined as follows - taking however due account of the approximation inherent to such definition:
- |                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| <i>Highly satisfactory (6)</i>       | The intervention (project, programme, non-lending, etc.) achieved - under a specific criteria or overall –strong progress towards all main objectives/impacts, and had best practice achievements on one or more of them. |
| <i>Satisfactory (5)</i>              | The intervention achieved acceptable progress towards all main objectives/impacts and strong progress on some of them.  |
| <i>Moderately satisfactory (4)</i>   | The intervention achieved acceptable (although not strong) progress towards the majority of its main objectives/impacts.  |
| <i>Moderately unsatisfactory (3)</i> | The intervention achieved acceptable progress only in a minority of its objectives/impacts.   |
| <i>Unsatisfactory (2)</i>            | The intervention's progress was weak in all objectives/ impacts.  |
| <i>Highly unsatisfactory (1)</i>     | The intervention did not make progress in any of its objectives/impacts.  |
339. It is recognized that differences may exist in the understanding and interpretation of ratings between evaluators (inter-evaluation variability). In order to minimize such variability IOE conducts systematic training of staff and consultants as well as thorough peer reviews.
340. **Evaluation process.** A CPE is conducted prior to the preparation of a new cooperation strategy in a given country. It entails three main phases: (i) design and desk review phase; (ii) country work phase; (iii) report writing, comments and communication phase.
341. The *design and desk review phase* entails developing the CPE approach paper. The paper specifies the evaluation objectives, methodology, process, timelines, and key questions. It is followed by a preparatory mission to the country to discuss the draft paper with key partners. During this stage, a desk review is conducted examining available documentation. Project review notes and a consolidated desk



review report are prepared and shared with IFAD's regional division and the government. The main objective of the desk review report is to identify preliminary hypotheses and issues to be analysed during the main CPE mission. During this stage both IFAD and the government conduct a self-assessment at the portfolio, non-lending, and COSOP levels.

342. The *country work stage* entails convening a multidisciplinary team of consultants to visit the country, holding meetings in the capital city with the government and other partners and traveling to different regions of the country to review activities of IFAD-funded projects on the ground and discuss with beneficiaries, public authorities, project management staff, NGOs, and other partners. A brief summary note is presented at the end of the mission to the government and other key partners.
343. During the *report writing, comments and communication of results* stage, IOE prepares the draft final CPE report, shared with IFAD's regional division, the government, and other partners for review and comments. The draft benefits from a peer review process within IOE including IOE staff as well as an external senior independent advisor. IOE then distributes the CPE report to partners to disseminate the results of the CPE. IOE and the government organize a national roundtable workshop that focuses on learning and allows multiple stakeholders to discuss the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The report is publicly disclosed.
344. A *core learning partnership* (CLP), consisting of the main users of the evaluation, provides guidance to IOE at critical stages in the evaluation process; in particular, it reviews and comments on the draft approach paper, the desk review report and the draft CPE report, and participates in the CPE National Roundtable Workshop.
345. Each CPE evaluation is concluded with an *agreement at completion point* (ACP). The ACP is a short document which captures the main findings of the evaluation as well as the recommendations contained in the CPE report that IFAD and the government agree to adopt and implement within a specific timeline.

## Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition<sup>a</sup></i>
<b>Project performance</b>	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design in achieving its objectives.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
<b>Rural poverty impact<sup>b</sup></b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household income and assets</li> </ul>	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human and social capital and empowerment</li> </ul>	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grassroots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food security and agricultural productivity</li> </ul>	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Natural resources, the environment and climate change</li> </ul>	The focus on natural resources and the environment involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment as well as in mitigating the negative impact of climate change or promoting adaptation measures.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutions and policies</li> </ul>	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
<b>Other performance criteria</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sustainability</li> </ul>	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Innovation and scaling up</li> </ul>	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gender equality and women's empowerment</li> </ul>	The criterion assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
<b>Performance of partners</b>	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. It also assesses the performance of individual partners against their expected role and responsibilities in the project life cycle.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IFAD</li> <li>Government</li> </ul>	

<sup>a</sup> These definitions have been taken from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).

<sup>b</sup> The IFAD Evaluation Manual also deals with the "lack of intervention", that is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or the mention "not applicable") is assigned.

## List of key persons met

### Government of Tanzania

#### Mainland

H.E. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania  
 Hon. Mary Nagu, Minister of State, Investment and Empowerment, Prime Minister's Office  
 Hon. Agrrey D.J.Mwanri, Deputy Minister of State Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government;  
 Mr Omari Issa, Chief Executive Officer, President's Delivery Bureau  
 Mr Geoffrey Kirenga, Chief Executive Officer, Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania Centre  
 Mr Zawadi Mbwambo, Acting Chairman, Tanzania Forest Service, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism  
 Mr David Malissa, Land Officer, Ministry of Lands  
 Mr Penniel Lyimo, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, President's Delivery Bureau (Big Results Now)  
 Mr Henry Kinyua, Director of Agricultural Market Efficiencies, President's Delivery Bureau (Big Results Now)

#### **Prime Minister's Office**

Mr Florens Turuka, Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office  
 Mr Obey N. Assery, Director of Coordination of Government Business, Prime Minister's Office  
 Mr Walter E. Swai, National Programme Coordinator, Marketing Infrastructure, Value Addition and Rural Finance Support Programme, MIVARF

#### **Ministry of Finance**

Dr Servacius Likwellie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance  
 Mr John Kuchaka, Principal Finance Management Officer, External Finance Department, Ministry of Finance

#### **Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives**

Hon. Chistopher Chiza, Minister for agriculture, food security and cooperatives  
 Ms Sophia Kaduma, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of agriculture, food security and cooperatives  
 Mr Raphael L. Daluti, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
 Ms Nkuvililwa Simkhanga, Director of Policy and Planning, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
 Mr Simon Mpaki, ASDP National Programme Officer, ASDP Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
 Ms Mariam Silim, Senior Economist, ASDP Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
 Mr Jackson Mbuya, Accountant, ASDP Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
 Ms Happiness Mlua, Information Officer, ASDP Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
 Mr Bonda Nkinga, Accounts and Finance Officer, ASDP Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives  
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 Mr Seth P. Luswema, Acting Director, Department of Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives

Ms Margaret Ndaba, Principal Economist, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives

### **Ministry of livestock and fisheries development**

Hon. Titus Mlengeya Kamani, Minister for livestock and fisheries development  
 Mr Yohanna Budeba, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries  
 Ms Catherine Joseph Dangat, Director of Policy Planning Division, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries  
 Mr Salimu Mwinjaka, Assistant Director, Monitoring & Evaluation, Ministry of Livestock Development and Fisheries

### **Ministry of Industry and Trade**

Ms Maria Bilia, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry and Trade  
 Mr Odilo Majengo, Deputy Director, Marketing, Ministry of Industry and Trade  
 Ms Consolatha Ishebabi, Director, SME, Ministry of Industry and Trade  
 Ms Fidea Mgima, Assistant Director, Business Services, Ministry of Industry and Trade  
 Mr C.L.W. Mashingo, Assistant Director, Industry, Ministry of Industry and Trade  
 Mr Edward M. Sungula, Director, Policy and Planning, Ministry of Industry and Trade  
 Mr Omar J. Bakari, Director General, Small Industries Development Organization  
 Ms Haika Shayo, Coordinator, Rural Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Support Programme (MUVI)  
 Mr Douglas H. Sawe, Principal Trade Officer, Small and Medium Enterprise Department, Ministry of Industry and Trade

### **Bank of Tanzania**

Mr David Kwimbere, Bank of Tanzania, Assistant Manager: Real Sector & Microfinance  
 Ms Nangi Massawe, Bank of Tanzania, Principal Officer, Real Sector & Microfinance

### **Zanzibar**

H.E. Ali Mohamed Shein, President of Zanzibar  
 Hon. Seif Ali Iddi Second Vice President of Zanzibar

### **Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources**

Hon. Othman Nyanga, Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Mr Affan O. Maalim, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Mr Juma Ali Juma, Deputy Permanent Secretary  
 Mr Zaki Khamis Juma, coordinator for the Zanzibar sub-programme of the Agricultural Services Support Programme and Agricultural Sector Development Programme- Livestock  
 Ms Asha A. Ameir, Director of Administration And Human Resources, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Ms Maryam J. Saadalla, Director of Policy, Planning And Research, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Mr Haji H. Saleh, Director of Agriculture Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Mr Mansura Kassim, Director of Food Security, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Mr Sheha Idrissa Hamdan, Director of Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Mr Ramadhan Abeid, Director of Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
 Mr Khalfan Saleh, Programme Coordinator MIVARF Zanzibar  
 Mr Andreas S. Mbinga, Monitoring And Evaluation Officer – ASSP/ASDP-L  
 Mr Talib Saleh, Coordinator, Agricultural Sector Facilitation Team (ASFT)

Mr Andreas Simon A. Mbinga, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, ASFT  
 Ms Zainab Saleh Hassan, Planning Officer, ASFT

### **Ministry Of Livestock And Fisheries**

Mr Shaaban Jabir, Director Of Administration And Human Resources, Ministry Of Livestock And Fisheries  
 Mr Hafidh Baalawi, Director Of Livestock Production, Ministry Of Livestock And Fisheries  
 MrDr Yussuf Haji Khamis, Director Of Veterinary Services, Ministry Of Livestock And Fisheries

### **Zanzibar National Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture**

Ms Monira Humoud Said, Executive Director  
 Mr Iddi Ohman Iddi, Membership Services Manager

### **Ministry of Finance**

Ms Bihindi Nassor Khatib, commissioner for, External Finance  
 Ms Halima Wagao, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer

### **Ministry of Empowerment, Social Welfare, Youth, Women and Children**

Ms Asha A Abchetta, Permanent Secretary  
 Mr Ali K Juma, Deputy Permanent Secretary  
 Mr Khamis Daud Simba, Director of Cooperatives  
 Mr Suleiman Atlaj, Director of Credit

### **IFAD Headquarters**

Mr John McIntire, Associate Vice-President, PMD  
 Mr Périn Saint-Ange, Director, ESA  
 Ms Miriam Okong'o, Country Programme Manager, ESA  
 Mr Michael Hamp, Lead Technical Specialist, Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA)  
 Mr Antonio Rota, Lead Technical Specialist, PTA  
 Mr Jonathan Agwe, Senior Technical Specialist, PTA  
 Ms Laura Sollazzo, Programme Associate, PTA  
 Ms Ilaria Firmian, Environment and Climate Knowledge Officer, Environment and Climate Division (ECD)  
 Ms Helen Gillman, Knowledge Management Coordinator, Global Engagement and Research Division (GER)  
 Mr Michael Taylor, Director International Land Coalition (ILC)

### **IFAD Country Office staff in Dar es Salaam**

Mr Francisco Pichon, Country Director Tanzania, ESA  
 Ms Mwatima Juma, Country Programme Officer, Tanzania, ESA  
 Mr Isaack Michael, Country Programme Assistant, Tanzania, ESA

### **International Organizations**

Mr Philippe Dongier, Country Director, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi, The World Bank  
 Mr David Rohrbach, Senior Agricultural Economist, the World Bank  
 Mr Olivier Braedt, Program Leader for Agriculture and Infrastructure, the World Bank  
 Ms Zainab Zitta Sengalawe, Senior Rural Development Specialist, Sustainable Development Network, Africa Region Agriculture and Rural Development Unit, The World Bank  
 Ms Tonia Kandiero, Resident Representative, African Development Bank, Tanzania Country Office

Mr Salum Ramadhani, Senior Agriculture Expert, African Development Bank, Tanzania Country Office  
 Ms Joyce Mends Cole, Acting Resident Coordinator, UN  
 Mr Philippe Poinot, Country Director, United Nations Development Programme  
 Mr Ernest Salla, Programme Specialist, United Nations Development Programme  
 Ms Diana Tempelman, FAO Representative in Tanzania  
 Mr Richard Ragan, Country Representative, WFP  
 Ms Géraldine Zeuner, Director of Development Cooperation, Swiss Cooperation Office, Tanzania  
 Mr Ronny Dynoodt, Attaché Development Cooperation, Embassy of Belgium  
 Mr Sizya Lugeye, Chief Advisor, Rural Livelihood and Growth, Embassy of Ireland  
 Mr Ueli Mauderli, Head of Domain, Private Sector Development – Agricultural Economic Affairs Officer, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation  
 Mr David Nyange, Michigan State University and advisor to USAID  
 Mr Gianluca Azzoni, Head of Section for Natural Resources, EU Delegation to Tanzania and the East African Community  
 Mr Alexandre Serres, Programme Officer, EU Delegation to Tanzania and the East African Community  
 Mr Homma Minoru, Senior Representative in Tanzania, Japan International Cooperation Agency  
 Mr Thomas Hobgood, Senior Advisor, Agriculture and Food Security, US Agency for International Development  
 Dr Mary Mgonja, Country Head, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)  
 Ms Mary Mgonja, Chief Executive Officer, AGRA

#### **Non-governmental and research organizations**

Mr Victor Manyong, Director of International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, East Africa Hub  
 Mr Amos Omore, Senior Veterinary Epidemiologist and Country Representative in Tanzania, International Livestock Research Institute  
 Mr Anthony Kimaro, Country Representative for Tanzania, World Agroforestry Centre  
 Mr Mathew Mpanda, Scientist, World Agroforestry Centre  
 Mr Tadeus Kalenzi, Consultant Sustainable Rangeland Management Project  
 Ms Agnes Namuhisa, Director for Cooperative Development, Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives  
 Mr Ahadiel Mmbughu, Research and Marketing Officer, Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives  
 Mr Salum Lupande, PwC Project Manager for MUVI Mwanza and Ruvuma, PricewaterhouseCoopers  
 Mr Hubert Nkya, Project Officer, PricewaterhouseCoopers  
 Mr Peniel Uliwa, Managing Partner, Matchmaker Associates, Service Provider for MUVI in Tanga  
 Prof. Humphrey Moshi, University of Dar es Salaam  
 Mr Audax Rukonge, Director, Agriculture Non State Actors Forum  
 Ms Janet Bitegeko, Executive Director, Agriculture Council of Tanzania  
 Ms Mary Marealle, Programme Officer, Rangelands and Pastoralists, Tanzania Natural Resource Forum

#### ***Iringa & Njombe Regions***

##### **Iringa and Njombe Regional SIDO Office**

Mr Gervase Kashebo, Regional Manager – Iringa, SIDO  
 Ms Wilma Mwaikambo Mtui, MUVI Project Coordinator - Iringa, SIDO  
 Mr Hebron Mwakalinga, Programme Coordinator, Business Care Services

##### **Iringa Regional Government**

Mr Adam M.N. Swai, Assistant Administrative Secretary, Iringa  
 Ms Grace Bernard Macha, Regional Agricultural Officer, Iringa

Mr Paulo Msangi, Regional Livestock Officer, Iringa  
 Ms Rose Kasole, Agricultural Officer, Iringa

### **Njombe Regional Government**

Mr Ernest Mkongo, Assistant Administrative Secretary, Economy and Production, Njombe region  
 Mr George Lupembe, Regional Trade Officer, Njombe region  
 Mr Paulo Malala, District Executive Director, Njombe district  
 Ms Bernadeta Celestine, District Agriculture and Cooperative Officer, Njombe district

### **Ruvuma Region**

#### **Ruvuma Regional SIDO Office**

Mr Emmanuel Makere, Regional Manager, SIDO  
 Mr Evelyn Fulko Mbenna, Regional Project Coordinator – MUVI, SIDO  
 Mr Stephano Ndungmu, Business Development Officer, SIDO  
 Mr Ralph Kananga, Senior Consultant, PricewaterhouseCoopers  
 Mr Abraham Youze, M&E officer, PricewaterhouseCoopers

### **Arusha Region**

#### **Karatu District**

Mr George Ngowi, Agricultural Officer, Karatu District Council, and MIVARF Focal Person

### **Manyara Region**

#### **Manyara Regional SIDO Office, Babati Town**

Mr Akundasi K Ndosi, Regional Manager  
 Mr Francis Stewart, Technical Officer  
 Mr Farasi Swabuqi, Credit Officer

#### **Babati District Council**

Mr Dominic Kueka, District Executive Director  
 Ms Jetrida Kyeuaka, District Agricultural, Irrigation and Cooperative Officer (DAICO)  
 Mr Jackson Nyella, Principal Agricultural Field Officer  
 Mr Jonas J Masamu, Agricultural Officer  
 Ms Rose A Pauangyo, Agricultural Officer  
 Mr Majid S Majin, Agricultural Officer

### **Tanga Region**

#### **Tanga City and Muheza District**

Mr Juzar Sachak, MUVI Programme Coordinator, Matchmaker Associates Ltd  
 Mr Liberati P. Macita, Acting Regional Manager, SIDO Tanga  
 Ms Gladness Foya, Regional Focal Person for MUVI, SIDO  
 Mr Edwin Shio, Project Officer, MUVI Muheza District  
 Mr Ibrahim Matovu, District Executive Director, Muheza District  
 Mr Anthony J Senkoro, District Agricultural Officer (DAICO), Muheza  
 Ms Jacauenne Ngatimwa, Logistics and Administrative Officer, MUVI Tanga  
 Kilongo Farmers Association

#### **Handeni District**

Mr Patrick Mutuwi, Project Officer, Matchmaker Associates/MUVI  
 Mr Yibarila Chiza Kamde, District Agricultural Officer  
 Mr Bahari Mgaza, Agriculture Officer

## Complementary tables to Chapter II, IV and VII

Table 1.

### Geographically disaggregated data on poverty and stunting prevalence in Tanzania

	<i>Monetary-based poverty estimates (household consumption)</i>	<i>Child chronic malnutrition prevalence (stunting)</i>	
	2000-2001	1999	2009-2010
Tanzania Mainland	36	48.3	42.3
Singinda	55	44.3	
Lindi	53	63.6	53.3
Mwanza	48	43.8	38.7
Pwani	46		32.4
Mara	46	32.2	31
Shinyanga	42	44.1	45
Ruvuma	41	57.9	47.4
Arusha	39	35.5	44.5
Mtwara	38	66.5	44.8
Kigoma	38	57.8	48.2
Tanga	36	61.2	50
Dodoma	34	61	57.1
Kilimanjaro	31	45.2	27.6
Rukwa	31	47.1	51.4
Morogoro	29	60.5	44.8
Iringa	29	71.9	52
Kagera	29	51.8	43.1
Tabora	26	44.3	32.6
Mbeya	21		51.3
Dar Es Salaam	18	28.7	19.7

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (1999, 2001, 2011)



Table 2

**Selected issues of value chains of relevance for smallholder famers**

**a) Maize** is the most important staple food in Tanzania and also a predominantly smallholder's crop. It is grown in almost all regions of Tanzania and approximately 40 per cent of the maize produced is commercially marketed. Three main kinds of buyers for maize are small private traders, the Cereals Board and the National Food Reserve Agency. Private traders purchase directly from the farmers in the harvesting season and take it to regional wholesale markets in producing areas. However, lack of market information and unstandardized measuring facilities are widespread thus resulting in very low farm gate prices for smallholders. Tanzania is both a major exporter and importer of maize. Restrictions on exports have been imposed in the past: a recent IFPRI study concludes that the impact of export bans on maize consumer prices is marginal (0.6-2.4 per cent lower) while vastly affecting the producer prices (7-26 per cent lower) mostly affecting smallholders.

**b) Coffee** is one of the most important export cash crops of Tanzania and about 90 per cent of the coffee is grown by smallholders. It is grown in North, South and West parts of the country and the yield varies significantly among the regions with an overall yield of 591 kg/hectare which is lower than the worldwide average of 760 kg/hectare. The Tanzania Coffee Board undertakes grading, issues permits and conducts auctions. Coffee growers have the option to sell directly at the Board auctions or to private buyers, cooperatives or Independent Primary Societies who in turn sell it through the auction. No export tariffs are levied on coffee. Farmers tend to receive only about 40% of the Freight on Board price due to value chain inefficiencies and domination by a few large export companies.

**c) Cassava** is an important subsistence crop, especially when the supply of maize fails. There is a wide prevalence of mixed maize-cassava systems. In its raw form, cassava is highly perishable post-harvest. Cassava is slowly moving towards commercialization driven by the increasing popularity of high quality cassava flour to be used for numerous food products. Other uses include consumption as food, livestock feed, as a sweetener in industrial food processing.

**d) Rice:** Similar to maize, rice is primarily a smallholder crop. Rice cultivation is characterized by low productivity, with the yield in 2013 estimated to be about 2.08 tonnes/hectare, compared to almost 5.2 tonnes and 5.3 tonnes respectively recorded in Kenya and Rwanda. About 40 percent of the rice produced in Tanzania is commercially marketed. The rice value chain includes a lot of intermediaries such as traders, millers, brokers, wholesalers, and retailers. The low vertical integration, with several intermediaries taking their own share of profit, results in low farm gate prices as a proportion of the prevalent market prices. High transportation costs and a district cess, value varying from district to district, further inflate the difference between the farm gate and the market price. The domestic rice industry is protected with a tariff of 75 per cent applied for rice imports from outside the East African Community (EAC).

**e) Cow Milk** accounts for about 92 per cent of milk production in Tanzania. About 65 per cent of milk is produced by indigenous breeds. Although estimates vary on this, the largest majority of cow milk is consumed without any processing either on-farm (29.5 per cent) or through informal sellers (67 per cent) and only 3.5 per cent of the produce is processed.

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Sources: IFAD (2014) *Tanzania COSOP Completion Report And Self-Assessment*; IFPRI (2013), *Economy wide impact of maize export bans on agricultural growth and household welfare in Tanzania, A Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model Analysis*; USAID (2010) *Tanzania Coffee Industry Value Chain Analysis*; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania; FAO-MAFAP (2013).

Table 3

**A note on environmental aspects to be considered in the design of Bagamoyo Programme**

**The Bagamoyo Sugarcane Out-grower and Wider Community Development Programme.** The project is still at a development stage and only preliminary considerations can be made. According to the IFAD concept note, the proposed programme would benefit smallholder farmers through irrigation development for sugar cane and the promotion of crop diversification, drought-tolerant varieties, forage crops, precision farming and better livestock management practices. The design is in line with national strategies and policies (such as land titling, the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania or the Bug Results Now).

It is important to recognize, on the positive side, that the design has seriously considered a number of risks that may emanate from the project implementation such as: (i) land tenure issues and resettlements of farmers and issues related to pastoralists' access to the area ; (ii) long time to start-up out-grower enterprises; (iii) delays in completing irrigation infrastructure; (iv) difficulty in finding financing for out-grower enterprises; (v) international sugar price fluctuations and fair cane prices for smallholders. Moreover, IFAD has tried to distil past experiences from similar past projects in Uganda and Swaziland.

However, the following issues need further consideration in the next design steps:

- (i) There is a need to focus on integrated (and wider) coastal area development in relation to the land-seascape area comprising the zone to be developed, and the Wami River basin landscape. A reduction (albeit seasonal) in the volume of fresh water flow reaching the Wami River estuary can be expected due to the amount of water to be used for sugarcane in irrigation. This may result into increased salinity in the estuary, which could have a negative impact on the mangrove ecosystem and fisheries resources. This may call for a specialized technical review.
- (ii) As recognized in the concept note and in the May-June 2014 pre-design mission, pre-estimated unit costs are on the very high side. Assuming a developed area of 3,800ha, the unit cost of infrastructure development (bulk and on-farm infrastructure combined) would be circa US\$16,900/ha. If additional baseline costs such as capacity development and catchment management and the programme coordination are included, then unit cost per ha would amount to US\$23,300/ha.<sup>7</sup> The question is whether the future stream of benefits can be expected to outstrip these costs. All this calls for a very careful analysis of costs and benefits and a judicious estimation on the number of beneficiaries (direct and indirect) of the out-grower scheme (not of the nucleus farm).

With regard to the risk of salinization of the Wami River estuary, it is worth noting that this is a large-scale irrigation project. Its design should pay attention to factors other than the technical engineering and the projected economic implications. A realistic assessment of the true costs and benefits that are likely to result is still needed. Among other things, the sustainability of the projects depends on the taking into consideration of environmental effects on the Wami estuary, and the impacts on the livelihoods of the communities depending on coastal area resources. It is essential that the project be planned and managed in the context of the overall integrated coastal area development plan, including both the upland catchment areas and the areas downstream.

An estuary is the transition between a river and the sea. In the estuary system, there is an interaction between water, sediment and salinity. The river discharges fresh water and sediments into the estuary and the sea fills the estuary with salty water, on the rhythm of the tide. The salinity of the estuary water is therefore the result of the balance between two opposing fluxes: a tide-driven saltwater flux

Source: CPE team elaborations (2014).

## Complementary tables to Chapter VII

Table 1

### Recommendations of the 2003 Tanzania CPE and actions taken in the COSOP 2003

<i>Recommendations (synthesis)</i>	<i>Actions taken</i>
<p><b>Consistency with GOT Policy Framework.</b> Further support the policy framework for rural poverty reduction in Tanzania. All future IFAD assistance should be provided within the existing pro-poor policy context, in particular within the framework of the PRSP, Rural Development Programme (RDP) and ASDP. This will ensure greater synergies and co-ordination with other development interventions and help lower the transaction costs of aid.</p>	<p>This COSOP has been prepared as an integral part of the country-owned process and within the framework of IFAD's Corporate Strategy and its Regional Strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa Region to realize the MDGs. These options are consistent with the broader guidelines of the PRSP, RDS and ASDS at the national level and the NEPAD and SADC at the regional level. Such options will allow the Government to focus on key strategic areas of the rural and agricultural sector, where substantial growth opportunities and potential exist.</p>
<p><b>Approaches to Rural Poverty Alleviation.</b> IFAD interventions should have a clear strategy for including the rural poor and explicitly analyze the challenges and develop specific strategies of extending reach to the poorest. Project and programme design must entail added information on how to reach the poor and the extent to which the poorest are also among the intended beneficiaries. However, targeting should be examined from the perspective of its feasibility so that overall sustainability of the programme is not jeopardised. This will require a more detailed definition of targeting mechanisms during the programme development phases. IFAD and other stakeholders are in reaching the poor.</p>	<p><i>No action described in the COSOP 2003</i></p>
<p><b>Target Group Definition.</b> Design documents need to distinguish between the 'poor' and 'poorest' and specify in detail the mechanisms to reach each group. This is best done at the design stage in a participatory manner with the rural poor and their communities. The practice of monitoring periodically the inclusion of identifiable groups of the poor in project activities during implementation should be intensified.</p>	<p>CPE has indicated that the definition of the poor and the poorest during the programme design has been considerably improved. Under the next phase of COSOP supported programmes, efforts will, however, continued to be made for further refinements of these definitions, including incorporation of appropriate instruments and modalities so that the rural poor can become the real beneficiaries of the programme support.</p>
<p><b>Thematic/Sub-Sectoral and Geographic Concentration.</b> Thematic and sub-sectoral concentration needs to be strengthened. Opportunities for combining thematic approaches with a geographical concentration should be further explored in order to ensure the IFAD assistance is not diluted in terms of area and sectoral coverage. Existing practices of harmonising social and economic components should be continued with added emphasis. A clear exit strategy needs to be formulated with all concerned stakeholders at least one year before closing.</p>	<p><i>No action described in the COSOP 2003</i></p>
<p><b>Policy Dialogue.</b> IFAD should simultaneously enter into a comprehensive policy dialogue and further strengthen advocacy work at the national and local levels with GOT and other external development partners. This will require greater IFAD representation at the country level and pro-active participation in relevant platforms and discussion groups. In particular, the Fund should contribute to the work of various strategy and policy working groups and processes, such as the PRSP, UNDAF, Food and Agriculture Sector Working Group (FASWOG) and the ASDS.</p>	<p>IFAD, in collaboration with other donors, is currently assisting the Government in developing a detailed policy and operational framework for grass-roots MFIs, rationalization of the agricultural taxation system, establishing appropriate cost recovery for irrigation systems, and a communications system for marketing information as well as policies on pricing. IFAD will extend its assistance to Government, within the framework of the ASDS and RDS, to resolve some of the critical policy issues relating to: i) implementation of land policy, particularly concerning property rights, land titling and registration; ii) improvement of water policy through introducing appropriate pricing policy and allocation procedures ; iii) microfinance policy for rationalising cooperative laws and regulations of private banks; iv) removal of trade barriers and marketing regulations; v) decentralisation of decision making process to local government and civil society organisations; and vi) improvement of cost recovery for sustainability.</p>
<p><b>The New Tanzania COSOP.</b> COSOP formulation should be undertaken as a joint exercise between IFAD and GOT. In addition, IFAD and its partners should use the development of the new Tanzania COSOP as an opportunity to promote a participatory and inclusive process of policy dialogue with the concerned stakeholders.</p>	<p><i>No action described in the COSOP 2003</i></p>

**Subsidies and Cost-Sharing Arrangements.** Cost-sharing arrangements should be promoted in line with the Government policy (public & social sectors) and be determined by participatory approaches, particularly for establishing the level and type of beneficiary contribution, so that the rural poor and their groups are aware of their roles and responsibilities particularly in terms of operation and management of activities. IFAD could take the lead in promoting a dialogue with various donors and GOT to develop a common framework for rationalising cost-sharing arrangements for rural poverty alleviation purposes in Tanzania.

IFAD does not allow or provide any subsidy in its operations unless it is considered as public good. Based on the existing practices, IFAD will rigorously enforce the principle of a cost recovery system to realize full Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and a part of the capital costs for the services rendered for health, irrigation and livestock diseases to ensure their long-term sustainability.

**Participation.** It is important to develop a common understanding at the outset among key stakeholders on the concept of participation, so that stakeholders have shared expectations and are cognisant of their specific roles and responsibilities. Participation should contribute to a transformation of the rural poor from being mere participants in development work to active agents of change. Projects/programmes should work through established institutions, including traditional structures, whenever appropriate, and the creation of new, parallel structures for building participation should be limited. Where institutions are not sufficiently oriented to promoting participatory approaches, staff training should be encouraged, specifically in interpersonal skills such as empathy, communication, group dynamics and facilitation, and motivational leadership.

*No action described in the COSOP 2003*

**Project/Programme Design.** Rationalise project/programme objectives to ensure enhanced efficiency in delivery and developmental results, while at the same time ensuring greater complementarity with other relevant projects and programmes supported by GOT and other development partners.

*No action described in the COSOP 2003*

**Project Management and Implementation.** Operate within GOT policies and with involvement of a cross-section of institutions (public sector, private sector, civil society organisations and NGOs) according to their comparative advantage. Learn from the experience of MARA-FIP in promoting decentralised project management and ensure capacity building of local authorities and grassroots institutions to take up the tasks of project coordination/facilitation.

*No action described in the COSOP 2003*

**C. Agriculture Technology.** Institutionalise client-oriented research and improve research-extension and farmer linkages, including taking stock of effective/appropriate technologies and involving poorest farmers in assessing current and new technologies. Promote dissemination of sustainable and environmentally friendly technologies, for example, by building information/communication systems (strengthen media such as radio, television and email/internet) and upscaling IPM/farmer field school approaches. Empower participatory groups and co-operatives from the community level, ward, district, zonal research, regional and at national levels. Identify, document and promote traditional knowledge practices and farmer innovations, establish a sustainable funding mechanism for technology generation and dissemination.

IFAD and the World Bank are currently testing on a limited scale, pilot extension and research approaches in the United Republic of Tanzania so that farmers, irrespective of their scale of operations, agro-ecological locations and diverse farm practices, can receive appropriate technical and managerial assistance based on their needs, demand and priorities. These programmes have produced excellent impacts. Encouraged by such approach, the Government has requested IFAD and the World Bank to replicate this programme country-wide so that the farmers can own, operate and manage process, generate and build customised low cost technology, and disseminate and communicate this knowledge through farmers to farmers exchange programmes.

**Monitoring and Evaluation.** Train communities to be involved in M&E activities and make them owners of M&E processes; Implementing. Authorities need to enhance transparency in M&E data collection, analysis and reporting, in particular by keeping the rural poor and their institutions involved and informed. Undertake external evaluation from time to time is essential for learning and building confidence among stakeholders. Intense efforts need to be made to track, follow-up on and implement M&E recommendations. The logical framework tool should be simplified and tailored to make it suitable for use with beneficiaries at the grassroots level.

A number of attempts has been made to improve the M&E system through incorporation of "Log-frame and Impact Analysis" with beneficiaries taking the major responsibilities of collection, compilation and analysis of the indicators based on perceived needs and priorities. This approach will be further refined through independent evaluation and by making appropriate linkages with PRSP, ASDS and RDS to ensure consistency with MDG goals.

**Gender Issues.** Gender analysis and gender-focused targeting should be included in all programme design and M&E work. Reporting to various stakeholders should include specific references to gender impact. In promoting women's development, the changing social and gender relations need to be assessed and necessary offset measures introduced (e.g., training for men).

IFAD, as a matter of policy, has introduced specific legal instruments and operational modalities to ensure women's participation and empowerment of women within the programmes and their access to resources made available to the country. Further streamlining of these approaches will be made during the course of programme design to enable women to access productive resources such as land, water, finance and market etc.

Source: CPE 2014 elaboration from CPE 2003 and COSOP 2003.

Table 2  
Information available on progress made on COSOP objectives –IOE synthesis

2003 COSOP Narrative summary of Strategic objectives	Objectively verifiable indicators	Available information/evidence
<p><b>Strategic objective 1,</b> "Enhance productive capacity/sustainability of the rural poor in both farm and non-farm"</p> <p><b>Strategic objective 2,</b> "Increase the overall trade volume of agriculture and livestock products and its share to total export"</p> <p><b>Strategic objective 3,</b> "Increase farmers' cash flow and employment opportunities enhanced"</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Percentage of growth in rural and agricultural economy.</li> <li>2) Agriculture and livestock export share and earnings increased.</li> <li>3) Small and marginal farmers' earnings increased.</li> <li>4) Increased participation by grassroots institutions in decision-making, etc.</li> <li>5) Agricultural taxation system Rationalized.</li> <li>6) Operationalization of land ownership policy.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) By 2006, PIDP had constructed 56 irrigation schemes to cover 14,000 ha and benefit 25,442 households. 56 water users associations were formed for management of the schemes. 328 km of farm to market access roads were constructed to facilitate movement of inputs/outputs.  The Growth rate of the agricultural sector ranged between 5.8 and 4.0 percent in 2004 and 2007 respectively. Note that there is an attribution issue that would make problematic any attempt to infer a cause-effect relationship between IFAD's funding and agricultural GDP growth</li> <li>2) No data available.</li> <li>3) By 2006, AMSDP (in 21 districts) had helped Government develop an Agricultural Marketing Policy and pass a Warehouse Receipt System Act (WRS). WRS was operating in 8 locations with year-end maize paddy stock of 5,000MT, and TSh 1 billion credit to SACCOS members. By 2006, RFSP was working with 230 MFIs with total membership of 54,867, capital of USD 754,620 and deposits of USD 3.7 million.</li> <li>4) Increased participation by target groups in project activities but not of grass-roots institutions in decision-making.</li> <li>5) No change in the agricultural taxation system due to IFAD program.</li> <li>6) There is no evidence of dialogue between IFAD and Government on land tenure policy. Overall a rating of "4" (moderately satisfactory) seems justified for the COSOP 2003 period, also taking into account the findings of past evaluations.</li> </ol>
2007 COSOP Narrative Summary of Strategic objectives	Milestone indicators for key results	Effectiveness
<p>SO1: Improved access to productivity enhancing technology and services</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Zonal agricultural research institute funds operational beginning 2008 under ASDP and ASSP/ASDP-L.</li> <li>1.2 Number of districts qualifying for district agricultural grants under ASDP remains steady or increased (107 of 121 for 2007/08).</li> <li>1.3 40% of 4m (Mainland) and 0.6m (Zanzibar) farmers/livestock keepers access extension services by 2009 under ASDP/ASSP/ASDP-L (crop 35% in 2003).</li> <li>1.4 15% increase in value of services delivered through NGOs/Private sector by 2008 under ASDP/ASSP/ASDP-L.</li> <li>1.5 Financial arrangements in place for private sector acquisition/use of agricultural machinery (including animal-powered) by beginning 2009.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 ASDP supported research activities in all the 7 Zonal Agricultural Research Institutes (ZARDIs). A total of 242 research proposals on crops, livestock and cross cutting themes have been funded since 2008/09 in the 7 ZARDIs, with an average budget of TSh. 25.8 million.</li> <li>1.2 At the local level, the basket supported districts activities through performance based grants channelled through the Local Government Development Grant (LGDG) system.</li> <li>1.3 At completion of ASDP, the achievement of the target of percentage of farmers receiving visits from public and private extension staff in the Mainland (50%) was 109% (baseline: 10% of farmer households). In Zanzibar, a survey showed that about 77%t of farmers had received knowledge or skills from an FFS.</li> <li>1.4 ASDP-Mainland: 1,400,000 smallholder households were participating in contract farming and marketing out-grower schemes (baseline: 821,000).</li> <li>1.5 ASDP-Mainland: 30% of farmers were using oxen (baseline: 20%), and 5% were using tractors (baseline: 3%).</li> </ol> <p>Overall in this a rea a sub-rating between "4" and "5" (moderately satisfactory to satisfactory is justified)</p>

SO2: Enhanced participation of farmer organizations in planning of ASDP	2.1 Farmers' forums established and recognized in 50% of districts by 2010.	<p>2.1 ASDP promoted bottom-up participatory process to prepare village and district level agricultural development plans. This is an important improvement compared to the past, although disparities exist in the quality of implementation. Farmer forums at Ward and District levels have been created (number created unknown); understanding among extension staff of what role the farmer fora should play or how they should operate is not always consistent. In addition a grant from IFAD (IMI facility) was given to MVIWATA. No results have been recorded for this grant.</p> <p>In this area a sub-rating of "4" (moderately satisfactory) is justified.</p>
SO3: Increased access to rural financial services	<p>3.1 30% increase in membership of SACCOS by 2010 in RFSP regions (54,867 members in 2006).</p> <p>3.2 50% increase in number of community banks supporting SACCOS in RFSP (Baseline: 3 in 2006).</p> <p>3.3 10% increase in number of functional SACCOS in Zanzibar by 2010 (through FO grant).</p> <p>3.4 From 2011, increase in number of rural financial services products (in addition to the SACCOS) nationwide</p>	<p>3.1 RFSP has contributed to giving some 100,000 households access to financial services. The rural poor of remote areas have access to semi-formal financial services for the first time.</p> <p>3.2 RFSP empowered village community banks (VICOBAs) and self-help groups to join SACCOS or form strong linkages with SACCOS or community banks. As of June 2009, 571 such groups had been mobilized and become members of SACCOS. All the 276 SACCOS were somehow linked to FIs, NGOs and other financial institutions. A total of 132 SACCOS were linked with upper level financial institutions and other types of bodies.</p> <p>3.3 No information available.</p> <p>3.4 RFSP provided support to improve the entrepreneurial and business skills of the members/borrowers, but inability to properly assess investments and make business plans remained a major challenge.</p> <p>3.5 Given the considerable implementation delays of MIVARF and the design issues still to be settled, there is limited progress to be reported beyond the closed RFSP project.</p> <p>In this area, a sub-rating of "4" (moderately satisfactory) is justified for the RFSP period, while so far progress under MIVARF could be considered unsatisfactory for the reasons discussed under Chapter IV.</p>
SO4: Increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprises	<p>4.1 50% increase by 2009 in number of completed business plans for supply contracts under MUVI and AMSDP in 2006).</p> <p>4.2 50% increase in number and membership of producer/trade organizations under AMSDP and MUVI (501 groups by AMSDP in 2006).</p> <p>4.3 25% increase in number of rehabilitated warehouses (AMSDP) by 2009 (9 in 2006).</p>	<p>4.1 AMSDP enabled targeted producers to practice collective marketing, determine profitable prices and thereby enhance their bargaining power. No information on business plans. MUVI reportedly directly and indirectly reached the reported 93,000 households, but very few contracts have been facilitated between farmer groups and rural enterprises and between these enterprises and the market.</p> <p>4.2 AMSDP had by program closure assisted 1,202 groups with 46,500 members against a target of 1,000 groups with 25,000 members.</p> <p>4.3 12 Storage facilities have been rehabilitated to completion level and were in use.</p> <p>In this area, results are confirmed to AMSDP. Progress made by MUVI is limited and marginal by MIVARF. The sub-rating of achievements under this COSOP objective is "3" (moderately unsatisfactory).</p>

Source: CPE Elaboration (2014)

Table 3  
**IFAD Tanzania COSOP Self-Assessment<sup>89</sup>**  
**COSOP Results Management Framework (2007 – 2013)**  
**Comparison of Planned and Estimated/Emerging Results at Completion<sup>90</sup>**

Strategic Objectives *	Planned Outcomes that IFAD Expects to Influence (by 2010) *	Estimated Outcomes (with IFAD Influence) (by end of 2010 and 2013) **	Planned Milestone Indicators *	Estimated Milestone Outputs (by end of 2010 and 2013) **
SO 1: Improved access to productivity enhancing technologies and services	With other partners, by 2010:  1.1. Increase food production <sup>91</sup> Baseline 2003: 9 million MT) Target 2010: to 12 million MT.	Working with other partners, by end of 2010 and 2013 the following estimated achievements were made:  1.1. Increased food production Maize: 2010: 4.5 million MTs 2013: 5.2 million MTs Rice: 2010: 1.7 M MTs 2013: 1.3 M MTs Beans: 2010: 0.87 M MTs 2013: 1.2 M MTs  Beef 2010: 0.243 M MTs 2013: 0.289 M MTs  Milk 2010: 1.65 M liters 2013: 1.85 M liters  Total "Food": <sup>92</sup> 2010: 12.3 M MTs 2013: 14.4 M MTs  Productivity Indicators: <sup>93</sup> Maize: (MT/Ha)	1.1 Zonal agricultural research institute funds operational beginning 2008 under ASDP and ASSP/ASDP-L.	1.1: Zonal agricultural research institute funds operational (via ASDP and ASSP/ASDP-L): 2010: TSh 4.2 billion 2013: TSh 0.89 billion (The data are for ASDP only)

<sup>89</sup> This Table has been extracted from Annex 6 of the second volume of the IFAD Tanzania self-assessment of the COSOP, completed in 2014.

<sup>90</sup> Info gaps are being completed.

<sup>91</sup> In the original RMF (of 2007), there was no definition of "food crops", nor was there any disaggregation of the main food crops, thereby making it difficult to come up with an accurate comparison.

<sup>92</sup> Food crops include: Maize, Rice, Sorghum, Millets, Potatoes, Banana, Cassava, and Pulses. The main data source is the MAFC Department of National Food Security

<sup>93</sup> In the original RMF, there was no stated indicator and breakdown according to productivity. These figures for the main food crops have compiled from official sources.

	<p>1.2. Increase % of farmers using modern technology (Baseline 2003: Irrigation 5%, fertilizer 12%, FYM 26%, improved seed 26%)</p> <p>1.3. Increase % use of farm mechanization Baseline 2003: ox-plough 23% tractor 3%</p> <p>1.4. Proportion of smallholders participating in contract production</p>	<p>2010: 1.55 2013: 1.24 Rice: 2010: 2.33 2013: 2.25 Beans: 2010: 0.72 2013: 0.95 Beef (use relevant productivity indicator) 2010: XX 2013: XX Milk (Lts/cow/yr) 2010: XX 2013: XX</p> <p>1.2. % of farmers using modern technology (a) Irrigation: 2010: 7.6 % 2013: XX % (b) fertilizer: 2010: 10 % 2013: XX % (c) Farm Yard Manure (FYM): 2010: 10 % 2013: XX % (d) Improved Seed: 2010: 24.3 % 2013: XX % Extension Impact study (2013) reports that S/Hs participating in the FFSs have highest % of adopting improved technologies 1.3 Farm Mechanization: a) Ox-plow: 2010: 14.5 % 2013: XX % b) tractor 2010: 0.9 % 2013: XX %</p>	<p>1.2 Number of districts qualifying for district agricultural grants under ASDP remains steady or increased (107 of 121 for 2007/08).</p> <p>1.3 40% of 4m (Mainland) and 0.6m (Zanzibar) farmers/livestock keepers access extension services by 2009 under ASDP/ASSP/ASDP-L (crop 35% in 2003).</p>	<p>1.2 Number of districts qualifying for district agricultural grants under ASDP 2010: No. XXX 2013: No. XXX</p> <p>1.3 % of of 4 million (Mainland) and of 0.6m (Zanzibar) farmers/livestock keepers access extension services by ASDP/ASSP/ASDP-L 2010: XXX % 2012: 45 % (mainland)<sup>94</sup> 2012: 53 (Zanzibar) (of which 61% are women)</p> <p>1.4 % increase in value of services delivered through NGOs/private sector under ASDP/ASSP/ASDP-L.:<sup>95</sup></p>
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<sup>94</sup> Source: Extension Impact Study (March, 2013).

<sup>95</sup> This indicator was dropped as one of the key "short listed" indicators monitored under ASDP



	<p>(Baseline 2003: 0.9% to 1.3% (in 2010))</p> <p>1.5. Increase % of livestock keepers using improved technology Baseline 2003: 16% (access to extension)</p>	<p>1.4 XX% of smallholders participating in contract production: 2010: XX % 2013: XX % Note: this is one of the ASDP shortlisted indicators</p> <p>1.5 XX% increase of livestock keepers using improved technology 2010: XX % 2013: XX % % increase in access to extension: 2010: XX % 2013: XX %</p>	<p>1.4 15% increase in value of services delivered through NGOs/private sector by 2008 (under ASDP/ASSP/ASDP-L).</p> <p>1.5 Financial arrangements in place for private sector acquisition/use of agricultural machinery (including animal-powered) by beginning 2009.</p>	<p>2010: XXX % 2013: XXX %</p> <p>1.5 XXX</p>
SO 2: Enhanced participation of farmer organizations in planning of ASDP	2.1. 50% of ASDP DADPs clearly reflect priorities of majority of poor farmers and/or livestock keepers	<p>2.1 XX% of ASDP DADPs which clearly reflect priorities of majority of poor farmers/livestock keepers (or some proxy indicator): 2010: XX % 2013: XX %</p> <p>It is estimated that about 10,000 village plans (part of DADPs) have been prepared using the O&amp;OD approach. This allowed for local productive agricultural investments funded by ASDP (covering nearly 3000 villages), on a cost-sharing basis, supporting the establishment of public infrastructures and farmer group investments, with an average investment per farming household equivalent to Tshs. 10,000/year<sup>96</sup>.</p> <p>The quality of DADPs is reported to have improved over the years. Almost all LGAs follow the guidelines and fulfil the minimum conditions of the Local Capital Development Grant (LCDG) system.</p>	2.1 Farmers forums established and recognized in 50% of districts by 2010.	<p>2.1 No (X). and XX % of Districts where farmer forums have been established and recognized: 2010: XXX No. XXX % of Districts 2013: XXX No. XXX % of Districts</p> <p>See qualitative comment, which implies good progress in establishing and operationalizing and strengthening farmers forums and other avenues for promoting S/H engagement in the planning processes. (IFAD funds supported this work through MVIWATA and ACT)</p>

<sup>96</sup> URT (2011) Evaluation of the Performance and Achievements of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP). Final Draft

		<p>In Zanzibar (unlike in the Mainland where DADPs are being implemented), one mechanism to encourage farmer participation is the establishment of farmer forums at the district level. These have been established in nine of the ten districts in Zanzibar, actively supported by IFAD activities. The decision to open the participation of these forums not just for the members of the FFS but for all farmers has led to enhancing their profile and has contributed to making them a more credible body for representing farmer interests. In addition, on a pilot basis, Shehia Agriculture Development Plans were prepared for Kisongoni and Kinyikani in Zanzibar. This exercise had helped the Shehias develop plans for control of theft of animals and crops, introduction of grazing by-laws, improved land use and environmental conservation, enhanced self-confidence and sense of direction and an increased sense of responsibility. This has also led to recognition of the local shehia leadership at district, regional and national levels.</p> <p>Other available qualitative information<sup>97</sup> reports that "significant progress has been made (in a total of 10 districts, including 2 districts in Zanzibar) in terms of support to smallholders and smallholder organizations in the areas of advocacy, planning and negotiating capacities (in both mainland and Zanzibar). In Zanzibar, there are qualitative reports of enhanced financial empowerment, especially for women groups." At the same time, there was limited funding for these local level activities, and therefore limited the scope and depth of fully achieving this overall SO.</p>		
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<sup>97</sup> Extract from the Tanzania Country Programme Issues Sheet/CPIS (IFAD, January, 2013).

<p>SO 3: Increased access to sustainable rural financial services</p>	<p>3.1. % of farmers who accessed formal agricultural credit (Baseline 2003: 1.7% to 10% (2010) (using RFSP-assisted SACCOS).</p> <p>3.2. % of poor, especially women accessing microfinance services in Zanzibar (Baseline 2005: 12,200 members of MFIs)</p>	<p>3.1 % of farmers who accessed formal agricultural credit (using SACCOS): 2010: XX % 2013: XX %</p> <p>3.2. % of poor, and members of MFIs, especially women accessing microfinance services in Zanzibar 2010: XX % 2013: XX %</p> <p>Available proxy information for country-wide trends: Under the now closed RFSP, the latter had assisted 276 grass roots MFIs (by end 2009), against a design target of 275. There was growth in the number of members of MFIs which grew from 3,750 in 2002 to 117,524 by 2010.<sup>98</sup></p> <p>Under the on-going MIVARF, it is supporting grassroots financial institutions, with the aim of building their capacities to increase rural outreach and expanded access to microfinance services.</p> <p>Tanzania has made good progress in developing its financial sector over the last several years. However, access to and quality of rural financial services have been below desired levels, and the sector still faces some key constraints because of commercial bank sector's risk perception of small-scale operators in the agricultural and rural sectors is very high.</p> <p>Although the Govt has established the</p>	<p>3.1 30% increase in membership of SACCOS by 2010 in RFSP regions (54,867 members 2006).</p> <p>3.2 50% increase in number of community banks supporting SACCOS in RFSP (Baseline: 3 in 2006)</p> <p>3.3 Ten % increase in number of functional SACCOS in Zanzibar by 2010 (through FO grant).</p> <p>3.4 From 2011, increase in number of rural financial services products (in addition to the SACCOS) nationwide.</p>	<p>3.1 XX% increase in membership of SACCOS in RFSP regions 2010: XXX % 2013: XXX %</p> <p>Please note that SACCOS were indicated as a shortlisted ASDP Indicator.</p> <p>3.2 XX% increase in number of community banks supporting SACCOS 2010: XX % 2013: XX % (Info obtained from RFSP)</p> <p>3.3 XX% increase in number of functional SACCOS in Zanzibar (through FO grant). 2010: XX % 2013: XX %</p> <p>3.4 From 2011, XX increase in number of rural financial services products (in addition to the SACCOS) nationwide. 2010: XX No. 2013: XX No.</p>
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<sup>98</sup> Rural Financial Services Programme and Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Programme Interim Evaluation. October 2011. Independent Office of Evaluation.

		Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB), it will take time to reach a point of meeting adequately the financial targets of smallholder producers and entrepreneurs and especially those residing in rural and remote areas.		
SO 4: Increased access to markets and opportunities for rural enterprise	4.1. % increase in volume of produce marketed through secured warehouses (Baseline: 8 operational warehouses in 2006).	<p>4.1. Volume and % increase in produce marketed through secured warehouses: 2006: 821 MT 2009: 8452 % Increase: 929% (note: data not available for 2013)</p> <p>Available information from AMSDP indicates that market training and rehabilitation of rural marketing infrastructure have enabled groups to increase volume and diversity of crops produced and marketed. Implementation of rural marketing infrastructure opened up accessibility to the farms by trucks, hence contributed to a reduction of transportation costs (in some cases reported to be a savings of over 100%). This also has reduced travel time by 50%, thereby contributing to expanded marketing options/competition.</p>	<p>4.1 50% increase by 2009 in number of completed business plans for supply contracts under MUVI and AMSDP.</p> <p>4.2 50% increase in number and membership of producer/trade organizations under AMSDP and MUVI (501 groups by AMSDP in 2006).</p> <p>4.3 25% increase in number of rehabilitated warehouses (AMSDP) (9 in 2006)</p>	<p>4.1 XX% increase in number of completed business plans for supply contracts under MUVI and AMSDP</p> <p>4.2 % increase in number and membership of producer/trade organizations: under AMSDP (by 2009): 140% under MUVI (by 2013): N.A. ??</p> <p>4.3 % increase in number of rehabilitated warehouses Under AMSDP, by 2009: 77% Under MUVI: XX%</p>

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