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**A**



تمكين السكان الريفيين الفقراء  
من التغلب على الفقر

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([evaluation@ifad.org](mailto:evaluation@ifad.org))

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Ashwani Muthoo  
Inder Sud ( ) Basil Kavalsky :  
( ) Marc de Sousa ( )  
Jicheng Zhang Oanh Nguyen ( )  
Kendra White Katrin Aidnell  
Anne-Marie Lambert Luciano Lavizzari)  
(Cecile Berthaud Miguel Torralba Andrew Brubaker Fabrizio Felloni  
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Robert Picciotto Namanga Ngongi  
Kings College

*Luciano Lavizzari :*

*Ashwani Muthoo :*

*Basil Kavalsky :*

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## التقييم المؤسسي لاستراتيجية الصندوق في تنمية القطاع الخاص وإرساء الشراكات

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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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## APPENDIX 1

## Definition of Evaluation Criteria Used by IFAD Office of Evaluation

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition<sup>a</sup></i>
<b>Project performance</b>	
• Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project coherence in achieving its objectives.
• Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
• Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
<b>Rural poverty impact<sup>b</sup></b>	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
• Household income and assets	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
• Human and social capital and empowerment	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
• Food security and agricultural productivity	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
• Natural resources and the environment and climate change	The focus on NRE involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of NRE. It also assesses any impacts projects may have in adapting to and/or mitigating climate change effects.
• Institutions and policies	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
<b>Other performance criteria</b>	
• Sustainability	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
• Promotion of pro-poor innovation, replication and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
• Gender	This criterion assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
<b>Overall project achievement</b>	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
<b>Performance of partners</b>	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner's expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.
• IFAD	
• Government	
• Cooperating institution	
• NGO/CBO*	
*community-based organization	

a. These definitions have been taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).

b It is important to underline that the new manual also deals with the “lack of intervention”. That is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or the mention “not applicable”) is assigned.

**APPENDIX 2**



**Document of the  
International Fund for Agricultural Development**

**IFAD's Engagement with the Private Sector  
in Rural Poverty Reduction**

**Corporate-level Evaluation**

**Approach Paper**

**17 May 2010**

**Office of Evaluation**



## I. Background

### A. Changing perception of the role of the private sector in rural poverty reduction

1. The involvement of government in the rural economy began in colonial times and was carried over into post-colonial states. There was a perception that market failures and the diseconomies of scale of small farmers called for a major presence on the part of government, extending in Communist societies to the production process itself and, in other countries, to a mix of state marketing boards to supply inputs and market outputs at controlled prices, and a range of supporting institutions: government research and extension services, and specialized agricultural development banks.

2. Until the late 1970s, these perceptions of the need for large-scale government intervention, and not only in agriculture but in all sectors of the economy, dominated the development paradigm. Five-year development plans continued to assign a dominant role to government, whereas the private sector was given a limited role and often with a degree of suspicion about whether or not it had the necessary commitment to the public good. Closed economy, import-substitution models still prevailed despite the advancing 'East Asian Miracle'. Capital transfers were still predominantly public-sector driven, and export-led growth was just gaining acceptance. The idea that the private sector should lead economic development in terms of investment, innovation and employment generation was appropriate for developed nations but government planning and direct involvement was needed in poor countries.

3. Over the past 30 years, the paradigm has shifted. Most governments have now withdrawn from direct production for the market in agriculture and manufacturing through the privatization of enterprises, including, in many cases, banking institutions. In many countries, even infrastructure has become privately owned or managed to some degree. The major role of government has shifted from being a direct investor and player to that of creating an enabling environment of appropriate policies and institutions that encourage the private sector to be the engine of growth. This paradigm shift is encapsulated in the Report of the 2003 United Nations Commission on the Private Sector and Development (see Box 1 below).

4. Before this change in the general paradigm, the small farm sector, perhaps the largest private-sector activity in most developing countries was dominated by government activities in production, markets and investments. The past 10-15 years have seen an acceleration of this shift as it impacts the small farm sector. A number of areas of significant change may be identified, including: (i) in most countries, the full-scale retreat of the state from rural marketing activities; (ii) increased private provision of agricultural services and technologies; (iii) the exponential increase in private remittances; (iv) more dynamic private agribusiness sectors in some regions; (v) the supermarket revolution, especially in Latin America; (vi) the advent of new microcredit channels in rural areas; and (vii) the growing role of private foundations and public-private partnerships in development assistance.

5. Reflecting these changes, in 2005, IFAD prepared a new private-sector strategy document<sup>1</sup>, which noted that only in the past 10-20 years has "... *the economic environment within which the rural poor seek their livelihood ... changed substantially in many developing countries*". In Africa and Eastern Europe "...*governments that used to play a key role in the organization of economic relations have now largely withdrawn from productive activities*". In Asia, traditional government involvement in the provision of inputs and in purchasing and/or fixing prices in product markets has been subjected to market forces and competition from the private sector. "*In Latin America as well, economic reforms over the last two decades have meant that productive economic activities – including the provision of rural services, once dominated by state organizations – have been opened up to the market*".

<sup>1</sup> IFAD's Private-Sector Development and Partnership Strategy (document EB 2005/84/R.4/Rev.1).

6. The aforementioned private-sector strategy document goes on to argue that *"In this new and dynamic global environment, the role of the private sector is becoming ever more important. The private sector provides most income-generating activities and job-creation opportunities, and is increasingly becoming the driving force for economic growth and poverty reduction. IFAD's target groups (i.e. small farmers, herders, woman-headed households, rural wage-earners, rural micro entrepreneurs and small agricultural traders) represent a large part of the private sector in developing countries; and rural poor people interact on a daily basis with other private operators in order to access resources, buy inputs, use technology, receive services, obtain credit, or sell their services and products"*.

### **Box 1: Report of the United Nations Commission on the Private Sector and Development**

As late as 2003, the Secretary-General of the United Nations felt the need to appoint a commission on the private sector and development. The report issued in March of 2004 made a strong case for the importance of the private sector in poverty reduction.

*"The Commission believes that any approach to private-sector development—and the policy and action recommendations that accompany it—should be grounded in the realization that the savings, investment and innovation that lead to development are undertaken largely by private individuals, corporations and communities."*

*"Small and medium enterprises can be engines of job creation—seedbeds for innovation and entrepreneurship. But in many poor countries, small and medium enterprises are marginal in the domestic ecosystem. Many operate outside the formal legal system, contributing to widespread informality and low productivity. They lack access to financing and long-term capital, the base that companies are built on."*

*"This report is about walking into the poorest village on market day and seeing entrepreneurs at work. It is about realizing that the poor entrepreneur is as important a part of the private sector as the multinational corporation. It is about acknowledging that the private sector is already central to the lives of the poor and has the power to make those lives better. It is about using the managerial, organizational and technological innovation that resides in the private sector to improve the lives of the poor."*

*"It is about unleashing the power of local entrepreneurs to reduce poverty in their communities and nations. Entrepreneurship flourishes perhaps most in small and medium firms with significant potential to grow and innovate. This dynamic segment is typically the hotbed of entrepreneurship and innovation. It can drive economic growth, create jobs and foster competition, innovation and productivity"*.

7. There are, however, challenges: new markets do not always evolve in ways that allow small rural producers and entrepreneurs to capture the opportunities that might open up in the new environment. *"As a result, the general move towards economies in which market forces and the private sector play a central role does not always reflect the interests of the rural poor. IFAD has an essential part to play in equipping the rural poor to interact more equitably with new market forces and in making market relationships work for them."* (IFAD's private-sector strategy)

### **B. Evolution of IFAD's approach to private-sector development and partnership**

8. For a number of reasons, the task of reducing rural poverty is one of the most challenging aspects of agriculture and rural development. Government rural and agricultural policies and institutions have been often captured by elites or rent-seeking groups; the bureaucrats who run them have little incentive to do so in an effective and efficient manner. The rural poor are also at the end of the queue for public investments in the social and

physical infrastructure needed to reduce their costs of production and marketing and improve their livelihoods. Diseconomies of scale often make it unattractive to the private sector to serve the small farmer, or small rural entrepreneur, with the knowledge, finance, inputs and markets needed to raise productivity. Small rural operators are generally un-organized and have limited bargaining power in the face of monopoly suppliers of inputs and buyers of outputs. The cooperative movement with the potential for increasing the bargaining power of small farmers proved to be only very intermittently successful. Some effective models are being pioneered by NGOs on a micro scale but, for the most part, they are not being systematically piloted or scaled up. Similarly, diseconomies of scale affect the interest and capacity of the large multilateral institutions to serve the rural poor, given the high cost per beneficiary of such programmes and the premium on local knowledge.

9. IFAD was established to support government efforts to reduce rural poverty, but in practice its approach to development has been a pragmatic one that involves seeking out projects that support rural poverty reduction. Inevitably, however, since IFAD works through governments and helps to implement programmes that they design and support, much of the emphasis of its activities over the years has been on making public interventions more effective for the rural poor. It was perhaps the recognition that, in this process, the Fund might not be taking full account of the potential role the private sector could play in rural poverty reduction that led donors at the Consultation on the Sixth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources in 2002 to request Management to provide the Executive Board with a *"strategy for achieving greater involvement of private-sector participants in IFAD programmes, through co-financing and other forms of partnership consistent with IFAD's mission"*.

10. In September 2004, a comprehensive document setting out IFAD's **strategy for private-sector development and partnership** was submitted to the Executive Board. The Board approved the principles underlying IFAD's strategy but requested a simplified and more operational document with a results framework to be resubmitted to its Eighty-Fourth Session in April 2005. The revised strategy document was approved in April 2005 and, in so doing, the Board also requested that the Office of Evaluation (IOE) should evaluate the strategy some years into its implementation.

11. The IFAD Strategic Framework 2007-2010 includes strategic objectives regarding: "transparent and competitive agricultural and produce markets"; and "opportunities for rural, off-farm employment and enterprise development". Expected operational outcomes include: *"Increased private-sector investment in rural areas: In the rural areas of developing countries, the smallholder farmer, the small-scale produce trader and the multinational agroprocessing company all form part of the private sector. Stimulating private-sector investment in rural areas, and ensuring that it works to the benefit of poor rural people in IFAD's key areas will be one of IFAD's key operational outcomes. Guided by its 2005 Private-Sector Development and Partnership Strategy, IFAD will work with a range of upstream and downstream market intermediaries – national rather than international wherever possible –and help them to reduce their risk and transaction costs, access sources of financing, build their capacity and outreach, and participate in national processes for policy development."*

12. The Report of the Consultation on the Eighth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (February 2009)<sup>2</sup> states that a strong and diverse private sector, providing agricultural inputs, production and financial services and markets, which poor rural producers are able to access and use, is critical for increasing their agricultural production and incomes. Under its private-sector strategy, IFAD can do much to engage and forge partnerships with a growing number of private-sector actors. It is, for example, working to link rural producers to export markets and to bring privately-owned financial institutions into rural finance operations. The Report of the Consultation further noted that, during the Eighth Replenishment period, IFAD would continue to work through its regular operations and within the framework of IFAD's private-sector strategy to build the conditions for successful private-sector partnerships between smallholder

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<sup>2</sup> See document GC 32/L.5.

farmers and other economic agents. Several agencies provide direct support to the private sector but few, if any, prioritize investments in agriculture that bring direct benefits to very poor rural communities – though some are now considering the possibility of doing so<sup>3</sup>. IFAD will strengthen its partnerships with these agencies to find ways to stimulate such investments. The Report of the Eighth Consultation reiterated that IOE would conduct an evaluation of IFAD's private-sector strategy in 2010, and that the findings of that exercise would provide lessons for future engagement.

13. With regard to the latter, IOE has accumulated a fair amount of experience in evaluating IFAD activities involving the private sector. One of the main lessons that numerous country programme and other evaluations highlight is that the commercialization of small farmers is extremely important to take them out of poverty. Small farmers have the potential to act as small entrepreneurs and can therefore be instrumental in ensuring food security and growth. Also, in the context of preparing the 2009 Annual Report on the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI), an issues paper was produced that examined in detail the opportunities and challenges associated with promoting access to input and output markets, including the role of the private sector in the process. A workshop was organized with representatives of IFAD Management and staff to discuss the main issues and identify priority areas for moving forward. Some of the main issues emerging from the workshop included: (i) the need to better understand value chains<sup>4</sup>, in which the private sector plays a prominent role; (ii) diversifying approaches to rural finance throughout the value chain and not just at the farm level; (iii) the importance of innovation; (iv) working on developing public-private partnerships; and (v) sharing knowledge both within and outside IFAD. Box 2 from the ARRI below summarizes some key discussion points related to improving access to markets.

14. During the Eighth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources, discussions were also held on the possibility of establishing a new facility to promote private-sector investment in rural areas, the aim being to provide investment finance directed to the private sector and to policy/institutional support to help establish an enabling environment for private-sector development. It was also recognized that IFAD should assess the need for and feasibility of developing new instruments to engage with the private sector, including through non-sovereign lending and equity investments. IFAD agreed that "If such a need is identified, a proposal for IFAD's role and instruments, fully consistent with IFAD's mandate, will be prepared and presented for approval to IFAD's Executive Board by December 2010", even though it was felt more appropriate to defer such a presentation until after the present evaluation had been completed. Finally, it is worth underlining that in 2009 the Executive Board approved IFAD's new grants policy, which for the first time opened the window for financing private-sector entities involved in IFAD-supported activities in borrower countries.

<sup>3</sup> The agencies identified included the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks (AfDB, AsDB, IDB); Inter-American Investment Corporation; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and bilateral agencies such as the German Investment and Development Company; Agence Française de Développement; Promotion et Participation pour la Coopération Économique (both of France); Capital for Development Group of the United Kingdom; and Swedfund of Sweden.

<sup>4</sup> In the context of the approach paper, a value chain is defined as the entire chain of activities for firms and distribution networks operating in a specific industry (thus, for an agricultural product, running the gamut from growing a particular crop, including the provision of inputs and technical services, to the processing, logistics, distribution, marketing and final sale). Value-chain analysis is then used as a means of identifying poverty-reduction strategies/activities that would upgrade and add value for IFAD's target group in the various steps/activities that make up the chain.

**Box 2. Key findings on market access, ARRI 2009**

There is now a more systematic and focused approach to market access and value chain analysis than in the past. The design of projects approved over the last few years is quite different to those covered by completion evaluations undertaken to date.

Partnerships with the private sector and other development agencies are important, but can be difficult to forge. IFAD needs to develop better models for working with the private sector, developing public/private-sector partnerships and working with other international organizations.

There is a need for more flexible and diversified financing instruments, such as lending to the private sector. Conventional instruments limit what IFAD can do in terms of addressing value chain constraints, especially those beyond the farm, such as the financing constraints faced by larger operators that poor people may depend upon both for farm inputs and for marketing and processing services.

Government policy is important in shaping market opportunities and constraints. Policy dialogue is vital and, although IFAD's ability to influence policy may be limited, it will need to generate a better understanding of how policy can affect project outcomes.

The trade-offs between targeting the poor and commercializing production give rise to concern. However, they may be addressed by a more in-depth analysis of poor people's needs, the use of social safety nets, and by equipping the poor with the skills they need to access labour markets.

**C. The 2005 IFAD Strategy for Private-Sector Development and Partnership<sup>5</sup>**

15. The Fund's private-sector strategy of 2005 starts by carefully and fully defining what IFAD means by the private sector. It states that the rural private sector includes a whole continuum of economic agents, ranging from subsistence or smallholder farmers, rural wage-earners, livestock herders, small-scale traders and microentrepreneurs; to medium-sized, local private operators such as input suppliers, microfinance institutions, transporters, agroprocessors, commodity brokers and traders; to other, bigger market players that may or may not reside in rural areas, including local or international commodity buyers and sellers, multinational seed or fertilizer companies, commercial banks, agribusiness firms and supermarkets. Associations of farmers, herders, water users or traders also constitute an important part of the private sector.

16. The strategy further underlines that IFAD's direct target group is the rural poor, who tend to be concentrated at the smaller end of the private-sector continuum. This group is considered part of the private sector because, in essence, it comprises agro- or rural-based microentrepreneurs who make their own economic decisions regarding what to produce and how to produce it, what to buy and sell, who to buy from and sell to, how much to buy or sell, and when. IFAD will concentrate its efforts on supporting the development of this private-sector target group. However, since the livelihoods of its target group are often dependent on other private-sector operators, IFAD will also support or partner with those private-sector operators that can provide improved income-generating opportunities for the target group.

17. After briefly identifying the variety of economic constraints that limit the potential for growth of private agents – including lack of access to knowledge and skills; inappropriate institutional and policy framework; and inadequate rural infrastructure – the strategy stresses that in order to stimulate private-sector-based rural economies to the benefit of the poor, what is needed is not only a lessening of the obstacles that each group faces on its own terms but the creation of conditions that can facilitate fair market relations among the various players. In partnership with the public sector, other donors, NGOs and relevant private organizations,

<sup>5</sup> Part of the text in this section has been taken from the IFAD private-sector strategy document of 2005.

there is an important role for IFAD to play in helping both the rural poor and other private operators overcome the various market constraints, and in making their market-based relationships more profitable and appealing, resulting in win-win situations for both groups.

18. The strategy document discusses the evolution of IFAD's engagement with the private sector. It specifically notes that since its foundation, IFAD has been supporting the private sector as represented by smallholder farmers and other rural poor residents. As recently as 10-20 years ago, and to some extent even today, the rural poor were looked upon mainly as local producers with few linkages to the rest of the economy. Indeed, early IFAD-supported projects focused mainly on boosting food production and improving the food security of rural households (within a largely 'subsistence economy' model). This called for financing the delivery of non-market-based, public rural services (such as extension, credit and infrastructure) and the capacity-building of public institutions. As noted earlier, the environment in which IFAD's target groups produce, work and obtain services has changed substantially over the past 10-20 years. The withdrawal or reduction of the state's role in providing services and purchasing outputs means that the private sector is increasingly fulfilling this role, or is at least expected to do so. This reinforces and underscores the fact that smallholder farmers and other rural entrepreneurs are private-sector actors operating in a much wider and dynamic context. Private-sector-driven economies have now created real opportunities for many rural poor residents, but there are also major challenges. Left to themselves, markets for goods and services in poor rural areas are not automatically more efficient than the state-led or mixed systems they have replaced. And even where they are, they certainly do not guarantee benefits to poor and un-organized rural producers, who do not easily gain access to these markets.

19. The objective of the 2005 strategy is to increase pro-poor private-sector operations and investment in rural areas. Three broad lines of action are called for: (i) policy dialogue for local private-sector development; (ii) investment operations to support local private-sector development; and (iii) partnerships with the private sector in order to leverage additional investments and knowledge for rural areas.

20. The strategy underlined the need for IFAD to develop guidelines (or a tool kit) for its operations staff to assist them in operationalizing the strategy, but they do not appear to have been formulated. Provision for staff training on partnering or engaging with the private sector was also foreseen. A staff member of the Programme Management Department (PMD) was to be appointed as focal point for the private sector.

21. The strategy included a results framework with 16 key performance indicators (e.g. at least 15 per cent of IFAD-funded projects will cofinance with, or generate complementary investments from, the private sector), and all targets in the results framework were expected to be reached by end-2008. In order to measure results and impact, IFAD's Results and Impact Measurement System and related monitoring and reporting tools were to be expanded or revised to capture the key indicators specified in the private-sector strategy. Reporting to the Executive Board was to be done by means of the Progress Report on the Project Portfolio (since merged into the Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness). However, no section is devoted specifically to engagement of the private sector.

22. It is important to note that the global economic crisis has led to questioning of the appropriate balance between public regulation and private economic activity, and this questioning extends to the role of the state in agriculture. Problems associated with soaring food prices in mid-2008, for example, led many countries to re-think the implications of food security for domestic policy. As such, any evaluation of the 2005 private-sector strategy should also look at its continuing relevance in the light of events since it was published.

## II. Objectives of the Evaluation

23. This is the first corporate-level evaluation of IFAD's engagement with the private sector. The 2005 strategy is rooted in IFAD's long-standing engagement with the private sector in the context of its operations. The underlying assumption of the strategy is that IFAD faces institutional constraints leading to sub-optimal engagements with the private sector. By addressing some of these constraints, increasing awareness of good practices among governments and IFAD staff, and defining a clear and measurable results framework, IFAD could play a more effective role in reducing rural poverty.

24. The core of the evaluation will be to assess the relevance of the 2005 private sector strategy against the results framework (2005-2008) laid out in the strategy. The evaluation will review IFAD's efforts to implement the strategy through a review of selected IFAD policies, country strategies, programme design and implementation, as well as attention to private sector in its non-lending activities (knowledge management, policy dialogue, partnership building, and grants).

25. The evaluation will not, however, be limited to examining the relevance, implementation and achievements of the 2005 private-sector strategy, but will also assess more broadly the evolution of IFAD's approaches and results in engaging the private sector over the years, and identify good practices and lessons for future operations. Therefore, the specific objectives of the evaluation are to:

- (vi) determine the relevance and evaluate the implementation of IFAD's 2005 private-sector strategy;
- (vii) assess the evolving approaches and results of IFAD's engagement with the private sector;
- (viii) examine the instruments and experiences of other development organizations in engaging private sector in agriculture and rural development, with the aim of identifying good practices that could be pertinent for IFAD; and
- (ix) generate a series of findings and recommendations that may serve as building blocks for IFAD's future engagement with the private sector.

## III. Evaluation Approach, Methodology and Process

### A. Evaluation Approach

26. **Period of coverage.** The evaluation will focus particularly on the activities funded by IFAD since 2003, which coincides with the decision by Member States during the Sixth Replenishment of IFAD's Resources (2002) for the Fund to develop "a strategy for achieving greater involvement of private-sector participants in IFAD programmes". In order to gain an appreciation of results on the ground, use will be also made of existing IOE evaluations and self-evaluation reports by IFAD Management prepared since 2003. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that these evaluations mostly cover projects that were designed in the mid-1990s and early 2000s but were under implementation until recently, and, as such, do not constitute the distant past.

27. **Key components of the evaluation.** There are four components that constitute the core building blocks of the evaluation, which will contribute to the preparation of the main evaluation report. In terms of its implementation, the evaluation will be conducted in phased manner (see section III C: Phasing of the evaluation).

- (i) The first component of the evaluation is a strategy review and portfolio scan, which is intended to look at achievements against the results framework of the 2005 strategy and provide an overview of the results of IFAD-funded operations with respect to the private sector.
- (ii) The second component involves country case studies. Eight countries will be selected for in-depth review to validate the findings of the strategy review and portfolio scan, as well as to identify good practices and the causes of less good performance in private sector engagement. The final list of countries to be covered will be determined during the desk review phase of the evaluation (see paragraph 39).
- (iii) The third component is a review of selected corporate business processes, which looks at how IFAD manages its internal process, including skills availability and development, to support its private sector agenda.
- (iv) The fourth component is a comparator study, looking at how other institutions are promoting the rural private sector

28. **The strategy review and portfolio scan.** This component will seek to provide an overview of IFAD support for private-sector development. It will entail reviewing: (i) selected corporate strategies, and recent country strategies and project designs to determine their coherence with the 2005 private-sector strategy; and (ii) the results of IFAD's private-sector engagement by mining existing evaluation and self-evaluation reports. Efforts will be made to benchmark the results across the five geographic regions where IFAD operates, and to identify lessons learned specific to different countries to enable cross-fertilization and exchanges of experience. This will be done by collecting data based on a review of evaluation and operational documents, and by holding a series of bilateral and focus group discussions with IFAD Management and staff. This component is also expected to generate key hypotheses and issues that merit deeper investigation and follow-up during the country work phase (see paragraph 30).

29. An important element of the strategy review and portfolio scan will be a review of the range of instruments (e.g. loans, grants) that IFAD has at its disposal and the corresponding challenges and opportunities they offer to promote the involvement of private-sector entities. For example, one key question is how effectively IFAD can promote private-sector engagement and development with loans provided to governments. In addition, the strategy review and portfolio scan will provide some analysis of IFAD's private-sector engagement at the corporate level, for example, by looking at the volume of funds raised from the private sector to cofinance IFAD-supported programmes, and the role of corporate and regional grants that have been given to the private sector (e.g. the Farmers Forum, etc.). A specific working paper will be prepared by the evaluation team to summarize the outcome of the strategy review and portfolio scan.

30. **Country case studies.** Eight countries will be covered under this component of the evaluation. The main objective of the country case studies is twofold: (i) to validate the results and hypotheses emerging from the strategy review and portfolio scan; and (ii) to identify good and less-good practices in private-sector engagement and the underlying causes for the same. A tentative list of countries developed in consultation with the PMD, to be confirmed following the strategy review and portfolio scan, include: Albania, Ghana, Guatemala, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. Owing to resource and time limitations, country visits will be only undertaken to Albania, Ghana, Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Uganda. All studies will make use of available evaluation and other reports as well as interviews with IFAD staff. For the five case studies that will entail country visits, information will be also collected from partners at the country level and during visits to selected IFAD-funded projects. A country working paper will be prepared for each of the eight countries covered under this



component of the evaluation. The specific methodology to be followed in preparing the country case studies is discussed below (see Section III, B).

**31. Review of corporate business processes.** Apart from assessing results of private-sector engagement in IFAD operations, the evaluation will look more broadly at IFAD's organizational capabilities and processes to ensure appropriate engagement with the private sector. An assessment will be made of the adequacy of organizational capabilities (e.g. culture, direction/leadership, competencies including staff skills and incentives, learning, etc.), as well as IFAD's structure and processes (e.g. quality enhancement and quality assurance, supervision and implementation support, results measurement and reporting, country presence, evaluation, etc.) for private sector engagement. A dedicated working paper on the topic will be prepared by the evaluation team.

**32. Comparator study.** The fourth component of the evaluation will involve reviewing the strategies, policies, instruments and experiences in the private-sector engagement of selected development agencies. The aim of the review will be to identify lessons that may be suitable – with due adaptation – to IFAD's own context and priorities. The study will be largely based on a review of documents and, selectively, discussions with key informants in the development organizations covered. The proposal is to cover a selection of institutions with a similar mandate to IFAD<sup>6</sup>. As part of the assessment of the adequacy of IFAD's instruments (see paragraph 29 above), the comparator study will also review the synergies between private-sector lending windows such as the IFC, Asian Development Fund and African Development Fund with the regular operations of the World Bank/IDA, AsDB and AfDB, respectively. In addition, an effort will be made to capture the experience of IFC, EBRD and the Commonwealth Development Corporation in providing support to agroprocessing operations. A specific evaluation working paper will be prepared on the comparator study, which will also inform the draft final evaluation report.

## B. Country Case Study Methodology

**33.** The main objectives of the country case studies are outlined in paragraph 30 above. The eight country case studies will look at a wide range of actual and potential support for rural private-sector development through IFAD-funded operations. The essential unit of the evaluation will be the country programme. The starting point will be to look at the country strategy and programme over time and, specifically, the operations funded before and subsequent to the approval of the 2005 private-sector strategy. Concretely, this will involve reviewing both past operations and more recent activities. For this purpose, the role of the rural private sector will be categorized as follows:

- (i) The first category is rural on-farm. Among other issues, here the evaluation will be looking at the dimension of private-sector support for small farmers in the form of research, extension, training, seed multiplication, input supply, harvesting and on-farm storage.
- (ii) The second category is the value chain. Here, the emphasis is on the link between the farm and the output market through processing, product certification, off-farm storage, transportation, the role of supermarkets, etc. This has become an increasing part of IFAD-funded projects in recent years. It is estimated that no less than 50 per cent of 2008 projects had some component or aspect relating to value chain development.


<sup>6</sup> AfDB, Agence Française de Développement, AsDB, Commonwealth Development Corporation, Department for International Development (United Kingdom), EBRD, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), IDB, IFC, International Food Policy Research Institute, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Bank.

- (iii) The third category is rural non-farm enterprise. The focus here, inter alia, is on support for enterprise development, skills training – both business and technical, and venture capital support.

34. In each of these areas, a number of public and private institutions are engaged in providing technical, commercial and financial support for the rural private sector. In order for the private sector to grow and contribute effectively to rural poverty reduction, however, a number of key enablers need to be in place (see Figure 1).

- The first of these is the *legal, regulatory and institutional framework* for private-sector development. The lessons of the past point to the need for fair and transparent rules of the game governing private sector activities. These range from broad political and social stability and effective governance, to land tenure practices, land registration, competition policy and regulation, property rights and a host of other factors that determine the context in which the private sector operates. IFAD's engagement in tribal land rights in India is an important example of its work in this area. Aspects of the institutional framework also include the effects of taxes and incentives for private-sector engagement and support for efforts to develop public-private partnerships.
- *Social infrastructure* is also an important determinant of the level and growth of the private sector. Higher levels of education, better standards of health and effective community structures all contribute to an environment in which the private sector can function.
- *Physical infrastructure* in the rural areas is generally recognized as a necessary condition for private-sector development. As farm products move up the value chain to local markets, to processing and to more distant urban and international markets, the quality of physical infrastructure – including water management structures, soil and land improvement, roads including feeder roads, bridges, railways, power supply, and communications infrastructure – becomes an increasingly significant determinant of the rate of growth of private enterprise. Physical infrastructure at the farm and community levels plays an important part of many IFAD-funded operations.
- *Access to rural finance* is another enabler of the development of the rural private sector. One of the important developments of the past two or three decades has been the growth of rural microfinance and the recognition of the important role it can play, particularly in on-farm enterprise development, health and weather insurance, and in encouraging off-farm enterprises such as the establishment of artisan production and local services. But once these enterprises grow, they need access to the commercial banking system and to more sophisticated financial products.

**Figure 1: Key components and enablers of private-sector engagement in IFAD operations**



35. An evaluation of IFAD support for rural private-sector development through country case studies does not need to focus on each of these enabling factors. However, it must question whether IFAD is assessing the context of private-sector development in supporting the components described in paragraph 34, and whether the absence or weakness of any of these enablers constitutes binding constraints to effective private-sector development that need to be addressed in parallel with direct support for the rural entrepreneur.

36. The **evaluation framework** in Appendix 2 outlines the evaluation objectives and maps them with the key questions the evaluation will address, as well as the activities that will be undertaken for collecting data and information to answer the key questions.

### C. Phasing of the Evaluation

37. The evaluation will be divided into the following phases:

38. **Inception.** Under this phase, the aim would be – among other tasks - to review key IFAD documents related to the private sector, develop further the overall evaluation approach and methodology, fine-tune the evaluation framework as required, develop the criteria and finalize the selection of countries, develop the detailed terms of reference for the country work, finalize the composition of the core learning partnership (CLP) (see section IV), prepare an indicative table of contents for the country working papers, and complete the selection of the consultants team and the senior independent advisers (SIAs, see paragraph 46).

39. **Desk review.** The strategy review and portfolio scan as well as the comparator study will be undertaken during this phase. Once the corresponding preliminary draft working paper on these topics is available, IOE will make a presentation to IFAD Management and staff on the emerging findings. The aim of this interim presentation will be to promote learning during the evaluation and obtain feedback on the hypotheses and key questions for the country case studies. During the desk review phase, arrangements will be also made for country visits by IOE.

40. **Country work.** IOE will contract one well-qualified consultant or deploy one of its own staff members to conduct each country study. Country work will be carried out in five of the

eight countries during missions of 5-7 days. Specific activities at the country level will be defined during the inception phase, and include discussions with government, beneficiaries, private-sector partners and others, as well as visits to selected IFAD-funded projects. The country working papers will be finalized following the country visits (in the five cases where country visits are undertaken), and all eight papers will be shared with PMD for review and comment.

41. **Corporate business process review.** This review will be undertaken once the country case studies have been completed. It will be important to be able to use the results of the country case studies in identifying key business process issues and framing the questions to be taken up in this process.

42. **Final report preparation.** The focus of this phase will be on preparation of the draft final report, building on the four components of the evaluation. The draft report will be shared with IFAD Management for comments. IOE will prepare an 'audit trail', which will clearly illustrate how Management's comments have been treated in the final report. Comments will be treated in line with the provisions contained in the IFAD Evaluation Policy<sup>7</sup>. IOE will be responsible for the overall evaluation process, for the contents of the final report, and for all other deliverables produced during the evaluation, as per the Evaluation Policy. A learning stakeholders' workshop will be held before the evaluation report is finalized to discuss the main issues, lessons and recommendations contained therein.

#### IV. Core Learning Partnership

43. The role of the CLP is to provide guidance to the evaluation process and review key evaluation deliverables. In particular, at the start of the evaluation, CLP members will help flag issues and information sources for the evaluation. After the completion of the independent evaluation report, the CLP will discuss the evaluation findings, deepen the understanding of the findings and recommendations, and eventually work out the operational implications of the evaluation recommendations and the division of labour/responsibilities among the various stakeholders involved. IOE representatives will facilitate the CLP discussions. The proposed composition of the CLP is as follows:

- Mr Kevin Cleaver, Associate Vice President, Programmes
- Mr Henock Kifle, Chief Development Strategist
- Mr Luciano Lavizzari, Director IOE
- All PMD regional division directors and regional economists
- Mr Rodney Cooke, Director, Operation Policy and Technical Advisory Division
- Ms Vera Weill-Halle, Director, Innovative Financing
- Mr Shyam Khadka, Senior Portfolio Manager, PMD
- Mr Ashwani Muthoo, Senior Evaluation Officer, IOE
- Mr Henning Pedersen, Country Programme Manager (CPM), Near East & North Africa Division
- Mr Michael Hamp, Technical Adviser, Rural Finance
- Mr Vineet Raswant, Technical Adviser, Value Chains and Access to Markets
- Mr Ronald Hartman, CPM, Asia and the Pacific Division
- Ms Chitra Deshpande, Programme Officer
- Representatives of FAO and other development institutions (to be identified)
- Selected private-sector partners from developing countries (to be identified)

44. The CLP will be responsible for sharing all information and documentation with colleagues in their respective divisions. Members of the CLP will be asked to meet a number of times

<sup>7</sup> "IOE will decide which comments should be incorporated in the revised (final) report. As a general rule: (i) the draft report will be revised to incorporate comments that correct factual errors or inaccuracies; (ii) it may also incorporate, by means of a note in the report, judgments that differ from those of the evaluation team; and (iii) comments not incorporated in the final evaluation report can be provided separately and included as an appendix to the report".

during the evaluation to discuss the draft approach paper, emerging findings following the desk review phase, and the draft final report. They will be also invited to take part in the learning workshop to be organized towards the end of the process.

## **V. Evaluation Team**

45. Under the overall guidance of the Director, IOE, the designated lead evaluator for the evaluation will be Ashwani Muthoo, Senior Evaluation Officer, IOE, supported by Messrs. Pietro Turilli, Evaluation Officer, Jicheng Zhang, Evaluation Research Analyst, and Ms Katrin Aidnell, Associate Evaluation Officer. The evaluation consultants' team will be led by Mr Basil Kavalsky (Economist) who, among other tasks, will be responsible for the comparator study, one country study and preparation of the draft final report. Mr Marc de Sousa, an expert on rural finance and regional economics, will be responsible for some of the country studies. Consultants with expertise in value chain, access to market, agribusiness and related private-sector themes will be identified for the other country studies. A consultant (still to be identified) with expertise in organizational issues and preferably with experience in private-sector engagement will assess the instruments, organizational capabilities and processes to promote the participation of the private sector in IFAD operations.

46. IOE will mobilise the collaboration of two SIAs for this evaluation. Their role will be to review and comment on key deliverables and provide inputs and advice on methodology, process and content issues. The SIAs will prepare a short joint final report on their assessment of the quality of the evaluation, which will be shared with IFAD Management and the Executive Board. Their report will be included in an annex of the final evaluation report. Professor Robert Picciotto, a renowned development evaluator with a thorough knowledge of IFAD and rural poverty reduction<sup>8</sup>, will be one of the two SIAs. The second SIA will be Dr Namanga Ngongi, who has wide experience and knowledge of the United Nations and government systems as well as of agriculture development in general<sup>9</sup>.

## **VI. Time Frame**

47. The following is a provisional time frame for the evaluation, which will be elaborated during the inception phase of the evaluation:

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<sup>8</sup> Professor Robert Picciotto was formerly Director-General of the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group and is currently Professor at King's College, London.

<sup>9</sup> Dr Namanga Ngongi was previously Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme and is currently President of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA).

<u>Date</u>	<u>Activities</u>
19 Mar 2010	Distribute draft approach paper to IFAD Management
9 Apr	Meeting with IFAD Management to discuss draft approach paper
May	Revise and finalize approach paper
Jun-Jul	Desk review phase: (i) strategy review and portfolio scan; and (ii) comparator study
Sep	Presentation to IFAD Management on emerging findings
Aug-Sept	Country work phase
Oct	Share country working papers with IFAD Management for comment
Oct	Corporate business process review
Oct-Nov	Prepare draft final report
End-Nov	IOE internal peer review process
End-Jan	Send draft report to IFAD Management for comment
Early Feb	Learning workshop to discuss the draft final report
End Feb 2011	Prepare and finalize evaluation's Agreement at Completion Point <sup>10</sup>
Apr 2011	Discuss final evaluation report, together with the Agreement at Completion Point, in the Evaluation Committee and Executive Board

## VII. Communication and Dissemination

48. Copies of the full evaluation report will be distributed to concerned staff in-house, Executive Board members and others. The main report will not exceed 50 pages. As per usual practice, an evaluation profile and one/two insights will be prepared based on the evaluation, to be distributed more widely both within and outside IFAD. Profiles/insights are communication tools (two-page brochures) prepared by IOE for a wider audience. The profile will contain a succinct summary of the evaluation's findings and recommendations. Each insight will focus on one learning theme emerging from the evaluation, with the aim of promoting debate among development practitioners, policy-makers and others on the topic. As mentioned earlier, a learning workshop will be organized to discuss the draft final report and to lay the foundations for the Agreement at Completion Point. All outputs will be also published in the dedicated web page on the private-sector evaluation, which will be created under the IOE section of the Fund's corporate website.

<sup>10</sup> The Agreement at Completion Point, an action-oriented document, will capture the evaluation's main findings and recommendations and illustrate IFAD Management's understanding of the main evaluation findings and their commitment to adopt and implement its recommendations within specific time frames.

Private Sector Strategy Evaluation Framework		
Objectives	Key questions	Key activities
1. Determine the relevance and evaluate the implementation of IFAD's 2005 private sector strategy	1. Is it the right strategy for IFAD's overall objectives of contributing to the reduction of rural poverty? 2. Has the 2005 Private Sector Development and Partnership (PSDP) strategy been relevant since approval? 3. To what extent the strategy has achieved its targets against the results framework 2005-2008 laid out in the strategy? 4. What is the further progress from 2009 onward? 5. During the implementation of the strategy, what have been successes and why? Where has it been less successful and why? 6. How has the Strategy changed the way IFAD approaches working with the private sector as compared to before 2005? 7. To what extent does IFAD's strategic guidance provide the institution with a clear, coherent (along corporate policy and guidelines), results focused and well-resourced framework to promote operations on private sector development and partnership?	1. A critical review of the 2005 private sector strategy; 2. Desk review of IFAD's strategic guidance on all documents related to private sector development and partnership in general approved by EB, GC and IFAD Management; 3. Analyse the data provided by PMD on the progress and achievements in relations to certain indicators; 4. Desk review of IEO evaluation reports since 2003; 5. Desk review of self-evaluation reports prepared by IFAD management since 2003; 6. Review of selected country strategies and project documents; 7. Interviews with IFAD Staff.
2. Assess the evolving approaches and results of IFAD's engagement with the private sector;	1. Are the IFAD framework, and related policies and strategies approved after the 2005 private sector strategy coherent in supporting IFAD's engagement with private sector as elaborated in the 2005 strategy? 2. To what extent IFAD's capabilities and structure and processes are adequate for achieving the targets of engaging private sector in rural poverty reduction? 3. Is IFAD's strategic guidance on private sector development and partnership well reflected into country strategies and	1. Desk review of IFAD Strategic Framework, selected IFAD policy and strategy documents approved after the 2005 private sector strategy; 2. Review of the a few selected policies and strategies approved before 2005 private sector strategy; 3. Desk review of countries strategies and operations in relation to private sector development; 4. Interviews with IFAD management and staff on organizational capabilities, structure and processes; 5. Select eight countries as case studies which would form a basis for the evaluation; 6. Country visit to five of the eight selected countries

Private Sector Strategy Evaluation Framework		
Objectives	Key questions	Key activities
	<p>programmes (COSOPs, project design and implementation, and non-lending operations)?</p> <p>4. To what extent the projects' design take the country and local context for private sector development into account? Are the private sector operations in country programmes consistent with IFAD's mandate and government policy? Are they well-adapted to local context?</p> <p>5. Did the projects identify opportunities for partnering or cofinancing with private sector players in implementation?</p> <p>6. Are the private sector activities in countries relevant the needs of target groups?</p> <p>7. Are the private sector operations coherent with other key activities in the country programmes? And therefore, contributing to poverty reduction?</p> <p>8. Do IFAD projects set monitorable objectives for private sector operations? Does the M&amp;E system include measurable indicators for progress in achieving private sector development and partnership objectives?</p> <p>9. What tangible results can be shown either in field operations, partnership building with private sector, or improved policy environment?</p> <p>10. What are the good practices and lessons? What are the key success factors and constraints?</p> <p>11. Are these operations sustainable? What are the key innovation features? How is the potential for replication and scaling-up?</p> <p>12. Are there significant differences between countries in the responsiveness and similarly between regions? What are the determinants for these differences?</p>	<p>and structured discussions with key policy makers, partners, government officials, projects staff, implementing agencies, NGOs and representatives from civil society, in country international donors, advocacy groups, IFAD country representatives.;</p> <p>7. Identifying good practices and constraints faced in promoting private sector development and partnership in country studies;</p> <p>8. Desk review of IEO evaluations since 2003;</p> <p>9. Desk review of self-evaluation reports by IFAD management prepared since 2003 in relation to private sector and the selected countries;</p> <p>10. Draft country working paper for strategy review and portfolio scan;</p> <p>11. Draft country working paper for corporate business processes;</p> <p>12. Draft country working papers for each of the eight countries covered in the evaluation</p>



Private Sector Strategy Evaluation Framework		
Objectives	Key questions	Key activities
	<p>13. Have there been successful policy dialogues involving IFAD alone and/or with other partners?</p> <p>14. Are there a set of factors which seem to foster private sector development and partnership emerging from IFAD's experience?</p>	
3. Examine the experience of other development organizations in terms of their corporate strategies, processes, instruments and lessons learned to support rural private sector development, with the aim of identifying good practices that could be pertinent to IFAD.	<p>1. Which instruments have the other organizations deployed in their operations? How well have other organizations done?</p> <p>2. What have they learned about what does and does not work?</p> <p>3. What are the good practices and lessons from these organizations that IFAD could reflect on in considering future operations relating to private sector development and partnership?</p>	<p>1. Desk review of the strategies, policies, instruments and experience for private sector engagement of other agencies (AfDB, AsDB, IDB, UNIDO and World Bank);</p> <p>2. Summarize the good practices and lessons of other organizations;</p> <p>3. Benchmark IFAD's strategic guidance against other organizations' strategies and policies;</p> <p>4. Interviews with staff of other agencies; and</p> <p>5. Determine which of the proposed strategies for private sector partnerships have worked.</p>

**APPENDIX 3****List of Policies and Strategies Reviewed by the Evaluation****A. Policies and Strategies**

1. Draft, 2011-2015 IFAD Strategic Framework
2. Climate Change Strategy (Apr 2010)
3. Policy on grant financing (Dec 2009)
4. Revision of the lending policies and criteria (Dec 2009)
5. Policy on engagement with indigenous people (Sep 2009)
6. Results measurement framework for the eighth replenishment period 2010-2012 (Sep 2009)
7. Rural finance policy (Apr 2009)
8. Revisions to the General Conditions for Agricultural Development Financing (Apr 2009)
9. Policy on improving access to land and tenure security (Sep 2008)
10. Replenishment Paper on Private Sector (2008)
11. Results Measurement Framework for Reporting on progress achieved against the IFAD Strategic Framework 2007-2010 (Sep 2007)
12. Innovation strategy (Sep 2007)
13. Strategy for Knowledge Management (Apr 2007)
14. IFAD Strategic Framework 2007 – 2010 (Dec 2006)
15. Policy on supervision and implementation support (Dec 2006)
16. Policy on targeting (Sep 2006)
17. Action Plan for Improving its Development Effectiveness (Dec 2005)
18. Private Sector Development and partnership Strategy (Apr 2005)
19. Gender Plan of Action (2003)
20. Rural Finance Policy (2000)
21. Rural Enterprise Policy (2004)
22. Report on the Sixth Consultation on the Resources of IFAD (2003)

**B. Reports released from 2006**

23. Progress report on the implementation of the IFAD Strategy for knowledge Management (Apr 2009)
24. Final progress report on implementation of IFAD's Action Plan for Improving its Development Effectiveness (Dec 2007)

**C. Final report of the consultation Governing Council**

25. Final report of the consultation GC 2009
26. Final report of the consultation GC 2006
27. Final report of the consultation GC 2003

**List of Projects Reviewed in the Strategy Review and Portfolio Scan**

Project Approved in 2009 ( 33 in total)	
<i>2009 December EB</i>	
<i>Western and Central Africa</i>	
<b>1.</b>	<b>Côte d'Ivoire:</b> Agricultural Rehabilitation and Poverty Reduction Project
<b>2.</b>	<b>Gambia:</b> Livestock and Horticulture Development Project
<b>3.</b>	<b>Liberia:</b> Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation Project
<i>Asia and the Pacific</i>	
<b>4.</b>	<b>Cambodia:</b> Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and Smallholder Development Project
<b>5.</b>	<b>Kyrgyzstan:</b> Forestry and Carbon Trading Project
<b>6.</b>	<b>Nepal:</b> High-value Agriculture Project in Hill and Mountain Areas
<b>7.</b>	<b>Sri Lanka:</b> National Agribusiness Development Programme
<i>Latin America and Caribbean</i>	
<b>8.</b>	<b>Brazil:</b> Cariri and Seridó Sustainable Development Project (PROCASE)
<b>9.</b>	<b>Plurinational State of Bolivia:</b> Plan VIDA-PEEP to eradicate extreme poverty – Phase I: Pilot Project to Strengthen the Capacity of Communities and Families Living in Extreme Poverty in Cochabamba and Potosí
<i>Near East and North Africa</i>	
<b>10.</b>	<b>Egypt:</b> On-farm Irrigation Development Project in the Oldlands
<b>11.</b>	<b>Georgia:</b> Agricultural Support Project
<b>12.</b>	<b>Sudan:</b> Rural Access Project
<b>13.</b>	<b>Turkey:</b> Ardahan-Kars-Artvin Development Project
<i>2009 September EB</i>	
<i>Western and Central Africa</i>	
<b>14.</b>	<b>Chad:</b> Pastoral Water Management Project in Sahelian Areas
<b>15.</b>	<b>Mauritania:</b> Value Chains Development Programme for Poverty Reduction
<i>Eastern and Southern Africa</i>	
<b>16.</b>	<b>Ethiopia:</b> Pastoral Community Development Project II
<b>17.</b>	<b>Zambia:</b> Smallholder Agribusiness Promotion Programme
<i>Asia and the Pacific</i>	
<b>18.</b>	<b>Bangladesh:</b> Participatory Small-scale Water Resources Sector Project

<b>19.</b>	<b>Pakistan:</b> Crop Maximization Support Project
<i>Latin America and the Caribbean</i>	
<b>20.</b>	<b>Brazil:</b> Semi-arid Sustainable Development Project in the State of Piauí (Viva o Semi-Árido)
<b>21.</b>	<b>Ecuador:</b> Ibarra-San Lorenzo Development Project
<b>22.</b>	<b>Mexico:</b> Community-based Forestry Development Project for Southern States (Campeche, Chiapas and Oaxaca)
<i>Near East and North Africa</i>	
<b>23.</b>	<b>Lebanon:</b> Hilly Areas Sustainable Agricultural Development Project
<b>24.</b>	<b>Sudan:</b> Revitalizing The Sudan Gum Arabic Production and Marketing Project
<i>2009 April EB</i>	
<i>Western and Central Africa</i>	
<b>25.</b>	<b>Benin:</b> Rural Economic Growth Support Project
<b>26.</b>	<b>Burkina Faso:</b> Rural Business Development Services Programme
<b>27.</b>	<b>Mali:</b> Rural Microfinance Programme
<i>Eastern and Southern Africa</i>	
<b>28.</b>	<b>Burundi:</b> Agricultural Intensification and Value-Enhancing Support Project
<b>29.</b>	<b>Ethiopia:</b> Community-based Integrated Natural Resources Management Project
<i>Asia and the Pacific</i>	
<b>30.</b>	<b>Afghanistan:</b> Rural Microfinance and Livestock Support Programme
<b>31.</b>	<b>China:</b> Sichuan Post-Earthquake Agricultural Rehabilitation Project
<b>32.</b>	<b>India:</b> Convergence of Agricultural Interventions in Maharashtra's Distressed Districts Programme
<i>Latin America and the Caribbean</i>	
<b>33.</b>	<b>Dominican Republic:</b> Development Project for Rural Poor Economic Organizations of the Border Region

<b>Projects approved in 2004 (25 in total)</b>	
2004 December EB	
1.	<b>Burkina Faso</b> : Sustainable Rural Development Programme
2.	<b>Ethiopia</b> : Agricultural Marketing Improvement Programme
3.	<b>Lesotho</b> : Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Programme
4.	<b>Tanzania , United Republic of</b> : Agricultural Services Support Programme
5.	<b>Zambia</b> : Rural Finance Programme
6.	<b>Bangladesh</b> : Microfinance for Marginal and Small Farmers Project
7.	<b>Indonesia</b> : Rural Empowerment and Agricultural Development Programme in Central Sulawesi
8.	<b>Nepal</b> : Leasehold Forestry and Livestock Programme
9.	<b>Viet Nam</b> : Decentralized Programme for Rural Poverty Reduction in Ha Giang and Quang Binh Provinces
10.	<b>Argentina</b> : Patagonia Rural Development Project
11.	<b>Brazil</b> : North-East Rural Family Enterprise Development Support Project
12.	<b>Ecuador</b> : Development of the Central Corridor Project
13.	<b>Guatemala</b> : National Rural Development Programme: Central and Eastern Regions
14.	<b>Algeria</b> : Rural Development Project in the Traras and Sebaa Chioukh Mountains of the Wilaya of Tlemcen
15.	<b>Armenia</b> : Rural Areas Economic Development Programme
16.	<b>Jordan</b> : Agricultural Resource Management Project - Phase II
17.	<b>Sudan</b> : Western Sudan Resources Management Programme
2004 September EB	
18.	<b>Burundi</b> : Transitional Programme of Post-Conflict Reconstruction
19.	<b>Sri Lanka</b> : Dry Zone Livelihood Support and Partnership Programme
20.	<b>Azerbaijan</b> : North-East Development Project
21.	<b>Yemen</b> : Al-Dhala Community Resources Management Project
2004 April EB	
22.	<b>Congo</b> : Rural Development Project in the Plateaux, Cuvette and Western Cuvette Departments
23.	<b>D.R. Congo</b> : Agricultural Revival Programme in Equateur Province
24.	<b>Gambia, The</b> : Participatory Integrated Watershed-Management Project
25.	<b>China</b> : Rural Finance Sector Programme

**List of 2009 COSOPs Reviewed by the Strategy Review and Portfolio Scan****2010**

1. Azerbaijan (NEN 1)
2. Dominican Republic (LAC 1)
3. Nigeria (WCA 1)
4. Sierra Leone (WCA 2)

**2009**

5. Chad (WCA 3)
6. Congo (WCA 4)
7. Haiti (LAC 2)
8. Malawi (ESA 1)
9. Pakistan (APR 1)
10. Peru (LAC 3)
11. Philippines (APR 2)
12. Syria (NEN 2)
13. Sudan (NEN 3)

**2008**

14. Afghanistan (APR 3 Apr)
15. Brazil (LAC 4)
16. Burundi (ESA 2)
17. Ethiopia (ESA 3)
18. Morocco (NEN 4)
19. Viet Nam (APR 4 Sep)

**2007**

20. Tanzania (ESA, 4 Sep)

**List of COSOPs and Projects Reviewed during the Seven Country Case Studies**

Country	COSOP Year
Albania	2005
Ghana	1998, 2006
Guatemala	2003, 2008
Pakistan	2003, 2009
Peru	2002, 2009
Sri Lanka	2003
Uganda	2004

Country	Project Name	Approval year	Effectiveness year	Closing year
Albania	Mountains to Markets Programme	2008	2009	2014
Albania	Programme for Sustainable Development in Rural Mountain Areas	2006	2007	2012
Albania	Mountain Areas Development Programme	1999	2001	2008
Ghana	Northern Rural Growth Programme	2007	2008	2017
Ghana	Root and Tuber Improvement and Marketing Programme	2005 Sep.	2006	2015
Ghana	Rural Enterprises Project – Phase II	2002	2003	2011
Guatemala	Sustainable Rural Development Programme in El Quiché	2010	-	-
Guatemala	National Rural Development Programme, Phase 1: Western Region	2003	2006	2013
Guatemala	Rural Development Programme for Las Verapaces	1999	2001	2012
Pakistan	Crop Maximization Support Project	2009	2009	2015
Pakistan	Programme for increasing Sustainable Microfinance	2007	2008	2013
Pakistan	Dir Area Support Project	1996	1997	2008
Peru	Project for Strengthening Assets, Markets and Rural Development Policies in the Northern Highlands	2007	2009	2015
Peru	Market Strengthening and Livelihood Diversification in the Southern Highlands Project	2002	2005	2011
Peru	Development of the Puno-Cusco Corridor Project	1997	2000	2008
Sri Lanka	National Agribusiness Development Programme	2009	2010	2015
Sri Lanka	Smallholder Plantations Entrepreneurship Development Programme	2006	2007	2018
Sri Lanka	Matale Regional Economic Advancement Project	1998	1999	2007
Uganda	Community Agricultural Infrastructure Improvement Programme	2007	2008	2013
Uganda	District Livelihoods Support Programme	2006	2007	2015
Uganda	Vegetable Oil Development Project, phase I	1997	1998	2012

**APPENDIX 4****Evaluation Bibliography**

AfDB/IFAD Joint Evaluation of the Agriculture and Rural Development Policies and Operations in Africa (2010)

Annual Report on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)

Corporate-level Evaluation on IFAD's Efforts and Achievements in Gender Equality and Women Empowerment, Approach Paper (2009)

Corporate-level Evaluation on IFAD's Capacity to Promote Replicable Innovations, Approach Paper (2008)

Country Programme Evaluation Report, Republic of India (2009)

Corporate-level Evaluation on IFAD's Rural Finance Policy (2007)

External Review of the Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (2002)

Independent External Evaluation (2005)

Interim Evaluation Report on the Vegetable Oil Development Project, Republic of Uganda (2011)

Rural Enterprise Policy (2004)



## APPENDIX 5

Private Sector Strategy Results Framework<sup>66</sup>  
(2005-2008)

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	KEY (PERFORMANCE) INDICATORS	MONITORING AND EVALUATION MECHANISMS
<b>Goal:</b> Increase growth and reduce poverty in rural areas through increased private sector activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Households with improvement in household asset ownership index</li> <li>Number of private sector jobs generated in rural areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revised RIMS indicators</li> </ul>
<b>Objective:</b> Increased pro-poor private sector operations and investment in rural areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Flow of local private sector investment in rural areas</li> <li>number of rural enterprises established/strengthened</li> <li>percentage of farmers using private advisory services</li> <li>percentage of rural poor accessing private financial services</li> <li>number of functioning marketing, storage and/or processing facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Statistics on private investments and flow of funds (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, UN databases)</li> <li>Revised RIMS indicators</li> </ul>
<b>Outputs:</b> 1. Enabling policy and institutional environment for local private sector development provided	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COSOPs include strategy to engage in policy dialogue for local private sector development</li> <li>Stakeholders in COSOP consultations include private sector representatives</li> <li>Where appropriate, policy dialogue to support the local private sector is included as a country programme activity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COSOP documents</li> <li>Project design documents</li> <li>Revised RIMS indicators</li> <li>Portfolio reviews</li> <li>Evaluation reports</li> <li>Project completion reports</li> </ul>
2. Local-private sector development supported through IFAD <b>investment operations:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthened <b>business capacity</b> of the rural poor and their organizations</li> <li><b>Private technical/advisory services</b> provided to the rural poor</li> <li><b>Private</b> RFIs strengthened to reach out to the rural poor</li> <li><b>Private agricultural markets and small and medium enterprises</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>20-25 per cent of all new IFAD projects strengthen the business capacities and skills of targeted rural poor or their organizations (e.g. farmers' associations, savings and credit associations, and water users' associations)</li> <li>In new projects with a component for agricultural production and related advisory services, 25-50 per cent of such services would be delivered by private sector providers</li> <li>In new projects with a rural financial service component, 50-75 per cent of the RFIs supported, strengthened or scaled up will be private sector institutions</li> <li>20-25 per cent of all projects will link small farmers with private markets or intermediaries (including contract farming initiatives) or will support the development of SMEs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COSOP documents.</li> <li>Project design documents</li> <li>Revised RIMS indicators</li> <li>Portfolio reviews</li> <li>Evaluation reports</li> <li>Project completion reports</li> </ul>

<sup>66</sup> Reproduced from the annex of the private sector strategy document, as approved by the Board.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	KEY (PERFORMANCE) INDICATORS	MONITORING AND EVALUATION MECHANISMS
supported and linked to the rural poor		
3. <b>Partnerships</b> with the private sector established within the context of projects and programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All new COSOPs include partnership possibilities with the private sector</li> <li>• At least 15 per cent of IFAD projects will cofinance with or will generate complementary investments from the private sector</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COSOP documents</li> <li>• Project design documents</li> <li>• Evaluation reports</li> <li>• Project completion reports</li> <li>• Resource mobilization unit reports on resource mobilization</li> </ul>

## APPENDIX 6

## A Review of the Recent Experience of Selected Comparator Organizations in Supporting PSD<sup>67</sup>

### A. The World Bank

1. Value chain work has a long history in the Bank through vertical integration projects –many of them related to plantation agriculture in the post-colonial era. Some of these were very successful. In the late 80s and 90s Bank theology moved away from the idea of commodity-led programmes, which were characterized as ‘picking winners’. There was a substantial portfolio shift and a movement to adjustment operations. The pendulum has not quite swung back, but the 2008 WDR discussion of linkages and the approach in the recent Agricultural Action Plan represents an important step. The strategy encompasses: Raising agricultural productivity; linking farmers to markets and strengthening value chains; and facilitating exit and entry including through promotion of rural non-farm incomes.<sup>68</sup>

2. *Raising farmer productivity:* New style research projects include private actors through agricultural innovation matching grants and outsourcing of extension services. There is now little of the traditional support for national research and extension services. Almost everything that is now done has either a private sector or a decentralized orientation. The Bank has done a lot on private sector involvement in research and is exploring demand driven approaches, but the problem has been that of ensuring sustainability and quality control. The poorest farmers cannot pay. The biggest problems relate to basic food crops with local markets. When farmers need advice on sorghum, why would the private sector come in. On research and seed replication the private sector is also very reluctant to engage in activities where there is open pollination and no control over the product. Extension approaches such as Train and Visit and Farmers’ Field Schools have huge budget requirements and in practice have not proven sustainable.

3. *Value Chains:* There has been particular emphasis on the market linkages. The substantial increase in CDD driven in part by the earlier strategy has led to many demand-driven community sub-projects that link local farmers to markets; and the anchor unit for Agriculture has had a substantial increase in its agri-business staffing. Nor has the Bank been very restrictive in focusing value chains narrowly on the rural poor. There is a need for multiple instruments for multiple target groups. By supporting value chain links for medium size farms the Bank can help increase the demand for labour and for off-farm services. In Mexico the Bank has projects where farmers have 7 to 10 hectares each. The Bank’s value chain work is focused mainly on the MIC’s and on export crops. Despite efforts in Africa, not much is happening there. Even in say Kenya, only 30,000 out of a million farms produce for export markets. Contract farming for processing is an area with high potential. Also there is scope for expanded synchronized planting and farming where smallholders work together i.e. organizing farmers and moving them up the supply chain.

4. *Rural non-farm enterprises:* This has mainly been supported through CDD projects. There is ample evidence of the success of the CDD approach. Part of this is of course through rural finance. A good example is the BANSEFI project in Mexico which includes a range of services to promote non-farm rural private sector development including even rural education.

<sup>67</sup> Prepared by the IOE private sector evaluation team.

<sup>68</sup> In the words of one staff member: “One of the important lessons is that there are no ‘universally replicable’ models be it Amul or BRAC or whatever. It is a matter of drawing from these experiences and adapting them to the local situation.”

5. *Policy and Regulatory Reform:* The Bank has initiated a set of country exercises on the rural investment climate (RICAs). These are jointly financed by IFAD. The rural investment climate studies started in 2003. So far there have been six completed pilots including studies on Sri Lanka and Tanzania (also Benin, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia). The regular Investment Climate Assessments (ICAs) carried out by the Bank are only 'urban' and limited to registered activities. The RICAs focus on the rural sector. Many of the reports are now on the website. Another important area is land titling and registration. Without secure titles farmers will be reluctant to undertake longer term investments.

6. *Social Infrastructure:* While the Bank has put considerable effort into developing farmer organizations, their sustainability seems to be a major issue. The problem is how to organize the poorest. The Amul experience in India has been difficult for the Bank to replicate – it works when road networks, trucks, cold storage, etc. are all in place – a much more challenging problem in Africa.

7. *Rural Infrastructure:* There is enormous demand and a need to prioritise with the focus on the areas with the maximum potential agricultural productivity gain. They are looking particularly at the issues of maintenance and sustainability. The focus is increasingly on spot improvement in roads, i.e. investing in the trouble spots. In some places earth roads work while in others there is a need for an engineered solution with drainage. There is a great deal of resistance to this approach – 'why just put concrete in one part?' There is also a need for a broader view of how roads fit into the objectives of rural development. Issues of maintenance become particularly important. There has been some work done with performance based contracting for maintenance but it is proving very difficult. 'The contractor did not build the road and does not know what state it is in or what the maintenance implications are.' In general it is better to link construction with maintenance and not to pay too much of the money up-front.

8. *Rural finance:* The Bank is trying hard to find ways of improving rural credit. Four audits on rural finance were conducted by IEG in Moldova, Vietnam, Philippines and Romania.

9. *Partnerships:* While the Bank has some sort of partnership with every institution working in the rural development field, perhaps the most interesting issues relate to the collaboration with IFC inside the Bank Group. From both sides there are comments on the difficulty of forging effective collaboration and synergies. This mattered less when IFC was a less significant player in rural space, but it is now increasingly important. Even examples given of effective collaboration turned out to be more in the nature of an agreement to let one or other institution handle the particular programme than a genuine joint effort.

## **B. The International Finance Corporation (IFC)**

10. In 2007 agri-business was made a strategic priority of IFC. The programme in this area had been growing gradually in the 1990s, but an evaluation of the agri-business portfolio in 2003, covering the period to 2001 had assessed this as one of the weakest areas of IFC's overall activity with only 39 per cent of projects having good development outcomes. An assessment made in 2010 of the current portfolio found that the proportion of agri-business projects with positive development outcomes had doubled to 78 per cent.

11. *Support for value chains:* What accounted for this turn-around? In the 90s international markets were not attractive for agricultural production, prices were in a slump and returns to agricultural activities were very low. Under the pressure to get involved in agri-business IFC engaged in some very low return programmes. The turning point came around 2000 when a secular upward trend in food and agricultural commodity markets began. At the same time IFC moved to a different model of support for agri-business. Instead of one off investments in companies it increasingly supported value chain projects using an anchor enterprise – a processor, trader or supermarket with

backward linkages to producers. IFC is of course able to invest directly in the anchor (up to 25 per cent of the capital of the enterprise); it provides assistance with marketing and technology and also brings its advisory services to bear on the relations with the farmers in the value chain. By and large IFC does not work with multi-national companies. 95 per cent of its value chain projects are with local traders. This said they tend to work with the larger local traders and processors. "SME financing is a neighbourhood activity". In addition to investing in equity, IFC gives them credit lines or on-lending guarantees.

12. Most of the portfolio growth in agri-business has been in emerging markets – probably 75-80 per cent. There is an increasing involvement in Africa but starting from a very low base. The main focus of investment is in processing. By and large they stay away from primary production and do not invest in plantations for example. IFC has now been asked to scale up its activities in agri-business substantially, from US\$600 million at present to US\$3 billion in the future. This will require a different approach. The bread and butter national value chain programmes are too labour intensive. Scaling up will require more wholesaling and probably more links with traders. This will probably be mainly to help trading companies cover their risks in the foreign exchange and commodity markets.

13. *Policy and Regulatory Reform:* In selected cases IFC's approach has encompassed broader advisory services in the areas of market reform and land reform. In general, however, they have a limited involvement and impact on the business environment. What they hope to do instead is to raise standards in the enterprises they support in areas such as financial practices, corporate governance and environmental safeguards, with the objective that these standards progressively become those of the industry as a whole. They are for example working with clients to certify environmental practices e.g. with soybean farmers in Brazil. They have established a consultative group to advise on the impact of palm oil on deforestation and vet the palm oil loans they provide. Similarly they are working to certify that child labour is not used in cocoa production in Cote d'Ivoire. The attempt is to increase the proportion of certified or benevolent practices among IFC clients.

14. *Rural Finance:* In the rural sector, IFC lends to banks or MFIs that lend to farmers. They provide advisory services to the commercial banks in areas such as risk management. In their experience these projects are most successful when they are part of a supply chain and not just a one-off support for a financial institution. They are trying to use the supply chain/finance approach in India, working with buyers and providing credit through the buyers' field agents. In micro-finance, the emphasis has now shifted from loans, to savings and micro-insurance programmes. BASIX in India is a particularly interesting example - a wealth management programme in which advisers talk to people about how best to manage their money. The programme guides people through a range of choices. The founder of the programme had begun with lending operations alone, but surveys showed that of micro-finance borrowers only 50 per cent were better off as a result of borrowing; 30 per cent were in the same situation and 20 per cent were worse off. He therefore decided that a more holistic approach was needed including productivity improvements, savings, health insurance, weather related insurance, etc. He started to develop a range of products for MFIs. IFC is a major shareholder of BASIX and of BRAC in Bangladesh. IFC has supported over 500 financial institutions and probably close to 100 MFIs in 60 countries.

15. IFC is also gearing up on the issue of micro-insurance, co-investing with LEAPFROG an NGO established in South Africa, in re-insuring small insurers e.g. a micro-insurance company in South Africa which is insuring people with AIDS. IFC is also supporting the development of micro-insurance products which can be sold through MFI networks – the networks take no risk – they are simply the agents.

16. *Partnerships:* IFC has recently developed an important partnership with ECOM – a US based company working in various countries to support improved coffee production. This is particularly attractive because ECOM works with smallholders. By providing 5 year

money to ECOM, IFC has been able to stabilize the company's debt profile (it was receiving one or two year money from commercial lenders). In return IFC has been able to push ECOM on tougher environmental and social standards. In Nicaragua, ECOM is working with 8,000 coffee farmers. There is a US\$25 million credit line from IFC to ECOM. The coffee goes to Nestle which has certified the product. There is also an IFC advisory project to support on-farm activities. The result has been a 40 per cent increase in farmer incomes. Aside from this IFC is relatively light on formal partnerships – even with the World Bank there is little coordination. In some projects the World Bank tried to bring IFC in but the lending cycles of the two institutions are very different. There has been some formal co-financing of value chains with private partners e.g. with Rabobank in India, but IFC has not found that this approach adds much value and is no longer doing it.

17. *Grant Technical Assistance:* In addition to lending IFC is also a major provider of technical assistance to the agri-business sector. The technical assistance provided covers a number of relevant areas: a) environmental and social responsibility; b) linking of farmers with traders and processors; c) the business enabling environment, d) access to finance – both agricultural finance and micro-finance, and e) infrastructure through PPPs. The pricing policy for IFC advisory services is based on apportioning the private and public benefits and getting the client to pay for the private part. Earlier these were provided free, but increasingly they find that in areas such as energy efficiency projects, the clients can save considerable money and are willing to pay for IFC energy audits. The payment can be cash or in-kind contributions. The starting point tends to be matching contributions. Delivery is often through coterminous IFC staff. Most of the staff are local, with a ratio of about 20 local to each internationally recruited staff member. (This is also seen as helping to build up the local consulting industry).

18. Because of the difficulty of assessing demand for and success of IFC advisory services a great deal of emphasis has been placed on evaluation of these products within IFC. There are M. and E. staff in all the regional hubs. There is a self-assessment at the end of each project. IFC has developed a set of mandatory indicators that can be used to aggregate outcomes and do impact evaluations. Local consulting firms are used to carry out these evaluations and they are asked to evaluate both the intermediary and the beneficiary.

### **C. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)**

19. The past ten years have seen a transformation of the rural areas in Latin America with the increased importance of non-farm income including remittances. The market environment has also changed with the explosion of supermarket chains and the increase in market access through trade agreements which have created new opportunities e.g. the impact of NAFTA on fruit and vegetables. In the first 3 or 4 years of NAFTA in Mexico for example, there was a great deal of public investment but not much happened. In years 4 to 6 however, private US companies moved in to source products for the US market.

20. *Farmer productivity:* IDB has tried to support a move from the traditional extension model to one based on public sector financing with services supplied by the private sector. Farmers who engage private service providers for technology enhancement are given matching grants through the project. This has been taken up in Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. The assumption was that over time this would lead to a market that was not subsidized for agricultural services. IDB has evaluated the impact of these programmes on technology adoption and productivity in terms of yield and efficiency. They found that the projects were generally effective. It was important however to provide continuity. It is wrong to assume that once there is a market for private extension services the donor agency can then withdraw. In these situations the producers may end up with neither public nor private service providers. In two schemes there were experiments with declining subsidies. In general however, the feeling is that even with subsidies in the form of matching grants

the approach is still better than public sector provision of extension services which is extremely inefficient and costly. Understandably "ministries hate these programmes". In addition to support for purchasing extension services there is also support for matching grants to purchase technology e.g. greenhouses in Ecuador. The conclusion from the experience to date is that private provision of on-farm services works, and farmers benefit, but in no case is this sustainable in the absence of project support.

21. *Value chains:* IDB has been struggling with how best to work with the private sector in supply chains and how it can add value to these. In some cases they have undertaken background surveys and analyses of market opportunities. One of the most interesting projects is the Pro Negocios project in Honduras which was modelled on a USAID project. In this case young agriculture graduates were selected to help organize producers in poor areas and present proposals to IDB which will channel US\$30,000 to US\$250,000 through the banking system for these programmes. IDB of course lends to the Government and the commercial bank role is that of paymaster. IDB hires a private implementation agent to handle the programme. The agent evaluates and approves the sub-projects and IDB gives a no objection. Environmental and social safeguards are part of the proposal. Essentially this is an effort to jump start value chains. A similar approach has been adopted in Bolivia.

22. *Non-farm enterprises:* IDB is experimenting with new projects which apply the 'anchor' approach used in the value chain to non-farm enterprises as a way of achieving rural (and municipal) poverty reduction. This is handled through their window for direct guarantees to the private sector.<sup>69</sup> In Brazil IDB has given US\$10 million to a programme in which hardware stores and manufacturers of building materials provide training for construction workers. The training is given at night on topics such as painting, plumbing etc. Seventy per cent of decisions on products used in construction outside of the major construction projects are made by the construction workers. The participating hardware stores and building material companies have had a 30 per cent increase in their sales as a result of the project. 250,000 workers have been trained. Once they are trained and certified they can be listed on a special web-site as trained specialists. In Northern Mexico the SEMEX project is paving streets in 12 poor neighbourhoods. IDB has provided a partial credit guarantee of US\$12 million to SEMEX. They provide services but also micro-credits. Municipalities give 50 per cent of the costs and families the rest while SEMEX provides the services. Once the streets have been paved, the municipality undertakes to collect garbage regularly. The curious thing is that of course the poor end up paying for the paved streets while the rich get their streets paved for free – or at least from their taxes. But the poor recognize the benefit from paved streets and garbage collection in quality of life and lower illnesses of children etc.

23. *Policy and Regulatory Reform:* Most of the focus is on land titling and registration etc. There is substantial activity, but the programme has shifted from land registration since the experience suggests that registration is not enough and there is a need for a full title. In some countries there were grass roots movements to stop land titling since once campesinos got title to their land they sold them to large companies, took the money and eventually became indigents. The Panama land titling project built in a social component to try to ensure this did not happen.

24. *Rural finance and micro-finance:* Very little IDB lending, perhaps because of availability of remittance income. There are micro-finance projects however and an evaluation of these is ongoing.

25. *Physical infrastructure:* IDB support this mainly through regional development funds which support decentralized provincial or municipal infrastructure. They are trying to evaluate alternative design standards in order to minimize the costs, e.g. through restrictions on the size of vehicles that can use the roads with communities applying voluntary restrictions; permanent maintenance programmes with farmers undertaking

<sup>69</sup> IDB considers this a flagship programme in poverty reduction and has set up a special office to handle it.

maintenance with contributions from the municipality; covering as many roads as possible with selective upgrading if demand expands. A key issue for the rural roads programme is sustainability. Initially in Peru the central government put in all the money. For the second project they wanted to get inputs from municipalities and this was quite successful with 92-94 per cent realization of collections from the municipalities. While the project is very successful, with hindsight it needed more links with markets to have an even greater impact. They included fairs in the project where new activities could be proposed to potential private marketers or processors. They are trying to do this now in Nicaragua and Panama i.e. to build a regional development project around rural road rehabilitation.

26. *Partnerships*: The Multilateral Investment Fund was established jointly with IFAD in 2004 to work on remittances. It facilitates and co-finances projects that utilize remittances for development. It worked initially in Latin America but was then broadened on IFAD's initiative to become a global facility of which IFAD provides the secretariat. It was extremely difficult initially to align the reporting and operational procedures of the two institutions. The view in IDB is that while the programme is a useful one, handling this as a partnership with IFAD has not been particularly useful or effective and they are easing out of this and that it is preferable to let IFAD handle it in future.

#### **D. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)**

27. There is a general concern about scalability of the activities AID is supporting. In the words of one staff member: "Are there too many boutique projects?" AID is looking at new paradigms but there are few examples of this as yet.

28. *Productivity*: In the 60s and 70s USAID support for the green revolution was instrumental in giving a major boost to small farmers in the developing world. In the past decades efforts have moved out of production and into agri-business. Now with food security re-emerging as an issue there is a shift back to production. Productivity was "missing for a generation". Now increasingly AID looks at extension services as the 'salesmen for new technology.'

29. An important area of AID's work, both on productivity and the value chain concerns bio-technology. There is a partnership with Monsanto, for example, which is donating genes that will eventually be subject to field trials in Nigeria on root crops. In the case of cotton in Burkina Faso, Monsanto is developing insect resistant varieties. At the other extreme they are looking for companies to help farmers to access technology. In India for example, small US biotechnology companies are developing drought resistant seeds. AID awards grants to US companies which sub-contract with local companies to help propagate the seeds. An important by product of this work is to help India bring together universities and government research institutes – and get away from the 'stovepipes'. AID is also supporting the development of new models of private/public extension services. In India for example they are helping build on existing private sector models to support one-stop shops for farmers where they can get advice on technologies and access companies providing inputs, seeds etc. There is a certification program for private extension services in India and the hope is that eventually this could be extended to the public sector as well.

30. *Value Chains*: Value chains are a major part of AID's support for the agricultural sector and the agency is active up and down the chain. One of the issues AID faces is where in the chain to put its money. It tends to go mainly to NGOs and universities, sometimes in partnership with food companies. AID also supports major corporations by meeting some of the start-up costs associated with working in a new location. The Office of Development Partnerships in USAID can engage the private sector and negotiate alliances for the private sector to invest in a particular market. They look for an overlap



between private commercial interests and development. Resources are shared on a 1 to 1 basis. Thus there is a partnership with General Mills in a number of countries to link their capacity to small to medium grain processors in the value chain. General Mills is helping to establish standards for the grain processing industry and is providing technology and technical assistance. USAID provides funds for nutritional supplements for the grains and helps to develop the capacity of the small processors. This is also intended to reduce post-harvest losses. The assumption is that over time General Mills will take over and run the programme themselves. It is obviously extremely time-consuming to identify and work with small local private operators and this depends on USAID missions. USAID does not limit itself to working with US companies and is also engaged with Nestle, Carrefour and others in these programmes.

31. *Non-farm enterprises:* This has proven a difficult area, particularly in scaling up micro-enterprises to small and medium levels.<sup>70</sup> AID has tended to use a cluster approach at the country level and to get groups of producers to work together in areas such as wood products, tourism etc. They usually contract international consulting firms to provide TA and training. The consultant helps to develop market linkages. A trade development project in Morocco brought people to trade fairs in order to put together processors and producer groups. AID is also trying to support local service providers in providing services to farmers and small business, but sustainability is proving a major issue given the need for continuing subsidization. AID tried to use business services firms as an entry point to supporting micro-enterprises but found that they were often reluctant to move into the rural areas.

32. *The policy and regulatory framework.* AID views this as key for enterprise development. "Direct services to enterprises are useful but not critical." Enterprises want to stay informal and this often makes direct interventions difficult. An important area for USAID is bio-safety assistance. They have a programme based in IFPRI and are working with 5 or 6 companies to establish bio-safety systems

33. *Micro-finance.* This is a major USAID programme. Support has risen from US\$65 million in 1989 to US\$275 million now. "Micro-finance is now a mature industry." AID supports both the NGO and the rural bank models for micro-finance provision. In Eastern Europe and the more advanced countries they have tended to go the banking route with full service banks.

34. *Rural Infrastructure:* AID does not do much directly on rural infrastructure – it got out of this in the 80s and 90s. This is largely handled under the Millennium Challenge Account which provides matching funds to qualifying countries. A country level steering committee is then set up to allocate these funds which tend to be mainly used for infrastructure development depending on national priorities.

### **E. African Development Bank (AfDB)**

35. *The role of PS lending in AfDB:* The Bank began its direct private sector lending in the late 1990s. Loans to the private sector now account for roughly US\$1 billion out of the AfDB's total annual lending of US\$7-8 billion. The first principle is to establish that the project cannot be financed through the available private sector financing sources alone and that AfDB and development partners are therefore critical to the undertaking of the project. This is not easy to establish as it depends on the cost of funds.<sup>71</sup> Second, this must be a part of AfDB's own country strategy. Finally the transaction itself should have a demonstration effect. (The objective is to finance the operation during construction and then to be refinanced by commercial banks.) This assessment of whether the operation meets these criteria is made by an independent group reporting to the Chief Economist, and the rating is made available to the Board. AfDB will not finance

<sup>70</sup> In a study carried out by Michigan State University in Africa it was found that only 1 per cent of enterprises graduated from micro to small.

<sup>71</sup> In general AfDB tries to ensure that there is a level playing field with private finance for the project and it charges what commercial banks are charging so as not to displace them – in some cases this has gone as high as Libor plus 18 per cent.<sup>71</sup> Second, the enabling environment in the country must be suitable for PS lending.

more than 33 per cent of the total costs of a project. While not a criterion it is considered a particular advantage if the programme supports PPP type transactions. In Uganda for example, AfDB is supporting private sector energy generation through a non-sovereign loan and transmission investment through a regular sovereign loan.

36. *Composition of PS lending:* AfDB's private sector strategy emphasises infrastructure and this is now the focus of about 40 per cent of AfDB's PS lending, with financial intermediation accounting for 30 per cent and the remaining 30 per cent in direct investment mainly for mining, industry and services. As far as PS financing of agriculture is concerned, there are three components of support:

- **Direct loans:** AfDB has a minimum size of US\$10 million per loan to the private sector. There have only been 3 agri-based loans in the direct private sector lending portfolio so far, each for US\$10 million. These are; a loan to Ghana which has closed, an ongoing loan to Gabon, and a loan to Morocco, which was approved but cancelled. They have just approved a loan to the African Agriculture Fund. The loan to Ghana for oil palm production is the closest AfDB has come to supporting a value chain project through its private sector window. The project was 60 per cent owned by a Belgian group, 20 per cent government and 20 per cent investors and employees. The company came with a package including a nucleus plantation, outgrowers and provision for improved stock. AfDB contributed US\$15 million of the US\$45 million project. They are currently looking at a sugar investment in Mali which is 65 per cent owned by Illovo sugar from South Africa. (This project will be a PPP with a loan to Government to cover the social development needed by the community – schools, roads, etc.) The Gabon project support oil palm and rubber and is with the same Belgian group as the Ghana project.<sup>72</sup>
- **Equity:** The only direct equity contribution for agricultural activities is through support of private equity funds based in Africa. In agribusiness they have provided US\$20 million to a private equity fund based in South Africa, US\$20 million to the African Agriculture Fund, and recently approved US\$20 million to a Forestry Fund.
- **Lines of credit:** Five years ago the lines of credit were 80 per cent of the PS portfolio, but now with the increased emphasis on infrastructure and mining, this has been reduced. The lines of credit are also the largest part of the PS agricultural portfolio. The commercial banks that receive these lines of credit, can lend to any enterprise, agricultural or non-agricultural, but some of these lines of credit go to dedicated agricultural banks in Ghana, Namibia and Botswana. Note that these are publicly owned, but they are treated as loans to the private sector because there is no sovereign guarantee – they are given directly to a corporatized entity. The sub-loans under the line of credit usually target medium scale enterprises with loans from US\$5 million and up. There are no examples as yet of value chain projects supported through these credit lines. They have experimented with different approaches for targeting women's enterprises, but there is a fundamental problem of the bankability of these enterprises. One programme provides a 50 per cent guarantee fee, but this just reduces the amount of collateral which the commercial bank asks for. A major part of the problem is that they find that borrowers need to be depositors of the commercial bank. The lesson is that if you want a loan 'don't keep your money at home.'

37. *Due Diligence:* AfDB meets the due diligence requirements of lending to the private sector in part through cofinancing with other development finance institutions such as IFC or EIB. This allows a joint approach to getting agreement on social and environmental responsibility. The AfDB appraisal team always includes social and

<sup>72</sup> When asked why there were so few of these projects the response was that it was a matter of staffing. Private sector projects are handled by a separate unit in AfDB. There are two staff working on agriculture in that unit, whereas the Agriculture department in AfDB has 100 staff members.

environmental expertise. There is full public disclosure of the social and environmental assessments. In addition when the size of an agricultural project exceeds 2000 hectares a special review of settlement issues is undertaken – these are identified as Category 1 projects and require public consultation. Unlike public sector projects, all PS projects have an ex ante review undertaken by a special independent unit reporting to the Chief Economist, which looks at the development outcomes associated with the lending or investment. The unit also looks at the additionality of AfDB involvement in projects, from three perspectives: Political risk mitigation; financing; and development impact. An interesting feature of this is that the review is not limited to AfDB's participation in the project, but treats donor financing as a joint activity. Thus for example the assessment is made as to whether the donors are jointly providing the financing needed for the project to go forward and not simply on the added value of the AfDB share of the total.

38. *Partnerships:* In general they try to partner in the PS operations. Partnerships include IFC – about 15 to 20 per cent of operations are partnered with IFC, KFW, EIB, the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), etc. So far all direct PS loans for agriculture have been cofinanced with IFC. They also try to bring in private banks, e.g. they have partnered with Standard Bank of South Africa and Nigerian private banks.

39. *What value does AfDB's capacity to lend to the private sector add to the institution and to its borrowers?* From the perspective of the private borrower, the inclusion of AfDB in the project brings a substantial mitigation of the political risk and the capacity of AfDB to intervene in the face of political or other constraints. In addition AfDB's presence can 'crowd in' investments from other sources. From the point of view of AfDB it enables the institution to take a total view of the economic environment in the country and to form partnerships with the private sector that might otherwise have little motivation to undertake. AfDB's experience in lending to the private sector suggests that if anything the risks associated with non-sovereign lending in Africa may be less than those associated with sovereign lending, since the repayment record thus far is excellent. It also enables AfDB to provide direct funding for the corporate sector rather than looking for intermediate routes through Government agencies which may give the wrong signals in the longer-term about the appropriate institutional framework for PSD support. The private sector also often brings important technical know-how to bear on the project, which promotes sustainability.

**APPENDIX 7****Joint Report by the Evaluation's two Senior Independent Advisors**

1. We are satisfied that our major comments on the approach paper and an earlier draft were heeded. The final report presents balanced and plausible findings and provides sound recommendations for what needs to be done in the years ahead. Detailed comments follow.

**Chapter I**

2. Taking the role of other development agencies into consideration IFAD's comparative advantage is the incubation of institutional initiatives followed by up-scaling and mainstreaming promoted in partnership with other organizations in order to help ensure that indigenous assets are fully utilised; that property rights are secure and that the rules of the game embedded in value chains are pro-poor and promote inclusiveness.

3. Whereas the private sector is central to agricultural growth, it is the policy and institutional context within which private agents operate that determines whether the pattern of growth is inclusive of the poor - or not.

4. Critical and diverse obstacles need to be overcome in different country situations so that market risks and rewards are borne equitably and the benefits flowing to the poor are enhanced. In particular, key policy issues that the 2005 strategy had neglected may need to be addressed: land tenure, child labour, trans-national monopolies, price volatility, food security concerns, fair trade initiatives. Had these aspects been treated more explicitly they would have made the strategy more relevant and responsive to evolving global policy issues<sup>73</sup>.

**Chapter II**

5. The methodology of the report complies with the approach successfully applied in prior corporate reviews carried out by IOE. Thus the report draws on portfolio scans; country case studies; a business process review and a comparator study. The typology of projects selected for review covers a wide spectrum of IFAD's project portfolio. A prior SIEA recommendation to focus on the delivery of the agreed 2005 strategy was heeded. And as we also suggested, the evaluation made use of project status reports for projects not yet evaluated by IOE<sup>74</sup>.

6. The case study countries were selected in consultation with management to focus on the learning dimension of the evaluation<sup>75</sup>. While this was a defensible decision it would have been useful to judge the representativeness of the country choices through an examination of private sector policy friendliness indicators for the selected countries and comparing them with those of other countries in the relevant region.

7. The evaluation opted to concentrate on the relevance and effectiveness of the strategy and to withhold judgment on its efficiency. This is due to the paucity of reliable evaluation material and budget data at project level. Also missing are socio-economic impact findings at farm and household levels. Such valuable information would have been available had IFAD projects been equipped with robust monitoring and evaluation systems, a critical issue that needs follow up.

<sup>73</sup> A vast literature about the feasibility of supply management of export crops and the development impact of Fair Trade initiatives is available.

<sup>74</sup> On the other hand, the evaluation did not rely on survey questionnaires directed to IFAD partners and stakeholders in the public, private and voluntary sectors as we had recommended.

<sup>75</sup> The purposive sampling of countries to meet formative evaluation purposes may have induced a selection bias by overestimating IFAD's responsiveness to the new policy directions of the 2005 strategy.

### Chapter III

8. As noted in our comments on Chapter I, the overarching policy context of the strategy needs to be beefed up. This said the basic assessment of relevance contained in this chapter seems reasonable. It points to a clear-cut leadership gap at the institutional level<sup>76</sup>. It also draws attention to the lack of participation of borrowing countries and the civil society in the process of strategy formulation.

9. The evaluation is also on the mark with respect to its assessment of the results framework<sup>77</sup> and it correctly suggests that the strategy needs updating to reflect the bitter lessons of experience associated with hasty privatizations, the growing profile of organic farming and fair trade initiatives<sup>78</sup>, etc.

10. On the other hand, the broad private sector definition used in the strategy statement (and sharply criticized by the evaluation) is not inconsistent with the specification of the private sector partners that IFAD can work with in support of agricultural and rural development - or with a suitable treatment of the critical and complex interface between farmers and the small and medium enterprises that service farmers and process/market agricultural products.

### Chapters IV and V

11. This is the core of the evaluation. The assessment is plausible and fair<sup>79</sup> although it might have stressed more explicitly that IFAD could have been more aggressive in building internal capacity, in forging more effective partnerships and in leading the international policy dialogue on the involvement of the private sector in agricultural and rural development.

12. At the project level, assessment of compliance with the tenets of the strategy relies on an ingenious evaluation framework in Chapter IV and taps into a self-evaluation data base in Chapter V: both sets of results indicate that a significant policy reorientation took place following approval of the strategy.

13. At the country level, the mixed quality of the policy dialogue is adequately documented by the case studies and many valuable policy lessons are drawn. At the institutional level, a nuanced assessment of the partnership dimension is provided along with a sobering score card of implementation promises vs. actual achievements

### Chapter VI

14. The evaluation of business processes is straightforward and refreshing. It addresses the performance of Board oversight; identifies skills gaps; documents weaknesses in quality assurance arrangements and highlights the benefits of a field presence. Finally it suggests that the introduction of a well-funded and properly staffed Private Sector Development Facility would enable IFAD to participate more directly in the evolving role of the private sector in credit guarantee schemes, risk reduction instruments and challenge funds.

### Chapter VII

15. This chapter is well crafted and concise. It draws on the experience of five other development organizations in this complex and (until recently) sorely neglected area. It demonstrates that no systematic knowledge sharing is taking place across institutions. It identifies common challenges;

<sup>76</sup> On the other hand, the shift observed with respect to operational priorities undoubtedly reflects strong ownership of the policy shift among some individual CPMs

<sup>77</sup> This assessment raises a policy question: should the Independent Evaluation Office play a role in assisting IFAD management design appropriate monitoring and evaluation arrangements of thematic policies.

<sup>78</sup> Engagement of the private sector in advanced agricultural research geared to climate change adaptation also needs emphasis.

<sup>79</sup> The limitations of the analysis are acknowledged at the outset of the chapter: no evaluation reports on projects approved since the strategy was approved are available since implementation of IFAD projects normally takes eight years.

isolates the comparative advantage of IFAD and pinpoints the specific areas where IFAD is lagging behind others. It also highlights good practices and puts forward issues that will need to be addressed if IFAD decides to move forward with direct lending to the private sector.

## **Chapter VIII**

16. Section A pulls together the main findings of the evaluation. However, the section might have highlighted recent and disturbing global food security trends to make clear that a new strategy (that also draws on the findings of the evaluation) is badly needed. Such a strategy would be designed to ensure that IFAD is properly organized and staffed to take the lead in partnerships that help engage the private sector in cutting edge agricultural research, up-scaling of rural innovations, building of local capacities, land tenure reform initiatives and value chain designs that protect the interests of small farmers and landless farm workers.

17. Section B offers a highly relevant agenda for agreement at the completion point meeting with one exception: there is no need for a new definition of the private sector. Beyond semantics the problem that really needs fixing lies in the lack of a robust policy framework solidly grounded in policy evidence and responsive to the contemporary aspirations of IFAD's developing member countries. A recommendation addressing the continuing failure of IFAD and its partners to incorporate workable M&E components in IFAD funded projects should also have been included.

RP/NN: rp/nn  
April 17, 2011

**APPENDIX 8****Excerpts from the Report of the Chairperson of the Evaluation Committee to the Executive Board on the Discussion on the Private Sector Evaluation**

1. The Committee discussed and welcomed the Corporate-level evaluation on IFAD's private sector development and partnership strategy undertaken by the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE).
2. The Committee underlined the importance of discussing the written IFAD Management response at the same time as the corresponding evaluation reports in the future.
3. The report was found to provide useful inputs in the discussions leading to the development of a new IFAD strategy for private-sector development, which is expected to be presented by the IFAD Management in December 2011.
4. The Committee emphasized that the departing point for discussions around the engagement by the Fund with the private sector is for IFAD to develop a more differentiated definition of the private sector in the context of IFAD operations.
5. The Committee underlined that governments are not generally reluctant to engage with the private sector, but may be constrained in doing so by selected national policies and institutional architecture.
6. The Committee highlighted that the private sector is a heterogeneous group of actors, needing different types of support. This should be clearly captured in the new strategy.
7. The Committee also emphasized the need to address the gender dimension, agricultural research and nutrition in the development of the new strategy by the Fund. It was also noted that the recommendation to establish a Private Sector Financing Facility could be useful and needed further elaboration by Management in the development of the new private sector strategy, taking into account complementarity of other partners.
8. The Committee underlined the importance for IFAD to establish partnerships on Knowledge Management on private sector development with relevant institutions.
9. The Committee noted that the Management will need to assess and elaborate recommendations further during the development of the new strategy.
10. The Committee noted that Management plans to produce a draft private sector strategy for consideration by the Board in December 2011. Before that, it was agreed that the draft document be presented for discussion in an informal seminar in September 2011.
11. The Committee:
  - a. Reiterated the need for IFAD to develop a clearer definition of the private sector in the context of the Fund's operations. This is extremely important given the heterogeneous nature of private sector entities working in rural areas.
  - b. Also emphasized the importance of partnerships with other institutions in order to enhance IFAD's knowledge on private sector development.
  - c. Underlined the importance of a favourable investment climate, which will require IFAD's concerted engagement in policy processes at country level.
  - d. Highlighted the risks of working with the private sector which need to be clearly spelled out in the forthcoming private sector strategy.
  - e. Encouraged IFAD to review its current organizational architecture and human resources to ensure that it has commensurate capacities for working towards private sector development.

- f. Recognises the importance of strengthening the existing IFAD instruments for private sector development and assess the corresponding costs.
- g. Recommended on the private sector financing facility to further delineate the development of the facility, as part of the forthcoming private sector strategy. This also requires outlining various options including expanding the cooperation with organisations that already have facilities for direct lending to the private sector. The eventual introduction of private sector facility should be undertaken in a gradual manner ensuring the complementarities with IFAD public sector operations.



