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الاستثمار في السكان الريفيين

## التقييم المؤسسي لانخراط الصندوق في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات

مذكرة إلى السادة ممثلي الدول الأعضاء في المجلس التنفيذي

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للاستعراض

## المحتويات

1

استعراض

الذيل

1

التقييم المؤسسي لانخراط الصندوق في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات - التقرير الرئيسي

## استعراض

### ألف - تعريف

1- التعريف الذي تبناه الصندوق في عمله في الدول الهشة هو على النحو التالي: "الدول الهشة هي تلك التي تتسم سياساتها بالضعف ومؤسساتها بالوهن وإدارتها بالسوء، والتي تعاني بالتالي من قلة النمو الاقتصادي وانتشار عدم المساواة وتردي التنمية البشرية. والدول الهشة أكثر تعرضاً لخطر نشوب أعمال العنف من الدول غير الهشة. وقد تكون الدول الهشة غنية بالموارد الطبيعية أو فقيرة بالموارد". وقد ورد هذا التعريف في سياسة الصندوق المؤسسية بشأن تفادي الأزمات والإنعاش منها، التي تبناها المجلس التنفيذي في أبريل/نيسان 2006.

### باء - الخلفية

2- يعيش أكثر من 1.2 مليار شخص في الدول الهشة وفي بلدان أخرى تعاني من أوضاع هشة. ويتسم الأشخاص الذين يعيشون في دول وأوضاع هشة على وجه العموم بمعدلات نمو أقل ومؤشرات اقتصادية واجتماعية أسوأ من الأشخاص الفقراء الذين يعيشون في البلدان الأخرى منخفضة الدخل.

3- على مدى السنوات كرس الصندوق المزيد من الاهتمام لانخراطه في مثل هذه السياقات. وينفذ حوالي 40 في المائة من العمليات الجارية للصندوق في حافظته الحالية في بلدان مصنفة على أنها من الدول الهشة. وحوالي 40 في المائة من الأشخاص الذين يعانون من الفقر المدقع (500 مليون نسمة) يعيشون في بلدان تصنف على أنها هشة.

4- ونظراً لاعتبار هشاشة الدولة من الأمور الرئيسية المحددة للفعالية الإنمائية، كما سلط عليه الضوء أيضاً التجديد العاشر لمراد الصندوق، قرر المجلس التنفيذي وجوب إجراء مكتب التقييم المستقل في عام 2014 لتقييم مؤسسي لانخراط الصندوق في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات.

### جيم - نهج التقييم

5- الأهداف. لهذا التقييم المؤسسي ثلاثة أهداف رئيسية وهي: (1) تقدير أداء انخراط الصندوق في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات؛ (2) تحديد الأسباب المنكرة والشاملة للأداء القوي والأقل قوة عبر الأقاليم والبلدان والمشروعات؛ (3) توليد نتائج وتوصيات شاملة للمزيد من التشذيب لانخراط الصندوق المستقبلي في مثل هذه السياقات القطرية.

6- وليس المقصود بهذا التقييم المؤسسي توليد توجيهات أو توصيات مفصلة حول بعض القضايا التشغيلية المحددة أو الأوضاع القطرية الإفرادية، إذ أن ذلك يتعدى نطاق التقييم المؤسسي، على الرغم من أن العديد من أوراق العمل التي أنجزت خلال سياق هذا التقييم توفر تحليلاً ونتائج قد تكون ذات فائدة للمهتمين من القراء بالأوضاع القطرية المحدودة.

- 7- **فترة التغطية.** قدر التقييم المؤسسي هذا أنشطة الصندوق على مدى فترة عشرة سنوات من عام 2004 إلى عام 2013. ويسمح ذلك للتقييم بالتقدير والتعلم من العمليات الأقدم، علاوة على تحليل كيفية تطور نُهج الصندوق في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات مع مرور الوقت في آن معاً.
- 8- **المنهجية.** اتبع التقييم نهجاً يتألف من مزيج من الطرق. وهو ينطوي على ما يلي: (1) استعراض شامل للأدبيات، بما في ذلك فحص التقييمات المستقلة السابقة التي أجراها مكتب التقييم المستقل، والسياسات والاستراتيجيات المؤسسية، وبرامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية، ووثائق المشروعات، والتقارير من منظمات أخرى؛ (2) تحليل بيانات الأداء الموجودة (سواءً من درجات التقييم الذاتي أو من درجات التقييم المستقل الذي يقوم به مكتب التقييم المستقل)، مقابلات مع الأشخاص المطلعين الرئيسيين في الصندوق، والدول الأعضاء الشريكة، والمنظمات الإنمائية الأخرى؛ (3) مسح إلكتروني لجمع التغذية الراجعة من مُدراء البرامج القطرية والموظفين في المكاتب القطرية للصندوق؛ (4) عشر دراسات حالة قطرية مبنية على زيارات قطرية<sup>1</sup>.
- 9- وأما الخطوة الأولى في هذه العملية، فكانت إعداد سلسلة نتائج ضمنية (انظر الشكل 1 في التقرير الرئيسي لانخراط الصندوق في الدول والأوضاع الهشة المتأثرة بالنزاعات). وقد سمح هذا لمكتب التقييم المستقل بتحديد الأسئلة الرئيسية ونهج التحليل الخاص به. وأما الجدول 1 في التقرير الرئيسي فيعرض معايير التقييم والأسئلة المستخدمة في التقييم.
- 10- **المعوقات.** واجه التقييم المؤسسي عدداً من المعوقات الناجمة عن الإطار السياسي المجزأ في الصندوق والذي يفتقر إلى مقاييس واضحة لتقييم التحليل السياقي وتصميم المشروعات. إذ لم تركز تقارير الإدارة الروتينية والدراسات السابقة على خصوصيات العمل في الدول الهشة، وليست هنالك أي قائمة مُعترف بها للبلدان التي لم يتم تصنيفها رسمياً على أنها دول هشة ولكنها تعاني من أوضاع داخلية هشة.
- 11- وللتغلب على هذه المعوقات، ضمّن مكتب التقييم المستقل أن يقوم بهيكله أدوات جمع بياناته بصورة دقيقة لضمان الاتساق، ومن ثمّ حلّل وجمع بيانات من أكثر من مصدر مع مراجعة جيدة للتوثيق قبل الوصول إلى الأحكام التقييمية. ولا يتسم أي تحيُّز محتمل ناجم عن اختيار البلدان بأي أهمية كبيرة لأن دراسات الحالة كانت موجهة في المقام الأول نحو تحديد الدروس المستفادة والممارسات الجيدة. ولم يتم التوصل إلى استنتاجات إلاّ عند ضمان الاتساق في النتائج من مصادر عديدة للدلائل. وتتعلّق الدروس المستفادة المستقاة من هذا التقييم بنُهج وعمليات الصندوق أكثر من تعلُّقها باستجابته لبعض السياقات المحددة.
- 12- **المخرجات.** تم الوصول إلى عددٍ من المخرجات خلال هذا التقييم بأسره. وهي تتضمن: تقارير إفرادية عن دراسات الحالة لعشرة بلدان تمت زيارتها، تحليل لاستراتيجيات وسياسات الصندوق الأساسية في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات، تحليل للتغذية الراجعة من المسح الإلكتروني، ورقة أساسية عن السياق العالمي للهشاشة والنزاعات، وتقرير عن معاملة الهشاشة في برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية وتصاميم المشروعات.

<sup>1</sup> تتضمن هذه البلدان البوسنة والهرسك، وبوروندي، وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية، وإريتريا، وهايتي، وليبيريا، ونيبال، والفلبين، والسودان، وتونس.

## دال - استراتيجية الصندوق وعملياته

- 13- **الفهم الناشئ للهشاشة والنزاعات.** غدا الارتباط الوثيق بين الهشاشة والنزاعات أكثر وضوحاً على مدى الفترة التي درسها هذا التقييم. وتبدأ حلقة النزاع المفرغة عندما تتضافر الضغوط والإجهادات السياسية والاقتصادية على العدالة والأمن مع ضعف المؤسسات. وتتشاطر الهشاشة والنزاعات أسباب جذرية مشتركة كما أنها تغذي أحدها الآخر. فالدول التي تتعرض لمخاطر الكوارث الطبيعية أو الهزات الخارجية تواجه ضغوطاً إضافية. وعندما يكون هنالك افتقار للقدرة على الاستجابة لمثل هذه التوتّرات تتزايد مخاطر العنف. ويُعدّ السكان الريفيون الفقراء عرضة للخطر على وجه الخصوص، لأنهم غالباً ما يعيشون في مناطق نائية كما أنهم يعتمدون بصورة كبيرة على الخدمات الحكومية.
- 14- **وضع قائمة بالدول الهشة.** يُعرّف الصندوق دولة عضو فيه كدولة هشة استناداً إلى قائمة مجمعة للبلدان التي تُعتبر دولاً هشة وفقاً لمصرف التنمية الآسيوي ومصرف التنمية الأفريقي ولجنة المساعدة الإنمائية التابعة لمنظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي والبنك الدولي. وفي عام 2014، صنّفت 48 دولة عضوة في الصندوق على أنها من الدول الهشة بما يعادل حوالي 50 في المائة من إجمالي البلدان المتلقية المُدرجة في دورة نظام تخصيص الموارد على أساس الأداء لفترة التجديد التاسع للموارد (2013-2015). وأكثر من نصف البلدان المُصنّفة على أنها دول هشة مصنّفة أيضاً على أنها بلدان متوسطة الدخل.
- 15- **السياسات المؤسسية.** منذ عام 2004، توجّه عمل الصندوق في الدول والبلدان الهشة والتي تعاني من النزاعات بثلاث وثائق شاملة، أولها الوثيقة المذكورة أعلاه، وهي سياسة الصندوق بشأن تفادي الأزمات والإنعاش منها، وأما الأهداف الثلاثة الرئيسية لهذه السياسة فهي على النحو التالي: (1) تعزيز نهج الصندوق في تفادي الأزمات؛ (2) توضيح دور الصندوق في أوضاع ما بعد الأزمات؛ (3) تحديد عملية تخصيص الموارد فيما يتعلّق بتمويل عمليات ما بعد الأزمات؛ (4) النهوض بإجراءات وعمليات تنفيذ البرامج بهدف زيادة فعالية الأنشطة في البلدان المعرضة للأزمات والمتأثرة بها.
- 16- وفي عام 2008، أعدت إدارة الصندوق ورقة حول دور الصندوق في الدول الهشة. وتوفّر هذه الورقة تقديراً لعمليات الصندوق في الدول الهشة وتضع مخططاً للنهج المقترح للعمل فيها. وقد أشارت هذه الورقة إلى أنه ليس هنالك من أي تعريف متفق عليه عالمياً للدول الهشة، ولكن وبالمعنى الواسع للكلمة، تتصف الدول الهشة برداءة الحوكمة ومحدودية القدرة المؤسسية وضعف الأطر السياساتية والنزاعات الأهلية أو نزاعات الحدود.
- 17- وأخيراً، وفي عام 2011 أدخل الصندوق المبادئ التوجيهية بشأن الإنعاش المبكر بعد الكوارث، حيث تم تطوير هذه المبادئ التوجيهية لدعم موظفي الصندوق في تنفيذ التدخّلات الفعّالة في الوقت المناسب في سياقات ما بعد الكوارث. وتؤكد هذه المبادئ التوجيهية على الحاجة لإشراك الصندوق في الإنعاش المبكر دعماً لإعادة إحياء سبل العيش الريفية ولضمان الانتقال السريع من الإغاثة إلى التنمية المستدامة طويلة الأجل.
- 18- **عمليات الصندوق.** تتزايد التزامات الصندوق نحو الدول الهشة. وحسب تقديرات إدارة الصندوق سيخصّص لهذه الدول حوالي 1.2 مليار دولار أمريكي بموجب برنامج القروض والمنح لفترة التجديد التاسع، مقارنة

بحوالي 884 مليون دولار أمريكي تم تخصيصها للدول الهشة بموجب برنامج القروض والمنح لفترة التجديد الثامن للموارد.

19- ويحدد نظام تخصيص الموارد على أساس الأداء المظروف على الأجل المتوسط (دورة لثلاث سنوات) لموارد الإقراض التي يمكن الالتزام بها مبدئياً لبلد ما. ووفقاً لبيانات إدارة الصندوق، يصل نصيب الدول الهشة إلى حوالي 54 في المائة من مخصصات نظام تخصيص الموارد على أساس الأداء للفترة 2013-2015. وتعرف المؤسسة الدولية للتنمية الدول الخارجة من النزاعات على أنها مؤهلة لتلقي مخصصات اعتيادية كما يولدها نظام تخصيص الموارد على أساس الأداء مع بعض المبالغ الإضافية المتفاوتة التي تتراوح بين 30 إلى 100 في المائة من مخصصاتها الاعتيادية بموجب هذا النظام.

20- وتظهر البيانات المقارنة بتاريخ 30 يونيو/جزيران 2008، إلى أن الحافظة الإجمالية للصندوق التي تضم 225 مشروعاً، تضم 62 مشروعاً (28 في المائة) في البلدان الهشة. وفي عام 2012، ومن بين 254 مشروعاً جارياً كان تنفيذ 105 منها (41 في المائة) يتم في الدول الهشة. ويُتوقع أن يوفّر التجديد التاسع لموارد الصندوق تمويلًا لـ 46 دولة هشة. ولا تُعطى الدول الهشة أية أفضلية في تخصيص المنح للمشروعات الاستثمارية، كما لا يوجد هنالك أي ارتباط بين تصنيف الدولة على أنها دولة هشة وإطار القدرة على تحمّل الديون. ومع مرور الوقت غدا انخراط الصندوق في الدول الهشة أكثر أهمية سواءً لجهة عدد المشروعات أو الموارد المُلتزم بها.

## هاء - النتائج الرئيسية

21- أداء المشروعات والبرامج القطرية. يُعتبر أداء عمليات الصندوق بالنسبة لمعظم معايير التقييم في الدول الهشة أضعف على وجه العموم منه في السياقات القطرية الأخرى. ويستند هذا إلى جميع تصنيفات تقييمات المشاريع المتاحة لمكتب التقييم المستقل منذ عام 2002. فعلى سبيل المثال وفي التقرير السنوي عن نتائج وأثر عمليات الصندوق لعام 2013، ورد تحليل للمشروعات الاستثنائية، ووجد التقرير بأن المشروعات في الدول الهشة غالباً ما يكون أداؤها أقل على خلفية معايير الأداء الرئيسية، بما في ذلك فعالية المشروعات وكفاءتها والأثر على الفقر الريفي والاستدامة وإنجازات المشروع على وجه العموم. وخلص التحليل أيضاً إلى أنه هنالك أمثلة أكثر بكثير للمشروعات سيئة الأداء مقارنة بالمشروعات جيدة الأداء في الدول الهشة. كما تؤكد على هذه النتائج بيانات التقييم الذاتي في الصندوق.

22- وفي سياق هذا التقييم المؤسسي، أجرى مكتب التقييم المستقل تحليلاً مفصلاً لتصنيفات تقييم المشروعات التي يجريها، علاوة على التصنيفات المنبثقة عن نظام التقييم الذاتي في الصندوق. وتشير استنتاجات هذا التحليل إلى أن المشروعات التي أُغلقت منذ عام 2010 وصاعداً تُظهر على وجه العموم أداءً أفضل في العديد من معايير التقييم مقارنة بالمشروعات التي أُغلقت في الفترة بين 2004-2009 (انظر الجداول 9-13 في التقرير الرئيسي).

23- وكشف هذا التحليل المفصّل عمّا يلي:

- (1) كان الأداء في البلدان التي صنّفت على الدوام على أنها هشةً أدنى من البلدان التي تحرّكت خارج الهشاشة (هشةً جزئياً) أو التي لم تصنّف على الإطلاق على أنها هشة؛
- (2) هنالك تحسينات كبيرة في البلدان التي كانت على الدوام هشةً في إنجازات المشروعات الإجمالية وفي فعاليتها، وكذلك في أداء الصندوق كشريك وفي الأثر على الفقر الريفي؛
- (3) بالنسبة لبعض المعايير (الفعالية وأداء الصندوق) كانت التحسينات في أفضل حالاتها في البلدان التي كانت هشةً على الدوام؛
- (4) أظهرت المشروعات التي اختتمت بعد عام 2010 في البلدان الهشةً على الدوام أداءً رديئاً نسبياً فيما يتعلّق بالكفاءة التشغيلية والاستدامة وأداء الحكومة كشريك؛
- (5) لم تتحسن الإنجازات في الترويج للمساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة في البلدان التي كانت هشةً على الدوام، في حين أنها أظهرت بعض التحسّن في البلدان الهشةً جزئياً أو التي لم تكن هشةً على الإطلاق. ويمكن عزو ذلك إلى حدٍ ما إلى محدودية الاستعانة بخبراء في التمايز بين الجنسين في التصميم والإشراف ودعم التنفيذ.

24- وقد وجد التقييم المؤسسي هذا عدداً من المحرّكات التي أسهمت في الأداء الأفضل للمشروعات التي أُغلقت في الدول الهشةً بعد عام 2010. وهي تتعلّق بالتحوّل الذي طرأ على النموذج التشغيلي للصندوق والذي يتضمّن: التحرك نحو الإشراف المباشر ودعم التنفيذ عام 2007، والرصد والتقييم الأكثر تمحيصاً للحافظة لتحسين تنفيذ المشروعات المعرضة للمخاطر، وافتتاح المكاتب القطرية للصندوق. وقد كان أثر الإشراف المباشر ودعم التنفيذ، والرصد والإدارة الأفضل للحافظة مفيداً للحافظة في جميع البلدان، وحوالي نصف المكاتب القطرية للصندوق موجودة في الدول الهشة. وقد وجدت تقييمات البرامج القطرية بصورة متسقة أن المكاتب القطرية كانت من العوامل المساهمة الهامة في تحسين الأداء<sup>2</sup>.

25- هنالك عوامل عديدة تفسّر الأداء الأضعف للعمليات السابقة في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات. ومن بين مسائل أخرى تتضمّن هذه العوامل: الأهداف الطموحة والتصميم المعقّد للمشروعات، ضعف الأطر السياسية وعدم كفاية القدرة المؤسسية لإيصال الخدمات سواءً ضمن الحكومة على مختلف المستويات و/أو في القطاع الخاص، انعدام الأمن مما يمنع إيفاد بعثات الإشراف ودعم التنفيذ إلى الميدان في مناطق المشروعات المعنية<sup>3</sup>. تدني القدرة على إدارة المشروعات، عدم الارتباط بين برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية وتصميم المشروعات لجهة مناطق أولوية التدخّلات، محدودية الحوافز والتدريب والأدوات العملية المتاحة لموظفي الصندوق العاملين في الأوضاع الهشة، عدم تخصيص ميزانيات للعمل التحليلي والتصميم والإشراف ودعم التنفيذ والتقييمات الذاتية. إضافة إلى ذلك، ومع أن معظم تقييمات

<sup>2</sup> تُظهر الدول الهشة التي تمتلك مكاتب قطرية للصندوق على وجه العموم أداءً أفضل (4 إلى 1 بالمتوسط) مقارنة بتلك الموجودة في الدول غير الهشة التي لا تمتلك مكاتب قطرية (3 إلى 8 بالمتوسط) وذلك استناداً إلى بيانات مكتب التقييم المستقل من تقييمات برامجه القطرية.

<sup>3</sup> على سبيل المثال في بابوا غينيا الجديدة وإندونيسيا وشمال مالي.

المشروعات تنطوي على تحليل مفصل للفقر، فإنها نادراً ما تتمعن في دراسة محركات الصراعات والهشاشة مما قد يؤدي إلى استهداف وتركيز أضعف لتدخلات المشروعات.

26- ومن نقاط الضعف الهامة التي وجدها التقييم المؤسسي في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات جودة البيانات، بما في ذلك تلك المنبثقة عن نظم الرصد والتقييم. وتُعتبر هذه قضية متكررة في الحافظة بأسرها، كما أشارت إليه التقارير السنوية المتتالية عن نتائج وأثر عمليات الصندوق، إلا أن الوضع يتفاقم في الدول والأوضاع الهشة المتأثرة بالنزاعات نظراً للضعف الشديد في نظم جمع البيانات، وتدني القدرة على التحليل، وكفاية الموارد المتاحة للأنشطة التي لم يتم النظر إليها على الدوام على أنها تتمتع بأولوية، وخاصة في ظل ظروف النزاعات والكوارث.

27- وهناك مجال آخر مثير للقلق ناجم عن التحليل يتعلّق بضعف نظم التوريد والإدارة المالية والمراجعة (مثلاً في هايتي حيث تم تعليق حافظة الصندوق). وخرجت بعض تقييمات مكتب التقييم المستقل بنتيجة مفادها أن هنالك تجاوزات كبيرة في تكاليف إدارة المشروعات (في بعض الأحيان تصل إلى 50 في المائة من إجمالي تكاليف المشروع). ويثير ذلك القلق بشأن فيما لو كانت هنالك إجراءات حمائية ملائمة لتجنب إساءة استخدام موارد التنمية السليمة. ويُعتبر مصدر القلق هذا هام على وجه الخصوص إذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار أن الإشراف والتحقيق وما يتعلّق بهما من النظم في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات غالباً ما تكون أضعف بصورة كبيرة من مثيلاتها في البلدان الأخرى، أو أنها تتعدم على الإطلاق.

28- وبناءً على تقييمات البرامج القطرية التي أجراها مكتب التقييم المستقل بين عامي 2008-2016، حلّ التقييم المؤسسي أيضاً الأداء على المستوى القطري للأنشطة غير الإقراضية مثل إدارة المعرفة وإرساء الشراكات وحوار السياسات وأداء برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية (فيما يتعلّق بأهمية وفعالية الاستراتيجية القطرية) والشراكة الإجمالية بين الحكومة والصندوق لأغراض الحدّ من الفقر الريفي. وتم إجراء المقارنات بين البلدان التي صنّفها الصندوق على أنها دول هشة وتلك التي صنّفها على أنها دول غير هشة.

29- وقد أفصح التحليل عن أن الأداء في المجالات الثلاث المذكورة أعلاه كان أضعف في الدول الهشة من الدول غير الهشة. وباستخدام سلم الدرجات الست الذي يستخدمه مكتب التقييم المستقل للأنشطة غير الإقراضية فقد تم تصنيف هذه الأنشطة بالمتوسط على أنها 3.7، في حين كان أداء برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية بحدود 4، والشراكات الإجمالية بين الحكومة والصندوق بحدود 4.2 في الدول الهشة مقارنة بـ 3.9 و 4.3 و 4.4 لنفس المعايير في الدول غير الهشة. وعلى الرغم من أن الفجوة في الأداء تبدو ضئيلة نسبياً، إلا أن الأرقام المقابلة لهذه المعايير الثلاثة المحللة تُظهر أداءً أضعف بصورة متسقة في الدول الهشة.

30- **الاستراتيجيات القطرية.** يستند هذا المقطع إلى استعراض مكتبي لـ 42 برنامج من برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية، وتقييمات متنوعة للبرامج القطرية وعشرة دراسات حالة قطرية جديدة. وتم إعداد دراسات الحالة بعد زيارات قطرية تضمّنت مقابلات وتغذية راجعة تم تجميعها من خلال المسوحات الإلكترونية.

31- في سبعة من البلدان العشرة التي تمت دراستها، كانت أهمية برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية فيما يتعلّق بتحليل النزاعات والهشاشة واستجابة الاستراتيجية لهذا التحليل مرضٍ إلى حدٍ ما. وفي الحالات

الثلاث الأخرى كانت مرضية. أما جودة تحليل السياق الذي أُجري أثناء الإعداد لبرامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية فكان ضعيفاً على وجه العموم، باستثناء سياقات ما بعد النزاعات، كما في نيبال حيث يبدو أنه تم اللجوء إلى استخدام أكبر لتحليل الوضع الذي أجراه شركاء التنمية. وهناك فرص لتثديب التحليل على وجه العموم إذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار الجودة المتفاوتة من بلدٍ إلى آخر وندرة تعامل هذا التحليل بصورة كافية مع الهشاشة والنزاع. وفي هذه الحالات القليلة التي يتم فيها اعتبار هذين العاملين، تعامل الهشاشة على أنها خطر لا بد من تقليصه إلى أقصى حدٍّ ممكن، عوضاً عن عامل مقرر للفقر لا بد من معالجته. علاوة على ذلك، فقد وجدت دراسات الحالة أنه ما أن تنتقل الأوضاع من ما بعد النزاعات إلى التنمية، فإن تحليل الهشاشة الشامل يغدو أكثر ندرة، وحتى وإن ظلَّ موجوداً بين شركاء التنمية الآخرين، فإنه نادراً ما يستخدم من قِبَل الصندوق.

32- تتضمن جميع وثائق برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية وتصميمات المشروعات تحليلاً للفقر. وفي جميع دراسات الحالة العشرة، تغطّي هذه التحاليل عدداً من المحركات ذات الصلة بالهشاشة بما فيها: التمايز بين الجنسين والتمكين الاقتصادي للمجموعات المحرومة، وقدرة الدولة على إيصال الخدمات، وإدارة الموارد الطبيعية. إلا أن التقييم المؤسسي حدّد فرصاً لتركيز أكبر على القضايا الأساسية للضعف والسمود، بما في ذلك التمايز بين الجنسين.

33- كذلك تم تحديد مسألة الأراضي كمحرك رئيسي للفقر ومصدر للنزاعات في بوروندي وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية وهايتي وليبيريا ونيبال والفلبين والسودان. ومع ذلك وفي معظم الحالات فإن تبعات لما يتوجب على الصندوق أن يدعمه وفعالية الدعم على المدى الأطول لم تطوّر بحيث تغدو استراتيجية<sup>4</sup>. أي أنه وعلى الرغم من تحديد محركات الفقر في سياق الهشاشة، لم تتم مواءمة برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية وغيرها من نُهج التنمية الأوسع بصورة كافية للاستجابة لاحتياجات الأوضاع الهشة.

34- على سبيل المثال، وبما يتمشى مع نهج التنمية الذي اتبعه الصندوق في ذلك الوقت، فإن تصميم مشروع التنمية القبلية في أندرا براديش أوكل دوراً كبيراً للمنظمات غير الحكومية لأغراض التعبئة المجتمعية وبناء القدرات في المناطق القبلية النائية المتضررة بصورة جديّة بالنزاعات الداخلية وأعمال العنف. وقد أثبتت هذه التجربة كونها مصدراً كبيراً للتوتر بين حكومة الولاية والشركاء الآخرين، بما في ذلك الصندوق حيث كان لذلك تبعات سلبية على التنفيذ والثقة والحوار في السنوات الأولى من المشروع. وما يتوجب تعلمه هو أن مثل هذه الأنشطة تحتاج لنهج يتسم بالمزيد من المواءمة، بحيث يأخذ بعين الاعتبار السياق الاقتصادي والسياسي بصورة أكثر حذراً عند التصميم.

35- وقد وجد التقييم المؤسسي بأن التوجّه السياسي الرئيسي بشأن الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات لم يتم تفعيله بصورة كافية ضمن برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية. ويعود السبب في ذلك جزئياً إلى عدم تخصيص المزيد من الموارد للموظفين، وعدم تعرضهم للمساءلة عن تحليل الهشاشة وعن المواءمة المعقّمة لبرامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية للسياقات المخصصة. إضافة إلى ذلك فإن السياسات القطاعية في

<sup>4</sup> أما الفلبين فهي الاستثناء إذ أنه قد تم إدخال منح صكوك ملكية الأراضي ضمن مشروع إدارة الموارد الزراعية في مرتفعات كورديليرا – المرحلة الثانية بعد تحقيق بعض النجاح في مرحلة سابقة ولكن التنفيذ كان غير فعال بسبب بعض التعقيدات ضمن المشروع.

الصندوق (مثل التمويل الريفي وتغيّر المناخ) لا تتضمن أحكاماً مخصصة ولا أدوات لتوجيه الموظفين الذين يتعاملون مع برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية للدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات.

36- وأخيراً، لا يحظى تصنيف الهشاشة بالترحيب من قبل الشركاء على المستوى القطري، ويحتاج للتطرق إليه بحذر وحساسية شديدة، إذا ما أردنا تجنب تقويض الفرص لإرساء حوارات مثمرة، وبناء الملكية في تدخّلات الصندوق. وأما نهج الصندوق الحالي المتمثّل في وضع قائمة تتضمن قوائم المؤسسات المالية الدولية، مع إضافة البلدان التي تصنّفها منظمة التنمية والتعاون في الميدان الاقتصادي، فقد أدّى إلى خلق قائمة خارقة تتضمن عدداً أكبر من البلدان الذي تتضمنه قوائم المؤسسات المالية الدولية الشريكة للصندوق. ويُعبّر ولا يُؤدّي وضع هذه القوائم نتيجة لهُج مختلفة في التصنيف إلّا إلى فائدة محدودة للبلدان المصنّفة. كما أن مثل هذا التصنيف لا يساعد الصندوق على اكتساب فهم أفضل للفقر الريفي أو للسكان المحرومين في مثل هذه البلدان، وهو يربط الصندوق بالإطار السياسي وإطار الموارد المعمول به في المؤسسة المالية الدولية، ويمكن القول بأنه يرسل رسالة خاطئة حول الحاجة لخصوصية السياق، كذلك فإنه يُغفل أيضاً بلداناً تنتم بأوضاع الهشاشة والنزاعات على المستوى دون الوطني.

37- **الإطار السياسي.** توجّه عمل الصندوق في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات بثلاث سياسات مكرّسة منذ عام 2004 (انظر الفقرات 15-17 أعلاه). وفي حين أنه لا يوجد أي تمييز واضح بين الكوارث والهشاشة، فإن الوثائق الثلاثة تنتم ببعض التداخل وتتشاطر بعض العناصر المشتركة. وهناك ارتباط وتقدّم واضح بحيث يتم اعتبار الكوارث على أنها العامل السياقي المحدّد الذي يحتاج الصندوق للتطرق إليه. ومفاد ذلك احتياج كل وضع على حدة لتقدير مفصل، يتم في المقام الأول من خلال تحليل يُجرى في برنامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية وبعده في تصميم المشروعات. على الرغم أنه وكما ذكر أعلاه، فإن ذلك لم يحدث حتى الآن إلى الحدّ الضروري.

38- أعدّ الصندوق ثلاثة أطر استراتيجية منذ عام 2002 مغطياً الفترات 2002-2006 و 2007-2010 و 2011-2015. وعلى الرغم من أنه لم تتم أية إشارة إلى عمل الصندوق في الأوضاع الهشة في الإطارين الاستراتيجيين الأولين، فقد اعترف الإطار الاستراتيجي للفترة 2011-2015 بالظروف الخاصة في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات، وأشار إلى أنه "وفي الدول والأوضاع الهشة، سيسعى الصندوق جاهداً لإيلاء المزيد من الاهتمام لتعزيز المؤسسات وقدرات الحكمة".

39- إلّا أنه وعلى وجه العموم، يبقى الإطار السياسي مجزئاً دون أن يتطرق أو يعالج بصورة كافية عدداً من القضايا الرئيسية المتعلقة بالهشاشة والنزاعات. وعلى سبيل المثال، عندما لا يتم تسليط الضوء على كيفية مقارنة الهشاشة عندما تتمثل نقطة الدخول المتميزة للصندوق في إنتاج الأغذية والتنمية الريفية والتغذية. علاوة على ذلك فإنه لا يتم التعامل مع النزاعات بتفصيل كبير، ولا تتم مناقشة ما الذي يمثلّ وضعاً هشاً أو وضعاً متأثراً بالنزاع على المستوى دون الوطني. وأخيراً، فإن التركيز على الكوارث المعرفة بصورة واسعة سواء منها الطبيعية وتلك التي هي من صنع الإنسان، قد أهمل إيضاح الفصل بين النهج المتباينة في المراحل المختلفة من دورة النزاعات (تدخّلات تقادي النزاعات، وإعادة الإعمار بعد النزاعات، وإرساء السلام).

- 40- لم يُعدّ الصندوق للنظر مرة أخرى في تعريفه للهشاشة منذ عام 2006، وقد حان الوقت لذلك، لأن من شأن ذلك أن يوفر الوضوح لموظفي الصندوق والدول الأعضاء فيه وشركاء التنمية الآخرين بشأن تركيز الصندوق ومجالات عمله ذات الأولوية، وخاصة إذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار الخطاب الدولي الذي يدور حول تطوير النهج في الدول والأوضاع الهشة التي تزايدت بصورة كبيرة في العقد الماضي.
- 41- وبصورة مشابهة، ونظراً لتعدد العمل في الأوضاع الهشة، فإن دور الشراكات حاسم إلا أن الطرق التي يرصد بها الصندوق عمل المؤسسات المالية الدولية ووكالات الأمم المتحدة الأخرى والمنظمات الثنائية لم يحظ بتحليل كافٍ في هذه السياسات الشاملة. وكذلك الأمر بالنسبة للفرص والتحديات التي تواجهها الشراكات الاستراتيجية والتمويل المشترك. فعلى سبيل المثال هل يتوجب على الصندوق المشاركة في تحالفات الجهات المانحة المتعددة التي ساعدت الدول الهشة على استعادة عافيتها بعد النزاعات، وإذا كان الأمر كذلك كيف؟
- 42- أشارت استراتيجية إرساء الشراكات في الصندوق إشارة عابرة إلى العمل في الدول والأوضاع الهشة، مشيرة إلى الحاجة إلى العمل مع الجهات الفاعلة غير الحكومية (أي المنظمات غير الحكومية والمجتمع المدني). ومع أن التقييم المؤسسي يوافق بصورة كاملة على هذا التركيز ويسلط الضوء أيضاً على المساهمة الممكنة للقطاع الخاص في الأوضاع الهشة، يجب ألا يكون ذلك على حساب بناء القدرات المؤسسية للوكالات الحكومية في القطاع الزراعي نظراً لأنها توفر البيئة السلطوية الأوسع لتحويل ريفي مستدام وشمولي في مثل هذه السياسات.
- 43- **النموذج التشغيلي للصندوق.** يُعتبر الحضور القطري المعزز خاصية هامة في التطور المؤسسي للصندوق في السنوات الخمس إلى السبع الماضية (انظر الجدول 8 من التقرير الرئيسي).
- 44- ومن بين 40 مكتباً قطرياً تم إنشاؤها حتى تاريخه، هنالك 19 مكتباً قطرياً في دول هشة. ولأحد عشر مكتباً من هذه المكاتب التسعة عشرة مدير للبرنامج القطري مركزه في البلد المعني، إلا أنه لم يتم ندب إلا أربعة مدراء برامج قطرية للبلدان المصنفة على الدوام على أنها دول هشة حتى تاريخه. ويعكس ذلك اعترافاً أكبر بالحاجة لفتح مكاتب قطرية وندب مدراء برامج قطريين إلى الدول الهشة (مثلاً قام الصندوق بندب مدراء برامج قطريين في هايتي وجمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية والسودان) إلا أنه لا توجد سياسة صريحة لتنفيذ نهج متميز أو تكريس موارد كافية لإنشاء المكاتب القطرية في الدول الهشة.
- 45- وقد وجدت التقييمات بأن الانتقال إلى الإشراف المباشر ودعم التنفيذ قد جلب معه فوائد كبيرة لجهة الفعالية الإنمائية، إلا أنه لا يوجد ما يشير إلى تركيز مخصص للإشراف على قضايا الهشاشة. ويتفق هذا مع حقيقة عدم وجود رصد منتظم للقضايا ذات الصلة بالهشاشة. ويشير أي تمعن في تقارير بعثات الإشراف أيضاً إلى القدر الضئيل من الاهتمام بإدارة المخاطر.
- 46- وبغض النظر عن بعض التفاوتات في الحالات الفردية، لا يتم التمايز بين ميزانيات الإشراف وفقاً لاحتياجات البلد أو المشروع. وقد يتوقع المرء ميزانيات إشراف أكبر تُخصّص للمشروعات في الأوضاع الهشة بهدف ضمان وجود دعم شامل للتنفيذ في الوقت المناسب للوصول إلى النواتج الأفضل. وتُدار ميزانيات الإشراف على المستوى الإقليمي مما يسمح للمدراء الإقليميين ببعض المرونة في تخصيص الموارد حيث يعتبرون الحاجة أمس إليها. إلا أنه لا يوجد هنالك أي نهج مؤسسي لهذه العملية. ومن الصعب

الحصول على تقدير جيد لتكاليف الإشراف، ويعود ذلك جزئياً إلى أن بعثات الإشراف غالباً ما تجري بصورة مشتركة مع التخطيط أو عمل حوار السياسات ومن غير المحتمل تحليل الجهد النسبي لكل بلد أو كل مشروع.

47- ويستحق دور مُدراء البرامج القطرية في الأوضاع الهشة بعض التفكير المخصوص، إذ يُطلب من مُدراء البرامج القطرية أداء مهام متعددة على الرغم من أنهم في بعض الحالات يُدعمون بموظفين محليين مكرّسين للحضور القطري. وتحتاج وظائفهم وقدراتهم على الأداء في الدول والأوضاع الهشة لاهتمام أعمق لجهة التدريب على تحليل الهشاشة وإرساء الشراكات، والأدوات والتوجيه للرصد والتقييم في مناطق النزاعات والمكافآت والاعتراف بالأداء. ولا بد من موازنة إطار الحوافز وسياسات الموارد البشرية الأوسع تبعاً لذلك. إضافة إلى هذا، كانت فرص تشاطر الدروس وتبادل الخبرات من العمليات في الدول والأوضاع الهشة، وبخاصة عبر الشعب الإقليمية محدودة في الماضي.

## واو - الاستنتاجات والتوصيات

### الاستنتاجات

48- الرسالة الشاملة. يلعب الصندوق دوراً حاسماً في الدول والأوضاع الهشة المتأثرة بالنزاعات في الترويج للتحوّل الريفي والتنمية الشمولية المستدامة. وهناك عدد كبير جداً من الأشخاص الذين يعيشون في فقر مدقع في مثل هذه السياقات. وباعتباره المنظمة الإنمائية متعدد الأطراف الوحيدة التي تركز حصراً على تنمية زراعة أصحاب الحيازات الصغيرة في المناطق الريفية، يضطلع الصندوق بمسؤولية فريدة من نوعها في دعم نظم الإنتاج المحلي وسبل العيش في الأوضاع الهشة، ومساعدة السكان الريفيين الفقراء على تحسين دخولهم وأمنهم الغذائي والتغذوي ورفاهيتهم.

49- هنالك اهتمام متنامٍ في المجتمع الدولي بمساعدة الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات. كذلك يولي الصندوق أيضاً اهتماماً متزايداً لهذه القضية من خلال الاعتراف بوضوح بحاجته إلى التأقلم ليؤدي بصورة أفضل في مثل هذه السياقات. وتُعتبر المناقشات والالتزامات في سياق مشاورات التجديد العاشر لموارد الصندوق المختتمة مؤخراً وهذا التقييم المكرّس للموضوع أمثلة على تعهّد المنظمة بالقيام بعملها بصورة مختلفة.

50- إلّا أن الصندوق سيحتاج للتأقلم بصورة أكبر ولتشذيب نهجه لتحقيق نواتج أفضل في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات، وبخاصة إذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار أن أكثر من نصف البلدان المتلقية فيه مصنّفة حالياً كدول هشة. وقد سلّط هذا التقييم الضوء على العديد من القضايا الجوهرية التي تحتاج للمعالجة بصورة صريحة وأنية بهدف تحقيق التحسينات والنتائج المرغوبة في المستقبل.

51- الإطار السياسي للصندوق مجزأ وهو بحاجة للتعزيز. على الرغم من أن الصندوق يمتلك العديد من وثائق التوجيه المؤسسية حول المواضيع ذات الصلة بالدول الهشة والانعاش المبكر بعد النزاعات والكوارث، إلّا أنه لا يوجد بيان سياسي مُفرد شامل يمكن أن يشكّل المرجع الرئيسي لموظفي الصندوق ومستشاريه أو للتوضيح للدول الأعضاء وغيرها من شركاء التنمية دور المنظمة وأولوياتها في هذا المضمّن. علاوة على ذلك، فإن الوثائق الحالية لا توفر الوضوح الكافي للتعريف، ولا تنظر في القضايا الأوسع للهشاشة

والنزاعات. وتتضمن توضيحاً محدوداً للفرق بين النزاع وتجنّب النزاع وإعادة الإعمار بعد النزاع والتنمية الانتقالية. وأما استراتيجية إرساء الشراكات في الصندوق، وهي جوهرية أيضاً، فإنها لا توفّر التوجيه الكافي لإرساء شراكات استراتيجية في الأوضاع الهشة، بما في ذلك مع المنظمات الثنائية ومتعددة الأطراف. وبصورة مماثلة يفتقر العديد من السياسات المؤسسية الأخرى إلى الأدوات والتقنيات اللازمة للعمل في الأوضاع الهشة.

52- تتضمن برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية وتصميمات المشروعات على وجه العموم تحليلاً جيداً للفرق ولكن تحليلاً أقل لقضايا الهشاشة والنزاعات. لم تتم مواءمة برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية والمشروعات بصورة كافية، كما أنها غالباً ما لا تتطرّق في محرّكات الهشاشة. علاوة على ذلك فإن النظام الحالي الذي يتبناه الصندوق لتصنيف البلدان على أنها دول هشة يتسم بتبعات هامة مما يستحق إعادة النظر فيه في المستقبل (مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار مهمة الصندوق في بناء الصمود وإتاحة الفرص للتنمية القاعدية المستدامة في القطاع الزراعي). إضافة إلى ذلك، فقد وجد التقييم أيضاً بأن تصميمات المشروعات كانت طموحة ولم تكن مفصلة بشكل كافٍ للسياق المعني، وغالباً ما أغفلت ضعف الأطر المؤسسية والسياساتية في الأوضاع الهشة. وفي واقع الأمر يشكل ضعف المؤسسات والقدرات والسياسات الحكومية معوقاً رئيسياً في وجه الأداء الأفضل على أرض الواقع. وأخيراً، فإن برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية مُثقلّة ولا تتضمن تقديرات للميزانية لتحقيق الأهداف المرجوة منها. ولا يمكن تخصيص إلا موارد إضافية قليلة نسبياً لمُدرء البرامج القطرية للقيام بعمل تحليلي مُعمّق مما هو ضروري في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات.

53- هنالك تحسينات في النموذج الإنمائي ولكن هنالك حاجة أيضاً للمزيد من المواءمة للاستجابة للمتطلبات المخصصة للعمل في الدول والأوضاع الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات. ويُعتبر الإشراف المباشر ودعم التنفيذ تحركاً إيجابياً للغاية ولكن هنالك حاجة لإبلاء المزيد من الاهتمام لتفصيل العمليات والميزانيات بحيث يمكن لها أن تتطرّق لقضايا الهشاشة والنزاعات. والأمر نفسه ينطبق على المكاتب القطرية للصندوق وعلى ندب مُدرء البرامج القطرية مع توفير الحوافز والمساهمة في الأداء الأفضل على وجه العموم، هنالك حاجة لنهج أكثر تفصيلاً في المستقبل. وبنفس الروح وعلى الرغم من التحسينات الكبيرة التي أُدخلت على الإدارة الإجمالية للموارد البشرية في الصندوق في السنوات الثلاث إلى الأربع الماضية، إلا أن متطلبات قوة العمل في الجبهة الأمامية للأوضاع الهشة لم تحظ بمعالجة شاملة. وأخيراً، وليس آخراً يفرض ضعف جمع البيانات وعدم كفاية نُظم الرصد والتقييم تحديات جدية لقياس النتائج والإبلاغ عنها، وتحديد الممارسات الجيدة والدروس المستفادة.

## التوصيات

يُخص التقييم المؤسسي إلى التوصيات الخمس التالية.

### 54- السياسة والاستراتيجية

- وضع مسودة لبيان سياساتي مؤسسي شامل يتضمّن تعريفاً جديداً ويضع مبادئ لنهج الصندوق للانخراط مع الدول الهشة والمتأثرة بالنزاعات والأوضاع الهشة والنزاعات على المستوى دون الوطني.

وكجزء من هذه السياسة لا بد من تحديد واضح لعتبة التنمية يساعد الموظفين على تحديد وضع الهاشاشة في بلدٍ أو إقليمٍ معيّن، مما يسمح لهم بتصميم العمليات باستخدام الأدوات والوسائل الملائمة. ويجب أن يحظى البيان السياساتي هذا بموافقة المجلس التنفيذي وأن ينظر في القضايا الرئيسية المحددة في هذا التقرير.

- تبيّن نهج أبسط في تصنيف البلدان التي تتسم بأوضاع هشّة يكون مخصّصاً لمهمة الصندوق وأولوياته كما يجب أن تكون قدرات البلد المعني السياساتية والمؤسسية من بين أكثر المعايير أهمية مما سيتم النظر فيه في نظام التصنيف الجديد.
- تعزيز تحليل الهاشاشة والنزاعات في برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية من خلال توفير موارد أكبر، والبناء بصورة صريحة أكثر على التحليل الذي تقوم به المؤسسات المالية ومنظمات الأمم المتحدة الشريكة في هذه البلدان، وتحديثه بصورة أكثر انتظاماً مما يُعتبر أمراً مرغوباً به لتمكين الصندوق من إدارة الاستراتيجية بصورة أكثر فعالية. ويتوجّب أن تتضمن برامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية المستقبلية تقديرات للميزانية لتحقيق الأهداف المتفق عليها.

#### 55- تصميم المشروعات والبرامج

- يحتاج تصميم البرامج لتحديد أين يمكن للصندوق أن ينخرط وأين لا يمكنه الانخراط. وفي البلدان التي تتسم بأوضاع هشّة على المستوى دون الوطني حيث لا تمنع متطلبات السلامة الأساسية انخراط الصندوق، يحتاج الصندوق لتقرير فيما لو أنه سينخرط في هذه البلدان أم لا بناءً على احتمالات تحقيقه للأثر على الفقر الريفي.
- إدراج أهداف وتصميمات بسيطة مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار السياقات المؤسسية والسياساتية للبلد المعني وتكريس اهتمام أكبر لضمان مواعمة النهج الإنمائية (مثل المساواة بين الجنسين وتمكين المرأة اعتماداً على السياق).
- وفي البلدان التي تختبر قدرات مؤسسية ضعيفة ورداءة في الحوكمة، يمكن للصندوق أن يبني على الممارسات الحالية بالعمل مع المجتمعات المحلية ومنظمات المزارعين ومستويات الحكومة الأخفض التي تتعامل مع إيصال الخدمات.

#### 56- تنفيذ المشروعات والبرامج

- توسيع الإشراف المباشر ودعم التنفيذ لجهة الكمّ والمستوى التقني، وضمان تخصيص الميزانيات النظرية استناداً إلى الاحتياجات عوضاً عن المخصّصات المقررة مسبقاً حسب المشروع. ويتوجّب على الموظفين التقنيين في شعبة السياسات والمشورة التقنية في الصندوق توسيع مشاركتهم بصورة أكبر في مثل هذه العمليات، علاوة على مشاركتهم في تصميمات المشروعات وبرامج الفرص الاستراتيجية القطرية.
- وضع أولويات واضحة وصريحة لإنشاء المكاتب القطرية الجديدة للصندوق وندب مُدراء البرامج القطرية إلى البلدان المتأثرة بالهاشاشة والنزاعات.

- إرساء شراكات استراتيجية لاستقطاب المهارات المكّمة وتوفير مستوى أعلى وأساس أعرض لدعم التنفيذ.

#### 57- تمكين الموظفين

- لا بد من بذل الجهود لإدخال حوافز مخصوصة للموظفين العاملين في الدول الهشة والأوضاع المتأثرة بالنزاعات، بما في ذلك أولئك الذين يعملون في مقر الصندوق ويتولون مهام مشابهة. ويجب إدراج العمل في الأوضاع الهشة كمعيار رئيسي للترقّي والتنوّع المهني، علاوة على التقدّم الوظيفي ضمن الإطار الأوسع لنظام تقييم الأداء في الصندوق. ولا بد من إيلاء اهتمام أكبر لبناء القدرات واحتياجات التدريب للموظفين مما يتوجّب الترويج له بصورة صريحة أيضاً، ولا بد من إدخال المنتديات لتبادل المعرفة والممارسات الجيدة والخبرات في العمل في الدول الهشة (عبر الشُعَب الإقليمية).

#### 58- قياس النتائج

- التخطيط لرصد وتصميم المشروعات وتزويدها بالموارد بصورة أكثر انتقائية. لا بد من إيلاء اهتمام أكبر للتخطيط للرصد والتقييم خلال تصميم المشروعات. وفي الوقت الحاضر فإن النهج المتبع هو نهج واحد يوائم جميع الحالات، حيث يُطلَب من جميع المشروعات التي تدافع عن تصميمها تقديم دلائل إما من المراحل الأبر للمشروع أو من مواقع أخرى تُثبِت نجاح التدخّل في السياق المخطط له. وحيث لا توجد الدلائل أو عندما تكون السياقات مُختلفة أو عندما يتم الاعتراف بالمشروع على أنه مشروع ابتكاري أو ريادي، فإن الرصد والتقييم يتطلّب المزيد من الموارد.
- تنقيح إطار قياس النتائج في الصندوق لإدراج مؤشرات للنواتج ذات الصلة بالهشاشة. هنالك فجوة كبيرة في قياس تمكين المرأة والأداء المؤسسي. ولا بد من إيجاد المؤشرات وسُبل القياس في هاتين الحالتين.

## Contents

Overview	1
<b>Abbreviations and acronyms</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>I. Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>II. Evaluation objectives, methodology &amp; process</b>	<b>6</b>
A. Objectives, scope and coverage	6
B. Methodology	8
C. Process	11
D. Limitations	12
<b>III. Fragile and conflict affected states and situations</b>	<b>12</b>
A. What is a fragile state?	13
B. Exploring what causes fragility and conflict	15
C. Approaches by multilateral partners to engagement in fragile states	16
D. Measuring fragility	20
E. Responding to fragility	22
<b>IV. Findings on IFAD's performance at country level</b>	<b>25</b>
A. Country strategy	25
B. Project design	33
C. Implementation	39
D. Evidence on the portfolio performance	46
<b>V. Findings on IFAD's approach to engagement in fragile states</b>	<b>53</b>
A. Development of policy and strategy	53
B. Financial instruments	55
C. IFAD's intervention model in fragile states	57
D. Policy coherence	59
E. Assessment of IFAD's approach	62
F. Fragility and IFAD's support to LICs and MICs	63
<b>VI. Conclusions and recommendations</b>	<b>65</b>
A. Storyline	65
B. Conclusions	66
C. Recommendations	68
<b>Appendix – Annexes</b>	
<b>I. Evaluation framework</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>II. Bibliography</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>III. List of people met</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>IV. Fragile states and situations</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>V. Report of the senior independent advisor</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>Working Papers</b>	
1 Fragility and conflict definitions and concepts	
2 Policy analysis	

- 3 Analysis of evidence from country programme case studies
- 4 Results from the desk reviews
- 5 Results from the CPM survey
- 6 Country Notes
- 7 Background paper: The 2014-15 Corporate-Level Evaluation of IFAD's performance in fragile states – some thoughts
- 8 Approach Paper of the CLE Fragile States

## Abbreviations and acronyms

AFDB	African Development Bank
ADB	Asian Development Bank
CLE	corporate-level evaluation
COSOP	country strategic opportunities paper
CPIA	World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPM	Country Programme Manager, IFAD
CPR	crisis prevention and recovery
DFID	Department for International Development, UK.
EB	Executive Board of IFAD
FCS	fragile and conflict affected states and situations
GEF	The Global Environment Facility
IDA	The World Bank's International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	International Financial Institution
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD
IRAI	The World Bank's Resource Allocation Index
MIC	middle-income country
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
PBA	performance-based allocation
PBAS	performance-based allocation system
PMD	Programme Management Department of IFAD
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WDR	World Development Report (World Bank)

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# Corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations

## I. Introduction

1. In 2011, the World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development (WDR) reported that one-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility or conflict, and at that time, no low-income fragile or conflict affected country had achieved a MDG<sup>5</sup>. The World Bank further indicated that "poverty rates are 20 per cent higher in countries affected by repeated cycles of violence, and every year of organized violence slows down poverty reduction by nearly one percentage point. By 2015, an estimated 32 percent of the world's poor will live in fragile and conflict-affected situations"<sup>6</sup>.
2. Fragility is an all-encompassing term that is mostly been used to describe states that have a lack of capacity to carry out core functions of the state, often in the aftermath of conflict or other types of crises<sup>7</sup> owing to weak governance, limited institutional capacity and/or political instability. The initial perception was that fragility was only an issue of low-income countries, but increasingly it is recognised that aspects of fragility can be found in low income, lower middle and upper middle income countries and indeed in developed countries as well.
3. A challenge when discussing fragile states is the lack of consensus among stakeholders on its definition. IFAD's definition is shown in Box 1. In practice, partners often emphasize different aspects of fragility, reflecting their internal policy stance, and to draw a contrast between fragile countries facing permanent conflict and those which are fragile but without conflict. An additional complication is that countries may be fragile in some respects and not others, and they may also move in and out of that condition. While approaches to fragile states must be tailor made policy research has established that horizontal inequalities, youth unemployment, natural resource mismanagement and corrupt governance are frequent characteristics of conflict prone countries.
4. IFAD's commitments to fragile states are rising. Some 40 per cent of the IFAD9 programme of loans and grants is allocated to fragile states.<sup>8</sup> Historically, projects in fragile states have not performed as well as those in non-fragile states. Project performance data show that while the overall performance of IFAD's portfolio improved over the period 2006-2013, projects in fragile states perform less satisfactorily and their performance has seen no improvement over the last eight years. This weaker performance of projects in fragile states is confirmed by the findings of the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE). However the differences are small which suggests that special emphasis on fragile states is fully warranted given the large rewards that are associated with judicious involvement in such high risk environments - especially aid orphan countries.
5. In 2013, IOE developed a "selectivity framework" to assist in the construction of its 2014 work programme. The selectivity framework allows IOE to more transparently identify and prioritize evaluations to be conducted, taking into account their potential in contributing to better IFAD performance and learning. Building on the priorities of key stakeholders and IOE's own strategic objectives, IOE proposed to undertake a Corporate Level Evaluation (CLE) on IFAD's engagement in fragile

<sup>5</sup> Preamble, World Bank. 2011. *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

<sup>6</sup> <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20042303~menuPK:34480~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>: viewed last on 17/02/2014.

<sup>7</sup> A fuller discussion of the issues introduced here and discussed in more detail on Chapter III, can be found in Working Paper 1.

<sup>8</sup> Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP) 2012-2013.

states. This was supported by the IFAD Management, the Evaluation Committee and endorsed by the Executive Board in December 2013. This is the first CLE on IFAD's work in fragile states.

Box 1

IFAD's definition of fragile states

"Fragile states are characterized by weak policies, weak institutions and weak governance, resulting in meagre economic growth, widespread inequality and poor human development. Fragile states are more exposed to the risk of outbreaks of violence than are non-fragile states. Fragile states may be well endowed with natural resources or be resource poor".

Source: *IFAD Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2006)*.

6. This evaluation takes a broad view to examine IFAD's engagement in fragile and conflict affected states and situations. For the purpose of this evaluation, fragile states refers to countries in the classification used by IFAD. But IFAD draws on the lists prepared by partner International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the OECD and these differ among themselves. Where appropriate, attention is drawn to this in the report. The report looks at IFAD's work and relates it to the evolving international approach to fragile states.
7. Chapter 2 explains the objectives of this evaluation, describes methodology, the approach used for data collection and acknowledges limitations arising from the study. Chapter 3 examines international thinking on definitions and approaches to measuring and responding to fragility. It includes the approaches taken by IFAD's main multilateral development partners and findings from recent evaluations of their performance, to set this study in a wider context. Chapter 4 presents findings on IFAD's performance at all stages of the results chain. Chapter 5 presents findings on IFAD's approach to engagement in fragile states; looking at policies and the intervention model. Conclusions and recommendations follow in Chapter 6. Extensive supporting information is available in appendices referenced in the report and available separately.

## II. Evaluation objectives, methodology & process

8. This chapter presents the evaluation's objectives, methodology and process. It starts with a description of the objectives, and reviews the time-frame, scope of work and coverage. The main steps of the evaluation are described under process and the chapter ends with an overview of limitations in the analysis.
9. The evaluation approach paper<sup>9</sup> was discussed at the outset of the process with the IFAD Management and Evaluation Committee of the Executive Board in March 2014. Their feedback and priorities were therefore duly captured early on in the evaluation process.

### A. Objectives, scope and coverage

10. **Objectives.** The objectives of the evaluation are to: (1) assess the performance of IFAD's engagement in fragile and conflict affected states and situations<sup>10</sup> (FCS) and identify the explanatory factors that lie behind current performance; and (2) generate a series of findings, lessons learnt and recommendations that will assist the IFAD management and Executive Board in deciding on the future strategic and operations directions of the Fund.
11. **Key evaluation questions.** Table 1 below sets out the main questions grouped by evaluation criteria. The full set of questions considered may be seen in the evaluation framework included as Annex II in the evaluation's approach paper.

<sup>9</sup> <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/ec/82/docs/EC-2014-82-W-P-6.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> The abbreviation FCS and the short phrase 'fragile states' are used interchangeably throughout the document for ease of readability. In all instances, their meaning is fragile and conflict affected states and situations unless otherwise stated.

Table 1  
**Key evaluation questions**

<i>Evaluation Criteria</i>	<i>Question</i>
Relevance	How has IFAD's engagement to FCS changed over time and why? To what extent is the 2006 Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery relevant to FCS? To what extent IFAD's [RB]-COSOPs, projects, and policy dialogue activities have explicitly sought to respond to the drivers and manifestations of fragility in specific FCS contexts? To what extent have IFAD's [RB]- COSOPs and projects been relevant and designed to be flexible in response to the constraints in FCS contexts?
Effectiveness	Has IFAD's approach to FCS resulted in better focused country strategies and projects with simpler objectives? How does security affect project implementation and implementation support by IFAD? <sup>11</sup>
Efficiency	How have IFADs procedures and management been responsive to the contexts in FCS? Is IFAD endowed with institutional capacity and administrative tools to be responsive to FCS specificities? What are the available concrete instruments and measures that IFAD already uses in fragile and conflict-affected states?
Impact	What evidence is there of impacts that tackle core issues in FCS?
Sustainability	Has IFAD's approach to FCS resulted in more sustainable outcomes for institutions and poor people?
Gender	Has IFAD's approach to country strategy and projects in FCS followed IFAD's strategy to introduce gender equality and women's empowerment?
Innovation and scaling up	Has IFAD's approach been innovative in responding to FCS challenges and are interventions likely to be scaled up?
Lesson learning	What are the lessons from past performance that can guide future support to FCS? Does the security situation have an impact on the average cost of project design, supervision and implementation support?

12. The evaluation's approach has taken into account two key issues that affect design and data analysis: (i) the relatively short time frame since IFAD introduced specific guidance on working in fragile states; and (ii) the diversity of country contexts that arises from IFAD's classification of fragile states.
13. In line with the recommendation endorsed by the Executive Board<sup>12</sup>, the evaluation covered all IFAD fragile and conflict affected member states as well as those not classified as FCS, but facing fragile and conflict-affected situations. Given that the list of FCS is updated annually based on the classifications used by the World Bank, regional development banks and the OECD, there has been movement in and out of the FCS category during the evaluation period and in some instances countries declared as fragile by one agency are not listed by others. To complicate the categorisation further, there is no internationally accepted definition of a state with a fragile situation<sup>13</sup>.
14. **Period covered by the evaluation.** The evaluation covers IFAD strategies and operations from 2004 till end 2013, thus encompassing a ten-year period of engagement in FCS. The choice of time frame for the evaluation balanced two considerations. First, the need to assess the institution's most current practices as found in recent operations and the degree to which it reflects IFAD's internal guidance and policies. Second, the reality that assessing the relevance and effectiveness of IFAD policies and guidelines means looking at projects that are still

<sup>11</sup> The sample of countries did not permit issues pertaining to security to be explored in the country case studies.

<sup>12</sup> IFAD (2013). Decisions and deliberations of the 110<sup>th</sup> session of the Executive Board (EB 2013/110/INF.9). Rome: IFAD.

<sup>13</sup> This point is discussed and elaborated in Chapter III.

under implementation and hence where some judgement over the likely outcomes is necessary.

15. **IFAD policy statements.** Policy on engagement in fragile states is spread across several documents. The key dates of the four guidance documents on fragility are listed below. Important to appreciate is that apart from the 2008 guidelines, these documents deal more with crises and disasters than fragility. There is no guidance about conflict situations:
- (a) 1998, IFAD Framework for Bridging Post-Crisis Recovery and Long-Term Development<sup>14</sup>;
  - (b) 2006, Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery<sup>15</sup> which formally introduced the concept of fragility into the work of the Fund;
  - (c) 2008, the Consultation on IFAD's 8th Replenishment for which guidelines on IFAD's role in fragile states were prepared<sup>16</sup>; and,
  - (d) 2011, Guidelines for disaster early recovery<sup>17</sup>.
16. **Data on performance.** The time frame of IFAD's guidance creates some challenges for the evaluation. No projects for which Project Completion Reports conducted by PMD or Project Performance Assessments and Project Completion Report Validations carried out by IOE have an Executive Board approval date more recent than 2005<sup>18</sup>. Their design therefore pre-dates the issuing of most of the relevant IFAD guidance and policy.

## B. Methodology

17. **Development of results chain.** It is important to appreciate that IFAD has never elaborated a results framework or detailed theory of change identifying both the key contextual factors and assumptions that affect IFAD's performance in the area of support in FCS<sup>19</sup>. The evaluation approach was therefore structured around the results chain (Figure 1) implicit in IFAD's approach to fragility and found in its guidance framework. This results chain was used to both structure and manage our lines of enquiry. As such, the evaluation's design is not explicitly theory driven because we did not set out how the main causal relationships under-pinning the results framework worked and then seek to gather evidence to judge whether or not they: (i) operated as assumed; and (ii) then led to the expected outcomes. Such an exercise would not have been very meaningful since each country situation differs.

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<sup>14</sup> EB 98/64/R.8.

<sup>15</sup> EB 2006/87/R.3/Rev.1.


<sup>16</sup> *IFAD's role in fragile states* (REPL.VIII/4/R.5).

<sup>17</sup> EB 2011/102/R.29.

<sup>18</sup> Seven projects approved in or after 2006 have been evaluated as part of a Country Programme Evaluation, as reported in the 2012 and 2013 ARRIs.

<sup>19</sup> At the time of this CLE IFAD does not follow a theory of change approach in the formulation of country strategies and projects, although all strategies and projects are structured around a results chain. Theories of change would differ for countries that have institutional fragility only, or those with a conflict dimension or those particularly vulnerable to natural disasters.

Figure 1  
Notional results chain for IFAD's engagement with fragile state<sup>20</sup>



18. Three key evaluation issues are evident in the results chain: the importance of IFAD's strategy and project design responding to the country fragility context; the nature of project design and implementation support; and outcomes that reflect the needs of a fragile state or situation. Each of these was examined during the evaluation.
19. **Evaluation framework.** Within the structure provided by the results chain, an evaluation framework was developed in the Approach Paper. This set out questions and sources of information, which were further developed during the inception phase of the evaluation. The aim of the inception phase was, inter-alia, to further develop the evaluation methodology and fine-tune the process, prepare the instruments for data collection, and to brief the consultants on the overall approach, timelines and expectations from the evaluation.
20. **Use of mixed-methods.** A mixed methods approach combining desk review of documentation, re-analysis of existing performance evidence, interviews with IFAD management and staff, and country case studies was then used in assembling evidence against the questions in the evaluation framework.
21. In most cases, if existing evidence was used, some assessment of its quality was made. However, in view of the systematic approach to project performance assessment through the ARPP and ARRI, the evaluation has drawn on established ratings and assessment of performance, without further validation. Dependent upon the issue, performance was then judged against one of the following: (i) measures of performance already used within the organisation (such as project performance); (ii) the degree to which the evidence either confirmed or not that the approach found within IFAD guidance was either implemented or not, and could credibly be seen as making a difference or not; and (iii) the degree to which IFAD's approach or conceptual understanding is similar to that of others. Following good

<sup>20</sup> The results chain draws on the approach taken by the Independent Evaluation Group at the World Bank in the 2013 Evaluation of IDA's support to Fragile States.

practice, the strength of findings and conclusions derived from the analysis then reflected the degree to which evidence derived from different sources of evidence/analysis were consistent (triangulation).

22. **Evaluation building blocks.** Seven areas of work were undertaken in the evaluation. These included:
- Review of definitions, concepts and approaches to fragility and conflict, to understand international thinking and best practice, and as a benchmark for assessing IFAD's approach. This included reviewing evaluations and lessons from other IFI and UN agencies.
  - Analysis of project portfolio performance, using both independent and self-evaluation data.
  - Review of IFAD's policy framework for fragile states and relevant evaluation reports.
  - Desk review of a sample of COSOPs to examine responsiveness to the 2006 and 2008 guidance documents (42 were reviewed in total).
  - Desk review of more recent projects linked to COSOPs drafted after 2008. A total of 50 projects were reviewed including projects in the country case studies. The aim of this component of the evaluation was to assess how fragility was treated in project design and early stages of implementation.
  - Ten country visits and preparation of corresponding country case studies to collect the perspectives from the field in all five IFAD geographic regions.
  - A web-based questionnaire survey sent to all Country Programme Managers and staff at country offices to collect their feedback and inputs.
23. Table 2 summarises the samples of COSOP and projects that were reviewed.

Table 2

**Distribution of sampled COSOPs and Projects**

	<i>In fragile states</i>	<i>In non-fragile states</i>	<i>Totals</i>	
COSOP pre-2009	11	8	19	42
COSOP 2009 & later	14	9	23	
Projects pre-2009	11	2	13	50
Projects 2009 & later	21	16	37	

24. For the ten country case studies, candidate member states were first identified against the following broad criteria and then countries were sampled purposively:<sup>21</sup>
- Persistent fragility: i.e. member states which have had prolonged fragility and been on the FCS list during the selected evaluation period from 2004 to 2014.
  - Volatile fragility: i.e. member states which have had volatility moving out of and back into the FCS list during the selected evaluation period.
  - Graduation: i.e. member states which have graduated during the evaluation period and are less likely to move back into the FCS list.

<sup>21</sup> in consultation with IFAD's regional divisions consideration was given not to include countries that had been sampled for other major studies and evaluations in the recent past and to avoid countries participating in current evaluations or with other demands on national governments. Others including Yemen and Syria were excluded owing to their security status.

- (d) Non FCS with sub-national fragility: i.e. member states have not been considered as FCS during the evaluation period while having regions facing fragile and conflict affected situations.

25. Table 3 lists the ten countries covered.

Table 3

**List of sampled countries**

<i>Region</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Income status</i>	<i>Fragility characteristics</i>
APR	Nepal	LIC	Graduating out of FCS status
APR	Philippines	LMIC	Non-fragile state with fragile post-conflict situations
ESA	Eritrea	LIC	Prolonged fragile state
ESA	Burundi	LIC	Fragile owing to post-conflict transition
WCA	Democratic Republic of Congo	LIC	Prolonged fragile state with subnational conflicts
WCA	Liberia	LIC	Improving, prolonged fragile state with a peace-keeping force
NEN	Sudan	LMIC	Prolonged fragile state and with subnational conflicts
NEN	Bosnia & Herzegovina	UMIC	Post-conflict state designated fragile later in the evaluation period
NEN	Tunisia	UMIC	Non-fragile state with fragile post-conflict situations
LAC	Haiti	LIC	Prolonged fragile state and post disaster crisis

26. A detailed audit trail is available for the evaluation findings. The reviews of COSOPs and projects were all undertaken using structured proforma with questions developed against the results chain, as was the gathering of evidence in the country case studies. A six point rating scale was used throughout the document reviews. The team reviewed a common set of documents at the start and compared findings and conclusions identified by the individual members as the basis for developing a common approach and understanding across the team of the evidence required and how concepts would be understood. All country notes were reviewed in a challenge workshop after eight of the country visits were completed in order to ensure consistency of the ratings.

### **C. Process**

27. As mentioned before, the initial step in the process was the development of the approach paper in the first quarter of 2014. The policy analysis, reviews of COSOPs and projects were started in April-May 2014. Country case study visits took place mainly in July, August and September. It was not possible to visit Liberia owing to travel restrictions imposed by the United Nations in response to the Ebola epidemic. The visit to Haiti was deferred until November 2014, at the request of the Government.
28. The electronic survey to collect feedback from country programme managers and IFAD country office staff was done in October, and the draft final report was prepared and internally peer reviewed within IOE between November and December 2014. A progress report on the implementation of the evaluation was delivered to member states in the October 2014 session of the consultation of the tenth replenishment of IFAD resources.

29. As per established practice, the draft final report was shared with IFAD Management in January 2015, and their comments considered in this final report, in line with the provisions of the IFAD Evaluation Policy. The final report together with the IFAD Management's written response was discussed in the Evaluation Committee in end March 2015 and the April 2015 Executive Board.

#### **D. Limitations**

30. Care has been taken at all stages to ensure findings are triangulated or cross-referenced to ensure a high degree of confidence in the conclusions. Even so, some limitations are unavoidable.
31. IFAD's policy framework is fragmented and many sectoral policies lack operational guidelines. As such, the evaluation team has had to evaluate against perceived intentions rather than clear yardsticks for contextual analysis and project design. To overcome any variations that arise from changing data sets to account for countries which are in and out of fragile status, countries were classified as to whether they have always been classified as fragile, or for only some of the years or not at all. This is described later in paragraph 132.
32. Any sampling brings unavoidable sampling bias that arises from the choice of countries visited. However, the country studies are case studies chosen primarily to illustrate the diversity of settings within which IFAD operates rather than to be generalized to represent average performance<sup>22</sup>. The evidence can be generalized for IFAD, but in the setting of countries with similar contexts. The ability to generalise therefore relies on how well findings can be triangulated. As such, conclusions have only been drawn when there is consistency in findings from multiple sources of evidence. Lessons drawn from the evaluation relate more to IFAD's approach and processes than response to specific contexts.
33. Resource limitations restricted the scope for field visits and the number of key informants that could be interviewed in the country visits. To a significant degree, the evaluation was reliant on whether or not documentation dealt in a systematic manner with the issues related to how IFAD works in FSC. At country level, and particularly at the level of the individual projects, it relied on the degree to which management had focused on the specificities related to working in FCS. In practice, experience was that the treatment of fragility and how IFAD should respond in both the documentation and performance information was highly variable. To a large extent this was addressed in the country visits, which allowed interviewing key stakeholders to fill in gaps, but the time available did not allow the possibility of collecting new evidence of the effectiveness of IFAD's contribution to addressing the causes of fragility at country level. So the least evidence-based aspect of the evaluation is around whether outcomes reflect the needs of a fragile state or situation.
34. The evaluation team has taken action to overcome these limitations by means of structured data collection instruments, a well-documented audit trail and benchmarking of assessments within the team. We do not think these limitations have led to any systematic bias in the conclusions drawn from the evidence.

### **III. Fragile and conflict affected states and situations**

35. This chapter reviews the evolution of international practice in defining and working with fragile states in order to understand the context within which IFAD is working and the implications for IFAD's strategies and programming. It draws on a more extensive review in Working Paper 1 (available separately on request). The chapter opens with a consideration of definitions and concepts. Next is an examination of

<sup>22</sup> A comprehensive overview of the use and misuse of case studies can be found in GAO (1990) Case Study Evaluations. Report GAO/PEMD-91-10.1.9.

the need for understanding what causes fragility and conflict. Last are current approaches to measuring fragility in order to classify affected states.

## A. What is a fragile state?

36. At the start of the century, the main focus on **fragility concerned the effectiveness of the state** in terms of capacity to perform core functions, including the ability to respond to external shocks, and to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society. From the outset, approaches endeavoured to reconcile three distinct elements: understanding of the causes and effects of fragility; the link with conflict; and the process by which states develop to achieve stability and become resilient.
37. In 2005 parties<sup>23</sup> to the 'Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States' reached a consensus on a broad definition:
  - Fragile states are those where the state power is unable and/or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property, basic public services and essential infrastructure.
38. This open definition allowed for classification of countries facing a wide range of differing contexts as fragile states, including those having experienced crises and in pre- and post-conflict phases. This understanding of fragility implied that the safety, security and well-being of the citizens were at risk of a relapse into crisis or violent conflict. But this definition did not distinguish between causes and effects, nor did it make any reference to states growing out of fragility.
39. Because **fragility and conflict share common root causes** and feed off each other, fragile countries tend to be prone to conflict. The close connection between fragility and conflict has become more explicit over the past ten years. The literature from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank helps clarify the linkage between conflict and fragility as follows:
  - (a) Economic, political and social changes favour tensions and conflicts between interests and values in societies;
  - (b) States or institutions are expected/ required to have the capacity, accountability or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state in order to manage such tensions or conflicts effectively;
  - (c) When and where there is a lack of or inappropriate state responsiveness to such tensions or conflicts, the risk of violence increases<sup>24</sup>/ vulnerability to violence materializes<sup>25</sup>.
40. **Reasserting the connection between fragility and conflict has broadened the boundary for defining fragility to introduce a multidimensional scope.** Inter-linkages between fragility and conflict refer to political, economic and social dimensions, identified to various extents among international organisation and agencies:
  - (a) DFID links violent conflict with bad governance and the lack of a broad-based economic development.<sup>26</sup>
  - (b) From the World Bank perspective (2011 *ibid*), vicious cycles of conflict commence when political and economic stresses and pressures on justice and security meet weak institutions.

<sup>23</sup> DFID, World Bank, OECD-DAC and the European Commission.

<sup>24</sup> Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, The ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Societal Dynamics of Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations, Social Development Department, Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Team, The World Bank, 2011.

<sup>26</sup> DFID (2010) Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations. A DFID practice paper.

- (c) International NGOs such as International Alert, also refer to the political and economic arenas, but with their civil society perspective, highlight the requirement for equal opportunities and political participation.
41. In a radical initiative in 2011, 19 fragile and conflict-affected states<sup>27</sup> with the support of the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the G7+, met to fashion the **New Deal initiative to improve effectiveness of development cooperation by increasing coordination and country ownership**. They refer to the state of fragility as a period of time during nationhood when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, and accountable and fair service delivery. Figure 2 illustrates the ideas of the process as set out by the G7+.

Figure 2

**Process conception from crisis to resilience**

42. The 2011 *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* commits fragile states and international partners to 1) "do things differently" – by designing and implementing their interventions with an even greater consideration for the specific characteristics of fragile states; and, further, 2) focus on "different things" – by structuring their interventions around peacebuilding and state building goals. The interpretation of these goals is set out in Box 2.

Box 2

**What do "state" and "peace" building mean?**

An internationally accepted conceptual framework<sup>28</sup> on **state building** suggests three critical aspects of state-society relations that influence the resilience or fragility of states: the political settlement and processes: elite bargain – balance of power; the capability and responsiveness of the state: security – justice – economic management (revenues, employment) – service delivery; and social expectations and the gap between the normative and realistic expectations, which can produce changes in perceptions of the state-society relation: terms of the state-society relationship – ability of society to articulate demands.

**Peacebuilding** has come to be seen as the collective, strategic framework under which security, humanitarian, governance, development, social cohesion and social capital, and reconciliation dimensions can be brought together to address the causes and impact of conflict and build mechanisms for non-violent conflict management.

**The New Deal sets out five peacebuilding and state building goals (PSGs):**

inclusive politics = foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution;  
 security = establish and strengthen people's security;  
 justice = address injustices and increase people's access to justice;  
 strong economic foundations = generate employment and improve livelihoods;  
 revenues and services = good resource and revenue management and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

<sup>27</sup> Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Island, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor Leste, Togo, Yemen.

<sup>28</sup> Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility and Conflict, OECD-DAC, 2011 and Building Peaceful States and Societies, A DFID Practice Paper, 2010.

43. By 2012, the OECD had developed its definition to include considerations of external shocks and development towards resilience, though not explicitly dealing with conflict.
- "A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum".<sup>29</sup>
44. **The evolving conceptualisation of fragility is significant for IFAD** in four ways. Firstly, IFAD's definition (see Box 1) does not reflect the spectrum from crisis to resilience. Secondly, the shift to a multidimensional approach with concerns for peacebuilding and statebuilding creates a challenge for IFAD's sectoral focus and programme interventions, though one that potentially builds on IFAD's mandate and comparative advantage. Thirdly, the recognition that fragility can exist at a sub-national level has implications for contextual analysis and programming strategy. Lastly, IFAD's rural-urban nexus has a direct orientation towards building resilience in the face of the causal links between hunger or food crises and conflict and fragility.

#### Summary of key points

- ❖ Since the early 2000s, the focus on institutional weakness to describe situations of fragility has evolved to incorporate the central role played by state-society relations in transitional processes driving to resilience.
- ❖ Legitimacy, authority/accountability and capacity are the 3 components framing the fragility of the state, which, when missing, prevent its social institutions' ability to absorb and adapt to internal and external shocks and setbacks they are likely to face.
- ❖ In the second half of the decade, recognising causality links between fragility and cycles of conflict has driven a broader understanding of the multi-dimensions of fragility – political, economic and social – beyond the symptoms of institutional weaknesses.
- ❖ Justice and security sectors have eventually emerged as a priority, including in the eyes of fragile and conflict-affected states.
- ❖ The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is the most comprehensive and ambitious framework to analyse situations of fragility, identify peacebuilding and statebuilding as key complementary objectives for international engagement and the principles of country-ownership and governance.

## B. Exploring what causes fragility and conflict

45. Despite the volume and share of ODA to **fragile states**, they **have remained the furthest behind in terms of meeting the Millennium Development Goals**. Reporting this, the WDR 2011 questioned the relevance of strategies adopted to support development and peace in FCS and, indirectly, the context analysis on which they are grounded.
46. Taking context as the starting point is the first of the ten fragile states principles drafted by the OECD-DAC in 2005 and endorsed by international aid agencies. According to their circumstances, fragile states face different constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy, and differences between (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations, (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. Sound political analysis is needed to allow international responses to be adapted to country and

<sup>29</sup> Reported in OECD (2012), Fragile states 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world.

regional contexts, at a level of detail beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength.

47. **Context analysis should explore** the multi-causal, multi-dimensional and mutually reinforcing nature of **the drivers of fragility** to understand the potential two-way interactions between interventions and fragility and conflict dynamics.
48. A number of conflict analysis frameworks have been developed (see Working Paper 1, Table 1). Most follow the same structure around profiles/ structures, actors and dynamics driving the actors' interests, goals and relationships. Some international NGOs, mostly humanitarian and relief oriented, the OECD, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the UN system, which have a prospective approach to peace, also analyse future trends and elaborate scenarios when looking at dynamics influencing actors' attitudes and actions.
49. None of those frameworks has devoted significant space to mainstreaming gender nor is there explicit discussion of conflict implications of competing claims over natural resources, especially access to land. Both are core features in IFAD's strategic frameworks and represent deficiencies in analysis that might limit their use by IFAD without further modification.

#### Summary of key points

- ❖ Analysis by the World Bank postulates that limitations in the production and use of quality context analyses have lessened the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of development strategies in FCS.
- ❖ Understanding fragility is not enough: its validity is determined by the relevance, comprehensiveness and dynamic nature of the context analysis and the degree of harmonisation of findings with international and national partners.
- ❖ The aim for context analysis in FCS is to diagnose institutions' capability, accountability and responsiveness to stresses and shocks that threaten the recovery process and hamper opportunities for resilience-building. It requires the identification of root causes and drivers of both fragility and conflict.
- ❖ Good practices include political economy analyses and guidance for programming and planning in the analysis itself. Areas for improvement include gender mainstreaming and deeper understanding of state-society relations.

### C. Approaches by multilateral partners to engagement in fragile states

50. This section looks briefly at the approaches of UNDP, FAO and WFP, which are more geared towards crises and disasters, then reviews four IFIs with which IFAD partners.
51. The three UN agencies recognise fragility as an issue, but their work is oriented primarily towards crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) arising either from conflict or natural disasters. UNDP expenditures for CPR represent about 25 per cent of annual global programme expenditure. FAO's emergency programme has grown from USD 160 million in 2002 to over USD 400 million in 2011<sup>30</sup> and a Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) was established in April 2004.
52. Independent evaluations of UNDP's CPR support in 2013<sup>31</sup> and FAO's work in post-crisis transition in 2014<sup>32</sup> found some common issues: needing to take a more standard approach such as greater use of conflict analysis at country level. For UNDP, the use of theory of change approaches and improved indicators and monitoring and evaluation were highlighted as potentially more effective ways of

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/en/>.

<sup>31</sup> UNDP 2013. *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-affected countries in the context of UN Peace Operations*. Independent Evaluation Office. New York: UNDP.

<sup>32</sup> FAO. 2012. *Update on the indicative rolling work plan of strategic and programme evaluation 2012-2014*. Programme Committee, Hundred and twelfth session. Rome: FAO.

- planning and working. A key finding was the need for FAO to go beyond its usual focus on technical solutions, to confront and help constructively shape difficult socio-political realities. This has a strong echo of the challenges facing IFAD, not least because of the close similarity in sectoral focus between FAO and IFAD.
53. WFP works in the continuum from emergency relief to development but has neither specific policies for fragile states nor a recent evaluation.
  54. The **International Development Association (IDA)** has transformed its approach to fragile states to tackle low levels of performance that saw projects twice as likely to fail as in non-fragile states. Policy responses included: policies to provide additional 'exceptional' funding for post-conflict and so-called re-engaging countries; access to a multi-donor trust fund; debt relief and support in response to natural disasters and crises; greater decentralisation of staff; and increased budget for operational work, analytical and advisory services and technical assistance. An evaluation in 2013 indicates that performance of projects in FCS is now on par with the rest of the IDA portfolio.<sup>33</sup>
  55. However, despite closing the performance gap, both the *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* (WDR 2011) and 2013 evaluation argue that further adjustment in the World Bank's management of the IDA portfolio in fragile states is required. The WDR 2011 has led to a paradigm shift based on the premise that the legacy of violence, weak institutions and the multiple challenges plaguing fragile and conflict-affected states cannot be resolved by short-term or partial solutions in the absence of institutions that provide people with security, justice and jobs. Recommendations from the 2013 evaluation argue for a more precise approach to defining fragile and conflict affected states; more closely tailored country assistance strategies; increased support to state-building; and a more responsive approach to gender issues in post-conflict settings.
  56. The current IDA17 framework (July 2014 to June 2017) considers fragile and conflict-affected states as a special theme of the replenishment and goes beyond the evaluation recommendations to provide enhanced financial support to them by: (i) implementing an exceptional allocation regime for countries facing "turn-around" situations<sup>34</sup>; (ii) increasing the poverty-orientation of the regular PBA system by changing the Country Performance Rating (CPR) exponent in the PBA formula; (iii) increasing the annual minimum base allocation; and (iv) ensuring a smooth transition for countries under the current exceptional post-conflict and re-engaging regimes<sup>35</sup>.
  57. The **African Development Bank's (AfDB)** 2013-2022 strategy specifies fragility as an area of special emphasis<sup>36</sup>. An evaluation in 2012 drew attention to problems of classifying states and the need for flexibility. It also reported below-average performance in those countries. As part of the ADF 13 (2014-2016 cycle) a High Level Panel on Fragile States recommended supplementing its country-based allocation model with a thematic funding instrument dedicated to conflict prevention and building resilience, intended to pilot innovative approaches for scaling up. Also a stronger focus on: youth employment; private investment in isolated economies; empowering women as key actors in peacebuilding and statebuilding and in building livelihoods; and on building the capacity of the

<sup>33</sup> IEG. 2013. *World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States*. An Independent Evaluation. Washington, DC: World Bank.

<sup>34</sup> A "turn-around" situation is a critical juncture in a country's development trajectory providing a significant opportunity for building stability and resilience to accelerate its transition out of fragility marked by: (i) the cessation of an ongoing conflict (e.g., interstate warfare, civil war or other cycles of violence and/or partial state collapse that significantly disrupt a country's development prospects); or (ii) the commitment to a major change in the policy environment following: • a prolonged period of disengagement from IDA lending; or • a major shift in a country's policy priorities addressing critical elements of fragility.

<sup>35</sup> IDA17. 2014. *IDA17: Maximizing Development Impact -Additions to IDA Resources: Seventeenth Replenishment*. Report from the Executive Directors of the IDA to the Board of Governors.

<sup>36</sup> AfDB. 2013. *Strategy for 2013-2022: At the center of Africa's transformation*. Tunis: AfDB.

Regional Economic Communities to pursue regional solutions to drivers of fragility such as natural resource management and the extractive industries.

58. The **Asian Development Bank (ADB)** evaluated its work in fragile states in 2010. Although relevant, many projects were identified as only borderline effective. A number of problems were identified including how to identify situations and separate fragility from conflict-affected situations; having a long-term framework for capacity development and avoiding over-ambitious project designs. The Bank adopted a revised approach in 2013<sup>37</sup>. This puts forward six main actions for ADB to mainstream its approach: (i) continue efforts to make country strategies and plans for all fragile and conflict affected situations countries more fragility- and conflict-sensitive; (ii) strengthen human resources for fragile and conflict affected situations operations; (iii) seek to augment financial resources for fragile and conflict affected situations operations; (iv) adopt differentiated business processes for fragile and conflict affected situations operations and develop a more appropriate risk framework; (v) develop an institutional strengthening framework for fragile and conflict affected situations developing member countries; and (vi) refine its approach to identifying fragile and conflict affected situations developing member countries.
59. Use of the terminology 'situations' distinguishes the Asian Development Bank from the World Bank and AfDB. Whilst the region has a low number of states defined as fragile, according to the Asia Foundation in the ten years up to 2013, nearly 60 per cent of the world's active subnational conflicts have been found in Asia.<sup>38</sup> Despite recognising this in the 2012 staff handbook, '*Working differently in fragile and conflict affected situations*', Bank policy and procedures still classify fragility for countries as a whole.<sup>39</sup> The handbook does, however, put forward a typology of fragility that includes reference to subnational situations. See Box 3.

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<sup>37</sup> ADB. 2013. *Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB's Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*. Manila: ADB.

<sup>38</sup> Parks, Thomas., Nat Colletta, Ben Oppenheim (2013) *Contested Corners of Asia*. The Asia Foundation. San Francisco.

<sup>39</sup> ADB (2012) *Working differently in fragile and conflict affected situations*. Manila p5 "FCS typically refers to a country as a whole, and sometimes to a supra- national territory that has been destabilized, but in the Asia and Pacific region, it is more likely to be applicable to subnational territories within countries."

Box 3

**A typology of fragility by the Asian Development Bank**

**Fragile situations** are small and geographically isolated, often with scattered, low-density populations and underdeveloped markets. Opportunities for economies of scale and scope, as well as human and financial resources and infrastructure, are limited and highly dependent on aid flows. Core state political, security, and service delivery functions are weak, unstable, and concentrated around urban areas. Countries in these fragile situations may also be particularly vulnerable to climate change and disasters.

**Conflict-affected situations**—conflict or post-conflict, national or subnational—are those in which significant social and economic disruptions lead to weak governance, extensive damage to infrastructure, and disruption of service provision.

**Transitional situations** include countries exiting fragility and conflict, or other significant social or political upheaval, wherein economies may be growing. Typically, however, reform processes are constrained by weak state capacities or poor governance. Delivery of essential services remains inadequate. Some countries may no longer be identified as fragile or conflict-affected per se, but the fragility risk remains. A country's transition may take place over a generation—between 15 to 30 years.

**Subnational fragile situations**—as defined by The Asia Foundation—have been afflicted by conflict for decades, leading to protracted cycles of underdevelopment, poor governance, and instability. These conditions often create an environment that stifles local economic growth, prevents integration into national and regional economies, and leads to deteriorating social services and a consistently high level of violent conflict.

Source: ADB (2012) *Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations. A staff handbook*. ADB, Manila.

60. **The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).** Although Haiti is the only country formally classified as a fragile state in Latin America, many countries have fragile or conflict prone situations and some Caribbean islands and countries in the Central American isthmus have experienced increasing vulnerability to external shocks and occasional weak institutional capacity in project implementation<sup>40</sup>. In the wake of Haiti's 2010 earthquake, the Bank included full debt forgiveness, delivery of concessional resources in 2010, and expansion of the Bank's Grant Facility to provide Haiti US\$200 million per year for a period of 10 years, subject to annual approval by the Governors. An evaluation in 2013 confirms that the financial mandates have been fulfilled. The intervention strategy adopted by the Bank emphasized long-term efforts, rather than reconstruction, and had very ambitious targets given the limited management capacities of the Government of Haiti. Execution problems, such as poor designs and weak supervision capacity, have limited the results of these programs. The pressure arising from the need for approval and disbursement of the annual US\$200 million commitment opens up new opportunities for a long-term country strategy, but is hindered by the slow, complex process of institution building.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Evaluation Offices gather to discuss lessons learned working in Fragile States, June 2013: <http://www.iadb.org/en/office-of-evaluation-and-oversight/evaluation-offices-gather-to-discuss-lessons-learned-working-in-fragile-states.8236.html>.

<sup>41</sup> <http://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/5861?locale-attribute=en>.

**Summary of key points**

A number of common themes are evident:

- ❖ Historically, all the IFIs have experienced lower performance in projects in fragile states. However the differences are now small and the goal oriented rating methodologies do not allow comparison of benefits among projects in fragile states vs. other states.
- ❖ There is a need for a more nuanced approach to classifying countries, with clearer distinctions between situations arising from crises, fragility and conflict. Reliance on institutional and policy analysis alone is not sufficient.
- ❖ Partners aim to better address the drivers of fragility at the country strategy and project design stage through solid context analysis including socio-political aspects. Improved engagement includes investment in analytical and implementation support.
- ❖ Programmes should tackle wider issues such as institutions, security, justice and jobs in the long-term perspective of peacebuilding and statebuilding, rather than have a narrow technical focus.
- ❖ More agile operational policies are needed that allow for flexibility and adaptability to sudden context changes and low implementation capacity.
- ❖ Strengthen direct engagement of staff in fragile and conflict affected states and ensure that all staff working in these countries are appropriately trained and provided with the right incentives.
- ❖ IDA, IADB and AfDB have created some additional flexibility in financial allocations to fragile and conflict affected states.

61. The experience and orientation of these multilateral agencies is highly relevant for IFAD, yet also challenging owing to IFAD's unique sectoral focus. The extent to which IFAD's experience mirrors those agencies and needs to adopt similar strategies is a theme in this evaluation. There is undoubtedly scope for collaboration based on each institution's comparative advantage.

**D. Measuring fragility**

62. The issue of tackling fragility has led to the development of indices of fragile states intended to classify fragility, monitor changes over time and recognise deteriorating situations to support context-specific responses. There are four kinds of actors producing fragility indices: universities, think tanks, media corporations and international organizations. Table 4 summarises two indices of direct relevance to IFAD's current practice as they are the basis of the approach used by IDA and the OECD.

Table 4  
**Characteristics of the CPIA and Failed States Indices**

<i>Index</i>	<i>Concept and measurement</i>	<i>Source and reliability</i>
World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) [Renamed International Development Association (IDA) Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) in 2013]	<p>16 indicators grouped in four classes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic Management</li> <li>• Structural Policies</li> <li>• Policies for social inclusion/equity</li> <li>• Public sector management and institutions</li> </ul> <p>Assessment rated on a six point scale and averaged to a single number. Countries scoring 3.2 or less are considered to be fragile.</p>	<p>Ratings are established by World Bank staff only with no external, independent review.</p> <p>Data are published for low income countries. Assessment of middle income countries is not publicly available.</p>
Fund for Peace Failed States Index [Renamed Fragile States Index in 2014]	<p>The FSI is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary <a href="#">Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST)</a> analytical platform.</p> <p>The Fund for Peace's software performs content analysis on collected information. Each is scored on a 10 point scale and aggregated to a total score. The higher the score, the more fragile the country.</p>	<p>Millions of documents are analyzed every year. Scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators (which in turn include over 100 sub-indicators).</p>

63. **Indices are not a substitute for context analysis.** At their best indices provide a quick assessment of a country's circumstances. Depending on the purpose, this might be adequate. But all indices have some limitations and the more detailed the purpose the less likely it is that an index will convey the necessary information:
- (a) when indicators are not specific enough to assess the nature of fragile situations, they are potentially too standardised and inadequate in measuring fragility and/or risk of fragility and vulnerability.
  - (b) they do not adequately differentiate state capacity across functions (an important point for IFAD with its focus on rural institutions).
  - (c) difficulties around data collection in fragile states can reduce the validity and reliability of indicators and additionally the time lag in data collection and analysis limits the ability to assess and respond to fast moving situations.
  - (d) they are country based models and do not sufficiently capture sub-national and external dimensions of the drivers of fragility.
  - (e) It is hard to draw conclusions as to whether small dissimilarities between countries are caused by error or true variation. Only large variations can be trusted.

**Summary of key points**

- ❖ Indices provide measurable indications on the situation of fragility and conflict against a variety of indicators. They allow comparison in time and space.
- ❖ Categorisation criteria and processes have their limits. It appears very risky to use them as rigid benchmarks for planning or allocation of resources.

**E. Responding to fragility**

64. A strong rationale has emerged about the **need to engage differently in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations**. The links between repeated cycles of violence and economic growth, level of human development and environmental sustainability have become widely acknowledged in the evolution of aid effectiveness agendas. Conventional aid principles and instruments have progressively been adjusted to the specific challenges of fragile states and to make aid more effective.
65. The requirement to tackle drivers of conflict and fragility and not only deal with fragility symptoms or consequences of conflict (ruined infrastructures, deterioration of social services) is assessed in the World Development Report of 2011. Because organised violence is stimulated by a range of domestic and international stresses, such as youth unemployment, income shocks, tensions among ethnic, religious or social groups, and trafficking networks, and because risks of violence are greater when high stresses combine with weak capacity or lack of legitimacy in key national institutions, it is crucial that development efforts go beyond institutional fragility and socio-political instability to target the root causes and drivers and break cycles of violence.
66. **The objectives of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and statebuilding are inextricably linked:** efforts to support and achieve them essentially address the same underlying problems. Their aims, too, are consistent: to help societies move in directions conducive to nonviolent resolution of conflict, address grievances and injustice, and move towards sustained peace and development. Engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states should then support the development of legitimate, accountable and capable national institutions, whether state or non state, that adequately respond to citizens' priority needs: notably security, justice and jobs.
67. The terms peacebuilding and statebuilding may be unfamiliar within IFAD, but the potential actions in support of the five PSGs (Box 2) are directly compatible with IFAD's mandate and comparative advantage. Box 4 provides some examples where IFAD can design approaches that contribute to the PSGs. IFAD can also create strategic partnerships with IFIs and other multilateral agencies to exploit their broader expertise and benefit from practical tools such as joint supervision.

## Box 4

**What IFAD can do in relation to the PSGs**

<b>PSGs</b>	<b>IFAD CAN'T</b>	<b>IFAD CAN</b>
1- Inclusive politics	IFAD cannot impose separation of powers (legislative, executive and judiciary).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IFAD can strengthen social cohesion. Its programmes emphasize the proactive role of women and of women's groups and organizations in rebuilding community cohesion.</li> <li>• Programmes also can target groups that have experienced social and economic exclusion, be it from gender, ethnic, caste or other reasons.</li> <li>• IFAD can promote good governance in natural resources management by promoting participatory political processes, for example on land rights issues; by ensuring community policy forums to secure access to land and water.</li> <li>• IFAD can enhance service delivery at national/subnational levels.</li> <li>• IFAD can contribute to diversity in decision-making bodies (gender, minorities).</li> </ul>
2- Security	<p>IFAD does not engage in peacekeeping operations.</p> <p>IFAD does not engage in humanitarian relief operations.</p> <p>IFAD does not directly work on law enforcement.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IFAD's engagement on institutional development among rural communities and on local governance issues can make a difference in moderating the spread of violence and in facilitating pacification, economic recovery and resumption of the development process.</li> <li>• IFAD can reinforce its coordination with agencies involved in humanitarian assistance by supporting complementary initiatives that help bridge the gap between emergency relief and the restoration of development processes. (Note link to 2011 policy) especially with respect to the peaceful reintegration of former combatants in their rural communities.</li> </ul>
3- Justice	<p>IFAD does not ensure reparations to victims of conflict.</p> <p>IFAD does not provide financing for the reform of the justice sector.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IFAD can promote rehabilitation of ex-combatants through trainings. (and targeting in project mechanisms)</li> <li>• IFAD's work with community groups, farmers organisations and government can promote good governance, rule of law and observance of accountability through processes such as audit.</li> </ul>
4- Strong economic foundations	IFAD is not a major player in interventions and advisory services related to improved macro-economic management.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IFAD is very relevant to promote fair land ownership legislation, sustainable land use policies, policy emphasis on revitalization of depressed regions, enhanced agricultural productivity, job creation and private sector development in rural areas.</li> <li>• Youth unemployment is a conflict driver and IFAD can target youth employment at many stages of the agricultural value chain.</li> </ul>
5- Revenues and services	IFAD does not provide assistance for tax collection nor does IFAD directly fight corruption.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IFAD can ensure sound financial management in its operations and contribute to the rise of rural populations incomes.</li> <li>• IFAD can promote microfinance/ microcredit projects with the overall objective to increase the targets' revenues.</li> <li>• IFAD's work on service delivery can promote value for money to citizens and accountability and rule of law in the procurement and</li> </ul>

PSGs	IFAD CAN'T	IFAD CAN
		operation of services.

68. This new perspective for international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states is reflected in shifts in three areas: aid allocation guiding principles; the emergence of whole of government approaches; and conflict-sensitivity in strategic programming, as well as in implementation arrangements.
69. **International actors need to address the problem of "aid orphans"** – states where few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. A 2007 study found that donors tended to focus their efforts on rewarding well-performing states through aid provision.<sup>42</sup> Poorly performing countries, by contrast, were left relatively isolated. In some cases this led to major crises or even state collapse. Although there is now greater recognition that fragile states should not be neglected, aid allocation sometimes works to the disadvantage of states with weak authority and legitimacy and in favour to states emerging from violent conflict.
70. **The whole of government approach recognises that the political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent** and tensions between objectives, particularly in the short-term, must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. Achieving policy coherence within donor governments, as well as between the international actors and partner governments, has been recognised as a critical determinant of successful outcomes in fragile states as early as 2005. It has actually been one of the main drivers to establishing fragile states principles.<sup>43</sup> In many fragile states, including post-conflict situations, humanitarian and development workers will be found side-by-side. But joined up working can have significant resource implications in both financial and human terms.
71. Incentives for departments to work collaboratively with other government counterparts remain missing in many cases. International Alert also points out the limited capacity of fragile states to absorb rapid reforms which makes it difficult to achieve the right balance between security, development and governance policies. The OECD 2011 monitoring survey on the Fragile States Principles shows that comprehensive and integrated approaches to political, security and development objectives have remained exceptional in practice.
72. The approach presents a particular challenge for sectoral agencies such as IFAD, who may need to collaborate with bilateral or multilateral partners in order to broaden interventions to link up with international efforts to address wider government constraints.
73. DFID defines **conflict sensitivity** as "the capacity of an organisation to understand the context in which it operates, to recognise the interaction between its operation and that context, and to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts"<sup>44</sup>. The AsDB<sup>45</sup> follows the same line when stating that conflict-sensitive approach should attend to positively address conflict and fragility: (i) reduce the chances of conflict outbreak, (ii) contribute to peace and stability, and (iii) work within the constraints of an FCS country.
74. Conflict-sensitivity grounds the 2<sup>nd</sup> Fragile States Principle "Ensure all activities do no harm". The Do No Harm Analytical Framework<sup>46</sup>, designed from programming experiences, has remained a reference since 2000 as a descriptive tool for mapping

<sup>42</sup> Global Monitoring Report, Confronting the Challenges of Gender Equality and Fragile States, 2007.

<sup>43</sup> Examples of Whole of Government Approaches from the UK, USA and Australia can be found in Working Paper 1, Table 5.

<sup>44</sup> Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations, Briefing Paper B: Do No Harm, DFID Practice Paper, March 2010.

<sup>45</sup> 2014.

<sup>46</sup> Options for Aid in Conflict, Mary B. Anderson, The Collaborative for Development Action, 2000.

the interactions between aid and conflict. It differentiates 6 steps:  
 (i) understanding the context of conflict (ii) analysing dividers and tensions  
 (iii) analysing connectors and local capacities for peace (iv) analysing the aid programme (v) analysing the aid programme's impact on dividers and connectors  
 (vi) considering and choosing programming options.

#### **Summary of key points**

- ❖ A strong rationale has emerged about the need to engage differently in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations to tackle drivers of conflict and fragility and not only deal with fragility symptoms or consequences of conflict.
- ❖ The objectives of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and statebuilding are inextricably linked and prompt a shift in aid allocation guiding principles and the emergence of whole of government approaches and conflict-sensitivity.
- ❖ A conflict-sensitive approach should positively address conflict and fragility, deliberately working in and on conflicts rather than simply getting round them.

## **IV. Findings on IFAD's performance at country level**

75. This chapter presents the main findings from the evaluation case study countries and from desk reviews of samples of COSOPs and new project designs. The evidence examines if IFAD's approach reflects what is in its guidance documents and if not, whether it seemed likely that not doing so explained 'poor' performance. The analysis examines the importance of IFAD's strategy and project design responding to the country fragility context; the nature of project design and implementation support; and evidence about outcomes that reflect the needs of a fragile state or situation. Supporting evidence also comes from a survey of CPMs and country office staff. The Chapter presents material in the sequence of the results chain, starting with strategy.

### **A. Country strategy**

#### **Relevance**

76. Table 5 draws together analysis by IFAD and other sources to identify symptoms and drivers of fragility in each country. The third column lists implications for development initiatives. The data on nature and drivers of fragility are drawn from the evaluation country case study materials summarised in Working Paper 6.

Table 5 Assessments of fragility from the case study countries

Country	Nature of fragility	Drivers of fragility	Implications for development initiatives
Bosnia & Herzegovina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political impasse and institutional deadlock over matters such as governance and rule of law.</li> <li>A lack of skills and capacity within the public and private sectors, and low empowerment and engagement of civil society.</li> <li>Corruption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Volatile ethnic-based political situation</li> <li>A high degree of social exclusion linked to polycentric political systems and discrimination based on ethnic affiliation – ethnic domination by territory.</li> <li>An absolute weakness of social bonds of trust, reciprocity and solidarity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targeted pro-poor social inclusion</li> <li>Capacity building of farmer organisations</li> <li>Youth employment</li> <li>Development of private sector capabilities</li> <li>Policy dialogue</li> <li>Partnership working linked to EU Accession</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political instability, as a consequence of ethnic civil war.</li> <li>Continuing banditry</li> <li>Land disputes</li> <li>Instances of human rights violations,</li> <li>Violence to women</li> <li>Corruption</li> <li>Climate change vulnerability</li> </ul>	<p>Structural factors of fragility such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Underlying ethnic tensions</li> <li>Dominance of coffee as the main source of export earnings</li> <li>Fast growing population</li> <li>Weak institutional capacities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women's empowerment</li> <li>Access to land and land tenure</li> <li>Improved market access (VC)</li> <li>Job creation/youth employment</li> <li>Resilience to climate change</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Localised and larger scale conflict</li> <li>Use of public resources for private financial accumulation</li> <li>Human rights violations</li> <li>Impunity among office-holders</li> <li>IDPs and refugee populations</li> <li>Domestic and sexual violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weak governance and institutional instability</li> <li>Cultural and ethnic diversity</li> <li>Gender inequity</li> <li>Distribution of and access to mineral resources</li> <li>Regional conflict</li> <li>Nepotism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targeting specific conflict-sensitive and remote locations</li> <li>Development of civil society</li> <li>Support to basic service provision</li> <li>Employment support to youth, women and girls</li> <li>Support to land tenure</li> </ul>
Eritrea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weak governance</li> <li>Disrupted and inadequate service provision</li> <li>Weak state capacity</li> <li>Persistent exodus of youth and talent</li> <li>Concentrated overuse of the natural resources (water, pastoral areas, forests and cropping land)</li> <li>Eroding assets and depletion of traditional coping mechanisms</li> <li>Diminishing level of support from the international community</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political process</li> <li>The lingering “no war no peace” situation</li> <li>Protracted and frequent droughts</li> <li>Weak state capacity</li> <li>National service policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Capacity building of farmer organisations</li> <li>Youth employment</li> <li>Promotion of private sector initiatives</li> </ul>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eroded governance</li> <li>Social violence,</li> <li>Environmental degradation that exacerbates the impact of natural disasters,</li> <li>Weak private sector</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political instability</li> <li>Social fracture</li> <li>High vulnerability to natural disasters.</li> <li>Inadequate business climate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promotion of private sector</li> <li>Youth employment</li> <li>Empowerment of women</li> <li>Policy dialogue</li> <li>Resilience/mitigation to natural disasters</li> </ul>

Country	Nature of fragility	Drivers of fragility	Implications for development initiatives
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migration of educated women and men</li> <li>• Weak state capacity to define policies to provide public goods and manage social risks.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity building</li> </ul>
Liberia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak human and institutional capacity</li> <li>• Vulnerability to climate change and external shocks.</li> <li>• Land disputes</li> <li>• Youth unemployment</li> <li>• Large urban/rural inequalities</li> <li>• Land disputes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Competition over resources and ownership of land</li> <li>• Lack of legitimate politics and weak justice system</li> <li>• Regional and internal instability, border /regional conflicts, conflict in neighbouring countries</li> <li>• Gender disparities</li> <li>• Youth unemployment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional strategy to include neighbouring countries</li> <li>• Consideration to work in border areas</li> <li>• Partnership with agencies dealing with regional conflicts and e.g. drug trafficking</li> <li>• Women's empowerment</li> </ul>
Nepal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak provision of services at local levels</li> <li>• Lack of and unequal access to economic opportunities,</li> <li>• Lack of access to governance institutions and processes</li> <li>• Large scale labour migration</li> <li>• Underused land</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political stagnation at national level</li> <li>• Political instability at local level</li> <li>• Ethnic, caste and gender-based discriminatory practices</li> <li>• Remoteness</li> <li>• Localised effects of climate change</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pro-active social inclusion</li> <li>• Targeting of remote locations/ area-based initiatives</li> <li>• Improved access to markets</li> <li>• Youth employment</li> <li>• Women's empowerment</li> </ul>
Philippines	<p>Localised situations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict</li> <li>• Poverty exacerbated by extreme climatic events and natural disasters</li> <li>• Weak service capacity in government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to land and land rights linked to indigenous peoples and commercial agriculture</li> <li>• Conflict over access to land, forest and mineral resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participatory, community-based initiatives</li> <li>• Land tenure and titling</li> <li>• Targeting of specific locations/ area-based initiatives</li> <li>• Land rights in disaster-prone locations</li> </ul>
Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continuing conflict and humanitarian crises in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States,</li> <li>• Extensive damage to infrastructure</li> <li>• Environmental fragility related to drought</li> <li>• Social and economic disruption</li> <li>• Weak governance</li> <li>• Disruption of service provision</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic and economic user group conflicts over access to natural resources</li> <li>• Drought and climate change risk</li> <li>• Vulnerable social cohesion</li> <li>• Limited state capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social and governance dimension of conflict over natural resources and environmental fragility</li> <li>• Policy dialogue on decentralisation and land reform in partnership with other agencies</li> <li>• Targeting of specific locations and agriculture/pastoralism systems</li> </ul>
Tunisia	<p>Localised situations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fourteen poorer governorates are considered more environmentally and socially fragile than the rest of the country.</li> <li>• Increasing corruption</li> <li>• Weakened government capacity to provide some services.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict among pastoral scarce water and rangeland resource users reflecting a technocratic approach to development in past policies.</li> <li>• Weak institutions post-Arab spring</li> <li>• A civil society that has been subservient to the central authorities since independence, posing issues of representativeness dramatically reducing its value as social capital</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targeting environmentally vulnerable areas and poorer communities</li> <li>• Conflict mitigation measures through community groups and traditional conflict resolution systems</li> <li>• Youth and gender-balanced employment</li> <li>• Policy studies and knowledge sharing on environment</li> </ul>

77. Findings on the relevance of IFAD's portfolio in each case study country against the situation of fragility in the country summarised in Table 5 above are summarised in Table 6 below. This analysis draws upon the conventional assessments of relevance as described in IFAD COSOPs and projects, even though it was often the case that such analyses didn't explicitly consider the implications of fragility.

Table 6  
**Relevance of IFAD's country portfolio to fragility**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Relevance<sup>47</sup></i>
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Moderately relevant
Burundi	Moderately relevant
Democratic Republic of Congo	Moderately relevant
Eritrea	Moderately relevant
Haiti	Relevant
Liberia	Moderately relevant
Nepal	Moderately relevant
Philippines	Moderately relevant
Sudan	Relevant
Tunisia	Relevant

78. **Context analysis rarely deals comprehensively with fragility and conflict.** A core assumption of IFAD's policy framework and the international guidance by the OECD and development banks is that dealing with fragility requires a contextual analysis to understand drivers of fragility, as opposed to just its symptoms, and identify points of entry to addressing the drivers. IFAD's 2006 policy and 2008 guidelines both stress the importance of the COSOP for this purpose. The finding is that this approach is not being systematically followed in practice. The findings from the case study countries and desk reviews (we reviewed 42 COSOPs of which 23 were approved between 2009 and 2014) show few examples of reference to or material from a fragility analysis or a comprehensive appraisal or consideration of the full range of drivers. Nor were instances of applying the principles of 'Do No Harm' found in proposed IFAD strategies. In general, fragility associated drivers that would be identified in a poverty analysis were identified, although the degree to which the analysis systematically addressed such drivers was variable. Only in a few cases were examples found of a context analysis that went beyond what should be expected in a credible poverty analysis and addressed issues of the under-lying political economy and state legitimacy.
79. **Examples of comprehensive context analyses dealing with the drivers of fragility were found in post-conflict settings.** Box 5 contains an example from Nepal. This illustrates that sometimes IFAD is able to draw on fragility analyses prepared by development partners in support of their own strategies. Examples found reflect the immediate post conflict situations – for example in Sudan, Burundi, Haiti, DRC and Nepal - but not always – as in Liberia. COSOPs developed at such points include a more explicit consideration of a wider range of fragility drivers and how IFAD might contribute to addressing them.

<sup>47</sup> A rating of relevant means that the strategy in the COSOP responds to the analysis of fragility found from national and international sources in the country. Moderately relevant indicates a strategy with some, but limited elements that responds to the analysis of fragility.

## Box 5

**Post conflict fragility in Nepal**

In 2006, when IFAD's COSOP was drafted, Nepal was entering a post-conflict era with a cease-fire from the insurgents and a dramatic end to the monarchy. The COSOP recognised the significance of the challenges facing the emerging republic. The implications of post conflict reconstruction and reconciliation were built into IFAD's strategy and informed decisions to target poor rural households and mitigate the risks inherent in the programme.

(2006 COSOP Para 16): "... Immediate opportunities include (i) reconstruction and/or rehabilitation of rural infrastructure; (ii) promotion of underdeveloped regions, particularly remote areas where armed conflict was initiated; (iii) poverty reduction in rural areas – particularly for the poorest, socially excluded and disadvantaged people of both the hills and the Terai foothills; (iv) realization of rural and agricultural development potential; (v) creation of productive employment opportunities for youth; (vi) relief and rehabilitation support to conflict-affected people – most urgently the homeless and internally displaced; and (vii) development of policy, legal and regulatory instruments to accelerate social reintegration."

(2006 COSOP Para 33): "...IFAD's policy allows for flexibility in conflict or post-conflict situations to be built into activities under all SOs including (i) the design of new programmes specifically aimed at conflict mitigation or reconstructing and reactivating the development capabilities of target groups; (ii) modification of activities and projects to incorporate special measures not embraced in the original design; and (iii) utilizing other instruments such as grant funding and sharing experiences with development partners. The strategy will support a conflict-sensitive development approach in IFAD activities to build the capacity of communities to engage in development works through the adoption of techniques for peace/conflict assessment, community mediation, negotiation, human rights, communications and facilitation. A new grant project with an allocation of US\$700,000 will be developed in early 2007 to address skills development and employment needs by the conflict- affected people in remote areas, including former combatants. This project will aim at contributing to post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts and focuses in particular on the youth in the hill and mountain areas where unemployment is one of the main reasons for violence and insurgency. ... "

80. **Analysis is stronger post-conflict than later during transition.** Once events had moved on to the transition from post-conflict to development, at least in the case study countries, comprehensive fragility analyses are more rare and even when present little used by IFAD. The finding that comprehensive fragility analysis is rare in IFAD COSOPs once a country moves out of the immediate post-conflict was also found in the COSOP/project desk review analysis, but we could not verify whether in the broader range of countries IFAD was missing the opportunity to use comprehensive fragility analyses, since we relied on what was found within the IFAD documentation. The implication is that there is no strong evidence that the 2006 policy or guidance issued in 2008 and 2011, which all call for such comprehensive analysis within the COSOP, has increased attention to a broader fragility, rather than poverty, analysis within COSOPs.
81. For example, following the approach described in Box 3, by the time of the subsequent, 2013 COSOP in Nepal, the UN considered the underlying causes of the insurgency to be still prevalent. "...*long-standing discriminatory practices, a general lack of and unequal access to economic opportunities, a parallel lack of access to governance institutions and processes, remoteness, and (now) the localised effects of climate change*" (UNDAF 2013-17 page 4). Officials note that caste, ethnic and gender discrimination are embedded in everyday life. The conflict legacy has undermined law and order and politicised life at all levels. Yet IFAD's COSOP makes scant reference to insecurity and political instability, does not reference analysis by the wider UN and fails to examine the continuing deep divisions in society that the recent generation of projects has been working to address. The impetus to examine fragility has dwindled as the post-conflict period has lengthened, yet as

we saw in Chapter 3, many countries face prolonged periods of transition from conflict to stability.

82. A similar experience can be seen in the DRC. The 2003 COSOP identified conflict-related drivers of poverty and food insecurity and the strategy prioritised conflict-affected and orphans areas in the early years. The 2011 COSOP proposes a 'whole of government' approach but from a very limited analytical base: lacking reference to the social and political dimensions of fragility. Hence, IFAD's 2011 analysis overlooked root causes and consequently relevant issues at stake for food security, such as land tenure and the incidence of social fracture on state authority, political stability, the demobilisation process and civil society institutional and organisational capacity.
83. **Political economy is not analysed.** Comparisons of fragility-related issues examined in the context analysis of development partners reveal an interesting trend. When fragility is investigated, the IFIs (including IFAD) tend to explore issues such as governance, government capacity to deliver services, vulnerability to geographical and environmental hazards and aspects of conflict mitigation, but are silent on political economy. In contrast, the UN through the Common Country Assessment does explore this. Examples include Nepal, Eritrea and the Sudan. The reason why is not clear.
84. **Poverty analysis covers many fragility issues.** All COSOPs and project design documents include a poverty analysis. Across the ten case studies, these analyses consistently covered a number of drivers related to fragility, including gender and disadvantaged groups' (economic) empowerment, the state's capacity to deliver services, and management of natural resources. This finding is broadly supported by the documentary review of 23 COSOPs and 37 projects designed post 2009.
85. Land issues were identified as a key driver of poverty and a source of conflict in Burundi, Haiti, DRC, Liberia, Nepal, Sudan, and the Philippines but in most instances the implications for both what IFAD should support and the longer-term effectiveness of IFAD's support was not developed into strategy.<sup>48</sup>
86. Analysis by the UN in the Philippines provides a good example of the existence of fragility even in a middle income non-fragile state. But IFAD's strategy fails to analyse or respond to the links between fragility and poverty. A strong presentation of key issues in the 2009 COSOP notes problems of climatic vulnerability and weak service capacity in government. But there is no treatment of conflict or post-conflict tensions, even in Mindanao, despite political instability and civil conflict being identified as reasons for slow and weak project performance later in the same document.
- "Rapid population growth, a real productivity slowdown in agriculture, armed conflict, the persistent threat from extreme climatic events and natural disasters and, most fundamentally, deteriorating governance remain challenges needing to be effectively addressed."*  
UNDAF for The Philippines 2012-18.
87. **Conflict is often seen as a risk to avoid rather than mitigate, especially when the driver of conflict is state legitimacy.** The treatment of fragility and conflict through risk analysis varies greatly across countries. Several of the cases – Burundi, Eritrea, Sudan, the Philippines, DRC – identify political instability or conflict as risks. In all cases, the risk management strategy identified is either to suspend operations or consider whether operations can continue without direct supervision by IFAD. The approach to whether future IFAD projects should address such issues appears to depend upon the degree to which the driver of conflict is one of state legitimacy and the degree to which it is considered feasible to

<sup>48</sup> The Philippines is an exception. Land titling was built into CHARMP2 following some success in a previous phase, but implementation has been ineffective owing to wider complications with the project.

implement projects in an area. An example is the decision in the Sudan not to develop projects in Darfur, but this response is also observed in both the Nigeria and Pakistan programmes where IFAD has located its new projects in areas away from conflict, despite those areas being a logical priority for IFAD based on poverty analyses and areas in which there was a history of IFAD support. On the other hand, in the Sudan and Tunisia (and to a lesser extent in The Philippines) components of the projects are directly focused on strengthening local capacity to manage conflicts over access to scarce natural resources.

88. **There are inconsistencies in the way natural disasters are identified as key risks** in either the project documents or COSOPs and hence mitigation strategies were often absent (Burundi, Bangladesh and Haiti provide positive examples). The examples of BiH, Philippines and Eritrea suggest that IFAD reacts to natural disasters rather than help countries strengthen their natural disaster preparedness. The evaluation was unable to find any examples of contingency planning (as suggested in the 2011 guidance). A valuable reference and listing of countries at high risk from natural and climate related disasters appears as an Annex to the 2011 Guidelines on Disaster Early Recovery, but we have not been able to find any reference to this being used in programme documentation.<sup>49</sup>
89. **Data indicate little difference in content of COSOPs before and after 2009.** The desk review of COSOPs examined the extent to which fragility was handled before and after 2009 and in fragile and non-fragile countries (Working Paper 4). In general, there is very little difference in treatment of fragility and its relation to poverty between fragile and non-fragile states and before and after 2009. The main findings that do emerge are as follows:
- The flagging of signs of fragility in COSOPs for states classified as fragile by IFAD is greater than in countries classified as not fragile but this does not translate into a more thorough analysis of the drivers of fragility or consideration of 'Do no harm'.
  - Treatment of fragility issues does not go further than what would normally be addressed anyway as part of IFAD's poverty focused analysis. However, within this limited focus the quality of analysis has improved over time in COSOPs for all countries whether classified as fragile or not fragile by IFAD.
  - Since 2009, across the COSOPs there appears to have been some modest improvement, from an initially low base, of consideration of specific operational responses identified in IFAD's policy documentation as important in fragile contexts.
90. Overall, there are few, but stronger examples of improved performance across all COSOPs pre- and post-2009 than in the differences between fragile and non-fragile states:
- Greater simplicity taking into account limited capacity of fragile states to manage and implement development projects.
  - Attention to mitigating, and responding to, risks of natural disaster and conflict.
  - Expansion of plans for knowledge sharing.
  - Strengthened capacity for analysis to underpin programme and project design and implementation – including through expanded IFAD country presence and direct supervision.
  - Attention to the management of risk associated with engagement in fragile states.

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<sup>49</sup> EB 2011/102/R.29.

91. **Examples of good analysis and performance are inconsistent across the portfolio.** Taken together, the desk review and country case study evidence suggests that whilst there are examples of good analysis and performance, they are isolated and peculiar to a particular combination of staff, country context and timing. In other words, inconsistent. Results from the survey of CPM and country office staff reveal some explanatory insights about staff capabilities and views about fragility analysis and the COSOP. In summary:
- Only one out of 47 respondents claims to have received any training in IFAD on how to assess a fragile state or situation.
  - 80 per cent think the COSOP is the right time for IFAD to analyse fragility but only 15 per cent of respondents have ever undertaken or commissioned such an analysis even though over 70 per cent had been responsible for work in a fragile state or state with a fragile situation. Some 84 per cent felt they did not have sufficient time or resources to do or commission a fragility analysis.
  - Over 60 per cent think that the current timing between COSOPs is not satisfactory (too long) for dealing with issues of fragility.
  - Most respondents (57 per cent) disagree or strongly disagree that they are 'confident about preparing a COSOP for a fragile state or country with fragile situations', though 55 per cent expressed confidence about designing a project in the same situation. This may reflect IFAD's business model as a project financier but also the limited scope for strategy in the timing and size of IFAD's country programmes.
  - Only two respondents said they are familiar with the approach advocated by the 'New Deal' and only one had tried to implement along those lines.
92. A wide range of open-ended comments were submitted as part of the survey and these can be read in full in Working Paper 5. Highlights are reproduced in Box 6 and illustrate the views of CPMs about getting the level of detail and timing right and resource implications. A point to note is that the COSOP Guidelines make provision for a transitional COSOP to be prepared every three years in a post crisis situation but the evaluation has been unable to find any evidence of this flexible practice being implemented.

## Box 6

**Survey respondents' comments about fragility analysis and the COSOP**

*"Given the sensitivity of the fragility analysis, lack of operational instruments in the COSOP guidelines as well as capacity gaps in the domain, IFAD should team up with other IFIs in the country to undertake such complex exercise. "*

*"It would be a separate analysis that should feed into the COSOP. The COSOP alone would be probably not sufficient as it focuses on many other things. "*

*"The timing of COSOP unlikely to fit timing of episodes of fragility, would do the analysis in context of annual rural sector performance assessment."*

*"The fragility analysis is a fully fledged and complex exercise which requires time and resources. A brief analysis of relevant elements of the fragility to IFAD core business should be analysed as part of risks and mitigation mechanisms chapter of the COSOP. Not a separate study. "*

*"Time yes, resources no."*

*"We should invest more resources (using analytical tools and concepts generated by insights new Institutional Economics,..) to assess institutional capabilities and the quality of services provided - even more so in MICs."*

*"No guidelines on how to conduct fragility analysis. It is not yet compulsory or part of any check list of OSC, QA, QE, key files, etc."*

93. **Evidence that corroborates the findings of this evaluation can be found in other studies by IOE.** The Efficiency evaluation<sup>50</sup> noted that policies do not always take adequate account of the human resource implications and this leaves some CPMs being asked to manage processes and activities for which they may not be adequately prepared. Arguably, this would include handling analysis of fragility and conflict in COSOPs.
94. Several IOE studies identify core issues with COSOPs.
- Firstly, recognition that for some initiatives such as targeting sectors for rural youth employment, analysis is best done during COSOP preparation. This accords with guidelines on crisis or disaster management and FCS more generally.
  - Secondly, evaluations of the RB-COSOP, Efficiency and Grant Financing, find that COSOPs display weak synergies between lending and non-lending activities.
  - Thirdly, the Efficiency evaluation argued there is a lack of differentiation of strategies in COSOPs, implying weaknesses in the contributing analysis. This is relevant because of the stated policy intentions to design responses to FCS during COSOP preparation.
  - Lastly, the annual, mid-term and completion reviews of COSOPs have not functioned as intended, leading to poor learning and feedback on COSOP quality and performance, which may be a factor in the weak differentiation between country strategies.

#### Summary of key points

- ❖ IFAD's policies call for analysis of context to be done in the COSOP, and staff agree with this approach. But it would be a substantial exercise and may be better done in collaboration with other development partners.
- ❖ Analysis of fragility is more likely to be done immediately post crisis; IFAD's treatment of fragility is not responsive to situations of prolonged transition (highlighted in Chapter 3 as a feature of fragile states).
- ❖ There is much common ground between IFAD's poverty analysis and factors of fragility. But COSOPs tend to present symptoms of fragility rather than drivers. Some areas that should build on IFAD's unique mandate, such as access to land, are not well covered.
- ❖ CPMs and country staff regard fragility analysis as relevant but they think time and resources limit their actions. They are more confident dealing with fragility at project level than in country strategies though this is not corroborated in our desk review of projects prepared since 2010.

## B. Project design

95. The results chain in Figure 1 indicates the need to take a flexible approach, address risks and seek co-financing where appropriate. Design should deal with issues such as vulnerability, resilience, economic empowerment, gender, food security, land rights, natural resource management, risks of natural disasters and conflict, according to need. But the extent to which IFAD is able to create a country strategy, develop appropriate projects and meet objectives of content, flexibility and simplicity, depends to a large extent on the ability to negotiate with government. The need to agree the analysis in the COSOP has already been noted as a factor that could affect the depth of analysis about fragility and conflict. It is also a factor in project design. The experience with Eritrea in Box 7 illustrates how challenging this can be.

<sup>50</sup> IFAD (2013) IFAD's institutional efficiency and efficiency of IFAD-funded operations.

## Box 7

**Challenges to developing projects in Eritrea**

Identification of issues of fragility has to match those deemed acceptable to government. Within these parameters, there is limited scope for IFAD to develop projects that expand work outside of government systems and very limited opportunities to work with civil society or the private sector. Attempts by IFAD to promote approaches such as role of the private sector, differing from those sanctioned by Government, have been challenging to get implemented.

Opportunities to engage at the policy level appear limited as government's policy-making process lacks consultative mechanisms with the international community. IFAD's main engagement is with Ministries of Agriculture/ Marine Resources whilst policy is set in the Ministry of National Development/ Office of the President, with which IFAD has less engagement.

96. **IFAD's approaches are well aligned with relevant themes but not well informed by fragility analysis.** IFAD's 2008 statement on Fragile States and subsequent 2011-2015 corporate strategy highlights vulnerability, resilience, economic empowerment, gender, food security, land rights and natural resource management as key issues for work in fragile states. But these are sufficiently broad that the approach followed by IFAD in many projects is ordinarily aligned with these. None of the policies associated with these themes, where they exist, has specific guidance for how to adapt to the context in fragile states. The main finding from the case studies is that rarely have the modalities of these approaches been informed by the fragility analysis in either the COSOP or project documents. This links into an absence of relevant indicators, discussed below. It may also be indicative of the common challenge in formal strategy planning processes of linking the implications of analysis with decisions on what is to be done, and what can be done, and adaptation during the period of implementation to a changing context and emerging opportunities and challenges.<sup>51</sup>
97. **IFAD does not implement a differentiated approach to capacity development in FCS or in most projects have the systems in place to manage for such outcomes.** All projects across the ten countries include support for establishment, and strengthening, of community-based organisations. In none of the ten cases is there explicit discussion of whether the approach to capacity development needs to be adapted, or the level of investment increased, in response to the fragile context. None of the case study countries displayed evidence of the approach to capacity development in IFAD's more recent institution-building initiatives described in the following chapter.
98. The overarching understanding of capacity development in the projects is that it amounts to training and provision of infrastructure. DRC is the only example of a country programme among our ten cases considering a whole of government approach to capacity development, reflecting the fact that it was the only example of acknowledgement of the need for a wider 'state-building' approach, as advocated under the New Deal.
99. Efforts to make capacity development an effective tool to build institutions are not supported by indicators at the outcome level. Across the ten countries, results frameworks generally do not include indicators assessing the changing performance of CBOs as a result of capacity development. Few indicators are found above the level of activities and outputs. Such indicators are also not to be found in RIMS, which is a major omission.
100. **Flexible approaches are important but not well understood.** Out of the eight case study countries designated as fragile by IFAD, in six cases the COSOP and/or

<sup>51</sup> See for instance Mintzberg, H. (1994) 'The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning'. Harvard Business Review. January-February 1994.

project documentation acknowledged the need for increased flexibility (Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Haiti, Liberia and the Sudan). However, what is meant by flexibility is often not defined and there was never any explicit discussion linking the need for flexibility with fragility.

101. Flexibility is seen in the freedom to respond to significant changes in the external environment. For instance in terms of the re-allocation of project funds in Haiti in response to the 2008 earthquake, or the re-allocation of PBAS funds across two cycles in DRC, or planned reallocation of funds after Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.
102. But more broadly flexibility is understood by key partners to lie at the level of adjustment in activities and outputs, and in this regard instances of adjustment are common. In at least two countries IFAD's greater willingness to adjust activities, compared with other partners, is seen as a major comparative advantage. On the other hand, no instances of flexibility at the level of project outcomes were observed, which was reported to reflect the fact that the transaction costs associated with change at this level are too great.
103. **Guidance on keeping projects simple doesn't tackle overambitious designs.** IFAD's 2011 guidance suggests that to aid simplicity, projects should be designed with only two components in addition to the project management component. Evidence across all ten case studies suggests that most projects, even whilst they may have been designed before 2011, already meet this suggestion. On the other hand, several of those interviewed noted that this suggestion is easy to game, as it is straightforward to just make the two components more broad. Restricting the number of components doesn't necessarily reduce the scope of the project.
104. Examples of over-ambitious/complex project designs were observed in seven of the ten countries - Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Haiti, Nepal, Sudan and The Philippines. The ability to address this challenge depends upon where simplification is required. If the overall design is too complex, such as the case of individual projects in Burundi, the Sudan and the Philippines, then attempts to simplify the design appear to have been unsuccessful. On the other hand, instances of simplification at the level of the activities are common, although evidence of the effectiveness of such initiatives is scarce.
105. Reviews of past CPE by IOE indicate that complexity is frequently cited as an issue. Examples can be found in the reports for Nepal, Sudan, Yemen and Nigeria.
106. The experience of Liberia and Nepal indicate that portfolio design needs to also reflect IFAD capacity, as well as that of national stakeholders given that the selection of intervention zones and activities is done collaboratively with government. In Nepal, the 2013 CPE concluded that 'IFAD-funded programmes had

***There is need for IFAD to find a balance between flexibility and complexity***

*In the case of Burundi, a youth employment component was added to the PRODEFI to align with the national Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy. On the one hand, the addition of this component shows flexibility for IFAD to adapt to the drivers of fragility, such as youth job creation which is fundamental to economic development and to social peace of the country. On the other hand, this was the 4<sup>th</sup> component of the project, which became complex to manage, as highlighted by interviewees in Bujumbura.*

***Project design has to align with national institutional capacities***

*In Eritrea, project designs over-estimated Government's capacity to implement the projects as designed in a timely manner. Explanatory factors involved include a lack of understanding by project partners, including the Government, over both their roles and IFAD requirements and unrealistic annual work planning processes. The result has been that IFAD supervision has focused primarily on sorting out implementation issues and providing technical support, for examples in the Post Conflict and Gash Barka Projects.*

*a very wide spread, geographically and thematically... This resulted in dilution and major management and governance challenges'. In contrast, Liberia's programme was deliberately designed to be geographically focused and thematically simple.*

107. **Given IFAD's limited resources and its specific mandate on the rural sector, it is not feasible for IFAD to address all the fundamental drivers of fragility on its own.** In this regard, co-financing could be seen to offer a way for IFAD both to share risks in fragile states and to benefit from funds devoted to specific sectors outside IFAD's competence, when other co-financiers are present.<sup>52</sup> However, the involvement of international co-financiers may undermine the simplicity of project implementation owing to the difficulty of harmonizing procedures as donors may insist on their own systems and procedures being implemented, leaving country partners with conflicting sets of instructions. For instance, the ability of IFAD to mobilize international co-financing during the evaluation period in Tunisia was limited to OFID, AFD and The Global Environment Facility (GEF). The implementation of the co-financing components were characterised by harmonization hiccups such as the case with the Integrated Agricultural Development Project in the Governorate of Siliana - Phase II where the resources from two other projects were made available at different times.
108. A number of examples were found whereby either small country grants or regional grants had a clear intention to complement the programme of loans, often by researching implementation modalities. Examples were found in Nepal, Philippines and BiH. None had a stated origin in responding to fragility but were relevant at seeking pro-poor targeted interventions. (Box 8) These examples are more positive at revealing a link between regional grants and country programmes and with some positive arrangements for learning and information sharing than the findings in IOE's evaluation of grant financing, which argued that such links are weak.<sup>53</sup>

Box 8

#### Grants to complement project loans

**Nepal** Leasehold forestry and livestock project: A series of four regional grants to ICIMOD helped provide TA and develop some tools for poverty analysis across the Himalaya region. Initially they provided demand-driven backup for projects; then worked on capacity building and development of a value chain approach for mountain areas. The most recent grant is a mixture of research and TA, working on a multi-dimensional poverty index, which they say informed IFADs approach to geographic and social targeting.

A diverse series of six grants in **The Philippines** covered a wide range of issues including developing farmers' organisations and research into innovative methods for pro-poor environmental services of relevance to the indigenous communities.

In **BiH** the original project designs based on geographic and sub-sector targeting have proved to be inadequate to reach the vulnerable poor. Oxfam Italia has used grant funding to help set up criteria for selecting communities and farmers to work with. In the past, entity ministries have not been so happy with discussions on targeting, therefore IFAD is considered very determined to take this initiative. Oxfam's grants are a logical link to support the loan projects. Their role has been to push further into fragility and identify more vulnerable groups: female headed households; excluded groups; IDPs. Entity ministries find this approach hard to work with and this has held back project staff.

109. **Desk review comparison between projects in designated fragile states with those in non-fragile states failed to reveal any clear trend of difference in approach to design across twenty indicators.** These reviews were looking explicitly at how fragility was reflected in design and arrangements for implementation, not to assess the broader developmental merit of the project

<sup>52</sup> Sudan and Eritrea are notable examples of countries where few other co-financiers were active.

<sup>53</sup> IFAD 2014 Corporate-level evaluation on the IFAD Policy for Grant Financing EC 2014/85/W.P.5.

design. At least according to the content of the project design documents, being in a fragile state does not seem to have materially influenced project content.

110. **But statistics from independent quality at entry reviews managed by the office of the Vice President (see tables in Appendix 4) indicate that projects in those countries that have always been classified as fragile have the lowest scores for overall quality of design in four of the seven years for which data are available.** Three of these are the early years so there may be a trend of improvement but the evidence is not clear. The quality at entry of projects in always fragile countries is consistently low. Over IFAD's whole portfolio since 2008 one third (35 per cent) of projects are rated 4, moderately satisfactory, for overall quality at entry and a greater proportion of these (43 per cent) are in always fragile countries compared with partial fragile (35 per cent) and never fragile (31 per cent) countries. Interviews with senior officials in PTA indicate that all new projects benefit from support from PTA during design and preparation missions, but that there is much less capacity to support implementation.
111. CPM and country staff who responded to the survey for this evaluation had some clear and strong views about project design. In the most recent project they have prepared, 63 per cent said they had made special provisions to analyse the effect of fragility on poverty and 79 per cent said they have modified or structured the design in some way to address aspects of fragility. Examples include keeping the funding pattern for the benefiting states very flexible to allow increase or decrease in funding subject to unfolding circumstances; adding co-financing to address fragility derived from past and future natural disasters; and using information provided on internally displaced persons and displacement risks. All the responses can be seen in Working Paper 5. These show some take-up of IFAD's guidance and reflect what was seen in the project documents reviewed, but do not focus on the implications of the drivers of fragility.
112. **OECD's fragility principles are generally supported.** IFAD's guidelines are specific to interventions dealing with the rural poor in agriculture and natural resources management. But the 2008 guidelines make specific reference to following the OECD Principles for engagement in fragile states, which view fragility from a broader perspective. When questioned in the survey about how far those principles could be incorporated in IFAD's work, several strong responses were noted.
113. Of the nine principles, the most frequent response (Table 7) was that there is no particular constraint for IFAD to work within these guidelines for seven of the nine. For all but two of these, more than half the respondents shared that view. The two lower responses were firstly, to *'Take fragility context as the starting point for planning/project design'* for which a lack of capacity in IFAD was seen as a major factor; and secondly, *'To recognise the links between political, security and development objectives: "whole-of-government" approach'*. Where concerns about IFAD's capacity and the engagement of other partners were prevalent.

Table 7  
Survey response to applicability of the OECD fragility principles

Percentage response	Not IFAD's mandate or priority	Applicable but lack of institutional / organisational capacity within IFAD	Applicable but lack of engagement of other stakeholders	Lack of opportunity considering the political, social and economic environment	No particular constraint
Take fragility context as the starting point for planning/project design.	12	28	8	8	44
Ensure all activities 'Do No Harm'.	0	26	11	5	58
Focus on state-building as the central objective.	57	9	9	13	13
Prioritise prevention: address the root causes of state fragility.	53	12	12	6	18
Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives: "whole-of-government" approach.	14	19	19	10	38
Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.	6	6	18	0	71
Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.	0	20	10	5	65
Stay engaged long enough to give success a chance: (minimum 10 years).	0	16	16	5	63
Avoid creating pockets of exclusion.	5	0	25	15	55

Note: shaded cells indicate the most frequent response.

114. Two principles were not accepted. Both '*Focus on state-building as the central objective*' and '*Prioritise prevention: address the root causes of state fragility*' were regarded as not IFAD's mandate or priority by 57 per cent and 53 per cent respectively. This implies that country programme managers and country staff support the principles that reinforce non-discriminatory behaviour and sustainable interventions such as 'Do no harm', align with local priorities, stay engaged long enough and avoid creating pockets of exclusion. But they reject those that link to root causes and whole of government approach. That raises a significant challenge for IFAD in aligning its corporate approach with other development partners and in supporting the 'New Deal'.

### Summary of key points

- ❖ IFAD's guidance for working in fragile states emphasises attention to vulnerability, resilience, economic empowerment, gender, food security, land rights and natural resource management. But these are broad and most projects align with these to some extent. The case studies found no clear evidence of approaches derived from fragility analysis though staff surveyed say they have modified project designs to take fragility into account and give examples.
- ❖ All projects include elements of capacity development but links to IFAD's more recent institution-building initiatives were not seen and projects lack indicators of improving institutional performance.
- ❖ Projects in fragile states are supposed to be flexible and have simpler designs. Flexibility is seen in willingness to adjust outputs and activities and in responding to the external environment. Guidance for simpler designs is ineffective and examples of overambitious projects were found in most case study countries.
- ❖ Some countries have effective complementary grants (regional and small) which support projects with an implicit orientation to drivers of fragility.
- ❖ Most of the OECD principles fit readily with IFAD's work, but a small majority of staff think that dealing with the root causes of fragility and linking with a whole of government approach are not within IFAD's mandate or priority.

## C. Implementation

115. The 2008 guidance recognised that IFAD's ability to provide support during implementation is a necessary step towards effective performance. IFAD needs to be closely involved in the supervision process and to place greater emphasis on coordinating its actions with other donors. An enhanced level of direct project supervision by IFAD was to be used to improve the performance of its programmes in fragile states. Fragility is one of the criteria used in selecting countries for new country presence initiatives. This section looks first at experience with supervision and country presence, then considers the effectiveness of capacity building.
116. **Despite the emphasis on supervision, no discussion of country need or supervision plans are to be found in the COSOPs from case study countries;** possibly reflecting the fact that it is not specifically required and meeting all content requirements within the COSOP page limit is challenging. The 2006 policy<sup>54</sup> on supervision and implementation support envisaged that IFAD would retain a mixed approach with two modalities: supervision by IFAD and supervision entrusted to a cooperating institution. It appears that the second modality has not been taken up. Consideration of the modality and approach was to use the following criteria: (a) national capacity; (b) nature, size and complexity of the country programme; (c) learning and knowledge-sharing potential; and (d) availability of appropriate and sufficient human resources within IFAD. This was to deal directly with concerns about overly standardised arrangements, not taking country needs into account, the heavy workload on CPMs and need for capacity and skills development. This suggests that discussion of the planned approach would be appropriate in the COSOP.
117. **Direct supervision adds value but has not brought greater attention to fragility.** Experience across the 10 country case studies shows a progression towards meeting the point made in the 2008 guidance that IFAD needs to be closely involved in the supervision process in FCSs. A move to direct supervision by IFAD is perceived by in-country stakeholders as adding greater value than the previous scenario when supervision was contracted out. However, in what could be seen as comparatively small programmes (in terms of money) the combination of a

<sup>54</sup> EB 2006/89/R.4/Rev.1.

CPO and non-resident CPM may raise issues with the effectiveness of supervision; for example in Tunisia and Nepal. On the other hand, in the Philippines, this model appears to work well.

118. An evaluation synthesis report by IOE in 2012<sup>55</sup> found that preparations for implementing the direct supervision policy had been inadequate, leading to delays. Positive benefits were seen at project level but the workload on CPM was an issue of concern.
119. Moving to direct supervision does not however appear to be associated with an obviously greater focus on issues of fragility within the process of supervision. The lack of identification and systematic monitoring of issues related to fragility is common. Scrutiny of supervision mission reports suggests that little attention is paid to the assumptions and risks in project designs. In some instances missions are staffed with a strong but narrow technical remit and lack the breadth of skills to look at wider issues related to fragility.
120. **Supervision budgets are managed, but not in a transparent manner that makes it clear to external parties the basis for allocative decisions.** Supervision budgets are managed at a regional level, allowing regional directors the flexibility to allocate resources where they are most needed. However, there is a lack of transparency about this process, partly because supervision missions often take place jointly with planning or policy dialogue work, and it is not possible to analyse the relative effort by country or project. Over 60 per cent of respondents to the survey claim that they do not have sufficient budget for the level of supervision and implementation support that they want to provide, including the use of consultants. Only 17 per cent of the respondents believe that more resources are made available in their region for FCS than for non-fragile countries.
121. Following a pilot exercise IFAD adopted a policy of country presence in 2011 with a declared aim to include fragile states as one of six empirical criteria: size of IFAD's country programme; country's dependency on agriculture; size of rural population; prevalence of poverty; existence of an enabling policy environment; and state fragility.<sup>56</sup> The decision on outposting a CPM rather than recruiting a Country Presence Officer (CPO) locally would take other factors into account but would include countries with weak institutions and development performance or those involved in or emerging from conflict rather than fragility *per se*. Table 8 summarises progress to date.

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<sup>55</sup> IOE Report No. 2572, 2012.

<sup>56</sup> EB 2011/102/R.10/Rev.2.

Table 8  
Country presence and outposting of CPM as at 1 April 2014

<i>Region</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Fragile status</i> <sup>57</sup>	<i>CO year</i> <sup>58</sup>	<i>CPM year</i>
APR	Bangladesh	Partial		
	China	Never	2003	
	India	Never	2003	
	Lao	Partial		2012
	Nepal	Partial	2008	
	Pakistan	Partial	2008	
	Viet Nam	Never	2004	2008
	Philippines	Never	2009	
	Sri Lanka	Partial	2008	
ESA	Burundi	Always		2012
	Ethiopia	Partial	2004	2010
	Kenya	Partial	2008	2013
	Madagascar	Never	2008	
	Malawi	Partial		
	Mozambique	Never	2008	
	Rwanda	Partial	2008	
	Uganda	Partial	2008	
	Tanzania	Never	2003	2008
	Zambia	Partial	2009	2013
LAC	Bolivia	Never	2008	2012
	Brazil	Never	2008	
	Guatemala	Never		2012
	Haiti	Always	2004	2013
	Panama	Never		2002
	Peru	Never		2013
NEN	Egypt	Never	2004	
	Sudan	Always	2003	2009
	Yemen	Partial	2003	
WCA	Burkina Faso	Never	2008	
	Cameroon	Partial	2009	2011
	DRC	Always	2007	2012
	Congo Rep.	Always	2003	
	Gambia	Partial	2003	
	Ghana	Never	2008	2011
	Guinea	Always	2008	
	Mali	Partial		
	Niger	Partial		2011
	Nigeria	Partial	2004	2012
Senegal	Partial	2003	2013	
Sierra Leone	Always			
	Total		40	19
	Total in FCS		21	12
			53%	63%

122. **Country presence does not especially favour fragile states.** As at April 2014 there are 40 countries with a country presence office. A further 18 are identified for country offices but await the process of a host agency service agreement and five of these are fragile states.<sup>59</sup> Of the 40, seven are countries that have always been classified as fragile and 18 countries that have been classified fragile at some time since 2004. A slight majority (53 per cent) of country presence offices are in fragile states. Of the 19 outposted CPM, 12 are to fragile states and seven not, a proportion of 63 per cent, which reflects IFAD's policy. Depending on the way

<sup>57</sup> The classification of always, partial and never fragile is discussed later in this chapter.

<sup>58</sup> Source EB 2011/102/R.10/Rev.2.

<sup>59</sup> Afghanistan, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Myanmar.

countries are categorised some 53 per cent of IFAD's countries are or have been classed as fragile, so the allocation of country offices is not weighted towards fragile states and allocation of CPMs is only slightly weighted in their favour. A further three new countries are planned to host a CPM in 2014 of which one, Uganda, has never been classified as fragile. The number of outposted CPMs is low compared with the number of country offices but is broadly in line with the 2011 policy.

123. IFAD's country presence is often hosted by a partner UN agency. It is interesting to note that not a single location is hosted by the World Bank or one of the regional development banks even though IFAD works closely with them and they are the likely target partner for scaling up, including in fragile states. Working more closely with the other multilateral development banks could provide a means of increasing implementation support to projects in fragile states.
124. Opinions vary about the relative merits of having a CPO or the need for an outposted CPM. Experiences in the case study countries are relevant here and are illustrated for four countries in Box 9. Interviewees at country level express different views as to the preferred staffing. Development partners prefer to see an outposted CPM, believing they are better suited to join in policy dialogue with government and have greater powers to make decisions. In many instances CPO are regarded as fulfilling a more administrative function. However, that is also regarded as of high value, not so much for the direct contribution to supervision missions, but for the ability to follow-up recommendations from supervisions and support implementation through project units. In general, however, CPEs by IOE have shown the outposting of the CPM to the IFAD Country Office is the most advantageous model for IFAD's decentralization.

## Box 9

**Country presence experiences****Burundi:**

All the interlocutors interviewed in the country confirmed the added-value of the opening of the country office in 2012. The outposted CPM now has time to go more often on the field, communication is easier, process for withdrawal applications is faster. The presence of country office facilitates policy dialogue with the authorities at the country level.

**DRC:**

Projects have been supervised by UNOPS until 2010. Then, IFAD direct supervision was established. Regular country presence started in 2005. There was a high turnover of CPMs between 2010 and 2012 after which a CPM was outposted.

Under UNOPS supervision, projects' performance (PRAPE & PRAPO) has suffered from long delays in procedures, insufficient monitoring, lack of rigor and transparency in financial management. Necessary adjustments of projects' design with regard to costs and quantitative targets did not occur before mid-term reviews, at a stage where implementation and disbursement rates were endangering IFAD's credibility. Frequent supervision missions did not help to increase management capacity by PMUs.

From 2010, direct supervision has progressively improved:

- partnership development and engagement in policy dialogue
- responsiveness in decision making following close and frequent monitoring
- management capacity of PMUs through continuous technical assistance

Direct supervision did not have an obvious effect on fragility or conflict-sensitive approach to projects' design.

**Nepal:**

*IOE's 2013 CPE found that 'In December 2008, the Executive Board approved the upgrading of Nepal's proxy field presence to a country office with one nationally recruited staff member – a country programme coordinator (CPC) appointed in 2007 – in order to deal with the workload of direct supervision and implementation support, and support post-conflict recovery. The Rome-based CPM for Nepal has changed seven times during the period evaluated. In most cases, the Nepal CPM has had other responsibilities, such as another country programme, and has therefore only been able to dedicate part of her/his time to Nepal.*

*Despite the fact that the Fund's proxy field presence was upgraded to an IFAD country office in 2008, with a national country programme coordinator, the COSOPs did not seem to have allocated sufficient resources to maintain an appropriate level of knowledge management, policy dialogue and participation in donor coordination.'*

**Sudan:**

IFAD appointed a Country Presence Officer in December 2005 under the Field Presence Pilot Programme. The CPO participated in supervision and design missions, providing backstopping to project teams and generally enhancing the implementation support provided by IFAD. The operations in the field were initially negatively affected by the limited financial resources available. The CPM became resident in Khartoum as of 2009, at which point IFAD assumed responsibility for direct supervision of all projects.

125. Despite IFAD having a policy on country presence since 2011 there have been no changes to human resources policies to provide incentives for CPM. Outposted CPM receive a special post allowance regardless of the duty station hardship status. There are in addition other entitlements applicable in such cases where living and working conditions are difficult, and those are hardship allowance, additional hardship allowance, danger pay and R&R. But there is no explicit career incentive despite reported statements by senior management to encourage CPM to take a post.

126. **Staff do not perceive that they have adequate flexibility during implementation.** The issue of flexibility was raised in the context of project design. This becomes a reality during implementation. IFAD's Financing Manual stipulates that an amendment only needs to be approved by the Executive Board if it changes the scope or characteristics of the financing or the project as originally approved.<sup>60</sup> Some examples are given in Box 10.

Box 10

**Examples of flexibility during implementation**

The CPM has to go back to EB when the scope of the project is affected: i.e. the goal, objectives, when there is an increase in the project financing and when project area is extended; changing country context requires a change in project set-up. Otherwise, there is quite a bit of room for flexibility. Flexibility occurs on an *ad hoc* basis, depending on the country situation and needs, but also on the CPM, the project team, and the Regional Director (what (s)he is willing to push for).

Practical examples

a/ Examples requesting the EB approval

- After the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia: expansion of the area coverage of P4K project to encompass the tsunami-hit area; change in financing terms from intermediate to highly concessional to help the country in the aftermath of the disaster (EB 2005/84/R.17)
- In 2009, a supplementary financing was provided to Haiti to extend the project area of PPI-2 to the Centre. The project initially intervened in two of the country's poorest departments: Nord-Est and Nord-Ouest. The additional financing allows the project to include Centre department, which is also characterized by high levels of poverty and extreme poverty and which was severely affected by the 2008 hurricanes. Since this additional support to the country entailed financing costs for IFAD, the EB had to approve this additional financing.

b/ Examples of flexibility without going back before the EB

- Activities can easily be modified based on recommendations in the MTR and supervision mission reports and actioned through the AWPB.
- Reduction in project areas: because of the crisis in CAR, the CPM could not work in the 4 initially planned areas. Areas were reduced to 2. No need for EB approval. Need to seek the CPMT agreement.
- Stop the activities: In Syria, movements of project staff members within the provinces or outside were largely restricted for security reasons. All projects activities have drastically been reduced, if not postponed (civil work using heavy equipment, such as land reclamation and water harvesting). The only remaining activity is the village-based micro finance because the funds are managed locally by elected village committees.

127. Respondents to the survey of CPM and country offices indicate that the need to change the timing or implementation period and the need to allocate new or additional grant financing are the two main areas that occur during project implementation to respond to specific aspects of fragility. There is a sense that it is comparatively easier to change the timing and implementation period than in allocating new financing resources, as illustrated in Box 11. Despite the examples of flexibility, 61 per cent of staff disagreed that IFAD's financial instruments are flexible enough to respond quickly to fragility issues; and 77 per cent disagreed that IFAD's human resources systems are flexible enough for a quick response.
128. **There are signs of a more effective approach to capacity building.** One of the core characteristics of poorly performing projects in fragile states has been the performance of government. The 2006 IFAD Policy On Crisis Prevention and

<sup>60</sup> *Financing Administrative Manual* (Section 5.11, para.132).

Recovery calls for a more pro-active stance by IFAD towards capacity building. The 2008 note, which forms the main policy statement, and is picked up in the COSOP guidelines, has a clear statement on the need for a strong focus on building the capacity of community and government institutions in FCSs. However, neither policy statement expands upon what this should mean in practice and they predate more recent work on institutional strengthening. The Efficiency evaluation argued that one determinant of weak government performance was in fact insufficient capacity building by IFAD in fragile states and LICs.

129. The country case studies did not identify any examples of good practice in building institutional capacity. But an example from Burundi is quoted in a synthesis report on lessons learnt from implementing IFAD's sourcebook on institutional and organizational analysis.<sup>61</sup> *"One successful example of IFAD helping create new rural institutions can be found with the PTRPC in Burundi. Weak government has fostered the creation of many rural associations that are active in local development. Taking advantage of this situation, the PTRPC has developed a new approach towards participatory community planning, ... They do this through traditional mediation practices, such as ensuring that everything is done publicly and that the names and addresses of those chosen as recipients are displayed where everyone can see them. ... traditional methods like this have helped reduce the risk of corruption and favouritism that fuelled conflict in the past."*
130. One initiative that appears to bridge both capacity building and knowledge management has been the creation and use of country-based country programme management teams (CPMT). These were active in both Nepal and the Philippines and were welcomed by participants as a means of maintaining their interaction with IFAD between periods of COSOP preparation. In both countries members join in discussion meetings during supervision missions and in the Philippines were part of a knowledge network.

#### **Summary of key points**

- ❖ Arrangements for supervision are not being analysed and planned in the COSOP.
- ❖ Specific attention to issues of fragility is rarely found in the reports of supervision missions, which do not systematically review assumptions and risks in their reports.
- ❖ IFAD staff think that fragile states do not receive any more resources than other countries for supervision. Records do not permit an analysis of resources devoted to supervision at the level of individual projects or countries.
- ❖ Country presence and outposting of CPMs is given only slightly greater weight to fragile states.
- ❖ Development partners, governments and IFAD staff all report benefits from IFAD establishing a country office and especially from having outposted CPM.
- ❖ There is a lot of flexibility over changing the arrangements for project activities, outputs and timing of implementation without the need for approval by the Executive Board. But staff who responded to the survey felt that financial instruments are not flexible enough.
- ❖ One example shows how IFAD's improved approach to capacity building can strengthen organisations to mitigate drivers of conflict, but wider evidence of this way of working was not found in the case studies.
- ❖ Country-based CPMT appear to be a practical way to maintain a capacity building and knowledge network at country level.

<sup>61</sup> IFAD 2013 Strengthening institutions and organizations p. 27.

## D. Evidence on the portfolio performance

131. In this section we review the available information about performance of IFAD's projects in fragile and non-fragile states. As was explained in Chapter 2, owing to the timing of this evaluation since the 2006 policy and 2008 guidelines, hardly any projects have been completed that were designed after those dates. This means that project completion report data are not available for information about performance *in response to those policies*. In view of the systematic approach to project performance assessment through the ARRI and ARPP, the evaluation has drawn on established IOE ratings and self-assessment of performance, without further validation.
132. **Comparison of performance in fragile states depends on how those states are defined.** As part of the background for the annual portfolio review exercise of 2012/13, PMD prepared a paper analysing IFAD's performance in fragile states, which was annexed to the Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP) 2012/13 and summarised in the 2013 Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (RIDE). The analysis drew on data from project completion reports and found that projects in non-fragile states performed consistently better. Comparing performance in the periods 2006-09 and 2010-13, portfolio performance in non-fragile states has improved whilst that in fragile states has shown no improvement or declined.
133. There are three limitations to that analysis. Firstly, by analysing completion reports, the sample of projects was drawn from those designed before the 2006 and 2008 policies, in some cases up to seven years before. In view of the policy guidance for more contextual analysis to inform country strategy and project design, comparison of these older projects reveals nothing about how effective IFAD's policies have been, and may be an unfair assessment of IFAD's performance.
134. Secondly, comparison between fragile and non-fragile assumes a static situation in countries. Yet in fact over the years some countries have entered the lists of fragility, others have exited and a few have moved in and out. There are three distinct groups: those that have always been classified as fragile, those that have never been classified and those that have been fragile part of the time.<sup>62</sup> Analysis by these categories would provide a more nuanced grouping of countries.
135. A third issue is the construction of IFAD's list of fragile states. By going beyond the harmonised list of the IFIs to include those additional countries listed by the OECD IFAD is drawing together assessments based on different methodologies. It results in more countries being classified as fragile than are listed by the other IFIs. Appendix 4 Table 1 lists countries classified as Always, Partially or Never fragile and records the equivalent data from IDA. There is almost complete agreement over the countries classified as Always fragile but substantial disparity in the list of countries in the Partially category where IFAD records many more than IDA. Some, of course, are middle income countries, but the list includes countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, and Uganda, all of which are low income countries.
136. The point about being listed is not the issue of being fragile but what are the characteristics that define fragility. To illustrate the complicated nature of the classifications, Appendix 4 Table 2 lists countries classified as fragile by IFAD in 2013 according to the origins of their list. This distinguishes between 23 countries that fall under the CPIA rating of 3.2 used by the World Bank and compatible with AfDB and AsDB. Next are 11 countries recorded as having peace-building or peace-keeping missions. Third, are the 16 additional countries listed as fragile by the

<sup>62</sup> This grouping of Always, Partial and Never was used by IDA in its 2013 evaluation of fragile states.

OECD and not in the IFI harmonised list. This gives a total of 50 out of the 54 recorded by IFAD.<sup>63</sup>

137. The analysis goes further by adding those countries in the Failed States Index that fall into the same scoring range as used by OECD, which adds a further 24. Lastly, none of these categories so far explicitly deals with conflict, despite conflict being so closely linked to fragility. For illustration the table shows an additional 23 states that have been assessed in the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer as having ratings of 3 or higher. Just 20 countries remain without any specific conflict or fragility characteristics.
138. Depending on what combination of indices is used almost all IFAD's partner countries exhibit some aspect of fragility. This makes it problematic to say that fragility is a cause of poor project performance.

### Analysis from project completion reports

139. Although data from the project completion reports do not reflect response to IFAD's policies, for comparison with PMD's findings they have been re-analysed in Tables 9, and 10, segregated according to the country being always, partially or never fragile.

Table 9  
Projects with satisfactory performance across two time periods<sup>64</sup>

2006-09					
% with Satisfactory performance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Poverty impact	Overall project achievement	No. projects
Always fragile	62	14	37	50	8 <sup>65</sup>
Partial fragile	84	61	82	76	38
Never fragile	80	73	78	78	58
Total					104
2010-2013					
Always fragile	64	36	64	64	11
Partial fragile	76	64	79	89	33
Never fragile	85	72	89	87	47
Total					91

Table 10  
Change in performance 2006-09 to 2010-13

Improvement in % 2010-2013/ 2006-2009	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Poverty impact	Overall project achievement
Always fragile	+3	+22	+27	+14
Partial fragile	-8	+3	-3	+13
Never fragile	+5	-1	+11	+9

140. **Countries that have always been classified as fragile have the lowest performing projects.** The findings are broadly similar to the PMD assessment

<sup>63</sup> IFAD (2014) IFAD's performance in fragile states. Annex 1. Programme Management Department IFAD lists a total of 54 countries as fragile. Four are listed additionally by the Asian Development Bank only.

<sup>64</sup> For consistency with portfolio analysis, 'satisfactory' is regarded as a rating of 4 (moderately satisfactory) or higher.

<sup>65</sup> Note relatively small number of completed projects from 'Always fragile' countries.

that projects in non-fragile states performed consistently better, but with some differences owing to the classification. In both time periods the Always Fragile countries have the lowest performance, presumably reflecting the persistence of fragility. Efficiency was much worse than others in the first period and lowest of all categories. This reflects a wider trend in IFAD's portfolio as a whole. Efficiency was slowest to improve after the Independent External Evaluation (IEE)<sup>66</sup>.

141. Among the 'Always fragile' countries with moderately satisfactory or higher performance only three of the 19 in both time periods were rated 'satisfactory' for overall project achievement, the remainder were 'moderately satisfactory'. With such a small sample the underlying trends are hard to identify with great certainty, but broadly, these 19 better performing projects display stronger ratings in several key areas, most notably for performance by both IFAD and government. These are important findings, which reflect the importance of IFAD's support and attention to management during implementation. The later period, 2010-13 shows a clear improvement with higher scores for both targeting and gender which suggest that the more successful projects are better focused on vulnerable people and are working towards empowerment of women.<sup>67</sup>
142. 'Partial fragile' is much closer in performance to 'Never fragile'. This suggests a significant difference in potential from 'Always fragile' and may reflect underlying difficulties in classification of states. But also note effectiveness and efficiency ratings for 'Partial fragile' countries deteriorated in the later years.
143. **Projects in 'always fragile' countries have improved performance by the greatest amount.** With the exception of efficiency, 'Never fragile' performance improved across the two time periods. But the highest rates of improvement were in the 'Always fragile' category, where efficiency, poverty impact and overall project achievement improved by 22, 27 and 14 percentage points respectively. So although these projects may not reflect improved designs that are responsive to policy, the attention to working in fragile states might have led to improved implementation support by IFAD, and improved outcomes.

#### Analysis from IOE's independent assessments

144. A similar analysis was prepared using the independent ratings prepared by IOE. Tables 11 and 12 present the findings across two time periods: projects that closed between 2004 and 2009; and projects with actual or planned closing dates in 2010 or later.

Table 11

#### Projects with satisfactory performance

2004-09 <sup>68</sup>					
% of projects rated satisfactory <sup>69</sup>	Overall achievement	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Sustainability
Always fragile	33	100	0	66	33
Partial fragile	61	93	61	50	50
Never fragile	85	96	83	74	57
2010 onwards					

<sup>66</sup> IFAD (2005) An Independent External Evaluation of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Office of Evaluation. September 2005.

<sup>67</sup> The PSR ratings for these same projects for which records could be found support these findings. In their later years of implementation, with some isolated exceptions, projects were moderately satisfactory or better for audit and project management and in most instances the equivalent ratings for institution building were as good or better. Fewer projects have data for supervision, but where they are available most are rated satisfactory or above. But management is not the only feature; gender and poverty focus both reveal high scores, the majority being satisfactory (5). This reinforces the argument for effective targeting.

<sup>68</sup> Dates refer to years of actual or planned closing of the projects.

<sup>69</sup> Following current practice, this is taken to be scores 4, 5 and 6.

Always fragile	42	83	33	42	27
Partial fragile	79	94	78	53	51
Never fragile	86	91	82	58	77

145. Projects in countries categorised as always fragile have the lowest performance for overall achievement, effectiveness and sustainability across both time periods. The trends are largely consistent with the data from project completion reports. Data from IOE go further in analysis than the completion reports and Table 11 presents performance of IFAD and government as well as rural poverty impact and gender. The same trend is apparent among projects in countries categorised as always fragile. There is no obvious trend across the two time periods in Table 10, but some interesting features emerge in Table 11. Performance of IFAD appears to have improved across the two periods, while that of government has only changed a little, indicating the scale of capacity-building challenge faced by IFAD.
146. Rural poverty impact has improved across all countries. Achievements in gender appear not to have improved in the always fragile countries, but to be improved and consistently higher in the partial fragile and never fragile cases.

Table 12

**Projects with satisfactory performance**

2004-09				
<i>% of projects rated satisfactory</i>	<i>Performance of IFAD</i>	<i>Performance of government</i>	<i>Rural poverty impact</i>	<i>Gender</i>
Always fragile	0	33	33	50
Partial fragile	39	54	52	72
Never fragile	70	74	79	54
2010 onwards				
Always fragile	50	33	55	50
Partial fragile	86	65	82	86
Never fragile	82	78	93	86

147. Table 13 presents analysis against the six-part classification described earlier in this Chapter and set out in Appendix 4.

Table 13

**Satisfactory performance 2010 and later**

<i>% Satisfactory performance 2010-onwards</i>	<i>Overall achievement</i>	<i>Rural poverty impact</i>	<i>Performance of IFAD</i>	<i>Performance of government</i>	<i>No. projects</i>
1 CPIA =<3.2	56	67	63	50	16
2 Presence of P/Pk	83	83	83	83	6
3 Additional OECD list	78	84	81	61	41
4 Additional FSI countries >=80 (Critical & above)	87	92	90	82	39
5 Additional with Heidelberg conflict ratings 3, 4, 5	80	90	83	71	35
6 All other countries	87	80	80	60	15
					152

148. **A low CPIA core is a good indicator of weak government capacity.** Overall, performance in categories 2 to 6 is all quite comparable, with no distinctive trend. The only category with a consistently lower performance is category 1, for countries with a low CPIA. This is instructive as it suggests that despite the weaknesses in the way the CPIA is constructed, it is an accurate predictor of weak government capacity, including for the agriculture sector. It is less surprising that there is little differentiation among the other categories, especially for countries with conflict, as IFAD's policies do not guide the institution on working to mitigate the drivers of conflict and the current approach to risk leads project designs to avoid conflict locations.
149. Any future approach by IFAD to reconsider the classification of fragility needs to build on this core set of information. However, CPIA scores are not published for middle income countries. Eight of the 24 countries classified as 'Always fragile' are in fact middle income countries and these are not picked up by the CPIA score.

#### Performance evidence from the case studies

150. To look in more detail at the available evidence, the evaluation searched for some outlier projects with very low (1 – highly unsatisfactory) or very high (6 – highly satisfactory) ratings to see what factors led to this performance. In fact, few projects receive such high and low ratings. Box 11 illustrates three examples.

Box 11

#### Justification of high and low score in projects in fragile states

<p>Bangladesh 1355 National Agricultural Technology Project (Effective 2008)  PSR DO 1 2009 Partial Fragile</p>	<p>No justification given in the 2009 Portfolio Review Report. But the previous mission aide memoire notes <i>'concerns that current management and implementation weakness in the project which could compromise its development effectiveness in the long run'</i> owing to four highlighted problems of weak management; slow action over a Cabinet approval; delayed start to activities arising from management problems; and lack of progress with supply chains.  (Interestingly, by the next year the rating was a 4.)</p>
<p>Tajikistan 1408 Khatlon Livelihoods Support Project (Effective 2009)  PSR DO 1 2013 Partial Fragile</p>	<p>The justification provided for the DO rating in the <b>Portfolio Review Report</b> is: <i>"It is clear that the project will not achieve its objectives. There is a high risk of cancelling the project."</i>  The 2013 MTR mission which led to the project being suspended wrote that: <i>Key constraint of the project is the lack of effective project management. IFAD supervision/implementation missions noted in October 2009 and March 2010 have noted very slow implementation progress and considerable weakness in general and in financial management and procurement in particular.</i></p>
<p>Bangladesh 1402  Finance for Enterprise Development and Employment Creation Project (Effective 2008)  PSR DO 6 2013 Partial Fragile</p>	<p><b>Portfolio Review Report 2013</b> <i>Project has exceeded its target for microfinance activities and is well in line with its target for the value chain development activities. Impact of both activities is substantial and impressive in terms of increase in income, permanent and seasonal jobs created, sustainability of employment and enterprises established/created. Phase II (replication and expansion) has already started for successful sub-projects' Phase I (testing the approach). Adoption rate of innovations promoted largely exceeds the number of training/support beneficiaries.</i>  <i>Poverty and gender issue are well addressed. Overall sustainability of the activities is ensured by PKSF and its partner organizations that have already started to finance similar subprojects from their own funds.</i></p>

151. Unsurprisingly, problems appear to be most closely associated with weak management, and high successes reflect clear progress towards project impact. Only the Bangladesh finance project in Box 12 has a coherent statement in support of the ratings. The other two illustrate a more general problem that PSR ratings are generally not well presented with evidence-based justification. The simple guidelines for the IP and DO ratings would benefit from a more comprehensive guidance such as is found in the gender marker, described in the next chapter.
152. **Performance ratings are not backed up by data.** Findings from the ten case study countries were consistent that the projects lacked credible evidence of results at the outcome and impact levels. Instances of MTRs and PCRs making explicit reference to survey data based on a sound research design were rare. One example is the Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Project (LFLP) in Nepal (see Box 12). This reveals a belated effort to design and implement a counterfactual impact survey late in the life of this investment and indicates that efforts prior to this have lacked a sound statistical design to measure impact and have not understood the importance of social inclusion in the project mechanism.

Box 12

**Searching for survey evidence for the Nepal Leasehold Forestry project**

Several initiatives have been made to try and measure the impact from this project which is widely regarded as having been a successful intervention over several phases. The project model was to create user groups for access to forest resources. A key issue to tackle potential drivers of conflict in the post-insurgency era is the extent to which women and marginalised ethnic and caste groups are included in project community processes and institutions and benefits.

RIMS reporting in 2012 compares data with a baseline from 2007 but, correctly, notes that without a control group the findings do not distinguish whether the changes over the period can be attributed to the project.

IFAD received a grant to document LFLP through the FAO Unilateral trust Fund. An FAO survey report in 2012 quantifies achievements against a number of indicators including a large section on institutional performance. But the information provided is in most instances simple quantification. There is no discussion of targeting or the performance of the enabling agencies. Nor is there any analysis of relationships or cause and effect.

FAO is conducting an impact evaluation of the whole investment since the original phase starting in 1992. The planning document for the impact survey starts off by stating that women's empowerment has been demonstrated; and that there is confirmed evidence about inclusion of the poorest. However, it then notes "*a considerable gap in some areas of recent information such as quantitative data on land use change, relatively small samples used in previous impact assessments, and often lack of comparisons with other changes taking place (the control or counterfactual), as well as weak understanding of the relationship between the project interventions and livelihoods improvements (e.g. on savings and credit).*"

*The description of the planned survey concentrates on distribution of benefits within groups; but the section on fieldwork methodology prominently recognises the need for control groups. An interesting Theory of Change was developed from the Design Logframe but still it starts assumptions with the creation of groups, not selection of group members. A management note from within FAO opens up discussion on inclusion with a set of points that (inclusion) must also not be take for granted – to what degree have the poorest and most marginalised been given priority; do women have equal access, not just when from a female head household; and which poverty or food security categories do participants come from?*

153. The country studies and desk reviews looked for arrangements to generate evidence to monitor performance. With the exception of the Sudan (see Box 13), project results frameworks lacked indicators of outcomes related to issues such as capacity or empowerment. Examples of approaches to measuring empowerment, such as the Community Capability Index (CCI) used in projects in Sudan, shows

that it is possible for projects to measure more intangible results. However, use of this approach in Sudan appears to reflect a response internal to NENA region and there was no evidence that IFAD had invested in spreading knowledge of such approaches across the organisation.

Box 13

#### Assessing community capabilities in the Sudan

Between 2003 and 2006, IFAD and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) jointly sponsored a project, Empowering the Rural Poor under Volatile Policy Environments in the Near East and North Africa Region, with the participation of the national agricultural research systems of Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. The project included community-level research on empowerment and capabilities in 85 villages in North and South Kordofan, Sudan. The main objectives of this project were to develop a conceptual model of empowerment and, following this, devise scientific tools to measure empowerment.

The Community Capability Index is a tool that was developed. The approach defined scales of assessment to analyse the extent of empowerment, drawing on evidence from a survey:

<i>Category of empowerment</i>	<i>Weighting given to the category</i>
Level of autonomy (agency)	20 points
Ability to take initiative	15 points
Ability to manage village funds	16 points
Ability to organize	14 points
Ability to manage communal lands	15 points
Level of achievements	20 points

Although projects designed subsequently included elements of empowerment, neither of the two most recently designed projects have explicitly included the CCI as part of their monitoring frameworks.

Ref: El Harizi, K. and H. Klemick (2007) Measuring and Accounting for Community Capabilities in Kordofan, Sudan. Development Strategy and Governance Division. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00730. November 2007.

154. **Overall, M&E systems were usually identified in IFAD supervisory documentation as under-performing** and there was limited evidence of improvement in M&E performance over time according to IFAD supervision reports. The findings from the ten countries are consistent with those from the 2012 portfolio reviews of the regional divisions reported in a 2012 information note on impact assessment to the Executive Board<sup>70</sup>:

- *The 2012 portfolio reviews of the regional divisions show, however, that in aggregate, implementation of M&E functions falls short of design, even though RIMS compliance continues to improve. There are delays in the establishment of M&E units and in the appointment of M&E staff. Staff numbers, terms of reference, competencies and experience do not always meet requirements. M&E implementation and RIMS compliance are partial, in part due to shortcomings in design, and in part due to perceptions of RIMS as an IFAD-owned instrument, not always integrated in national M&E systems. Compliance with baseline, mid-term and completion RIMS survey requirements is partial. Relevance, adequacy and quality of data is variable, with a focus on input and outputs, less on outcomes and impact. The quality of surveys and the pertinence of analyses are uneven; and the timing of reports is inconsistent. This limits the use of M&E results for the purpose of: identifying impact pathways; impact attribution; learning and performance enhancement; defining scaling-up pathways; evidence-based policy dialogue*

<sup>70</sup> IFAD (2012) Methodologies for Impact Assessments for IFAD9. Information note prepared for the 107th Session of the IFAD Executive Board, EB 2012/107/INF.7. December 2012.

**Summary of key points**

- ❖ Analysis of data from completion reports across two time periods shows that countries that have always been fragile have consistently the lowest performance. Countries that have been classified as fragile for only part of the time are more similar to those that are never fragile.
- ❖ Across the two time periods performance in the always fragile countries remains the lowest but shows the highest level of improvement.
- ❖ When performance is analysed against the underlying causes of fragility countries with a low CPIA have the weakest performance indicating that this measure provides an accurate prediction of weak government capacity, including for the agriculture sector.
- ❖ Analysis of data from IOE confirms the consistently lower performance of projects in always-fragile countries but there is no clear trend of improvement over time.
- ❖ Projects in the case study countries have performance assessments clustered around 4 and 5 with few outliers. In most instances, the justification for ratings is very weak. Where data are available, low ratings tend to be associated with weak management and government capacity; high ratings where there is some evidence of progress towards impact.
- ❖ A major reason for poor justifications is the lack of supporting information owing to weak M&E systems, a characteristic well recognised by IFAD's operational divisions.

## V. Findings on IFAD's approach to engagement in fragile states

155. A brief introduction on IFAD's engagement in fragile states was given in Chapter 1. Chapter 5 takes that further, with analysis of IFAD's policy and strategy framework to explain the project performance analysed in Chapter 4. It draws primarily on material in Working Paper 2. The chapter starts with an overview of the core policy framework. Implications for financing are explained next, followed by a review of IFAD's intervention model and then a look at wider coherence across IFAD's thematic and sub-sectoral policies and strategies.

### A. Development of policy and strategy

156. There is no single policy comprehensively covering IFAD's engagement in Fragile States. But as noted earlier, direction can be found in a collection of four guidance statements:
- (a) 1998 IFAD Framework For Bridging Post-Crisis Recovery And Long-Term Development.
  - (b) 2006 IFAD Policy On Crisis Prevention And Recovery.
  - (c) 2008 IFAD's Role In Fragile States (a note for the Consultation on IFAD's 8<sup>th</sup> Replenishment).
  - (d) 2011 IFAD Guidelines for Disaster Early Recovery.
157. These evolved over a number of years and reflect IFAD's changing orientation. IFAD was in some respects slow to address fragility and had to be prompted for a statement during the consultations on the Eighth Replenishment. The 2006 Crisis Prevention and Recovery Policy is the only policy document, the others comprise frameworks and guidelines which staff should take into account, but do not provide a formal structure that must be followed in the way of a policy. The absence of a policy statement may reflect an element of congestion in policy development by IFAD at that time. The IEE reporting in 2005 noted the absence of a strong policy framework to guide IFAD's work. In response, the years 2006 to 2012 saw the production of thirteen policy statements and six strategies or results frameworks (see Annex 6, Table 1).
158. **IFAD's four guidance statements share some common features.** Whilst there is a clear distinction between crises and fragility, the four have some overlap and

common elements. There is a clear link and progression, taking crises as the underlying contextual factor that IFAD needs to respond to. This leads to a more or less common proposal that each situation requires tailored assessment and approaches. These are to be carried out primarily through the analysis in the COSOP and then in project design. Box 14 highlights the main provisions for working in fragile states as set out in the 2008 document and revisited in the report on IFAD's 8<sup>th</sup> Replenishment.

Box 14

**IFAD's guidance on working in fragile states emphasises:**<sup>71</sup>

- i. a flexible approach to programme and project design, with a strong focus on building the capacity of community and government institutions;
- ii. a greater focus on the key issues of vulnerability and resilience, economic empowerment, gender, indigenous peoples, food security, land rights and natural resource management;
- iii. greater simplicity in project objectives and activities, to take account of the limited capacity of many fragile states to manage and implement development projects;
- iv. better analysis to underpin the design and implementation of programmes and projects, through expanded IFAD country presence and direct supervision;
- v. attention to mitigating and responding to the risks of natural disasters and conflict, particularly local conflicts over access to natural resources;
- vi. greater knowledge sharing, particularly with partners able to address more of the causes of fragility than IFAD alone can address; and
- vii. co-financing through harmonized procedures, where possible, in order to avoid increasing transaction costs to governments.

159. **The approach fails to tackle many of the wider issues of fragility and conflict.** IFAD has not re-examined its 2006 definition of fragility. There is no discussion about the problems of defining fragile states and situations. The discussion in Chapter 3 highlights how international understanding has evolved from a state's capacity and willingness to provide services towards new awareness that recognises the multidimensional aspects of fragility encompassing authority, capacity and legitimacy. IFAD has not yet embraced this awareness in the same way as its partner IFIs.
160. **Conflict is not dealt with in any detail and nor is there discussion of what constitutes a sub-national fragile or conflict affected situation.** The focus on broadly defined crises has neglected to bring clarity between conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building interventions. As seen in Chapter 3, other development agencies have recognized the critical need to carry out conflict sensitivity analyses in fragile situations. Such analyses would be very useful in the design of IFAD's country strategies. For example, there is ample evidence that natural resource mismanagement, youth unemployment and horizontal inequalities are major causes of conflict in fragile states. IFAD's development impact would be improved if the institution recognized that major conflict prevention benefits would likely flow from explicit identification of human security threats in fragile countries and situations.
161. **How to approach addressing drivers of fragility when IFAD's distinctive entry point is food production and equitable rural development in poor countries is not considered.** These policies do not extend to an understanding of food and nutrition security and poverty reduction in fragile states, and what IFAD's entry point should be in these contexts. How does IFAD complement other IFIs and UN agencies, especially in the wider context of peacebuilding and statebuilding?

<sup>71</sup> REPL.VIII/4/R.5.

Should IFAD participate in multi-donor coalitions that have helped fragile countries recover following a conflict, and if so, how?

162. **How generic guidance should be tailored to the case-by-case approach suggested in IFAD's guidance is not addressed.** This includes in terms of considerations of resources or implications for the COSOP, which instruments to use in which contexts or how to use flexibility, nor of the resource implications for planning and effective supervision. The specificities of supporting agriculture, food and nutrition security in FCS and how to reflect this in IFAD's rules of engagement are left to IFAD's wider policies. Without more specific supportive policies these four guidelines are an ineffective framework for work in fragile states.

#### Summary of key points

- ❖ Four documents make up IFAD's policy framework, dealing with crises, disasters and fragile states.
- ❖ They share a common thread that issues should be dealt with on a case by case basis through analysis in the COSOP and in project design; yet the approaches summarised in Box 4 imply a generic approach across all FCS rather than tailored to circumstances taking into account of the fact that youth unemployment, natural resources mismanagement, regional inequalities and poor rural administration are key drivers of conflict.
- ❖ The policies fail to tackle many of the wider issues of fragility and conflict. There is no discussion about the problems of defining fragile states and situations. Nor is there clarity between conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building interventions.
- ❖ IFAD has not re-examined its 2006 definition of fragile states and lags behind partner IFIs in recognising the multidimensional aspects of fragility.

## B. Financial instruments

163. Two decisions in the core policy framework have far reaching implications. Firstly, that IFAD will delineate fragile states based on a harmonised list from IDA, AfDB and AsDB, supplemented by analysis from OECD. Secondly, that access to additional allocation under the Performance Based Allocation System (PBAS) will be linked to decisions by IDA. Both have financial and operational implications.

### Fragile states and financial allocations

164. **IFAD's list of fragile states mixes two different approaches.** Harmonisation of the list of states considered to be fragile among the World Bank, AfDB and AsDB makes sense to promote consistent policies and foster collaborative working. It is logical for IFAD to follow the same approach. But by deciding to include countries listed by the OECD, IFAD complicates delineation with no obvious advantage to the Fund or to the listed countries. The listing by the three IFIs is based on an institutional assessment or the presence of a peace-building or peace-keeping force. OECD's listing is based on the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index. This index is derived using a different methodology and understanding of fragility and results in some differences in the listed states. Thus in 2013, IFAD's list included Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Georgia, Iran, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. None of these countries appear on the IFI harmonised list.<sup>72</sup>
165. IFAD's financial allocations to countries has followed a performance based system since 2004.<sup>73</sup> Allocations are based on a six part algorithm that considers: country needs, derived from GNI per capita and the size of the rural population; then

<sup>72</sup> IFAD 2014 *IFAD's performance in fragile states*, Programme Management Department, Annex 1.

<sup>73</sup> IFAD 2003 *The Structure And Operation Of A Performance-Based Allocation System For IFAD* EB 2003/79/R.2/Rev.1.

country performance which draws together the IDA Resource Allocation Index (formerly known as the CPIA) and three IFAD-specific measures, rural sector performance, portfolio at risk and country performance rating.

166. As noted in the design paper, PBASs do not operate to exclude countries that have achieved less: they allocate relatively fewer resources to them until a more supportive institutional and policy framework is achieved, and they provide a clear basis for identifying the areas in which improvement is essential. But unlike among partner IFIs, the present approach to identifying areas of improvement doesn't explicitly consider fragility. This may be a consequence of IFAD not updating its definition and understanding of fragile states. IFAD's rural sector performance (RSP) assessment would be the logical place to assess conflict or fragility given IFAD's business practices. But neither the 12 main indicators nor their underlying questions in the current version tackles conflict sensitivity or other aspects of fragility.<sup>74</sup>
167. **There are no additional resources made available to countries by virtue of being labelled as fragile.** The original proposal for PBAS did note that '*The conditions of countries in post-conflict situations would be reflected, and provision might be made for other special circumstances on the basis of policy papers approved by the Executive Board.*'<sup>75</sup> This provision has only been taken up for post-conflict situations, but not 'special circumstances' as suggested in the note.
168. Some additional funding is made available based on the *post-conflict* situation of a country and is derived directly from IDA's policy. Countries which meet IDA's criteria receive an extra 30 to 100 per cent of the PBAS allocation. The selection of countries therefore happens automatically, in the sense that the IDA analysis and assessment of countries to be designated as post-conflict is adopted directly by IFAD. The exact amount is decided and incorporated into the allocation tables. The effect of this addition can be seen across two periods, 2007-09 and 2010-12 in Table 14.

Table 14

**Additional funds to post-conflict states**

US\$	Allocation period: 2007-2009			2010-2012		
	Allocation	Approval	% increase	Allocation	Approval	% increase
Afghanistan	19,279,209	23,895,248	23.94	39,906,119	58,001,000	45.34
Angola	8,400,000	8,200,000	-2.38			
Burundi	24,555,932	27,553,572	12.21	40,030,705	46,258,606	15.56
Congo DR	23,330,000	23,326,249	-0.02	58,795,307	68,382,311	16.31
Congo Rep	9,102,830	8,573,978	-5.81	9,102,830	8,573,978	-5.81
Côte d'Ivoire				23,012,850	32,505,925	41.25
Eritrea	0	8,000,000	-	24,489,260	29,857,027	21.92
Liberia	2,251,978	4,999,936	122.02	16,898,041	16,883,759	-0.08
Timor-Leste				4,576,243	4,944,676	8.05
Total additional		17,629,034			48,595,927	

Source: Data from PMD.

169. The total additional approval amounted to US\$66 million. This benefitted nine countries, three of which<sup>76</sup> are among the top fragile state recipients of aid and so to an extent, can be regarded as supporting the desirable the shift in resources towards states emerging from violent conflict. The most recent PSR data for these

<sup>74</sup> See Rural Sector Performance Scoring Form 2012 version.

<sup>75</sup> IFAD 2003 *ibid*.

<sup>76</sup> Afghanistan, Congo DR and Cote d'Ivoire.

countries suggests performance is predominantly in the zone of moderately satisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory.

### Grants and debt sustainability

170. IFAD's finance to member countries is a mixture of loans and grants. Since 2007 countries are classified according to the IDA model of a debt sustainability framework (DSF) to govern the allocation of assistance to countries eligible for highly concessional assistance and with high to moderate debt-distress risk.<sup>77</sup> Categorisation is colour coded 'red', with a high risk of debt vulnerability; 'yellow', medium risk of debt vulnerability; 'green', no risk of debt vulnerability. Red countries receive finance as 100 per cent grant; yellow a mixture of 50 per cent grant and 50 per cent loan. Green are loan only. There is no direct correlation to fragility status. In 2013, 10 of IFAD's fragile states are coded red and 13 are coded yellow.
171. The implication for countries coded red or yellow is that countries with grants under the DSF are not then eligible for additional grant funding through IFAD's 'Country-specific' grant window. A revision to IFAD's grant policy in 2009 made no changes to this despite emphasising capacity building of partner institutions, a core strategy in fragile states. The value of small country grants or regional grants has already been noted in Box 6, above.

### Co-financing

172. Co-financing offers a way for IFAD both to share risks in fragile states and to benefit from funds devoted to specific sectors outside IFAD's competence. For example, co-financing with the OPEC Fund is often used to support civil works and infrastructure. Guidance is clear that where co-financing is used, harmonised procedures should be adopted in order to avoid increasing transaction costs to governments. Within the framework of fragile states policies, however, there is no additional guidance for co-financing. The Efficiency evaluation argued that IFAD needs to actively pursue strategic partnerships in countries with very small PBAS allocations and not favour stand-alone operations in such cases. This would appear to be directly germane for fragile states that don't qualify for additional post-conflict financing.<sup>78</sup>

#### Summary of key points

- ❖ IFAD's decision to combine listing of fragile states from both the IFIs and OECD results in an expanded list with little obvious benefit to the countries listed.
- ❖ Substantial reallocated funding for fragile states is defined by criteria set by IDA and is limited to post-conflict countries and adopted by IFAD.
- ❖ There are no additional trust funds or special provisions for grant funding for fragile states.

## C. IFAD's intervention model in fragile states

173. Figure 1 in Chapter 2 describes a simple results chain. Although it is specifically about working in fragile states, it also summarises IFAD's general intervention model.<sup>79</sup> The diagram highlights how the COSOP brings together issues concerning fragility in order to inform project design, risk management and financing arrangements. Not shown in the diagram is the central role of the CPM to interpret IFAD's strategies and policy framework, and lead on learning and policy dialogue. This point is stressed because **the apparent simplicity of the IFAD model**

<sup>77</sup> EB 2007/90/R.3.

<sup>78</sup> IFAD (2013) IFAD's institutional efficiency and efficiency of IFAD-funded operations.

<sup>79</sup> A discussion of how IFAD's business model has changed over the years can be found in the Independent External Evaluation (IEE) Report (2005) pp56-57 and Figures 8 and 9.

**relies upon the abilities of the CPM to tailor the approach to the specificity of the individual country**, an issue particularly crucial in fragile states and situations. To argue that if COSOPs focus on the right issues and that good work follows development impact will be secured is over-simplistic.

174. Two key features of IFAD's approach that coincide with the period of this evaluation are the shift away from using cooperating institutions during implementation to direct supervision by IFAD, and the creation of country presence by a mixture of country offices with locally appointed staff and outposting of CPMs. Aspects of these approaches have been discussed above in Chapter 4.C. The IEE described these changes as giving the CPM an increasingly fractured role, demanding a range of skills from strategy development through project design to policy dialogue.<sup>80</sup> To these could be added implementation support, scaling up, private sector partnerships and working with development partners.
175. The challenges for a CPM are illustrated when considering the advice that simplicity in project objectives is seen as a desirable characteristic of projects in fragile states and contexts. Yet fragility is associated with conflict and uncertainty, which are key ingredients of complexity. This implies that CPMs need appropriate guidance and skills to understand the underlying drivers of fragility and conflict in order to identify the proper ways in which specific problems (and possible solutions) are identified and to be prepared to adapt designs in a timely fashion based on experience. This places greater burdens on the CPM, which the evaluation of IFAD's Efficiency noted has led (among other new areas of work) to significant workload implications arising out of new initiatives. The evolution of the operating model expects the CPM to have an ever-growing range of skills, or access to appropriate support within IFAD. It implies that staff (especially CPMs) are being asked to manage processes and activities for which they may not be adequately prepared.<sup>81</sup>
176. **Support is available to assess security threats.** In conflict-affected countries consideration has to be made as to the impact on IFAD's ability to plan and support implementation. IFAD's security division maintains a 'living' table on Security Levels in Effect by Region. This resource identifies issues under five categories: armed conflict; terrorism; crime; civil unrest; and hazards, at a subnational level for all countries. Threats are assessed on a six-point scale. CPMs can receive support from the division, in particular concerning geographical assessments. It is mandatory that a living programme assessment be prepared by each CPM to assess the fragility and security issues in the country, but it appears these are rarely produced. The country-based UN Security Management Teams are at the frontline of security assessment, and have a faster response time to security issues.

***IFAD does not systemically interrupt its interventions during conflicts***

*Burundi and Nepal both illustrate examples where IFAD did not interrupt its interventions during conflict times.*

*In some areas, insurgents valued IFAD's support to the most vulnerable and therefore did not hinder projects' implementation. Interviewees in both countries acknowledged that IFAD's added-value rests in its ability to intervene at grass-root level, work in close proximity with those who are the most in need.*

**Summary of key points**

- ❖ IFAD's intervention model has a simple structure but is in fact complex with heavy demands on country programme managers that require a strongly supportive policy and strategy framework, a point that is examined in the next section.
- ❖ Support for planning in conflict situations exists within IFAD but is underused.

<sup>80</sup> IFAD (2005) Independent External Evaluation (IEE) para 3.9.

<sup>81</sup> IFAD (2013) *ibid.*

## D. Policy coherence

177. The full analysis of IFAD's policies can be found in Working Paper 2. Policies were grouped into seven broad categories defined by the evaluators as indicated in Table 15. Of these, the most numerous deal with sectoral and thematic issues, with 11 documents reviewed, followed by strategy with nine. Overall, 53 per cent of policies had either very limited or limited treatment of fragility and conflict. Only two (6 per cent) were classified as having a high level of detail. These were:

- (a) The 2014 paper for the consultation for IFAD's 10<sup>th</sup> replenishment (very recent and therefore with no influence over IFAD's performance during the period of this evaluation); and,
- (b) IFAD's 2009 Rural Finance Policy

Table 15

### Relevance and coherence of treatment of fragility & conflict in IFAD policies

Number of documents reviewed	Extent of treatment of fragility & conflict issues						Total
	Very limited	Limited	Partial	Considerable	High	Very high	
Strategy		4	3	1	1		9 26%
COSOP				1			1 3%
Project design	1	2	1				4 12%
Sector & thematic	3	2	5	1			11 32%
Financial	2	1			1		4 12%
Country presence & supervision	1		1				2 6%
Results	1	1	1				3 9%
Totals	8	10	11	3	2	0	34 100%
	24%	29%	32%	9%	6%	0%	

178. Clearly, not every document needs to reflect fragility. But the 2008 paper said that IFAD would adjust its procedures and guidelines to reflect the needs of fragility. In view of the contrast between generic statements on IFAD's approach (Box 4) and a recognised need to develop programmes on a case by case basis, there is a stronger argument that programme cycle and sectoral guidance should highlight the special requirements of fragile states.
179. The results chain in Figure 1 highlights five broad topics where some reference would be expected: development of the COSOP; co-financing; project design; implementation support; and measurement of results. Within these, capacity building and gender are prominent cross-cutting topics.
180. **Significant policy gaps or weaknesses are apparent in support for project design, sectoral or thematic guidelines, and measurement of results.** Many of the documents reviewed make a slight, passing reference to fragile states, but very few, as indicated, set out how IFAD can address issues of fragility or conflict and how performance might be measured. The 2008 note described above, which

forms the main policy statement, has clear statements about issues such as the need for:

- (a) a strong focus on building the capacity of community and government institutions;
  - (b) a greater focus on the key issues of vulnerability and resilience, economic empowerment, gender, indigenous peoples, food security, land rights and natural resource management; and,
  - (c) greater simplicity in project objectives and activities, to take account of the limited capacity of many fragile states to manage and implement development projects;
181. This is echoed in the 2009 Rural Finance Policy, which notes the importance of access to finance for risk prevention measures in the context of the Rome Partnership (with FAO and WFP) on Integrated Disaster Risk Management, and highlights cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and women's empowerment (core topics for interventions in fragile states) and the need to address specific conflict and economic recovery issues in conflict-impacted countries.
182. Yet with two notable exceptions neither sectoral and thematic policies nor guidance on strategy and project design develop methods by which IFAD can take up these ways of working.
183. Gaps are found in seven areas:
- (a) Under strategy, policies emphasise the theme of doing analysis in the COSOP (and include provision for a 3 year 'transitional' COSOP in a post-conflict setting, but which enquires with PMD reveal has never been used) but the COSOP guidelines contain no material on what such an analysis would look like or how it relates to IFAD's poverty analysis. The new material simply restates the 2008 note and includes some lessons of experience.
  - (b) Guidance on project design is missing any substantive material on how to develop simpler objectives and flexible approaches, both of which are prominent aspects of strategies in FCS. Fragility and conflict are seen as a feature of the risk analysis, but for avoidance rather than to design a mitigation strategy as part of the project.
  - (c) Targeting is potentially a core supportive policy linked, again, to the COSOP. But no discussion of what considerations targeting needs to take into account in FCS.
  - (d) Similarly, gender and women's empowerment policy stops short of a link to problems of discrimination and social exclusion and the specific challenges in post-conflict settings.
  - (e) Access to land and land tenure is often seen to be a key issue in conflict. The policy recognises the importance of including a gender-sensitive analysis and working to 'do-no-harm', but stops short of practical guidelines.
  - (f) Working in partnership is a core IFAD strategy, and in FCS partnerships are ways of ensuring complementary issues can be tackled outside IFAD's sectoral competence, such as peacebuilding and statebuilding. The policy includes a reference to partnerships in FCS. But guidelines on establishing or enhancing such partnerships is absent.
  - (g) The results measurement frameworks do not include any indicators that would demonstrate improved performance for capacity building, women's empowerment, youth employment, or access to land,<sup>82</sup> especially in the RIMS indicators. Indicators of fragile states appear only as part of the quality at

<sup>82</sup> Training and community action plans feature as indicators at the level of outputs, level 3.

entry review and portfolio management, percentage disbursement ratio-for countries in fragile situations

184. It is clear that **when working in fragile states or contexts, most of IFAD's substantive guidance doesn't consider how to support the work of CPMs** or for CPMs to use in managing teams of consultants or working in partnership with other development organisations. Evaluations of Gender, Private Sector and Rural Finance conducted by IOE share a similar observation that whilst strategy or policy may be relevant, follow-up with clear guidelines has not always been achieved.
185. **Furthermore, CPMs report a low level of training and organisational support related to fragility.** These findings are reinforced by the responses to a survey of CPM and country staff reported in Working Paper 5. Respondents consider that support and information from IFAD is quite limited. Only one claimed that he/she has received training in IFAD on how to assess fragile states/situations and more than 75 per cent are of the opinion that IFAD does not provide necessary information and support in this regard. In particular, around 70 per cent of the respondents claim that there is no guidance available in their divisions on the specific indicators reflecting fragility or they are not aware of them.
186. **Examples in gender and institutional development illustrate potential for FCS-relevant approaches.** Core target areas for IFAD interventions are capacity building, economic empowerment, gender, indigenous peoples, food security, land rights and natural resource management. More recent initiatives in two of these areas, gender and capacity building demonstrate IFAD's potential to respond.
187. **Gender and women's empowerment** is a cross-cutting area for IFAD and has received considerable attention.<sup>83</sup> Three examples illustrate ways in which support is being provided for staff to improve analysis, design and implementation.<sup>84</sup> Firstly, Household Methodologies, which "*...enable family members to work together to improve relations and decision-making, and to achieve more equitable workloads.*" Documentation includes a teaser (a short briefing note), a fuller 'How to Do it Note' and case studies. Secondly, a webinar series for self-learning, covering topics such as analysis, targeting strategies, indicators and the gender marker. Thirdly, a gender marker system has been drafted.
188. The marker provides a rich text framework, or rubric, for assessing the gender sensitivity of IFAD projects at various stages of the project cycle, enhancing IFAD's 6-point rating scale to reflect the terminology of 'gender blind, gender neutral, gender aware, gender mainstreaming, through to gender transformative'. This way of working helps create a more systematic approach to ratings and clarifies the nature of performance. The approach does not specifically address issues of gender and women's empowerment in conditions of fragility and conflict, which is an omission, but brings rigour in analysis and application that is directly applicable to fragile states.
189. Initiatives to develop the **capacity of smallholder institutions and organisations** follow some similar patterns but with a stronger orientation towards conflict. The orientation is to move beyond capacity building as training, to sustainable institutional change. There is a short teaser pamphlet; a series of How to Do it Notes; a range of guidance material – a source book, practitioner's guide, institutional analysis, good practice report written jointly with FAO; and a synthesis report analysing experiences using the source book in 15 countries.<sup>85</sup> Conflict is

<sup>83</sup> In the UN System-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2013 report, IFAD improved from an 'approaches requirements' rating in 2012 to an 'exceeds requirements' rating in 2013. The UN system average for meeting/ exceeding requirements was only 42 per cent whereas IFAD achieved 67 per cent.

<sup>84</sup> IFAD 2014, Toolkit on Household Methodologies; IFAD's Gender and Targeting Webinar Series (not dated); IFAD Gender Markers, January 2014 (PTA Gender Desk).

<sup>85</sup> See IFAD 2008 Institutional and organizational analysis for pro-poor change: meeting IFAD's millennium challenge; IFAD (n.d.) A field practitioner's guide. Institutional and organizational analysis and capacity strengthening; IFAD 2014 Building smallholder institutions and organisations.

handled as a specific element in the series with discussion of conflict arising from corruption, favouritism, land and natural resource management. Examples are given from Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.

190. Much of the material being promoted for gender and capacity building is quite recent and has not yet moved beyond small-scale adoption across IFAD's portfolio. But they illustrate new ways of working that could be applied in other areas such as indigenous peoples, land rights and natural resource management.

#### Summary of key points

- ❖ There is a high degree of relevance in the policy and strategy topics but no single document draws together the core elements of IFAD's approach to FCS and takes full advantage of policy research findings about the drivers and root causes of conflict in fragile states. Four specific policies, 34 associated policies or guidance documents and nine corporate level evaluations or evaluation syntheses have been reviewed. Six clear weaknesses have been found:
  - The interpretation of fragile states is narrow, restricted to a harmonised combination of the IFI lists plus OECD rankings.<sup>86</sup> This excludes many countries with sub-national conflicts or conflict-prone circumstances. There is no consideration of the appropriateness of the IFI/OECD definitions for IFAD's mandate nor any discussion about fragility or conflict affected situations.
  - IFAD's core policies are more concerned with crises and disasters than with fragility and conflict. In particular, they exclude long-running complex crises. Conflict is largely neglected in the policy framework.
  - Supportive policies place emphasis on case-by-case analysis, mostly through the COSOP, but also in project design. Yet sectoral and thematic policies and strategies do not provide staff with the tools and techniques to guide those analyses.
  - Many key policies do not explain how their interpretation should be tailored to the needs of FCS. In particular, the practical implications of exhortations to keep project design simple and flexible are not spelled out in guidance.
  - There is no specific provision for additional financial or implementation support other than for IDA-designated post-conflict states.
  - Results measurement frameworks do not include any higher-level indicators for IFAD's contribution to FCS.
- ❖ The policy framework is judged to be marginally satisfactory for relevance, but unsatisfactory for coherence. IFAD's modalities and procedures as reviewed here fail to achieve an effective policy framework for operations in fragile and conflict affected states and situations.

## E. Assessment of IFAD's approach

191. Analysis of strategies and projects in the case study countries and a wider desk review of documents points to seven clear findings about IFAD's performance at country level.
- Context analysis is supposed to take place in the COSOP process, but staff lack training or specific guidelines and many think resources limit the scope for this work. Opportunities exist to draw on the work of partner agencies but these are rarely taken up. The most effective analyses are found in countries in the immediate aftermath of conflict or crisis. Fragility and conflict analysis is largely overlooked in countries in transition.
  - Opinions among staff are divided about how far IFAD should go in tackling root causes of fragility or linking to whole of government approaches, given IFAD's small-scale project modalities. This confirms the need to make staff aware of policy research findings about the root causes of conflict.

<sup>86</sup> See Working Paper 1 on Fragility and Conflict for a wider discussion of this.

- The guidance on project design in fragile states is clear about emphasis on capacity building and attention to a range of relevant factors such as vulnerability, gender, food security etc. But these are broad and in view of the fact that IFAD ordinarily works in very poor and disadvantaged locations, it is difficult to find any evidence of how these approaches differ in fragile states. This reflects the absence of a good context analysis to identify drivers of fragility and conflict.
  - Recent years have seen development of innovative ways to intervene for women's empowerment and gender focus, and also institution-building. These have not yet worked through to inform the design of projects in fragile states, beyond pilot locations.
  - Staff recognise the scope for flexibility in the components and timing of project implementation. But guidance on keeping designs simple is ineffective and overambitious projects are still found, often responding to pressures from governments.
  - Fragile states are not receiving any additional resources for project design or supervision given the tight budget environment and the very broad definition of state fragility. The creation of country offices and outposting of CPM is only marginally geared towards these countries despite strong support from governments and development partners for IFAD's closer involvement.
192. Analysis of project performance data from completion reports and status reports indicates that projects in countries that have always been classified as fragile perform less well. The CPIA score does seem to provide a useful measure of weak government capacity that contributes to poor project performance. But projects in countries classified by different measures of fragility or presence of conflict do not display any significant difference from projects in countries that have never been fragile. In any event project ratings are goal based and do not allow comparisons of net benefits across projects. Since policy research findings highlight that aid benefits are relatively high in vulnerable countries it would be counter-productive to reduce IFAD allocations to fragile states on faulty "performance" grounds especially in aid orphan countries.

## F. Fragility and IFAD's support to LICs and MICs

193. IFAD's strategic framework for the period 2011-2015 recognises the tensions the Fund faces in trying to define a coherent strategy and at the same time respond flexibly to the differing needs of countries. . Filling gaps in the natural resource and economic asset base, enabling access to services, integrating poor people within value chains, empowering poor rural men and women to influence policies and enhancing institutional and policy environments are ambitious goals. There is a clear intention to be selective and adopt differentiated approaches according to the country context and respond to the most salient causes of fragility in each country<sup>87</sup>
194. **The implicit assumption is that fragile states are a subset of IFAD's countries and among the poorest.** Yet as we have seen, operations in states classified as fragile are a major part of the portfolio and they are located in low income, lower middle and upper middle income. Among the 24 always fragile are seven lower-middle and one upper middle-income country; in the 44 states partially fragile in IFADs' listings, only 16 are low-income countries. States that are currently or ever have been fragile outnumber those that have never been so classified. But these not-fragile countries also include many which have conflict prone or actual conflict situations at a sub-national level. Thus the issues discussed in this report are generic and pertinent to IFAD's overall operational policies and practices.

<sup>87</sup> EB 2011/102/R.2/Rev.1 para 68.

195. **When so many countries fall within a supposed sub-category the value of that categorisation must be questioned.** Awareness about the need to differentiate approaches is evident and the consultation paper for the IFAD10 Replenishment, '*Enhancing IFAD's business model for inclusive and sustainable rural transformation*',<sup>88</sup> makes reference to needing a clearer differentiation in IFAD's approach to fragile and conflict-affected countries, to other low-income countries, and to MICs. Unbundling the fragility concept and providing guidance to staff regarding how to address root causes of conflict through IFAD's instruments should be the core aim of reconsidering IFAD's policy framework.
196. IFAD's approach to programme and project development is described as aligning interventions with a country's agricultural plans through jointly developed COSOPs which enables IFAD to tailor its interventions and support to each partner country's stated needs and strategy. But as this evaluation has shown, this approach has not always taken into account the drivers of conflict and fragility. Nurturing country ownership of the policy goals needed to address them is challenging and requires expert and persistent policy dialogue.
197. The recent synthesis evaluation on IFAD's engagement in middle income countries found that IFAD's performance is no better in MICs than in LICs, and no better in UMICs than in LMICs, possibly because IFAD-supported projects in MICs tend to be located in poorer, remote and more difficult regions, where the context is similar to that found in LICs or fragile states. The enormous diversity within MICs as a group makes generalisation difficult. MICs should not be treated as a single group, nor should a country classification by income be used by itself to determine the nature of IFAD's engagement.<sup>89</sup> Considering the analysis of fragility and conflict in Chapter 3, rather than think of LICs, MICS and fragile states it may be more appropriate for IFAD to categorise along a spectrum that includes: low institutional capacity (core fragile states); low income; conflict countries; post conflict transition; states with sub-national fragile or conflict situations; and stable or resilient states of low or middle incomes.
198. The final question in the staff survey asked respondents for their views on what changes in policy or practice would better enable a response to fragile states and situations. The responses range across policy, resources, staff skills and flexibility. There is a recognition that IFAD's core work is in fragile settings, but there are concerns revolving around the resource implications of extensive fragility analyses. They confirm the need for selective reviews that focus on the core causes of conflict that are well within IFAD's mandate. Box 15 contains a selection. The full list is in Working Paper 5.

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<sup>88</sup> IFAD10/2/R.3.

<sup>89</sup> IFAD (2014) Evaluation synthesis on IFAD's engagement in middle-income countries EC 2014/83/W.P.3.

## Box 15

**Suggestions of changes to improve IFAD's engagement in fragile states and situations**

- Fragility analysis should be limited to areas of IFAD mandate. The "do-better" and "don't harm" principles should be exercised concurrently in so called fragile states. Operational instruments for analysis of elements of fragility linked to IFAD operations should be developed as part of the COSOP design guidelines. A fully fledged fragility analysis should not be part of IFAD design requirements.
- Need additional resources to provide implement support to projects in fragile states.
- More flexibility in compliance with fiduciary requirements - Additional budget to work in fragile contexts (e.g. additional costs of transportation, higher consultant fees, need for much closer supervision/higher number of supervision missions, etc.)
- Training in designing and supervising projects in fragile state;
  - increase frequency of supervision and implementation support;
  - active role of ICO in procurement for higher threshold;
  - small grant to support implementations;
  - training in assessing and monitoring fragility;
  - flexibility for adjusting to dynamics of fragility
- We need fast track systems.
- Different Evaluation Process tailored to Fragile States. Problem projects are likely to raise in fragile states but there is no weight for fragility in the evaluation
- Provide training to staff in particular to staff in the field - CPAs, CPOs and CPMs; Include aspects of fragile states and situations during COSOP preparation and review.
- Adopt a different approach to Fragile states also with regards to rapid response systems as well as short term investment strategies in fragile states. Same to supervision and resourceful allocation.
- Allow additional financing to ongoing projects when emergencies occur, allow financing of increased government public administration skills.
- Better involvement of all staff to help full participation in programme as this is IFAD core function.
- Flexibility in design and implementation and supervision
- IFAD should prepare proper policies dealing specifically with: (i) conflict and post conflict countries; (ii) natural disaster affected countries; and (iii) chronically food insecure fragility. These cannot be bunched into one policy as it was instructed to do in 2004-2006.
- Each fragility situation demands a different set of policy plus strategy and resources to tackle to root causes of the specific fragility. Also, IFAD should consider equipping itself with a Unit dealing specifically with the different fragilities and with its allocated funds. as is the case with the other IFIs.

**VI. Conclusions and recommendations**

199. This chapter draws together from the findings and discussion in the report and presents a storyline, conclusions and recommendations. These follow directly from the findings as set out and summarised periodically in the text. After the first overarching conclusion they are structured in the same way as the report, following the results chain and starting with policy.

**A. Storyline**

59. IFAD has a critical role to play in fragile and conflict affected-states and situations in promoting sustainable inclusive development and rural transformation. A very

large number of people live in severe poverty in such contexts. As the only multilateral development organization that focuses exclusively on smallholder agriculture development in rural areas, the Fund has a unique responsibility to support local production and livelihoods systems in fragile situations, and help poor rural people improve their incomes, nutrition, food security and well-being.

60. There is growing interest among the international community in assisting fragile and conflict-affected states and situations. IFAD too is paying greater attention to this issue by clearly recognizing that it needs to adapt to perform better in such contexts. Both the discussions and commitments in the recently concluded IFAD10 Consultation and this dedicated evaluation on the topic are examples of the organization's pledge to do things differently.
200. IFAD will, however, need to adapt further and sharpen its approaches to achieve better outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations, especially given that more than half of its recipient countries are currently classified as fragile states. This evaluation has highlighted several core issues that will need to be tackled upfront in order to achieve desired improvements and results in the future.

## B. Conclusions

201. **The assumption that IFAD's performance in fragile states is worse than in the rest of the portfolio is not corroborated by evidence. It is only consistently worse in a small group of countries with very limited capacity.** A contributory reason for this evaluation was an analysis presented by management showing that, as with other IFIs, portfolio performance was worse in fragile states than in the rest of the portfolio.
202. In fact, analysis of data from completion reports across two time periods shows that countries that have always been fragile may consistently have the lowest performance. By contrast, countries that have been classified as fragile for part of the time are more similar in terms of performance to those that are never fragile.
203. Across two time periods performance in the always fragile countries remains the lowest but also shows the highest level of improvement. When performance is analysed against the underlying causes of fragility, countries with a low CPIA have the weakest performance. This suggests that weak government capacity is the main determinant of their poorer comparative performance.
204. **IFAD's current approach to classifying fragile states is ineffective.** By combining the harmonised list from the IFIs together with any individual IFI listing and additional countries listed by the OECD, IFAD creates a supra-list that bring in more countries than its partner IFIs. This listing combines different approaches to classification and brings no benefit to the listed countries in terms of additional resources or implementation support. Nor does such a classification help IFAD get a better understanding of rural poverty and the vulnerable poor in countries so classed and hence be better placed to meet its mandate. It ties IFAD to IDA's policy and resource framework, and arguably, it sends the wrong message about the need to be context specific. It overlooks countries with sub-national situations of fragility and conflict, which are likely to affect the very people that IFAD targets.
205. **IFAD's policy framework lacks a clear focus on fragility and conflict and fails to respond to the importance of context.** IFAD to date has no overall policy on fragility, but rather four guidance documents that address various aspects of the policy framework required for addressing fragility. The absence of an up to date definition of fragility is a symptom of policy failure and contributes to the simplistic approach to classification. During the evaluation period, there is little evidence that these documents have had any major effect upon what the organisation actually does. In addition, neither is there evidence that these documents deal with the implications of the evolving understanding of what is meant by fragility and its consequences for IFAD's approach and work, nor of IFAD

amending its wider range of policies and guidance to enhance its ability to work in fragile contexts.

206. **IFAD's sectoral and thematic policies do not help staff tackle drivers of fragility and conflict.** The four documents cover aspects of this agenda but provide no strategic guidance on how IFAD should tailor its support to the specific national contexts, the degree to which it should aim to contribute to addressing the underlying drivers of fragility or whether and how it should address sub-national instances of fragility. As important, policy and guidance issued to date has not answered the question of how IFAD should modify its approach to partnerships with other security and development agencies when considering the drivers of fragility that fall outside of the organisation's mandate and areas of expertise.
207. Good work has been done in recent years to promote improved approaches to gender and institution-building. They have not yet had an impact on IFAD's wider portfolio. But they provide a benchmark for ways of working that need to be taken up in other areas of work, especially involvement in post conflict settings to support reintegration of former combatants in the rural economy, access to land and land tenure, youth employment and emphasis on rural development in disadvantaged regions, among others.
208. **The COSOP is overloaded and its preparation has in most instances not fulfilled its assumed purpose as an opportunity to think strategically about the implications of fragility.** Policies call for detailed analysis to be undertaken in the COSOP. Detailed analysis of drivers of fragility, and their implications for how IFAD meets its mandate, are rarely found. There is evidence that analysis of poverty and use of this analysis in developing IFAD's strategy at country level is improving. This means that a number of the commonly identified drivers of fragility are considered in all COSOPs. But most of the time, the evidence does not suggest that the analysis in 'fragile' states is any different from the normal poverty-focused analysis carried out elsewhere.
209. Staff are under pressure to keep the COSOP document short, resources for preparation are constrained, financial allocations are no higher for fragile states than for others and there is no evidence of other partners in-country pushing IFAD to consider these issues more explicitly. In particular, there is no obvious incentive to explore drivers of fragility and conflict through analysis of political economy. Staff lack the needed skills to lead on such work. There is scope to draw more on analyses done by the UN, IFIs and international NGOs. When such analysis is available, IFAD doesn't always use it. The need to agree the COSOP, and support country ownership and strong partnership with government may also discourage meaningful analysis of issues that are politically sensitive and call for extended policy dialogue to help demonstrate that they fall well within IFAD's mandate.
210. Risk aversion may also be at work. Thus, management leadership is needed to ensure that risks are identified and managed rather than avoided in order to reap potentially high conflict prevention rewards.
211. **Guidelines on project design are not always specific enough to address issues associated with fragility.** Thematic focus on capacity building and gender is appropriate and well supported. But broad guidance to keep projects simple and flexible misses the point. . Conflict and fragility are complex phenomena and if projects are to tackle underlying drivers they may need designs that are not simple. Simple is different from overambitious and flexibility means supervision conceived as reappraisal. . More support is needed to help staff identify ways of working that promote social inclusion and ways to tackle conflict over access to resources, whilst also being realistic about the level of national capacity.
212. **There is scope for more flexibility during implementation.** CPMs have the opportunity to modify many aspects of location, timing and the make-up of

activities. Evidence suggests that this flexibility is used and appreciated by partners. On the other hand, modification of objectives or structural changes to finance are technically possible but rarely taken advantage of. This is because it requires approval of the Executive Board and the transaction costs are perceived to be too high. Similar constraints are at work among other IFIs.

213. **Country presence and direct supervision has brought clear benefits but not in addressing the challenges of fragility.** The creation of country offices and out-posting of CPM is still only marginally weighted towards fragile states. The experience of the World Bank is that an increase in staffing and other resources for preparation, supervision and country presence has helped improve performance of their fragile states portfolio. Beyond creating a country office, IFAD has little scope for more resources so that an unbundled definition of fragility is needed to guide budget decisions. Incentives for CPM to work in out-posted locations could expand this process. PTA is expanding staff numbers specifically to provide more implementation support and this is to be welcomed. Greater partnership working could be another solution as well as linking IFAD to whole of government approaches.
214. **Weak project performance is mainly due to low government capacity and overambitious designs.** A 'country-based' fragility classification is not a useful guide to project performance. For example, in many countries, fragility is most extreme in particular sub-regions and these areas are associated with conflict. In such cases, fragility becomes a risk to be avoided and projects are therefore not located in such areas, even though these might be the areas with the highest levels of rural poverty. In the sub-group of 'fragile' countries where portfolio performance is lower than in the rest of the portfolio, poor performance is related to both low government capacity and overambitious designs.
215. **The quality of information is inadequate to support ratings of project performance.** Self-evaluation ratings provide a useful source of performance information and evaluations by IOE confirm they are reasonably robust when independently reviewed. But the narrative to justify the ratings in many instances lacks clear a clear basis of evidence. This reflects poor performance of project monitoring and evaluation systems; a challenge recognised by managements in most IFAD regions and countries. This issue is accentuated because IFAD's results measurement framework does not include any substantive indicators at level 2 that would measure key elements of work in fragile states, such as empowerment and capacity building. This lack of relevant indicators is also found in the RIMS. The gender and social inclusion group in PTA have produced a gender marker, which sets standards and will help harmonise ratings on gender. It could provide a lesson for other ratings.
216. **Plans for evaluation do not discriminate according to the needs of learning and accountability.** At present, IFAD projects have a largely standardised approach to developing monitoring and evaluation across all regions. The approach implicitly assumes that monitoring and evaluation for the individual projects always address the same purposes. This approach isn't working. Robust evidence at anything above the level of the activity and output is usually lacking or, where available, has not been collected through an approach designed to deliver methodologically credible evidence or present information transparently to show that the evidence is credible and reliable.

### C. Recommendations

217. Recommendations are set out here following the broad structure of the results chain, which reflects the structure of this report. Each main recommendation is at a strategic level, but discussion indicates the type of instruments or actions that could be followed.

### Policy and strategy

218. **Reconsider the current classifications of fragile states.** The way forward needs more careful planning than trying to reconcile a coherent corporate strategy with a recognition that development effectiveness will require bespoke programming in most countries. A particular problem is in trying to predict where the majority of the poor will live in the future. The MICS synthesis evaluation pointed out contrasting scenarios as to whether most absolute poverty will be in low-income and African states or, as today, mostly in middle-income states.<sup>90</sup> That will depend to a large extent on the levels of growth achieved in those countries. Whilst IFAD's primary focus will continue to be rural poverty, the close interaction between conflict, fragility and poverty means that even if the locus of poverty shifts away from MICs, IFAD is likely to still be working in remote, hard to access locations where pockets of poverty persist.
219. Instead of the current all-encompassing approach take the opposite stance and differentiate clearly among countries. A starting point is those states with weak national-level policy and institutional capacity, as reflected in the low CPIA score, which we have seen is correlated with weak project performance. But the IFI lists exclude middle income countries and this is where more use could be made of the Rural Sector Performance assessments that IFAD already employs, possibly with some modification, to classify such countries. All other settings would then reflect context specific factors and should draw on data from UN and independent sources to discriminate among conflict prone, conflict, post conflict, and transition settings and also include countries at risk from natural disasters. In view of the speed with which context can change, such assessment needs to be more frequent than current COSOP practice.
220. **Draft a statement that defines a set of principles to guide how IFAD plans to engage with fragile and conflict affected states and sub-national situations.** This is long overdue. It should distinguish clearly between natural and man-made disasters and it should put forward a working definition of fragility that identifies the major drivers of conflict and provide clear distinctions about how to deal with various fragility dimensions and whether they are connected with proneness to conflict. The principles should also include discussion of how IFAD will respond to specific country needs when fragility and conflict are contained in sub-national situations. They should take account of distinct vulnerabilities to climate change and natural disasters. They should also assess the resilience associated with disaster preparedness and institutional capacities geared to coping abilities, . This should link to the 2011 Guidelines for Disaster Early Recovery.
221. **Change the approach to analysis in the COSOP.** Situational or context analysis is essential and the COSOP is widely considered to be the right instrument. IFAD needs to provide adequate resources, draw more explicitly on analysis done by partner IFIs and UN agencies and find a means to update the information more frequently than the current period between COSOPs. One solution would be to prepare a transitional COSOP after three years in all fragile and conflict affected states and situations. A simpler approach could be to commission a separate working paper from time to time, dealing more specifically with drivers of fragility and conflict. Instead of listing full synopses of pipeline projects in the COSOP, a short menu of possible interventions would bring more flexibility and choice that could be followed up depending on country performance.
222. In many countries, the present poverty focused analysis will be enough and IFAD should therefore focus on enhancing the quality and comprehensiveness of the analysis and strengthening the link between analysis and what it and partners decide it should do. At the other extreme are countries where conflict looms or

<sup>90</sup> See Kharas, Homi and Andrew Rogerson. 2012. *Horizon 2025: Creative Destruction in the Aid Industry*. London: ODI. Reported in EC 2014/83/W.P.3.

major conflict has recently been resolved by a peace agreement. In such cases, fragility analyses are often available and other security and development institutions are involved and the challenge for IFAD will be to draw on their analyses and identify its niche as part of multi-donor coalitions.. . In between is the large number of countries in which aspects of fragility will be found at either national or sub-national level. In these cases, IFAD needs to assess the risks, share them with other partners and manage them while concentrating on its comparative advantage.

### **Project and programme design**

223. ***Programme design needs to identify where IFAD can engage and where it cannot.*** IFAD's mandate is not to solve fragility or conflict. In countries with sub-national fragile situations, where basic security requirements do not preclude IFAD's involvement, IFAD needs to decide whether to engage in those locations or not on the basis of their impact on rural poverty and their potential conflict prevention benefits. In many instances this will involve IFAD projects in issues of social exclusion and disputes over access to natural resources, especially land. Identifying who is to benefit and how institutions can be supported will be a key part of that process and results frameworks need to incorporate measurable indicators of change in performance at the level of outcomes. Use of theories of change might help project planners to identify processes and assumptions more effectively than the current logframe-based approach.
224. ***In fragile states with low government capacity*** ensure simple objectives and design, taking carefully into account the country's policy and institutional context, and greater attention needs to be devoted to ensuring customisation of development approaches (e.g., to gender equality and women's empowerment) depending on the context. And, in those countries experiencing weak institutional capacity and poor governance IFAD can build on current practices of working with local communities, farmer organisations and lower levels of government dealing with service delivery.

### **Project and programme implementation**

225. ***Expand implementation support in quantity and technical content.*** Opportunities exist to strengthen implementation support in several ways.
- (a) ***More resources for implementation support:*** Regional spending on implementation support should be made more transparent and allocated according to country needs so that relative effort can be monitored and managed across the whole portfolio. PTA already plans to increase technical involvement and this is to be welcomed.
  - (b) ***IFAD country offices and out-posting:*** Explicitly prioritize the establishment of new IFAD country offices and out-posting of CPMs in countries affected by fragility and conflict.
  - (c) ***Strategic partnerships:*** In fragile states where state building is an objective IFAD could take a more radical approach and expand partnership with IFIs and multilateral agencies that can provide a higher level and broader basis of implementation support. IFAD's policy on supervision still provides for contracted arrangements and these could be used selectively to expand IFAD's reach in countries where IFAD has a small presence but partner IFI's have large country teams. Such an approach is directly compatible with IFAD's core policy of innovative designs leading to scaling up, for which close partnership working is desirable.

### **Empowerment of staff**

226. Efforts should be made to introduce specific incentives for staff working in fragile states and conflict-affected situations, including those based in headquarters

discharging similar functions. Working in fragile situations should be included as a main criterion for professional development and diversification as well as career advancement within the broader framework of IFAD's performance evaluation system. Greater attention to capacity-building and training needs of staff should also be explicitly promoted, and platforms for exchanging knowledge, good practices and experiences of working in fragile states (across regional divisions) should be introduced.

### **Results Measurement**

227. ***Plan and resource project M&E more selectively.*** The persistent problem of weak M&E needs to be reversed. It might help to develop a core competency within PTA. But greater attention needs to be paid to planning for monitoring and evaluation during project design. At present, the approach is one size fits all. But some project interventions are well proven and arguably need little or no evaluation. Others may be innovative and require a counterfactual evaluation design to test their effectiveness. Most projects will fall somewhere between these extremes. All projects should be required to defend their design with proven evidence from earlier phases or other locations that the intervention will work in the planned context. That process leads logically to a decision on the necessary effort for evaluation. Where evidence is lacking, or contexts are very different, or where a project is an acknowledged innovation or pilot, evaluation will need more resources. More selective evaluation designs, supported by grants or partnerships with other donors, would enable resources to be concentrated where they are most necessary for learning.
228. ***Revise IFAD's results measurement framework to include indicators of outcomes related to fragility.*** The major gaps are in measurement of women's empowerment and institutional performance. Indicators and means of measurement need to be established in both areas.

## Evaluation framework

### Objectives:

- (1) identify the explanatory factors that lie behind current performance in fragile states; and
- (2) generate a series of lessons learnt and recommendations that will assist the Board and IFAD management in deciding on the future strategic and operations directions of the Fund in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations.

<i>Main questions</i>	<i>Detailed questions</i>	<i>Sources of information</i>
<b>Relevance</b>		
How has IFAD's engagement to FCS changed over time and why? To what extent is the 2006 Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery relevant to FCS?		
To what extent have IFAD's COSOPs and projects been relevant and designed to be flexible in response to the constraints in FCS contexts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was the design of projects sensitive to available local resources and capacities? Were project designs adjusted on the basis of deepening understandings and changing needs?</li> </ul>	Analysis of new projects Country Case studies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were the choice of project objectives driven by an explicit analysis of what was needed to focus on key issues of weak governance, institutional capacity, vulnerability and resilience?</li> </ul>	Analysis of COSOPs Analysis of new projects Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did designs pay adequate attention to mitigating and responding to the risks of natural disasters and conflict, particularly local conflicts over access to natural resources</li> </ul>	Analysis of COSOPs Analysis of new projects Country Case studies
<b>Effectiveness</b>		
Has IFAD's approach to FCS resulted in better focused country strategies and projects with simpler objectives?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the characteristics of good and poor performance among FCS?</li> </ul>	Review of findings from other IFI and development organisations Portfolio analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were provisions for direct IFAD oversight and support effective?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff; government staff and implementation staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent was capacity building incorporated in project design?</li> </ul>	Analysis of new projects Country Case studies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was institution building well targeted and approached with clear expectations of how long IFAD's support would be required for its interventions to 'take'? Was that substantiated by experience?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff; government staff and implementation staff
<b>Efficiency</b>		
How have IFADs procedures and management been responsive to the contexts in FSC? Is IFAD endowed with institutional capacity and administrative tools to be responsive to FCS specificities? Is IFAD equipped to intervene in fragile situations in MICS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was appropriate use made of IFAD's financing instruments and co-financing opportunities?</li> </ul>	Analysis of new projects Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff

<i>Main questions</i>	<i>Detailed questions</i>	<i>Sources of information</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What attempts were made to reduce the administrative burden on the government (simpler procedures, use of government systems, efforts to better harmonize with other donors)?</li> </ul>	Analysis of new projects Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff; government staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What steps were taken to accelerate project processing and streamline fiduciary requirements?</li> </ul>	Analysis of new projects Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff; government staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How were setbacks and shortcomings handled in IFAD communications to the government, and within HQ?</li> </ul>	Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent has monitoring and evaluation contributed to flexible implementation?</li> </ul>	Analysis of COSOPs Analysis of new projects Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
<b>Impact</b>		
What evidence is there of impacts that tackle core issues in FSC?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What impacts can be claimed on food security, rural employment and incomes, land rights and NRM?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What impacts can be claimed on community and state institutions and the transparency of governance?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What impact did projects have on relationships between disadvantaged groups, including women, and those with power?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What were the consequences of such impacts on the disadvantaged: was their social position enhanced, or did they suffer as a result?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs; government staff; implementation staff; and beneficiaries
<b>Sustainability</b>		
Has IFAD's approach to FSC resulted in more sustainable outcomes for institutions and poor people?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What type of sustainability was being sought? (Project activities <i>per se</i>? the transfer of knowledge and experience to individuals? The creation of durable community or state-level organizations? Altered power relationships?).</li> </ul>	Analysis of new projects Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What efforts were made (at design, during implementation and after project completion) to analyse the project's wider lessons, and to disseminate/advocate for their uptake?</li> </ul>	Analysis of COSOPs Analysis of new projects Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
<b>Gender</b>		
Has IFAD's approach to country strategy and projects in FCS followed IFAD's strategy to introduce gender equality and women's empowerment?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have IFAD projects in FCS set monitorable objectives for female and male beneficiaries?</li> </ul>	Analysis of COSOPs Analysis of new projects Country Case studies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Does the M&amp;E system implemented in FCS include measurable indicators for progress in gender objectives?</li> </ul>	Analysis of COSOPs Analysis of new projects Country Case studies

<i>Main questions</i>	<i>Detailed questions</i>	<i>Sources of information</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have the gender objectives of the projects in FCS been achieved or are likely to be achieved?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the factors affecting project performance in achieving gender objectives in FCS?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
<b><i>Innovation and scaling up</i></b>		
Has IFAD's approach been innovative in responding to FCS challenges and are interventions likely to be scaled up?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent have IFAD's projects been innovative within the FCS context?</li> </ul>	Analysis of COSOPs Analysis of new projects Country Case studies
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did the innovation originate in the fragility context (e.g. through the beneficiaries, government, IFAD, NGOs, etc.) and was it adapted in any particular way during project/ programme design?</li> </ul>	Country Case studies Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are there plans for scaling up or has interested been expressed by any development partners?</li> </ul>	Interviews with CPMs and PMD staff

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## List of people met

### BiH Country Visit

- Bejta Ramovic, Head of Department, Ministry of Finance and Treasury
- Benjamin Torić, Farma project, USAID/Sida
- Branka Janko, Director, Zepce Development Agency (RAZ)
- Denis Jamak, Executive director for loans, LOK Microcredit Foundation
- Dzenan Basic, Cooperative Poljar, Zepce
- Dzenita Kulovac, Financial consultant, LOK Microcredit Foundation
- Emir Tutnic, Association of raspberry growers/ Cooperative, Zepce
- Gordana Prastalo, Head of the Department for foreign loans, Ministry of Finance of RS
- Igor Blagojević, Senior Adviser, Division for the Coordination and Mobilisation of International Aid, State Ministry of Finance & Treasury
- Joseph Guntern, Director of cooperation, Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)
- Maja Došenović, DEU
- Maid Suljakovic, Cooperative Poljar, Zepce
- Marijana Zovko, RAZ
- Martin Schieder, First Secretary
- Mirjana Karahasanović, Operations Officer, Agriculture and Rural Development, World Bank
- Miroljub Kronic, Assistant to Minister, Ministry of Finance and Treasury
- Natasha Miskin, Programme Officer, Sida
- Nevenka Dalać , Expert Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations
- Radenko Jeftic, APCU Director
- Slavko Dobrilović, Deputy President of Cooperative Union of BiH
- Slobodan Tadić, Senior Programme Coordinator, UNDP Sarajevo;
- Svjetlana Vukojcic , Expert Associate, Ministry of Finance and Treasury
- Vedad Nezirović, International Projects Coordinator, Federal Ministry of Finance
- Vedrana Ferri, Reporting officer, LOK Microcredit Foundation
- Yuri Afanasiev, Resident Representative , UNDP Sarajevo
- Zakira Virani, Coordinator Specialist, UNDP Sarajevo
- Zoran Kovacevic, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Agriculture of RS

### Brundi Country Visit

- Aline Munyameza, Conseillère à la Direction Générale des Droits de la personne humaine et du Genre, Ministère de la Solidarité
- Apollinaire Manirakiza, FENACOBU
- Apollinaire Masuguru, Assistant au FAO-REP, Représentation de la FAO au Burundi

- Anicet Nduwimana, Chargé de programmes, CAPAD
- Béatrice Ntahe, Spécialiste Genre des projets FIDA
- Bienvenu Djossa, Représentant du Programme Alimentaire Mondial
- Brice Mikponhoue, Chargé principal de programme pays, Banque Africaine de Développement
- Camille Nshimirimana, WISE
- Caritas Baramkariza, Directrice du Département de l'Egalité des Genres, Ministère de la Solidarité
- Damase Ntiranyibagira, Coordonnateur du projet PTRPC
- Daniella Icigeme, CECM
- Donatienne Girukwishaka, Directrice Générale de la Promotion de la Femme et de l'Egalité des Genres, Ministère de la Solidarité
- Egide Kamaranyota, Twitezembere
- Epérance Musirimu, Cadre d'appui finance rurale aux projets FIDA
- Ernest Ndikumana, Directeur Général de l'Aménagement du Territoire, et Protection du Patrimoine Foncier, Direction Générale de l'Aménagement du territoire, de l'Environnement et du Tourisme
- Fidès Nduwayo, Responsable de développement communautaire, CAPAD
- Francois Haragirimana, Responsable de la composante développement communautaire, ACORD
- Gaston Ndayismiye, Twitezembere
- Gérard Ndabemeye, Directeur Général de la Planification et Elevage, Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage
- Isabelle Moreira, Conseillère au Programme Spécialiste Technique, Santé Maternelle, Fonds des Nations Unies pour la Population Anicet Ndoricimpa, Point focal CAPAD/PRODEFI
- Jean Paul Bitoga, Coordonnateur du projet PRODEFI
- Jean-Marie Ndayishimiye, Coordonnateur technique, CAPAD
- Joseph Ndayishimiye, Point focal CAPAD/PAIVA-B
- Joseph Ntirandekura, Conseiller du Ministre des Finances et de la planification de développement économique, Point Focal pour la mission d'évaluation, Ministère des Finances
- Ladislav Hobotimara, OPP PRODEFI
- Mme Rehema Rashid, Responsable S&E PAIVA-B
- Paul Vossen, Ministre- Conseiller Chef de Section des Opérations de Coopération, Délégation de l'Union Européenne au Burundi
- Prime Rudiya, Directeur Pays, ACORD
- Rachidi.B.Rdji, Représentant de la Banque Mondiale
- Renovat Goragoza, Responsable développement rural, Programme Alimentaire Mondial

- Rym Ben Zid, Chargée de portefeuille Burundi, FIDA
- Salvator Mwaminifu, Responsable S&E PARSE
- Savir Nahimani, Cadre d'appui au PRODEFI
- Schamim Muhiteka, Chargée de finances rurales, CAPAD
- Victoire Bizindahi, UCODE
- Yves Minani, Consultant du bureau FIDA, et ancien coordonnateur du PRDMR

### **DRC Country Visit**

- Abdouramane Diaw, Chargée de Programme Pays, Africain Développement Bank
- Abel Léon Kalambayi, Secrétaire Général, Secrétariat General du développement rural
- Abwana A Mombula, Directeur Administratif et Financier, Service National de l'Hydraulique Rural
- Adam Malam, UN-Habitat
- Adolphe Dipoliso, Vice-président, Comité de gestion du Point d'eau de Yalolia
- Adolphina Koandja, Conseillère, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Alain Bononga, Chef d'Antenne, Service National de Vulgarisation District de la Tshopo
- Alain Constant, Chargé des opérations, FAO
- Alfred Kibangula, Coordonnateur National, Projet d'Appui à la Réhabilitation et à la relance du secteur Agricole (PARSSA)/Banque Mondiale
- Ali Ramazani, Secrétaire Général, Secrétariat General de l'Agriculture, pêche et Elevage
- Alpha Bwembe, Président UOPA Lukombe, UOPA
- Anna Posho, Conseillère, Association des femmes Veuves de Likango
- Antoine Roger Sumbela, Coordonnateur, PRAPE
- Augustin Loti, Trésorier, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Badjoko Djuma, Chercheur, Institut National de Recherche Agricole (INERA) de Yangambi
- Bamawa Lionko, Chercheur, Institut National de Recherche Agricole (INERA) de Yangambi
- Basosila Bondo, Inspecteur, Inspection de l'Agriculture Territoire d'Isangi
- Bassay Balomba, Inspecteur, Inspection du Développement Rural District de la Tshopo
- Bibicha Liatali, Secrétaire-adjointe, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Bienvenu Bukidi, Responsable du suivi et évaluation, PRAPO
- Bolota Bobenola, Inspecteur, Inspection du Développement Rural Territoire d'Isangi
- Césarine Losua, Vice-présidente, Association des filles-mères de Likango
- Charly Monzambe, Christian Aid

- Christophe Bokana, Coordonnateur Provincial, Service National des Semences
- Claudine Bayombe, Présidente, Association des filles-mères de Likango
- Clément Mbikayi, Coordonnateur adjoint de la Cellule de Suivi des Projets et Programmes financés par les partenaires extérieurs, Ministère des Finances
- David Lifenya, Coordonnateur Provincial, Service National de Mécanisation Agricole
- Detie Omba, Membre, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Edmond Bundutidi, Chef de Division de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural à la Direction des Secteurs Productifs, Ministère du Plan et Suivi de la Révolution de la Modernité/ Direction des Secteurs Productifs (DSP)
- Elisée Otondja, Modératrice, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Emmanuel Lobela, Président UOPA Kombe, UOPA
- Eric Willemaers, Attaché de coopération, Ambassade de Belgique
- Georges Thionza, Coordonnateur du Programme de Renforcement des Capacités de la Société Civile dans la Prévention et la Gestion des Conflits en Afrique Centrale (PROGESCO), Coordination de la Société Civile
- Guillaume Famba, Coordonnateur Provincial, Division des Voies de Desserte Agricole
- Hubert Petit, Chef de la section Gouvernance et droits de l'Homme, Délégation de l'Union Européenne
- Jacqueline Angeli, Chargée de suivi et évaluation, Service National de l'Information Rurale
- Jean-Baptiste Kadiata, Chargé du secteur de l'Agriculture et la gestion des ressources naturelles, Africain Développement Bank
- Jean Damas Bulubulu, Coordonnateur, PRAPO
- Joseph Lokondo, Président UOPA Turumbu, UOPA
- Joseph Kayawa, Responsable local, Projet d'Appui à la production végétale (APV/CTB)
- J.P. Liyeye, Inspecteur Provincial, Inspection Provinciale de l'Agriculture
- Kasongo Kasong, Directeur, Institut National de Recherche Agricole (INERA) de Yangambi Territoire d'Isangi
- Kathelyne Craenen, Attachée de coopération, Ambassade de Belgique
- Kolokota Jean, Vice-modérateur, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Liho-Li-Lombongo, Président UOPA Luete, UOPA
- Lilee Libote, Président UOPA Babelota, UOPA
- Lifenya Lofoli, Président UOPA Yalolia, UOPA
- Lifita Olinda, Animateur, OPB Nord
- Lilatemi Kisangani, Conseillère, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Lisalu Lisule, Secrétaire exécutif UOPA Bolomba, UOPA
- Lofu Tuta, Président UOPA Yaolia, UOPA

- Lokangu Solomo, Président UOPA Yawembe, UOPA
- Loula Bofetsha, Communicateur, Unions des Organisations des Producteurs (UOPA)
- Mago Takanyato, Directeur de cabinet, Ministère Provincial de l'Agriculture
- Maguy Mukidi, Christian Aid
- Marie Engulunguma, Présidente, Association des femmes Veuves de Likango
- Mélanie Lasom, Secrétaire permanent, Confédération des Paysans du Congo (COPACO)
- Michel Disonama, Assistant du Représentant, FAO
- Mischa Foxell, Program Manager, Conflit and Humanitarian Team, DFID
- Monique Mputu, Ancienne chargée de programme et consultante, Bureau pays FIDA
- Nathanaël Buka, Porte-parole National, Confédération des Paysans du Congo (COPACO)
- Owendingo Lolua, Coordonnateur Provincial, Service National de Statistique Agricole
- Paul Itata, Président UOPA Liutua, UOPA
- Placide Guwenda, Administrateur du Bureau de liaison des projets cofinancés par le FIDA, Secrétariat General de l'Agriculture, pêche et Elevage
- Rasha Omar, Chargée de Programme (CPM), Bureau pays FIDA
- Régine Bamungu, Secrétaire, Association des femmes Veuves de Likango
- Richard Azelipo, Inspecteur Provincial, Inspection Provinciale du Développement Rural
- Richard Kangisa, Coordonnateur Provincial a.i, Service National de l'Habitat Rural
- Roberta del Guidice, Chargée des programmes pour l'instrument de stabilité, Délégation de l'Union Européenne
- Rosalie Biuma, Vice-présidente du Conseil d'administration, Confédération Nationale des Paysans du Congo (CONAPAC)
- Sanduku Afindjelo, Président UOPA Yaliko, UOPA
- Sidro Bolukaoto, Conseiller, Club d'écoute Liloba de Lilanda
- Sylvain Ntumba, Directeur, INADES-Formations
- Sylvestre Kambaza, Secrétaire exécutif, Confédération Nationale des Paysans du Congo (CONAPAC)
- Taib Diallo, Senior Policy Advisor, MONUSCO : UN Mission in the D.R.Congo
- Theo Kanene, Directeur, Ministère du Plan et Suivi de la Révolution de la Modernité/Direction de la Coordination des Ressources Extérieures (DCRE)
- Thomas Kembola, Coordonnateur du Bureau de liaison des projets cofinancés par le FIDA, Secrétariat General de l'Agriculture, pêche et Elevage
- Victor Lobela, Coordonnateur Provincial, Service National de Vulgarisation
- Xaveria Adipoba, Coordonnateur Provincial, Service de la pêche en milieu rural

### **Eritrea Country Visit**

- Alemseghed Asgedom, Director General, Ministry of Agriculture
- Arefaine Berhe, Minister, Ministry of Agriculture
- Christine Umutoni, Resident Coordinator, UN
- Daniele Morbin, Programme Manager, Delegation of the European Commission
- Efreem Krestos, Governor, Debub Zoba Administration
- Eric Rwabidadi, Country Programme Manager, IFAD
- Goitem, NAP M&E Officer, Debub Zoba Administration
- Hailemichael Iyob, Director General, , Debub Zoba Administration
- Heruy Ashghedom, Director General, Ministry of Agriculture
- Iyassu, Director General, Ministry of Agriculture
- Menghis Samuel, Chairman, Eritrean National Chamber of Commerce
- Mesghina Ketema, NAP Programme Coordinator, Ministry of Agriculture
- Michael Haile, Zonal Programme Coordination Officer, Department of Agriculture, Northern Red Sea Zoba
- Michael Yohannes, NAP Coordinator, Debub Zoba Administration
- Misghina Okbaselassie, NAP M&E Officer, Ministry of Agriculture
- Mogos Woldeyohanes, Director General, Ministry of Environment
- Seid Mohammed, Programme Coordinator, FDP, Ministry of Marine Resources
- Taisier M. Ali, Director, Peace Building Centre for the Horn of Africa
- Teclé Alemseghed, Director General, Ministry of Marine Resources
- Tewelde Kelati, Minister, Ministry of Marine Resources
- Tewolde Woldemikael, Director General, Ministry of Marine Resources

### **Haiti Country Visit**

- Bruno Jacquet, Rural Development Specialist, Inter-american Development Bank
- Caroline Bidault, Rural Development Specialist, Inter-american Development Bank
- Christophe Grosjean, Agriculture Specialist, World Bank
- Elyse Gelin, Directrice de Cabinet, Ministère de la Condition Féminine et des Droits des femmes
- Esther Kasalu-Coffin, Country Programme Manager, IFAD
- Etzer Beauva, Directeur Exécutif de Ayiti Gouvènans
- Frits Ohler, FAO Representative in Haïti, FAO
- Gary Mathieu, Coordonnateur National, Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA)
- Georges Alexis, Chef de projet, Agro Action Allemande
- Guerdy Leandre, Directeur Exécutif de Firme & Associés
- Henriot Nader, Hydrotech
- Jean-Pierre Leandre, Coordonnateur de Firme & Associés

- Jean Thomas Ferdinand, Coordonnateur, Ministère de l'agriculture, des ressources naturelles et du développement rural (MARNDR)
- Lordis Bernard, Économiste et point focal de la mission d'évaluation, Membre de Cabinet du Ministre, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances
- Ludgie Saincima, Country Programme Assistant, IFAD
- Mahmoudou Issoufou-Wasmeier, Chef de Site Jean Rabel, Agro Action Allemande
- Marcelin Norvilus, Country Programme Officer, IFAD
- Marie Flore Monval-Bourgoin, Responsable Composante 1, PAIP
- Marie France A. Laleau, Directrice des Etudes Economiques, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances
- Marie Yanick Mezile, Ministre de la Condition Féminine et des Droits des femmes
- Merly Liburd, Responsable Administratif et Financier, MARNDR
- Michel Prémumé, Secrétaire d'État à la Planification, Ministère de la Planification et Coopération Externe
- Mirreille Benjamin, Responsable Composante 3, PAIP
- Nolès Abellard, Chargé de projets économiques du FAES pour le Centre
- Paula Cyr, Field Security Specialist, UNDP
- Paul Moise Gabriel, Deputy Director General, Fonds d'assistance économique et sociale (FAES)- Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives Productives (PAIP)
- Roeder Desliens, Cadre de terrain de BECSFARSA
- Sophie de Caen, Senior Country Director, UNDP Haiti
- Stanley Jean-Baptiste, Directeur du Bureau régional du Centre (FAES)
- Wendy Bigham, Deputy Country Director, Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM)

### **Nepal Country Visit**

- Bashu Aryal, Country Programme Officer, IFAD
- Bigyan Pradhan, Acting Country Director, World Bank Nepal Country Office
- Edward Bell, Conflict adviser, DFID Nepal
- Gobinda Neupane, Local Governance Coordinator, DFID Nepal
- Jean-François Cuénod Chargé d'Affaires a.i. and Head of Cooperation, SDC
- Nicole Menage, Country Director, World Food Programme
- Pradip Maharjan, CEO -Agro Enterprise Centre, Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- Raju Tuladhar, Senior Country Specialist, Nepal Resident Mission of the Asian Development Bank (AsDB Nepal)
- Sharada Jnawali, Peace Building Advisor, AsDB Nepal
- Sini Kukka-Maaria Korhonen, APO, IFAD
- Suman Subba, Senior Social Development Officer, AsDB Nepal
- Tika Limbu. Portfolio Management Unit Head, AsDB Nepal

### **Liberia Country Visit**

- Augustine Roberts, Agro –Business Consultant, Project Management Unit
- David K Yemeago, Project Manager, LAADCO

- Deroe A Weeks, Head of Unit, Food Security and Nutrition Department, Ministry of Agriculture
- Eddie Mulbah, Senior Technical Advisor, Peace Building Office
- Francis Wreh, Deputy Director General/Statistics and Data Processing, LISGIS
- John Perkins, Program Officer, Farmers Union-Liberia(FUN)
- Korley Armah, Loan and Investment Manager, LAADCO
- Mike Arthur Pay-Bayee, Executive Director, Land Commission
- Moses Zinnah, Director, Project Management Unit
- Patricl Krah, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Project Management Unit
- Princetta Clinton Varmah, Project Coordinator-STCRSP/ARSP/IT-67,Project Management Unit
- Sayba Tamba, Program Officer, Food Security and Nutrition Department, Ministry of Agriculture
- Stanley Toe, Senior Program Officer, Land Commission
- Thoe Addey, New Deal Focal Person, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

### **Philippine Country Visit**

- Andrew Brubaker, Senior Evaluation Specialist, Independent Evaluation Department, ADB
- Sirpa Jarvenpaa, Director, Operations Planning and Coordination Division, Strategy and Policy Department, ADB
- Kharmina Anit, Researcher, RUPES III, IRRI
- Digna O Manzanilla, CURE Coordinator, IRRI
- Felixberto Lansigim, Head Technical Staff, INREMP
- Diquielle D Gabriel, Administrative Aid and PA, INREMP
- Yolando Arban, Country Programme Officer, IFAD
- Vivian Azore, Country Programme Assistant, IFAD
- Stella Laureano, Director, Department of Finance
- Yrah Kriselle David
- Nelson Ambart, Desk Officer, IFAD
- Louis Berger, Group Vice President Charlie Feibel , USAID-funded Growth with Equity for Mindanao (GEM)
- Susan Warren-Mercado , Coordinator for Multilateral and Bilateral Agencies, OPARR Multi/Bilateral Office
- Carol Geron-Figueroa, Portfolio Manager, World Bank
- Maria Theresa G. Quiñones
- Joey Virtucio
- Manny Gerochi, DENR USec
- Felixberto Lansigim, Head technical Staff, INREMP
- Amie Rabang, Project Manager INREMP

- Luisito G. Montalbo, Executive Director, OPAPP USec
- Patrick B. Safran Principal Operations Coordination Specialist, ADB
- Cyrel San Gabriel, Consultant, ADB
- Chongshan Liu, Principal Economist, ADB
- Guido Geissler, ADB
- Erlinda F. Dolatre, Senior Adviser, Policy Dialogue and Strategic Steering, GIZ
- Rogelio G. Borbon, former manager, WMCIP
- Virginia Verora, former Deputy Manager, NMCIREMP
- Cameron Odsey, Project Manager CHARMP2
- John Ray Libiran, OIC Regional Director, NCIP
- Jezl Rafols-Boado, Technical Staff, NCIP
- Raul Montemayor, National Manager federation of Free Farmers
- Ruperto Alerosa, Chaiman, National Union of Rural Based Organisations (PKSK)
- Ernesto Prieto, National Secretary, Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura (KMA)
- Dionicio Antonio, National Vice-President, Aniban ng Manggagawa at Magsasaka sa Niyugan (AMMANI)
- Francisco (Pancho) Lara, Country Director, International Alert
- Nikki Philline C. de la Rosa, Programme Manager
- Ruel Punongbayan, Project Support Officer
- Beh Afable, DAR Director
- Susan Perez, Desk Officer
- Ma Cristina C Dagdag, Project Development Officer
- Gina Cantano-dela Cruz, Assistant Secretary, NAPC
- Patrocinio Jude H Esguerra III, Undersecretary, NAPC
- Jessica Reyes Cantos, Head executive Assistant, NAPC
- Klarise Espinosa, Researcher, NAPC
- Esther Penunia, Secretary-General of Asean Farmers Alliance/AFA, the regional implementer of IFAD-FAO MTCP
- Senen C. Bacani, President and Chairman La Frutera, former Secretary of DA
- Aristeo A. Portugal, Assistant FAO Representative, FAO
- Marlea P. Muñoz, Executive Director, NCIP
- Marie Grace T. Pascua, NCIP-OSESSC
- Carlos P Buasen Jr., NCIP-OECH
- Jeanette D. Manuel, ADO
- Che-Loir U. Menendez, ADO
- Agustin C Panganiban, RMD-ADO
- ANGO Antonio B. Quizon, Chairperson

- Nathaniel Don E. Marquez, Executive Director
- USec Fred Serrano, DA
- Renato P Manantan, Project Director RUMEPP
- Mohagher Iqbal, BTC Chair
- Fatmawati Salapuddin , Commissioner
- Cheryll B. Tienzo, MES, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
- Mark Pagulayan, RDS
- Kathleen Virtusio, ODDG-IP
- Maria Luisa R. Magbojos, PLS
- Calixto M Mangilin, PLS
- Florante G Igtiben, PLS
- Violeta S Corpus
- Jean R Centen, ANRES
- Tamara Palis, ANRES
- Sally Almendrin, MES.

#### **Sudan Country Visit**

- Abdelfattah Khairelseed, Financial Officer, International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Abdellatif Nasir, Director of Statistics and Information Division, Macro Policies and Planning Administration, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Abd Elatti Jabir Deputy General Director, Macro Policies and Planning Administration, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Abdelrahim Salih, Pastoralist Coordinator, SOS Sahel Sudan
- Abdi Adan Jama, Country Representative FAO
- Adam Hashim, Programme Officer, Islamic Relief Agency
- Adil Osman Idris , Partnerships Director, International Cooperation, Federal Ministry of Agriculture
- Adnan Khan, Country Director, Sudan WFP
- Amal Ahmed El Hassan, Director of Studies and Research Division, Macro
- Ammar Idris, Director of Planning, Ministry of Livestock Fisheries and Range
- Anwar Hassan, M&E Officer, Islamic Relief Agency
- Elanan Mohamed, Financial officer, International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- El Amin Hassan, Director General, Administration of International Cooperation of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture
- El Fadul Ahmed Ishag, Programme Support Officer, IFAD
- Esther Loeffen, Deputy Head, Netherlands Embassy in Sudan
- Faiza Awad, General Administration Director Macro Policies and Planning Administration, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

- Fathia Sayed, Director, Planning and Macro Policies Division, Macro Policies and Planning Administration, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Ahmed Gabir, Subahi, Country Programme Officer, IFAD
- Fatima Ahmed, President, ZENAB for Women Development Organizations
- Hani Abdelkader Elsadani, Country Programme Manager, Sudan IFAD
- Hassan Makkawi, M&E officer, Ministry of Livestock Fisheries and Range
- Hisham Alkurdi Procurement officer, Revitalizing The Sudan Gum Arabic Production and Marketing Project
- Hyder ElSafi, Secretary General , High Council for Environment and Natural Resources Management
- Ibrahim Rahimtalla Hamad, Programme Coordinator, Revitalizing The Sudan Gum Arabic Production and Marketing Project
- Iris Wielders, Conflict Adviser, DFID
- Ismail Ewali, Project Coordinator, SOS Sahel Sudan
- Izzaladin Ahmed Eltayeb, States Development Administration, International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Joachim Knoth, First Counsellor, EU Delegation
- Kenneth Onyango, Country Programme Officer, Sudan AfDB
- Mohamed A Barre, Regional Statistician, FAO
- Mohamed Abdelgadir, former CPO, Sudan IFAD
- Mohamed Attallah Development Officer, International Cooperation, Federal Ministry of Agriculture
- Mohamad Hussein , Independent consultant
- Mohamed Yousif, Programme Coordinator, Western Sudan Resources Management Programme
- Mohamed Elhag, Senior Coordinator, IFAD Co-financed Projects, Government of the Sudan
- Mosliem Ahmed Alamir, Senior Economist, World Bank Osman Omar, Abdalla Director of the Technical Sector, Forestry National Corporation
- Motaz Osman Adam, Organization Manager, International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Omar Mohamed Awad Elsed, Programme Coordinator, Sinnar State Project
- Omer Elhag, Poverty Programme Analyst, UNDP
- Omer Elhaj, Director General, International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Pontus Ohrsted, Head of Conflict Prevention, UNDP
- Rashid Abdel Aziz, MUSAAD Programme Coordinator, Butana Integrated Rural Development Project and Rural Access Project
- Salih Abdelmajid, Executive Director, SOS Sahel Sudan
- Salih Khalil, Development Specialist, International Cooperation, Federal Ministry of Agriculture

- Somaia Ali Mohamed, Loans & grants monitoring officer, International Cooperation, Federal Ministry of Agriculture
- Sudan, Siham Bolad Programme Officer, Islamic Relief Agency
- Susanna, Blankhart, Ambassador, Netherlands Embassy
- Suwareh Darbo, Country Economist, Sudan Programme, AfDB
- Tarig S. Mohamed, Project Manager, ZENAB for Women Development Organizations
- Wail Fahmi Badawi, Head of Modelling Division, Macro Policies and Planning Administration, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Yousif Elyahir, Senior Economist, Sudan Programme AfDB
- Yvonne Helle, Country Director, Sudan UNDP
- Zahour Badawi, Ahmed Finance officer – Policies Division, Macro Policies and Planning Administration, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- Zahrha Amir, IFAD Desk Senior Officer, International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

### **Tunisia Country Visit**

- Abdalal El Raobhi, HE Commissioner of Agriculture, The Governorate o Zaghoun
- Adel Messaoudi, Vice President / Information Chief, Union Tunisia de Agriculture et de la Peche (UTAP)
- Ahmed Bougacha, Assistant FAO Rep Tunisia ( Programmes), FAO Sub Regional Office for NA
- Ali SHEkeirian, The Governorate o Zaghoun
- Cherifa Ben Nasr, IFAD Focal Point, Tunisian Central Bank
- Didier Bardaquer, Charge de Project Environnement/Development, Agence Francaise de Development
- Eileen Murray, Resident Country Programme Manager, Banque Mondiale Tunisie
- El Bakhti, President PDA Geradu, The Governorate o Zaghoun
- El Hadi El Abed, Zaghoun Project Director and Zaghoun Agriculture Commisionary Accountant, The Governorate o Zaghoun
- El Habib Salim, President of PDA Suraiba, The Governorate o Zaghoun
- Faouzeya El Reweisi, Head of Community Development, The Governorate o Zaghoun
- Ghoya Fatnassi, AVFA (Agric Extension), Ministry of Agriculture
- Hajer Chalouati Sous, Directeur General, Directorate Multilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Development and International Cooperation
- Haykal El Ghodbane, Head Payments of foreign financial resources, Tunisian Central Bank
- Kalthoum Hamzaoui, Directeur General, Foreign Financing and Loans, Ministry of Development and International Cooperation
- Kamal El Dridi, Project Manager, the Governorate of Silian

- Khalifa Sboui, DG Ajoint, Bank Tunisienne de Soldirarite
- Lamia Gemali, Directirce DEFIOP ( nvestment),Ministry of Agriculture
- Matthieu Le Grix, Charge de Mission, Agence Francaise de Development
- Mohamed Tolba, Agriculture Economiste, North Africa, Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD)
- Mohammed Bengoumi, Animal Production & Health Officer, FAO Sub Regional Office for NA
- Mohamed Tahrani, Director of basic infrastructure, Minstry of Development and International Cooperation
- Nabiha Fibli, DGPA (Agricultural productions), Ministry of Agriculture
- Nabil Hamada, Biodiversity Focal Point, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development
- Nadia Arfarin, DG/ ACTA ( soil conservation), Ministry of Agriculture
- Nouredddine Nasr, Plant production Protection office and gender focal point, FAO Sub Regional Office for NA
- Sabria Bnoui, GEF Focal Point for Tunisia, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development
- Samia Saeed, Deputy Director Payments of foreign financial resources, Tunisian Central Bank

## Fragile states and situations

Table 1 Fragile country classification

<i>Always Fragile</i>	<i>Partially Fragile</i>	<i>Never Fragile</i>
Afghanistan,	Bangladesh #	Albania
Angola,	Benin #	Argentina
Burundi	Bosnia and Herzegovina,	Armenia
Central African Republic,	Cambodia §	Azerbaijan
Chad,	Cameroon §	Belize
Comoros,	Djibouti §	Bhutan #
Congo D.R,	Equatorial Guinea	Bolivia
Congo Republic,	Ethiopia #	Botswana
Cote d'Ivoire	Gambia, The §	Brazil
Eritrea,	Georgia,	Burkina Faso #
Guinea Bissau	Iran,	Cape Verde
Guinea,	Iraq	Chile
Haiti	Kenya #	China
Kosovo,	Kiribati §	Colombia
Liberia,	Korea D.R,	Costa Rica
Myanmar	Kyrgyzstan #	Cuba
Sierra Leone,	Lao, People's Republic of §	Cyprus
Solomon islands,	Libya,	Dominica
Somalia	Malawi #	Dominican Republic
Sudan,	Mali #	Ecuador
Timor-Leste,	Marshall islands #	Egypt
Togo,	Mauretania#	El Salvador
West Bank and Gaza*	Micronesia FS #	Gabon
Zimbabwe*	Nauru	Ghana #
	Nepal §	Grenada
	Niger #	Guatemala
	Nigeria,	Guyana #
	Pakistan	Honduras #
	Palau,	India
	Papua New Guinea	Indonesia
	Rwanda #	Jordan
	Sao Tome & Principe §	Lebanon
	Senegal #	Lesotho #
	Seychelles	Macedonia FYR
	South Sudan,	Madagascar #
	Sri Lanka #	Maldives

<i>Always Fragile</i>	<i>Partially Fragile</i>	<i>Never Fragile</i>
	Syria	Mauritius
	Tajikistan §	Mexico
	Tonga §	Moldova #
	Tuvalu #	Mongolia #
	Uganda #	Morocco
	Vanuatu §	Mozambique #
	Yemen §	Namibia
	Zambia #	Nicaragua #
		Panama
		Paraguay
		Peru
		Philippines
		Romania
		Samoa #
		St Lucia
		St Vincent & the Grenadines
		Suriname
		Swaziland
		Tanzania #
		Thailand
		Tunisia
		Turkey
		Uruguay
		Venezuela
		Viet Nam
WB IDA 22	WB IDA 12 §	WB IDA
IFAD 24	IFAD 44	IFAD 61
IFAD-only marked with *	Countries listed as partial fragile by both IDA and IFAD marked § 17 considered sometimes fragile by IFAD are classed never fragile by WB# (2013 evaluation). Also includes MICs	Classed never fragile by WB marked # List includes MICs

Table 2 **Fragile states and situations 2013**

Characteristic	APR	NEN	ESA	WCA	LAC	Sum/Cum
<b>Fragile States</b>						
CPIA =<3.2	Afghanistan	Sudan	Somalia	Chad	Haiti	23
<b>1</b>	Marshall Islands	Yemen	Eritrea	Central African Republic	1	
	Kiribati	2	Zimbabwe			
	Solomon Islands		Comoros	Congo DR		
	Timor Leste		Angola	Cote d'Ivoire		
	Tuvalu		Burundi	Togo		
	6		6	Guinea Bissau		
				Guinea		
				Congo Republic		
				8		
Presence of P/Pk	Nepal	Kosovo	South Sudan	Sierra Leone	0	11/34
<b>2</b>	Cambodia	Bosnia & Herzegovina	1	Liberia		
	2			2		
		Iraq				
		Libya				
		Syria				
		West Bank & Gaza				
		6				
<b>States with other aspects of fragility</b>						
Additional OECD list used by IFAD	Bangladesh	Georgia	Ethiopia	Cameroon	0	16/50
<b>3</b>	Korea DR	Iran	Kenya	Niger		
	Kyrgyzstan	2	Malawi	Nigeria		
	Pakistan		Rwanda	3		
	Sri Lanka		Uganda			
	(Myanmar)		5			
	6					
Additional FSI countries >=80 (Critical & above)	Tajikistan	Egypt	Zambia	Burkina Faso	Colombia	24/74
<b>4</b>	Papua New Guinea	Lebanon	Swaziland	Mauritania	Bolivia	
	Laos	2	Djibouti	Mali	Guatemala	
	Philippines		Mozambique	Equatorial Guinea	3	
	Bhutan		Madagascar	Gambia		
	China		Tanzania	Senegal		
	8		6	6		
Additional states with Heidelberg conflict ratings 3, 4, 5	Indonesia	Azerbaijan	0	0	Nicaragua	23/97
<b>5</b>	India	Moldova			Ecuador	
	Thailand	Tunisia			Honduras	
	3	Turkey			Venezuela	

<i>Characteristic</i>	<i>APR</i>	<i>NEN</i>	<i>ESA</i>	<i>WCA</i>	<i>LAC</i>	<i>Sum/Cum</i>
		Morocco			El Salvador	
		Armenia			Mexico	
		Romania			Peru	
		Jordan			Paraguay	
		8			Brazil	
					Panama	
					Argentina	
					Chile	
					12	
<b>Sub total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>96</b>
All other countries with no fragility or conflict assessment	Maldives	Albania	Botswana	Benin	Belize	20
	Mauritius	Algeria	Lesotho	Cape Verde	Dominican republic	
	Mongolia	Macedonia		Gabon	Grenada	
	Tonga			Ghana	Guyana	
<b>6</b>	Viet Nam			Sao Tome	Uruguay	

Countries in blue highlight are also at Extreme risk of either natural disasters or climate change vulnerability (Listed in Annex to IFAD 2011 Disaster Recovery EB 2011/102/R.29).

## Analysis of Quality at Entry ratings

Table 3 2008-2009

<i>% of projects rated satisfactory<sup>91</sup></i>	<i>Overall quality of design</i>	<i>Overall effectiveness of thematic areas</i>	<i>Rural employment and enterprise</i>	<i>Empowerment</i>	<i>Gender equity and targeting</i>	<i>Overall projected impact on poverty</i>
Always fragile	80	90	88	80	89	90
Partial fragile	100	100	100	100	96	100
Never fragile	93	93	96	90	89	90

Table 4 2010-2014

<i>% of projects rated satisfactory</i>	<i>Overall quality of design</i>	<i>Overall effectiveness of thematic areas</i>	<i>Rural employment and enterprise</i>	<i>Empowerment</i>	<i>Gender equity and targeting</i>	<i>Overall projected impact on poverty</i>
Always fragile	83	93	87	97	93	97
Partial fragile	91	97	95	91	88	91
Never fragile	92	96	95	97	95	100

Table 5 Overall quality of project design

<i>% of projects rated satisfactory</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>N=</i>
Always fragile	50	88	86	89	80	50	86	40
Partial fragile	100	100	100	85	78	93	100	106
Never fragile	94	97	94	94	90	100	85	80
<i>N=</i>	29	33	36	38	35	28	30	226 <sup>92</sup>

### Findings:

The always fragile countries have the lowest scores for overall quality of design, overall effectiveness of thematic areas and rural employment and enterprise across both time periods.

<sup>91</sup> Following current practice, this is taken to be scores 4, 5 and 6.

<sup>92</sup> The full database consist of 229 records and includes 3 projects in countries not rated for fragility: South Africa and Uzbekistan.

The same always fragile countries have the lowest scores for overall quality of design in four of the seven years for which data are available. Three of these are the early years so there may be a trend of improvement.

Table 6 Overall quality of project design

<i>% of projects rated 5 or 6</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>N=</i>
Always fragile	50	50	43	44	60	0	14	40
Partial fragile	63	71	55	46	33	73	60	106
Never fragile	83	64	50	69	58	55	46	80
<i>N=</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>226<sup>93</sup></i>

The low ratings of projects in countries that are always fragile is seen more clearly if ratings of 4, moderately satisfactory are excluded. Projects in always fragile countries have the lowest percentage in 5 of the seven years. Overall one third (35 per cent) of projects are rated 4 for overall quality and more of these (43 per cent) are in always fragile countries compared with partial fragile (35 per cent) and never fragile (31 per cent).

<sup>93</sup> The full database consist of 229 records and includes 3 projects in countries not rated for fragility: South Africa and Uzbekistan.

## Analysis from project status reports

1. To examine performance by projects designed after the 2006 policy, a similar analysis was prepared using the self-assessment data in IFAD's project status reports. Tables 7 and 8 present the findings, which include comparison with the year 2004, before the policies.

Table 7 **Percentage satisfactory projects by fragility persistence**

Percentage rated satisfactory (4, 5, 6)	Likelihood of achieving Development Objectives (DO)			Overall Implementation Progress (IP)			
	Year	2004	2009	2013	2004	2009	2013
Always fragile		64	84	86	73	84	84
Partial fragile		72	88	85	72	83	84
Never fragile		100	85	89	100	88	82
Number of projects		89	214	269	89	214	269

2. The category of 'Always fragile' was the lowest rating only in 2004, before the policies. No project in an Always fragile country was rated 1 or 6 in any of the years (but 3 projects in Partial Fragile countries were rated 6 and two were rated 1). The data indicate a significant improvement after 2004 for both DO and IP in Always Fragile and Partial Fragile but less evidently between 2009 and 2013. Performance in the 'Never Fragile' group shows no visible change.

Table 8 **Percentage satisfactory projects by fragility classification**

Percentage rated satisfactory (4, 5, 6)	Likelihood of achieving Development Objectives			Overall Implementation Progress			
	Year	2004	2009	2013	2004	2009	2013
1 CPIA =<3.2		56	84	86	64	87	84
2 Presence of P/Pk		80	87	70	80	87	75
3 Additional OECD list		69	87	90	69	79	88
4 Additional FSI countries >=80 (Critical & above)		91	90	85	94	88	84
5 Additional with Heidelberg conflict ratings 3, 4, 5		100	82	98	100	91	85
6 All other countries		100	86	78	100	82	74
Number of projects		89	214	269	89	214	269

3. Performance in the core fragile countries with low CPIA shows a marked improvement after 2004 but in the other categories no clear trend emerges.
4. Interpretation of these data is complicated. PSR ratings are made at least once every year and reflect the most recent observations of performance, which can fluctuate considerably over the project life cycle. However, they provide snapshots of the portfolio, in this case at three points in time.
5. Table 13 analyses the distribution of problem projects against persistence of fragility. The percentage of projects classified as having an Actual Problem is highest for the 'Always Fragile' category in two of the three years, but by a small

amount. The proportion of projects at risk was significantly lower for the never fragile category in 2004 but has since risen to be close to the group of 'Partial Fragile' countries. The overall proportion of projects at risk reduced after 2004 but data are very similar for 2009 and 2013. In all years the percentage of problem projects does not vary materially according to fragility status, which suggests factors other than drivers of fragility are responsible.

Table 9 **Analysis of projects at risk**

% Projects at risk	2004		2009		2013	
	Potential Problem	Actual Problem	Potential Problem	Actual Problem	Potential Problem	Actual Problem
Always fragile	9	36	0	23	7	16
Partial fragile	3	34	5	18	3	17
Never fragile	0	0	2	18	4	18

## Report of the senior independent advisor

### Introduction

1. This corporate level evaluation (CLE) is timely. Addressing the problems of fragile states and situations is key to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals currently being finalized by the United Nations. Forty percent of the absolute poor live in fragile states. Overcoming the obstacles that they face while striving to improve human livelihoods is the crux of the international development challenge.
2. IFAD has a distinctive role to play towards implementation of the post 2015 development agenda. Creative and innovative IFAD operations especially in fragile contexts can contribute to the elimination of poverty (Goal 1); help achieve food security; reduce malnutrition and promote sustainable agriculture (Goal 2); promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth and help generate productive employment for all (Goal 8) as well as promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development (Goal 16).

### Methodology

3. Due to resource constraints the authors of the CLE did not undertake a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as originally envisaged in the Approach Paper<sup>94</sup>. Nor did they use is theory based country reviews that would have helped to differentiate between fragility indicators (capacity, legitimacy, governance and resilience) and their consequences (economic stagnation, growing inequality, civil strife, violence)<sup>95</sup>. Also missing from the CLE is an independent re-assessment of project level performance ratings<sup>96</sup>. Nevertheless the mixed methods, surveys and analyses included in the CLE have proved serviceable and fit for purpose.

### The performance dimension of fragility

4. The CLE appropriately challenges the usefulness of the all encompassing fragile states definition adopted by IFAD. It is so broad that it cannot be used to frame staff incentives or budget allocations. The CLE also includes a decisive review of the association between state fragility criteria and IFAD project performance ratings.
5. The analysis shows convincingly that, except for a small group of highly disadvantaged countries, independent and self evaluation performance ratings are not significantly worse in the states currently classified as fragile by IFAD.
6. This finding refutes a widespread myth originally put forward by management as a rationale for the CLE.

### Risk management vs. risk avoidance

7. Taking account of the policy research finding that aid to vulnerable countries is cost effective and considering that goal based performance ratings at completion do not allow comparison of net benefits across projects<sup>97</sup> it would be prudent (pending further and more detailed analyses) to privilege the most fragile states in IFAD lending allocations.
8. Traditional performance based allocation formulas encourage risk avoidance in circumstances that would justify high risk/ high reward lending. An important test of IFAD operational relevance to its fragile member states would be a concrete

<sup>94</sup> A QCA based on the CLE country case studies would have allowed a rigorous, results based test of the conflict sensitivity of COSOPs.

<sup>95</sup> The generic theory of change included in the report is deficient. It does not challenge the tautological assumptions that underlie an IFAD policy framework that merely assumes that provided COSOPs focus on the right issues and that good work follows development effectiveness will follow impact

<sup>96</sup> Using the DAC evaluation criteria for conflict prevention and peace building operations instead of relying on IFAD's routine self evaluation ratings would have been instructive.

<sup>97</sup> In particular, operational benefits associated with conflict prevention are not adequately captured by IFIs' project performance criteria.

demonstration that IFAD is doing its part to contribute to rectifying the imbalance of aid flows given which, according to DAC, half of all ODA to fragile states goes to only seven "donor darlings".

### **The policy framework**

9. The CLE includes a thorough examination of the policy framework for IFAD's work in fragile states and situations. It stresses the need to draw transparent distinctions between natural emergencies and human made disasters. Beyond broad policy principles it points to the need for detailed operational guidance drawing on operational experience and policy research findings that highlight youth unemployment, natural resource mismanagement, regional inequality, unfair land policies and corrupt administrations as drivers of violent conflict.
10. Simplicity in project objectives is praised by the existing policy framework. Yet fragility is associated with conflict and uncertainty which are key ingredients of complexity. Simplicity in such circumstances is hard to achieve at design stage. More useful would be greater emphasis on adaptability and tailor made approaches. As highlighted by a WIDER working paper<sup>98</sup>, the theories of change that guide interventions should be context specific and draw on historical, cultural, political and social analyses to identify the proper ways in which specific problems (and possible solutions) can be overcome.

### **The imperative of partnership**

11. The CLE stresses the need for greater reliance on partnerships. There is little doubt that coherence, complementarity and coordination should have pride of place ) in the design of evaluative country and thematic strategies in fragile countries and situations. IFAD has a lot to offer to other partners at all phases on the conflict cycle. Conversely IFAD could make fuller use of conflict sensitivity analyses carried out by other agencies.
12. Delineating distinct operational stances for IFAD at various stages of the conflict cycle should be clarified in the revised policy framework. This would *inter alia* require IFAD to join multi-donor coalitions that help fragile countries recover following a conflict, e.g. in the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life following the demobilisation and disarmament phases.

### **Conclusion**

13. The CLE is a useful, comprehensive and well documented report. It deserves careful review and prompt follow up by IFAD's board and management following a fulsome debate.

**Robert Picciotto, Senior Independent Evaluation Adviser.**

<sup>98</sup> <file:///C:/Users/Robert/Downloads/wp2014-097.pdf>.